. manner v. Hyman. 49
dispute. Under these circumstances, the deeds being void on their face,
and not coupled with 10 years’ open, notorious, exclusive, and adverse
possession, this defense also must fail. These being the only questions,
judgment will be entered for plaintiff. And the case of Rowena Young
v. Harriet Leighton et al., and the case of Rcwena Ymmg v. The Lincoln
Driving Park Association, are like this, and the same judgment must be
entered.
. · VFRADLEY ·v. HYI.AND.
· (Uircuit 0'owrt, S. D. New Yark. December 1, 1888.)
1. Pnmcxruu. mn AGEN.T—LIABILITY or Pmncnnu.-Snrrrmmnnr nnrwurm
Parncrrn. Ann Aennr.
Where an agent, authorized by a principal to purchase supplies for the
useof the principal, and instructed to purchase only for cash, purchases in
his owuname, upon credit, of a seller who supposes the agent to be buying
‘ for himself only, and the principal pays or settles with the agent for the sup
plies iu` good faith, supposing that the agent had purchased them for cash or
upon hispersonal credit, he 18 not liable over aga n to the seller for the price
of the supplies.
2. SAME.
The rule that a seller who deals with the agent of an undisclosed principal
can. upondiscovering the principal, resort to the latter for payment, unless
by his conduct he has led the principal in the meanwhile to pay or settle with
, the agent. does not apply to a case in which the agent bought contrary to his
’ instructions, and the sel er gave credit to the agent supposing him to be the
only principal, and the principal has in the meantime paid the agent.
(Syllabus by the Oourt.)
In Admiralty. On appeal from district court.
Libel by one Fradley against Hyland for supplies furnished one Gib-
son, respondent’s agent in charge of a canal-boat. Decree for libelant
as to the iirst cause of action, and respondent appeals.
Jomkmh A. Hyland, for appellant.
Peter S. Carter, for appellee.
WALIJACE, J. The libel sets forth two causes of action for supplies
purchasedby one Gibson. The district court decreed in favor of the
libelant upon the first cause of action, and dismissed the libel as to the
other. The respondent in the court below is the appellant here, but the
libelant, although he has not appealed from the part of the decree by
which the libel as to the second cause of action was dismissed, cites the
case of Irvine v. The Hewer, 122 U. S. 256, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1177, and in-
sists that he is entitled to urge that this court should decree in his favor
~ as to that cause of action. The facts which appear in evidence are these:
During the period in which the supplies were purchased, one Gibson,
who was the owner, and was managing certain canal-boats of his own,
was employed by the appellant, to manage certain canal-boats for the lat-
ter. Gibson was to obtain employment for the boats, and return the net
v.37r.no.1——4 U