*50 mnmmu. amroaran.
earningsmonthly to appellant, after paying for all repairs and supplies, »
‘ and deducting his own commissions. His instructions were·not to ob-
tain supplies upon credit, but, if not in funds from the earnings, to
» · call upon the appellant. Monthly settlements of account took place be-
tween Gibson and the appellant, inrwhich Gibson was allowed all items
for supplies paid or contracted.:for.by him against the earnings of the
boats, and a considerable fund was always left in his hands bythe ap-
pellant. Gibson ceased to act as appellant’s agent September 1, 1886.
The supplies were sold to him prior to that time. The libelant supposed
that Gibson was the owner of all the boats he was managing, and dealt
with him as such, selling. him! supplies for all indiscriminately, charging
· the price to him, and taking his notes from time to time, or those of one
Isham, his _clerk.» The claim to recover the part of these supplies used
on appellant’s boats is the Hrst cause of action set forth in the libel. One
Kelly had also sold supplies to Gibson for the same boatsysupposing
that Gibson was the owner, andhad received Gibson’s notes, or notes of
·Gibson’s clerk, for the amount. After these notes had matured, Gibson
asked the libelant to pay them forhim to Kelly, and the libelant did so,
- receiving new notes from Gibson for the amount. There was no assign-
V mentto libelant of Kelly’s original demand against Gibson. The claim
for the supplies thus sold by Kelly to Gibson is the second cause of ac-
_ tion set forth in the libel, Afte1i;Gibs0n ceased to act asagent for ap-
  pellant, the libelant discovered that some of the supplies had been pur-
chased for the appe1lant’s boats, and, being unable to collect his demands
Q of Gibson, made claim against the appellant therefor.; Until then the
appellant did not know of the transactions between Gibson and the libel-
ant, or between Gibson and Kelly. The moneys left by appellant in
Gibson’s hands were at all times more than the amount of the 1ibelant’s
demands, and Gibson was indebted to the appellant _in more than that
_  amount when he left the appellantsemploy, and when this 1ibe1·was
nf]·€d_ .. :.·—; ,;,w » · ~ . ·
As to the first cause of action no question is made by the appel-
lant that it is not of admiralty cognizance, but he insists that he is
not liable as a principal for the supplies sold to his agent by the libel-
ant, under the circumstances of the case. The general rule is familiar
that, when goodsare bought by an agent, who doesrnot at the time dis-
··olose that he is acting as agent,.the;seller, although he has relied solely
upon the agent’s credit, may, upon discovering the principal, resort to
the latter for payment. But the rule which allows the seller to have re-
course against an undisclosed principal is subjectto the qualihcation
stated by Lord MANsF1nLn in Railton v. Hodgson, 4 Taunt. 576, and by
Tnnrnansn, C. J., and BAYLEY, J., in Thomson v.·Davenport, 9 Barn. &
_ C. 78. As stated by Mr. Justice JBAYLEY, it is " that the principal shall
not be prejudiced by being made personally liable if the justice of the ‘
· case is that he should notbe personally liable. If the principal has paid
the agent, or if the state of accounts between the agent here and the prin-
cipal would make it unjust that the seller should call on the principal, ,
the fact of payment or such a state of accounts would be an answer to