KANSAS CITY & jr. 3.,;.:0..0. INTERQTZATE LUMBER C0.  
V A KANSAS CI’1‘Yi& T. R.;Co.iv. Inrmtsum Lumens Co. yi Q
I (Circuit Court,     Missouri, WZ D. Decembe1iz10,1S88.) ‘ V, V
1. Rnmovlu. or- CAUEES—JURISDIGTTON or COURT—NON·RESIDENTS or Drsraror. -
Under the act of March 3, 1887, providing that the circuit courts shall have
, original cognizance of actions between citizens of diiferent states; that no
suit shall be brought by original process in any district other than that whereof
defendantis an inhabitant, but that where jurisdiction is founded only on dr-
verse citizenship suit may be brought in the district of the residence of either
party; and that any suit of which the circuit courts are thereby given juris-
" diction may be removed.—an action pending in astate court may be removed
by defendant to the federal court, though neither party is a resident of the
district; the restriction as to the place of bringing suit being in the nature of
a personal privilege, which defendant may waive. Overruling Harold v. Mm-
ing O0., 83 ed. Rep. 529. ,
2. SA1m—Ac·r1oNs AT LAW—EMINENT Domain. _
A proceeding by a railroad company for the condemnation of land, 1B an ac-
tion at law, and removable to the federal court. Following Sear! v. School-
Diat., 124 U. S. 197, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460. ‘
3. SAME-—Mo·r1oN ·ro RmrANn—HnAn1No AT Srncur. Tanu. c
. Where an act changing the time of holding a term of court is passed, but
· too late to permit the holding of a term at the substituted time, and a special
_ term in lieu thereof is called, proceedings for the removal of a cause, the pe-
tition and bond in which were nled before the time for holding the regular
term as fixed either by the act or the former law, are before the special term
for the purposes of a motion to remand; the act providing that (process from
the clerk’s oiliice shall be returnable at the substituted term, an Rev. St. §§
669, 670, enabling a special term to transact all business that may be trans- ’
acted at a regular term.
On. Motion to Remand.
For opinion on a previous motion to remand. see 36 Fed. Rep. 9.
Crittenden, McDougal dc Stiles, for plaintiff.
Brumback &: Brumback and Kagy d': Brennerman, for defendant.
Bnuwmc, J. This case now stands on a motion to remand. The pro-
ceeding in the state court was one for the condemnation of a right of way. ‘
It was commenced on the 5th day of June, 1888, by the tiling in the
office of the clerk of the circuit court of Jackson county, Mo., of a peti-
tion. On the 16th day of June the defendant filed its petition and bond
for removal, and on August 27th the plaintiff took a copy of the record
from the state court, nled it in this, and with it a motion to remand.
Defendant objected to the hearing of that motion, on the groundthat it
was prematurely tiled; that by the terms of its application for removal
it had until the first day of the next succeeding term of the federal court
in which to file the record; and that, while the plaintiff might undoubt-
edly at once take and file a copy of the record here, yet the case was not
thereby_ so fully transferred to this court as to justify it in making such
a hnal order as is involved in the decision of a motion to remand. _ It
was conceded that the jurisdiction of the state court ceased on the filing
of the petition and bond, and that, when the record was filed here, this
court had jurisdiction for any provisional remedies and orders necessary
to preserve the rights of the parties ad interim, and only the right to make