I
16 FEDERAL nsroaran, vol. 38.
“ 5. SAm¤—Pnoxm.vra Cause.
But the railroad company is not liable if the injury to the passenger was
due solely to the negligence of the street-car driver.
6. SAMm—Ra·rn on Sr·nmD—-VroL.vr1oN or Oamnancn.
» The ordinances of a city regulating speed of trains and train signals do not
change the general law .on the subject, nor change the rights and duties of
the parties growing out of obedience or disobedience of the ordinance.
7. DAMAGES—FOR Pmasouan Iruunrus. ‘
· In assessing damages for personal injuries, the jury should take into ac-
count expenses incurred for medical attendance and nursing. compensation for
pain and suffering, loss of what might otherwise have been earned in business
i or profession, an of what the injured person has been deprived of earning
by any permanent disability, so far as the result ofthe injury.
‘ 8. Ssmr—Ev1naNcn—An1vo1rY Taamns. » .
Standard life and annuity tablesare competent evidence in determining such
dxamages. . .
. At Law. .
~ Action by William J. Whelan against the New York, Lake Erie &
Western Railroad Company, for damages for personal injuries. Plaintiff
was in a street-railroad car in the city of Youngstown as a passenger. As
the street-car was passing the crossing of the defendants railroad, aloco-
_ motive ran into it, knocking itoff the track, and throwing plaintiff from
the car upon the ground, injuring _him severely. Plaintiff alleges that
defendant was guilty of negligence in not closing the gate it had estab-
, lished across the·street on whichthe street-car was approaching towards
_ thecrossing, at the time the engine was about crossing the street-car track;
that therewere no proper signalsgiven of the approach of the train;, and
that the engine was running at a dangerous speed at the time. This
negligence was denied by the defendant, and it also alleged contrib-
, utory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The evidence showed that
the gate was not closed at the time of the collision; that the street-car
passed through it. There was `arconflict of evidence whether the street-
car was stopped after passingthe gate, and before the collision, also a
condict as to the ringing of the bell of the engine, and as to the speed
e thereof at the time. There was not shown, in the proof, any negligence
`Yor wantof care in the crossing on the part of the plaintiff himself, but
·thed·efendant claimed theccar-driver was guilty of contributory negli-
gence that must be imputed to the plaintiff, and so prevent his recovery.
,For opinion on motion to remand to state court, see 35. Fed. Rep. 849.
Y »»   W.Jones, R. B. Murray, and W. S. Anderson, for plaintiff. »
·’‘* ·‘ »S'.’E. Williamson and H*lne"¢fciOla.rke, for defendant. J
·   ¤Wm.Kaa, J., chargedthe jury, among other things: r
N ` `1. That it was the dutynof the defendant, having placed across the
street near its crossing a gate under the care of its tlagman, as a reasonable
 precaution for the safety of persons passing over its track at the crossing, to
V ` close down the gate attinieswhen its cars, trains, or engine were passing
over the street crossingrand along its track, in order to make it reasona-
vbly safe for persons so- passing. _ That it was the duty of defendant when
  about to pass over the °"sti*eet,track to give such reasonable and proper