52 FEDERAL REPORTER.
the price in his settlements with Gibson, would have been liable to those
who sold to him upon the theory of ratification. But, as Gibson did not
assume to act as agent in making the purchases, there is no basis for ap-
plying the doctrine of ratification. »
Very different considerations govern the case in which an agent who
assumes to represent an undisclosed principal buys of a seller upon credit,
and one in which the agent assumes to be acting for himself, and the
seller deals with him, and gives him exclusive credit, supposing him to
be the only principal. In the first, if the agent has authority, express
or implied, to buy upon credit for the principal, or ostensible authority
to do so, upon which the seller relies, then, by the familiar rules of law,
the contract is the contract of the principal, and is none the less so be-
cause the name of the principal does not happen to have been disclosed.
. The principal is bound by the acts of his agent within the scope of his
real or apparent authority; and the seller understands that, even though
he may hold the agent personally responsible, he may also resort to the
undisclosed principal. But ir1 the _other, as the seller does not rely upon
any ostensible authority of the one with whom he contracts to represent
a third person, he can only resort to the third person as principal, and
charge him as such, when the purchase is made by one having lawful
authority to bind the third person. It is immaterial, insuch a case, V
whether the contract is made by an agent who is employed, in a contin-
uous employment or in a single transaction, by a principal, or whether
he is one who may be deemed a general, instead of a special agent.
" When the agency is not held out by the principal by any acts or declara-
tions or implications to be general in regard to the particular act or bus-
iness, it must from necessity be construed according to its real nature
and extent; and the other party must act at his own peril, andis bound
_ to inquire into the nature and extent of the authority actually conferred.
In such a case there is no ground to contend that the principal ought to
be bound by the acts of the-agent beyond what he has apparently author-
ized, because he has not misled the confidence of the other party who
has dealt with the agent,". Story, Ag. § 133. It is therefore difhcult to
understand how, as an original proposition, it could be reasonably main-
tained that there is any liability on the part of one who has employed
another to manage his interests in abusiness, or series of transactions,
in which, as an incident, purchases of goods are to be made, has given
him instructions not to purchase on credit,_ and has supplied him with
funds to purchase for cash, to a seller who has sold to the person em-
ployed upon credit, and dealt with him as the only principal. Taft v.
Baker, 100 Mass. 68. Of course he would be liable, and the instruc-
tions not to buy on credit would go for nothing, if he did not supply the
` agent with funds to pay for the necessary goods, because in that case the
agent would have implied authority to buy them on credit. So, also,
in a case which may be supposed, where a principal knows, or oughtto
know, that the agent is buying on credit in his own name, yet the prin-
cipal takes all the income of the business without making any provision
for payment to those who have trusted the agent, the principal would