FRADLEY 1:. HYLAND. 53
be liable, because in such a case his conduct would be inconsistent with
good faith, and he ought -not to be permitted to avail himself of the ben-
efits without incurring full responsibility for the agent’s acts. But it is
probably too late to consider the questions thus suggested upon princi-
ple; and it may be accepted as law that the seller, under the circum-
stances of a case like the present, upon discovery of the principal, can
resort to and recover of him, if he has not bona _/ide paid the agent in the
mean time, or has not made such a change in the state of the account
between the agent and himself that he would suffer loss if he should be -
compelled to pay the seller. Story, Ag. § 291, 1 Pars. Cont. 63; Fish
v. Wood, 4. E. D. Smith, 327; Thomas v. Atkinson, 38 Ind. 248; Clealand
v. Walker, 11 Ala. 1058; McC'ullo*u.gh v. Thompson, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct.
449; Laing v. Butler, 37 Hun, 144. In the case last cited the court
used this language: ·
i " Where the purchase has been made by the agent upon credit authorized
by the principal, but without disclosing his name, and payment is subsequently »
made by the principal tothe agent in good faith before the agency is disclosed
to the seller, then the principal would not be liable."
According to these authorities, if it should be conceded that the facts
in the present case warrant the inference that the appellant gave Gibson `
authority to buy either upon his own credit or upon the credit of the ap- '
pellant, the libelant cannot recover. It certainly is not material that the
appellant did not pay Gibson, or make any settlement with him, on ac-
count of the libelant’s demands specifically. It is enough that he did
settlewith Gibson for, and allowed him to retain in his hands suliicient
moneys to pay, all outstanding liabilities contracted by him for the ap-
pellant’s benefit, including the demands of the libelant. At the time of
the last settlement the appellant had paid the libelant’s demands and all
outstanding liabilities contracted by Gibson as between Gibson and him-
self, and thiswas before the libelant knew any principal in the purchases
other than Gibson himself. V
As respects the second cause of action, the case may be brieiiy disposed
of without considering the question whether the libelant can be heard to
urge that the decree from which he has not appealed ought to be re-
versed. The, transaction was merely a loan from libelant to Gibson.
Whether the appellant is liable as upon a loan made by his agent or not,
his obligation is in no sense a maritime one, and cannot be enforced in a
court of admiralty. The libelant did not, by paying the notes to Kelly,
and receiving Gibson’s notes for the amount, succeed to any rights which
Kelly may have had to enforce a claim for the supplies. Thelibel is dis-
missed, with the costs of this court and of the district court.