32 FEDERAL `nrzroarar., vol. 38.
What the intent of congress was in enacting this particular paragraph
seems reasonably plain from the common knowledge which we all pos-
sess, and from a comparison of it with the paragraph of the Revised
Statutes, which was the law on the same subject immediately preceding
the adoption of the act of 1883. Of course, it is a matter of common `
‘ x knowledge that our tariff acts are devised for more than the single purpose
of raising. revenue. The creation, protection, and fostering of home
industries, large, small, or yet unborn, is an element which is largely
considered by the law-makers when they frame these statutes. And that
some such object was intended here seems to me plainly apparent upon
a comparison of the two paragraphs, No. 365 of this act, and the corre-
· spondingclause in the Revised Statutes. By the act of June 22, 1874,
all women’s and children’s dress goods, whether made of mixed ma-
‘ terials, or made wholly of wool, were dutiable at 6 cents per square yard
and 35 per centum ad valarem. The act of March 3, 1883, divided such
articles into two groups,—the mixed goods, and the wholly wool goods.
On the mixed goods it reduced the duty from 6 cents per square yard
and 35 per centum ad valcrcm to 5 cents per square yard and 35 per
' centum ad vulorem; but on the wholly wool goods it raised the duty very
_mate1·ially, viz., from 6 cents per square yard and 35 per centum ad
valorem to 9 cents per square yard and 40 per centum acl valorcm. The
mere comparison of these two paragraphs seems plainly to indicate that
there was an intention, in fixing this new rate of duty, to accord some
measure of protection to the wholly wool goods. Taking that into con-
sideration, the plain, first meaning which any one would draw from the
closing part of the paragraph which begins with the words "if composed
wholly of wool, worsted," etc., is that congress intended to provide that
if goods in reality of the wholly woolen class were so disguised as to
masquerade as mixed goods, when in reality they were wholly of wool,
they should not by that operation avoid the heavy discrimination which;
was laid against the wholly woolen goods. Although we may be quite
well satisfied, however, that such was the intent of congress, and with
due appreciation of the great lengths to which the courts have repeatedly
gone in applying the doctrine of interpretation according to intent, I do`
not feel warranted in interpreting this last clause of the paragraph ac-
cording to the intent expressed above unless we can tind within the plain
language used, when fairly construed, such words as will warrant the
application of that interpretation. In what way, then, do they provide;
for the goods which, although in reality of one class, may be claimed, ~
in order to evade the operation of the tariff act, to be another? By the
enumeration of certain kinds of goods in an excepting clause. First, the
exception provides for "all such goods with selvedges made wholly or in
part of other materials." The use of the word "such," and of the word
"0ther," turns us back to preceding words in order to {ind out what that
particular clause means. Turning to those words, we find the whole
sentence to read thus: "If composed wholly of wool, worsted, etc., or of
a mixture of them, 9 cents per square yard and 40 per centum adr
valorem; but all such goods with selvedges made wholly or in part of