mam. v. rosrmz. 4, 37
defendants. At Hrst blush this seems plausible; but if the fact is, as the
plaintiff ·claims, these notes were paid, the record of the assessments
would equally show that Foster did not deduct this indebtedness from
his assessment; not for the reason given, but because it did not exist, at
least from the time of such payment.
It may be admitted that a debtor and creditor may honestly make an
agreement by which the former agrees not to deduct his indebtedness to
the latter from the value of his property assessed for taxation, in consid-
eration of which the creditor may honestly conclude that such indebt-
edness need not be returned by him for taxation as a credit liable thereto.
Most persons are disposed to construe the law so as to keep out of the as-
sessor’s books as much as possible. But the law is otherwise, except in
the case of a note secured by mortgage, since 1882; and the creditor,
when called on to swear to the amount of credits belonging to him and
subject to taxation in his hands, cannot lawfully or truthfully omit such
credit from his return. But Crawford may have believed that the Foster
notes held by him under the agreement stated were not liable to taxation
eo ·n0·m*im, because a tax on the value of the same was being paid by the
debtor, as a condition of the credit. And therefore, while the failure of
Crawford to return these notes for taxation is some evidence that they ’
did not then exist as a legal obligation against Foster,—a living credit
_ subject to taxation,-—it is neither conclusive nor cogent on that point. _
The defendant Goltra also testifies that in June, 1883, in talking with
Crawford about Foster’s financial condition, he said: " People think that
Foster owes you considerable, or you have an interest in the mill ;" when
Crawford said: "He neither owes me, nor have I any interest in the
mill." It is admitted he had no interest in the mill, and Crawford de-
nies that he said Foster owed him nothing; and, all things considered,
the denial at least neutralizes the assertion. ,
On this point my conclusion is that the weight ofthe evidence is that the
three Foster notes in question were existing obligations between the par-
ties at the date of the transfer; and that, whether this be so or not, the
purchase was made in good faith, and for a valuable. and even adequate,
consideration. · A
As to the purchase of the brick block by William Crawford, it is prac-
_tica.lly admitted that on July 20, 1867, William Crawford sold the mill
in question to James H. and John Foster for $16,000,-%,000 paid in
cash, and $10,000 by the five joint notes of the purchasers for $2,000 '
each, payable in one, two, three, four, and tive years, respectively, with
interest at 10 per centum per annum, secured by a mortgage on the
premises. The notes are in evidence, and each of them bears indorse-
ments of payments of interest thereon, as follows: July 20, 1869, $400;
July 20, 1875, $1,200; and April 15, 1881, $478.75.
All the business of William Crawford with Foster appears to have been
transacted by J ohn_A. Crawfordtas his agent.
Crawford and Foster testify that about July 20, 1883, these {ive notes
were unpaid, except as shown by the indorsements thereon, when they
were by consent of parties exchanged for six notes signed by James H.