WHELAN v. xmw Yomc, L. m. ar W. 12. co. 17
warning, by ringing of the bell or blowing of the whistle, of its intended
crossing of the street, and to pass over the crossing at a reasonably safe
speed. Failing to exercise such care would be negligence to the extent
of such failure. K
2. The gate being open, the car—driver had the right to suppose the
track was clear, and was safe to cross, and was guilty of no carelessness
in passing through the gate towards the crossing without stopping at the
gate to look or listen for a passing engine.
3. It was not carelessness in the driver of the street—car, after passing
the open gate, and immediately before crossing the track, to stop and
look and listen for approaching engine, or to ascertain whether there was
danger in proceeding across, if in so doing he exercised ordinary prudence
or care in attempting to cross the track and avoid injury. `That if, in so
stopping and listening and looking, he discovered the engine approach-
ing at a dangerous speed, or in close proximity to the crossing, it was, _
in the faceof such danger, negligence on the part ofthe driver to attempt '
to cross the track. j
4. Thatltheplaintiff at the time was onlya. passenger in the car: He
had, nor could have had, no control in the management of the car,-—of ‘
of its stopping or going on; and not in a situation to himself look out
for, or prevent, danger in crossing the railroad track. I direct you,
therefore, thatif the evidence shows no fault of omission or commission
in the conductof the plaintiff or negligence on his part contributing to
his injury, the negligence of the driver, if guilty of any negligence, can-
not be imputed to the plaintiff so as to prevent his recovery in thiscase,
if it is shown that the defendant was guilty of negligence which‘pro·
duced the injury, or directly contributed thereto.
5.- That, if the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned solely by the care-
lessness of the driver of the street-car, the defendant cannotbe held lia-
ble for thezinjury thus produced. V ·
6.- That the ordinances of _the city of Youngstown regulating the speed
of trains passing through the city, or the blowing of the whistle on en-
gines, are only police regulations, and do not have the effect of changing
the general law upon the same subject, or change the duties or rights of
the parties growing out of the failure to do, or doing, what the ordinance
commands or prohibits. “
7. That the assessment of damages to the plaintiff, if the jury find for
the plaintiff, was under the control of the jury. That there were certain
elements to be taken into account in such assessment, such as reasonable
compensation, so far as it is susceptible of an estimate in money for loss .
and damage caused to him by the defendant’s negligence, including not
only expensesincurred for medical attendance and nursing, and a rea-
sonable sum for his pain and suffering, but also a fair compensation for
the loss of what he would otherwise have earned in his profession or bus-
iness, and has been deprivedof earning by any permanent disability
shown to have- been sustained by the wrongful act ofthe defendant.
That if ·the·plaintiff, before the injury complainedof, was already suffer-
ing under. permanent disability, then the defendant would be liableonly
v.381·*.no.1—2