9     ,. . . , -”'?E¥N·l F~F?°F·“lB· . t . .  
foundjwithin the district,»he could not have been sued originally in that
court,. A S Lesy. Insurance.C0.,_ 2 Curt. 212; Barney v. Bank, 5 Blatchf.
1,07; Buélhlell v.. Kennedy, 3 Wall. 387; Green v. Custard, 23 How. 484.
And the same rulewas enforced where the plaintiff was debarred from
an original suit in that court by reason of his being an assignee of some
note or other chose of action from a party citizen of the same state with
the defendant. See City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 282. I quote
therefrom: l , {
. "Suits may properly be removed·from a state courtinto the circuit court in
cases where the jurisdiction of the circuit court, if the suit had been origi-
nally commenced there, could nothave been sustained, as the twelfth section
of the `judiciary act does not contain any such restriction as that contained in
the elevent`fi"section of the act defining the original jurisdiction of the circuit
courts. ‘· Since the decision in the case of Bushnell v. Kennedy, all doubt upon
_ the`·subject is removed, as itris there expressly determined that the restric-
tion incorporated in the eleventhsection of the judiciary act has no application
to cases removed into the circuit court from a state court, and it is quite clear
that the same rule must be applied in the construction of the subsequent acts
of congress extending that privilege to other suitors not embraced in the
twelfth section of the ju`diciary act. ". _
And the same distinction was jappiied to the act of March 3, 1875,
between the right of removal, and the right to bring a party in by orig- Q
inal process; Clajlin v. Insurance C0., 110 U. S. 81, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep.
507. Now, turning to the act of 1887, and the portions above quoted,
it is obvious that the first part of section 1_ describes in general terms the
jurisdiction ofthe circuit courts, while the provisions of the latter part
of the section refer, not to the general matter of jurisdiction, but to the _
· particular court in which a case may be brought and tried. It is said
by Chief Justice WAITE, in Er: parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 378:
" That the act of congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued
is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the
nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which
he may waive. If the cit_izenship of the parties is suincient, a defendant may
consent to be sued anywhere he pleases; and certainly jurisdiction will not be
ousted because he has conseuted."
The same; distinction between the general matter of jurisdiction and
the particular court for suit and trial is recognized in Fales v. Railway
Co., 32 Fed.lRep. 673; Gavin v. Vance, 33 Fed. Rep. 84; Loomis v. Coal
~ Co., Id. 353. r Turning tothe second section, we ind that the removable
suits are those of which, by the first section, the federal courts are given
jurisdiction. The language speaks of jurisdiction generally, and of courts
in the plural. Any suit is removable of which any federal circuit court
might take jurisdiction, and the merefact that the defendantcould have
successfully objected to being sued in any one or more particular federal
. courts, does not destroy the general jurisdiction of federal courts, or pre-
vent its removal. Take the case at bar. If the suit had been com-
menced in this court, and process served personally upon the defendant,
and it had raised no question other than upon the merits of the contro-
versy, this court would have had undoubted jurisdiction, and the judg-