48 FEDERAB Rnronrnn.
· the plaintiffs remedy is in a court of equity, and in view of_the fact that
the defendants have paid the taxes for so many years it is obvious that
full protection to the rights of all the parties can be most successfully
secured in a court of equity. It may be also that upon this motion I
am limited narrowly to a consideration of the facts stated in the findings.
· Assumingrthat to be true, it appears from the fourth finding that the
power of attorney to Donavan was made "to enable him to make convey-
anccsto purchasers when sales were made by Scott, Boyd & La Master,
and to facilitate their operations under their contract of March 31 , 1874."
It is notclear from this finding whether the jury mean to affirm that this
purpose wasexpressed on the face of the power of attorney, or only that
that was the purpose of the parties in executing the instrument. As the
_ defendants are building up their title, and are insisting upon a strict
adherence to the facts stated in the findings, it seems to me that I am
justified inassuniingthat this Ending shows that such a purpose was
expressed onthe face of the power of attorney. It is not shown by any
finding that Scott, Boyd & La Master ever made the sale, or had anything
to do with the sale to Lantz. Nor is it shown that the conveyance upon
its face purported to bein consummation of a sale made by those gentle-
men. For aught that appears, the power of attorney and the deed taken
together may have disclosed both the purpose for which the power of
attorney was .executed—u*hich of course operated as a limitation on the ·
power-—and _a breach of trust in the conveyance. It is true that the
meagerness of these findings leaves the matter in considerable doubt; but
in view of the grievous wrong attempted to be consummated by these
transactions, as shown by the findings of the jury, I am constrained to
hold against the defendants on this chain of title also, even in this law
action. .
The remaining chain of title is under certain tax deeds. There were
two ofrthese—-one for the taxes of the year 1867, and dated on June 12,
1871; and one for those of 1868, dated December 15, 1871. There was
no assessment of the land in controversy in the year‘1867, nor was the
same placed upon the tax—list of that year. Neither deed was sealed by
the county treasurer with his official seal, nor did the county treasurer
have an official seal. Under the decisions of the supreme court. of Ne-
braska such tax deeds are void. Sutton v. Stone, 4 Neb. 323; Reed v.
Merriam, 15 Neb. 325, 18 N. W. Rep. 137; Hendrix v. Boggs, 15 Neb.
472, 20 N. W. Rep. 28_; Sullivan v. Merriam, 16 Neb. 160, 20 N. VV. Rep.
_ 118; Seaman v. Thompson, 16 Neb.548, 20 N. W. Rep. 857; Shelley v.
Towle, 16 Neb. 195, 20 N. W. Rep. 251; Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 Neb.
.200,-20 N. W; Rep. 250. Nor were these deeds coupled with an exclu-
sive and actual adverse possession for 10 years. The language of all
. the separate findings upon a matter of possession affirms only a mixed
. possession. The jury having in the original verdict, prepared by coun-
. sel and handed to them for their consideration, stricken out such adject-
tivesas "actual, undisputed, exclusive, open, notorious, and adverse,"
and inserted in lieu thereof the word "mixed," plainly, as I think, in-
dicate thereby their finding that. the possession was always a matter of