` KANSAS our at ·r..·nY.’co. v. xurnssram Lunamu co. 11-
the required bond for removal, the jurisdictioniof the state court over the
subject—matter of the suit ceases, and the jurisdiction of the United States
cireuitcourt attaches eo instantj; but the exercise of that jurisdiction be-
~ gins when the copy of the record is entered in court. *Railmad C0. v.
Koontz, 104 U.- S. 5-14. The case is supposed to be docketed on filing
the transcript. Spear, Fed. Jud. 520. This would be the docket of the ~
next session for the purpose of the exercise of jurisdiction in proceeding
to the hearing, trial, and determination of the cause. As jurisdiction
over the case itself is not to be left in absolute suspense between its ces-
sation in the state court and the next session of the United States circuit
court,—the very necessities of justice, and the preservation of the rights
of the plaintiii`, would demand that the latter court should exert its ju-
risdictional power, under certain contingencies, ad interim. This, it has
been held, it may do on presentation of the recordand notice to the ad-A
verse party, in the instance of issuing the writ of injunction, or some re-
straining order to preserve the status of thc case, or to appoint a receiver,
and to issue the writ of attachment in aid of the suit. Dill. Rem. Causes;
71; Mntng Co. v. Bennett, 4 Sawy. 289; Railroad Co. v. Railroad Co., 5
Fed. Rep. 160; Inrc Railway Co., 2 McCrary, 216, 4 Fed. Rep. 10.· So
it was held, orally, by Judge DILLON, when judge of this circuit, that
between the time of the order of removal in the state court, and thetil-
ing of the record in the United States court, depositions might be taken
de bene esac. These are in the nature of provisional remedies and orders, _
designed to preserve the essential rights of the parties, in preventing a`
failure of justice. In other words, they are agencies to preserve the statu
quo of the parties prior to the act of removal. It seems to me that it
would be a forced construction of these rulings to extend thenrto thein-
s stance of remanding the cause prior to the return-day. Inorder tore-
mand this cause, the court must review the petition, and consider the
whole question of jurisdiction, the subject-matter of the controversy, and
the character of the parties as disclosed by therpetition. If the cause is
remanded, it is B».Hl'18l determination of the case, a Hnal judgment, so far
as this court is concerned. . As the law now stands, it is a. judgment not
reviewable on appeal or writ of error. It is final. It certainly was not
within the contemplation of the framer of the act that the party taking
the removal could be thus turned out of the United States court prior to
the return—day of tbelcase. It is true, the removal act, section 5, act,
1875, which is not repealed by the act of 1887, provides that, if it shall.
appear to the circuit court, at any time after such suit is broughtor re- —
moved thereto, thatsuch suit does not really involve the jurisdictional
matter, it-may be remanded. But it is to be observed that this canbe-
done only "atter such suit has been brought or removed thereto." As
already shown, this was not contemplated until the time. had elapsed
when the party so removing it had tiled the record. And while thead-
verse party may present the record, "the suitwill stand and be proceeded,
in the sameas ifjthe papers had been` filed. by the applicant for removal.")
MqBratey v. Usher, 1 Dill. 37,1. Wehave not overlooked, in ireachingy,
this conclusion,. the suggestion of the great inconvenience and injustice