ram ·v. srmrnsns urn. az mm. co. 29
sert or impress such notice, or wbrds of the same purport, in or upon
any book, map, chart, musical composition, print, cut, engraving, or
photograph, or other article for which he has not obtained a copyright,
shall be liable to a penalty of one hundred dollars, recoverable, one-half
for the person who shall sue for such penalty, and one-half to the use of
the United States." The petition alleges that the defendant thus printed
and issued 10,000 copies, and plaintiff asks judgment for $100 penalty
for each copy, or $1,000,000 in gross. All this is stated in one count; and
one ground of challenge is that either there are 10,000 different causes
of action, which should each be stated in a separate count, or, if there is
but one cause of action, a single penalty of $100 only is recoverable, and
the amount prayed for is excessive. The plaintiff pleads the great trou-
ble and inconvenience therewould be in setting out 10,000 causes of ac-
tion. .We think that the rule is unquestioned, and see no reason why
it should be deviated from in a case like this. Plaintiff is not suing, for
the value of his services, or for injury to his property, but simply to
make profit to himself out of the wrongs of others; and when a man comes
in as an informer, and in that attitude alone asks to have a half million
dollars put into his pocket, the courts will never strain a point to make
his labors light, or his recovery easy. So that, if each separate imprint
is a separate cause of action, we have no doubt that the petition is de-
murrable as joining 10,000 causes of action in a single count. But we
think that, fairly construed, there is only one cause of action stated.
The petition alleges “ that heretofore, to-wit, on the 2d day of November,
A. D. 1888, and at divers times between said day and the commence-
ment of this action, the said defendant did engrave, print, publish, and
sell to the number of 10,000 copies, a certain print, etc." Now, the lan-
guage of the statute is not "for each copy;" and while it may be true
that if, upon different days, under different circumstances, the defend-
antprinted separate copies, each transaction thus separate would consti-
tute a separate offense, yet when the printing of many copies is a single
continuous act, only one offense is committed thereby We had a sim-
ilar question under the election statutes a year or two since, where false
registrations were charged} We held there that where several names
were falsely registered, and all done at one time, and as a single contin-
uous act, it constituted but one offense, although, if registered on differ-
ent days, and under different circumstances, they might constitute sepa-
rate offenses. Here the allegation is that "on the 2d of November, and
at divers times ” thereafter. This of course suggests a separation, at least
~in- the matter of time. Yet, if the pleader claims that there were sepa-
rate and distinct offenses, there should be a clear divergence of each trans-
action, both as to time and circumstances, and the court in a quasi crim-
inal action ought to hold the pleader to language free from doubt, and .
hold, as to a pleading like this, that it simply alleges a continuous ac-
1{ion in the printing and issuing of these 10,000 copies, and as such states
ut a single offense.
' U. S. v. Eagan, *30 Fed. Rep;498. `