52 FEDERAL REPORTER.
S Ill. 495, where a cause was dismissed on the defendant’s motion because
no declaration had been filed by the first day of the second term, the
court awarding to defendant a judgment for costs, but giving no judg-
ment for return of the property. About two years thereafter, and after
the lapse of the term at which the cause was dismissed, defendant moved
to amend the judgment, as is done in this case, by the addition of a.
judgment for return of the property. Such motion was allowed, and on
appeal the supreme court reversed the action of the court, holding that
the court had no supervisory power over the judgment after the expira-
tion of the term at which it was rendered; that the amendment made
was a matter of substance, and not a mere matter of form; and that
although the court on the dismissal of the case had the right to rendera
1 judgment for return of the property, it by no means followed that it
could several years afterwards review its own judgment and enterthe
judgment that should have been entered in the first instance. And to
the same effect are Troutman v. Hills, 5 Bradw. 896; Becker v. Sauter,
89 Ill. 596; Jones v. Randohoh, 104 U. S. 110; Linder v. Lewis, 1 Fed.
Rep. 378. The statute, it will be seen, provides for just such a judg-
ment as was entered in this case, if it shall appear that the plaintiff since
the commencement of the suit has become entitled to the possession of
the property in question; and, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
the court will presume that the judgment was in accordance with the
proof before the court. But even if proof was now offered showing con-
clusively that at the time the judgment of dismissal was entered there
was nothing before the court which would authorize_the court to deny
the judgment for return of the property, such proof could not now be
heard, as that would bein effect correcting the error of the court after
the term had closed. The motion must be overruled.
lh parte KINNEBREW.
(Circuit Uourt, NZ D. Georgia. March 19, 1888.)
1. Inroxrcnrne LIQUORS—CONSTITUTIONALITY or ACTS—REGULAHOId or COM·
MERCE·‘-GEORGIA Loca:. Or·rroN Law
The Georgia local option act of September 18, 1885, which, after prohibit-
_ ing the sale of intoxicating liquor, provides, " that nothing in this act shall be
so construedas to prevent the manufacture, sale. and use of domestic wines
or cider. " etc., in excepting domestic wines from the prohibition must be taken
as also excepting other wines, and so construed is not in violation of Const. U.
S. art. 1, § 8, giving to congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.
2. COURTS+FEDERAL JURTSDICTION—·FEDERAL Qunsrron.
Whether the objectionable part of the Georgia local option act of Septem-
ber 18, 1885, being separated, the rest may stand alone, is not a question aris-
gng under the United States constitution, or alaw or treaty of the United
tates.
8. SAMn—DUn Pnocnss or Law.
When a defendant has been indicted for violation of the Georgia local op-
tion act of September 18, 1885, the validity of which is for the state court to