24 FEDERAL Ruronrsa, vol. 38.
I Umrnn Smrns v. Cosran.
° (Oncuit Oourt, D. Oolorado. January 14, 1889.)
Arronuuv Arm CLmm·—DrsnAnunNr—Banacu or- Tnusr.
An attorney who,.after having been employed by one party to a litigation,
. and having ceased to be thus employed. seeks employment by the adverse
party, offering to impart to thelatter important information, is guilty of such
a breach of trust as requires his disbarmenul . ,
Proceeding for Disbarment. I
Hugh. Butler and respondent pro se. ,_ _
l Bmcwnn, J., (orally.) This is a proceeding to disbar. The facts are
` _these: The respondent was counsel for the complainant in certain liti-
. gation in this court. After acting as counsel for complainant awhile,
· he ceased to be thus employed, possibly by reason of a transfer of the
Tinterests on that side; and after he had ceased to act as counsel he pro-
' poses to the other side employment by it, and advises its counsel that
he is in possession of facts of great importance to that side; he desires
`employment, but that the fact be concealed. Plainly, from the letters
which he wrote, as plainly as language can express, he says to the other
side: "I have have acquired knowledge during my employment of facts
"of great importance. I am no longer employed by the complainant. ‘ I
want to be employed by you, and I will put you in possession of these·
facts, though I do not want to be known as under your employment."
The letters, whose writing is admitted, are attached to the charges pre--
sented by the committee. Now, it is theglory of our profession that its.
_ fidelity to its client can be depended on; that a man may safely go to a
lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any
litigation with the absolute assurance that that lawyer’s tongue is tied.
from ever disclosing it; and any lawyer who proves false to such an ob-- ‘
ligation, and betrays or seeks to betray any information or any facts that
he has attained while employed on the one side, is guilty of the grossest.
breach of trust. I can tolerate a great many things that a lawyer may
.do,--—things that in and of themselves may perhaps be criticised or con-.
demned when done in obedience to the interest or supposed interest of
his own client, and when he is seeking simply to protect and uphold
those interests. If he goes beyond, perhaps, the limits of propriety, I
A can tolerate and pass that by; but I cannot tolerate for a moment, neither
can the profession, neither can the community, any disloyalty on the
part of a lawyer to his client. In all things he must be true to that
trust, or, failing it, he must leave the profession. The motion for dis-.
barment will be allowed.
1Res ecting rounds for the disbarmeut ot attorneys at1aw.see State v. Burr, (Neb.).
28 N.   Rep. 561. and note: In re Stephens, (Cal.) 19 Pac. Rep. 646.
I