Hnsnmnson v; ‘·rnann*_nuxnnnn ·roNs·oF mos one. 43
§§ 592, 593;-r Stringer v. Lisuronee Co., LTR. ’4 Q.   676; Castrique  
Imrie, LQ B. 4`H.`L. 427; Great v‘Gillespie, Earl v. Spooner, supra.   W
In admiralty causes, as cases like the present, there are special grounds
' for denying any such damages. Thesale was miadelto prevent theprop-
erty being eaten up by charges} The result of the suit was uncertain,
and the sale was presumablyfor the benefit of all interested. Pollard v.
Baker, 101 Mass. 259. The owner had personal notice, not only of the
original arrest, but of the application to sell. His proctors, after several
postponements, finally did not appear to oppose the motion. Had he
desired to avert a sale, as he was entirely responsible, it was easy for `
him at any moment to obtain a release of the goods by the usual prac-
tice of the court`, upon giving a bond to the marshal under the act of
1845, without the payment of any charges whatever, (The Georgearma, .
31 Fed} ‘RepL 405,) or by stipulation given under rule 10of the supreme
court. As he voluntarily abstained from availing himself of these simple
and perfect remedies, a court of admiralty, which acts upon equitable
principles, ought not to entertain a suit for alleged damages that have
thus, in effect, been voluntarily incurred. He was bound to pursue the
remedies provided, or abidethe result. The Adohih, 5 Fed. Rep. 114;
Stringer v. Insurance Oo., L. R. 4 Q. B. 69]. If such suits were to be en-
tertained and damages given, it would virtually put an end to libels in
rem upon bona _/ide controversies; since no responsible person could safely
venture to arrest the res, if through some mistake of law or fact, as might.
be subsequently determined, he must respond for alliconseq-uential dam-
ages that might arise in theprogress of tithe pause. without his `fault.
Great temptations to fraud would also be offered-through purchases by
the claimants at low pricespunder cover of other nominal purchasers,
while large damages would still be demanded. Had the claimants in
the oross—libe1 against the Scandinavia left her in custody and allowed
her to be sold, instead of bonding her in accordance with the—usual.prac—
tice, a much larger claim of consequential_darn_age might probably have
been presented against the cross-lihelant. . A . , V
The absence of authority, however, even in common-law suits, for the
allowance of any such damages exceptfor want of jurisdiction, or for
malice or bad faith, neither of which exists here, is conclusive proof that,
in the absence, of statutory provision, no such right exists; and more-
clearly stillfit cannot, under theexisting rules, be properly admitted in
the law and practice of the aclmiralty. The] supplemental cross-liebel,
treated as an` original suit, must therefore, be dismissed, with costs. V · ` 4
The entire proceeds of the ore having been applied either to thenpay-
ment of the freight, ($804.72,) which was a lien upon it, or to the fees,
costs, and charges attendingthe arrest, custody, and sale of it, the con-
. signee is entitled to tax all these costs and charges against the libelants
as apa-rt‘of his costs on the dismissal of the original libel: The libel-) 4
ants are not entitled to interest on freight in consequence of their refusal
of the tendermade to them,. The amount paid from the fund onzaqebunt
of freight was $928.17.` Astinterest is not allowed, this‘was°$12l3`Z45
too much; t and the claimant is therefore entitled to a decree for the ex-