<DOC>
[1997 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:39719.wais]


                                                        S. Hrg. 105-183
 
                       CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                       ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                      APRIL 8, 9, 15 AND 17, 1997

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations




                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia              PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

                     James W. Nance, Staff Director

                 Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)

  

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                         Tuesday, April 8, 1997
                              a.m. session

Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald, former Secretary of Defense...............    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    19
Schlesinger, Hon. James R., former Secretary of Defense..........     5
    Letter Submitted by Hon. Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary 
      of Defense.................................................     5
Weinberger, Hon. Caspar, former Secretary of Defense.............     9

                              P.M. SESSION

Albright, Hon. Madeleine Korbel, Secretary of State..............    61
    Prepared statement...........................................    64

                        Wednesday, April 9, 1997

Feith, Douglas J., Feith and Zell, P.C., former Deputy Assistant 
  Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy....................   107
    Prepared statement...........................................   110
Ikle, Dr. Fred C., former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament 
  Agency.........................................................   105
Kirkpatrick, Dr. Jeane J., former U.S. Permanent Representative 
  to the United Nations, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise 
  Institute......................................................    91
    Prepared statement...........................................    96
Perle, Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Policy..................................    99
Rowny, Lieutenant General Edward L., U.S. Army (retired), 
  International Negotiation Consultant...........................   131
    Prepared statement...........................................   133
Scowcroft, General Brent, President, Forum for International 
  Policy, and former National Security Policy Advisor............   134
Zumwalt, Admiral E.R., Jr., United States Navy (retired), Member, 
  President's Foreign Intelligence Avisory Board.................   124

                        Tuesday, April 15, 1997

Bailey, Hon. Kathleen C., Senior Fellow, Lawrence Livermore 
  National Laboratory............................................   182
    Prepared statement...........................................   185
    Letter Submitted by Paul L. Eisman, Senior Vice President for 
      Refining, Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation............   182
    Letter Submitted by Robert W. Roten, President and CEO of 
      Sterling Chemicals.........................................   183
Forbes, Malcolm S., Jr., President and CEO, Forbes, Inc., New 
  York, New York.................................................   153
    Prepared statement...........................................   157
Johnson, Ralph V., Vice President, Environmental Affairs, Dixie 
  Chemical Company, Inc., Houston, Texas.........................   180
Kearns, Kevin L., President, United States Business and 
  Industrial Council.............................................   174
    Prepared statement...........................................   176
Merrifield, Hon. Bruce, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce...   187
Reinsch, Hon. William A., Under Secretary of Commerce for Export 
  Administration.................................................   189
    Prepared statement...........................................   192
Spears, Wayne, Owner and CEO, Spears Manufacturing, Inc., Sylmar, 
  California.....................................................   178
    Prepared statement...........................................   179
Webber, Frederick, President, Chemical Manufacturers Association, 
  Washington, D.C................................................   194
    Prepared statement...........................................   197

                        Thursday, April 17, 1997

Goss, Hon. Porter J., U.S. Representative in Congress From 
  Florida........................................................   219
Lehman, Hon. Ronald F., former Director, Arms Control and 
  Disarmament Agency.............................................   236
Odom, General William, U.S. Army (retired), former Director, 
  National Security Agency.......................................   227
O'Malley, Edward J., former Assistant Director 
  (Counterintelligence), Federal Bureau of Investigation.........   231

                                Appendix

Conditions to the Chemical Weapons Convention....................   261
The Case Against The Chemical Weapons Convention ``Truth or 
  Consequences'' [Prepared by The Center for Security Policy]....   276
Remarks by President Bill Clinton and Others at the White House, 
  April 4, 1997..................................................   321
False Promises, Fatal Flaws: The Chemical Weapons Convention 
  [Prepared by Empower America]..................................   326
Letters and Other Material Submitted in Support of Ratification 
  of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
    American Ex-Prisoners of War.................................   329
    Veterans of Foreign Wars of the U.S..........................   329
    Reserve Officers Association of the United States............   329
    Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A.............................   330
    Prepared Statement of Brad Roberts, Institute for Defense 
      Analyses...................................................   331
Letters Submitted in Opposition to Ratification of the Chemical 
  Weapons Convention:
    Sterling Chemicals...........................................   335
    Small Business Survival Committee............................   335
Statement by Ronald F. Lehman Before the U.S. Senate Foreign 
  Relations Committee, June 9, 1994..............................   337
  


                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                              ----------                              


                  TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--A.M. SESSION

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Hagel, Smith, Thomas, 
Ashcroft, Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Robb, 
Feingold, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    I believe it is customary to wait until there is at least 
one Senator from each party present.
    I would inquire of the minority counsel.
    Can you give us some advice as to whether Senator Biden 
would wish us to proceed?
    I might explain to our distinguished guests this morning--
and, as a matter of fact, everybody here is a distinguished 
guest as far as I am concerned--as I just said, it is a 
tradition, in this committee, at least, to have at least one 
Senator from each party present before the proceeding begins.
    Senator Biden is on a train coming in from Delaware, and I 
am seeking information as to whether it would be his wish that 
we proceed without him until he gets here.
    I am told that it is satisfactory with Senator Biden that 
we do proceed.
    As is obvious, this morning's hearing is the first of the 
Foreign Relations Committee's final round of testimony on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, or that's right.
    I think it is fair to say that history is being made here 
this morning and I believe today is the first time that three 
distinguished, former U.S. Secretaries of Defense have ever 
appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose 
ratification of an arms control treaty. And if ever a treaty 
deserved such highly respected opposition, it is the dangerous 
and defective so-called Chemical Weapons Convention.
    This morning's witnesses include Hon. James Schlesinger, 
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon, Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, 
Secretary of Defense for President Ford, and Hon. Caspar 
Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
    Further, we will have testimony today in the form of a 
letter from Hon. Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the 
Bush administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precluded him 
from being here in person today. But he has asked Secretary 
Schlesinger to read into the record Secretary Cheney's strong 
opposition to Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
    So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will 
consist of testimony by and from Defense Secretaries of every 
Republican administration since Richard Nixon, testimony that 
will counsel the Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously 
defective treaty.
    These distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More 
than 50--more than 50--generals, admirals, and senior officials 
from previous administrations have joined them in opposing the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and if that does not send a clear 
signal on just how dangerous this treaty really is, I cannot 
imagine what would.
    So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your 
being here today to testify. I regret that we cannot offer you 
the pomp and circumstance of the Rose Garden ceremony last 
week, but our invitation to be there got lost in the mail 
somehow.
    Your testimony here today will convey to the American 
people highly respected assessments of this dangerous treaty.
    Now our precise purpose today is to examine the national 
security implications of the CWC which is important because the 
105th Congress has 15 new Senators, including three new and 
able members of this committee who have never heard testimony 
on this treaty.
    The case against the treaty can be summarized quite simply, 
I think. It is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not 
constitutional, and it will not work. Otherwise, it is a fair 
treaty.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention will do absolutely nothing 
to protect the American people from the dangers of chemical 
weapons. What it will do is increase rogue regimes' access to 
dangerous chemical agents and technology while imposing new 
regulations on American businesses, exposing them to increased 
danger of industrial espionage and trampling their 
constitutional rights. Outside of the Beltway, where people do 
not worship at the altar of arms control, that is what we call 
``A bum deal.''
    We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from the 
proponents of the treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from 
the face of the earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No 
supporter of this treaty can tell us with a straight face how 
this treaty will actually accomplish that goal.
    The best argument they have mustered to date is yes, it is 
defective, they say, but it is better than nothing.
    But, in fact, this treaty is worse than nothing for, on top 
of the problems with the CWC's verifiability and 
constitutionality, this treaty gives the American people a 
false sense of security that something is being done to reduce 
the dangers of chemical weaponry when, in fact, nothing--
nothing--is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the 
American people at greater risk.
    More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical 
weaponry have not ratified the CWC, and more than one-third of 
them have not even signed it. This includes almost all of the 
terrorist regimes whose possession of chemical weapons does 
threaten the United States, countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, 
and North Korea. Not one of them--not one of them--is a 
signatory to this treaty and none of them will be affected by 
it.
    Worse still, this treaty will increase access to dangerous 
chemical agents and technology to rogue states who do sign the 
treaty. Iran, for example, is one of the few nations on this 
earth ever to use chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory of 
the CWC.
    I am going to stop with the rest of my prepared statement 
today so that we can get to our witnesses, which is what you 
are here for.
    But I want to say, once more, that I ask the American 
people not to take my word for anything that I am saying. I ask 
the American people to consider the judgments of these 
distinguished former Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC.
    I am looking forward to hearing from them about the 
treaty's scope, verifiability, about its Articles X and XI, and 
the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the overall 
potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.
    That said, we turn to the witnesses.
    Secretary Schlesinger, we call on you first.

    [The prepared statement of The Chairman follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Chairman Helms

    This morning's hearing is the first of the Foreign Relations 
Committee's final round of testimony on the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. I think it is fair to say that history is being made this 
morning. I believe today is the first time that three distinguished 
former United States Secretaries of Defense have ever appeared together 
before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control 
treaty. And if ever a treaty deserved such highly respected opposition, 
it is the dangerous and defective Chemical Weapons Convention.
    This morning's witnesses include the Honorable James Schlesinger, 
Secretary of Defense for President Nixon; the Honorable Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense for President Ford; and the Honorable 
Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense for President Reagan.
    Further, we will have testimony today, in the form of a letter from 
the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for the Bush 
Administration. Secretary Cheney's schedule precludes him from being 
here in person today, but he has asked Secretary Schlesinger to read 
into the record Secretary Cheney's strong opposition to Senate 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    So with Secretary Cheney's contribution, this hearing will consist 
of testimony by and from defense secretaries of every Republican 
administration since Richard Nixon--testimony that will counsel the 
Senate to decline to ratify this dangerously defective treaty. These 
distinguished Americans are by no means alone. More than 50 generals, 
admirals, and senior officials from previous Administrations have 
joined them in opposing the Chemical Weapons Convention. If that 
doesn't send a clear signal of just how dangerous this treaty really 
is, I can't imagine what would.
    So, gentlemen, we welcome you and deeply appreciate your being here 
today to testify. I regret we cannot offer you the pomp and 
circumstance of a Rose Garden ceremony, but your testimony here today 
will convey to the American people highly respected assessments of this 
dangerous treaty.
    Our precise purpose today is to examine the national security 
implications of the CWC. This is important because the 105th Congress 
has 15 new Senators, including three new and able members of this 
committee, who have never heard testimony on the treaty.
    The case against this treaty can be summarized quite simply: It is 
not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will 
not work.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention will do nothing to protect the 
American people from the dangers of chemical weapons. What it will in 
fact do is increase rogue regimes' access to dangerous chemical agents 
and technology, while imposing new regulations on American businesses, 
exposing them to increased danger of industrial espionage, and 
trampling their Constitutional rights. Outside the beltway, where 
people don't worship at the altar of arms control, that's what we call 
a bum deal.
    We have been hearing a lot of empty rhetoric from proponents of 
this treaty about ``banning chemical weapons from the face of the 
earth.'' This treaty will do no such thing. No supporter of this treaty 
can tell us, with a straight face, how this treaty will actually 
accomplish that goal.
    The best argument they have mustered to date is: Yes, it is 
defective, but it is better than nothing.
    But in fact, this treaty is much worse than nothing. For, on top of 
the problems with the CWC's verifiability and constitutionality, this 
treaty gives the American people a false sense of security that 
something is being done to reduce the dangers of chemical weapons, when 
in fact nothing is being done. If anything, this treaty puts the 
American people at greater risk.
    More than 90 percent of the countries possessing chemical weapons 
have not ratified the CWC, and more than one third of them have not 
even signed it. That includes almost all of the terrorist regimes whose 
possession of chemical weapons does threaten the United States--
countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. Not one of them is 
a signatory to this treaty. And none of them will be affected by it.
    Worse still, this treaty would increase access to dangerous 
chemical agents and technology by rogue states who do sign it. Iran, 
for example, is one of the few nations on the earth ever to use 
chemical weapons. Yet Iran is a signatory to the CWC.
    Why, you may ask, why does Iran support the treaty? Because by 
joining the CWC, Iran can demand access to chemical technology of any 
other signatory nation--including the United States, if the U.S. Senate 
were to make the mistake of ratifying it. In other words, Iran will be 
entitled to chemical defensive gear and dangerous dual-use chemicals 
and technologies that will help them modernize their chemical weapons 
program.
    Giving U.S. assent to legalizing such transfers of chemical agents 
and technology to such rogue nations is pure folly, and will make the 
problem of chemical weapons more difficult to constrain, not less.
    For example, if the U.S. were to protest a planned sale of a 
chemical manufacturing facility by Russia to Iran, under the CWC Russia 
could argue that not only are they permitted to sell such dangerous 
chemical technology to Teheran, but they are obliged to do so--by a 
treaty the U.S. agreed to. Because Iran's terrorist leaders have 
promised to get rid of their chemical weapons.
    Is it possible for the United States to verify whether Iran will be 
complying with its treaty obligations? Of course not. Even the 
administration admits that this chemical weapons treaty is 
unverifiable.
    President Clinton's own Director of Central Intelligence, James 
Woolsey, declared in testimony before this committee on June 23, 1994, 
that, and I quote, ``the chemical weapons problem is so difficult from 
an intelligence perspective, that I cannot state that we have high 
confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, especially on a 
small scale.
    So in other words, under this treaty, the American people will have 
to take the Ayatollahs' word for it.
    And what about Russia--the country possessing the largest and most 
sophisticated chemical weapons arsenal in the world? Russia has made 
perfectly clear it has no intention of eliminating its chemical weapons 
stockpile. In fact, Russia is already violating its bilateral agreement 
with the U.S. to get rid of these terrible weapons; It has consistently 
refused to come clean about the true size of its chemical weapons 
stockpile; and Russia continues to work on a new generation of nerve 
agents, disguised as everyday commercial or agricultural chemicals, 
specifically designed to circumvent this chemical weapons treaty that 
the Clinton Administration is pulling out all the stops to force the 
Senate to ratify.
    All this, sad to say, is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
what's wrong with this treaty. There is a whole array of other problems 
which I hope we can discuss today. But I think it borders on fraudulent 
to mislead the American people, as so many other treaty proponents 
have, into to believing that their lives will somehow be made safer if 
this treaty is ratified--and that their safety is being put at risk if 
the Senate refuses to be stampeded by Rose Garden ceremonies and high-
pressure tactics.
    But I ask the American people not to take my word for it. I ask all 
Americans to consider the judgments of these distinguished former 
Secretaries of Defense who oppose the CWC. I am looking forward to 
hearing from them about the treaty's scope, verifiability, its Articles 
X and XI, and the assessment of our distinguished witnesses about the 
overall potential impact of this treaty on America's national security.

  STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Dr. Schlesinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    At the outset, I will allow Secretary Cheney to join us 
vicariously. He has sent a letter, as you indicated, and I 
shall read it into the record.
    This letter is dated April 7, from Dallas, Texas.

Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
    Dear Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your letter inviting me to join 
several other former Secretaries of Defense in testifying in early 
April when the Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Regrettably, other commitments will 
preclude me from participation. I hope that this correspondence will be 
sufficient to convey my views on this convention.
    During the years I served as Secretary of Defense, I was deeply 
concerned about the inherent unverifiability, lack of global coverage, 
and unenforceability of a convention that sought to ban production and 
stockpiling of chemical weapons. My misgivings on these scores have 
only intensified during the 4 years since I left the Pentagon.
    The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too 
ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and 
the international community's record of responding effectively to 
violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit 
confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical 
threat.
    Indeed, some aspects of the present convention--notably its 
obligation to share with potential adversaries, like Iran, chemical 
manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and 
chemical defensive equipment--threaten to make this accord worse than 
having no treaty at all. In my judgment, the treaty's Articles X and XI 
amount to a formula for greatly accelerating the proliferation of 
chemical warfare capabilities around the globe.
    Those nations most likely to comply with the Chemical Weapons 
Convention are not likely to ever constitute a military threat to the 
United States. The governments we should be concerned about are likely 
to cheat on the CWC even if they do participate.
    In effect, the Senate is being asked to ratify the CWC even though 
it is likely to be ineffective, unverifiable, and unenforceable. Having 
ratified the convention, we will then be told we have ``dealt with the 
problem of chemical weapons'' when, in fact, we have not. But 
ratification of the CWC will lead to a sense of complacency, totally 
unjustified given the flaws in the convention.
    I would urge the Senate to reject the Chemical Weapons Convention.
            Sincerely,
                                       Dick Cheney.

    The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I 
thank the committee for its invitation to testify today on the 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention. I must at the 
outset underscore my belief that the proper criterion for 
judging the convention is whether or not it is in the interest 
of the United States and whether or not it will serve the long-
run purposes of the American people. It should not be approved 
simply for reasons of diplomatic momentum or a gesture toward 
multilateralism, but as a treaty with which this Nation must 
live.
    Mr. Chairman, I start with the interesting and somewhat 
checkered history of efforts at the control of chemical 
weapons. The introduction of poison gas in World War I and then 
its widespread use in the later stages of that war led to a 
horrified reaction. That reaction, plus the unease concerning 
its subsequent use by colonial powers, led to the Geneva 
Convention in 1925, which forbids the use of poison gas by all 
signatories.
    In the period prior to World War II, the European powers 
carefully prepared for the possible use of poison gas. In the 
actual circumstances of the war, however, the German decision 
to refrain from using poison gas came not for humanitarian 
reasons, not for reasons of the treaty, which German diplomats 
might well have described as ``a scrap of paper,'' but out of 
concern for the threat of devastating retaliation by the 
Western allies.
    Iraq has been and is a signatory to the Geneva Convention. 
In the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's, Iraq used poison gas as a 
way of stemming the ``human wave'' attacks of the Iranians. 
What was our reaction and the reaction of other Western powers 
at that time? In brief, it was to avert our gaze.
    Later, as the war died down, Saddam Hussein used gas 
against Iraq's Kurds. This time, however, the response was 
slightly more vigorous. An international gathering took place 
in Paris in January 1989. Not only did the international 
community fail to denounce Iraq, most participants were 
reluctant even to name Iraq for using gas. Our own reaction, 
was to say the least, somewhat muted. After all, Iraq provided 
protection in the Gulf against the Ayatollah's Iran. For what 
were regarded as sound geopolitical reasons, we failed to take 
action to sustain the existing prohibition on the use of poison 
gas by a signatory--despite Iraq's blatant violation of the 
Geneva Convention. This manifest failure of the existing arms 
control regime did stimulate renewed efforts on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention that lies before you. Aha! Perhaps if we 
were unwilling to enforce the existing ban on the use of poison 
gas, we might be more willing to take strong actions against 
its manufacture.
    Would we actually do more in enforcement when the evidence 
is far more ambiguous and the menace more distant? The use of 
poison gas is readily detectable; manufacture is not. Tapes and 
photographs were widely available of Kurdish women clutching 
their children to their breasts in the vain attempt to protect 
them against the gas. And yet we did nothing--for then it was 
not regarded as in our interest to intervene.
    By contrast, in the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein did not use 
poison gas against our troops. In the famous letter from 
President Bush to Saddam Hussein in early 1991 in which we 
demanded Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, we reminded Saddam that 
the United States had nuclear weapons. As Secretary Baker has 
said, we also, ``made it very clear that if Iraq used weapons 
of mass destruction, chemical weapons against U.S. forces, that 
the American people would demand vengeance and that we had the 
means to achieve it.''
    What are the lessons learned from these episodes? Treaties 
alone will do little. To prevent the use or the manufacture of 
chemical weapons requires a structure for deterrence backed by 
real capabilities. Above all, enforcement will depend upon the 
will to take action which, if history is any guide, will in 
turn depend upon a careful geopolitical assessment.
    Mr. Chairman, let me turn from history to specific problems 
in this convention. In this brief statement, I can only deal 
with five problem areas. Nonetheless, I would hope that the 
members of this committee and your colleagues in the Senate 
receive clear reassurance in these areas before you approve the 
convention.
    First is non-lethal chemicals. Non-lethal chemicals are 
necessary for crowd control, for peacekeeping, for rescuing 
downed pilots and the like. In the negotiations on the 
convention, we were pressed to ban non-lethal chemicals along 
with lethal chemicals. President Bush, under pressure from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, reiterated prior American policy and 
indicated that use of riot control agents would not be banned. 
The Clinton administration has been far more ambiguous on this 
subject, retreating from President Bush's stated exclusion. 
Sometime it has suggested that such agents could be used in 
peacetime but not in wartime. That raises the question of 
defining when the Nation is at war. Was the Vietnam War a war?
    Just 2 days ago, the New York Times stated that the 
administration ``has also refused to interpret the treaty in a 
way that would allow the use of tear gas for crowd control, 
mainly because the Pentagon has said it has no need to ever use 
non-lethal gases.''
    If the latter is true, it represents a remarkable 
transformation of Pentagon attitudes, and I recommend that you 
check this out. The first part of the quotation reflects the 
continuing ambivalence of the administration on the question of 
non-lethal chemicals. I trust that the Senate will seek 
clarification of the administration's position and indeed 
insist that the use of tear gas will not be banned either in 
peace or war. Otherwise, we may wind up placing ourselves in 
the position of the Chinese Government in dealing with the 
Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989. The failure to use tear gas 
meant that that government only had recourse to the massive use 
of firepower to disperse the crowd.
    Second is sharing CW technology. Article X of the treaty 
requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive 
technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the 
United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran, 
Cuba, and other such nations that may sign the convention. 
Almost certainly that interpretation will be argued by lawyers 
in the government. But, even if the Senate were able to prevent 
such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X 
legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which 
will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty.
    Clearly, that undercuts any sanctions directed against 
rogue nations that happen to sign the convention. And, in any 
event, there are still other states that do not agree with our 
judgments in these matters and will acquire such chemical 
warfare defensive technologies and will share such technologies 
with rogue nations whether signatories or not.
    Third is the defense against chemical weapons. Continued 
and vigorous efforts to develop chemical weapons defenses are 
required. In the years ahead, various groups, inclined to 
fanaticism, are likely to use chemical weapons as instruments 
of sabotage or terrorism. Aum Shin Rikyo, the Japanese 
religious cult, is but a prototype of these other terrorist 
groups. To deal with such prospective attacks, it is essential 
to have continuing efforts on defensive measures to protect our 
civilian population as well as our forces.
    In this connection, two points must be made. First, the 
illusion that this convention will provide protection against 
chemical weapons will tempt us to lower our guard and to reduce 
our efforts on defensive CW measures. Such temptations should 
be formally rejected through safeguards. Second, the sharing of 
technologies required by Article X will provide other nations 
with the information that will help to neutralize our chemical 
weapons defenses and, thus, expose us to greater risk.
    Fourth is industrial espionage. The convention permits or 
encourages challenge inspections against any facility deemed 
capable of producing chemical weapons--indeed against any 
facility. This exposes American companies to a degree to 
industrial espionage never before encountered in this country. 
This implies the possibility of the capture of proprietary 
information or national security information from American 
corporations by present or by prospective commercial rivals. To 
preclude such intrusive inspections requires the vote of three-
quarters of the Executive Council of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Such super majority votes are 
unlikely to be forthcoming and will grow less so over time.
    The committee may wish to inquire how FBI counter 
intelligence feels about these arrangements.
    Mr. Chairman, I trust that the committee will delve deeply 
into this issue because scuttlebutt has it that the White House 
has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say 
nothing against this treaty. Consequently, you may wish to 
examine not only present but former counter intelligence 
officers.
    The Chairman. We will. Thank you.
    Dr. Schlesinger. This convention is sometimes compared to 
the arrangements under the Atoms for Peace Agreement. But it 
should be noted that few of the several mechanisms that provide 
protection in the nuclear area exist under this convention.
    Five is how do we respond to violations. Is the convention 
something more than a feel good treaty? Is it more meaningful 
than the more explicit and more relevant ban on use in the 
Geneva Convention? If so, what is its operational significance? 
Last April, Secretary Perry, reiterating some of the warnings 
of President Bush and Secretary Baker to Saddam Hussein stated, 
``Anyone who considers using a weapon of mass destruction 
against the United States or its allies must first consider the 
consequences. We would not specify in advance what our response 
would be, but it would be both overwhelming and devastating.''
    Administration officials have more recently reiterated that 
threat. Does this convention oblige us to take actions beyond 
attacks on ourselves or on our allies? Are we prepared to take 
action if Iran attacks Tajikistan or even uses gas against its 
own minorities? If Syria, or Saudi Arabia, or Israel, or South 
Africa manufactures gas, what are we prepared to do? What 
actions would we take if we discover that Russia, or Ukraine, 
or China is engaged clandestinely--or openly--in the 
manufacture of gas?
    As the leading world power and as the initial sponsor of 
this convention, the United States bears a particular 
responsibility for those signatories who have foregone the 
right of direct retaliation and who lack the American capacity 
for a response, both ``overwhelming and devastating.'' The role 
of the United States visibly transcends that of the 
Netherlands, or of Sweden, or of other nations that are 
prepared to sign the convention. I trust, therefore, that this 
committee will press for clear answers regarding how we might 
feel obliged to respond in different hypothetical 
circumstances.
    Mr. Chairman, as this committee proceeds with its 
deliberations, I trust that it will carefully examine some of 
the exaggerated or false claims that have been made on behalf 
of the convention. This treaty will not serve to banish the 
threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight 
against terrorism. Only effective police work will accomplish 
that.
    As the Japanese cult, Aum Shin Rikyo, has demonstrated, a 
significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a 
facility as small as 8 feet by 15 feet. Increasingly, are we 
aware how vulnerable this Nation may be to terrorist attacks, 
and this treaty will do little to limit such vulnerability. Nor 
will this treaty ``provide our children broad protection 
against the threat of chemical attacks.'' Such statements 
merely disguise and, thereby, increase our vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from 
international sharing of information on CW defenses, our 
vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished.
    Finally, this treaty in no way helps ``shield our soldiers 
from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.'' As indicated 
earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such 
protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on 
our troops has great credibility and, thus, serves as an 
effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no 
more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva 
Convention.
    Mr. Chairman, some treaty proponents, while conceding the 
lack of verifiability, the lack of broad enforceability, and 
the other inherent weaknesses of the convention, suggest that 
it should be ratified because whatever its weaknesses, it 
serves to establish ``international norms.'' If Senators are 
moved by that last ditch defense of the convention, they should 
vote for ratification. I urge, however, that Senators bear in 
mind that most nations do not care a figure for ``international 
norms,'' and we already have the Geneva Convention as a norm, 
regularly violated. And they remain relatively free to violate 
this norm with relative impunity since the treaty is difficult 
to verify and more difficult to enforce.
    Proponents have simply ignored the evidence of the past 
failure to control chemical weapons and have proceeded blithely 
with a renewed effort at control which disregards the ambiguity 
and the ineffectiveness of the control mechanism. In the rather 
forlorn hope to preclude the employment of chemical weapons, 
they have produced an agreement with an illusory goal and a 
rather gargantuan and worrisome enforcement mechanism. The 
manifold weaknesses of the proposed convention deserve careful 
attention from every member of the Senate.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall be pleased later to 
respond to any questions the committee may have.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Weinberger.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it is always an 
honor to appear before a committee of the U.S. Senate and I am 
deeply appreciative of that this morning.
    I think that both your Chairman's statement and Secretary 
Schlesinger's very impressive statement also, both together, 
set out the basic reasons why I think all of us on this 
Secretary of Defense panel feel so strongly that this treaty 
should not be ratified.
    I would like to make a couple of points at the beginning 
because it is the common practice now for opponents of anything 
that is desired by the White House to be painted in as 
unenviable a position as possible. I would like to make it 
clear that everybody I know detests chemical weapons, 
particularly soldiers.
    I have some small personal experiences I might share with 
you. They stem mainly from the fact of my extreme age. The fact 
is that, during World War II, I had been assigned to the 
Australian Anti-Gas School. The Australians used very spartan 
methods and very rigorous methods of instructing, and they 
instructed by showing us the actual effects on our own persons 
of mustard gas, a blister agent. They gave us all kinds of 
information with respect to the required defense and defensive 
equipment.
    I was then later appointed one of the gas defense officers 
to the 41st Infantry Division, conducted a lot of training with 
the soldiers in the gas protective equipment which, as anybody 
who served in the armed forces knows, is extremely difficult to 
operate in, and this leads, without any question whatever, to 
this detestation of these weapons.
    So people who oppose this treaty are not people who favor 
poison gas. I think it is important to make that rather obvious 
point at the beginning because we have heard so much about the 
motives of opponents of this treaty. My motive is the security 
of the United States, with which I had the honor to be 
associated for 7 years as Secretary, and which I think, as a 
country, should be maintained, even in the face of very strong 
support of a treaty which purports to outlaw and ban the 
production of these terrible weapons.
    Everybody likes the aims of the treaty. Everybody will 
admit, I think, that it is a well intentioned treaty. Everybody 
that I know including many of the proponents, admit that it is 
a very badly flawed treaty, and it is with those flaws that I 
am concerned today.
    Primarily the flaws, as Secretary Schlesinger just 
mentioned, are that it cannot be verified and it cannot be 
enforced. The enforcement mechanism involves going to the 
United Nations Security Council, of which Russia and China are 
members. It does not require a very big stretch of the 
imagination to indicate that they would probably veto any kind 
of enforcement action proposed against them.
    So you would have not only the lack of verifiability, you 
would have, very much like with the Geneva Convention, a very 
nice statement of the proper intentions of humankind which 
simply cannot be enforced and which basically, sadly, 
accomplish nothing.
    Now there has been a great deal of discussion also about 
the enforcement mechanisms, the international inspectors and 
what they can do and their powers. This is not just academic 
discussion, Mr. Chairman. These inspectors, under this treaty, 
under Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically 
American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS and even the 
Department of Justice cannot wander around the country without 
search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in 
thousands of factories. There are varying estimates of the 
number of factories and commercial plants involved, but they 
are all in the thousands. I won't attempt to say which one is 
right or wrong, but they are in the thousands. The treaty gives 
the right to these inspectors to see what they want to do, to 
make analyses and tests, and the other articles of the 
convention require that we share any late technologies we might 
develop--and we should be working on them; I hope we are; we 
always used to--defensive technologies to improve the masks, 
the protective equipment, and all of the other things.
    As we make some progress in this field, that would have to 
be shared and, therefore, would be, consequently, far less 
valuable, to put it mildly, in the event that any of our troops 
should be attacked with a gas attack.
    These inspections are a two-way street in some ways. We 
have the right of inspection under what I consider to be the 
worst appeasement agreement we have signed and that has been 
presented since Munich, and that is the North Korean Agreement 
under which we promised to give them two very large nuclear 
reactors which can produce plutonium--although it is always 
said not to worry, they can't. But, of course, they can. And we 
are permitted also to have all kinds of inspection under that 
appeasement agreement.
    We have not been granted this to the extent that we need 
it. What we are allowed is to go where North Korea wants us to 
go. It's exactly as with the agreement with Iraq that ended 
that war. We are permitted to go where the Iraqis let us go and 
after long delays in which they are given the opportunity to 
remove any incriminating kinds of evidence.
    That is one way that these inspections can work, and those 
would be probably the ways that countries like Iran, that have 
signed the agreement, would interpret it.
    But the permitted inspections and the way we would do it, 
because we carry out our word as a country and we do allow 
these things once we sign an agreement, would be as intrusive 
as anything previously imagined and far more intrusive than our 
own officials are allowed under our own laws to investigate 
violations of American law.
    Jim Schlesinger has covered very adequately and thoroughly 
the industrial espionage problems that are involved in this and 
in the sharing of these not only offensive, but defensive 
technologies that we may be working on. And it is important 
that we work on these defensive technologies because, even if 
all the countries sign this agreement, the possibilities that 
it would be treated as Geneva is always treated are always 
there. Indeed, we know that Iraq is stockpiling this VX nerve 
agent, which is a rather nasty piece of equipment, and Russia 
has been developing the nerve agent A-223, which is purported 
to be something like 7 times as fatal as the VX nerve agent. 
These are things that are going on now, after these treaties 
have been signed and while the whole discussion is there.
    The idea that these countries would give up these newly 
developed agents on which they spent a great deal of money, 
some of it, in Russia's case, our money that we sent over for 
economic development, does not seem to me to be very credible.
    The requirement that we share all of these technologies 
also would remove any kind of deterrent capability that we 
might have if we carry out the treaty in full. And one of the 
deterrent capabilities is retaliation.
    We have had many indications not only in World War II but 
in the Gulf and elsewhere, that the fact that we were spared a 
chemical attack there simply stems from the ability that we 
would have to retaliate. If we give up that retaliatory 
capability, along with all but four or five nations, the four 
or five nations would still not be nearly as worried about 
launching an attack as they were in the case of the Gulf War.
    We already know that there is at least a possibility. We 
don't know it and I would not claim it as a fact, but there is 
at least a possibility that Iraq's storage of these chemical 
weapons is resulting in disease and illness to American forces 
now. People talk about who is to blame and all of that. The 
only important issue, I think, there is that we should 
remember, and I hope we always will, that we have an absolute 
obligation to take care of these people who did fall ill from 
whatever cause in that war for the rest of their lives and take 
care of their families. I hope we are prepared to honor that.
    All of these are things that have happened with nations 
that have either signed or refused to sign the treaty. Iran is 
one that has signed. Iran, therefore, would be able to see and 
inspect any one of several thousand companies. They would have 
to share their technologies and we, as a country, would have to 
share our technologies with Iran.
    Strong supporters of the treaty, including General 
Schwarzkopf, when reminded of the fact, when asked if that is 
what he really wanted, said of course not. He said the worst 
thing in the world would be to share any knowledge with a 
country like Iran in this field.
    So there has been, I think, a lack of understanding, and I 
congratulate the committee on holding these hearings, because I 
hope that we can get a full understanding of how a well 
intentioned treaty, the goals of which everybody of course 
supports, cannot possibly reach those goals if we are going to 
have the kind of provisions that remain in this treaty.
    We also have a situation in which we are repeatedly told 
that the April 29 deadline must be met, otherwise we will have 
no influence in administering the treaty. Mr. Chairman, we are 
going to bear 25 percent of the cost of this treaty, and I 
suspect any 25 percent owner, so to speak, to use corporate 
terms, is going to have a little influence in it. I think that 
it is absurd to say that we must rush to judgment simply 
because April 29 is the deadline.
    There was plenty of opportunity last fall when the treaty 
was before the Senate, and was withdrawn by the administration, 
to have the kind of discussion that we are now having and that 
we should have. If it takes a little past April 29, and if by 
any chance we are able, through reservations or other changes, 
to make any of these things to which we object so strongly 
slightly more acceptable, that would certainly be worth a few 
days or a few months delay.
    The costs involved, of course, are not just the 25 percent 
of the costs of administering the treaty and of all of the 
inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of 
what we believe to be our constitutional rules against 
unreasonable search and seizure, seizing property without due 
process, and all the rest. We could add the $70 million that we 
have already given Russia under the so-called ``Bilateral 
Destruction Act'' to start destroying their weapons. And they 
have announced publicly and in writing--I guess it has been 
released; it's been printed all over the country--that they 
will no longer be bound by it, that it no longer serves their 
best interests and, therefore, they are not paying any more 
attention to it.
    They are a signatory of this Chemical Weapons Convention 
and they have been held up as a country that is essential to 
get into the international order and is willing to destroy 
these weapons. But certainly the record thus far is slightly 
less than modest.
    I think it is important that we emphasize again, as I did 
at the beginning, that our opposition to these kinds of weapons 
is well known. We were instrumental in getting the Geneva 
Agreement approved many, many years ago. We have signed the 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, which had a great deal of hope 
behind it, and practically no realization. And now Russia has 
walked away from it.
    We have showed that we would, of course, not only if we 
sign this convention comply with it, but that we would be a 
leader in financing it. All of that I think is an ample 
demonstration to the world, if any is needed, that we don't 
like these weapons. But we don't have to sign a flawed and an 
ineffective, unenforceable, unverifiable convention to prove 
that; and I don't think that we should worry so much about 
being tarred as being pro chemical weapons that we would 
disregard completely the flaws in this treaty and ratify it 
anyway just to make a statement.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much having had the 
opportunity to express these views before you and your 
committee, and as Secretary Schlesinger has said, I will be 
glad to try to answer questions at an appropriate time.
    The Chairman. We thank you, sir. Secretary Rumsfeld.

 STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee. I appreciate the opportunity to express concerns 
about this convention. Rather than read my entire statement, I 
would like to touch on some of the more important points, and I 
ask that my entire statement be included in the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Certainly, one of the most serious problems 
facing our country and our friends and allies around the world 
is, indeed, the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention before the Senate 
would appear to fit in that category. But in my view, it has 
serious flaws.
    I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this 
and, indeed, that a number of our friends and associates that 
we have worked with on these problems over the years find 
themselves on opposing sides.
    As a former Member, I also recall the difficulty of finding 
oneself in the position of opposing a position that is strongly 
supported by a President. It is not an attractive position to 
be in or a pleasant one. My inclination was always to try to 
support the President on these matters.
    Certainly in this case, being positioned as appearing to 
favor chemical weapons, is also not an appealing position.
    So let me be very clear: Were there pending before this 
committee a convention that was verifiable and global and that 
would accomplish the elimination of chemical weapons in the 
hands of nations most likely to use them, I would be appearing 
before the committee as a supporter.
    Unfortunately, I do not believe that it meets those tests.
    First, I don't believe that this is verifiable, nor have I 
met a single, knowledgeable person who believes that it is 
verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in 
some countries, but it is debatable whether the treaty would 
reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially 
hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the 
United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not 
signed the CWC, let alone ratified it, include Libya, Syria, 
Iraq, and North Korea. Certainly these countries are among the 
most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, our 
soldiers, and our allies.
    In addition, there are countries that might sign the 
convention which would not be reliable with respect to 
compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not 
a trivial problem, it seems to me.
    For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we 
really cannot rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it 
is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its 
obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement, as 
Secretary Weinberger pointed out. Also, Washington newspapers 
and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have 
developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that 
would make discovery next to impossible in that they are 
apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals. This 
raises the question as to the likelihood of their complying 
with the convention.
    As a Wall Street Journal article recently put it, under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, members to the convention could 
look for chemical weapons in New Zealand or the Netherlands but 
not in North Korea, Libya, or Iraq, which are countries that 
could be chemical warfare threats.
    Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the 
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments, 
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the 
world to have standards and values, as Secretary Schlesinger 
mentioned. This is the ``speed limit'' argument.
    My friend, Dr. Kenneth Adelman, a former Director of ACDA, 
recently argued, supporting the agreement, that standards and 
values violated are better than no standards and values at all.
    I personally think that is probably the most persuasive 
case that can be made for the convention. However, I do not 
believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the scales.
    While standards and norms are important, there is a real 
risk that in ratifying the convention and in setting forth high 
standards, the U.S. would be misinforming the world by 
misleading people into believing that we had, in fact, done 
something with respect to the international controls over the 
use of chemical weapons, despite the certainty, in my mind, at 
least, that this convention cannot provide that assurance.
    Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only 
potential benefits of the convention, such as standards and 
norms, but also its burdens and costs.
    It seems to me clear that any advantages of setting forth 
such standards by ratifying the convention are more than offset 
by the disadvantages.
    I note that there would be considerable cost to the 
taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a 
U.N.-style funding formula, which calls for the United States 
to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would 
be costs to private industry, which I do not believe can be 
properly quantified at present in that it is not possible yet 
to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would 
actually work. This is to say nothing of the cost to companies 
of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise.
    These costs would amount, in a real sense, to unfunded 
mandates on American enterprise.
    These were among the concerns that were expressed by a 
number of government, civilian, and military officials in a 
letter sent to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott late last 
year, which I signed, and I ask that a copy of that letter and 
the signatories be placed in the record at this point.
    The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

    [The information referred to follows:]

                                                 September 9, 1996.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, United States Senate,
Washington, DC 20510.
    Senator Lott: As you know, the Senate is currently scheduled to 
take final action on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on or before 
September 14th. This Treaty has been presented as a global, effective 
and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As individuals with 
considerable experience in national security matters, we would all 
support such a ban. We have, however, concluded that the present 
convention is seriously deficient on each of these scores, among 
others.
    The CWC is not global since many dangerous nations (for example, 
Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have not agreed to join the treaty 
regime. Russia is among those who have signed the Convention, but is 
unlikely to ratify--especially without a commitment of billions in U.S. 
aid to pay for the destruction of Russia's vast arsenal. Even then, 
given our experience with the Kremlin's treaty violations and its 
repeated refusal to implement the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement 
on chemical weapons, future CWC violations must be expected.
    The CWC is not effective because it does not ban or control 
possession of all chemicals that could be used for lethal weapons 
purposes. For example, it does not prohibit two chemical agents that 
were employed with deadly effect in World War I--phosgene and hydrogen 
cyanide. The reason speaks volumes about this treaty's impractical 
nature: they are too widely used for commercial purposes to be banned.
    The CWC is not verifiable as the U.S. intelligence community has 
repeatedly acknowledged in congressional testimony. Authoritarian 
regimes can be confident that their violations will be undetectable. 
Now, some argue that the treaty's intrusive inspections regime will 
help us know more than we would otherwise. The relevant test, however, 
is whether any additional information thus gleaned will translate into 
convincing evidence of cheating and result in the collective imposition 
of sanctions or other enforcement measures. In practice, this test is 
unlikely to be satisfied since governments tend to took the other way 
at evidence of non-compliance rather than jeopardize a treaty regime.
    What the CWC will do, however, is quite troubling: It will create a 
massive new, U.N.-style international inspection bureaucracy (which 
will help the total cost of this treaty to U.S. taxpayers amount to as 
much as $200 million per year). It will jeopardize U.S. citizens' 
constitutional rights by requiring the U.S. government to permit 
searches without either warrants or probable cause. It will impose a 
costly and complex regulatory burden on U.S. industry. As many as 8,000 
companies across the country may be subjected to new reporting 
requirements entailing uncompensated annual costs of between thousands 
to hundreds-of-thousands of dollars per year to comply. Most of these 
American companies have no idea that they will be affected. And perhaps 
worst of all, the CWC will undermine the standard of verifiability that 
has been a key national security principle for the United States.
    Under these circumstances, the national security benefits of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention clearly do not outweigh its considerable 
costs. Consequently, we respectfully urge you to reject ratification of 
the CWC unless and until it is made genuinely global, effective and 
verifiable.

  Signatories on Letter to Senator Trent Lott Regarding the Chemical 
                           Weapons Convention

                  As of September 9, 1996; 11:30 a.m.

Former Cabinet Members:
Richard B. Cheney, former Secretary of Defense
William P. Clark, former National Security Advisor to the President
Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former Secretary of State (signed on September 
        10)
John S. Herrington, former Secretary of Energy (signed on September 9)
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
Edwin Meese III, former U.S. Attorney General
Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense (signed on September 10)
Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense
Additional Signatories (retired military):
General John W. Foss, U.S. Army (Retired), former Commanding General, 
        Training and Doctrine Command
Vice Admiral William Houser, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Deputy Chief 
        of Naval Operations for Aviation
General P.X. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former Commandant of 
        U.S. Marine Corps (signed on September 9)
Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, U.S. Army (Retired), former Director 
        for Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff (signed on September 9)
Admiral Wesley McDonald, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Supreme Allied 
        Commander, Atlantic
Admiral Kinnaird McKee, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Director, Naval 
        Nuclear Propulsion
General Merrill A. McPeak, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Chief of 
        Staff, U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant General T.H. Miller, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), former 
        Fleet Marine Force Commander/Head, Marine Aviation
General John. L. Piotrowski, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Member of 
        the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Vice Chief, U.S. Air Force
General Bernard Schriever, U.S. Air Force (Retired), former Commander, 
        Air Research and Development and Air Force Systems Command
Vice Admiral Jerry Unruh, U.S. Navy (Retired), former Commander 3rd 
        Fleet (signed on September 10)
Lieutenant General James Williams, U.S. Army (Retired), former 
        Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Additional Signatories (non-military):
Elliott Abrams, former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American 
        Affairs (signed on September 9)
Mark Albrecht, former Executive Secretary, National Space Council
Kathleen Bailey, former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and 
        Disarmament Agency
Robert B. Barker, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 
        Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Matters
Angelo Codevilla, former Senior Fellow, Hoover Institute (signed on 
        September 10)
Henry Cooper, former Director, Strategic Defense Initiative 
        Organization
J.D. Crouch, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Midge Decter, former President, Committee for the Free World
Kenneth deGraffenreid, former Senior Director of Intelligence Programs, 
        National Security Council
Diana Denman, former Co-Chair, U.S. Peace Corps Advisory Council
Elaine Donnelly, former Commissioner, Presidential Commission on the 
        Assignment of Women in the Armed Services
David M. Evans, former Senior Advisor to the Congressional Commission 
        on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Charles Fairbanks, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Douglas J. Feith, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Rand H. Fishbein, former Professional Staff member, Senate Defense 
        Appropriations Subcommittee
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
William R. Graham, former Science Advisor to the President
E.C. Grayson, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy
James T. Hackett, former Acting Director of the Arms Control and 
        Disarmament Agency
Stefan Halper, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (signed on 
        September 10)
Thomas N. Harvey, former National Space Council Staff Officer (signed 
        on September 9)
Charles A. Hamilton, former Deputy Director, Strategic Trade Policy, 
        U.S. Department of Defense
Amoretta M. Hoeber, former Deputy Under Secretary, U.S. Army
Charles Horner, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Science 
        and Technology
Fred Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Sven F. Kraemer, former Director for Arms Control, National Security 
        Council
Charles M. Kupperman, former Special Assistant to the President
John Lehman, former Secretary of the Navy
John Lenczowski, former Director for Soviet Affairs, National Security 
        Council
Bruce Merrifield, former Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, 
        Department of Commerce
Taffy Gould McCallum, columnist and free-lance writer
James C. McCrery, former senior member of the Intelligence Community 
        and Arms Control Negotiator (Standing Consultative Committee)
J. William Middendorf II, former Secretary of the Navy (signed on 
        September 10)
Laurie Mylroie, best-selling author and Mideast expert specializing in 
        Iraqi affairs
Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Norman Podhoretz, former editor, Commentary Magazine
Roger W. Robinson, Jr., former Chief Economist, National Security 
        Council
Peter W. Rodman, former Deputy Assistant to the President for National 
        Security Affairs and former Director of the Policy Planing 
        Staff, Department of State
Edward Rowny, former Advisor to the President and Secretary of State 
        for Arms Control
Carl M. Smith, former Staff Director, Senate Armed Services Committee
Jacqueline Tillman, former Staff member, National Security Council
Michelle Van Cleave, former Associate Director, Office of Science and 
        Technology
William Van Cleave, former Senior Defense Advisor and Defense Policy 
        Coordinator to the President
Malcolm Wallop, former United States Senator
Deborah L. Wince-Smith, former Assistant Secretary for Technology 
        Policy, Department of Commerce
Curtin Winsor, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica
Dov S. Zakheim, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

    Mr. Rumsfeld. Over the coming days, the members of the 
committee and the Senate will be faced with two important 
questions relating to the convention. First is, can the Senate 
responsibly oppose the President on this important foreign 
policy issue? Second is, what will happen if the Senate does 
reject the treaty and the United States seemingly stands 
essentially alone in the world, ex- 
cept for the rogue states with whom we would be associated as 
non-signatories?
    Let me address those questions in order.
    First is the issue of not supporting the President. As I 
indicated, my inclination has always been to try to do that. 
However, we know the Constitution did not grant sole authority 
to the President of the United States in the area of foreign 
policy. Indeed, it does not provide for a simple majority to 
ratify a treaty but, rather, for a two-thirds vote, so that it 
would have to be almost beyond doubt that a given treaty is in 
our national security interest. So it is certainly within the 
right of the Senate to disagree.
    Also, not surprisingly, there have been a number of 
treaties, conventions, and agreements where the Senate has 
disagreed over our history.
    The second question, as to what might happen if the U.S. 
stands alone, is an important one and one that I suspect will 
be a principal focus of the debate over the coming days.
    One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be, 
admittedly, expressions of concern by some of our friends and 
allies around the world that have. But I suspect there will be 
no smiles from the rogue states. And the world will be spared 
the deception which would follow ratification, because the 
world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the 
threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. I 
submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary 
Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification.
    Further, small and medium sized companies will be spared 
the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which 
would result from U.S. participation. You know, big companies 
seem to get along just fine with big government. They get along 
with American government, they get along with foreign 
government, they get along with international organizations. 
They have the staying power, they have the resources to wait 
things out. They have the ability, with all their Washington 
representatives, to deal effectively with bureaucracies.
    Indeed, that talent and skill, that capability on the part 
of big companies actually serves as sort of a barrier to entry 
to small and medium sized companies that lack that capability. 
So I do not suggest for a minute that the large American 
companies are not going to be able to cope with these 
regulations. They are. They will do it a whale of a lot better 
than small and medium sized companies.
    But if you look at that opening round with the Department 
of Commerce's regulations and requirements, and having been a 
regulator in the Federal government at one point in my life, I 
know that if you start with this, you end up with this 
(indicating). It does not take long.
    That problem of regulation on small and medium sized 
companies literally sucks the energy out of those companies. 
They are not capable of waiting and finding out the answers to 
all those things. They are trying to make money. That is the 
area of our society where the energy, the vitality, and the 
creativity is. They are the ones who are creating jobs in our 
country--not the large companies, which have been downsizing 
for the most part.
    So the fact that a number of large companies are not 
concerned about this does not surprise me the all, I must say.
    What would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, 
we did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had 
very different views as to what the appropriate relationship 
between the American people and their government ought to be 
than other countries did.
    Would we be abdicating leadership on this issue of chemical 
weapons and the threat by not ratifying, as some have argued? I 
say no. I think not.
    I say this because the threat of chemical weapons will 
remain despite the fact that this agreement gets ratified by a 
number of nations. And the world will--must--look to the United 
States for leadership in dealing with that threat. Because of 
our capacity, our resources, our knowledge, our credibility, we 
will retain a significant leadership role.
    So, despite the argument, the power of the argument, that 
the U.S. would be standing alone, I think the truth is that we 
have done it before and it has worked out rather well. Not 
every country has the ability to stand alone, but the U.S. is 
not just any country.
    With our resources, our weight, our capabilities, we can 
not only afford to provide leadership, but we have a special 
obligation to provide that kind of leadership and not just go 
along with the current diplomatic momentum.
    Because we are the United States, we have a singular 
responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such as 
this and then to set about the task of fashioning a better 
solution.
    Other countries look to us for that kind of behavior.
    I hope the Senate will decide to take its time and work to 
achieve the changes necessary to improve this in material ways. 
The proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to the reduce 
the chemical and biological weapons threat is a practical place 
to start.
    Mr. Chairman, I commend you and your committee for your 
efforts to give such careful consideration to the matter and I 
appreciate the opportunity of participating.
    Thank you very much.

                 Prepared Statement of Donald Rumsfeld

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.
    Let me say at the outset that I am not an expert on chemicals, nor 
am I a lawyer. I have been in and around the subject of Arms Control 
since my service in the Congress in the 1960s, as U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO during the early 1970s when we were working on MBFR and SALT, as 
well as my service in the Pentagon. So, I am here today not as an 
expert on chemicals or international law, but rather as one with a long 
interest in U.S. national security.
    One of the most serious problems facing the United States, our 
friends and allies, and indeed the world is proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Surely among the most important treaties of the 
decades since World War II are those which effectively enhance U.S. 
national security by addressing this problem. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention now before the Senate would appear to fit in that category, 
but, in my view, it does not.
    I recognize that there are arguments on both sides of this issue. 
Indeed, a number of the people many of us have worked with on these 
subjects over the years and respect, find themselves on opposing sides.
    Furthermore, as a former Member of the Congress, I well understand 
the difficulty in finding oneself in the position of opposing a treaty 
that the President of the United States strongly supports and that has 
such broad appeal. Being posi- 
tioned both as opposing our President and as favoring poison gas, which 
seems to be what happens to those who oppose this convention, is not an 
attractive position.
    Let me be clear. Were there pending before the Senate a convention 
that was verifiable and global and which would accomplish the 
elimination of chemical weapons in the hands of the nations most likely 
to use them, I would be appearing before this committee as a supporter, 
asserting that ratification would be in our national interest. 
Unfortunately, I do not believe this convention meets these tests.
    Interestingly, the preamble of the convention states in the first 
paragraph: ``The states parties to this convention * * *. Determined to 
act with a view to achieving effective progress toward general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, 
including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of 
mass destruction * * * .''
    That is a goal that can only be described as monumentally 
ambitious. More to the point, it is not clear to me that that is today 
the agreed policy of the U.S. government or even that it is realistic. 
The history of mankind suggests that the achievement of ``complete 
disarmament'' is not a likely prospect, and the idea of ``strict and 
effective international controls'' to assure compliance with ``complete 
disarmament'' is, to put it mildly, a stretch.
    I do not believe that this convention is verifiable. Nor have I met 
or heard a single knowledgeable person who believes it is verifiable. 
The U.S. intelligence community has acknowledged in congressional 
testimony that we cannot have high confidence that violation of the CWC 
will be detected.
    It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries. It 
is debatable, however, whether this treaty would reduce the chemical 
arsenals of any of the nations potentially hostile to the United 
States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing 
chemical weapons, that have not signed the CWC let alone ratified it, 
include Libya, Syria, Iraq and North Korea. Certainly, these countries 
are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens, 
our soldiers and our allies.
    In addition there are countries that might well sign the 
convention, but which would not be reliable with respect to compliance. 
Since the convention is not verifiable, that is not a trivial problem. 
For example, even if Iran does ratify can we really rely on them to 
comply? Also, it is my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its 
obligations under the 1990 U.S.-Russian bilateral destruction 
agreement. The Washington Times and Jane's have reported that the 
Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner 
which would make discovery next to impossible, in that they are 
comprised of common commercial chemicals. This raises the question as 
to the likelihood of their complying with this convention.
    It appears that this convention is proceeding in a way that it 
could conceivably disarm democratic, friendly, non aggressive nations, 
that either do not have chemical weapons, or if they have them would be 
most unlikely to use them against us, while it will not effectively 
apply to totalitarian, enemy and aggressive nations that would be most 
likely to use them against the U.S. and its allies. As a recent Wall 
Street Journal article put it, under the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
members to the convention could look for chemical weapons in New 
Zealand or the Netherlands, but not in North Korea, Libya or Iraq--
countries which could be chemical warfare threats.
    Despite what I believe to be the low possibility that the 
convention would result in real arms control accomplishments, 
nonetheless a case can be made that it is important for the world to 
have standards and values. Dr. Kenneth Adelman, former director of 
ACDA, recently argued in supporting the agreement that ``standards and 
values violated are better than no standards or values at all.'' That 
is the most persuasive argument for the convention I have heard. 
However, I do not believe that it is sufficiently persuasive to tip the 
scales.
    While standards are important, there is the real risk that in 
ratifying the convention and setting forth high standards, the U.S. 
would be misinforming the world by misleading people into believing 
that there were reasonable international controls over the use of 
chemical weapons, despite the certainty that this convention cannot 
provide that assurance. The use of various gases during World War I led 
to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which banned first use of chemical 
weapons in war. Despite that high standard, that ban has not been 
observed, witness Iraq's use of such chemicals.
    Furthermore, it is important to consider and weigh not only any 
potential benefits of the convention, but also its burdens and costs. 
It seems clear that any advantages of setting forth laudable standards 
and values by ratifying the convention are more than offset by the 
disadvantages.
    I note that there would be considerable cost to U.S. taxpayers in 
that the CWC provides for use of a U.N.-style funding formula, which as 
I recall bills the U.S. to pay some 25 percent of all costs. 
Personally, I think that percentage is too high and I cannot see why we 
would wish to extend it to still more international organizations.
    In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I do 
not believe can be quantified at present, in that it is not possible to 
know yet how the mechanisms to police the convention would work. And 
this is to say nothing of the costs to companies of trying to protect 
proprietary information from compromise.
    These were among the concerns expressed by a number of former U.S. 
government civilian and military officials in a letter sent to Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott late last year, which I signed. (I have 
attached a copy of the letter to my remarks, and ask that it be made a 
part of the record at this point.)
    [The letter referred to by Mr. Rumsfeld appears on page 15.]
    Other concerns expressed in the letter included: The risk that the 
convention would lead to the creation of a new U.N.-style international 
inspection bureaucracy at great cost to the American taxpayers; that 
the CWC could undermine the standard of verifiability that had been a 
key national security principle for the U.S.; and that the convention 
could prevent the use of non-lethal riot control agents, to the 
disadvantage of U.S. forces.
    Over the coming days members of the committee and the Senate will 
be faced with two important questions.
    First, can the Senate responsibly oppose the President on this 
important foreign policy issue; and second, what will happen if the 
Senate does reject the treaty, and the U.S. seemingly stands 
essentially alone and apart in the world.
    Let me address those questions in order.
    First, is the issue of not supporting our President on a key 
foreign policy matter. As one, with a background in the executive 
branch, I begin with a strong preference to support the President on 
such matters. Indeed, I felt that pull even as a Member of Congress 
with Presidents of the other party. And I so voted. So that is my 
inclination.
    However, we know the Constitution did not grant the President sole 
responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, it provides not for a simple 
majority vote for the Senate to ratify a treaty, but a two-thirds vote, 
so that it would have to be beyond doubt that a given treaty is in the 
U.S. national security interest. So, it is not only well within the 
right of the Senate to disagree with a treaty as its best judgment may 
dictate, but it is its constitutional obligation. In exercising that 
responsibility, there have been a number of treaties, conventions, and 
international agreements that have not been approved by the U.S. Senate 
over our history, and in each case the sun came up the next day and the 
world did not end.
    The second question as to what might happen if the U.S. stands 
apart on this issue, is also an important one, and one which I suspect 
will be a principle focus of the debate over the coming days. One 
result of the Senate not ratifying this treaty will be expressions of 
concern by some of our friends, but there will likely be no smiles from 
the rogue states.
    Next, the world will be spared the deception which would follow 
ratification, because the world will not be led to believe erroneously 
that the threat of chemical weapons had been effectively dealt with, 
and the complacency which would follow.
    Further, small and medium sized U.S. companies will be spared the 
costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result 
from U.S. participation. Big companies seem to get along well with big 
governments, foreign governments, and international organizations. They 
have the resources, the time, and the Washington representatives to 
work skillfully with governments. These capabilities of larger 
companies serve as an advantage over smaller companies, which lack the 
staying power and resources to cope with national and international 
regulations, inspections and the like.
    Next, U.S. taxpayers will be spared the cost of the convention. 
That is not a reason to reject it alone, but it is a fact. The U.S. 
would be spared the time and effort of implementing, complying with, 
and trying to enforce an agreement which in any event doesn't cover the 
nations most likely to use chemical weapons.
    So what would be the result of the U.S. standing alone? Well, we 
did this at our Nation's birth. We did it because we had very different 
views as to the appropriate relationship between the people and their 
government.
    Also, President Ronald Reagan did it with the Law of the Sea 
Treaty, notwithstanding the fact that most every nation in the world 
had signed that agreement. He did so because he found objectionable 
certain provisions relating to the seabed mining provisions. He refused 
to sign that treaty and asked me to serve as his Special Envoy to alert 
key countries of the dangers of going forward with that portion of the 
treaty.
    Would the U.S. be abdicating its leadership on this issue by not 
ratifying the convention, as some have argued? The answer is no. I say 
that because the problem of chemical weapons will remain despite this 
agreement, and the world will look to the U.S. for leadership in 
dealing with that serious threat.
    So despite the power of the argument that the U.S. would be 
standing alone, the truth is, we have done it before and it has worked 
out rather well. Not every country has the ability to stand alone. But 
the U.S. is not just any country. With our resources, our weight, our 
capabilities and our credibility the United States not only can afford 
to provide leadership, but it has a special obligation and ability to 
not just go along with what seems popular at the moment, but to stand 
up for what is right. Because we are the United States we have a 
singular responsibility to exercise our best judgment on matters such 
as this, and then set about the task of fashioning a better solution.
    I hope that the Senate will decide to take its time and work to 
achieve the changes necessary to improve it in material ways. The 
proposal introduced by Senator Kyl and others to reduce the chemical 
and biological weapons threat is a practical place to start.
    Mr. Chairman I commend you and your committee for your efforts to 
give the most careful consideration to this matter. I appreciate this 
opportunity to express my views and my concerns about the convention.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. I thank all three of you.
    Senator Biden was necessarily detained because of the train 
this morning, and we were authorized to begin without him. So 
he missed his opportunity, as the ranking member, to make a 
statement.
    I would just say for perhaps his guidance that I took 14 
minutes and he might want to consider that same neighborhood.
    Senator Biden. I will try to do less than that, Mr. 
Chairman. I thank the committee for its indulgence and I would 
like the record to show that, although I am late, it will not 
add to the total time. Had I been here, I would have used the 
time. And the only manifest failure this morning that I have 
observed, to use Secretary Schlesinger's words, is the train 
schedule. That has been my most manifest failure this morning. 
I may reveal others as I speak, though.
    Mr. Chairman, I think this is a defining moment, not only 
for the United States but, quite frankly, for this committee 
and in your significant effort to reestablish this committee 
and its credibility and standing within the Congress. I think 
our failure to act on this treaty would be a reflection on us, 
as well as an extremely negative reflection on the United 
States' role internationally.
    Twelve years ago, the United States made a firm commitment 
to destroy 30,000 tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We 
had made that decision because these weapons no longer had any 
military value, according to our leaders.
    President Reagan also initiated an international effort 
aimed at forcing others to do what we already decided to do 
unilaterally. Through two Republican administrations, efforts 
to negotiate a chemical weapons treaty made slow, but steady, 
progress, and I would go back to that in a minute, but that was 
all part of that process.
    The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf War brought 
home the threat of poison and chemical weapons over 4 years 
ago. To set the record straight on that, as my friends I am 
sure know, in terms of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf 
War, Secretary Weinberger alluded to the exposure of American 
troops to poison gas. That was part of an Iraqi stockpile we 
destroyed after the Gulf War. I am certain he realizes that 
there was nothing illegal under any law about stockpiling or 
producing chemical weapons.
    The Geneva Convention applies only to the use of poison gas 
in international conflict.
    The CWC, on the other hand, bans production and stockpiling 
of poison gas and would give significant justification in the 
eyes of the international community had we again discovered 
another nation was making or storing these weapons or had we 
used whatever force we chose to use against them.
    Second, with regard to the issue of the Gulf War, prior to 
the Gulf War, an example of Saddam Hussein using poison gas 
against the Kurds, which was alluded to here, is another reason 
why the CWC is needed, in my view. There is nothing illegal 
under the Geneva Convention about the use of poison gas in 
internal conflicts.
    The proscription applies only to international armed 
conflict, as I am sure the Secretary knows. So they didn't even 
violate the Geneva Convention. It is also true the 
international community failed to act.
    But you did not fail to act, Mr. Chairman. You led the 
effort here in the U.S. Senate with Senator Pell and we 
received a unanimous vote for a sanctions bill on September 
1988 soon after this came to light.
    Unfortunately, the bill died at the end of the Congress, in 
large measure because of the opposition of the Reagan 
administration. Indeed, the Reagan State Department, then 
deluded into believing the United States could cooperate with 
Saddam Hussein, denounced the Senate bill that you pushed and 
you got through as premature.
    So I say that neither this Senator nor would others stand 
idly by if violations of the Geneva Convention were discovered. 
But I'm sure the Secretary knew that there was no violation of 
the Geneva Convention and the point he made was still a very 
valid one. That is, we did not act.
    We led the world to the altar, you might say, of attempting 
to deal with chemical weapons, and I am confident that we will 
not abandon 160 other nations, for, if we did, it seems to me 
we would send a signal of retreat, forfeit our leadership, and 
cripple our ability to forge coalitions against the gravest 
threats we face as a Nation, as Secretary Rumsfeld referred to. 
This is the proliferation of weapons, all weapons, of mass 
destruction. We have not even talked about biological weapons 
yet.
    I know that the witnesses this morning do not share my view 
that this treaty is in our vital national interest. And I know 
that and we have heard arguments that the treaty is flawed 
because several rogue states have not signed.
    We also heard that verification will be difficult and that 
the CWC will harm U.S. industry and that it will supposedly 
force us to transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and 
defenses to dangerous regimes.
    And, finally, maybe the most strenuous argument we have 
heard today is that we are going to be lulled into a false 
sense of security, that we are going to drop our guard.
    I hope to demonstrate through these hearings today, 
tomorrow, and the next day that those criticisms are incorrect 
and the problems they site will only get worse--get worse--
without CWC.
    From the military perspective, I believe this convention is 
clearly in our interest. I know that the witnesses do not agree 
with me. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense and 
the present Secretary of Defense, not represented here today, 
do agree with me. Harold Brown, William Perry, and Secretary of 
Defense Cohen all believe it is in our interest.
    There is a draft statement from Brown and Perry. It says, 
``As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join 
former military leaders, including past Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Powell, Vessey, Jones, Crowe, and former Chiefs 
of Staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps plus 
combat veterans like Norman Schwarzkopf in offering our strong 
support for ratification of the Chemical Weapons Treaty.''
    I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of their 
statement be placed in the record in the interest of time, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

           Draft Statement of Harold Brown and William Perry

    As former Secretaries of Defense, we would like to join former 
military leaders including past chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Generals Colin Powell, John Vessey, David Jones, and Admiral William 
Crowe, and former chiefs of staff from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps, plus other combat veterans like General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, in offering our strong support for the ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
    We firmly believe that U.S. ratification of the CWC will contribute 
significantly to the security interests of the United States and the 
safety of our armed forces. In conjunction with the Department of 
Defense's other efforts against chemical weapons proliferation, a 
robust chemical protection program and maintenance of a range of non-
chemical response capabilities, the CWC will serve the best interests 
of the United States and the world community. In light of the decision 
under President Reagan to get rid of the vast majority of U.S. chemical 
weapons stockpiles, it is in our interests to require other nations to 
do the same. The access provided for by the treaty will enhance our 
ability to monitor world-wide CW activities.
    We believe the CWC, which was negotiated under Presidents Reagan 
and Bush and completed by President Bush, to be a carefully considered 
treaty that serves our national interests well. Failure to ratify the 
CWC would send a clear signal of U.S. retreat from international 
leadership to both our friends and to our potential adversaries and 
would damage our ability to inhibit the proliferation of chemical 
weapons.

    Senator Biden. As the authors of this statement note, every 
single Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since President 
Carter's administration has endorsed ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Last Friday, 17 distinguished 
retired military officers sent a letter to the President in 
which they endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. The collection of signatures on this letter is 
quite impressive. If my colleagues will indulge me, let me just 
read a few: General Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Admiral 
Stanley Arthur, General Michael Duggan, General Charles Horner, 
General David Jones, General Wesley McDonald, General Meryl 
McPeak, General Carl Mundy, Admiral William Owens, General 
Gordon Sullivan, Vice Admiral Richard Truly, Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, General John Vessey, General Fred Warner, Admiral Elmo 
Zumwalt.
    In this letter they wrote--and I will just read the first 
paragraph--the following. They say, ``As former members of the 
United States Armed Forces, we would like to express our strong 
support for Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. This landmark treaty serves the national security 
interests of the United States.''
    I will not read the rest of the letter, but I ask unanimous 
consent that it be placed in the record, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                                                     April 3, 1997.
The Honorable William J. Clinton,
The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500.
    Dear Mr. President: As former members of the United States Armed 
Forces, we write to express our strong support for Senate ratification 
of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This landmark treaty serves 
the national security interests of the United States.
    Each of us can point to decades of military experience in command 
positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to prepare for the 
wartime use of chemical weapons and for defenses against them. We all 
recognize the limited military utility of these weapons, and supported 
President Bush's decision to renounce the use of an offensive chemical 
weapons capability and to unilaterally destroy U.S. stockpiles. The CWC 
simply mandates that other countries follow our lead. This is the 
primary contribution of the CWC: to destroy militarily-significant 
stockpiles of chemical weapons around the globe.
    We recognize that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
including chemical agents, presents a major national security threat to 
the U.S. The CWC cannot eliminate this threat, as terrorists and rogue 
states may still be able to evade the treaty's strict controls. 
However, the treaty does destroy existing stockpiles and improves our 
abilities to gather intelligence on emerging threats. These new 
intelligence tools deserve the Senate's support.
    On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security against 
chemical weapons. We must continue to support robust defense 
capabilities, and remain willing to respond--through the CWC or by 
unilateral action--to violators of the convention. Our focus is not on 
the treaty's limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC 
destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it significantly 
improves our intelligence capabilities; and it creates new 
international sanctions to punish those states who remain outside of 
the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

Officers who signed the April 3, 1997 letter to the President
Admiral Stanley Arthur, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Naval 
        Operations
General Michael Dugan, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
General Charles Homer, USAF (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Space Command
General David Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
        Staff
Admiral Wesley McDonald, USN (Ret.), former CINC, Atlantic Command
General Merrill McPeak, USAF (Ret.), former Air Force Chief of Staff
General Carl Mundy, USMC (Ret.), former Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
Admiral William Owens, USN (Ret.), former Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
        of Staff
General Colin Powell, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
        Staff
General Robert RisCassi, USA (Ret.), former CINC, U.S. Forces Korea
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Central Command
General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.), former Army Chief of Staff
Admiral Richard Truly, USN (Ret.), former Director, NASA
Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.), former Director of Central 
        Intelligence
General John Vessey, USA (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Frederick Woemer, USA (Ret.), former CINC, Southern Command
Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations

    Senator Biden. Now several of these signatories to the 
letter I have just read were present at a White House event 
early on Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from 
many walks of life joined together to call for early 
ratification of the treaty.
    I would like to ask unanimous consent that the text of the 
remarks made at this event be included in the record as well, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, the convention has won the 
endorsement of several highly respected veterans organizations 
as well. These include the Reserve Officers Association, the 
Vietnam Veterans Association, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the 
Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., the American Ex-Prisoners of 
War, and I would ask unanimous consent that the statements by 
these organizations also be placed in the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The information referred to appears in the Appendix.]
    Senator Biden. These individuals and organizations, none of 
whom can be characterized as soft headed or soft hearted, 
recognize the benefits of the convention for our front line 
soldiers, who increasingly face the risk of less discriminating 
and more treacherous weapons like poison gas. We should do the 
same.
    I would like to point out that I do not for a moment, nor 
do I know anybody else who does, question the patriotism, the 
integrity, or the distaste for poison gas or chemical weapons 
that is shared by our three most distinguished witnesses today. 
Anyone who would make such a statement is a damn fool.
    But the truth of the matter is we just have, as I say, a 
healthy disagreement among respected women and men about the 
value of this treaty for the United States. I think the value 
for those in favor far outweigh those opposed, but not in terms 
of their intellectual capability but in terms of their number.
    The argument that the treaty will be ineffective because 
several rogue states have not signed is, I find, equally 
perplexing. Today there is absolutely nothing illegal about the 
chemical weapons programs in these rogue states, and that will 
change once the CWC comes into force. At least it will be 
illegal. It will make such programs illegal. It will also 
provide us with a valuable tool--the moral suasion of the 
entire international community--to isolate and target those 
states who violate the norm which my friend, the former 
Secretary and head of more than one agency, believes--his view 
is that norms don't matter in international relations. I would 
like to have a talk with him, if we have more time, about the 
notion of norms and why I think they do matter.
    But at any rate, if you disagree and norms don't matter, 
then it doesn't matter. But most Americans and most people do 
agree that norms do matter. They do have some impact. They may 
not solve it all, but they have an impact.
    As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify 
this afternoon has noted, to say that we should not try to make 
chemical weapons illegal because there will be cheaters is like 
saying we should not have laws because we know people are going 
to break them.
    Norms are created so that we have standards for civilized 
conduct by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the 
rogue countries to behave as free actors.
    Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight 
of the world community to take whatever actions are necessary 
to respond and to prevent them. I acknowledge that we will 
ultimately take only that action which we view to be in our 
national interest. We will ultimately take only that action we 
view to be in our national interest.
    When my friends were former Secretaries of Defense, they 
did not recommend actions taken when we knew countries were 
acting in ways that were beyond our interests without 
considering the global interest and the interest of the United 
States relative to other considerations.
    So I acknowledge that ultimately we will take action or not 
take action based on whether it is in our interest.
    Equally importantly, we will place our military might 
behind the world's threat to act against violators.
    The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the 
supposedly onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly 
intriguing to me. You see, I come from Delaware. If there is 
any state in the Union that has a greater interest in the 
chemical industry, I know of none. And I can assure you 
gentlemen, big or small--and they are both big and small--if 
they had a problem, I guarantee you I would hear about it. I 
promise you that I would after 24 years.
    You were a former member, Secretary Rumsfeld. Do you doubt 
that the industry would let me know? Do you doubt for one 
moment?
    I can tell you that not only do they support it--and, by 
the way, this impacts on half of Delaware's industrial output, 
these chemicals. It is one-half. Not only does industry support 
it, they strongly support it.
    And in terms of those small outfits, Secretary Rumsfeld may 
not be aware of this, but Dan Danner of the National Federation 
of Independent Businesses said the CWC will have no impact on 
their members. They are neutral on the treaty.
    Maybe he was unaware of that, but that is their position.
    What I have heard from the chemical industry is if you 
don't ratify this convention, the chemical industry, which is 
the country's largest exporter, stands to lose hundreds of 
millions of dollars in export earnings; because it would be 
subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into 
the treaty to target rogue states. We wrote it in.
    Now this will be the irony of all ironies. My State will 
get a kick in the teeth on something we wrote into a treaty, 
because we do not ratify the treaty. And Germany has already 
announced that, come April 29, sanctions are going to apply.
    In fact, we have heard that all non-members will be subject 
to those German sanctions.
    By the way, one of our largest competitors is Germany, as 
you might guess. So there is a little interest there.
    The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a 
classic case of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No 
arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable, and the CWC is no 
exception to the rule. While there are risks that a State party 
will hide some covert chemical weapons stockpiles or illegally 
produce chemical weapons, it will be much more difficult to 
engage in large scale violations that would pose the greatest 
danger to U.S. military forces.
    As one of our witnesses this afternoon, a former colleague 
of yours, Ambassador Kirkpatrick points out--though she did not 
mean to point it out this way--she said you know, don't worry 
about verification. We are going to have to do this 
verification anyway, even if there is no treaty. That is the 
point. That is the point. We have to do it anyway. And we can 
do it less well--less well--without the treaty than with the 
treaty.
    George Tenet, the Acting Director of CIA, said, ``In the 
absence of tools that the convention gives us, it will be much 
harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and 
policymakers of where we think we are in the world regarding 
these developments.'' The intelligence community sees benefits 
in us ratifying CWC.
    In addition, there may well be occasions in which on-site 
inspection will provide evidence of treaty violations. In other 
words, while we will not catch every violator, we will catch 
some, and that does act as a deterrent. And without CWC, we 
won't catch anybody.
    The allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of 
export controls on dangerous chemicals is based on a poor 
reading of the treaty, with all due respect.
    Article XI of the convention supports the chemical, trade, 
and technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under the 
convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be 
``incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this 
convention.''
    The CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement 
of the Australia Group controls which member states use to keep 
chemical and biological materials out of the hands of rogue 
states. The executive branch has said this time and again and 
so have our Australia Group allies.
    In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of 
repeating these assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is 
the decline and failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the 
gravest threat to the Australia Group, and failure to ratify 
the CWC would be seen by friend and foe alike as a retreat from 
that world leadership.
    Under that circumstance, State and chemical industries 
might indeed conclude that we should go back to helping the 
Iraqis and Libyans of the world to build their suspect chemical 
facilities. If one were to extrapolate the argument treaty 
opponents make, one would have to conclude that no matter what 
we do, the Australia Group is a dead letter because on April 
29, those Australia Group countries that have joined the 
convention will be required to begin trading freely in 
dangerous chemicals, according to the argument made by the 
opponents. Obviously, this is as preposterous as it sounds. But 
it is a logical outgrowth of the allegation made by opponents.
    Finally, I would look forward to engaging the witnesses on 
their claim that the convention will lull us into a false sense 
of security. The Pentagon made it clear on numerous occasions 
that it will maintain a robust chemical capability supported by 
robust intelligence collection. The commitment to protecting 
our forces has the full support of the President and the 
Congress. In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms, 
assuming this treaty comes up, to a legally binding condition 
of the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense to insure 
that the U.S. forces are capable of carrying out our military 
missions regardless of any foreign threats or use of chemical 
weapons. Besides, our experience in other arms control 
agreements shows there is little chance of our becoming 
complacent about a chemical weapons threat if the CWC is 
ratified.
    I just would cite the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and 
not much more in the interest of time.
    Article X does not require the CWC defense assistance 
beyond antidotes and medical treatments. Does that really harm 
U.S. security? Isn't it a fair trade for getting those 
countries to forego chemical weapons? If other countries want 
to provide additional CWC defenses, as the Secretary indicates, 
how would the U.S. failure to ratify stop that in any way? You 
made your own argument. You said these guys are going to go out 
and do this anyway.
    Well, that's true. If they're going to do it, they're going 
to do it whether we are a signatory or not. Being a signatory 
in no way enhances that prospect. Industrial espionage is 
another question that I will not get into in the interest of 
time. But I notice that the chemical industry is not making 
that case, Secretary Rumsfeld, and we will have safeguards 
requiring the Secretary of Defense to maintain U.S. military 
capabilities to operate in chemical environments.
    The riot control agents is another subject that I would 
like to speak to, which I think we have taken care of.
    I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make my statement 
late, and I thank you gentlemen for listening. But then, what 
else could you do?
    [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

    Mr. Chairman, this is a defining moment in our foreign relations. 
In my view, the credibility and continued leadership of the United 
States on arms control and proliferation matters hangs in the balance. 
Twelve years ago the United States made a firm commitment to destroy 
the thirty thousand tons of poison gas that we had stockpiled. We made 
that decision because these weapons no longer had any military value.
    We also initiated a global effort aimed at forcing others to do 
what we had already decided to do unilaterally. Through two Republican 
administrations, efforts to negotiate the Chemical Weapons Treaty made 
slow but steady progress. The effort gained new urgency after the Gulf 
War again awakened us to the threat posed by chemical weapons. Over 
four years ago, Secretary of State Eagelburger signed the Chemical 
Weapons Treaty on behalf of the Bush Administration.
    Having led the world to the altar, I am confident that we will not 
abandon 160 other nations. For if we did, we would send a signal of 
retreat, forfeit our leadership, and cripple our ability to forge 
coalitions against the gravest threat we face as a nation--the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
    I know that the witnesses today do not share my view that this 
treaty is in our vital national interest. I know that we will hear 
arguments that the treaty is flawed because several rogue states have 
not signed. We will hear that verification will be difficult, that the 
CWC will harm U.S. industry, that it will supposedly force us to 
transfer sophisticated chemical equipment and defenses to dangerous 
regimes. Finally, perhaps their most strenuous argument will be that 
this treaty will lull us into a false sense of security and cause us to 
drop our guard.
    I hope to demonstrate today that these claims are incorrect and 
that the problems they cite will only get worse without the CWC. From 
the military perspective, I believe that this convention is clearly in 
our interest. I know that the witnesses may not agree with me in this 
regard. However, two other former Secretaries of Defense not 
represented here today do agree with me. These are Harold Brown, 
Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and William Perry, 
Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton term.
    I ask unanimous consent that their statement be included in the 
record. As they note in their statement, every single Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of staff since President Carter's Administration has 
endorsed ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Last friday, 17 distinguished retired military officers sent a 
letter to the President in which they endorsed ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. The collection of signatures on this 
letter is quite impressive. I would ask unanimous consent to place the 
text of this letter as well as an opinion piece by Secretary of Defense 
William Cohen in the record.
    Several of these signatories were present at a White House event on 
Friday in which dozens of distinguished Americans from many walks of 
life and both sides of the political fence joined together to call for 
early ratification of this treaty. I would ask unanimous consent that 
the text of the remarks made at this event be included in the record.
    The Convention has won the endorsement of several highly-respected 
veterans and military organizations as well. This list includes the 
Reserve Officers Association, the Vietnam Veterans Association, the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., and 
The American Ex-prisoners of War. I would ask unanimous consent that 
statements by these organizations be placed in the record.
    These individuals and organizations--none of whom can be 
characterized as soft-headed or soft-hearted--recognize the benefits of 
this Convention for our front-line soldiers, who increasingly face the 
risk of less discriminating and more treacherous weapons like poison 
gas. We should do the same.
    Mr. Chairman, the argument that the treaty will be ineffective 
because several rogue states have not signed is equally perplexing to 
me. Today, there is absolutely nothing illegal under international or 
domestic law about the chemical weapons programs in these rogue states. 
That will change once the CWC enters into force. It will make such 
programs illegal. It will also provide us with a valuable tool--the 
weight of the entire international community to isolate and target 
those states that violate the norm set by this treaty.
    As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who will testify this 
afternoon, has noted--to say that we shouldn't try to make chemical 
weapons illegal because there will be cheaters, is like saying that we 
shouldn't have laws because people will break them. International norms 
of behavior are created so that we have standards of civilized conduct 
by which to judge others. Without them, we leave the rogue countries to 
behave as free actors.
    Indeed, by joining the convention, we place the full weight of the 
world community to take whatever action is necessary to respond to, or 
prevent an adversary from using chemical weapons. Equally important, we 
will place our military might behind the world's threat to act against 
violators.
    The argument that U.S. industry will suffer under the supposedly 
onerous burdens of the treaty is particularly interesting for me to 
hear. You see, coming from Delaware I know a thing or two about the 
chemical industry--which is the industry that will be most impacted by 
this treaty. The chemical industry accounts for over one-half of 
Delaware's industrial output. If the chemical industry had a problem 
with this treaty, I assure you that I would have been among the first 
to hear about it. Instead, what I have heard is that the chemical 
industry played a key role in negotiating the convention and is among 
its strongest supporters.
    What I have heard is that if we don't ratify this convention, the 
chemical industry, which is this country's largest exporter, stands to 
lose hundreds of millions of dollars in export earnings because it 
would be subject to trade sanctions that the United States wrote into 
the treaty to target rogue states. In fact, we have now heard that 
Germany has announced that it will impose trade restrictions on non-
members come April 29.
    The argument that the convention is unverifiable is a classic case 
of making the perfect the enemy of the good. No arms control treaty is 
perfectly verifiable. The CWC is no exception to that rule. While there 
are risks that a state party will hide some covert chemical weapons 
stocks or illegally produce chemical weapons, it will be much more 
difficult to engage in large-scale violations that would pose the 
greatest danger to U.S. military forces. This is because of the CWC's 
extensive on-site inspection regime.
    George Tenet, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, 
testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that: ``In the 
absence of the tools that the Convention gives to us, it will be much 
harder for us to apprise you, apprise the military and policymakers of 
where we think we are in the world with regards to these 
developments.''
    The intelligence community wants us to ratify CWC because it will 
give them additional tools to detect chemical weapon programs in other 
countries. And that is something we're going to have to do anyway. In 
addition, there may well be some occasions in which on-site inspection 
will produce evidence of treaty violations. In other words, while we 
may not catch every violator, we may well catch some--and that will 
lead to deterrence.
    And without the CWC, we won't catch anybody--because there will be 
no bar on countries producing and stockpiling those weapons. The 
allegation that the treaty would lead to the end of export controls on 
dangerous chemicals is based on a poor reading of the treaty text. 
Article Eleven of the Convention supports chemical trade and technology 
exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also 
requires that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the 
obligations undertaken under this convention.''
    But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of 
the Australia group controls, which member states use to keep chemical 
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The 
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our 
Australia group allies.
    In fact, as we speak, our allies are in the process of repeating 
those assurances through diplomatic contacts. It is the decline and 
failure of U.S. leadership that would pose the gravest threat to the 
Australia group. And failure to ratify the CWC would be seen by friend 
and foe alike as a U.S. retreat from world leadership in an area that 
is critical to global security. Under that circumstance, states with 
chemical industries might indeed conclude that they should go back to 
helping the Iraqs and Libyas Of the world to build suspect chemical 
facilities.
    If one were to extrapolate the arguments of treaty opponents, one 
would have to conclude that no matter what we do, the Australia group 
is a dead letter. Because on April 29 those Australia group countries 
that have joined the Convention will be required to begin trading 
freely in dangerous chemicals according to the argument made by 
opponents. Obviously, this argument is as preposterous as it sounds, 
but it is the logical outgrowth of the allegation made by the 
opponents.
    Finally, I look forward to engaging our witnesses on their claim 
that this Convention will lull us into a false sense of security. The 
Pentagon has made it clear on numerous occasions that it will maintain 
a robust chemical defense capability supported by robust intelligence 
collection. The commitment to protecting our forces has the full 
support of the President and the Congress and I believe strongly that 
no future Administration or Congress will abandon our solemn 
responsibility to our troops in this regard.
    In addition, I have agreed with Senator Helms to add a legally 
binding condition to the treaty that requires the Secretary of Defense 
to ensure that U.S. forces are capable of carrying out military 
missions regardless of any foreign threat or use of chemical weapons. 
Besides, our experience with other arms control agreements shows that 
there is little chance of our becoming complacent about the chemical 
weapon threat if the CWC is ratified.
    For example, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was signed 
twenty-five years ago, yet we are continually vigilant on the threat of 
nuclear proliferation. As for defenses against poison gas--troop 
protection and decontamination training is a function of congressional 
funding. That equipment and that training will not go away unless 
Congress lets it go away. I certainly won't allow it, and I don't think 
my colleagues on the other committees of jurisdiction or on side of 
this issue will either.
    I am concerned that the opponents solution to the perceived problem 
of being lulled to sleep is to allow the threat of chemical weapons to 
grow even worse. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to a frank and open 
exchange with our witnesses. I hope that the hearing today moves us one 
step closer to action on this critical treaty before the impending 
deadline.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. You didn't take but 18.5 minutes.
    Senator Biden. Well, then I will forego my questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Oh, no, no. You are always very impressive, I 
will say, one way or another.
    The Chairman. Since we are playing a name game, Trent Lott 
got a letter the other day, signed by a few military people, 
such as Dick Cheney, Bill Clark, Alexander Haig, John S. 
Herrington, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Edwin Meese, Donald Rumsfeld, 
Caspar Weinberger, General Voss, Vice Admiral William Houser, 
General Kelley of the Marine Corps, General Thomas Kelly of the 
Army, Admiral Wesley McDonald--is that enough?
    Senator Biden. That's pretty good, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. OK. We have about 75 other signatories. 
Without objection, we will put that in the record.
    [The letter referred to by Chairman Helms appears on page 
15.]
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, this is not fair to do, but 
two of the guys you named changed their mind and signed a 
letter on April 3 saying that they are for the treaty.
    Oh, they changed their mind after they signed that.
    Oh, gosh, all right.
    There are a lot of guys changing their minds around here 
these days. Maybe we can change your mind, too.
    The Chairman. That will be the day.
    You won't change my mind about this statement made 
repeatedly about the Reagan Administration, which is not for 
this treaty. Think about Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, Bill Clark, 
Ed Meese, Richard Perle, Dick Adams, and on down the list. In 
fact, I know of no one on the Reagan team, as it is known, who 
is in favor of it. Sadly, nobody can ask the President himself, 
President Reagan, how he feels about it.
    I understand that several Senators are going to return so 
that they can have their time. We have agreed that 5 minutes 
for the first round may be the course of wisdom.
    Secretary Rumsfeld, you served for many years as Chairman 
and CEO of G.D. Searle and Company, which is, I believe, a 
large, multilateral pharmaceutical business. You have had quite 
a bit of experience and expertise in dealing with government 
regulations, to which you referred.
    In your expert opinion, why would the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association be so aggressive in supporting the 
treaty when I have this many letters (indicating) from chemical 
companies saying it is a bad treaty and please do not approve 
it?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, I cannot climb into the minds of the 
executives of the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Senator, 
but certainly an industry like that has, as Senator Biden has 
indicated, an opportunity to increase the number of chemicals 
they can export if this treaty is passed. At the present time, 
a number of chemicals are not permitted for export, which would 
be made permissible for export by this convention.
    So it is in their interest to have it passed in that 
regard.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Second, I am not an expert on the 
association, but certainly they represent the big companies. 
They don't represent the medium sized and small companies.
    Senator Biden has said he does not doubt that he would be 
hearing from small companies if there were a problem. I suspect 
if this passes he will hear from them. I don't believe that the 
thousands, whatever the number is, of companies across this 
country know about this treaty in any detail, believe that the 
treaty would apply to them, understand that they could be 
subjected to inspections, appreciate the unfunded mandates that 
would be imposed on them in the event this treaty were to be 
ratified.
    I might just point out that the Aerospace Industries 
Association has stated its strong concern about the treaty, and 
I hope that since they have said that they have not changed 
their mind.
    But you never know.
    But they have said it would unnecessarily jeopardize our 
Nation's ability to protect its national security information 
and proprietary technological data.
    I was told yesterday by an individual who is knowledgeable 
that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, for example, personnel 
from there were involved in one of the mock inspections 
conducted by the U.S. government. They evaluated the inspection 
results and some weeks later, from outside the facility, using 
modern technology, were capable of coming away with classified 
information and proprietary information from the inspection.
    So I don't think that it would be wise for us to 
underestimate the risk that would exist to classified 
information, to a company's proprietary information.
    There is a third problem. Most of us in business are 
engaged with joint ventures and partnerships with companies 
across the globe. We share proprietary information in the same 
facility. Were these inspections imposed, it is entirely 
possible that not only your own proprietary information could 
be compromised but also the proprietary information of joint 
venture partners to whom you have promised not to permit their 
proprietary information to be shared.
    Even cereal companies close their doors and do not allow 
people to walk through the plant. Why? They don't have 
classified information. What they have is process information, 
and the idea of photography or samples leaving their factory 
would unquestionably concern them deeply.
    The Chairman. I thank you. My time is up.
    Without objection, I am going to ask that the letters from 
industry in opposition to treaty ratification be made a part of 
this record.
    [The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
    The Chairman. I don't have but 30 seconds left, so I will 
turn to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
    I was just handed an interesting little comment that I will 
say to all of you. One of the letters that I have is from the 
company which makes the ink for the dollar bill. They are 
frightened that foreign inspections under the CWC would give 
counterfeiters some advantage.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. They are probably incorporated in Delaware.
    Senator Biden. I hope so. That accounts for the other 50 
percent of our business.
    Actually, that's not true. Chickens are bigger.
    Dr. Schlesinger. They are incorporated in Virginia and the 
letter was sent to Charles Robb.
    Senator Biden. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, obviously because of the time I am not going to 
be able to ask you all that I want to, though I am sure my 
colleagues will do a better job at it than I would.
    Let me ask you about a few things you have mentioned here 
and about conditions that have been tentatively agreed to, 
conditions added to the treaty that have been tentatively 
agreed to by Senator Helms and me--speaking only for me and not 
for any other member of the Democratic Caucus or the Republican 
Caucus. One of the criticisms was that this is unenforceable, 
this treaty. And one of the conditions we have tentatively 
agreed on is that the President would be required to consult 
with the Senate if the treaty is being violated. The President 
would be required to report to us on what was being done by way 
of inspections, diplomacy, and sanctions to respond to the 
violation. And if the violations were to persist for one year, 
the President would have to come back to the Senate and ask the 
Senate to decide if we should continue to adhere to the treaty 
or not. He would have an affirmative obligation.
    My question is, does this condition in any way, do you view 
it as positive, not whether it cures the problems of the 
treaty, but do you consider it a positive condition?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I think it is a positive condition.
    Mr. Weinberger. I would suggest, however, that we might 
want to look very carefully at the content of the report that 
the President makes to the Senate and see if it, in fact, is as 
accurate as it should be.
    Senator Biden. I think that is a valid concern and a valid 
point raised. There is another condition that we have 
tentatively agreed on.
    In response to a piece, an op-ed piece done by you 
distinguished gentlemen, you said, on March 5, that if the 
United States is not a CWC member State, the danger is lessened 
that American intelligence about ongoing chemical weapons 
operations will be ``dumbed down'' or otherwise compromised.
    In order to address that concern, Senator Helms and I have 
agreed to a condition requiring periodic reports and prompt 
notice to the Congress about chemical weapons programs around 
the world and the status of CWC compliance.
    The executive branch would also be required to offer 
briefings on these issues. This condition would give Congress 
an active role in advising the President in regard to insuring 
compliance. The information would be before the Congress and it 
would be incumbent upon us to review it and define, if we 
disagreed, when violations were taking place.
    My question is does this in any way go toward alleviating 
the concern about dumbing down?
    Dr. Schlesinger. Well, it helps in some ways and it adds to 
the problem in others.
    As you know, there is a proclivity of the executive branch, 
when it wants to avoid action, to ignore or to dumb down 
violations by others. There is a long history of this. I need 
not repeat it.
    Senator Biden. I'm aware of that.
    Dr. Schlesinger. You referred to the Iraq case yourself.
    Senator Biden. Now the other question that several of you 
have indicated in written material in the past was without a 
commitment of billions of U.S. aid to pay for destruction of 
Russia's vast arsenal, they will not comply with this treaty.
    Senator Helms and I have agreed to a condition to a 
resolution of ratification in an attempt to address this issue. 
Our condition states: The United States will not accept any 
Russian effort to condition its ratification upon the U.S. 
providing guarantees to pay for implementation.
    Let me ask you this. Does this in any way help in that 
problem, although I find it kind of strange? It's like the 
argument about why the Nunn-Lugar legislation was a bad idea--
this is not an argu- 
ment on your part, but some here have argued that it was a bad 
idea because we were paying money to the Russians to destroy 
nuclear weapons.
    I always found that an interesting argument, and I don't 
know why it would be such a bad idea to help destroy their 
chemical weapons, either. At any rate, we have a condition that 
says that that can be no condition of ratification.
    Is that a useful or a destructive addition to this treaty?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is useful, Senator. It does, 
however, underscore a fundamental problem that we have in that 
the bilateral destruction agreement was the foundation for the 
Chemical Weapons Convention and that Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin has now said that agreement has outlived its 
usefulness. That is worrisome.
    Senator Biden. As you will recall--and this will obviously 
be my last comment--as you will recall, the reason for that 
treaty was to prompt this treaty. You will remember that. 
Second, we did not ratify the treaty nor did they ratify the 
treaty.
    Anyway, thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen.
    The Chairman. Before I recognize Senator Lugar, let me say 
that the distinguished ranking member, Joe Biden, and I have 
spent several hours together trying to work on details, and we 
have agreed on about 21 relatively minor defects in the treaty. 
There are 5 or 6 major things yet to be considered, and the 
administration up till now--not Joe Biden, but the 
administration--is stonewalling considering even those defects.
    Senator Lugar.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to join you and members of the committee in 
welcoming witnesses this morning who are good public servants 
and personal friends of many of us on this committee. I have 
listened to their testimony and I have studied the op-ed which 
they wrote for the Washington Post last month. I believe their 
contribution was well written, but, at least for me, it was 
unpersuasive.
    Critics of the convention often speak as if the concerns 
they are expressing are being heard almost for the first time 
and that members of the committee have now taken these issues 
into account in developing the resolution of ratification.
    The critics may not be familiar with the resolution of 
ratification that we passed out of this committee by a vote of 
13 to 5 last year or the ongoing negotiations on the 
ratification issue this year which the Chairman just cited.
    The resolution is precisely the vehicle through which these 
matters of interpretation are taken up and conditions added to 
conform to U.S. domestic law. Instead of working these complex 
interpretation issues, many critics are repeating many of the 
same arguments that we have dealt with.
    I would say, for example, that we are treated to the so-
called complacency argument; that is, United States 
ratification of the CWC will lull the country into a false 
sense of security and a tendency to neglect its defenses. But 
this is surely a matter of political will here at home. It has 
nothing to do with the treaty. There is nothing inevitable 
about arms control agreements contributing to lessening a 
perceived need and, therefore, support for defense against such 
threats.
    But there is something wrong with the notion that by 
allowing our potential adversaries to have a chemical weapon 
situation without norms and international law, that we are sure 
to be reminded to defend ourselves against them. Rather than 
whining about complacency, Congress ought to do its job: 
Authorize and appropriate the funds necessary to provide for a 
robust chemical defense capability.
    In addition, Congress has every ability to add or to shift 
funds to ensure that CWC monitoring remains a priority.
    Second, we are treated again to the so-called poisons for 
peace argument; namely, the CWC will obligate member states to 
facilitate transfers of CWC specific technology, equipment and 
material to member states of the convention. Further, they 
charge the treaty commits new member states not to observe any 
agreements that would obstruct these transfers.
    That is the Iranian interpretation of Article XI. The 
United States and others rejected that argument and maintain 
that interpretation of Article XI did not require them to do 
so, that mechanisms such as the Australian Group are legitimate 
under the CWC, and the work of the Australian Group will 
continue.
    The resolution of ratification clarifies the American 
interpretation. The U.S. preserves the right to maintain or 
impose export controls for foreign policy or national security 
reasons. But nothing in the convention obligates the United 
States to accept any weakening of existing national export 
controls and that the export control and nonproliferation 
measures the Australian Group has undertaken are fully 
consistent with all requirements of the CWC.
    If, as critics state, the CWC would likely leave the United 
States more and not less vulnerable to chemical attack, then 
the blame again resides with political leaders in the United 
States, not with the convention. The treaty in no way 
constrains our ability as a nation to provide for a robust 
defense against chemical weapons or to impose and maintain 
export controls.
    Third, we are told that if the U.S. is a CWC participant, 
American intelligence is in danger of being dumbed down or 
compromised. Again, any dumbing down of intelligence has 
nothing to do with the convention. It has to do, once again, 
with political will.
    We quite predictably get, then, a charge on the 
Constitution made by critics that U.S. participation could 
leave U.S. citizens and companies vulnerable to burdens 
associated with reporting and inspection arrangements and to 
jeopardizing confidential business information.
    The critics pose as protectors of American industry, but 
industry has spoken for itself. U.S. industry would not support 
the CWC if it posed significant risks to confidential business 
information. Specifically, the chemical industry has worked 
intensively to ensure that protections against the loss of 
confidential information are incorporated in the CWC and the 
administration-proposed implementing legislation.
    By the same token, allegations that this will require 
violation of the Constitution are wrong. The proposed 
implementing legislation provides for search warrants if 
routine or challenge inspections are to be carried out without 
consent. The CWC also allows the U.S. to take into account 
constitutional obligations regarding searches and seizures, 
proprietary rights, and providing access through challenge 
inspections.
    Finally, there is the argument that we be in no hurry to 
adhere to the convention and if and when we decide to join 
other signatories will have no choice but to adjust. 
Nevertheless, if we are not a party when it enters into force, 
we will have no role in the governing body and that is 
important.
    The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I noted 
when I walked in here the presence of the distinguished 
Admiral, who has rejoined us here.
    It is a pleasure to see you again, Admiral. We are glad to 
have you back with us.
    Today I thank all three of you for being here as witnesses. 
All three of you had distinguished careers, and it is a 
pleasure to see you back before the committee.
    Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding these hearings. I 
respect immensely the concerns that you have raised. You have 
done so in an appropriate fashion over the last number of 
months, and we are going to have a chance, as it appears now, 
in the next few days to actually express our will in the Senate 
on this, which I think is appropriate and proper given the 
April 29 deadline.
    I commend you and Senator Biden for the tremendous effort 
you have both put in, along with your staffs, to try to resolve 
some of the outstanding differences. Senator Lugar as well 
deserves a great deal of credit, having a long-standing 
commitment to this issue.
    So I commend all of you for your work.
    I noted, Mr. Chairman, that you said the Reagan 
administration team was sort of opposed to this. The name game 
is dangerous, but the last time I looked, General Vessey, Jim 
Baker, Ken Adelman, Colin Powell, General Rowny, Paul Nitze and 
the Vice President were part of the Reagan team and they 
support the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    But there is a danger in going back and forth. I think the 
question has to be raised of what is in the interest of our 
country here, whether or not this is going to serve our 
interests in the 21st century.
    I am struck by a couple of observations. One is that we saw 
in the 1970's--in fact, Secretary Schlesinger I think was very 
much involved in this--the Biological Weapons Convention or 
treaty which President Nixon sent up to us here, which was 
strongly supported, as I recall, by both parties, both sides of 
the aisle. It has some 157 signatories, I think. One hundred 
forty countries ratified it. There is no verification, to the 
best of my knowledge, in that particular convention, yet it has 
worked pretty well.
    It has short comings, obviously. There is not universal 
adherence to it, but it has worked fairly well.
    I raise that because this treaty obviously does have 
verification included in it. One would argue that it actually 
does a much better job.
    I am also struck by the fact that in 1985, President Reagan 
signed into law a bill that would eliminate by the year 2004 
the entire existing stockpile of chemical weapons. So we made a 
decision about a decade ago. One could argue, I suppose, the 
merits of it, but we made that decision; and we have been about 
the business not of upgrading or modernizing any of our 
chemical weapons but to unilaterally--to unilaterally--
eliminate our own stockpiles in chemical weapons.
    I know of nothing that has been said here, nor has anyone 
advocated, at least in the last few years that I have been 
here, that we ought to modernize our stockpiles in chemical 
weapons. No one has made that suggestion that I know of or 
offered legislation in that regard.
    So it seems as a country, in a bipartisan way, going back 
almost 25 years, more than 25 years, that we have taken a 
leadership position, both internationally and unilaterally, on 
the issue of chemical weapons; because we realize the dangers 
involved and associated with these weapons of mass destruction.
    The issue now comes down to whether or not this Nation, 
having authored, championed, and led this effort, whether or 
not we are going to be able to sit on the Executive Council 
which will set the rules of the road.
    We are acting in some way as if, if we don't ratify this, 
it does not happen. It does happen. If we don't ratify this, it 
does happen.
    The issue now becomes whether or not we are going to ratify 
in such a way that the interests of our country and the 
interests which we champion, that is, the abolition of chemical 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction, that we are going to 
be allowed to sit at the very table to decide the rules of the 
road to determine whether or not that is going to work, having 
unilaterally decided that we will take ourselves out of this 
game by the year 2004.
    I just wonder, briefly, if our three witnesses here might, 
in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention of the 
1970's, the general success of that, the decision in 1985 by 
the Reagan administration and Secretary Weinberger to 
unilaterally get out of this business by the year 2004--that 
was a Reagan administration decision--why it is not in the best 
interest of our country to move forward on this convention in 
light of the decisions we have already made.
    The Chairman. We will let you answer that on the next 
round.
    Senator Hagel.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I very much appreciate the opportunity to listen and learn 
this morning. Mr. Chairman, as you suggested, there are 15 new 
United States Senators. There are 3 new United States Senators 
on this panel.
    This is one United States Senator who needs to know more 
about what we are doing here, and I very much appreciate you 
and Senator Biden opening the process and giving us a chance to 
learn and listen.
    Just as in life where actions have consequences, treaties 
have consequences. We live with those consequences.
    I, as a supporter of a ballistic missile defense system, am 
somewhat struck that we are still captive to the 1972 ABM 
Treaty in the argument of some why we cannot go forward and 
construct a ballistic missile defense system.
    We are not here to talk about the ABM Treaty, but I am here 
to learn a little bit more about what this chemical treaty is 
about. Understanding, as the distinguished panel has brought 
out in rather poignant terms this morning in the questioning 
and the comments by my distinguished colleagues have added to 
this enlightenment, first, civilized conduct is not predicated 
on treaties and is not governed by treaties. Civilized conduct 
is not anchored by treaties or some esoteric academic kind of 
parchment.
    Civilized conduct is anchored by civilized people. One of 
the concerns I have with this treaty as it is written, not 
unlike what I have heard this morning--and I must say also what 
Secretary Weinberger has said, I do not know of anyone who is 
for chemical weapons or the use of them--and as someone who has 
understood a little bit about combat, as others on this 
committee know and some of the direct personal experiences 
articulated by our panel this morning show they understand a 
little bit about this business, is this; and I guess my 
question comes down to this: Should we have a chemical weapons 
treaty and if we should, what form should it take? I would be 
very interested in our three distinguished panelists, Mr. 
Chairman, answering that question. If not this treaty, should 
we have one? Whatever that answer is leads us obviously to the 
next question, which is what form, if you agree we should have 
a treaty, what form should that treaty take.
    Secretary Weinberger?
    Mr. Weinberger. I think we have to bear in mind the point 
that you made at the beginning, that you don't solve the 
problems of ethics or of use of these weapons by any attempt to 
impose civilized standards on uncivilized government. I don't 
think for a moment, in connection with the statements Senator 
Biden and Senator Dodd made, that it would make the slightest 
difference to Saddam Hussein whether it was legal or illegal 
for him to use poison gas. He did violate that treaty, the 
original agreement in Geneva, when he attacked the Kurds. I 
think any time it suits his interest, he would do so.
    Indeed, the old Soviet definition of truth is whatever 
serves the country. So you have to have in mind that kind of 
attitude.
    Against that background, there is no impropriety in setting 
standards. I think that you can make it clear that the use of 
poison gas is outlawed by public opinion around the world. You 
can get statements to that effect. But when you add to that the 
enormously intrusive processes which require us to share with 
some extremely potentially hostile countries defensive 
mechanisms that we may be, and I hope are, working on to 
improve our capability of defending against this type of 
warfare, then I think you are neglecting the best interests of 
the United States. That is one of the reasons why I think this 
treaty, this convention, should not be ratified.
    There are all kinds of ways of making international 
statements. But when you bind yourselves to the situation of 
preventing the country from having the kind of defensive 
capability it needs in a world like this, then I think you are 
not serving the best interests of the United States. That is 
one of the reasons I think this treaty goes far beyond 
attempting to set just international standards and speed 
limits, and all those other comforting terms, because at the 
same time it requires us to take actions that would weaken us 
very severely and, I think, increase the chances of chemical 
warfare being used by rogue nations who would be told very 
publicly that other nations had no retaliatory capability.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Secretary Rumsfeld.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Just very briefly, I won't take much time. I 
see you are on the yellow already.
    First, obviously a great deal of the problem is with 
Articles X and XI.
    Second, the Executive Council is a problem. It is unlike 
the United Nations, where the United States at least has a 
veto. Here, in this instance, as I recall, Asia has 9 members, 
Africa has 9 or 10, Latin America has 7, Eastern Europe has 5, 
Western Europe has 10, and ``other'' is thrown in with Western 
Europe. We don't even have a guaranteed seat.
    So it would be a very different kind of mechanism, even 
different than the International Atomic Energy mechanism, as 
Secretary Schlesinger mentioned.
    So I think those two things stand out by way of problems.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kerry.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Might I add just a little bit on that 
point, the last point that Mr. Rumsfeld mentioned?
    The fact is that, under the IAEA, the United States 
provides scrutiny of the budget in a way that this budget will 
not be scrutinized through the internal politics of the IAEA. 
Second, the Western nations have a blocking vote in the Board 
of Governors of the IAEA. It requires a two-thirds vote of the 
IAEA. To prevent intrusions in the United States requires a 
three-quarters adverse vote. And as Mr. Rumsfeld has just 
indicated, under the circumstances, the United States is not 
guaranteed a seat. It is described as ``other.''
    That is, I think, a clarification of the remarks by Senator 
Dodd with regard to our participation in the Executive Council. 
That may be a transitory device. It may be a permanent device. 
But there is no indication of it.
    Finally, there is a facilities agreement under the IAEA so 
that there is no hunting license to go around in the 10,000 
facilities in the United States that are subject to the 
requirements of this agreement.
    The Chairman. Now Senator Kerry.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I have a number of questions, and I am sure I will not be 
able to get at them in the short time available. But let me 
begin, if I can.
    Gentlemen, I assume you don't believe that chemical weapons 
manufacturing or chemical weapons threats can be adequately 
monitored by U.S. technical means alone.
    Do you agree with that?
    Mr. Weinberger. That's correct. I agree with that. It 
cannot be.
    Senator Kerry. So you need some kind of protocol, some kind 
of mechanism for the process of adequately providing our 
intelligence community with a capacity to advise our leaders 
adequately.
    Mr. Weinberger. Senator, I see what you are getting at. But 
the fact of the matter is that the treaty that we are 
considering here does not have any kind of guarantees or any 
kind of verifiability that countries that say they are going to 
do one thing are going to do it.
    Just because it has a very intrusive mechanism which allows 
them to go all into these 10,000 or more companies in the 
United States or similar numbers in other countries of the 
world does not mean that there is any guarantee that any of the 
countries that are signatory to it are in effect going to be 
doing what they say they are going to be doing.
    Senator Kerry. By that same logic, there is no absolute 
guarantee for any treaties that we have signed. Isn't that 
accurate?
    Mr. Weinberger. That's one of the reasons I was always 
worried about relying exclusively on an arms control regime, as 
opposed to a military capability regime along with arms control 
for insuring our own security.
    Senator Kerry. If you follow that logic----
    Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, could I say something 
without taking away from the Senator's time?
    Senator Kerry [continuing]. Can he do it without taking 
away from my time?
    The Chairman. Oh, certainly.
    Senator Kerry. That is a privilege. Thank you.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Senator, let me try and raise the 
fundamental question here, which is the loss of sources and 
methods.
    When David Kaye was in charge of the inspection in Iraq, he 
discovered to his chagrin that the Iraqis had been able to hide 
from Western intelligence their activities. Why--because the 
Iraqis themselves had been trained by the IAEA in the 
techniques used by Western, specifically American, 
intelligence.
    He had a conversation with an Iraqi official who simply 
stated we have gotten all of this information.
    Now the Executive Council of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is engaged in training people 
from all nations at this juncture.
    What we are doing in the intelligence area is probably 
suffering a net loss. As the Senator indicates, we will have 
greater access and, therefore, we will have increased 
intelligence of one type. But our techniques for intrusion, our 
techniques for interpretation will be compromised.
    This is clearly the case in North Korea, in which the North 
Koreans have wisely discovered through our revelations that the 
IAEA's demand to see their waste dumps will compromise 
information on their production of plutonium.
    So the Senator's question is quite right with regard to 
improved intelligence, but it is offset by the compromise of 
sources and methods.
    Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, I 
understand your argument, but I think the logic is lost here 
for a number of reasons.
    First of all, Iraq is not a party. So nothing will change 
with respect to Iraq. In fact, none of the rogue states about 
which we have the greatest fears are parties. Therefore, 
nothing with respect to our intelligence gathering or state of 
anxiety should change with respect to those states.
    On the other hand, because you have a regimen with respect 
to everybody else who is trafficking in or legitimately trading 
in the precursor chemicals, we will have a much greater 
ability, in fact, according to our own intelligence personnel, 
to determine the ability of those rogue states to, in fact, get 
a hold of those chemicals, or the ability to manufacture on 
their own.
    What do you say to that? It is interesting that Jim Woolsey 
said this will give the country an additional tool in the box. 
Our current CIA Acting Director, George Tenet, says it will. 
John Deutch said it will. The entire U.S. command structure, 
almost the entire U.S. command structure for the Persian Gulf, 
who faced the threat of chemical weapons, say that this will 
strengthen our hand.
    It is hard for me to understand why you find their 
perception of this as an increased tool and as an important 
protection wanting.
    Dr. Schlesinger. I think that is easily answered, Senator, 
and if I may respectfully suggest, you are on the wrong wicket 
in this regard.
    For a decade DCI's have come to this Senate, to the House, 
and stated that this treaty is unverifiable. Jim Woolsey came 
up and said this treaty is unverifiable. John Deutch, who has 
been cited by the administration as saying that it is 
verifiable has stated, ``I've never said it's verifiable. It's 
clearly unverifiable.'' And in the article with General 
Scowcroft, he indicated it was unverifiable.
    The nonsignatories, such as Syria and Libya, are likely to 
get a little assistance from signatories like Iran and Cuba. 
That will not be difficult to establish.
    Senator Kerry. Can I just interrupt you there on the point 
of verifiability?
    Dr. Schlesinger. Sure.
    Senator Kerry. First of all, no treaty is purely 
verifiable. No treaty.
    Second, none of them said that this treaty is not 
verifiable to some degree. They all said this is verifiable to 
a certain degree. We all understand that.
    The question before us is are we better off without any 
protocol which controls precursor chemicals, are we better off 
being totally outside of the regime that will be set up by the 
control as of the 29th of this month, and are we better off 
without all nations, Russia included, coming in to an agreement 
as to how we will try to track this. Are you better off in 
terms of verifiability?
    Are you better off in terms of verifiability without this? 
That is my question.
    Dr. Schlesinger. We have to look at the----
    Senator Kerry. No. Please answer my question.
    Are we better off without verifiability?
    The Chairman. Just a minute. The Chair is----
    Senator Kerry [continuing]. I'd just like to get my 
question answered, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Well, you can do it with a little more 
discretion than that.
    Now you are talking with a former Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency. He should know what he is talking about. 
He deserves better than to be----
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I'm not trying to do anything 
except----
    The Chairman [continuing]. Please, please.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Now you can answer the question, sir.
    Dr. Schlesinger. There will be gains in verifiability and 
losses in verifiability. The fact that our techniques will be 
undermined probably will exceed the gains in verifiability. 
Moreover, we are dealing not only with the verification of 
chemical weapons, we are dealing with the possible industrial 
espionage in the United States. And that industrial espionage 
is going to be a godsend--I repeat, a godsend--to foreign 
intelligence agencies and to the corporations which will feed 
on those foreign intelligence agencies.
    A recent book, ``War by Other Means,'' talks about economic 
espionage in the United States and how vulnerable we are to 
economic espionage. That must be included in the total 
assessment with regard to the performance of the intelligence 
community.
    Mr. Chairman, may I say that I worry deeply about the 
statement that was earlier made by Senator Biden that the 
intelligence community wants us to ratify the treaty. I heard 
that statement--and excuse me, Senator Kerry for drifting off 
your question--I heard that statement, and I am deeply 
concerned that the intelligence community should not be wanting 
a decision on any policy matter. The intelligence community is 
there to provide information, not to provide judgments on 
policy issues.
    I hope that that statement did not reflect either the 
DCI's, the Acting DCI's views or the views of the intelligence 
community.
    Mr. Weinberger. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might answer 
another of Senator Kerry's questions which is do you think we 
are better off by not signing this protocol. My answer is 
unequivocally yes, we are better off by not signing it because 
this particular protocol not only has all of the faults that we 
pointed out and is not verifiable, but it does require us, and 
we would carry out our obligations, I am confident, because we 
always have, it requires us to share both defensive and 
offensive technological developments that we should be working 
on to protect our troops.
    That I think is a very deep flaw. The Senator, I am sure 
inadvertently, omitted from the list of rogue nations that have 
not joined the fact that Iran has joined and Iraq has not.
    So you would be giving an enormous intelligence advantage 
and an enormous disclosure advantage to a country like Iran. 
When General Schwarzkopf was asked why he supported the treaty 
and if he understood that by supporting the treaty he was 
supporting the sharing of this kind of technical development 
with Iran, he said of course not. He was horrified.
    I think that is a fair description of what he felt when 
this was brought home to him.
    The Chairman. Senator Grams.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Grams.
    Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
welcome our distinguished panel, and I appreciate your time 
here this morning.
    Some of these you might have already answered. I came in 
late, so I apologize. But I would just like to go over some of 
the basics on this.
    One basic argument, a major argument, that has been made by 
the supporters of the CWC is that, although it may be far from 
perfect, that it is better to have some treaty in force rather 
than none at all; in other words, sign on to be part of this 
board or Executive Council to enact what may be a troubled 
treaty.
    How would you respond to that assertion, that it is better 
to be a part of this treaty than none at all.
    Mr. Rumsfeld, may we start with you?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that when one weighs the advantages 
and disadvantages, it is clear to me, at least, that the 
defects vastly outweigh the advantages of establishing a 
standard or a norm in this instance.
    Further, I think it is perfectly possible to achieve the 
advantages that would accrue from this agreement without having 
to be burdened with the disadvantages.
    Senator Grams. How would you do that, Mr. Rumsfeld?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, one way, as I mentioned, is the 
question of Articles X and XI, which I think should not be in 
there. The way they are written they represent very serious 
problems. The second way I mentioned was the mechanism of 
enforcement. The so-called Executive Council I think is flawed 
and would offer the United States nowhere near the ability to 
affect decisions that we have in the United Nations or that we 
have in the IAEA.
    Senator Grams. Mr. Weinberger?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, I think the argument that something 
is better than nothing depends upon something not being worse 
than what you have.
    We don't need to sign this treaty to assert our goodwill or 
to assert the fact that we are against chemical weapons. I said 
at the beginning that I have the greatest detestation for these 
weapons, and I am sure every soldier does. Anyone who took part 
in any kind of service understands what they mean and what they 
do.
    But we don't have to sign a flawed treaty to demonstrate to 
the world our rejection of these kinds of weapons. We have many 
times taken actions that indicate that we are opposed to them.
    So I would certainly agree completely with Don Rumsfeld 
that you do have great disadvantages and those disadvantages 
outweigh any possible good that can come from a generalized 
statement that we, too, dislike these weapons and we, too, are 
willing to have them abolished.
    Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger?
    Dr. Schlesinger. We have a treaty, we have an agreement, we 
have a convention, the Geneva Convention, which is already in 
force. So it is not a question that something is better than 
nothing because we already have something. That something 
prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It is easier to detect 
the use of chemical weapons than it will ever be to detect the 
manufacture of chemical weapons. Consequently, we are far 
better off not watering down the Geneva Convention in the way 
that this treaty threatens to.
    I note that in Article VII or, thereabouts, it says that no 
way does this current agreement weaken the requirements of the 
Geneva Convention. We should take a firm stand on the use of 
weapons, and we need to have the capacity to enforce it.
    If we look at what will happen after the signing of this 
agreement, if, for example, China signs--and I have been 
described as a friend of China. I don't see any reason for us 
to drift into confrontation with China. But I want to say that 
anybody who believes that the Chinese will give up their 
chemical weapons capability or that they will give up the 
capacity to manufacture must be suffering from hallucinations.
    If we are prepared to do anything about it, that would 
require a greater rigor in dealing with Chinese departures from 
agreed on arms control measures than we have exhibited to this 
point.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. May I add one comment or thought that comes 
to mind?
    Senator Grams. Sure.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. In view of both what you and Senator Kerry 
have asked and discussed, the implication that nothing will 
change with respect to Iraq goes back to my point on Articles X 
and XI. I think it will change, even with respect to Iraq, in 
this sense. Country's that don't sign will be there, and with 
the dramatically increased flow of information which Articles X 
and XI require, and transfer of technology, and availability of 
information, it will get around. There is no question but that 
the information, particularly with respect to the defensive 
side, will be available. It will get out into the marketplace.
    You cannot keep it in. If that many countries have access 
to it, it will not be secret from the rogue nations.
    Senator Grams. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Feingold.
    Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me first take this opportunity to thank you and the 
ranking member, Senator Biden, for the leadership and the 
dedication you have demonstrated on this issue before us this 
morning. I also want to recognize the efforts of the White 
House Working Group and the Lott Task Force to clarify this 
issue. I know that these negotiations are taking a great deal 
of time and involve a tremendous amount of technical detail.
    I want to note that this committee, too, has spent a lot of 
time on this treaty. In the 104th Congress, the distinguished 
Chair held three extensive hearings. I was pleased to be able 
to participate in those hearings, which have given the members 
of this committee an opportunity to closely examine a number of 
issues pertaining to this treaty and the consequences of its 
ratification or of the failure to ratify it.
    We asked some tough and probing questions and I think 
received thoughtful responses from the administration and 
private witnesses who have come before us.
    Despite all of this hard, hard work, we find ourselves at 
the 11th hour without Senate debate on this treaty. Even though 
the United States had the key leadership role throughout 
negotiations over this treaty, and even though 70 countries 
have already ratified it, this institution has not yet had a 
chance to actually consider the ratification of CWC.
    I just would like to reiterate, in the couple of minutes I 
have, what has already been said here this morning. Time is of 
the essence for the full Senate to have this debate. We are all 
well aware of the looming deadline of April 29, exactly 3 weeks 
from today. That is the deadline by which the United States 
must deposit its instrument of ratification of this treaty so 
that we may be a full participant in the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or OPCW, the governing body 
that will have the responsibility for deciding the terms for 
the implementation of CWC.
    In my view, the United States participation in the OPCW is 
fundamental to ensuring that American companies and American 
citizens are treated fairly under the inspection provisions of 
this treaty. It is precisely because some observers think that 
these provisions are faulty that Senate consideration is 
essential. Senators should have the opportunity to debate these 
concerns, and the American people certainly deserve a chance to 
hear them.
    As elected representatives with the constitutional 
responsibility to provide advice and consent to treaties signed 
by the President, I think we are obligated to give full 
consideration to the CWC. With the April 29 deadline looming 
ahead of us, I think we owe it to the people who elected us to 
fulfill that duty to do it in a timely fashion and to do it 
responsibly.
    This treaty was signed by President Bush in January 1993 
and was submitted to the Senate by President Clinton in 
November of that year. Almost 3\1/2\ years later, the Senate is 
now faced with a 3-week deadline. The Chemical Weapons 
Convention is the culmination of a decades-long effort to bring 
these weapons under international control and work toward their 
eventual elimination.
    While I think we would all concede and have said that the 
CWC remains imperfect, I still believe it is the best avenue 
available for beginning down the road to that eventual 
elimination.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I again commend the tremendous interest 
you have taken in this issue, but I hope we can vote on the 
treaty soon.
    Mr. Chairman, I just have a couple of questions for the 
panel.
    First, in your March 5 Washington Post op-ed, the three 
distinguished members of this panel indicated that if the 
United States decides to become a party at a later date to this 
convention, perhaps after improvements are made to enhance the 
treaty's effectiveness, it is hard to believe that its 
preferences regarding implementation arrangements would not be 
given considerable weight.
    I guess I would like to know what improvements you would 
make. If it is in the interest of the United States to make 
these improvements, how would you propose that the United 
States accomplish this if we are not a member of the OPCW?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, I don't think that the possibility of 
our being disregarded exists, Senator. I think if we are 
expected to pay 25 percent of the costs of this treaty, which 
are very considerable, we are certainly going to be listened 
to.
    As far as changes are concerned, I tried to indicate this 
morning, in a too lengthy statement, perhaps, all of the things 
that I think are wrong with it. Certainly Articles X and XI 
would have to be changed in a major way so that we do not 
preclude ourselves from having the capability of defending 
against rogue states who either signed or didn't sign this 
convention.
    What we have done in those articles, in my opinion, gives 
them all of the opportunity to either weaken or basically 
eliminate any kind of improvements we would make in the 
protective clothing, the masks, the defensive capabilities 
against these terrible weapons. It does not prevent rogue 
states from using them, or from stockpiling them, or from 
manufacturing them.
    Senator Feingold. If I may follow up just for a second on 
that, in effect, then, you are saying that our financial 
leverage would be sufficient to allow us to change it?
    Mr. Weinberger. Oh, I would be extremely disappointed if it 
isn't, Senator. Yes. We have quite a lot of opportunity to 
observe that in a number of other organizations, and if we are 
expected to put up 25 percent--and I would suspect that within 
a couple of years it would be 35 percent--of the cost of this 
treaty, we would certainly, I would hope anybody who was 
President at that time or Secretary of State at that time would 
make it quite clear that we require for our contribution a very 
genuine decisionmaking role.
    Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Brownback.
    Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and for holding 
the hearing. I am delighted to be here with these three 
gentlemen who I view as some of the key implementers of our 
strategy to win the cold war. You gentlemen were allegation 
three there and were a key part of that, to which our country 
and my children have an enduring debt to you for doing that.
    I thank you for it, for all you have done.
    I have a couple of questions. I am new to this committee 
and new to the Senate. So this is among the first hearings I 
have had on the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Secretary Weinberger, Russia, of course, has not signed on 
to the treaty and yet is the world's largest chemical weapons 
possessor. Do you think we at a minimum should require that 
they sign on before we would consider signing on to this 
treaty?
    Mr. Weinberger. Senator, my understanding is that they have 
agreed, or ``signed on,'' so to speak, but they have not 
ratified it yet. Their record is extremely poor in this 
because, as you said, they have a very large stockpile of these 
weapons and they have already stepped out of--which is the kind 
and polite way to phrase it--the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement, which was widely heralded as one of the great 
saviors of mankind when it was originally submitted. They have 
simply said it has outlived its usefulness.
    So that is a very unfortunate record to have before the 
world.
    They are widely reported to have said that they would only 
sign on if we agreed to pay the full costs of their destruction 
of their weapons. This is a large sum; and if it ever should 
happen, I would very much hope that we would have some ability 
to monitor and follow any money we gave them. We have already 
given them some sort of token or opening demonstration of our 
goodwill, and we don't know what that was used for. And we 
don't know what a lot of the economic aid is used for.
    So all of these are things that I think would certainly 
have to be at least far better understood than they are now. It 
would not bother me at all if Russia were required to have some 
kind of guarantee that they would take care of destruction of 
their own weapons and that we should not make our commitment to 
any kind of agreement to pay for that.
    Senator Brownback. Now as we have both noted, they have not 
ratified. Should we require their ratification before we would 
ratify?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, it would certainly be a more 
comfortable feeling, but it certainly would not remove, in my 
mind, the objections to the faults and the flaws within the 
treaty itself.
    Senator Brownback. So, even really if they do ratify, you 
would still have the same sort of reservations you do now?
    Mr. Weinberger. As it stands now, yes, sir, I would.
    Senator Brownback. And that would depend upon further 
negotiations with the Russians and their destruction of the 
chemical weapons they have?
    Mr. Weinberger. I would just like to find out what the 
problem is with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement they 
signed. Why has it served its purpose? Why is it no longer 
useful for them to adhere to it?
    Senator Brownback. Secretary Rumsfeld, you had noted that 
the United States has the ability as a nation to stand alone, 
to pull something to be a much better document, a much better 
treaty, than what it is in your testimony. If we did stand out 
on this and we said we're not going to sign the CWC; because it 
is such a flawed agreement, how would we be able to, how do you 
think it would evolve that we would pull that on toward a 
better agreement? How would you see that evolving into the 
future to where it would be something that you would like to 
support?
    As all of you noted, and as all of us have noted, none of 
us wants chemical weapons in this world. We are all opposed to 
those. How would you see that evolve to where we could get a 
better agreement?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I do think that the United States is among 
the very few countries in this world that do have the ability 
to not be subject to the kind of diplomatic momentum and to 
decide what they believe is right and then set about trying to 
fashion an arrangement whereby what's right can be achieved. If 
we can't, who in the world can do that?
    So the idea that we are going to lose our leadership I 
think is just not true.
    The way to approach it, it seems to me, would be to start 
with what is important and what is realistic. As these 
gentlemen and I have tried to do today, we have pointed out the 
things that are the problems. What one would do would be to try 
to avoid those.
    I must add a comment, however, about the Russians. The fact 
that recently there is information available suggesting that 
they have, using everyday commercial chemicals, developed the 
ability to develop chemical weapons suggests that they or 
anyone else would be able to shift facilities from making 
chemical weapons to making commercial chemicals in a very short 
period of time.
    We were talking about no treaty is verifiable. It is a lot 
easier to verify intercontinental ballistic missiles than it is 
chemicals, commercial chemicals, that can also be used for 
chemical weapons and things that can be made in very small 
spaces.
    So I think even though we have an enormously intrusive 
regime for policing it, as intrusive as it is, it would not be 
able to do the job.
    So I think that we have the cart before the horse in this 
process, and I would like to see us go back and do it right.
    Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, you might want to put in the 
record the Reuters report on what the Russians are doing. It is 
interesting that the new development avoids any of the 
precursors that are listed under the existing treaty. So if one 
uses different precursor chemicals, one can avoid the 
restrictions of the treaty.
    The Chairman. Let's go to one more round. I don't want to 
keep you here all day, but this is a fascinating discussion. 
Let me reiterate at mid point that I certainly do appreciate 
your coming here today and cooperating with us.
    We will make this a 3-minute-per-Senator round.
    You said something early in your testimony, Mr. Secretary, 
about people being instructed not to say anything unfavorable 
about this treaty. Well, we have had the same thing in our 
committee among the staff, and I had one report saying that the 
FBI had specifically been instructed to say nothing unfavorable 
about this treaty.
    Now you have been Director of the CIA and I need your help. 
Whom would you recommend, past or present, that we subpoena to 
testify under oath regarding the CWC and the White House 
directions that we have had reported to us?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff, 
Senator.
    The Chairman. Pardon?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I will suggest a list to the staff----
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Dr. Schlesinger [continuing]. A list of suitable 
witnesses--whether or not the subject of subpoena is a decision 
for the committee and not by me.
    The Chairman. That will be fine, and I thank you.
    Now I think it has not been mentioned, except indirectly, 
about Jim Woolsey's testimony in June 1994, in which he said 
the chemical weapons problem ``is so difficult from an 
intelligence perspective that I cannot state that we have a 
high confidence in our ability to detect noncompliance, 
especially on a small scale.''
    Now, Secretary Rumsfeld, I have a letter from the Aerospace 
Industry Association stating strong concern that the CWC will, 
and I quote the letter, ``unnecessarily jeopardize our Nation's 
ability to protect its national security information and 
proprietary technological data.''
    Now this was fascinating to me because back in early 
January, I think it was, the B-2 was taken to North Carolina, 
to Seymore Johnson Air Force Base, and thousands of people came 
to see it. Everybody was proud of it and marveled at the 
enormity of it, and so forth.
    But then it occurred to me that chemicals are used in the 
manufacture of the B-2.
    Now let me ask you to step back and very quickly say what 
kinds of risks to our companies are posed by letting foreign 
inspectors poke around, interview employees, take photographs, 
and take samples for analysis overseas.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. Well, Mr. Chairman, I must say that I cannot 
answer it authoritatively, and I am struck by the dramatically 
different views on this particular issue by proponents and 
opponents.
    My personal view is anything I have read or seen in this 
document and these materials I cannot see how we could avoid 
allowing classified information to be made available to 
inspection teams.
    I have heard statements by Members of the Senate of: 
``Don't worry about that, that's not a problem.'' But I have 
not seen anything in the agreements that suggest to me that 
it's not a problem, because modern technology enables people to 
do an enormous amount of analysis some distance in time and 
space from where the materials were located and still come away 
with information that is exceedingly important, classified, and 
proprietary.
    I don't know how it would be avoided.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Senator Biden.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Chairman, on that particular point, 
the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons will 
use as its principal tool the GC/MS, to wit, the gas 
chromatograph mass spectrometer. That is the tool that was used 
by the Livermore Laboratory to procure from outside the gates 
classified information at a missile facility, and that will be 
the tool of choice.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Joe.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, I apologize for having left for a few moments. I 
had to go to another meeting briefly.
    I understand this issue of defensive technologies made 
available to rogue states, states that are parties to the 
convention. I assume we are primarily talking about Iran. We 
could be talking about China, we could be talking about, in 
some people's minds, Russia.
    But paragraph 1 of Article X lists ``medical antidotes and 
treatments'' as a permissible form of defensive assistance.
    Now, again, as Secretary Rumsfeld just pointed out, it is 
amazing how an authoritative and informed people end up on both 
sides of the issue on the same point. So let me ask you this.
    Where do any of you find the requirement that a State 
Party, that is, a signatory to this convention, a ratifier, is 
required to provide anything more than that--medical antidotes 
and treatments?
    Mr. Weinberger. Do you want to look at the third paragraph, 
Senator, of Article X? Each State Party undertakes to 
facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the 
fullest possible exchange of equipment, material, scientific 
and technological information concerning means of protection 
against chemical weapons.
    Senator Biden. Has the right.
    Mr. Weinberger. Yes, the right.
    Senator Biden. So you believe that paragraph says that we 
are required to give them, any State, any technology that we 
have available?
    Mr. Weinberger. Senator, as was said in another connection, 
English is my mother tongue, and I can't read it any other way.
    Senator Biden. Now on Article XI, the chemical trade that 
the CWC would encourage is only that ``for purposes not 
prohibited under the convention.'' And the only prohibited 
trade restrictions are those ``incompatible with the 
obligations undertaken under this convention.''
    Now we don't say we have to undo our trade restrictions and 
neither do the other Australia Group members. So why do we 
accept Iran's interpretation of this article over that of our 
allies and the U.S.?
    Mr. Weinberger. Precisely because it is so fuzzy that you 
have all kinds of interpretations, and you will have a big set 
of arguments as to who is doing what. And any interpretation 
that we may claim can be denied very easily by all other 
countries that don't happen to agree with us or don't want to 
agree with us.
    You have, what you have set up here is an oral battleground 
for varying interpretations. It will allow enemies of the 
United States or potential enemies to make claims that, when we 
are in the position of denying them, will set us up as being 
violators of this treaty.
    Senator Biden. If I can, I would conclude by saying would a 
condition that would be binding, that a legal declaration we'd 
make to not provide rogue states with advanced chemical 
defenses--assurances--would that meet any of your concerns?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, I would certainly like to see it 
written down, Senator. Yes.
    Senator Biden. OK, thank you.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Well, the provisional body, the 
provisional body states that we are obligated to provide these 
defensive technologies.
    There was an argument in a recent National Public Radio 
broadcast between the general counsel of ACDA and the head of 
the provisional body, Mr. Kenyan, a Brit. He stated and rebuked 
the proposition that the United States might be able to avoid 
providing this kind of technology, that it was required 
underneath the CWC.
    So I think that you have a clear legitimization. Even if 
we, for one reason or another, withhold such information, our 
industrial partners will proceed to provide this because of the 
legitimization provided by this agreement.
    As Senator Biden observed earlier, norms are important, and 
if you provide a norm which allows the Germans or others to 
provide information to Iran, they will accept that norm.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Weinberger, you obviously were the Secretary of 
Defense during most of the Reagan administration. For the 
record, and for this Senator, much has been made of the fact 
that the CWC was initiated during the Reagan administration.
    Could you provide, at least me, somewhat of an analysis as 
to how it was initiated, why it was initiated, and today why 
most of the Reagan administration officials during that time 
are now opposed to it?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, I cannot speak for anyone else, 
Senator, and I don't know what the historic origins of it were 
all the way back. But I think that everybody was appalled by 
the use by Iraq of poison gas against the Kurds, and there was 
an attempt to get some kind of international order to try to 
prevent that sort of thing.
    President Reagan is a very compassionate and humane man and 
obviously shared with the world the distaste and the 
detestation of these kinds of weapons.
    I would hesitate very much to say that he had an 
opportunity to see all of the provisions that emerged from the 
very lengthy negotiation. He certainly did not have that 
opportunity. He certainly did not know that four of the 
principal rogue nations of the world would stay outside the 
treaty and, therefore, not be banned from doing anything at all 
and that we would be put in the position of weakening any kind 
of retaliatory capability we might have.
    Those are conditions that changed since the initial 
praiseworthy, humanitarian effort to try to do something about 
the elimination of these weapons.
    As Secretary Schlesinger pointed out, we did that after 
World War I, the Geneva Conference. We did it later on, after 
President Reagan left office, with the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement, which simply does not work out.
    There are all kinds of reasons why humane and compassionate 
people--and I like occasionally to classify myself in that same 
category--dislike these weapons and would like to do something 
about it.
    But the fact of the matter is that what we have done here 
is not only ineffective, but it is dangerous for the security 
of our troops, in my opinion.
    Dr. Schlesinger. I have two quick points, Senator.
    When George Shultz announced the quest for a chemical 
weapons agreement, he said that it would be a verifiable 
chemical weapons treaty. This is not verifiable.
    Second, the Reagan administration to the very end believed 
that the United States should retain a 500 aging ton level of 
binary chemical weapons and should not surrender that minimum 
capability until such time as other countries came into 
conformity. I think that the argument that this all originated 
with Ronald Reagan is not an accurate argument.
    George Bush was for this treaty, but Ronald Reagan would 
not be if he were able to comment on it.
    The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
    Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, the first question I want to put to you is that 
the United States is now embarked on a path of unilaterally 
destroying our stockpile of chemical weapons. Do you think we 
should carry through on that?
    Mr. Weinberger. To the extent that Secretary Schlesinger 
indicated, with the reservation that was made during the Reagan 
administration that we should have a minimal deterrent 
capability and that other nations should know that we do have 
that, particu- 
larly rogue nations that are likely to or have indeed used 
chemical weapons.
    Senator Sarbanes. So you would keep some chemical weapons?
    Mr. Weinberger. I think you have to, Senator. Yes.
    Senator Sarbanes. And that's your position, I take it, 
Secretary Schlesinger?
    Dr. Schlesinger. No, sir. The existing stockpile is 
obsolete, and it is more dangerous.
    Mr. Weinberger. Excuse me. It's the binaries we're talking 
about now.
    Dr. Schlesinger. It's obsolete and dangerous, and I think 
we must get rid of it one way or another.
    Mr. Weinberger. The unitary weapons are indeed being 
replaced. It is the binary weapons that we were talking about 
under the Bilateral Destruction Agreement. But everyone said 
that we had to keep some kind of minimal retaliatory capability 
of the binary weapons.
    Senator Sarbanes. What is your position, Secretary 
Rumsfeld?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I think that we need some to develop the 
defensive capabilities that are necessary, so that we know what 
we are doing.
    Senator Sarbanes. So you would all keep some chemical 
weapons.
    Now the next question I have is what is your position on 
whether the Senate should have an opportunity to vote on this 
treaty. I know how you would encourage members to vote as I 
understand your testimony. But what is your position on whether 
the Senate ought to be able to take this treaty up and consider 
it and vote on it.
    Dr. Schlesinger. The Senate should vote.
    Mr. Weinberger. Yes, certainly. I thought that's what this 
process was, that this was the beginning of the process that 
leads to a Senate vote.
    Senator Sarbanes. Well, it doesn't always lead to a Senate 
vote. No. The question I am putting to you is whether you think 
there should be a Senate vote.
    Mr. Weinberger. I have no problem with that at all.
    Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I have no problem with it.
    Senator Sarbanes. Now the other question I want to ask you 
is this. You have each raised a number of problems or concerns 
that you have with the treaty. I want to narrow it down and 
isolate it out.
    If the rogue nations do not sign the treaty, is that in and 
of itself, in your view, sufficient grounds not to approve the 
treaty?
    Mr. Weinberger. Speaking for myself, Senator, it would seem 
to me that if you have a ban on the nations that are basically 
in some form of general agreement with us with respect to 
democratic values and all the rest of it, and that they carry 
that out, and that the nations that do not, including 
specifically the rogue nations outside this treaty at the 
moment, you would be offering them an invitation to launch a 
chemical attack. This is because we would have, by a standard 
that we follow, we would carry out our agree- 
ment and we would denude ourselves of any capability of 
retaliating and that is one of the best ways of deterring.
    It is unfortunate that in this kind of world that has to be 
the case, but it is.
    Even the nations, some of the nations that are within the 
treaty, like Iran, you find that----
    Senator Sarbanes. I just want to try to focus this for the 
moment.
    Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Yes, I understand what you are 
saying, Senator, but I would like to complete the answer. The 
answer basically is that the answer of rogue nations from those 
who sign would be a source of considerable concern.
    It is not the only source of concern because many nations 
which sign----
    Senator Sarbanes. I understand that.
    Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. Would not be able, would not 
keep their word, and we could not verify whether they are doing 
it or not.
    Senator Sarbanes. Is the absence of the rogue nations in 
your view of sufficient concern that you would be against the 
treaty?
    Mr. Weinberger. It is one of the reasons that leads me to 
oppose it, but there are many others.
    Senator Sarbanes. If the others were not present, would 
that in and of itself be enough that you would oppose it?
    Mr. Weinberger. If the others were what?
    Senator Sarbanes. If the other reasons that you have for 
opposing it were not present, were taken care of, would the 
absence of the rogue nations be enough for you to oppose it?
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, as you put the question, if all of 
the things I object to are not in the treaty, then almost by 
definition I wouldn't oppose it.
    Senator Sarbanes. No, no--the rogue nations are not in the 
treaty in the question I'm asking. That's all I'm--I'm just 
trying to determine how critical a factor that is in your 
thinking.
    Mr. Weinberger. Let me say that my opposition is based on a 
large number of reasons and one of them is the absence of the 
rogue nations from any provisions with respect to compliance.
    Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Schlesinger?
    Dr. Schlesinger. No, the absence of the rogue nations in 
and of itself would not lead me to oppose the treaty. I would 
regret that absence. But the other problems are much more 
serious in my view.
    Senator Sarbanes. Secretary Rumsfeld?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I agree with Secretary Schlesinger.
    The Chairman. Senator Grams.
    Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have 
just a quick, brief question.
    As you know, riot control agents, such as tear gas, have 
also been used by the U.S. military during search and rescue 
missions for downed pilots or to handle situations where 
noncombatants are mixed in with the combatants. My 
understanding is that the Clinton administration's current 
interpretation of the CWC is that it would ban such uses of 
riot control agents by the U.S. military.
    Mr. Weinberger, when the Reagan administration was 
negotiating the CWC, was it ever your understanding that the 
U.S. would have agreed to such a ban or that it was a desired 
result of this treaty at all?
    Mr. Weinberger. No. Those were always to be excluded 
because of their obvious importance and their obvious 
necessity. We understand that the commitment was made that they 
would be excluded from the treaty but that the Clinton 
administration changed its mind in its commitment and now says 
that they would be banned.
    There is now some very technical discussion of whether they 
would be banned in wartime or not; that it might be all right 
to use them in peacetime crowds, but not in wartime. I would 
like to use them to protect our soldiers in wartime or in 
peacetime.
    Senator Grams. Now if this is not a lethal chemical, does 
this give you any concern about the broad scope of agents that 
could be covered under this treaty, which would open the door 
for more inspections?
    Mr. Schlesinger?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I'm not sure I understood the question, 
sir.
    Senator Grams. I mean, if this is a nonlethal chemical and 
this is included, is there a concern that it would be so broad 
that all chemicals or any definition of a chemical could be 
part of the reasons for inspections or to come into plants in 
the U.S.?
    Mr. Rumsfeld. The very reason for an investigation suggests 
that there is a question. So ``investigation'' can run to 
organizations that don't have anything to do with lethal or 
nonlethal chemical weapons--because someone has to look. If 
there is an allegation, a charge, a question, they can go in 
and investigate. That is where you end up with the numbers of 
companies running into the thousands.
    Senator Grams. Mr. Schlesinger, this is the economic 
warfare that you had talked about earlier, possibly?
    Dr. Schlesinger. I'd like to clarify one thing.
    President Ford issued an Executive order which has existed 
and prescribed U.S. policy on riot control issues for the last 
20 years. That has been somewhat obscured now by pressures from 
our allies and equivocation within the administration.
    On the question that you put, indeed, inevitably questions 
will be raised about any chemicals under those circumstances.
    Senator Grams. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Kerry.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    If I could just say with respect to my last round of 
questioning, I want to make it very clear, and I think 
Secretary Schlesinger knows this, that he is a friend and a man 
for whom I have enormous respect. I would in no way try to do 
anything except work this light here, which is our perpetual 
enemy. We try to get answers rapidly and, unfortunately, 
sometimes we get witnesses here who are so good at answering 
only one question.
    Dr. Schlesinger. I fully understood, Senator, and I tried 
to protect your time. I was not successful.
    Senator Kerry. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
    If I could just ask you, Secretary Weinberger, I was really 
struck by your statement about deterrence. Is it your position 
that you can only deter chemical weapons use with chemical 
weapons?
    Mr. Weinberger. No. I thought I was quite clear, Senator, 
that it is one of the ways of trying to do it. Arms control is 
another way, and there are probably many more. But it is 
essential, I think, that a country that has already used poison 
gas against some of its own people, as just occurred, it is 
only prudent I think for that country to know that if they 
launch a chemical attack on some other nation or the United 
States that they would be met with a comparable, not a 
proportionate, response in the terms of one of our departments, 
but a massive response and that they should know that. That is 
one of the means of deterring, though it is not the only means.
    Senator Kerry. Wouldn't you say that the Bush 
administration was, in fact, quite effective at making it clear 
to Iraq that the nuclear use was, in fact, available and, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is, as of now, no indication 
that that was not successful?
    Mr. Weinberger. Yes. That is my exact point, that we were 
able to do that. If we denuded ourselves of any capability of 
making that kind of response, I have no doubt that----
    Senator Kerry. But nobody here is talking about that. All 
we are talking about is continuing to pursue what a number of 
administrations have pursued, which is reducing our own 
manufacturing participation in chemical weapons.
    Mr. Weinberger [continuing]. That's fine. But I don't think 
at the same time we ought to take away our capabilities of 
developing new, improved, and better defensive technologies and 
equipment.
    Senator Kerry. Defensive, I agree. And the treaty agrees.
    Mr. Weinberger. No, the treaty doesn't.
    Senator Kerry. Well, the treaty says very clearly that we 
are allowed to defend.
    Mr. Weinberger. That's right, and we have to disclose them 
completely to any other signatory, and that disclosure in 
itself weakens them if it does not destroy their effectiveness.
    Senator Kerry. Well, in point of fact Article I, which you 
have not referred to, addresses the questions of whether or not 
you have to, under any circumstances, assist, encourage, or 
induce in any way anyone to engage in any activity that is 
prohibited by this treaty.
    Now all we are talking about under this treaty is chemical 
weapons. So, therefore, Article I, in fact, most people--see, 
there is that infernal bell, or light. It is hard to have a 
dialog here.
    Most people have argued it supersedes any other clause in 
here, because the basic intent of this treaty is to preclude 
the manufacture by anybody of chemical weapons in a way that 
could be used against another nation.
    Mr. Weinberger. That is the intent. There are nations 
outside it who may be manufacturing them, who may be 
stockpiling, and, in fact, are stockpiling them as we know now.
    What I am troubled by is the fact that if we develop a so-
called fool proof mask and protective clothing that still 
enables you to take the actions that soldiers have to take in 
defending themselves and their country, you are going to have 
to share that. By sharing it, you eliminate its effectiveness. 
There is a little process called reverse engineering whereby 
all of the processes which you have to produce that have to be 
given to other members, other signatories, and those signatory 
members, as Secretary Rumsfeld suggested, that kind of 
information, distributed on that kind of scale, one way or 
another is bound to get into the hands of potential enemies.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Secretary, this is a very, very 
important point. In effect, what you are saying is that if you 
were to share it, you would have rendered even more ineffective 
the capacity to use chemical weapons, which is, in effect, the 
very purpose of this treaty.
    Mr. Weinberger. Well, that is not the way I would phrase 
it. No.
    Senator Kerry. Let me just finish my thought.
    Mr. Weinberger. We are talking about defensive equipment 
now.
    Senator Kerry. I understand. But if you can defend against 
something, it has no offensive capacity. If it has no offensive 
capacity, you have taken away its military value. That is 
precisely the purpose of this treaty.
    Mr. Weinberger. You are talking about absolutes, Senator, 
absolute capabilities and all the rest. But what I am talking 
about are improvements in an already imperfect defensive 
capability that we have now.
    Senator Kerry. But if I were a military leader----
    Mr. Weinberger. Sharing those improvements makes them 
relatively--at least we could phrase it this way if you would 
like--makes them relatively less effective than if we didn't 
share them.
    Senator Kerry [continuing]. I agree. But if I were a 
military leader, knowing that we had shared our ability to be 
able to have a foolproof mask, I am not going to use the 
chemical weapon. And if you don't use the chemical weapon 
because you know it is foolproof, you have done exactly what 
you have tried to do with this treaty, which is eliminate the 
potential for chemical weapons to be used.
    Mr. Weinberger. I'm sorry, but I don't follow you. I have 
great respect for you, but I don't follow that.
    Senator Kerry. Well, I don't think it is that hard to 
follow.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. May I respond?
    Senator Kerry. I think----
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary Rumsfeld.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. I just think that the way you have cast it is 
not correct. First, there is the threat of the use of chemical 
weapons, which is a terror weapon. It affects people, behavior, 
and soldiers. Second is the reality that for every offense 
there is a defense and for every defense there is going to be 
an offense. There is always going to be an evolution in 
technology. So the idea of perfection does not exist in this 
business.
    But let's say that you had reasonably good defensive 
capability. Assume that on the part of the other side. You 
cannot function for long in a chemical environment. You could 
not function with that kind of equipment. The advantage clearly 
is in the hands of the aggressor.
    So I think you are on a track that, to me, does not make 
sense. In my view, sharing technology about how to defend 
against these weapons is not anything other than 
disadvantageous for the defender and advantageous for the 
aggressor.
    The Chairman. That is the last word.
    We have been here for 2 hours and 47 minutes. I have been 
on this committee for quite a while--otherwise I would not be 
sitting in this chair, and I do not recall a more significant 
hearing with more facts and figures being given than you 
gentlemen have provided.
    I want you to know, speaking for myself and I think for all 
of the Senators on this committee, I am enormously grateful for 
your having made the sacrifice to even be here, particularly 
Secretary Rumsfeld. You came quite a distance.
    But I do thank you on behalf of the Senate and the 
committee.
    As we close, let me point out once more, in case somebody 
has forgotten it, that last year this treaty was reported by 
this committee and scheduled for debate in the Senate. And it 
was not dropped by my request. It was dropped by the request of 
the administration, which did some head counting and realized 
they did not have the votes.
    Now I presume in saying that you think the Senate ought to 
vote on this treaty that you mean after the committee has 
performed under the rules and reported it to the Senate with a 
majority vote. Is that what you mean?
    Mr. Weinberger. Of course. Yes.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Yes, it is.
    Mr. Weinberger. As I said, Senator, I thought this was part 
of the process for the Senate.
    Mr. Rumsfeld. It's for this committee to decide that.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if we were ready last year, 
why aren't we ready this year? Nothing has changed in the 
treaty.
    The Chairman. Well, I don't know about that. I thought you 
and I made some changes in it.
    Senator Biden. Oh, we know we did. But the point is we were 
ready before.
    Dr. Schlesinger. Well, there are two branches of 
government, Senator, at least.
    Senator Kerry. But only one does treaties.
    The Chairman. I'm at a disadvantage with hearing aids, so I 
had better get out of this one.
    There being no further business to come before the 
committee, we stand in recess.
    Thank you again, gentlemen.
    [Whereupon, at 12:49 p.m., the committee recessed, to 
reconvene at 3:30 p.m. the same day]


                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                              ----------                              


                  TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 1997--P.M. SESSION

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:30 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Lugar, Coverdell, Hagel, Smith, 
Grams, Brownback, Biden, Sarbanes, Robb, Feinstein, and 
Wellstone.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Madam Secretary, I was delighted late yesterday to learn 
that you wanted to appear before this committee today to give 
the benefit of the administration's perspective on the treaty 
again. I think it is clearly a matter of public record that the 
entire Helms family admires you. I think they are going to 
score some points by having you up here this afternoon.
    Now, if Senator Biden will agree, this is the first time 
you have appeared as Secretary of State formally.
    Secretary Albright. That is true.
    The Chairman. And this being such an important issue, I 
know that the Senators will have questions either in writing or 
in person that they want to ask directly of you. I know, 
knowing you, that you will respond to these written questions, 
realizing the Senators have commitments to other places.
    I and the other members of the committee will forego our 
statements, unless Senator Biden wishes to make one.
    Senator Biden. I will be happy to place mine in the record, 
Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank Secretary Albright 
this afternoon for appearing on such very short notice and making time 
in her busy schedule to be with us this afternoon because she 
recognizes the central importance of this issue for our national 
security.
    I appreciate the opportunity to take a few minutes again to address 
perhaps the most important issue to come before the 105th Congress to 
date: The Chemical Weapons Convention.
    This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and 
what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: This 
treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention would make it illegal under 
international and domestic laws for a country to use, develop, produce, 
transfer or stockpile chemical weapons.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention represents a significant step 
forward in our efforts to contend with the greatest immediate threat to 
our national security: The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction.
    The CWC will help protect our citizens from the use of poison gas 
weapons by terrorist groups. It will benefit our military by requiring 
other nations to follow our lead and destroy their chemical weapons. It 
will improve the ability of our intelligence agencies to monitor 
chemical weapons threats to our armed forces and our Nation.
    The convention has the strong support of the American chemical 
industry, which was centrally involved in the negotiation of the CWC. 
It also takes into account all of the protections afforded Americans 
under our Constitution.
    The CWC will make pariahs out of states that refuse to abide by its 
provisions. Through the sanctions required by the convention, it will 
make it more difficult for those pariah states to obtain the precursor 
chemicals they need to manufacture poison gas. It will create 
international pressure on these states to sign and ratify the CWC and 
to abide by its provisions.
    The CWC will create a standard for good international citizens to 
meet. It will brand as outlaws those countries that choose to remain 
outside this regime.
    The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a 
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support 
for the important american objective of containing and penalizing rogue 
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
    we need to disregard arguments that are superfluous to the core 
reality of what this convention will accomplish: It outlaws poison gas, 
period. The United States is already committed to destroying its 
chemical weapon arsenal. By ratifying the CWC, we can hold other 
countries to the same standard we have set for ourselves.
    In this morning's testimony, we heard three very distinguished 
former Secretaries of Defense tesify on this treaty.
    Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us 
to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states, 
including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement. 
Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all 
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through 
mechanisms like the australia group.
    In reviewing the treaty, we find both claims are false.
    With regard to sharing defensive technology, paragraph seven of 
article ten states that: ``Each state party undertakes to provide 
assistance through the organization and to this end to elect to take 
one or more of the following measures.'' Let me emphasize: ``Elect to 
take one or more.''
    Among the options, the option I expect the United States would 
choose, is that we could: ``Declare, not later than 180 days after this 
convention enters into force for [us], the kind of assistance we might 
provide in response to an appeal by the organization.''
    That's right: We would declare what we might provide.
    The Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a condition that 
would require the executive branch not to provide any assistance to a 
rogue state beyond medical antidotes and treatment. And that would be 
fully in keeping with article ten of the CWC.
    As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current 
mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the 
CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
    Article eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange 
``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires 
that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations 
undertaken under this convention.''
    But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of 
the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical 
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The 
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our 
Australia Group allies.
    I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most 
advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on 
chemical weapons. I will be interested to hear how the officials in the 
administration today view these provisions.
    I understand that Secretary Albright must leave after her statement 
today, and I welcome the opportunity to hear her testimony and the 
statements and responses of all of our witnesses here today.

    The Chairman. And we will print any statement that you wish 
to make for the record, and that will give you an opportunity 
to summarize if you wish. In other words, you are a free agent 
and you are welcome. Madam Secretary, the stage is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE KORBEL ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE

    Secretary Albright. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am 
delighted to see you here, as I enjoyed our trip to North 
Carolina.
    The Chairman. We enjoyed it.
    Secretary Albright. I had a good time.
    Senator Biden and Senator Brownback, I am very glad that 
you were able to make time for me to testify on such short 
notice. I am also delighted to note the return of Admiral 
Nance, who just walked through the door. I wish him continued 
recovery, and I say that sincerely on behalf of the entire 
Department and not simply those whose names are scheduled to 
come up before you for confirmation.
    Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is 
one of the President's top foreign policy priorities and, this 
afternoon, I would like to explain why. I begin with the 
imperative of American leadership. The United States is the 
only nation with the power and respect to forge a strong global 
consensus against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
    In recent years, we have used our influence wisely to gain 
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus and 
Kazakstan. We have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear 
program. We have maintained sanctions against Iraq. We have 
joined with others in controlling the transfer of dangerous 
conventional arms. In these and other efforts, we have counted 
on the support and counsel of this committee and your Senate 
colleagues.
    American leadership on arms control is not something we do 
as a favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for 
Americans and to protect our allies and friends. We have now 
another opportunity to exercise leadership for those ends and, 
once again, we look to this committee for help.
    The CWC will enter into force on April 29th. For reasons I 
will discuss, we believe it is essential to ratify the 
agreement before then, so that America will be an original 
party. Chemical weapons are inhumane. They kill horribly, 
massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable than 
the wind.
    We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons 
and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles. 
Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we 
would ever use against others, but it would help ensure that 
others never use chemical weapons against us.
    In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in 
mind that today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are 
legal. The gas Saddam Hussein used a decade ago to massacre 
Kurdish villagers was legally produced. In most countries, 
terrorists can buy chemical agents, such as sarin gas, legally. 
Countries such as Iran and Libya can buildup their stockpiles 
of chemical weapons legally.
    If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, 
we must begin by making not only their use, but also their 
development, production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. 
This is fun- 
damental. Making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the 
CWC.
    The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation 
to build or possess a chemical weapon and gives us strong and 
effective tools for enforcing that standard. This will not 
eliminate all danger, but it will make chemical weapons harder 
for terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build, or conceal.
    Under the treaty, parties must give up the chemical weapons 
they have and refrain from developing or acquiring them in the 
future. To enforce these requirements, a comprehensive 
inspection regime will be in place. The treaty will give us the 
tools we need to learn more about chemical weapons programs. It 
will also enable us to act on the information we obtain.
    In the future, countries known to possess chemical weapons 
and who have joined the CWC will be forced to choose between 
compliance and sanctions. Countries outside the CWC will be 
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to 
possess chemical weapons.
    These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They 
will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical 
weapons and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to 
acquire materials needed to produce them.
    Over time, I believe that if the United States joins the 
CWC, most other countries will, too.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the problem 
states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if 
America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We 
will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support 
strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to 
join the treaty being violated.
    The core question here is, who do we want to set the 
standards? Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed, because we 
cannot assume early ratification and full compliance by the 
outlaw states. To me, that is like saying that because some 
people smuggle drugs, we should enact no law against drug 
smuggling. When it comes to the protection of Americans, the 
lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who abide 
by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by 
which all should be judged.
    Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of 
April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive 
Council for at least 1 year, thereby losing the right to help 
draft the rules by which the Convention will be enforced; we 
would lose the right to help administer and conduct 
inspections; and because of the trade restrictions imposed on 
nonmember states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that 
they would risk serious economic loss.
    Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan 
goal. The convention itself is the product of years of effort 
by leaders from both parties. The treaty has strong backing 
from our defense and military leaders.
    I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this 
morning from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not 
favor approval of this convention. Their arguments deserve 
consideration. I would point out, however, that other former 
Secretaries of Defense from both parties support the treaty, 
and that every former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, going back 
to the Carter administration, has endorsed it.
    Just this past week, we received a letter signed by 17 
former four-star generals and admirals, including three of the 
former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and five former service 
chiefs.
    Let me quote from that letter:

    Each of us can point to decades of military experience in 
command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to 
prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for defense 
against them.

    The quote continues:

Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations, but instead on 
its many strengths. The CWC destroys stockpiles that could 
threaten our troops; it significantly improves our intelligence 
capabilities; and it creates new international sanctions to 
punish those states who remain outside the treaty. For these 
reasons, we strongly support the CWC.

    I also note, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, 
that your witnesses this morning have not had the benefit of 
the dialog we have been conducting with Senators, including 
yourself, the Ranking Member and other members of this 
committee. We have attempted, in the course of this dialog, to 
address the major issues treaty opponents have raised.
    For example, some believe the CWC will require its members 
to exchange manufacturing technology that could then be used to 
make chemical agents. In fact, the CWC prohibits members from 
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical 
weapons proliferation.
    There are those who suggest that if we were to ratify the 
CWC, America would then become complacent about the threat that 
chemical weapons pose. This, too, is false, and this body can 
help ensure that it remains false.
    The President has requested an increase of almost $225 
million over 6 years in our already robust program to equip and 
train our troops against chemical and biological attack.
    Some have expressed the view that the inspection 
requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems 
here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly 
that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's 
constitutional process.
    Another fear is that the CWC could become a regulatory 
nightmare for small business. But after reviewing the facts, 
the National Federation of Independent Business concluded that 
its members ``will not be affected'' by the treaty.
    Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really 
need not act before April 29th. But, as I have said, there are 
real costs attached to any such delay. The treaty has already 
been before the Senate for more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 
pages of testimony and reports have been provided and hundreds 
of questions have been answered. The Senate is always the 
arbiter of its own pace; but from where I sit, a decision prior 
to April 29 would be very welcome and, Mr. Chairman, I believe 
very much in the best interest of the United States.
    Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a 
future of greater security and safety for us and for all who 
share our commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that 
future is through the maintenance of American readiness and the 
expansion of the rule of law. We are the center around which 
international consensus forms. We are the builder of 
coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader in 
separating acceptable international behavior from that which 
cannot be tolerated.

    This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden 
by some, but I think, to most of our citizens, it is a source 
of great pride. It is also a source of continuing strength, for 
our influence is essential to protect our interests, which are 
global and increasing. If we turn our backs on the CWC after so 
much effort by leaders from both parties, we will scar America 
with a grievous and self-inflicted wound. We will shed the 
cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for others to 
pick it up.

    But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James 
Baker and Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as 
Generals Powell, Mundy and Schwarzkopf, and thoughtful public 
officials such as former Senators Nunn, Boren and Kassebaum-
Baker, we will reinforce America's role in the world.

    By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a 
new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to 
challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons. 
We will provide an added measure of security for the men and 
women of our armed forces. We will protect American industry 
and American jobs. We will make our citizens safer than they 
would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal.

    This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. 
It reflects existing American practices and advances enduring 
American interests. It is right and smart for America. It 
deserves the Senate's support and it deserves that support now.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    [The prepared statement of Secretary Albright follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Madeleine K. Albright

    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify before you this afternoon. As evidenced by the 
bipartisan show of support at the White House last week, timely 
approval of the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC, is one of the 
President's top foreign policy priorities.

    This afternoon, with the help of my colleagues, I would like to 
explain why.

    I begin with the imperative of American leadership. The United 
States is the only nation with the power, influence, and respect to 
forge a strong global consensus against the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction. In recent years, we have used our position wisely to gain 
the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan. We 
have led in securing the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty. We have frozen North Korea's nuclear program. We have 
maintained sanctions against Iraq. And we have joined forces with more 
than two dozen other major countries in controlling the transfer of 
dangerous conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies.

    In these and other efforts, we have counted on the strong support 
and wise counsel of this committee and your Senate colleagues. Your 
consent to ratification of the START II Treaty made possible the 
agreement in Helsinki to seek further significant reductions in cold 
war nuclear arsenals. And the Nunn-Lugar program set the standard for 
forward-looking bipartisan action to promote nuclear security.

    American leadership on arms control is not something we do as a 
favor to others. Our goal is to make the world safer for Americans and 
to protect our allies and friends. We have now another opportunity to 
exercise leadership for those ends. And once again, we look to this 
committee for help.

    The CWC will enter into force on April 29. Our goal is to ratify 
the agreement before then so that America will be an original party. By 
so doing, as the President said last Friday, we ``can help to shield 
our soldiers from one of the battlefield's deadliest killers * * * and 
we can bolster our leadership in the fight against terrorism, and 
proliferation around the world.'' Chemical weapons are inhumane. They 
kill horribly, massively, and--once deployed--are no more controllable 
than the wind. That is why the United States decided--under a law 
signed by President Reagan in 1985--to destroy the vast majority of our 
chemical weapons stockpiles by the year 2004. Thus, the CWC will not 
deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others; but 
it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us.

    In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that 
today, keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal. The gas Saddam 
Hussein used to massacre Kurdish villagers in 1988 was produced 
legally. In most countries, terrorists can produce or procure chemical 
agents, such as sarin gas, legally. Regimes such as Iran and Libya can 
buildup their stockpiles of chemical weapons legally.

    If we are ever to rid the world of these horrible weapons, we must 
begin by making not only their use, but also their development, 
production, acquisition, and stockpiling illegal. This is fundamental. 
This is especially important now when America's comparative military 
might is so great that an attack by unconventional means may hold for 
some potential adversaries their only perceived hope of success. And 
making chemical weapons illegal is the purpose of the CWC.

    The CWC sets the standard that it is wrong for any nation to build 
or possess a chemical weapon, and gives us strong and effective tools 
for enforcing that standard. This is not a magic wand. It will not 
eliminate all danger. It will not allow us to relax or cease to ensure 
the full preparedness of our armed forces against the threat of 
chemical weapons. What it will do is make chemical weapons harder for 
terrorists or outlaw states to buy, build or conceal.

    Under the treaty, parties will be required to give up the chemical 
weapons they have, and to refrain from developing, producing or 
acquiring such weapons in the future. To enforce these requirements, 
the most comprehensive and intense inspection regime ever negotiated 
will be put in place. Parties will also be obliged to enact and enforce 
laws to punish violators within their jurisdictions.

    Of course, no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, but this treaty 
provides us valuable tools for monitoring chemical weapons 
proliferation worldwide--a task we will have to do with or without the 
CWC.

    CWC inspections and monitoring will help us learn more about 
chemical weapons programs. It will also enable us to act on the 
information we obtain. In the future, countries known to possess 
chemical weapons, and who have joined the CWC, will be forced to choose 
between compliance and sanctions. And countries outside the CWC will be 
subject to trade restrictions whether or not they are known to possess 
chemical arms.

    These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make 
it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more 
difficult for rogue states or terrorists to acquire materials needed to 
produce them.

    Over time, I believe that--if the United States joins the CWC--most 
other countries will, too. Consider that there are now 185 members of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and only five outside. Most 
nations play by the rules and want the respect and benefits the world 
bestows upon those who do.

    But the problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical 
weapons if America stays out, keeps them company and gives them cover. 
We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong 
action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the 
treaty being violated.

    The core question here is who do we want to set the standards? 
Critics suggest that the CWC is flawed because we cannot assume early 
ratification and full compliance by the outlaw states. To me, that is 
like saying that because some people smuggle drugs, we should enact no 
law against drug smuggling. When it comes to the protection of 
Americans, the lowest common denominator is not good enough. Those who 
abide by the law, not those who break it, must establish the rules by 
which all should be judged.

    Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April:

  <bullet> We would forfeit our seat on the treaty's Executive Council 
        for at least 1 year, thereby costing us the chance to help 
        draft the rules by which the convention will be enforced;

  <bullet> We would not be able to participate in the critical first 
        sessions of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
        Weapons, which monitors compliance;

  <bullet> We would lose the right to help administer and conduct 
        inspections; and

  <bullet> Because of the trade restrictions imposed on nonmember 
        states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they 
        would risk serious economic loss.

    According to a letter signed by the CEOs of more than fifty 
chemical manufacturing companies, the American chemical industry's 
``status as the world's preferred supplier * * * may be jeopardized if 
* * * the Senate does not vote in favor of the CWC.''

    According to those executives ``we stand to lose hundreds of 
millions of dollars in overseas sales, putting at risk thousands of 
good-paying American jobs.''

    Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. The 
convention itself is the product of years of effort by leaders from 
both parties.

    And the treaty has strong backing from our defense and military 
leaders.

    I am aware, Mr. Chairman, that the committee heard this morning 
from three former Secretaries of Defense who do not favor approval of 
this convention. There is no question their arguments are sincerely 
held, and deserve consideration. I would point out, however, that other 
former Secretaries of Defense from both parties are on record in 
support of the treaty, and that every former chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, going back to the Carter Administration, has endorsed 
it.

    Just this past week, we received a letter of support signed by 17 
former four star generals and admirals, including three of the former 
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and five former service chiefs. 
In their words:

          Each of us can point to decades of military experience in 
        command positions. We have all trained and commanded troops to 
        prepare for the wartime use of chemical weapons and for 
        defenses against them. Our focus is not on the treaty's 
        limitations, but instead on its many strengths. The CWC 
        destroys stockpiles that could threaten our troops; it 
        significantly improves our intelligence capabilities; and it 
        creates new international sanctions to punish those states who 
        remain outside of the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly 
        support the CWC.

    I also note, Mr. Chairman, that the former officials who testified 
before the committee this morning have not had the benefit of the 
intensive dialog we have been conducting with Members of the Senate 
leadership, including yourself, the ranking Member, and other key 
members of this committee. We have attempted, in the course of this 
dialog, to address the major issues the opponents of the treaty have 
raised, and to provide appropriate assurances in binding conditions to 
accompany the resolution of ratification.

    For example, critics have asserted that the CWC obliges member 
states to exchange manufacturing technology that can be used to make 
chemical agents. This is untrue. The CWC prohibits members from 
providing any assistance that would contribute to chemical weapons 
proliferation.

    Nothing in the CWC requires any weakening of our export controls. 
Further, the United States will continue to work through the Australia 
Group to maintain and make more effective internationally agreed 
controls on chemical and biological weapons technology. And, as I have 
said, the CWC establishes tough restrictions on the transfer of 
precursor chemicals and other materials that might help a nation or 
terrorist group to acquire chemical weapons.

    Opponents also suggest that if we ratify the CWC, we will become 
complacent about the threat that chemical weapons pose. This, too, is 
false--and this body can help ensure it remains false. The President 
has requested an increase of almost $225 million over 5 years in our 
already robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical 
and biological attack. We are also proceeding with theater missile 
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat.

    Some critics of the treaty have expressed the fear that its 
inspection requirements could raise constitutional problems here in the 
United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections 
will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional processes.

    Another issue that arose early in the debate was that the CWC could 
become a regulatory nightmare for small businesses here in the United 
States. But after reviewing the facts, the National Federation of 
Independent Business concluded that its members ``will not be 
affected'' by the treaty.

    Finally, I have heard the argument that the Senate really need not 
act before April 29. But as I have said, there are real costs attached 
to any such delay. The treaty has already been before the Senate for 
more than 180 weeks. More than 1,500 pages of testimony and reports 
have been provided, and hundreds of questions have been answered. The 
Senate is always the arbiter of its own pace. But from where I sit, a 
decision prior to April 29 would be very much in the best interests of 
the United States.

    Mr. Chairman, America is the world's leader in building a future of 
greater security and safety for us and for those who share our 
commitment to democracy and peace. The path to that future is through 
the maintenance of American readiness and the expansion of the rule of 
law. We are the center around which international consensus forms. We 
are the builder of coalitions, the designer of safeguards, the leader 
in separating acceptable international behavior from that which cannot 
be tolerated.

    This leadership role for America may be viewed as a burden by some, 
but I think to most of our citizens, it is a source of great pride. It 
is also a source of continuing strength, for our influence is essential 
to protect our interests, which are global and increasing. If we turn 
our backs on the CWC, after so much effort by leaders from both 
parties, we will scar America with a grievous and self inflicted wound. 
We will shed the cloak of leadership and leave it on the ground for 
others to pick up.

    But if we heed the advice of wise diplomats such as James Baker and 
Brent Scowcroft, experienced military leaders such as Generals Powell, 
Mundy, and Schwartzkopf, and thoughtful public officials such as former 
Senators Nunn, Boren, and Kassebaum-Baker, we will reinforce America's 
role in the world.

    By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and 
effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who 
refuse to give up these poisonous weapons. We will provide an added 
measure of security for the men and women of our armed forces. We will 
protect American industry and American jobs. And we will make our 
citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain 
legal.

    This treaty is about other people's weapons, not our own. It 
reflects existing American practices and advances enduring American 
interests. It is right and smart for America. It deserves the Senate's 
timely support.

    Thank you very much.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.

    Let us see, we have nine, and you need to leave here by 
about 4:15 or 4:20?

    Secretary Albright. That is correct, sir.

    The Chairman. I think we will have to confine ourselves to 
about 3 minutes per Senator.

    Let me just say to you, as your well-advertised friend, 
that during the 103d Congress, both the Congress and the 
administration were controlled by the political party to which 
you belong and to which I once belonged. The CWC was submitted 
in November 1993 and it lay absolutely fallow for the entire 
remainder of the 103d Congress, with no action even hinted by 
the Senate.

    During the 104th Congress, with the Senate controlled by 
Republicans, we passed the treaty from this committee and were 
prepared to vote for it--or vote on it--on September 14, 1996. 
But, what do you know? On the very day that the vote was 
scheduled, the administration panicked and asked the Senate not 
to vote on the treaty. Now I read in the press that members of 
the administration are either openly stating or insinuating 
that some of us are to be blamed for blocking passage of the 
treaty.

    Now, that kind of thing will not do. I have said 
repeatedly, and I will say it to you again--and as we discussed 
when you were good enough to go to North Carolina--if some in 
the administration will stop stonewalling and let us look at 
some of the important changes that I think need to be made in 
this treaty, I think you might be surprised at the outcome. But 
as long as the administration stonewalls, I can stonewall, too.

    I am going to reserve the balance of my time. I think I 
have about a minute and a half remaining.

    Senator Biden.

    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I will adopt your practice and 
yield to my colleague from California, since I get to speak to 
the Secretary all the time on this issue.

    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator.

    Good afternoon, Madam Secretary. I very much appreciated 
your comments.

    Let me ask you a question that is somewhat speculative, but 
I hope you will answer it. I have been really very puzzled. I 
have read all of the analyses, all of the discussions that I 
could find between our Ranking Member and our Chairman over why 
this situation seems to have become so polarized. It is hard 
for me to understand it. I see the argument made on 
verification. It seems to me, though, that we are a step ahead 
whenever we make illegal the manufacture of some of these 
gasses.

    I think the important points you made in your speech were 
that the Iraqi gasses were legally made, and the degree to 
which nations will conform to an international concordat which 
simply states these are illegal and that the verification is 
based on the constitutional methodology of each country, that 
still we accomplish something. Have you been able to pinpoint 
more definitively any of the rationale for the opposition to 
this?

    Secretary Albright. Senator Feinstein, you ask, I think, a 
very important question. Because from the perspective of those 
of us who believe that this Chemical Weapons Convention is a 
tool for those countries, especially the United States, that 
have already given up the use of chemical weapons, to get 
insight and control over what is going on in other countries in 
chemical weapons programs, it seems mighty strange that we 
would want to deprive ourselves of what is clearly a very good 
method for checking up on what others are doing.

    I must say that as I have read testimony by the others or, 
frankly, have listened to my friend, the Chairman, who I think 
is a true patriotic American, there is something that makes one 
wonder what is the problem with this. I think that the issue 
comes down to the fact that we would all very much like to have 
perfect arms control treaties. That is, those that are 
completely and totally verifiable, that limit everybody else 
and leave us some options. This is not possible.

    This treaty does have certain issues raised about 
verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify 
and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem 
or a large military problem for the United States. Therefore, 
we can go through other parts, but I think that the reason that 
good Americans are concerned about this is that they want 
perfection, and what we have is a treaty that is excellent and 
very good and a useful tool for the United States.

    I would, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, like to enter 
into the record two letters that I have for you--one from the 
Secretary of Defense and one from the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs--that really, I believe, address in a very cogent and 
coherent way some of the questions that have been raised. If I 
might just take one more minute and deal with the verification 
issue--and this is in Secretary Cohen's letter. He says:



    Critics have argued that the CWC's verification regime is 
not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the 
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our 
ability to monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation, 
which we must do with or without the CWC. As you know, the 
military use of any weapon typically requires significant 
testing, equipping, and training of forces. These activities 
would be more difficult to hide in the face of the CWC's 
comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based 
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection 
rights. Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this 
regime should enable us to more readily detect significant 
violations before they become a real problem for U.S. national 
security.



    So the point is the same--that it is impossible to have 
perfection. But with this convention, it is a huge step forward 
for America.

    [The material referred to by Secretary Albright follows:]



                                  The Secretary of Defense,
                                              Washington, DC 20501.

The Honorable Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.

    Dear Mr. Chairman,

    Thank you for the opportunity to provide the views of the 
Department of Defense on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). I 
sincerely regret that my duties as Secretary of Defense have taken me 
out of the country and thereby, have precluded me from testifying 
before your Committee on this most important national security treaty.

    As you very well know, as we approach the next millennium, we face 
the prospect of regional aggressors and others seeking to use chemical 
weapons to achieve what they cannot achieve through conventional 
military means. Dealing with this threat requires a coherent, multi-
faceted national response involving: active and passive defenses 
against chemical weapons; strong unilateral and multilateral export 
controls to limit the spread of chemical weapons technology; improved 
intelligence collection and threat analysis; well-coordinated civil 
defense capabilities and an international standard barring the 
production and possession of chemical weapons. The CWC is a necessary 
component of this response. It strengthens our hand in achieving 
effective limits on the spread of technology that could be used against 
us, supports our intelligence and civil defense efforts, and holds 
others to the standard that Presidents Reagan and Bush and previous 
Congresses set for the United States.

    As I have stated before, the United States does not need chemical 
weapons to protect our security interests. Our robust military response 
capabilities and increasingly robust defensive capabilities provide an 
effective deterrent and allow us to inflict an effective, devastating 
and overwhelming response should we be attacked. We have a strong 
national security interest in seeing other nations eliminate their 
chemical weapons stockpiles and capabilities, since that elimination 
will reduce the risk that our troops will face chemical weapons on the 
battlefield.

    Critics of the CWC have made several assertions regarding the 
implications of the CWC for our national security that I urge you to 
reject.

    Chemical Defense: Critics suggest that if the United States 
ratifies the CWC, it will reduce our support for defensive measures. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. DOD not only maintains a 
robust program to equip and train our troops against chemical and 
biological attack, but I have asked Congress to increase our budget for 
chemical and biological defenses by almost $225 million over the next 
six years. Moreover, I place a high priority on our theater missile 
defense programs and intelligence efforts against the chemical threat

    U.S. Response Capability: Critics charge that the CWC, by 
constraining riot control agents, will reduce our options for 
responding to an attack against our troops, including our ability to 
rescue downed pilots. In fact, the Chemical Weapons Convention does not 
limit our options in the situations in which our troops are most likely 
to be engaged and pilots might be downed: peacetime military operations 
within an area of ongoing armed conflict in which the U.S. is not a 
party to the conflict (such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); consensual 
peacetime operations when the receiving state has authorized the use of 
force (including UN Chapter VI operations); and peacekeeping operations 
under the Chapter VII authority of the UN Security Council.

    In all such cases, the CWC's restrictions on the use of RCAs 
against combatants apply only when U.S. forces are engaged in a use of 
force of a scope, duration and intensity which would trigger the laws 
of war. These are situations in which other options normally would be 
used and for which I am accelerating the development and fielding of 
non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with the CWC.

    The CWC also does not limit our options in normal peacekeeping 
operations and other likely scenarios, such as law enforcement 
operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, 
counterterrorist and hostage rescue operations and noncombatant rescue 
operations outside of internal or international armed conflict.

    Chemical Weapons Proliferation: Some have argued that by ratifying 
the CWC, we would be contributing to chemical weapons proliferation. 
This is because they believe that the CWC would require us to provide 
to other member states our most advanced defensive equipment and 
manufacturing technologies, which some of these states would then use 
to build up clandestinely their chemical weapons capabilities. In fact. 
nothing in the CWC requires that we share our advanced chemical weapons 
defensive capabilities or chemical manufacturing technologies. Indeed, 
quite the opposite is true. The CWC prohibits any member from providing 
any assistance to anyone if that member believes that doing so would 
contribute to chemical weapons proliferation. Further, it establishes 
strict trade restrictions on precursor chemicals and requires that 
member states ensure that their internal regulations, which would 
include export controls, also are consistent with the object and 
purpose of the CWC. We will continue to work in the Australia Group to 
maintain effective internationally-agreed controls on chemical weapons-
usable elements and technology.

    Rogue States: While some critics argue that it is meaningless since 
only law-abiding nations will respect it, the reality is that the CWC 
will reduce the chemical weapons problem to a few notorious rogue 
states and impose trade restrictions that will curb their ability to 
obtain the materials to make chemical agents. This is clearly better 
than the status quo.

    Verification: Critics have argued that the CWC's verification 
regime is not good enough. While no verification regime is perfect, the 
CWC's comprehensive and extensive regime will improve our ability to 
monitor possible chemical weapons proliferation--which we must do with 
or without the CWC. As you know, the military use of any weapon 
typically requires significant testing, equipping and training of 
forces. These activities would be more difficult to hide in the face of 
the CWC's comprehensive inspection regime that includes a broad-based 
data declaration and both routine and challenge inspection rights. 
Together with our unilateral intelligence efforts, this regime should 
enable us to more readily detect significant violations before they 
become a real problem for U.S. national security.

    U.S. Industry: Some critics have claimed that the CWC will impose 
costly burdens on U.S. industry that could potentially erode our 
technological edge and, by eroding our edge, affect our national 
security. The reality is that the American chemical companies most 
affected by the CWC view its requirements as reasonable and manageable. 
Small chemical businesses who were initially troubled by critics' 
claims now also agree that abiding by the CWC will be manageable. The 
reality also is that, if the United States fails to ratify the CWC, it 
will be U.S. industry that is penalized with trade restrictions that 
industry estimates could cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

    Mr. Chairman, in the 1980s, I led the Congressional fight to build 
binary chemical weapons to deter Soviet chemical use in Europe. With 
the end of the Cold War, the world has changed. Regional aggressors can 
be deterred by our vow to respond with overwhelming and devastating 
force to a chemical attack. Our military commanders agree that 
threatening a chemical weapons response is not necessary and they 
support the CWC.

    The safety of our troops and the security of our nation will be 
strengthened by the CWC. But, the clock is ticking. So that we can reap 
the full security benefits of the CWC, it is imperative that the 
Congress act on this national security treaty before the treaty goes 
into force on April 29. If we ratify in time, the U.S. will have a seat 
at the table during the first critical days of implementation of the 
CWC and be assured that American citizens will be able to ensure the 
fullest and most rigorous compliance with this treaty. I urge your 
Committee to report the Chemical Weapons Convention out favorably to 
the Senate and the Senate to act now to ratify the Convention before it 
enters into force on April 29.

            Sincerely,

                                           William S. Cohen



cc:

    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,

    Ranking Member

                     Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
                                       Washington, DC 20510-3301,  
                                                      8 April 1997.
The Honorable Jesse Helms
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510-3301
    Dear Mr. Chairman,
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide you, and through you to 
the United States Senate, my military appraisal of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
    Let me state that the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
by as many nations as possible is in the best interest of the Armed 
Forces of the United States. The combination of the nonproliferation 
and disarmament aspects of the Convention greatly reduces the 
likelihood that US Forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional 
conflict. The protection of the young men and women in our forces, 
should they have to go in harm's way in the future, is strengthened not 
diminished, by the CWC.
    The United States has unilaterally commenced the destruction of its 
chemical weapons stockpile--under the CWC, all other chemical weapons 
capable State Parties incur this same obligation. While no verification 
regime is perfect, the Convention's regime allows for intrusive 
inspections while protecting national security concerns. The CWC 
enjoins the world community to forego these heinous weapons, implements 
a regime of enforcement, and impairs the ability of those outside the 
Convention to obtain the materials to make chemical agents.
    The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders are 
steadfast in support for a strong chemical defense posture. We will 
maintain a robust chemical defensive capability supported by aggressive 
intelligence collection efforts, but will not rely solely an these 
measures. As Secretary Perry testified in March 1996, if any country 
was foolish enough to use chemical against the United States, the 
response will be overwhelming and devastating. We do not need chemical 
weapons to provide an effective deterrent or to deliver an effective 
response.
    It is important to emphasize that the CWC permits the use of riot 
control agents under most scenarios that the United States will likely 
face during future operations. If US Forces are deployed during 
peacetime to intercede in an internal or international armed conflict, 
such as under a UN mandate, the CWC will not affect our use of RCAs 
unless US or UN Forces become engaged in a use of force of a scope, 
duration, and intensity that would trigger the laws of war with respect 
to these forces. Until that time, the United States is not restricted 
by the CWC in its RCA use options, including against combatants who are 
parties to the conflict.
    If we are a party to an international armed conflict, the CWC 
prohibits the use of RCAs only in specific situations where combatants 
are present. In these particular situations, options other than RCA 
exist. As one example, non-lethal alternatives that are consistent with 
the CWC could be employed. The CWC permits RCA use in riot control 
situations under direct and distinct US military control, such as 
controlling rioting prisoners of war, and in rear echelon areas outside 
the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civilian 
disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations. The ability 
of our forces to defend themselves will not be reduced by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. Nothing will override our commanders' inherent 
authority and obligation to use all legal means available and to take 
all appropriate action, including the use of lethal force, in self 
defense of their units and personnel.
    In my military judgment, we are better served as an original member 
of the Convention. I strongly support this Convention and respectfully 
request the Senate's advice and consent.
            Sincerely,
                                     John M. Shalikashvili,
                             Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy to:
    The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    Ranking Member

    The Honorable Strom Thurmond,
    Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

    The Honorable Carl Levin,
    Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee

    Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
    Senator Lugar. Madam Secretary, two of the strong points of 
the convention are that our own intelligence will be enhanced--
namely, we know a lot about chemical weapons, or believe we do 
now; but, given the network of inspections and a network of 
finding out about the shipment of chemicals and their 
precursors, we will have a better lead as to who is active and 
where the materials are going.
    The question that arises, and I suppose arose this morning, 
is: Is there value to us in terms of having international law 
behind us; that is, a norm in which clearly the production of 
chemical weapons is illegal in the world? I just ask you from 
your standpoint of your previous work in the United Nations, 
dealing with other nations. If the charge is made that we might 
let our guard down, would not be active, is it not your 
experience that in fact, if we have international law going for 
us, plus an international set of inspections and intelligence 
collection, we are more likely not only to act, but to act 
effectively, and maybe even, in some cases, unilaterally?
    Specifically, if Libya had a situation that we felt was 
undesirable, we could now, I presume, send aircraft there and 
demolish the facilities before they knew what we were doing? 
Are we more likely, however, as a Nation, to do that if we have 
international law going for us, plus the intelligence apparatus 
of all other nations going for us likewise?
    Secretary Albright. Senator Lugar, I believe that we gain 
greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence 
capability that comes from having an international regime and, 
second, the force of being part of an international regime. 
Though it is not exactly the same situation, I would say that 
we have multiplied our own effectiveness through something like 
the IAEA--the way to inspect and have safeguards on nuclear 
weapons, by having a regime that puts the force of the entire 
international community behind an inspection or behind a 
determination to take action and provide international 
sanctions.
    So this is a force multiplier for us, the country that no 
longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that 
others still have them.
    Senator Lugar. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, it seems to me--and I will 
not take the time, in part, because I do not have the time--
that everything that the critics say is wrong with this treaty 
is worse without the treaty, beginning with verification and I 
think, literally, every major criticism.
    Let me ask you a question. This is a strange-sounding 
question, I guess. But let us assume we either bring this 
treaty up--hopefully, we will have an opportunity to do that by 
April 29th and vote on it--we bring it up and it is defeated or 
we do not bring it up. What do you say? I mean what happens? 
Describe to us what happens when you attend the next meeting of 
your counterparts, where the Secretaries of State, your 
counterparts in France and Germany and Great Britain, et 
cetera--I mean our allies, our friends, the Australia Group--
not all of whom are European, obviously--what happens at that 
meeting?
    I am not being facetious when I ask the question; I am 
being serious.
    Secretary Albright. I would hope very much that I would 
never have to be in that position; because I truly do think 
that it would be not just a major embarrassment for the leading 
country in the world to be in a position of having decided not 
to become a part of what is now a hugely ratified convention, 
but I think it would also hurt us, Senator, in other ways. 
Because we see ourselves as the leaders of creating 
international norms and regimes.
    I think I have said to some of you that I believe that 
there are four groups of countries in the world, and the 
largest one are those countries of which we are the leader, 
that are basically those countries that abide by international 
norms, that provide--because they establish a better way of 
life for our citizens--rules of the road. It would lessen our 
credibility not only in this obviously important regime but 
across the board if we decide, for some reason, not to become a 
part of what is clearly a step forward in limiting weapons of 
mass destruction.
    I think it would hurt our credibility across the board, and 
not just on this issue, Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, Madam Secretary.
    The Chairman. Senator Coverdell.
    Senator Coverdell. Madam Secretary, I know that there have 
been extensive discussions about conditions between the 
administration, the Chairman, and others. Could you 
characterize your assessment of the progress, your general 
feeling at this hour, as we are embedded in the debate? Is 
there an optimism on your part with regard to this process? 
Have we gone as far as we can and we are down to our 
differences? Do you characterize it as still being a viable 
process that might move to an agreement?
    Secretary Albright. Senator Coverdell, first of all, I 
think that there has been a great deal of goodwill as the 
process has gone forward and through a variety of meetings. 
There has been, I think, considerable movement on dealing with 
a variety of questions that obviously are legitimate, given our 
process of government and the importance of having you all, as 
the representatives of the people, understand more about how 
this treaty is being carried out.
    I do think that I am optimistic, because that is my nature. 
I do think that while there are still a number of points on 
which we disagree, that we are moving forward in a good way. 
What I do think is absolutely important is for the time to come 
for the Senate to vote. There have been, as I have stated--13 
hearings that have been held before this one was, 1,500 pages 
of testimony, lots of back-and-forth, in terms of trying to 
exchange information. I think that if we cannot agree on some 
of the differences within informal groupings, that there must 
be some way that we can vote--you all can vote--on the 
differences that still exist.
    I cannot stress enough the importance of having the vote 
before the time expires to be an original party. I think we are 
definitely cutting off our nose to spite our face if we do not 
ratify before that deadline. Our request to all of you is to 
vote.
    Senator Coverdell. If I have just a second, just as a 
matter for clarification and not necessarily related to the 
overall aspect of our position in the world, but has Israel 
signed this treaty, do you know?
    Secretary Albright. Israel has signed, but not ratified.
    Senator Coverdell. But not ratified?
    Secretary Albright. Right.
    The Chairman. The Senator from Minnesota.
    Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, thank you.
    I guess, in the limited amount of time that we have, almost 
more than asking the question, I just would like to amplify or 
build on a point you made about the importance of our hoping to 
have an agreement and moving this forward and having a vote. I 
am on the Veterans' Affairs Committee, and General Schwarzkopf, 
when he testified before our committee dealing with the illness 
of the Gulf veterans, was really poignant in also expressing 
his support for this agreement. Just to quote from not just 
General Schwarzkopf, but any number of other military leaders:
    ``On its own, the CWC cannot guarantee complete security 
against chemical weapons.'' I think that was your point. You 
did not come here to argue it is perfect. We must continue to 
support robust defense capabilities and remain willing to 
respond through the CWC or by unilateral action to violators of 
the convention. Our focus is not on the treaty's limitations 
but, instead, on its many strengths. The CWC destroys 
stockpiles that could threaten our troops, it significantly 
improves our intelligence capabilities, and it creates new 
international sanctions to punish those states who remain 
outside the treaty. For these reasons, we strongly support the 
CWC.
    I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we will be able to have an 
agreement and bring this to the floor. I do believe we owe it 
to people in the country to have an up or down vote, and I hope 
it will be a favorable vote.
    Secretary Albright. I must say that I was very impressed 
with the testimony that General Schwarzkopf gave earlier, in 
which he basically said that, by our not ratifying, we put 
ourself on the side of Iraq and Libya and on a different side 
from our allies.
    I think, when Senator Biden said, how would I feel in 
meetings, I would find it mighty strange to be on the same side 
of the table as Iraq and Libya.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Madam Secretary, always nice to see you.
    Secretary Albright. Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Since I last saw you, I know you have become 
much more enlightened in many areas. You have played baseball. 
You have gone to North Carolina.
    Secretary Albright. That is true.
    Senator Hagel. I know we can expect even greater things 
from you now.
    Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, picking up on the Iraq, 
Libya, North Korea, Syria issues, those are the real threats. 
Those countries are the real threats. I do not believe the 
threats of chemical warfare to our troops or civilized nations' 
troops are within the signatory countries of the CWC. So my 
question is: How do we get to the real threat, those countries 
that we fear most, who we either suspect or know now possess 
chemical weapons and are not afraid to use them?
    Secretary Albright. Senator, I think that it is exactly 
because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to 
try to use the tools that the international regime puts before 
us. I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it 
becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated 
politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that 
put pressure on their economies and limit their ability to 
obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons.
    If, for instance, there is also a concern, I think, by some 
that they will sign in a cynical way, well, if they sign up and 
then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the 
CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they will 
probably get caught. When they are caught, they will be subject 
to international pressure and other CWC sanctions. I think that 
by not putting ourselves in a position of being one of the 
original ratifiers of CWC, we weaken the convention itself, and 
then weaken our own ability and deprive ourselves of this force 
multiplier to try to get at the rogue states.
    This is the single best tool we have to try to get a handle 
on the Iraqs and Libyas, because this will provide an eye into 
their system.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Smith.
    Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, thank you for coming. There is an old 
saying in politics that to get a vote, you have got to ask for 
a vote. I appreciate your being here, because no one from the 
administration has ever asked for my vote on this. I have had 
many people from the other side asking me for my vote on this.
    Senator Biden. Ask him, will you, now, quick. Ask him.
    Secretary Albright. Give me a minute. I was going to do it 
with drama.
    Senator Smith. And all I have heard is from the other side. 
So my question, which has already been asked somewhat before, 
is: Is this the best we can do? And Senator Helms' comments 
earlier, which were that there are three points he wants to 
work out. Is it too late to work anything else out in this 
treaty?
    Secretary Albright. Well, first of all, let me say 
officially, openly, publicly, I am asking you for your vote.
    Senator Smith. Thank you.
    Secretary Albright. And let me also say that there are some 
areas, I think, that the Chairman has concern about that I 
think we can still work on. I think there are some where we may 
not be able to work something out. You all will have to vote on 
that.
    Senator Smith. And would that be done in the OPCW 
decisionmaking process, which means the April 29 deadline and 
U.S. participation in the process are important? Is that where 
we address questions like nonlethal chemicals that our police 
may need for riot control and things of that nature?
    Secretary Albright. Well, let us talk specifically about 
the riot control issue. I think that difference, if I may be so 
bold, is based on a misunderstanding about what the treaty 
provides in terms of riot control. If I might just take a 
minute while asking you for your vote to explain fully what 
happens to the riot control agents.
    The CWC does not limit our ability to use RCA's, riot 
control agents, in the situations in which U.S. troops are most 
likely to be involved. I think there is a concern that we are 
robbing ourselves of a tool. What I am going to tell you is how 
we are not doing that.
    The CWC does not limit our options in such likely scenarios 
as law enforcement operations, humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations, counter-terrorist and hostage rescue operations, 
and noncombatant rescue operations outside of armed conflict. 
The CWC also does not limit RCA use under normal peacekeeping 
operations. That includes peacetime operations within an area 
of ongoing conflict, to which the U.S. is not a party, such as 
Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda, or in consensual peacetime 
operations, when the receiving State has authorized the use of 
force--that is including Chapter 6 operations under the U.N. 
peacekeeping operations under Chapter 7.
    So the CWC restrictions on riot control agents apply only 
when combatants are present and U.S. forces are engaged in the 
use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity that would 
trigger the laws of war.
    Now, the reason I read this to you in such detail is that I 
think this is an example of where we may have a 
misunderstanding of fact and as one of the areas where there 
are still discussions, which we believe could be dealt with. In 
the letter that I introduced into the record, written by 
General Shalikashvili, I think more of this is addressed.
    So I am hoping, in the intervening days we have here, that 
we can address in a factual way some of the problems that still 
exist.
    Senator Smith. Thank you. I hope that we can do that. My 
time is up. We are discharging our constitutional 
responsibility to vote on this treaty. One of my concerns you 
answered earlier in your testimony, which was that we are not 
in fact voting for something that is unconstitutional or 
violates the constitutional rights of Americans.
    Finally, I hope at some point here you can address an 
implication that Secretary Schlesinger made that some in the 
FBI are being muzzled right now, not to speak unfavorably about 
this treaty. I wonder, at some point, if you could comment on 
that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Grams.
    Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, a pleasure to see you.
    Just to kind of clarify the last question that Senator 
Smith asked, dealing with riot control chemicals. On February 
2nd, an article in a column by John Deutch, who served as 
Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense for President Clinton, wrote the following. He said:

    We should reject interpretations of the CWC that prohibit 
the use of tear gas or other nonlethal chemicals so that we do 
not put ourselves in the bizarre position of having no choice 
but to rely on guns and bullets when we face situations like 
driving off noncombatants who might be threatening a downed 
pilot.

    Now, do you agree with that statement? And do you believe 
that is what the CWC is stating clearly?
    Secretary Albright. I think that the CWC does not prohibit 
it. As I said, the restrictions apply only when combatants are 
present and U.S. forces are engaged in the use of force of the 
scope, duration and intensity that would trigger the laws of 
war. I think we would have to see what the situation is. But, 
basically, it is possible for us to use various new kinds of 
chemical agents in order to rescue hostages and to deal with 
isolated issues. We always have a third choice in a war, which 
is to use nonlethal weapons. We are not left only with the 
possibility of using chemical weapons or riot control agents.
    Senator Grams. So, generally then, you would agree with the 
statement that Mr. Deutch made?
    Secretary Albright. Well, I would have to see it within its 
overall context, but I generally agree with the statements that 
he made.
    Senator Grams. And just one other quick question dealing 
with Russia. The recent record on arms control agreements has 
been less than impressive for Russia. It has not implemented 
the Bilateral Destruction Agreement on chemical weapons which 
it signed with the United States several years ago. There have 
been reports that Russia has developed a chemical weapons 
program specifically designed to evade the CWC.
    In addition, Russia has not even ratified the START II 
Treaty on nuclear weapons, which I and many other Senators 
strongly support. So does the administration believe that 
Russia should agree to fully implement the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement before the U.S. would join the CWC?
    Secretary Albright. Senator, let me just take a little 
minute here to explain something. We just finished our meetings 
in Helsinki with the Russians. We went there with the idea of 
issuing a number of joint communiques. One which had not been 
part of our original intention, because we were dealing with 
Russia--NATO and with START and other issues--but the Russians 
came to us and we then issued a joint U.S.-Russian statement on 
chemical weapons. It was basically done because of President 
Yeltsin's and Foreign Minister Primakov's interest in making 
clear that they wanted to go forward in order to expedite 
ratification.
    So the second paragraph says: The Presidents reaffirm their 
intention to take the steps necessary to expedite ratification 
in each of the two countries.
    President Clinton expressed his determination that the U.S. 
be a party. Then President Yeltsin noted that the convention 
had been submitted to the Duma with his strong recommendation 
for prompt ratification--I am not reading it all. The 
Presidents noted that cooperation between the two countries in 
the prohibition of chemical weapons has enabled both countries 
to enhance openness regarding their military chemical potential 
and to gain experience with procedures and measures for 
verifying compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, et 
cetera.
    So I would say that there is a major push on behalf of 
President Yeltsin, who is going to use this document to make 
sure that they go forward with ratification of the CWC also.
    Senator Grams. How much cost will there be to the U.S. For 
the Russian program to destroy its chemical weapons?
    Secretary Albright. I will have to get that for you for the 
record.
    [The information referred to was unavailable at the time of 
printing.]
    Senator Grams. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
    Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I think I first ought to give you the opportunity--because 
the question was simply left hanging out there by one of my 
colleagues--that people within the administration were being 
muzzled with respect to commenting on this treaty. I think the 
specific reference was to the FBI. Could you address that?
    Secretary Albright. Senator, I am completely unaware that 
something like that would be taking place. I have heard nothing 
like that. I have no reason to believe that that is true--
absolutely none.
    Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, the Joint Chiefs are in favor 
of this treaty, are they not?
    Secretary Albright. They are, sir.
    Senator Sarbanes. And I think they have been very clear in 
indicating, not just the chairman, but all the other members of 
the Joint Chiefs, as well, is that correct?
    Secretary Albright. That is correct. Then, earlier, there 
was a letter submitted, or a statement, by 17 other former 
generals and former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs and other 
generals very much in favor of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Senator Sarbanes. I do not quite understand--and I 
addressed some questions this morning directed toward it--this 
notion that unless the rogue states sign up, the rest of the 
world should not approve and ratify this treaty and the United 
States ought not to be part of it. Do you understand that 
argument?
    Secretary Albright. I do not, sir, because my own feeling 
is that it is as if we had been provided with a brand-new 
mechanism for looking inside potential violator societies to 
find out what they are doing. We are eschewing that tool mainly 
because the rogues, or those who are not part of the system, do 
not want to sign it.
    As I said in my statement, it is like saying that you are 
not going to have laws against drug smuggling just because all 
the drug smugglers have not signed up to it. What you do is you 
try to develop the best possible regime, and not allow the 
lowest common denominator to determine what the will of the 
international community and the majority of nation-states would 
like to have happen.
    Senator Sarbanes. Would not the convention in fact make it 
possible to put into place a more rigorous regime against the 
rogue states than is possible under the current situation?
    Secretary Albright. Absolutely. What it does is provide a 
system for intrusive inspections into their societies, and then 
a system for also having more stringent sanctions against them, 
with the force of having international law and the 
international community behind them. So, by deciding not to 
take action until they do, I think we are cutting off our nose 
to spite our face.
    The Chairman. Madam Secretary, we are within 2 or 3 minutes 
of fulfilling what I hope was a commitment. Before you leave, 
let me suggest that you mention to the administration that it 
would clear up the whole thing if a statement were issued in 
the name of the President or the administration, saying that 
nobody in the FBI nor anybody else employed by the Federal 
Government must not speak disapprovingly of the treaty. Now, 
that will clear it up.
    Now, there is one other thing. The Chemical Manufacturers' 
Association was claiming that $600 million in sales would be 
lost if this treaty is not ratified. We discussed that when you 
were here. They have since cut that number down by more than 
half, and even their new figures are highly suspect. It was 
said here this morning that the Chemical Manufacturers' 
Association does not represent the small manufacturers--only a 
few big ones.
    During your confirmation hearing, you may recall that I 
asked that you supply the committee with a detailed list of 
chemicals that would be affected if the United States were not 
to ratify the CWC. You told me then, in good faith I am sure, 
that such a list would be forthcoming. It has not come. I 
certainly understand why. Would you tell your people to get 
that list to us?
    Secretary Albright. Yes, absolutely.
    The Chairman. I know you have another meeting. I thank you 
for coming to see us. Do you have further comments to make? I 
see notes being passed around. I figured there is one more 
thing they want you to say.
    Secretary Albright. Yes. Apparently the list has been sent 
to you this morning in response to that question.
    The Chairman. This morning. Very well.
    Secretary Albright. So the check is in the mail.
    The Chairman. If there be no further business to come 
before the committee----
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any further 
business for the Secretary. I want to just publicly thank you. 
I was a bit of a pain in the neck in attempting to see you and 
ask you to accommodate.
    I guess I was a pain in the neck to Secretary Albright, as 
well, to come up here this afternoon. I thought it was 
important.
    With regard to tomorrow's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I realize 
that the committee has a rule that I am just learning. Back in 
the good old days, when my team was in charge and I was 
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we used to have a one-to-
one rule. That is, the minority and majority could have the 
same number of witnesses. I have learned subsequently that is 
not the rule here.
    The Chairman. It never has been.
    Senator Biden. I understand that. But yesterday we were 
going to have--I wanted to have Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Deutch. 
Mr. Deutch had to go out of town. I said to my staff--there was 
a bit of a misunderstanding--that Scowcroft could come 
tomorrow, along with General Rowny and Admiral Zumwalt. I am 
now told by my staff that they may not be able to appear 
tomorrow because of a rule.
    I would like you to consider accommodating a rookie ranking 
minority member here and allow them, since I have asked them to 
change their schedules, so that I do not find myself--this is 
probably the only thing I have ever agreed with General Rowny 
on and Admiral Zumwalt.
    And I do not want to completely ruin my credibility with 
them. So I would like to publicly ask you to consider allowing 
an exception to the rule. I will give up two future draft 
choices at a later date if you would consider allowing me to 
have them tomorrow, notwithstanding the committee tradition of 
a 2- or 3-to-1 majority. So I am going to publicly ask you if 
you would consider that. I am not asking for an answer now. If 
the answer is no, do not give it to me now.
    If it is yes, I would take it now.
    The Chairman. Well, as Mr. English back in my home town of 
Monroe used to say, I will study about it.
    Senator Biden. All right. Good.
    The Chairman. There being no further business to come 
before the committee, we stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 4:23 p.m., the committee adjourned to 
reconvene at 2:11 p.m., April 9, 1997.]


                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, APRIL 9, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:11 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Frist, Biden, Kerry, 
Robb, Feinstein, and Wellstone.
    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    We have been delaying a little bit, because one of the four 
witnesses on the first panel has just arrived. We are delighted 
to see you.
    Well, I say to my distinguished colleagues, Mr. Robb and 
Mr. Biden, that today marks the third in this particular round 
of hearings on the Chemical Weapons Convention. This morning's 
first panel of witnesses will include the Hon. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, known to all of us, former Ambassador to the 
United Nations; the Hon. Richard Perle, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense; the Hon. Fred Ikle, former Director of 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Doug Feith, former 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Former goes before each 
one of those titles.
    There will be a second panel of witnesses in support of the 
Convention.
    We appreciate your appearing here this afternoon as the 
committee undertakes further consideration of the CWC. All four 
of you are distinguished leaders, whose impressive expertise 
makes your insight crucial to the Senate's consideration of 
this matter, which involves, as we all know, the future 
security of the United States. The Senate will benefit greatly 
from your assessment and guidance regarding the wisdom of 
ratifying the treaty in its present form--and I would 
underscore those words.
    Now, I will say we have had many, many compliments by 
telephone, fax and otherwise regarding the testimony of three 
former Secretaries of Defense who were here in person, and one 
of whom read a letter of opposition to the treaty written by 
the previous Secretary of Defense. We look forward to your 
testimony. You are joined in your opposition by a fourth 
Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, and more than 50 
generals, admirals and top officials from previous 
administrations.
    I think this ought to be sort of a wake-up call to the 
administration, because the American people, despite efforts to 
the contrary by some in the news media, the American people are 
increasingly aware of the defects in this treaty. Now, I am not 
going to proceed further with my statement, in the interest of 
hearing our witnesses, but I will defer to the distinguished 
Ranking Member.
    If Senator Robb has any comments, since I did not know you 
were here yesterday, we would be glad to hear from you as well.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me 
begin by publicly thanking you for allowing the second panel. 
We have a number--seven very distinguished Americans here. I 
think they probably find--they are probably in the position, 
not for the first time, but not as frequently as we are, of 
finding themselves on opposite sides of things they are usually 
in total agreement with their friends on and vice-versa. I mean 
we are accustomed to that. That is part of our stock in trade.
    I appreciate you allowing former National Security Advisor 
Brent Scowcroft--a former general, as well--General Rowny, and 
Admiral Zumwalt to be here. I realize the rule is basically 3-
to-1, but you were kind enough to us yesterday to allow that. I 
appreciate it.
    I want to take just a few minutes to address a few concerns 
that we raised in yesterday's hearing and that have gone 
unanswered. The reason I bother to do it I am not sure, because 
so much has been going on in terms of the non-public side of 
this process and in terms of negotiations; I am not suggesting 
that any of the things we have tentatively agreed on among 
ourselves on this side of the bench and with the administration 
and Senator Lott and others, that they will satisfy any of the 
witnesses, but there is no reason they would know they existed. 
I will just take just a few minutes--probably about 9 I hope.
    My impression is that one of the reasons you suggested that 
we have an additional set of hearings was that we have a number 
of new Members--a very bright, informed group of people, who 
have taken their jobs on this committee very seriously--and 
that they did not have an opportunity to participate in 
previous hearings. My impression is that these new Members 
truly want to learn about the treaty and base their decision on 
the facts. I hope that these hearings are giving them an 
opportunity to be acquainted with them.
    This afternoon, we are going to hear testimony about the 
treaty and what it does and does not do. But I used to practice 
law with a fellow who was one of the best trial lawyers in the 
State of Delaware, a guy named Sid Bialek. He always used to 
say when he would teach young lawyers like me how to address a 
jury, he would say, when you start off with a jury, tell them: 
Now, jury, keep your eye on the ball. This is not about whether 
or not my client is a nice guy. It is whether he killed Cock 
Robin. Keep your eye on the ball.
    Well, I think one of the things we have to keep our eye on, 
I say to my colleagues--obviously, not to the witnesses--is 
that this is a treaty that outlaws poison gas. It outlaws 
chemical weapons. At least that is its intent. I guess that is 
the essence of the debate here--whether or not it adequately 
does that.
    Entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will 
mark a major milestone in our effort to enlist greater 
international support for an important American objective of 
containing and penalizing rogue states that seek to acquire or 
transfer weapons of mass destruction. I want to make it clear, 
based on yesterday's panel, the first one--and it was a 
distinguished panel--several said, including one former 
Secretary of Defense, that they were accused of being for 
chemical weapons and for the use of these.
    I just want you to know, I know no one who supports the 
treaty in the Senate who suggests anyone who opposes the treaty 
is someone who is for the active use of chemical weapons. So I 
want to make that clear at the outset. I never heard anybody 
say that, and I am sure the former Secretary would not have 
said it unless someone had mentioned it to him. But no one on 
this committee that I am aware of who is for the treaty thinks 
that.
    Among the claims, though, that were made yesterday about 
the CWC is that it would force us to share our most advanced 
defensive technology with all states, including countries of 
concern that have ratified the agreement. Iran comes to mind 
immediately.
    Another assertion is that it requires us to abandon all 
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology 
through mechanisms like the Australia Group. As I reviewed the 
treaty, I became a little concerned about this initially. With 
regard to sharing the defensive technologies, some general 
provisions appeared to back up their claim. But, on close 
inspection, I believe it reveals that the critics are wrong.
    First, the provisions in Article X, Paragraph 3, are 
deliberately vague. The obligation on a party is to facilitate 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment and information. 
When read in light of the overriding imperative of Article I, 
to not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited 
by CWC, it seems clear to me and the lawyers that I have 
consulted that we will not be obliged to provide assistance to 
rogue states under this provision.
    Now, just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I 
asked for some clarification. I spoke to somebody who obviously 
would want to clarify it the way I read it, so take it for what 
it is worth. But the National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, 
today sent me a letter. In that letter, he states that any 
exchange of equipment and technology under Paragraph 3 of 
Article X, ``is limited to that which we determine would be 
appropriate and permitted under the convention.'' In addition, 
Paragraph 7 of Article X requires no assistance, ``other than 
medical supplies, if we so choose''--if we so choose.
    I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted in the 
record, Mr. Chairman, so that my colleagues can at least 
understand the position that I hold and that I believe that 
pertains.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, DC, April 9, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510.
    Dear Senator Biden. In recent days, concerns have been raised about 
the impact of the Chemical Weapons Convention on the ability of rogue 
states to acquire advanced U.S. Chemical defense or chemical 
manufacturing technology. I would like to take this opportunity to set 
the record straight on these matters.
    Specifically, concern has been expressed about Paragraph 3 of 
Article X of the CWC, which states that ``Each Party undertakes to 
facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and 
technological information concerning means of protection against chemi- 

cal weapons.'' The inclusion of the words ``facilitate'' and 
``possible'' underscores that no specific exchange is required and that 
any exchange which does occur is limited to that which we determine 
would be appropriate and permitted under the Convention. Moreover, 
nothing in Paragraph 7 of Article X, which concerns possible responses 
to requests for assistance, requires us to provide anything other than 
medical supplies, if we so choose.
    Concern has also been expressed about whether Article XI of the 
CWC, which relates to cooperation in the field of chemical activities 
for purposes not prohibited under the treaty, might force our chemical 
industry to share dual-use technologies and manufacturing secrets with 
other nations. Let me assure you that Article XI does not require 
private businesses to release such proprietary or otherwise 
confidential business information, nor does it require the U.S. 
Government to force private businesses to undertake such activities. 
Let me further assure you that the export controls that we and other 
Australia Group members have undertaken, as well as our own national 
export controls, are fully consistent with the CWC and serve to further 
its implementation.
    I hope this information facilitates Senate consideration of the 
CWC. I look forward to continuing to work with you and other CWC 
supporters to ensure a successful vote on this vital treaty in the days 
ahead.
            Sincerely,
                                          Samuel R. Berger,
          Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

    Senator Biden. At this point, Mr. Chairman, you and I have 
come close to agreement on a condition that would require the 
executive branch to ensure that countries of concern receive no 
assistance from us beyond medical antidotes and treatment, and 
that we would be fully informed and it would be fully in 
keeping with Article X of the CWC.
    As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our 
current mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive 
technology, the CWC explicitly allows us to keep these 
protections in place. Article 7 supports chemical trade and 
technology exchange ``for purposes not prohibited under this 
convention.'' It also requires that trade restrictions not be, 
quote, incompatible with the obligations undertaken in this 
convention.
    But the CWC is completely consistent with the continued 
enforcement of the Australia Group controls, which member 
states use to keep chemical and biological weapons materiel out 
of the hands of rogue states. The executive branch has said 
this time and again, and so have our friends and allies in the 
Australia Group. That helps explain why 26 of the 29 members of 
the Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except 
Iceland, Luxembourg and the United States.
    Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia 
Group, the 29 countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain 
common export controls, while joining the treaty convention. In 
a statement issued at the meeting, the Australia Group said, 
``the maintenance of effective export controls remain an 
essential, practical means of fulfilling obligations under the 
CWC.''
    I would also ask unanimous consent that that statement be 
inserted in the record, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The information referred to follows:]

                                 Australian Embassy, Paris,
                                                  October 17, 1996.

                        Australia Group Meeting

    Australia Group participants held informal consultations in Paris 
between Oct. 14-17, to discuss the continuing problem of chemical and 
biological weapons (CBW) proliferation. Participants at these talks 
were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, the European Commission, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United 
States, with the Republic of Korea taking part for the first time.
    Participants maintain a strong belief that full adherence to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) will be the best way to eliminate these types 
of particularly inhumane weapons from the world's arsenals. In this 
context the maintenance of effective export controls will remain an 
essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC and 
the BTWC.
    All participants at the meeting welcomed the expected entry into 
force of the CWC, noting that this long-awaited step will be an 
important, historic moment in international efforts to prohibit 
chemical weapons. Participants agreed to issue a separate statement on 
this matter, which is attached.
    Participants also welcomed the progress of efforts to strengthen 
the BTWC in the negotiations taking place in the Ad Hoc Group of BTWC 
States Parties in Geneva. All Australia Group participating countries 
are also States Parties to this treaty, and strongly support efforts to 
develop internationally agreed procedures for strengthening 
international confidence in the treaty regime by verifying compliance 
with BTWC obligations.
    Experts from participating countries discussed national export 
licensing systems aimed at preventing inadvertent assistance to the 
production of CBW. They confirmed that participants administered export 
controls in a streamlined and effective manner which allows trade and 
the exchange of technology for peaceful purposes to flourish. They 
agreed to continue working to focus these national measures efficiently 
and solely on preventing any contribution to chemical and biological 
weapons programs. Participants noted that the value of these measures 
in inhibiting CBW proliferation benefited not only the countries 
participating in the Australia Group, but the whole international 
community.
    Participants also agreed to continue a wide range of contacts, 
including a further program of briefings for countries not 
participating in the Paris consultations to further awareness and 
understanding of national policies in this area. Participants endorsed 
in this context the importance of regional seminars as valuable means 
of widening contacts with other countries on these issues. In 
particular, Romania's plans to host a seminar on CBW export controls 
for Central and Eastern European countries and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States in Bucharest on Oct. 21-22 and Japan's plans to host 
a fourth Asian Export Control Seminar in Tokyo in early 1997 were 
warmly welcomed by participants. Argentina will also host a regional 
seminar on non-proliferation matters, in Buenos Aires, in the first 
week of December 1996. France will organize a seminar for French-
speaking countries on the implementation of the CWC. This will take 
place shortly before entry into force of the Convention.
    The meeting also discussed relevant aspects of terrorist interest 
in CBW and agreed that this serious issue requires continuing 
attention.
    Participants agreed to hold further consultations in October 1997.

                               __________

 Australia Group Countries Welcome Prospective Entry Into Force of the 
                      Chemical Weapons Convention

    The countries participating in the Australia Group warmly welcomed 
the expected entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
during a meeting of the Group in Paris in October 1996. They noted, 
that the long awaited commencement of the CWC regime, including the 
establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, will be an historic watershed in global efforts to abolish 
chemical weapons for all time. They also noted that all states adhering 
to the CWC are obliged to ensure their national activities support the 
goal of a world free of chemical weapons.
    All of the participating countries reiterated their previous 
statements underlining their intention to be among the original States 
Parties to the CWC. They noted that 24 of the 30 countries 
participating in the Australia Group have already ratified the 
Convention. Representatives also recalled their previous expressions of 
support for the CWC, and reaffirmed these commitments. They restated 
their view that the effective operation and implementation of the CWC 
offers the best means available to the international community to rid 
the world of these weapons for all time. They called on all signatories 
to ratify the CWC as soon as possible, and on the small number of 
countries which have not signed the treaty to join the regime and 
thereby contribute to international efforts to ban these weapons.
    Representatives at the Australia Group meeting recalled that all of 
the participating countries are taking steps at the national level to 
ensure that relevant national regulations promote the object and 
purpose of the CWC and are fully consistent with the Convention's 
provisions when the CWC enters into force for each of these countries. 
They noted that the practical experience each country had obtained in 
operating export licensing systems intended to prevent assistance to 
chemical weapons programs have been especially valuable in each 
country's preparations for implementation of key obligations under the 
CWC. They noted in this context, that these national systems are aimed 
solely at avoiding assistance for activities which are prohibited under 
the Convention, while ensuring they do not restrict or impede trade and 
other exchanges facilitated by the CWC.

    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am convinced the CWC does 
not require us to share our most advanced defense technology or 
to abandon existing controls on chemical weapons. Just to make 
certain of that, I asked Sandy Berger to address this point. I 
will, in the interest of time, since I asked you to add 
additional witnesses, ask that the remainder of my statement be 
placed in the record and conclude by saying this treaty enters 
in force on April 29th, and time is running short. Mr. 
Chairman, I hope that we, when we conclude these hearings--as 
long as I do not prolong them--that at some point we might be 
able to reach an agreement on how to proceed on the floor. But 
that is for another time, another moment.
    I thank the witnesses and I thank the chair.
    [The prepared statement and the information referred to by 
Senator Biden follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Senator Biden

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to take a few minutes this 
morning to address a few concerns that were raised in yesterday's 
hearing and may have gone unanswered.
    When you called these hearings, you said that it was important that 
the new members of the committee have an opportunity to learn more 
about it. And I am pleased to see that our new colleagues have taken 
your recommendation to heart.
    My impression is that they truly want to learn about this treaty 
and base their decision on the facts--and maybe the request by the 
Secretary of State won't hurt, either.
    This afternoon we will hear more testimony about this treaty and 
what it does and does not do, but the core issue is very simple: this 
treaty outlaws poison gas weapons.
    The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will mark a 
major milestone in our efforts to enlist greater international support 
for the important American objective of containing and penalizing rogue 
states that seek to acquire or transfer weapons of mass destruction.
    Yesterday, we heard three very distinguished former Secretaries of 
Defense testify on this treaty.
    Among the claims they made about the CWC are that it would force us 
to share our most advanced defensive technology with all states, 
including countries of concern, that have ratified this agreement.
    Another assertion they made is that it requires us to abandon all 
controls we have on the proliferation of sensitive technology through 
mechanisms like the Australia Group.
    As I reviewed the treaty, I became a little concerned about this. 
With regard to sharing defensive technology, some general provisions 
appeared to back up their claim.
    But close inspection reveals that the critics are wrong.
    First, the provisions of Article Ten, Paragraph Three are 
deliberately vague: the obligation on a party is to ``facilitate'' the 
``fullest possible exchange'' of equipment and information.
    When read in light of the overriding imperative in Article One to 
not assist any party from engaging in activities prohibited by the CWC, 
it is clear that we will not be obligated to provide assistance to 
rogue states under this provision.
    Now just to make sure that I was reading this correctly, I asked 
the White House to clarify this point for me. Sandy Berger, the 
President's National Security Adviser, today sent me a letter that 
confirms this interpretation.
    In Mr. Berger's letter, he states that any exchange of equipment 
and technology under Paragraph Three of Article Ten ``is limited to 
that which we determine would be appropriate and permitted under the 
convention.'' In addition, Paragraph Seven of Article Ten requires no 
assistance ``other than medical supplies, if we so choose.''
    I ask that this letter from Mr. Berger be inserted into the record, 
so that my colleagues can reassure themselves that this treaty does not 
oblige us to share advanced chemical defense technology with rogue 
states.
    On this point, the Chairman and I are very close to agreement on a 
condition that would require the executive branch to ensure that 
countries of concern receive no assistance from us beyond medical 
antidotes and treatment. And that would be fully in keeping with 
Article Ten of the CWC.
    As for the argument that we would be forced to abandon our current 
mechanisms to control the proliferation of sensitive technology, the 
CWC explicitly allows us to keep these protections in place.
    Article Eleven supports chemical trade and technology exchange 
``for purposes not prohibited under this convention.'' It also requires 
that trade restrictions not be ``incompatible with the obligations 
undertaken under this convention.''
    But the CWC is completely consistent with continued enforcement of 
the Australia Group controls, which member states use to keep chemical 
and biological weapons material out of the hands of rogue states. The 
executive branch has said this time and again, and so have our friends 
and allies in the Australia Group.
    That helps explain why twenty-six of the twenty-nine members of the 
Australia Group have ratified this treaty--everyone except Iceland, 
Luxembourg and the United States.
    Last October, at the most recent meeting of the Australia Group, 
the twenty-nine countries reaffirmed their intention to maintain common 
export controls while joining the Chemical Weapons Convention.
    In a statement issued at that meeting, the Australia Group said, 
and I quote: ``the maintenance of effective export controls will remain 
an essential practical means of fulfilling obligations under the CWC.''
    I ask consent that this statement be inserted into the record.
    I am convinced that the CWC does not require us to share our most 
advanced defensive technology or to abandon existing controls on 
chemical weapons. And just to make certain of that, I asked Sandy 
Berger to address this point in the letter I referred to.
    So I ask my colleagues to review this section of the treaty and to 
examine Mr. Berger's letter and the Australia Group's statement to 
reassure themselves that the CWC does not obligate us to share advanced 
defensive technology or chemicals or chemical technologies with 
countries like China, Cuba or Iran.
    Turning to another issue, my colleague, Senator Smith, expressed an 
interest yesterday in the constitutional issues that many critics of 
the convention have raised. I want to take this opportunity to set the 
record straight.
    The convention is constitutional. There is nothing in the 
convention that requires searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
takings of property without just compensation, or compelled self-
incriminatory testimony
    Just this morning we received a letter from twenty-two law 
professors and distinguished attorneys expressing their view that the 
convention is constitutional, including former Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson, former State Department legal adviser and Harvard law 
professor Abram Chayes, Columbia University professor Louis Henkin, and 
Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe. I ask that this letter be placed 
into the record.
    Those who claim that the CWC would permit international inspectors 
to engage in warrantless searches in any business or private home are 
dead wrong and are spreading falsehoods.
    There will be no warrantless searches under the CWC, period. Here 
are the facts:
    There are two types of inspections--routine inspections and 
challenge inspections.
    Routine inspections apply only to declared facilities--that is, 
facilities that produce or use scheduled chemicals. In the unlikely 
event that a declared facility does not consent to be searched, an 
administrative warrant will be sought from a federal judge or 
magistrate judge.
    This is the same procedure that would be used for inspections 
conducted under Federal health, safety, and environmental laws.
    Challenge inspections are conducted at the request of another 
government based on evidence of possible non-compliance. These 
inspections can take place anywhere in the United States.
    The administration has agreed that, absent consent, the U.S. 
Government will have to obtain a criminal search warrant, based on 
probable cause of criminal wrongdoing, to conduct a challenge 
inspection everywhere but declared facilities.
    If a search warrant cannot be obtained for either type of search, 
the inspection will not take place.
    And, since the convention allows the United States Government to 
``take into account any constitutional obligations it may have with 
regard to searches and seizures'' when granting access to U.S. 
facilities, we will not be in breach of our treaty obligations if a 
challenge inspection is denied due to Fourth Amendment considerations.
    I ask consent that a letter from the Attorney General to Senator 
Lott addressing these very issues be made a part of the record.
    I hope that the Attorney General's assurances, along with the 
statements of other administration officials, have eased the concerns 
of those who, like me, strongly believe in the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment.
    Again, I would like to thank my colleagues and our witnesses for 
their time and attention this morning. I hope that these hearings will 
help to clear up the misconceptions about the Chemical Weapons 
Convention so that we can move expeditiously to bring this treaty 
before the full Senate for a vote on ratification.
    This treaty enters into force on April 29, and time is running 
short.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                                 ______
                                 

                Letter From Attorney General Janet Reno

                  to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott

                            Office of the Attorney General,
                                      Washington DC, March 3, 1997.
Hon. Trent Lott,
Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC 20510.
    Dear Mr. Leader: As the public debate over ratification of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) grows in intensity, various concerns 
regarding the constitutionality of the CWC have come to my attention. 
Some have suggested that enforcement of the CWC, in order to be 
effective, will necessarily impinge on Fourth Amendment rights. 
Specifically, concerns have been raised that the Convention will 
authorize warrantless, non-consensual searches or that searches will be 
conducted pursuant to warrants that lack probable cause. The CWC and 
the draft implementing legislation contemplate no such circumstances. 
All inspections will be conducted consistent with the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.
    Let there be no doubt, the Department of Justice stands fully 
behind both the goals and the specific terms of the CWC. The 
Convention, along with the proposed legislation, strikes the proper 
balance between effective efforts to eliminate the scourge of chemical 
weapons and to preserve our constitutional rights. Over the course of 
the past four years, the Justice Department has closely scrutinized CWC 
and has assisted in the drafting of its implementing legislation. Our 
focus has been consistently on the necessity of adherence to 
constitutional requirements. In testimony given on September 9, 1996, 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Richard Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, explained how inspections would be conducted 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. We expect the vast majority of 
routine inspections will be conducted with consent. On the few 
occasions where consent has been withheld, administrative search 
warrants will be sought for routine inspections. In the case of 
challenge inspections, again, we expect consent to be the rule. 
Declared facilities selected for a challenge inspection would be 
subject to inspections in the same manner as provided under the CWC and 
implementing legislation for routine inspections. However, a criminal 
search warrant will be applied for in every case where consent is 
denied to a challenge inspection of undeclared facilities.
    The convention, in Annex 2, pt. X, para. 41, specifically allows 
the U.S. Government, in granting access to facilities identified for 
challenge inspections, to ``take into account any constitutional 
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches 
and seizures.'' Hence, in the rare event that the Fourth Amendment 
would pose a bar to a search of premises identified for a challenge 
inspection, the United States would remain in full compliance with its 
obligations under the CWC.
    I realize that many of the detractors of the Convention are 
principled in their opposition. Their constitutional concerns are, 
however, unfounded. The dictates of the Fourth Amendment have been 
scrupulously honored in the drafting and will be rigidly followed in 
the implementation. Finally, no legitimate Fifth Amendment issues are 
raised with respect to the record keeping or disclosure requirements. 
The provisions of the Convention and the draft implementing legislation 
neither require nor contemplate compelling anyone to incriminate 
himself. And, both the CWC and draft legislation in no way authorize 
the taking of private property without compensation.
    It is my hope that the Senate will consider the Convention in an 
expeditious manner and will consent to its ratification.
            Sincerely,
                                        Janet Reno.
                               __________
                                                     April 9, 1997.
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr,
Minority Leader, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Senator Biden: The undersigned lawyers, former government 
officials, and professors of constitutional and international law write 
to urge the Senate to give its prompt advice and consent to the 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Senate's 
decision will have profound ramifications for United States leadership 
in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the 
Convention will enter into force on April 29 whether or not the United 
States ratifies, but if it does so without U.S. ratification, American 
participation in the staffing of the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and in the inspector corps will be severely 
reduced. Therefore, prompt action is essential.
    The CWC is a global commitment to eliminate an entire category of 
weapons of mass destruction and to verify their continued absence. The 
treaty's backbone is the most thoroughgoing international law 
enforcement system yet devised, providing for verification of the 
destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and for monitoring of 
chemical plants to prevent future proliferation. The verification 
system includes declaration of precursor chemicals that could be made 
into chemical weapons, routine inspections at facilities that are 
declared to possess such precursors, and ``challenge'' inspections to 
confirm compliance at any facility or location. President George Bush, 
under whose administration the treaty was completed and signed, 
characterized the Convention as ``an entirely new concept for 
overcoming the great obstacle that has impeded progress in the past 
toward a full chemical weapons ban.''
    We would have thought that U.S. ratification of this Convention was 
a foregone conclusion. Unfortunately, at the last minute, objections 
have been raised concerning the constitutionality of the Convention's 
elaborate verification system under the Fourth Amendment. Treaty 
opponents have circulated the claim that, under the CWC, foreign 
inspectors would be empowered to intrude into the privacy of American 
citizens and businesses in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 
Much of this commentary based on a letter from Judge Robert Bork to 
Senator Orrin Hatch stating that ``there are grounds to be concerned'' 
about the compatibility of some of the provisions of the Convention 
with the Constitution. Judge Bork's letter concedes that he is ``not 
intimately familiar with the provisions of the Convention,'' an 
acknowledgment that is borne out by the inaccuracy of his description 
of the Convention in the body of his letter.
    The short answer to these contentions is that the Convention itself 
provides that each State Party shall implement its provisions ``in 
accordance with its constitutional processes,'' (Art. VII, par. 1), and 
the challenge inspection provisions further require that inspections 
must be consistent with ``any constitutional obligations * * * with 
regard to * * * searches and seizures.'' (Verification Annex, pt. X, 
par. 41). Thus, Congress, which must pass domestic legislation to 
implement the inspection provisions of the Convention, can do so in a 
manner that fully protects the rights of American citizens under the 
Fourth Amendment without in any way violating the international 
obligations the United States will undertake under the treaty. A vast 
quantity of scholarly and governmental discussion on the subject has 
affirmed virtually unanimously that the CWC fully respects U.S. 
constitutional protections of privacy. Indeed, every scholar willing to 
put his or her opinions on the CWC to the test of detailed public 
review agrees that the treaty manifests extraordinary care in balancing 
the demands of privacy against the requirements for effective 
verification of the Convention.
    If the Senate fails to give its advice and consent to the CWC, an 
extraordinary achievement of over fifteen years of bipartisan effort 
will be frustrated; and a major opportunity to prevent the 
proliferation of chemical weapons will have been lost. If the Senate 
wishes to reject the treaty, that is of course its prerogative. But it 
should not do so on the spurious ground that it conflicts with the 
Constitution.
            Sincerely,
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, DePaul University College of Law
 Professor Richard B. Bilder, Burrus-Bascom Professor, University of 
        Wisconsin Law School
 Professor Thomas Buergenthal, Lobingier Professor of Comparative Law & 
        Jurisprudence, the George Washington University Law School
 Professor George Bunn, Dean Emeritus, Professor Emeritus, University 
        of Wisconsin Law School
Professor David D. Caron, University of California at Berkeley School 
        of Law
Abram Chayes, Professor of Law, Emeritus Felix Frankfurter Harvard Law 
        School
Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch, Columbia University School of Law
Professor John Hart Ely, Richard A. Hausler Professor University of 
        Miami School of Law
Phil Fleming, Crowell & Moring
 Professor Thomas M. Franck, Murray and Ida Becker Professor, Director, 
        Center for International Studies, New York University School of 
        Law
Professor Michael J. Glennon, University of California at Davis School 
        of Law
Professor Barry Kellman, DePaul University College of Law
Professor John F. Murphy, Villanova University School of Law
John B. Rhinelander, Shaw, Pittman
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, J. Sinclair Armstrong Professor of 
        International, Comparative and Foreign Law, Harvard Law School
Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of 
        Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School
Professor Louis Henkin, University Professor Emeritus, Special Service 
        Professor, Columbia University School of Law
Professor David A. Koplow, Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies, 
        Georgetown University Law Center
Professor Peter Raven-Hansen, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs, Glen 
        Earl Weston Research Professor, George Washington University 
        Law School
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Professor Edwin (Rip) Smith, Leon Benwell Professor of Law and 
        International Relations, University of Southern California Law 
        School
Professor Burns H. Weston, Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished 
        Professor, Associate Dean, International and Comparative Legal 
        Studies, University of Iowa College of Law

    The Chairman. Let us have brief statements by our other 
Senators here, if you wish. Senator Robb.
    Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were kind enough 
to make reference to the fact that I came in just at the 
conclusion of yesterday afternoon's hearing, and you had not 
recognized me as you were banging the gavel. I thank you for 
that acknowledgement.
    I had raced up from an armed services hearing, trying to 
sort out the dangers posed by Russian submarines and other 
submarines, in order to get here. I want to assure you, 
however, that both the portions of yesterday's meeting, in the 
morning that I had to leave and the portion that I missed 
yesterday afternoon, were replayed on C-SPAN, beginning about 
midnight and ending about 2:45 a.m.
    And, Mr. Chairman, to demonstrate my commitment to the 
cause, I want you to know that I stayed up and watched all of 
the hearing that I missed. Regrettably, I am going to have to 
go to an intelligence hearing today, so I will miss more. But I 
am sure that it will be rebroadcast.
    On a more serious vein, I did attend all of the hearings 
last year. I thought they were some of the best and most 
informative. There have been excellent witnesses on both sides 
of the question. I committed myself to the affirmative side. I 
thought that was the more persuasive argument last year. I have 
not changed my position. But I think that the distinguished 
witnesses that we have had for these hearings have done more to 
give the American people, and certainly the members who are 
going to vote on these issues, a better understanding of what 
the treaty does and does not do. For that, I commend you, and I 
thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Senator Frist.
    Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
congratulate you for bringing forth such outstanding witnesses 
in this series of hearings. I want to thank each of you for 
being with us today.
    I continue to struggle with the issues that we are talking 
about--the verification, the extent of coverage, global 
coverage, enforceability. Part of it is based on my experience 
of being in chemistry labs myself, whether it is organic 
chemistry or inorganic chemistry, which I had to do to become a 
physician, and remembering very vividly people saying, ``right 
in this room, in this little laboratory, we could do such 
destruction if we wanted to.'' Then I come back today, in terms 
of that verification and enforceability, and I look forward to 
hearing from each of our witnesses as we systematically 
continue our addressing these very important issues.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Briefly, please, ma'am, and sir. After you two, if any 
other Senators come in, I am going to not notice their arrival 
either. Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Just very quickly, Mr. Chairman, if I 
might, and to our distinguished witnesses.
    I think the thing that would be most helpful to me, and 
perhaps you can cover this in your testimony, would be if you 
could substantiate your comments on your belief of non-
verification, why you believe it is better to stay out of this 
kind of a treaty and why you think that, with our staying out 
of it, we would have a better opportunity (a) to make a moral 
commitment and (b) a real commitment and (c) how verification 
would be improved if we are not in the treaty.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I am sure they will answer that in due time.
    Briefly, please.
    Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I feel like I am under 
pressure to be brief.
    The Chairman. You are.
    Senator Wellstone. So I will be brief. I know we have got a 
long hearing today, and I am only going to be able to stay for 
the first part. I apologize to the others. So I thank the Chair 
for the hearing and I thank each of you for being here.
    The Chairman. Do you have anything to say, Chuck?
    Senator Hagel. No. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you will be the lead-
off, please.

 STATEMENT OF DR. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT 
 REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN 
                      ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you for coming.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee 
on this important subject. It is an important subject, and the 
Senate's decision will be more important even.
    I have followed this and some comparable issues with great 
interest since I served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations under Ronald Reagan. At that time, there were 
several such covenants that either had been passed or were 
being considered. It was then that I became aware of some of 
the facts which have ever since caused me to have a lot of 
questions and doubts about such covenants.
    It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was being used to achieve very 
different purposes than those for which it was undoubtedly 
intended. It was then I became aware of the fact that it was 
being used to acquire and spread the technology and products 
needed to produce nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their 
spread.
    It was even then understood among the informed public in 
the United Nations context that a country such as Iraq, by 
signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, acquired 
a right to share technology which could then be used to produce 
nuclear products. Now, it is generally understood by such 
countries that the shortest route to a nuclear capacity is 
through the NPT, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
    Iran is traveling that road today. We and other signatories 
are helping to finance their development of a nuclear capacity, 
and we know it.
    Secretary of State Christopher made an interesting comment 
on this subject 2 years ago, when he said, in terms of its, 
``organization, programs, procurement and covered activities, 
Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons, which 
has been followed by almost all states that have recently 
sought a nuclear capability.''
    Now, more recently, there have been several public reports 
of U.S. Government efforts to persuade Russia not to assist 
Iran in the development of a nuclear capacity and of 
operational reactors. There have been reminders from Russia 
that Iran is a signatory of the NPT and, as such, has a right 
to assistance in developing a nuclear capacity for peaceful 
use. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that there has been far too 
little attention given to this problem, the principal source of 
nuclear proliferation.
    It was also in my U.N. years that I first became really 
sensitive to the issue of the composition of the governing 
board of the IAEA. Senator Biden may think I am not keeping my 
eye on the ball. But I assure you, Senator Biden, I am.
    As for the composition of the governing board of the IAEA, 
Iraq, as I am sure many of you know, sat on the governing board 
of the IAEA through just exactly that period that it was 
violating its own promises not to undertake development of 
nuclear weapons.
    It also was violating, at that very moment, already 
existing promises not to use poison gases in war. Iran and Iraq 
are two of the countries in the world that have already 
violated the Geneva Protocol against using poison gases. As we 
all understand, I think, there is already an operative treaty 
which forbids the use in war of, ``asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases,'' which is the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, many people speak of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and its verification regime as if it 
had prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that 
were the case, Mr. Chairman, Iraq, North Korea, India, and 
Pakistan, among others, would not today have either advanced 
programs for producing nuclear weapons or the weapons 
themselves. But, of course, they do.
    There is a kind of strange silence which shrouds the facts 
of nuclear proliferation. Even the U.S. Government has been 
strangely reluctant to face facts about the failure of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to prevent proliferation. But 
if our government and our allies had faced facts about the 
nuclear proliferation facilitated by the NPT, they would 
presumably not have reproduced Article XI and other key 
loopholes in the Convention on Chemical Weapons which have 
permitted and facilitated proliferation.
    But, of course, in the Convention on Chemical Weapons, they 
have paragraphs which call for sharing technology among the 
signatories and forbid efforts to restrict or impede trade in 
development and promotion of scientific and technological 
knowledge in the field of chemistry--for peaceful purposes, to 
be sure. I think the spirit of the CWC is, ``share now'' the 
treaty counsels, ``verify purposes and intentions later.''
    Mr. Chairman, my years at the United Nations sensitized me 
to the composition of governing boards of the United Nations. 
All too often, the composition of those governing boards simply 
reflect the bloc system and its operation in the U.N.; it 
dominates many processes of the U.N. The bloc system is purely 
geographical and political in character, and takes little or no 
account of technical competence or democratic representation--
or of who pays the bills, I might add.
    I believe that the Senate should take specific note of the 
composition of all the international boards entrusted to 
enforce international covenants, boards which make important 
decisions affecting our country. The CWC governing board will 
be chosen on a basis that gives little weight to competence, 
because the IAEA's governing board is used as a model. The 
IAEA's verification regime has not been able either to verify 
or to enforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
    As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA 
regime to adequately verify violations of the NPT, so, Mr. 
Chairman, can we learn some hard lessons from the IAEA 
experience, about the non-enforceability of just such treaties.
    What happens when violations of the Nonproliferation Treaty 
are discovered? This is a very important question. There are 
the questions of verifiability and enforceability. What happens 
when a nation which has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty is discovered to be in violation?
    The answer is: Not much.
    Iraq has suffered some penalties because of its violations 
of the NPT. But it has suffered, because it invaded a 
neighbor--namely, Kuwait--not because it cynically violated the 
NPT norms.
    I believe that the composition of the governing board of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, the OPCW, guarantees that 
countries with the greatest technical knowledge will be in a 
permanent minority in that decisionmaking group. The important 
decisions will be made by the OPCW; but the United States and 
Western Europe, the most highly industrialized and technically 
sophisticated countries, will be in a permanent minority in 
that group.
    The United States has no guaranteed seat in that governing 
body. Neither the amount of our financial contribution nor our 
technical competence guarantees us a seat. We will compete for 
a seat with the other most highly industrial countries for 10 
of 41 seats. Asia will have nine. There will be one rotating 
seat. Latin America and the Caribbean will have seven. Africa 
will have nine. Eastern Europe will have five. What we in the 
U.N. call WEOG, Western Europe and others group--and we fall in 
that group--will have 10.
    I am not certain, Mr. Chairman, where Russia falls in these 
groups today. Probably in Eastern Europe, but maybe not. There 
would have to be some special provision made. That is 
important, since, if indeed Russia ratifies the treaty, it is 
eligible to sit on the OPCW. It may not. It has signed but not 
yet ratified, of course.
    But the composition of the OPCW explains why its decisions 
are not likely to take account of the best technical 
information available. Not only that, the method of composition 
of that group explains why most efforts by U.N. bodies to 
develop operational groups fail. Because the members of the 
group are chosen on the basis of criteria which are irrelevant 
to their ability to perform, with technical competence, the 
task of the group.
    From experience with the NPT and the IAEA, I believe we 
have had a great deal of opportunity to learn about the 
problems of verification and enforceability. The IAEA's 
verification procedures, of course, require prior notification 
and consent of the party to be inspected including the parties 
inspected, the right to approve or veto the composition of the 
teams of inspectors.
    Now, we all know that Iraq's nuclear projects and its 
progress were discovered only as a consequence of their defeat 
in the Gulf War. Iraq's violations of NPT have been discovered 
again and again, as we keep finding things we did not know and 
new information about aspects of their program that we were 
unaware of by virtue of our access through the armistice and 
their defeat in the Kuwaiti War. It was not the result of IAEA 
inspections. Routine procedures for verification did not reveal 
Iraq's large nuclear project.
    Now, as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop 
chemical weapons than nuclear weapons. It is much easier to 
procure and hide the components. As everyone knows, the 
technology required in developing nuclear weapons is much more 
complex and esoteric than chemical weapons. Everyone knows that 
chemical weapons rely largely on dual-use substances that are 
common in everyday life. Chemical weapons can be manufactured 
with uncomplicated technology.
    That is, I think, why, in the 1980's, when I was at the 
United Nations, it was commonplace to hear Third World 
spokesmen refer to chemical weapons as the Third World's 
nuclear bombs. Even very technologically underdeveloped 
countries could produce them. It was suggested often that it 
was not quite cricket for the devel- 
oped countries to try to deprive the least developed countries 
of the Third World weapons of mass destruction.
    I do not think any of us need weapons of mass destruction, 
quite frankly, to prove that we can survive in the contemporary 
world.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Senate should face the 
fact that ratifying this treaty will not prevent the 
manufacture or use of chemical weapons. That is precisely the 
point. The Chemical Weapons Convention is neither verifiable 
nor enforceable.
    Proponents sometimes say, so it is not perfect. Is not 
something that is not perfect better than nothing at all?
    I do not think that is necessarily so, particularly since 
the countries that have signed and ratified the Convention are 
countries about which we would never worry about using chemical 
weapons. The countries that have neither signed nor ratified 
are countries that we are most likely to worry about--the so-
called rogue states or outlaw nations--Syria, Iraq, North 
Korea, Libya. Those are the countries we worry about.
    We do not worry about Britain, France, the WEOG, and the 
Australia Group. I do not worry a bit about the Australia 
Group. Those are our best friends. They do not need to worry 
about us either, I might say.
    The treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact that the 
treaty cannot help us monitor the production of these weapons 
by states most likely to use chemical weapons. Why, then, have 
so many countries signed on to a treaty that can offer so 
little protection?
    I believe, Mr. Chairman, that it is simply wishful 
thinking, frankly. I believe it is hoping and pretending that 
something that you want to be verifiable, enforceable, and 
universal may actually turn out to be that, in spite of the 
fact that, from experience, we know it is not and will not.
    We should also face the fact that signing the treaty will 
not prevent signatories of bad will from breaking their 
promises not to produce noxious gases. We know that Russia has 
in fact already, in its continuing production of noxious gases, 
broken two sets of promises--not the promises of the treaty, 
but bilateral promises to the United States involving the 
production of nerve gases and the failure to destroy gases 
which they had agreed to destroy. Countries do not necessarily 
keep their promises.
    Advocates of the treaty argue it would surely do some good 
and, at the very least, would do no harm.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Chemical Weapons 
Convention will actually make the world more dangerous. That is 
why I came today. I believe the treaty will hasten the spread 
of advanced chemical weapons, as I believe a comparable treaty 
has hastened the spread of the technology for nuclear weapon 
construction--and that is not all.
    Mr. Chairman, I recently asked a French friend, who happens 
to be visiting just now, did the Maginot Line do France any 
harm in World War II?
    Well, I think most French think so. It gave them the 
impression that they had dealt with a dangerous threat--an 
invasion from the east, across their borders--when in fact they 
were in as much danger as before. The Maginot Line created a 
comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of 
security.
    I believe the world is probably less dangerous today, Mr. 
Chairman, than at any time in my life--or certainly than in 
most of my life. I cherish this sense of lessened threat. I 
love it. But I believe we are not so safe that we can afford to 
create a false sense of security by pretending that we have 
eliminated chemical weapons.
    President Clinton said in one statement that I read: ``We 
will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' Well, that is 
poetic license or a politician's license or perhaps a 
President's license, but it surely is not an accurate statement 
about what will be the case. The countries most likely to 
produce and use poison gas are unaffected by this treaty.
    I think the Senate, personally, should reaffirm the U.S. 
sense of responsibility and our commitment to that 
responsibility toward preserving a peaceful world and decline 
to ratify this treaty unless or until progress is made toward 
making it more verifiable, enforceable, and universal. There is 
still a long way to go.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

    Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this 
distinguished committee today.
    The subject of today's hearing is important. The Senate's decision 
will be more important. I have followed this issue with interest since 
my tenure as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations under 
Ronald Reagan brought several such proposed covenants to the forefront 
of my attention.
    It was then that I first became aware of the fact that the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was being used to achieve very different 
purposes than those for which it was intended--that it was being used 
to acquire and spread the technology and products needed to produce 
nuclear weapons rather than to prevent their spread.
    It was even then understood among the informed public that by 
signing the treaty a country--such as Iraq--acquired a ``right'' to 
share technology needed to produce nuclear products.
    By now, it is generally understood that the shortest route to a 
nuclear capacity is through the NPT. Iran is traveling that road today. 
We and other signatories are helping finance their development of a 
nuclear capacity. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said on this 
subject, ``Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the 
mid-1980's, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring 
and developing nuclear weapons.'' He added that in terms of its 
``organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is 
pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed 
by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability.'' 
[F.N. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 7/95. Vol. 51, Issue 4, page 23.]
    More recently there have been several public reports of U.S. 
Government efforts that persuade Russia not to assist Iran in the 
development of its nuclear capacity and reminders that Iran--a 
signatory of the NPT--had the right to assistance in developing a 
nuclear capacity for peaceful use. There has been far too little public 
attention to this--the principal source of nuclear proliferation.
    It was also in my U.N. years that I first noticed the composition 
of the governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). Iraq sat on the governing board of the IAEA and were at that 
very time violating promises not to undertake the development of 
nuclear weapons--promises not to use poison gases in war. [Iraq did 
both.] Several of the same countries have already violated commitments 
not to use poison gas in war, for, as we all understand, there is 
already an operative treaty which forbids the use in war of 
``Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases.'' It is the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925.
    Mr. Chairman, many people speak as if the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and verification regime had prevented proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. If that were the case Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan would 
not have either bombs today nor advanced programs for producing them. 
But they do.
    A strange silence shrouds the facts of nuclear proliferation. Even 
the U.S. Government has been strangely reluctant to face the facts 
about the failure of the NPT to prevent proliferation. But it is an 
open secret that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been a source 
of proliferation of nuclear technology. It is also perfectly clear that 
the CWC will facilitate the spread of chemical weapons through 
provisions in Chapter Eleven of the treaty that call on countries with 
a developed chemical industry to share their advanced technology with 
less developed countries.
    If our government and our allies had faced facts about the nuclear 
proliferation facilitated by the NPT they would presumably not have 
reproduced in Article XI the loopholes that have been permitted and 
facilitated it. But they have in the paragraphs which call for sharing 
technology among the signatories and forbid efforts to ``restrict or 
impede trade and development and promotion of scientific and 
technological knowledge in the field of chemistry * * * '' for peaceful 
purposes to be sure.
    Share now, the treaty counsels, verify purposes and intentions 
later.
    My years at the United Nations also sensitized me to the 
composition of the governing boards of U.N. bodies. All too often the 
composition of governing boards simply reflects the bloc system which 
dominates many processes in the United Nations. The bloc system is 
purely political/geographical in character. It takes little or no 
account of technical competence and standards, of democratic 
representation, or of who pays the bills.
    The Senate should take careful note of the IAEA governing board.
    Iraq served on the governing board of the IAEA the entire time that 
it was working to develop nuclear weapons in violation of its pledge. 
It is not the only known violator to be selected for that board. The 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) governing board will be chosen on a 
basis that gives still less weight to competence.
    The IAEA's verification regime often regarded as a model has not 
been able either to verify or to enforce the NPT.
    As we can learn hard lessons about failures of the IAEA regime to 
adequately verify violations of the NPT, so we can learn about the non-
enforceability of such Treaties. What happens when violations are 
discovered? Not much. Iraq has suffered because it invaded a neighbor, 
not because it cynically violated NPT norms.
    The composition of the governing body of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) guarantees that countries with 
the greatest technical knowledge will be in a permanent minority. There 
are no permanent members on the OPCW and no vetoes.
    The composition of the Executive Council of the OPCW explains why 
the U.N. bodies fail at operational efforts, through their validity as 
representational bodies.
    From experience with the NPT and the IAEA we have had the 
opportunity to learn a good deal about the problems of verification and 
the weaknesses of the verification regime that was developed to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the inadequacy of the IAEA's 
verification procedures that require prior notification of the party to 
be inspected, consent of the inspected party, and a right to approve or 
veto the composition of the team of inspectors.
    Iraq's large, advanced nuclear development project was discovered 
only as a consequence of their defeat in the Gulf War NOT as a result 
of IAEA inspections. Likewise, North Korea's large nuclear development.
    And as everyone knows, it is much simpler to develop chemical than 
nuclear weapons, much easier to procure and to hide the components. 
Nuclear weapons require weapons grade plutonium. The technology 
required in developing nuclear weapons is more complex and esoteric. 
But chemical weapons rely largely on dual use substances common in 
everyday life, small space, and uncomplicated technology. That is why 
in the 80s chemical weapons were sometimes called the ``Third World's 
nuclear bombs.'' Even very technologically underdeveloped countries 
could produce them.
    The Senate should face the fact that ratifying the treaty will not 
prevent the manufacture or use of chemical weapons. The Chemical 
Weapons Convention is neither verifiable nor enforceable. Proponents 
attempt to dismiss the many loopholes in the treaty with the assertion 
that nothing is perfect. But perfection is not the question.
    Proponents seek to minimize the fact that the countries with the 
most highly developed programs either have signed but not ratified the 
treaty--Russia, China, Cuba, Iran, Vietnam--or have not signed at all--
Syria, Iraq, North Korea, Libya--but signing does not solve the 
problem. Signing will not prevent signatories from breaking their 
promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently broken a 
promise to the United States.
    And the treaty's advocates simply ignore the fact the treaty cannot 
help us monitor the production of the states most likely to use 
chemical warfare.
    Why then have so many countries signed on to a treaty that can 
offer so little protection?
    Only wishful thinking encourages it. It is as if pretending that 
the treaty were verifiable, enforceable, and universal would make it 
so. But it doesn't. It also will not prevent signatories from breaking 
their promises not to produce noxious gases as Russia has recently 
done.
    But surely it would do some good, treaty advocates argue. At the 
very least we can say it would do no harm.
    Mr. Chairman, it is because I believe the CWC would actually make 
the world more dangerous that I am here. I believe the treaty will 
hasten the spread of advanced chemical weapons as it has nuclear 
technology.
    Americans working for ratification of the CWC should take a hard 
look at what happened in the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
meeting in Geneva this week. The United States could not even get a 
discussion of China's human rights violations put on the agenda.
    For the seventh straight year China was able to prevent 
discussion--much less censure--of its deeply shocking treatment of 
Tibet and all manner of dissidents and to do so by a comfortable 27 to 
17 margin (with nine abstentions). China won the vote with strong Third 
World support, including some close U.S. associates such as Egypt, 
India and Indonesia.
    China's chief delegate, Wu Jianmen, explained later the vote showed 
that the Third World ``identified'' with China. He also emphasized the 
failure of some close U.S. allies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Japan, Greece, Italy, Canada and Australia) to co-sponsor the 
``Western'' resolution this year, because, he said, they ``want dialog 
and cooperation and not confrontation.'' In truth China won the vote 
because there is weak support for democracy beyond North America, 
Europe, and a few Asian and South American states, and also because 
China mounted a tough worldwide campaign--that included arm-twisting 
and threat of economic consequences. A belated U.S. effort to rally 
support--including personal intervention by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright--did not help much.
    This shameful outcome was not a defeat for the United States or the 
countries sponsoring the resolution. It was a defeat for humane values 
and rational discussion of deeply serious moral and political issues. 
It was a defeat for victims of repression and for the very purposes for 
which the United Nations was founded. This outcome in the Human Rights 
Commission is a harsh reminder that the United States often cannot win 
votes for its basic values and interests in U.N. arenas--even when the 
issue is purely symbolic and the U.S., itself, and most of our 
principal allies are present.
    The balance of power would be much less favorable to the United 
States in the governing body that will implement the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.
    In pressing the Senate to ratify the CWC quickly, before the treaty 
enters into effect on April 29, the Clinton administration has argued 
that by getting in on the ground floor the United States will be 
assured of having an important voice in shaping the structure and 
function of the organization. But that is not so. The composition and 
structure of the governing body of the CWC are prescribed in the 
treaty. The treaty, itself, hands us a stacked deck with which to play 
for influence.
    The United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China (that 
is, the permanent members of the Security Council) are all guaranteed 
seats on the Human Rights Commission but not on the Executive Council 
that will administer the CWC. The 41 members of that Executive Council 
will be designated from the U.N.'s standard geographical groupings and 
elected by all the signatories of the CWC for 2 year terms. There will 
be no permanent members and no vetoes.
    The United States is a member of the WEOG (Western European and 
Other Group) which is allotted 10 seats on the 41 member Executive 
Council that also provides nine seats for Asia, seven for Latin America 
and the Caribbean, nine for Africa, five for Eastern Europe plus one 
rotating seat. To win one of the 10 WEOG seats for a 2-year term, the 
United States will need to compete with the other Western industrial 
democratic nations who altogether will have only 10 of 41 seats (or 15 
of 41 seats if we count Eastern Europe; or 16 of 41 with all of Europe 
plus Japan).
    In this competition our friends in the European Union will have 15 
votes to our one vote. Therefore, the United States would frequently 
fail to gain a voice in the decisions of the Executive Council. Neither 
the amount of our financial contribution nor our technical competence 
would guarantee us a seat.
    The draft of the CWC supported by the Reagan administration guarded 
against this possibility. It provided that permanent members of the 
Security Council would be members of the Executive Council that 
implements the treaty. This would have guaranteed representation of the 
most powerful nations and those with the most highly developed chemical 
industries. The CWC which is now before the Senate operates on the 
basis of one country, one vote.
    The fact that the United States might have no voice in setting 
policy for implementing the CWC but would surely be bound by its 
decisions is one important reason that the U.S. Senate should not 
ratify this treaty.
    There are others.
    Most of the countries in the Human Rights Commission have ratified 
the Declaration on Universal Human Rights.
    Will the United States ratifying the CWC make the world safer?
    Mr. Chairman, did the Maginot Line do any harm to France in World 
War II? Most French think so. It gave them the impression that they had 
taken care of a dangerous threat: an invasion from the East; when in 
fact, they were in as much danger as ever. The Maginot Line created a 
comforting illusion which lulled France into a false sense of security 
and facilitated Hitler's conquest.
    The world is less dangerous today than during most of my lifetime. 
I cherish this sense of lessened threat. But we are not so safe we can 
afford to create a false sense of security by pretending that we have 
eliminated the threat of chemical weapons. President Bill Clinton said, 
``We will have banished poison gas from the Earth.'' It will not be so. 
We had better do some hard thinking about how to defend ourselves and 
the world against the poison gases that have been and will be produced 
whether or not we ratify.
    I think the Senate should reaffirm the U.S. sense of responsibility 
and commitment to a peaceful world and decline to ratify this treaty 
unless or until it becomes verifiable, enforceable, and universal. 
There is a long way to go.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
    Let me say to the visitors here today and those who are 
watching on television that I have been to several functions 
that shared the podium with the distinguished Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, who, by the way, is a Senior Fellow of the 
American Enterprise Institute and, as almost everybody knows, 
she is a former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. But 
everywhere I go or have gone, where she has appeared likewise, 
I have sensed that she is one of the most respected women in 
America. We are honored to have you with us today.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Now, we move to Mr. Richard N. Perle, who is 
one of the best informed individuals I know. He is formerly 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Policy. I do not know how many times I have called on Richard 
for information and guidance on various issues. We are 
certainly glad to have you here, and you may proceed, sir.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, you do not have any idea how 
many times we have regretted that you called on him, because he 
is so persuasive. I hope you are not so good today, Richard.
    The Chairman. Just watch him.

 STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. PERLE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
           DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

    Mr. Perle. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for inviting 
me.
    Senator Biden, I can assure you I would not have come today 
if I did not think there was a very strong case to be made. I 
will try to take seriously your injunction to keep my eye on 
the ball.
    In fact, I think my colleague and friend Jeane Kirkpatrick 
clearly identified the ball when she described the way in which 
the Nonproliferation Treaty, without anyone ever having 
intended that it should work this way, had the effect of making 
technology for the production of nuclear material far more 
readily available than it might have been otherwise--a defect 
that unhappily is reproduced like a computer virus in the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.
    Before I get into the key point I want to make today, let 
me say that I have chosen to focus on one issue--one rather 
narrow issue. I think that is in fact the ball that Senator 
Biden has in mind. My colleague Doug Feith, from whom you will 
hear shortly, has prepared a more comprehensive statement that 
deals with other aspects of the treaty in a thoroughly 
convincing and understandable way. I agree entirely with the 
points that Doug will soon be making.
    But I want to restrict myself to one key point. That is, as 
it happens, the point that Sandy Berger was concerned to deal 
with in the letter with which he provided you. I take that 
letter as confirmation of the fact that the National Security 
Adviser, like others, have begun, under the exigency of 
imminent action on this treaty, to understand that there are 
problems in the treaty that need to be addressed. I wish they 
had been addressed at an earlier stage in the proceedings. That 
is to say, while the treaty was under negotiation. Because had 
the ball that Sandy Berger has now found been seen earlier, we 
would have a treaty without Article X in it, and probably 
without Article XI in it.
    Had we been more attentive, had we learned the lesson of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty, had we thought through the means 
by which countries may in future acquire a meaningful military 
chemical weapons capability, I am quite convinced that we would 
not have allowed Article X to become a part of this treaty.
    What Jeane had to say about the Nonproliferation Treaty 
applies to this Convention in spades. The reason why I say in 
spades, Mr. Chairman, is that the production of nuclear 
material clandestinely from facilities that are intended for 
peaceful purposes and that are monitored by the IAEA--not 
perfectly, but monitored--is a very difficult thing to 
accomplish. Building nuclear power plants is not easy. 
Operating them is not easy. Handling nuclear material is not 
easy.
    Chemical weapons, on the other hand, pose an entirely 
different set of issues. The production of lethal chemicals 
which can be used for military purposes is not difficult. Any 
facility capable of producing insecticides, any facility 
capable of producing fertilizer can, with relatively minor 
modifications--well within the capacity of any country that has 
an insecticide or a fertilizer plant--be converted to the 
production of chemicals. Indeed, some of the chemicals of 
concern are not even barred under this treaty, because they are 
already so widely spread around the world.
    So the acquisition of lethal chemicals for military 
purposes is easy. But the possession of lethal chemicals is 
not, by itself, sufficient to constitute a military capability. 
Because in order to use chemical weapons for military purposes, 
you have to be able to protect your own troops. The soldiers 
that go into the field, the pilots that drop canisters, the 
artillerymen that launch chemical shells all need to be 
protected themselves. Otherwise, their missions become 
suicidal. They are difficult enough even if they are protected 
themselves.
    So what is difficult about acquiring a chemical weapons 
capability, a military capability, is not the offense; it is 
the defense. The offense is easy. The defense is very hard.
    Article X of this treaty says that the parties to the 
treaty, the signatories, will be entitled to receive help in 
the development of the hard thing--the defensive capabilities. 
In fact, it requires participants who enter into this in good 
faith to assist them.
    I want to read the exact words of Article X, because I have 
a feeling that, by the time the Senate votes, everyone will 
have understood that this is the ball that we have to keep 
clearly in focus. Paragraph 3 of Article X reads as follows:

    Each state party undertakes--undertakes--to facilitate and 
shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, material and scientific and 
technological information concerning means of protection 
against chemical weapons. The parties undertake.

    Paragraph 6 of Article X reads:

    Nothing in this convention--nothing in this convention [if 
we had drafted this up here, it would say notwithstanding any 
other provision of law] nothing in this convention shall be 
interpreted--shall be interpreted--as impeding the right of 
states parties to request and provide assistance bilaterally 
and to conclude individual agreements with other states parties 
concerning the emergency procurement of assistance.

    So Article X not only pledges the parties, they undertake 
to share everything that is hard to achieve in a chemical 
weapons capability--the defensive side--but, in fact, 
anticipating the possibility that someone might say, well, we 
interpret this differently, words have specifically been 
included that say nothing in this convention shall be 
interpreted as impeding.
    Now, what are we talking about when we talk about the 
assistance, the fullest possible exchange, and so forth? That 
is defined in Article X. It refers inter alia to detection 
equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment, 
decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes 
and treatments, and advice on any of these protective measures. 
In short, everything you need, combined with the offensive 
chemicals themselves, to constitute a militarily effective 
chemical weapons capability.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am sure Mr. Perle would not 
mind my asking. Can I ask a clarification question?
    Mr. Perle. Sure.
    Senator Biden. What does Paragraph 7 mean?
    Mr. Perle. The paragraph I read to you, nothing in this 
convention shall be----
    Senator Biden. No. Each party undertakes to provide 
assistance through the organization and, to this end, to 
elect--to elect to take one or more of the following measures. 
Does that modify it? That is all I am trying to bring up.
    Mr. Perle [continuing]. No. I do not believe it does.
    It sets up a mechanism, which actually makes matters a 
little bit worse. Because the Secretariat will become a 
repository--not the only repository, because this envisions 
bilateral cooperation, as, for example, between China and Iran 
or China and Pakistan. But the Secretariat will now become a 
repository of information about defensive technology.
    So the span of control of the United States will be 
diluted, to the extent to which the United States does not 
constitute the Secretariat all by itself, which of course it 
will not.
    Senator Biden. I thank you. I have a different view, but I 
will wait until my time for questions.
    Mr. Perle. So I think it is reasonable to speculate that if 
we go ahead and approve this convention as it is now written, 
we will look back 1 day--5 years from now, 7, 10 years from 
now, maybe sooner--and we will unhappily identify states who 
got their chemical weapons capability through the sharing that 
is going to take place pursuant to Article X.
    The administration argues that, well, we are not going to 
do that. Of course, we are not going to give our defensive 
technology to rogue states. You would have to be out of your 
mind to do that. We have no intention of doing that. It is 
certainly the right of the administration to enter into an 
undertaking without any intention of carrying it out, because 
it runs counter to one's common sense. Some people would call 
that bad faith. I think it would be justified bad faith if we 
were unhappily unable to avoid the undertaking in the first 
place, which we are still in a position to avoid.
    But there are a great many other countries that also 
possess defensive capabilities and defensive technology. They 
may not be so willing to act in bad faith. Indeed, they may be 
actually rather eager to find a basis for sharing the kinds of 
defensive technologies, equipment, know-how, and so forth that 
we are talking about here.
    So if, for example, the challenge were to discourage the 
Chinese from assisting the Pakistanis, would not the Chinese 
invoke Article X of the treaty and say, we understand your 
feelings about this, Mr. President, but we undertook to share 
this technology. You are not asking us to violate a solemn 
undertaking, are you?
    I think our capacity to persuade others will be 
significantly diminished by virtue of the undertakings in 
Article X, which we may enter into in bad faith, but others 
will not.
    Let me give you a proliferation scenario just for 
illustrative purposes. Let us take Iran as the example. Iran 
has already signed, and I assume it will ratify the convention. 
I think there is evidence that Iran presently has a chemical 
weapons capability. But let us say that the Iranians, upon 
entering the Chemical Weapons Convention, decide to abandon 
that offensive capability. It is a matter of converting some 
plants that are now producing chemicals to the production of 
insecticide or fertilizer. What can you do from left to right, 
you can do from right to left.
    So Iran now ceases to have an offensive chemical weapons 
production capability. It is, therefore, in strict compliance 
with the terms of this convention. That is what I would do if I 
were Mr. Rafsanjani and wanted a chemical weapons capability. 
Because I do not today have the defensive side of the equation.
    So I would eliminate any violation by ceasing illegal 
activity. Now I would invoke Article X, and I would go to other 
countries and say, ``We have no offensive capability. We are in 
full compliance. You are obliged--you have undertaken to share 
with us the defenses.'' I promise you there will be countries 
that will accommodate them--for a price--maybe even without 
insisting on much of a price. Who could argue against it, since 
they will be, at that point, in full compliance?
    So a period of time elapses, during which the Iranians, who 
were clever, acquire all the defensive technology they need. 
They acquire, in the words of the treaty, detection equipment 
and alarm systems, protective equipment, decontamination 
equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes and treatments, 
and advice on all of the above.
    Once they have that firmly in hand, once they have the 
difficult part of acquiring a chemical weapons capability, now 
they restart the production of offensive chemicals. But it is 
too late. We will have supplied them the thing that they cannot 
now easily achieve. They will put part A and part B together, 
and they will have a chemical weapons military capability. The 
instrument by which they will have achieved this is the 
convention that we are now talking about ratifying.
    Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying two other things. 
One about how we could get into this situation. How could we be 
at this stage of the proceedings, with so many countries having 
signed this agreement, with the Senate about to take it up, 
having overlooked--because that is the only fair way to 
describe it--the portentous implications of Article X?
    There is another article, Article XI, which tends very much 
in the same direction, and I think it will have a similar 
result.
    I had occasion to discuss this treaty recently with a 
senior official of this government, a cabinet level official. I 
asked this person about Article X. This person did not know 
about Article X. Now, Article X has become better known in the 
last 72 hours. But a couple of weeks ago, there were an awful 
lot of very senior officials of this government who did not 
know about Article X and did not know about the problem.
    You wonder how this could happen. Well, it happens in the 
following way. The United States makes a decision to propose a 
treaty on chemical weapons and a draft is put together. The 
draft did not have Article X in it. We sent a team of people to 
Geneva, and they come back 10 years later, basically. For 10 
years, they are working away on this convention.
    The people who are receiving their cables in Washington are 
very often people who were in Geneva, because there is a kind 
of rotation. This is how it works in the real world. So you get 
an intellectually incestuous relationship among the Geneva 
people and the Washington people, with almost no adult 
supervision. The individuals involved in this invest a great 
deal of their time, years of their lives, in attempting to 
bring about a treaty.
    Somebody insists on an Article X, or maybe a group of 
countries insist on an Article X. It is 10 years after we got 
started on this, and we want to bring this treaty home. It is 
the experts who are making the decision. No President reads the 
treaty. No Secretary of State reads the treaty. No Under 
Secretary. No Assistant Secretary. I promise you, Mr. Chairman, 
this treaty, 160 pages long, has not been read by anyone who 
was not paid full-time to work on it.
    So terrible mistakes can be made--mistakes in which 
somebody loses sight of the ball along the way. That is what 
comes to the Senate for ratification.
    One last point. Senator Feinstein asked about verification. 
How would verification be improved if the United States 
remained outside the treaty? It is a fair question. The answer 
is counterintuitive. So let me take a quick shot at it.
    I think it would be improved in two ways. First of all, I 
think we would do a better job of keeping to ourselves the 
means by which we detect violations. Jeane Kirkpatrick made 
reference to the fact that Iraq had served on the governing 
board of the IAEA. They were there for a good reason.
    The Iraqi Government did not contribute the full-time 
talent of one of its senior officials for the benefit of the 
IAEA; I promise you that. He was there to learn as much as he 
could learn about how the IAEA went about detecting illegal 
activity. He was an intelligence officer. I promise you that 
the organization responsible for implementing this agreement 
will be full of intelligence officers, including intelligence 
officers from countries who are eager to discover how they 
might be caught if they had a clandestine program.
    So we will end up educating the very people whose programs 
we are trying to stop in how to avoid getting detected in the 
first place. So that is one way in which we will be worse off. 
We do not have to educate them now, but we will then.
    Second, and this is a more subtle point, once activity 
becomes illegal, the way in which information about it is 
collected and analyzed and reported acquires an entirely 
different meaning than when it is simply intelligence about the 
activities of others.
    When we are interested in the capabilities of a Russian 
missile, we employ technicians who look at the test data that 
they are able to acquire, who look at photography, who look at 
all sources of intelligence; and they make a judgment about the 
capability of that missile; and they say how far they think it 
can go; and they say what size warhead they think it can carry.
    They say everything to the best of their ability about that 
missile; and they do not think about the implications of their 
answer, because their job is to unearth the truth about that 
missile.
    But now, suppose there is an arms control regime in which 
that missile, if its range is over 600 kilometers, is a 
violation of a treaty; but if it is only 595 kilometers it is 
not a violation of a treaty, and you are now responsible for 
deciding whether to send to the President a report that says, 
we believe the range of this missile to be 650 kilometers, 
which has very important political implications. At that point, 
an element of political judgment enters into the assessment of 
intelligence.
    I saw this day in and day out as we grappled with the 
question of how to interpret what we were seeing in the old 
Soviet Union in the cold war days, so I believe that the 
objectivity with which we view the evidence becomes inevitably 
colored by political considerations when the issue is not, what 
do we know, but is what we know going to touch off a crisis 
because we have now caught someone violating the treaty; and 
that requires some response on our part.
    So I do not accept the now hourly-passed-off view that we 
are going to do more with this treaty than without it, which is 
the conventional wisdom; but I think it overlooks these two 
very important points.
    I am sorry for going on too long, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
very much.
    The Chairman. You have not at all, and I thank you very 
much.
    Now we have another long-time friend of all of us, Dr. Fred 
Ikle, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. We appreciate you coming, sir. We will be glad to hear 
from you now.

 STATEMENT OF DR. FRED C. IKLE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL 
                     AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

    Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be 
invited here.
    The previous witnesses, Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Richard 
Perle, made so many of the important points of what effectively 
is a sad story that I can be quite brief. It is a sad story; 
because as witnesses yesterday mentioned, there were good 
intentions behind this treaty, and we all are--the witnesses 
yesterday and today--are horrified by the potential of chemical 
weapons and would like to see them banished from the face of 
the Earth.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick very tellingly brought back the 
nonproliferation treaty, which of course was preceded by the 
Atoms for Peace program. President Eisenhower with that program 
also had very good intentions. In fact, he got enormous kudos 
in the press when he presented that program. It was one of his 
greatest public affairs successes, and--as it turns out now 
from hindsight--one of the main contributors to nuclear 
proliferation.
    I can add to the telling points Richard Perle made about 
Article X and the related culprit, Article XI about the 
assistance in chemical manufacturing technology. Here, there is 
something a bit startling in the discussion we had. By and 
large the discussion in Congress and in the media has been very 
thoughtful on both sides, serious arguments, honestly felt.
    It is all the more regrettable here that on the question 
relating to Article XI it looks like some misinformation has 
deliberately been infiltrated into our discussion, and that is 
the allegation which a number of people here picked up 
innocently, the allegation that the United States would lose 
seriously in chemical manufacturing exports if we did not 
ratify the treaty.
    For a while, the administration spokespersons mentioned a 
number like $600 million lost per year in U.S. exports, 
legitimate chemical manufacturing exports. When pressed on 
where that number came from, the administration said: ``talk to 
the Chemical Manufacturing Association.'' When the people there 
were asked, they really were unable to give an explanation.
    So we did some further digging into this question; and it 
turns out the only exports that the U.S. could no longer make, 
if it did not become a party to the treaty, to other treaty 
members like Germany, Japan, and the U.K., would be the poison 
gas itself, which of course we do not want to be exporting, and 
the most dangerous ingredients to be used in gas warfare.
    Schedule I type chemicals is poison gas itself. There are 
no exports, obviously, from the United States of any 
importance. Schedule II, that may have some role in pesticides, 
but exports are much more limited than the $600 million figure 
suggested.
    So why has this export damage been so vigorously mentioned, 
particularly by the Chemical Manufacturing Association 
representatives that are urging the Senate to ratify this 
treaty? I think the answer, I believe, is that some people 
there relish the prospect that the Chemical Weapons Convention 
would undo the restrictions of the Australia Group, precisely 
the thing Senator Biden expressed serious concern about, and 
rightly so.
    Now, this is a serious charge to make, and maybe I had 
better have a couple of exhibits for my case. One, I was not 
able to fully nail down. Maybe you could have this done, Mr. 
Chairman. Last fall, in the House of Representatives, a step 
was taken--exactly where it came from I do not know, it would 
seem to have the support of the Chemical Manufacturing 
Association--to lift the licensing requirements for chemical 
weapons exports to the member states of the convention before 
even the United States had ratified the treaty.
    Then, Members--colleagues of yours--I think yourself, Mr. 
Chairman, Senator Pell, Senator Glenn, Senator Kyl in a 
bipartisan effort stopped that premature dismantling of our 
licensing requirements.
    The more definitive exhibit goes further back. In testimony 
before this committee on June 9, 1994, a spokesman conveying 
the support of the Chemical Manufacturing Association said, and 
I quote, ``There are several significant reasons why the 
chemical industry supports the CWC. Those chemical 
manufacturers do not make chemical weapons. Our industry does 
produce commercial chemicals which can be illegally converted 
into weapons. An effective CWC could have the positive effect 
of liberalizing--liberalizing the existing system for export 
controls applicable to our industry's products, technologies, 
and processes.''
    So I think there is at least a partial explanation for the 
enthusiasm of the CMA for this treaty. Now, that is perhaps in 
some ways a serious charge. I think it is.
    Let me add one more point there. To the extent I have been 
able to find out, and I know some other people have confirmed 
this, this is not a charge against the most senior officials of 
the industry who are members of the association. I have talked 
to CEO's of large chemical companies, including in Delaware, 
who have never heard of the treaty while it was in process and 
while the representatives here in town of the CMA have been 
working together with this club in Geneva that Richard Perle 
described, and nourished the support for this treaty.
    So I think we have to first of all get rid of the idea that 
not ratifying the treaty would damage the exports of the United 
States chemical industry, the legitimate, important exports; 
and second I think we have to put a question mark behind the 
support alleged by the CMA of the responsible senior officials 
in the chemical industry.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank you, Dr. Ikle. I think the 
legislation you were talking about was H.R. 364, and that would 
have just devastated the U.S. export controls.
    Now we come to Doug Feith, former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Negotiation Policy, and by George, I 
am anxiously awaiting hearing from you. Thank you for coming 
in.

  STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS J. FEITH, FEITH AND ZELL, P.C., FORMER 
  DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY

    Mr. Feith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
the opportunity to appear before this committee again on this 
important question. I agree with Dr. Ikle that the debate on 
the Chemical Weapons Convention has been of remarkably high 
quality for a matter so complex. I have a statement that I 
would appreciate the committee admitting for the record, and 
what I would like to do now is just touch on some of the points 
in my written statement, if that is acceptable.
    The Chairman. Very well. Without objection it will be so 
ordered.
    Mr. Feith. Thank you.
    Both sides in this debate have established substantial 
common ground. Both sides agree that the treaty is not 
verifiable, if by verifiable we mean confidence in detection by 
U.S. intelligence of illegal clandestine stockpiling or 
production of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence 
community has ever said the treaty is verifiable by that 
standard.
    It is worthwhile to stress that the verification problem 
here is not the lack of perfection. The problem is not that we 
would detect cheating only 90 percent or 50 percent of the 
time. The problem is that chemical weapons production is so 
easy to do and to conceal that it is inherently impossible to 
achieve any degree of confidence, let alone high confidence, 
that we could detect it even regarding militarily significant 
quantities of chemical weapons.
    Someone once drove this point home by saying that the 
Chemical Weapons Convention is like an effort to ban 
Hollandaise sauce without banning eggs and butter. Treaty 
critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be 
ineffective, impossible to monitor properly, and impossible to 
enforce.
    I speak as a lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The 
world would surely be a better place if law in fact played a 
greater role in securing international peace and civilized 
behavior, but we do not move toward this goal by promulgating a 
patently ineffective treaty. A chemical weapons ban that states 
know they can sign cynically and violate without punishment 
will not shore up the international norm against such weapons. 
Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The 
CWC will cheapen the currency of international law.
    The wiser approach, in my opinion, to chemical weapons arms 
control is embodied in the bill S. 495, authored by Senator Kyl 
and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Helms, and others. The United 
States should work to obtain international agreement on 
mechanisms for enforcing the existing treaty that bans 
initiation of chemical warfare. We should put teeth in the 1925 
Geneva Protocol.
    If that treaty were properly enforced, there clearly would 
not be any need for the CWC; and if the Geneva Protocol 
continues to be violated with impunity, then there is no hope 
that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the CWC are 
far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to 
horrify worldwide opinion than violations of the non-use ban.
    What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as 
we are destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is 
better, in our view, to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than 
to enter into a treaty that we know will not accomplish its 
purpose. By acting unilaterally, we produce some of the key 
benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking on the treaty's 
undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral statement 
against chemical weapons, but it does not lend our name to the 
dishonest proposition that Iran, China, or others have actually 
abolished their chemical weapons arsenals.
    Which brings us back to the question highlighted by Senator 
Feinstein: Whether we are better off with the inspection and 
information rights that the CWC will provide, or without. On 
balance, we are better off without.
    The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first 
is voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what 
the parties voluntarily declare about their own holdings of 
chemical weapons, manufacturing facilities and the like. 
Virtually all the CWC's inspections will be at so-called 
declared facilities, that is, locations that each party will 
itself declare to be subject to inspection.
    Nearly all the large budget of the new CWC organization 
based in The Hague will be allocated to inspecting declared 
facilities and processing the parties' voluntary declarations. 
Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China or Russia to 
declare a facility in which it is planning to produce or store 
illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections 
of declared facilities will yield our government little, if 
anything, of value to augment what we already know from our own 
national intelligence means.
    Looking for chemical weapons at declared facilities brings 
to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under 
the street lamp rather than some ways off where he dropped 
them, because there is more light under the lamp.
    The verification regime's second leg is challenge 
inspection. That is, inspection of a facility that was not 
declared. This is often talked of as if it were a tool for 
adding to our knowledge, or for finding violations. It is not. 
One cannot spot check a country the size of Iran, much less 
China, by means of challenge inspections.
    The purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass 
a state that one has by other intelligence means caught in a 
violation. So it is incorrect to think that we will learn much 
of substantive value through challenge inspections.
    Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection provisions were 
watered down in the negotiations to the point where they are 
not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will 
easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and 
otherwise defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection 
provisions.
    The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for 
our intelligence capabilities must also be considered in light 
of the harm that will result from participation in the 
international inspection program by unreliable states, as 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle highlighted, and as 
Secretary Schlesinger highlighted yesterday.
    I would simply emphasize that when rogue states learn how 
to inspect, they learn how to conceal, and in this regard I 
think it should disturb the Senate that the administration has 
taken steps to begin training foreign CWC inspectors even 
before the Senate has acted on this treaty. I understand that 
some government agencies are resisting this effort, and I urge 
this committee to inquire into this.
    Now, Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great 
deal of attention lately, and these provisions are a major part 
of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good, as has 
been explained very well.
    I do want to reemphasize in response to the textual 
analysis that Senator Biden mentioned that the argument that 
Article X, paragraph 3, the most troubling provision, is 
overridden by Article I, is, I believe, flatly contradicted by 
what paragraph 6 says, that nothing in this convention shall be 
interpreted as impeding the right of States' Parties to provide 
assistance.
    The people who drafted this provision anticipated precisely 
the argument that Article I might override Article X, paragraph 
3, and they took care of it by nailing it in paragraph 6. This 
is a serious problem.
    As for Article XI, it prohibits, or at least expresses 
disapproval of export restrictions in the chemical field among 
treaty parties.
    Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not 
completely unqualified, so the administration has been able to 
offer an interpretation that renders this provision 
meaningless, a legal nullity.
    But whether or not the administration's interpretation is 
valid, I would argue that it is beside the point--the real 
issue is not--and I want to emphasize this point. The real 
issue is not what the United States itself will export, but 
what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this 
world.
    For export controls to be effective they must have 
multilateral support, which is hard to organize. If a German or 
Chinese company arranges to sell an advanced chemical plant to 
Iran, and the U.S. Government protests that this would enhance 
Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or 
Chinese Government to cite Article XI for the proposition that 
the sale is not only permitted but required by the CWC; for 
Iran will be a party in good standing, or in any event a party 
against whom no violation can be proved.
    Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny 
that it would be a better or less bad treaty if the so-called, 
``poisons for peace'' provisions were fixed.
    Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC outright, 
some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their 
opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and 
XI are properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics 
argue that to be minimally acceptable the CWC should at least 
not undermine the very interests--stemming chemical weapons 
proliferation--that it aims to promote.
    Administration officials counter with the argument that it 
would be embarrassing for the United States at this late stage 
to insist that the treaty be amended. They say this would 
destroy our diplomatic credibility.
    While it would to some extent be embarrassing, it is also 
embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as 
Articles X and XI. As for our diplomats' credibility, the 
effect of forcing amendments of Article X and XI could be 
powerfully positive.
    If the administration's interpretations of those provisions 
are widely held, then the amendment should not be unduly 
difficult to arrange. If they are so difficult, this would 
confirm that the provisions are a problem, and the United 
States should not ratify until the problem is resolved.
    If the administration, as is likely, then succeeds in 
getting the needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats 
would be enhanced. The next time a multilateral forum proposes 
a treaty with a bizarre provision adverse to our interests, our 
negotiators would be able to declare credibly that that 
provision will preclude Senate approval of the treaty. This 
will strengthen our hand.
    A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern 
to us--Syria, Libya, Iraq, and North Korea--have not signed the 
CWC. Although some such states, specifically Russia, China, 
Iran, and Cuba, have signed; none of these latter four has yet 
ratified. The administration insists that it is crucial that 
the United States ratify the CWC before April 29, but if we do 
we will be the only state party that actually has a significant 
chemical weapons capability.
    April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United 
States might decide to become a party, it will, because of its 
military and financial status, be afforded an appropriate 
position of influence in the treaty organization if we assert 
ourselves properly.
    This is true because we are to pay 25 percent of the total 
budget of the new organization. It is true also because the 
other major states in this field are waiting for the United 
States before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is 
ready to act before April 29, then well and good, but the 
Senate should not, in my opinion, hasten its deliberations 
simply to make a meaningless deadline.
    Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Feith follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Douglas J. Feith

    Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you again 
on this important question. It was in March 1996 that I last had the 
honor to address this committee on why I think the Senate should not 
consent to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 
During the Reagan Administration, I served as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy and my responsibilities 
included the chemical weapons treaty negotiations.
    The debate on the CWC has been of remarkably high quality for a 
matter so complex. The sides have engaged each other intelligently and 
generally respectfully and have established substantial common ground. 
They agree that chemical weapons are evil. Specifically, all four of us 
on this panel--Fred Ikle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle and myself--
agree with the treaty's proponents that it would be desirable to 
eliminate these weapons from the world entirely and that the United 
States should continue to destroy its own chemical weapons, as we are 
already doing, whether or not the United States joins the CWC. We all 
favor the CWC's goal. We all agree that the chemical weapons threat in 
the world is a problem the gravity of which the world should never 
underestimate. In fact, a key reason for opposing the CWC is that it 
will falsely advertise that the chemical weapons threat has been 
mitigated when it has not.
    The debate has also made clear that both CWC proponents and critics 
acknowledge that the treaty has flaws. Both sides agree that the treaty 
will not be global and will not cover a number of the states of 
greatest concern to us.
    Both sides also agree that the treaty is not verifiable, if by 
``verifiable'' we mean confidence in detection by U.S. Intelligence of 
illegal, clandestine stockpiling or pro- 
duction of chemical weapons. No one in the intelligence community has 
ever said the treaty is verifiable by that standard. It is worthwhile 
to stress that the verification problem here is not the lack of 
perfection. The problem is not that we would detect cheating only 90 
percent or even only 50 percent of the time. The problem is that 
chemical weapons production is so easy to do and to conceal that it is 
inherently impossible to achieve any degree of confidence--let alone 
``high confidence''--that we could detect it, even regarding militarily 
significant quantities. Someone once drove this point home by saying 
that the CWC is like an effort to ban hollandaise sauce without banning 
eggs and butter.
    In her testimony before this Committee yesterday, Secretary of 
State Albright argued for the CWC by asserting that rogue states would 
be subject to unprecedented verification measures and ``will probably 
be caught'' if they violate the treaty. The Secretary of State was 
incorrect in this assertion and there is no intelligence authority in 
the government that would confirm her claim.
    Both sides in the CWC debate agree that the treaty will not 
actually eliminate chemical weapons from the world. And both sides 
agree that the CWC is in essence a moral statement against chemical 
weapons, a declaration that the civilized nations abhor these weapons 
and think that no one should possess them.
    The debate now has a rather precise focus: Given the importance of 
the chemical weapons problem and given that the CWC has its flaws, is 
the United States better served by ratifying the treaty or not. Treaty 
proponents say that the United States is better off if the world enacts 
this new international law against possession of chemical weapons, even 
if we know that key countries will violate it. They also say that we 
are better off with the inspection and information rights that the CWC 
will provide than without. Treaty critics contend that the treaty will 
not accomplish its purpose and will actually exacerbate the chemical 
weapons problem in the world.
    Treaty critics believe that it would not serve the anti-chemical-
weapons cause for us to join a ban that we know will be ineffective, 
impossible to monitor properly and impossible to enforce. I speak as a 
lawyer devoted to the principle of law. The world would surely be a 
better place if law in fact played a greater role in securing 
international peace and civilized behavior. But we do not move toward 
this goal by promulgating a patently ineffective new treaty. A chemical 
weapons ban that states know they can sign cynically and violate 
without punishment will not shore up the international norm against 
such weapons. On the contrary, it will damage that norm even more 
severely than it was harmed by the world's failure to uphold the 1925 
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons when Iraq violated that venerable 
treaty in the late 1980's.
    Creating bad law is not the way to build respect for law. The ill-
conceived CWC will cheapen the currency of international law. The wiser 
approach to chemical weapons arms control is embodied in the bill, S. 
495, authored by Senator Kyl and cosponsored by Senators Lott, Nickles, 
Mack, Coverdell, Helms, Shelby and Hutchison: The United States should 
work to obtain international agreement on mechanisms for enforcing the 
existing treaty that bans initiation of chemical warfare. In other 
words, we should put teeth in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If that treaty 
were properly enforced, there would clearly be no need for the CWC. And 
if the Geneva Protocol continues to be violated with impunity, then 
there is no hope that the CWC will be respected, for violations of the 
CWC are far less discoverable and provable and far less likely to 
horrify world opinion than violations of the non-use ban. If one cannot 
get the world excited about disfigured corpses produced by violations 
of the Geneva Protocol, it is unrealistic to expect tough enforcement 
action when U.S. officials allege clandestine storage somewhere of some 
chemical bulk agent.
    What of the point that we might as well ratify the CWC as we are 
destroying the U.S. chemical arsenal anyway? It is better, in my view, 
to destroy our arsenal unilaterally than to enter into a treaty that we 
know will not accomplish its purpose. By acting unilaterally, we 
produce some of the key benefits hoped for from the CWC without taking 
on the treaty's undesirable baggage. Our action makes a strong moral 
statement against chemical weapons. But it does not lend our name to 
the dishonest proposition that Iran, China or others have actually 
abolished their chemical weapons arsenals. The world can verify our 
compliance with our self-imposed ban by reading the Congressional 
Record. We then do not have to participate in a costly, wasteful, 
intrusive but ineffective verification regime that is more likely to 
spread militarily relevant chemical weapons technology than contain it.
    Any other chemical weapons state that wants to follow our lead can 
do so, also unilaterally. Each will have the opportunity to persuade 
the world as best it can that it is doing what it has promised. This 
way, states will not obtain a clean bill of health simply by signing a 
treaty and subjecting themselves to an inspection regime that they know 
is easy to defeat.
    Which brings us back to the question of whether we are better off 
with the inspection and information rights that the CWC will provide or 
without. On balance, we are better off without. Treaty proponents 
stress that the CWC's verification provisions are unprecedented in 
their elaborateness and intrusiveness, which is true. But they will 
contribute little of any importance to what we need to know about the 
chemical weapons threat in the world.
    The CWC's verification regime stands on two legs. The first is 
voluntary disclosure. Most of the regime is based on what the parties 
voluntarily declare about their own holdings of chemical weapons, 
manufacturing facilities, chemical stocks and the like. Virtually all 
the inspections to be conducted under the CWC will be of so-called 
``declared facilities''--that is, locations that each party will itself 
declare to be subject to inspection. Routine inspections will focus 
exclusively on ``declared facilities.'' Nearly all the large budget of 
the new CWC organization based in the Hague will be allocated to 
inspecting ``declared facilities'' and processing the parties' 
voluntary declarations. Does anyone expect a country like Iran or China 
or Russia to declare a facility at which it is planning to produce or 
store illegal chemical weapons? The declarations and the inspections of 
``declared facilities'' will yield our government little if anything of 
value to augment what we already know from our own national means of 
intelligence. Looking for chemical weapons at ``declared facilities'' 
brings to mind the joke about the drunk who looks for his keys under 
the street lamp rather than some ways off, where he dropped them, 
because there is more light under the lamp.
    The CWC verification regime's second leg is challenge inspection--
that is, inspection of a facility that was not ``declared.'' This is 
often talked of as if it were a tool for adding to our knowledge or for 
finding violations. It is not. One cannot spot check a country the size 
of Iran, much less China, by means of challenge inspections. The 
purpose of challenge inspections is to try to embarrass a state that 
one has, by other intelligence means, caught in a violation. So it is 
incorrect to think that we will learn much of substantive value through 
challenge inspections. Moreover, the CWC's challenge inspection 
provisions were watered down in the negotiations to the point where 
they are not even a useful tool for embarrassing cheaters. Parties will 
easily be able, within the treaty's terms, to delay and otherwise 
defeat the purposes of the challenge inspection provisions.
    The issue of whether the CWC will produce a net gain for our 
intelligence capabilities must be considered also in light of the harm 
that will result from participation in the international inspection 
program by unreliable states. As Secretary Schlesinger noted before 
this committee yesterday, Iraq in the 1970's and 1980's learned a great 
deal about how to conceal its nuclear weapons program through 
participating in the inspection regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. When rogue states learn how to inspect, they learn how to 
conceal. In this regard, I think it should disturb the Senate that the 
Administration has taken steps to begin training CWC inspectors even 
before the Senate has acted on the treaty. I understand that some 
government agencies are resisting this effort. I urge this committee to 
inquire into this.
    Articles X and XI of the CWC have received a great deal of 
attention, including at this committee's hearing yesterday with the 
three former Secretaries of Defense--Rumsfeld, Schlesinger and 
Weinberger--who opposed ratification. These provisions are a major part 
of the reason that the CWC will do more harm than good. These 
provisions will promote the spread of chemical defense and other 
technology that will make it easier for states to develop a chemical 
war fighting capability than if the CWC did not exist.
    Article X obliges the parties to facilitate the exchange with the 
other parties of chemical weapons defense material and technology. To 
have an effective chemical war fighting capability, one must have 
defense material and technology to protect one's own forces. Article X 
will establish the right of Iran, for example, to obtain such items 
from Germany, France, China or some other state. And it will establish 
the right of the would-be sellers to provide such items to Iran. The 
language of Article X is straightforward. Paragraph 3 says:

        Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall have the 
        right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
        equipment, material and scientific and technological 
        information concerning means of protection against chemical 
        weapons.

    And Paragraph 6 says:

        Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the 
        right of States Parties to * * * provide assistance * * * 
        [where ``assistance'' is defined as ``delivery * * * of 
        protection against chemical weapons, including * * * detection 
        equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment * * *; 
        decontamination equipment * * *; medical antidotes * * *; and 
        advice on any of these protective measures].

    As Richard Perle has pointed out, the CWC prohibits that part of a 
chemical weapons capability that is easy for states to make for 
themselves: the weapons themselves. The other part of that capability--
defense material and technology, which is relatively ``high tech'' and 
difficult to acquire--is precisely what the treaty affirmatively 
requires the parties to proliferate.
    Similarly, Article XI prohibits--or at least expresses disapproval 
of--export restrictions in the chemical field among treaty parties. 
Unlike the language of Article X, that of Article XI is not completely 
unqualified, so the Administration has been able to offer an 
``interpretation'' that renders this provision meaningless, a legal 
nullity. This allows Administration officials to assert that the United 
States will maintain export controls on Iran and others notwithstanding 
Article XI. Whether or not the Administration's interpretation is 
valid, it is beside the point.
    The real issue is not what the United States itself will export, 
but what third countries will want to sell to the Irans of this world. 
For export controls to be effective, they must have multilateral 
support which is hard to organize. To return to the example above: If a 
German or Chinese company will arrange to sell an advanced chemical 
plant to Iran and the U.S. government protests that this would enhance 
Iran's chemical weapons program, we can expect the German or Chinese 
government to cite Article XI for the proposition that the sale is not 
only permitted but required by the CWC, for Iran will be a treaty party 
in good standing (or, in any event, a party against whom no violation 
can be proved). There is precedent for such a colloquy. The Clinton 
Administration protested against a Russian sale of a nuclear reactor to 
Iran. The Russians replied by citing the provisions in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty--the ``atoms for peace'' section--on which CWC 
Articles X and XI are modeled. This is why Fred Ikle has referred to 
Articles X and XI as ``poisons for peace.''
    Whatever one thinks of the CWC overall, no one can deny that it 
would be a better (or less bad) treaty if the ``poisons for peace'' 
provisions were fixed. Though I think the Senate should reject the CWC 
outright, some treaty critics would be willing to withdraw their 
opposition if only the Senate would ensure that Articles X and XI are 
properly amended before U.S. ratification. Such critics argue that, to 
be minimally acceptable, the CWC should at least not undermine the very 
interest--stemming chemical weapons proliferation--it aims to promote.
    Administration officials counter with the argument that it would be 
embarrassing for the United States, at this late stage, to insist that 
the treaty be amended. They say this would destroy our diplomatic 
credibility. While it would, to some extent, be embarrassing, it is 
also embarrassing to ratify a treaty with provisions as perverse as 
Articles X and XI. Also, the Clinton Administration could take comfort 
from the fact that the error of agreeing to those provisions was 
committed not by itself but by the Bush Administration.
    As for our diplomats' credibility, the effect of forcing amendments 
of Articles X and XI could be powerfully positive. If the 
Administration's interpretations of those provisions are widely held, 
then the amendments should not be unduly difficult to arrange. If they 
are so difficult, this would confirm that the provisions are a problem 
and the United States should not ratify until the problem is resolved. 
If the Administration, as is likely, then succeeds in getting the 
needed amendments, the influence of our diplomats would be enhanced. 
The next time a multilateral forum proposes a treaty with a bizarre 
provision adverse to our interests, our negotiators would be able to 
declare credibly that that provision will preclude Senate approval of 
the treaty. This will strengthen our hand.
    A final point regarding deadlines. Many states of concern to us--
Syria, Libya, Iraq and North Korea--have not signed the CWC. Although 
some such states--specifically Russia, China, Iran and Cuba--have 
signed, none of these latter four has yet ratified. The Administration 
insists that it is crucial that the United States ratify the CWC before 
April 29, but if we do, we shall be the only state party that actually 
has a significant chemical weapons capability.
    April 29 is an artificial deadline. Any time the United States 
might decide to become a party, it will, because of its military and 
financial status, be afforded an appropriate position of influence in 
the treaty organization. This is true because we are to pay 25 percent 
of the total budget of this new organization. It is true also because 
the other major states in this field are waiting for the United States 
before they decide whether to ratify. If the Senate is ready to act 
before April 29, then well and good. But the Senate should not, in my 
opinion, hasten its deliberations simply to make a meaningless 
deadline.
    Thank you.

    The Chairman. Thank you, sir. That concludes the testimony.
    Now, we have two or three Senators on this side coming 
back. I think we had better limit ourselves in the first round 
to 5 minutes, if that is satisfactory.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, is it possible to get a little 
more? Five minutes is really very difficult to develop any 
line.
    The Chairman. Well, it will eat into the time of the 
proponents of the treaty.
    Senator Kerry. We have got all day.
    Senator Biden. Admiral Zumwalt has to leave here at 4:30, I 
am told. Maybe----
    Senator Kerry. Well, I will go along with it, then.
    The Chairman. All right. Let us try 5 minutes.
    Dr. Ikle, I have a letter dated March 13 from the Aerospace 
Industries Association. It states that a strong concern that 
the CWC will, and I quote from the letter, ``unnecessarily 
jeopardize our Nation's ability to protect its national 
security information and proprietary technological data.''
    Now, this treaty, as we know, will permit foreign 
inspectors into thousands of U.S. businesses to poke around, 
interview employees, take photographs, and take samples home 
for analysis there. Now, given your assessment of the foreign 
policy benefits of this treaty, if any, do you think it makes 
sense to subject U.S. companies, private companies, to this 
danger of the theft of millions of dollars in trade secrets?
    Dr. Ikle. I like the way, Mr. Chairman, you put the 
question--``given the benefits of the treaty.''
    If the treaty was of major benefit, clearly verifiable in 
other aspects and it enhanced arms control objectives, maybe 
that was a risk we would want to take, that on occasion some 
very clever disguised intelligence person, disguised as an 
objective inspector, could pick up some valid information.
    But that is not the case. The benefits of the treaty, even 
as seen by the supporters, are not that strong, and from what 
we have heard today, they are a negative. From what we have 
heard so far among the witnesses today, what you can obtain by 
samples that can be analyzed in a national laboratory back home 
by instruments which can be carried with you, brought into the 
places where chemicals are prepared for our sensitive weapons 
systems, could be very, very significant.
    I remember from my days in the Pentagon the briefings that 
I received of analyses that our intelligence organization had 
made in other places, and how much we learned from just 
somebody walking through with the right little instrument in 
his pocket. So that is very serious.
    Incidentally, if I may insert here a further thought, as if 
all of this was not bad enough, some supporters who want to 
hasten the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
argue that it should be followed up then by a verification 
scheme for biological weapons.
    As Arms Control Director, I took the biological weapons 
treaty before this committee. Senator Fulbright was sitting in 
the chair at the time, and I explained right away that it was 
not verifiable but it was a useful thing to have as a statement 
of our opposition to biological weapons, and I do not regret 
that. I think it is useful even now in Iraq, because it caught 
Iraq violating the agreement that they had signed.
    But if you want to follow that up with an inspection team 
on biological weapons--many people in the bureaucracy are now 
working on that, in this process that Richard Perle described 
to Geneva and back here without ``adult supervision''--it is 
ten times as dangerous, the things you can then steal from 
these so-called onsite inspections to get really way ahead in 
biological weapons. So it is dangerous here, and if you cannot 
stop the follow on it will be really catastrophic.
    The Chairman. I thank you, sir.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick, you hear a lot of arguments that 
nonratification of the CWC will mark the forfeiture of U.S. 
leadership in the fight to eliminate chemical weapons from the 
face of the Earth. That is almost a quote-unquote from voice 
after voice after voice orchestrated by the White House. Do you 
agree, or do you believe that the rest of the world will 
continue to look to the United States with or without this 
treaty?
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Mr. Chairman, actually I think that 
to the extent that the rest of the world looks to us for 
leadership, and I think we sometimes exaggerate that leadership 
in our own minds, I do not think it will be affected much by 
what we do on this treaty; and I will tell you why.
    The reason is that our reputation for leadership in the 
military, scientific, and technological domain rests not only 
on our clear undoubted excellence and long lead on other 
nations, but also in our willingness to assume responsibility 
for responding to dangerous challenges.
    We have done this again and again, and I think we will 
continue to offer that kind of leadership. Sometimes that 
requires standing alone, or standing nearly alone and saying, 
should we not consider what the implications of this are for 
the spread of chemical weapons in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Europe?
    I think that those nations that have a high regard for us 
might even have a higher regard for us.
    The Chairman. I think so, too. Senator Biden. My time is 
up.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much. In the interests of 
time I am going to focus on only one issue, and I think we all 
acknowledge that sometimes the more persuasive we make one of 
our arguments against the treaty, the more irrelevant another 
argument becomes.
    For example, it is kind of interesting that I think 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick and Mr. Perle have made very strong 
arguments against universality of the treaty, because if they 
are correct then the last person you want in this, Mr. 
Chairman, is Korea and the other rogue nations, Iraq and Libya; 
so I think it is a very compelling argument against 
universality.
    Mr. Feith makes a very compelling argument that one of the 
reasons why verification does not work is because the Bush 
administration responded to what Ronald Reagan wanted done, and 
that was he wanted intrusive investigations that were 
inspections that maybe would violate our Fourth Amendment, and 
so we fixed the Fourth Amendment. There is no Fourth Amendment 
problem here, notwithstanding what people assert, and I think 
you would acknowledge that. You may not want to, but as a good 
lawyer I believe you would have to. I know you looked at it.
    So the administration fixed one piece and made the 
inspections, the relevance of inspections that were challenge 
inspections less relevant.
    But let me focus on this notion that paragraph or Article X 
is so bad. Let me tell you folks how I read it, and Mr. Perle, 
I would like to direct this to you, but I will not limit it to 
you, although I would like to get in one other question before 
the light goes out.
    As I read it, and I might point out, Mr. Feith, paragraph 6 
is not affected--does not in any way limit paragraph 1. 
Paragraph 6 refers to bilateral, not international regimes but 
bilateral, and so the issue here is whether or not we are going 
to contribute to, in effect, this fund. We are going to put in 
this information that can be disbursed by this international 
organization.
    All paragraph 6 is about is saying that if we want to keep 
our deal going with NATO, if we want to keep our deal going 
with our allies, we can do that.
    But as I see this, multilateral is the only way to limit 
these chemical weapons, yet paragraph 6 on Article X refers to 
bilateral. Paragraph 1, which defines assistance, I believe 
trumps paragraph 3, but ultimately paragraph 1's definition 
lies in paragraph 7. It defines what international assistance 
is. That is where it is defined.
    Within that, it says that international assistance is the 
following, that you can provide assistance, and to this end 
elect--elect one or more of the following so there is no 
requirement, as I read Article X, and as constitutional 
scholars I have spoken to--and this is not a constitutional 
issue, but legal scholars I have spoken to, there is no 
requirement of the United States to throw anything into the pot 
but what it decides it wishes to throw in, and to that end, 
Senator Helms and I have been negotiating conditions, which 
leads to my question.
    A condition that says--let me get it here--that requires 
the United States--requires the United States not to contribute 
to the voluntary fund for chemical defense assistance anything 
other than certain medical antidotes and treatment, which is 
what is listed in paragraph 1, so if we are not in the treaty, 
the point you made still pertains. If England or if France or 
if anyone else is going to transfer this technology to Iran, 
they are going to do it whether we are in it or not.
    If we are in the treaty, we are not obliged to do that, and 
to clarify that--at least I am, and I assume the Chairman still 
is--willing to attach a condition to the treaty defining our 
interpretation of Article X and limiting what can or cannot be 
transferred to what is mentioned, medical antidotes and 
treatments.
    I am not asking you to accept it. I would just like your 
view, Mr. Perle, whether that would--assume the worst from your 
perspective, that the treaty passes. Is it better to have that, 
and if it is, how much better is it?
    Mr. Perle. I do think, Senator, that paragraph 3, which 
describes the undertaking, is not qualified by the elaboration 
of the various means in paragraph 7. I do not think that was 
ever the intention.
    It will, I am sure, not surprise you to know that in the 
course of negotiation at one time paragraph 3 read, ``each 
State Party guarantees to facilitate.''
    The United States thought that was too much, and maybe 
others did as well, so we ended up compromising on 
``undertakes,'' as though--the point, in objecting to 
``guarantee,'' the American representative made it very clear 
that he did not think he could fall back on the interpretation 
you have just offered of paragraph 7 to limit the extent of the 
undertaking.
    Senator Biden. My time is up. I would disagree with that. I 
would argue statutory interpretation, the specific controls the 
general. The specifics in paragraph 7, the legal judgments I 
have gotten comport with this.
    Mr. Perle. Senator, if I could just answer the question 
with a kind of question, if we could fix this treaty, I mean, I 
am sure that you would agree that the cleanest solution would 
be to eliminate the whole of Article X. Why not do that?
    Senator Biden. I think the cleanest solution would be to 
limit our participation in the treaty to define this the way in 
which we intended, or at least we intended here; because I 
think to go back and renegotiate an entire treaty, we are 
another 10 years down the road, but we can fix it by doing this 
in my view.
    Mr. Perle. But if it means what you say it means, and other 
parties to the treaty understand that, then it seems to me it 
would be a breeze to change it.
    The Chairman. Because of this point, I am going to allow 
you about 45 seconds, which I will take off my time.
    Mr. Feith. I appreciate that, Senator. I would just say, 
Senator Biden, if everybody in the Senate devoted the kind of 
meticulous attention to the words that you have done, I am 
confident that there would be a much greater understanding and 
much less support for the treaty.
    I do compliment you on paying close attention. This treaty 
looks worse when you look at it closely, so I very much applaud 
your careful attention.
    Senator Biden. Now, that is a nice smart-ass comment.
    Mr. Feith. When you said that if we are out of the 
agreement we will not be bound, and the Germans or the British 
will be participating under the terms of this article, that is 
true.
    If, on the other hand, the United States made clear that 
the condition for our coming into the treaty is fixing this 
provision, without which, I think we can all agree the treaty 
would be better off--the fact that you have to do so elaborate 
an interpretation makes it clear that we will have difficulties 
when we go to other countries. Even if we could persuade 
ourselves of your interpretation, on which reasonable people 
can differ, when we go to persuade other countries, that is the 
nub of the issue: going to Germany or China or whoever and 
trying to get their cooperation on export controls----
    Senator Biden. No, that is not is how it is happening here.
    Mr. Feith [continuing]. We are going to have great 
difficulty. The treaty would be better off without this 
provision complicating things.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I wish to thank 
the panelists. You have provided an awful lot of very 
significant insight, and I, as well as all of my colleagues, am 
grateful, and thank you.
    I am going to help my friend Senator Biden here, because I 
am going to follow along that path that he has taken. Is this, 
in your opinion--and I would like to hear from each of you--a 
treaty, a convention that is one that you can rehabilitate? Is 
it one that you think we can still work on and, if it is, what 
do we do? Do we eliminate X and XI, amend it? If we were able 
to amend X and XI, would that satisfy the four of you?
    Each of you, I would like to have each of you, if you 
would, respond. Ambassador.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think it would be very 
significantly improved. I believe that the composition of the 
governing board requires attention as well.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Mr. Perle. Senator, I could support this treaty without any 
great expectations of its efficacy if we corrected the problem 
in Article X and Article XI, and I think that can be done. It 
took 10 years to produce this treaty with this serious flaw in 
it. I think it would take a great deal less time to eliminate 
the flaw. Nothing else would have to be renegotiated, only this 
one provision.
    Senator Hagel. In your opinion. Thank you. Sir.
    Dr. Ikle. I would agree that it would eliminate the damage 
to the down side. It would not make it into a great 
accomplishment, and it would still have some flaws on the 
intelligence collection; but it would be much less damaging, so 
that on balance maybe it could be passed, if it is really 
amended, Article X.
    Senator Hagel. Thank you.
    Mr. Feith. In my view, the treaty is a net loss from the 
national security point of view, in any event. I believe that 
the country would be better off if the Senate rejected the 
treaty and sent everybody back to the drawing board and did 
something constructive in this field.
    But one of the key questions is: How much of a net loss? I 
agree with all of my colleagues that the treaty would be far 
less bad if Articles X and XI were duly amended.
    Senator Hagel. So there we are, Mr. Chairman. We figured it 
out, and I will yield my time back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Very good. He is a breath of fresh air in the 
Senate, I will tell you that.
    I am going to suggest that the Senator have 8 minutes to 
sort of compensate for whatever has run over with time.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. With my 
voice, I may need it.
    Welcome back to the panel. Let me, if I can, follow up on 
the question from Senator Hagel. Mr. Perle, I understand, then, 
from your answer to Senator Hagel that your chief, your 
principal objection to it resides in the transfer of 
technological scientific information, Article X, section 3, and 
then in Article XI, the entire question of technical 
information with respect to chemical, general chemical 
development, is that correct?
    Mr. Perle. Yes, although it is not just section 3 of 
Article X. It is really the whole of Article X.
    Senator Kerry. Well, let me ask you why--and I am having 
difficulty with this, but I am trying to keep open-minded about 
it. Reading Article I, which as you, I am sure, will agree, is 
the heart of this treaty and the overpowering article, it says 
that each party to the convention undertakes never under any 
circumstances--and I presume you will agree that any 
circumstances mean, under any circumstances, so that when you 
go to Article XI, or X, you are clearly defining within the 
context of Article I under any circumstance no party can ever 
transfer directly or indirectly chemical weapons to anyone.
    Therefore, all of Article XI with respect to development of 
any kind of chemical is clearly interpreted by the directly or 
indirectly clause of I.
    Second, it says that you can never undertake under any 
circumstances to develop or produce or otherwise acquire, 
stockpile, retain, to assist, encourage or induce anyone to 
engage in any activity prohibited under this convention.
    Now, I do not think any lawyer sitting here has any problem 
with that language, do we? Is there any confusion as to what is 
prohibited here?
    Mr. Perle. Senator, the problem is that until a State Party 
to the convention is found to have violated the convention by 
engaging in the production of chemical weapons----
    Senator Kerry. Precisely.
    Mr. Perle [continuing]. There is no basis upon which you 
could presume that Article I would permit you to avoid the 
undertaking of Article X or the promise of Article XI.
    Senator Kerry. Now, let us get to that. Now we are sort of 
going down the road.
    So therefore, under any circumstances, the only way we will 
ever be able to do anything about Article I or any of the 
others is to know what is going on.
    Mr. Perle. No, not to know what is going on. There is a 
very big difference between knowing what is going on and 
proving through the mechanisms of the institution that a 
violation has taken place.
    Senator Kerry. Right, but that is ultimately how you know. 
You prove it. You prove it through the challenge process, 
through the inspection process.
    Mr. Perle. No, I do not think you will ever prove anything 
through the inspection process.
    Senator Kerry. So no verification process----
    Mr. Perle. Could I just say one thing?
    Senator Kerry. Let me just ask you, are you saying that no 
verification process whatsoever would therefore be sufficient?
    Mr. Perle. I am saying you cannot verify the production of 
chemical weapons, because any plant that can be used for the 
production of permitted chemicals can also be used for the 
production of chemical weapons. There is a problem here.
    Senator Kerry. I understand that, and that can happen 
today, without the treaty.
    Mr. Perle. In 1997 a country that is not violating the 
agreement, and which is therefore entitled to all the benefits 
of Article X and XI, may exploit those benefits, invite 
international companies in to buildup their chemical industry 
as perfectly proper and perfectly legal, invite, solicit, 
receive cooperation in the development of the full range of 
defensive measures, and then, having accomplished all of that, 
violate Article I and some other point.
    Senator Kerry. But isn't the problem, can't they do that 
now anyway?
    Mr. Perle. Can they induce others to?
    Senator Kerry. They could invite anybody or induce anybody 
or pay anybody to do whatever they want today.
    Mr. Perle. The difference is the following. Let us take 
China and Pakistan as an example. The Germans complain that 
they are too frequently identified in this regard. The German 
industry is very aggressive in this regard, but set that aside, 
and take China and Pakistan.
    If China today engages in the sharing of chemical defensive 
technology with Pakistan, you can be sure that an American 
administration that is doing its job is going to be in Beijing 
remonstrating with the Chinese and saying, we think this is a 
very dangerous thing to do.
    Senator Kerry. But let me stop you there if I can for a 
minute.
    Mr. Perle. But suppose there was a treaty that says they 
must do it?
    Senator Kerry. I understand. Well, no. What it says is, 
they shall have the right to participate in the fullest 
possible exchange.
    Mr. Perle. Right.
    Senator Kerry. Now, possible is what is right and 
appropriate under Article I, which means----
    Mr. Perle. No, no. No, no. But there will have been no 
finding in the case of Pakistan, Senator. Pakistan is a 
legitimate recipient of assistance until Pakistan is found to 
have violated the agreement.
    Senator Kerry. Correct, but it is only as to defense, 
number 1, that they have a right to request anything.
    Mr. Perle. Well, both with respect to defensive, and with 
respect to commerce and chemicals.
    Senator Kerry. Defensive with respect to chemical weapons, 
and generically with respect to the development of a chemical.
    Mr. Perle. But the defense is the tough part. That is what 
is hard to do.
    Senator Kerry. But let me ask you, you were in the 
administration that offered to give the Russians Star Wars once 
we developed it. I mean, you were going to turn over the entire 
defense to them once we put it together. That was your plan.
    Mr. Perle. There is an important difference here.
    Senator Kerry. Which is?
    Mr. Perle. Which is that the defense in this case, the 
ability to operate in the presence of chemical weapons, is what 
makes the offensive capability possible.
    Senator Kerry. But that is exactly the same thing.
    Mr. Perle. No, it is not. The sharing of defenses in the 
earlier context was intended to permit both sides to eliminate 
the offensive capability.
    Senator Kerry. Correct.
    Mr. Perle. Not to make it feasible. It is exactly the 
opposite.
    Senator Kerry. I would disagree. If you are sharing a 
defensive capacity--I mean, Caspar Weinberger yesterday used a 
good example. If you have developed a foolproof gas mask, and 
you transfer the foolproof gas mask to another country, the 
likelihood, if you both have a foolproof gas mask, of either of 
you successfully using chemical weapons against each other is 
zero if it is foolproof, so the likelihood--I mean, you are not 
going to factor it into your military strategy. That was the 
same strategy in Star Wars.
    Mr. Perle. Well, we do not have chemical weapons, Senator, 
and we will not, so a foolproof gas mask--let me just put it 
this way. I would not worry if we had a foolproof gas mask, but 
I would certainly worry if Iran or Iraq or Libya had a 
foolproof gas mask, even if we also had one.
    Senator Kerry. But you see, you have already suggested that 
we are better off getting rid of our chemical weapons 
altogether, without any inspection regimen. Now, that is very 
hard for me to follow.
    Mr. Perle. Because I do not think they are militarily 
useful.
    Senator Kerry. Well, if they are not militarily useful, 
then you do not worry about what they have in terms of 
defensive capacity. You are going to deter it with nuclear 
weapons. We did not have any problem deterring Iraq, did we, 
during that war. It seems to me that there is a cold war 
philosophy going on here that you have got to have a 
technological edge, and you have to keep having the edge rather 
than struggling to go into a state of neutrality.
    Mr. Perle. I take very seriously what Jeane said, that 
chemical weapons are regarded in much of the Third World as the 
poor man's equivalent of nuclear weapons, and there is a lot of 
pressure to acquire these chemicals.
    We want to discourage that, and we want to discourage it in 
every possible way, and one way to discourage it is to make 
sure that the thing that is most difficult for a country 
desiring chemical weapons to accomplish, which is the 
acquisition of a defense, is made more difficult and not less 
difficult, and any treaty that promises to share that 
technology is just headed in the wrong direction. Why don't we 
fix it?
    The Chairman. Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
want to thank the witnesses, because I think their testimony 
has really been very thought-provoking. I have been a proponent 
of the treaty, and I must say you have encouraged me to look at 
it in a very different way.
    I have read and reread Article X now about eight different 
times.
    But Mr. Perle, you make an interesting theorem, and that is 
that the effectiveness of any policy here is the defense, and 
if you can defend against it you create a spiral. I mean, you 
succeed.
    Do you have any information that the administration might 
have agreed to this section on a case-by-case basis?
    Mr. Perle. I am not sure I understand what you mean.
    Senator Feinstein. In other words, that this section would 
only be carried out provided they, the United States, had the 
right to reject a request.
    Mr. Perle. No, I have no information to that effect. I 
think it is our intention not to honor the undertaking. I mean, 
I would prefer that when we undertake to treaties----
    Senator Feinstein. You mean, to guarantee to undertake and 
then not honor--in other words, not carry out that section?
    Mr. Perle. I think we intend not to carry out what is a 
clear obligation.
    Senator Feinstein. That is No. 3.
    Mr. Perle. If we are burdened with this treaty then I, too, 
would be in favor of not honoring that commitment, because it 
would be a foolish thing to do.
    Senator Feinstein. Because I think you made a good 
argument. Why is Article X in there? Obviously, if somebody has 
an offensive use of a chemical weapon against them, I think the 
legitimate nations of this world are going to respond and try 
to be helpful as much as possible. I wonder why it is necessary 
to have this in it at all, in terms of the integrity of the 
treaty.
    Mr. Perle. I believe it is not, and more to the point, if 
you will allow me to say this, I think that if you came to the 
conclusion that it should not be there, and two or three of 
your colleagues joined you, we can get it out of there.
    Senator Feinstein. May I then go on, and thank you very 
much, to what Ambassador Kirkpatrick mentioned on the 
composition of the governing bodies. You mentioned that. That 
was the other concern that you had. What changes do you think 
are merited in the composition?
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Feinstein, what concerns me 
with this governing body and comparable ones is the 
preponderance on the governing body of countries lacking in the 
technological sophistication and technological experience to 
make really well-informed judgments about handling these 
materials. That is what concerns me.
    I just do not think that the quality of the decisions will 
be nearly as reliable as they could be. They are dangerous in 
any case. We all agree that this is a dangerous subject, and 
any decisions dealing with it are going to be imperfect and 
leave some danger. But the more the board that makes the 
decisions knows, the more experience they have, the more 
detailed technological sophistication they have, the better 
their decisions will be. That is what concerns me about it.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether this is possible or 
not, but I would very much like to have an administration 
response to the arguments made on Article X. I think the points 
made here are very good points. I wonder why Article X is 
really necessary.
    Senator Biden. I would be happy to give them to you. They 
have responded officially and on the record. I would be happy 
to make sure you get them.
    Senator Feinstein. All right. That is a major concern to 
me. I just make that point.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. I thank you, Senator Feinstein.
    Lady and gentlemen, thank you so much for coming.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you dismiss this panel, 
could I have 30 seconds to try to clarify one point, if I may?
    The Chairman. Thirty seconds.
    Senator Biden. First of all, I think Article X--I disagree 
with the reading, but even if your reading is correct, I think 
it can be cleared up by a condition.
    But, Mr. Perle, you talked about the real world. The real 
world is Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi, or any of the rogue states. 
They are not going to worry about protecting their troops 
before they use chemical weapons. Nothing in their modus 
operandi would suggest that would even be a consideration for 
whether or not they would use chemical weapons, if they were 
going to use it, I would respectfully suggest.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, could I have 20 seconds? I 
just want to clarify one point with Mr. Perle.
    The Chairman. It is your time, 20 seconds. Go.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, sir.
    I just wanted to clarify with Secretary Perle that it is my 
understanding that nothing in the convention requires the 
finding of a treaty violation before Article I applies to that 
particular country. I think, in your answer to me, you were 
suggesting you had to first find the violation. I do not 
believe you do.
    Mr. Perle. In the illustration that I offered before, where 
the Chinese might be building a facility for Pakistan, I do not 
mean--I just chose Pakistan at random.
    Senator Kerry. I am not even picking those countries. I 
just mean generically.
    Mr. Perle. But any country pair. I do not see on what 
basis, Senator, we could prevail over the words and the 
obligations and the undertakings of the treaty itself if there 
had been no finding of a violation. Otherwise, you are saying, 
anybody can do whatever anybody wishes.
    Senator Kerry. Well, in effect----
    The Chairman. No, wait a minute, 20 seconds.
    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, I think this is important to 
note.
    The Chairman. All of them are important, including the next 
panel.
    Senator Kerry. In effect, in this treaty, you can.
    The Chairman. Come on, Senator, I gave you more time than 
anybody else had.
    Senator Kerry. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. But I am 
not trying to abuse it. I just think the record is important 
here.
    Mr. Perle. I will be glad to call you after the hearing.
    Senator Kerry. There is a withdrawal capacity for national 
interest here. Any time we see the national interest, you have 
got 90 days to get out of this.
    Mr. Perle. Oh, yes, we can always get out of this treaty. 
But that is not going to solve any of the problems we are 
concerned about.
    The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen and lady. We appreciate 
your coming so much.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The next panel consists of three friends of 
all of us. They have been around this place for a while.
    As I was saying, this panel not only consists of Americans 
who are well known, but they are friends of every one of us on 
the committee. General Scowcroft, I have known him ever since I 
came to this city, and that was a while ago. He is now 
President of the Forum for International Policy. He is former 
National Security Policy Advisor. Admiral Zumwalt is a member 
of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and he 
is former Chief of Naval Operations. Ed Rowny. He is the very 
Hon. Ed Rowny, my neighbor, former Ambassador, and Lieutenant 
General, U.S. Army, retired, International Negotiation 
Consultant, former Chief Negotiator for START I, and Special 
Arms Control Advisor, Washington, D.C.
    Now, I am going to have to depart for another meeting I 
cannot get out of, and Senator Hagel said that he would take 
the gavel for me. I have one question, if I may, out of order. 
That would be for Admiral Zumwalt.
    Sir, Article X has been criticized, because it promotes the 
spread of CW defense technology. Article XI has been 
criticized, because it tends to undermine multilateral export 
controls among treaty parties in the chemical field. Even 
regarding untrustworthy states like Iran, are the concerns 
about Article X and XI sensible? In other words, is it 
sensible, sir, to concern ourselves with whether Iran might 
more easily get CW defense or other technology as a result of 
these Articles? Would the United States of America be better 
off if Articles X and XI are fixed before the CWC is ratified? 
Three questions.
    Admiral Zumwalt. It is a fair question to raise in 
connection with Articles X and XI, in my judgment. The answer, 
in my judgment, is that non-ratification to seek a modification 
at this time would, in essence, delay the participation of the 
United States, in the mechanism that is being set up for a very 
large number of years, and that the organization created by 
those that have ratified it in sufficient numbers would operate 
with all of the advantages and disadvantages the critics on 
either side are citing.
    I believe that we would be better off to ratify the treaty 
and to work from within the system, with the considerable 
powers we bring, both financial and political, to make any 
modifications over time than we would to let this new treaty 
regime operate without the insider influence of the U.S. 
Government.
    The Chairman. Very well.
    Now Senator Hagel is going to take the chair and the gavel. 
Why do not you, since you are under time constraints, go with 
your statement first, sir, followed by Ed Rowny and Mr. 
Scowcroft.
    Senator Biden. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
accommodating this panel. I appreciate it.

  STATEMENT OF E.R. ZUMWALT, JR., ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES NAVY 
 (RETIRED), MEMBER, PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY 
                             BOARD

    Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Since I was notified, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
committee, just yesterday of the requirement to be here, I 
would submit for the record an article I have written and a 
letter which I co-authored, which state the positions I have 
taken on this treaty. I, of course, recommend that it be 
ratified.
    I found myself disappointed to have to be at crosshairs 
with the distinguished panel that just preceded he me, because 
they are all good friends of mine; but I take issue with a 
number of things that were said.
    First, with regard to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, I 
was a part of the group that analyzed the capabilities of the 
nations of the world to acquire nuclear weapons before the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty was considered. We estimated that 
there were somewhere between 20 and 30 nations, within a period 
of 10 years, that would have the nuclear capability. In my 
judgment, the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty has, without a 
question of a doubt, slowed down the rate of acquisition of 
nuclear weapons.
    It was not a perfect treaty. It could have been made more 
perfect if it could have been negotiated, but it was not 
negotiable in any other form. It has accomplished its mission 
far better than no regime would have permitted it be 
accomplished. I think the same thing can be said with regard to 
this Chemical Weapons Convention.
    We hear that it is a disadvantage that we will not get the 
rogue nations in. The rogue nations will not come in whether or 
not the United States ratifies it. It will make no difference 
whatsoever with regard to the situation in the world whether or 
not we ratify insofar as the rogue nations are concerned. It 
has been said that because they would not come in, the treaty 
is therefore useless.
    In my judgment, the international regime that the treaty 
gives us--the ability to sanction the rogue nations that do not 
come in--is not there without U.S. membership and thus 
effective U.S. influence as it is for those like Iran who do 
come in. But the conventional sanctions that we are capable of 
bringing about in other ways are still there for us to operate. 
In other words, insofar as those who do not come in are 
concerned, I think this treaty, ratification or not, is 
irrelevant.
    With regard to the Article X issue, I think it has been 
quite clear, both based on what lawyers have told us and what 
Mr. Berger for the administration has told us, that the 
undertaking to facilitate does not obligate the United States 
to do more than has been discussed here; namely, to provide, if 
it chooses to do so, the kind of help that would not in any way 
harm us.
    The ability for us to get more access is an important thing 
to me as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board. I have just finished service on a subcommittee 
of that group, which has examined our ability to gain the 
appropriate intelligence in the BW field and the CW field and 
in the nuclear field. I can tell you that we need to improve it 
and that, however less than perfect it might be, the 
opportunity to inspect is going to give us additional 
information which can be cross-compared with what we get 
through other sources in the intelligence community. It will, 
without a doubt, enhance our ability to know more about what is 
going on.
    That, coupled with the fact that we have an international 
regime, if we ratify the treaty, to work within, the fact that 
the treaty will cause, at the very least, the disposition of 
masses of volumes of poisonous substances-- after all the 
nations who are ratifying it will be obligated to eliminate 
their volume--make it less available for the terrorists groups 
and for the rogue nations to get, in one way or another.
    I worry about a decision to reject. I worry about a 
decision to qualify in a way that does not provide formal 
ratification. I think that the logical course for the United 
States, now that we have reached this point, with a treaty that 
is going to come into effect whether or not we ratify it, is 
that we are better off to work within the system, use our 
financial powers and our political powers to seek the 
modifications that are necessary and to pick up the advantages 
that are there.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information referred to by Admiral Zumwalt follows:]

                                           Washington Post,
                                                   January 6, 1997.

                    A Needless Risk for U.S. Troops

                         [by E. R. Zumwalt Jr.]

    It has been more than 80 years since poison gas was first used in 
modern warfare--in April 1915 during the first year of World War I. It 
is long past time to do something about such weapons.
    I am not a dove. As a young naval officer in 1945, I supported the 
use of nuclear weapons against Japan. As chief of naval operations two 
decades ago, I pressed for substantially higher military spending than 
the nation's political leadership was willing to grant. After retiring 
from the Navy, I helped lead the opposition to the SALT II treaty 
because I was convinced it would give the Soviet Union a strategic 
advantage.
    Now the Senate is considering whether to approve the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. This is a worldwide treaty, negotiated by the 
Reagan administration and signed by the Bush administration. It bans 
the development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical 
weapons. Senate opposition to ratification is led by some with whom I 
often agree. But in this case, I believe they do a grave disservice to 
America's men and women in uniform.
    To a Third World leader indifferent to the health of his own troops 
and seeking to cause large-scale pain and death for its own sake, 
chemical weapons have a certain attraction. They don't require the 
advanced technology needed to build nuclear weapons. Nor do they 
require the educated populace needed to create a modern conventional 
military. But they cannot give an inferior force a war-winning 
capability. In the Persian Gulf war, the threat of our uncompromising 
retaliation with conventional weapons deterred Saddam Hussein from 
using his chemical arsenal against us.
    Next time, our adversary may be more berserk than Saddam; and 
deterrence may fail. If that happens, our retaliation will be decisive, 
devastating--and no help to the young American men and women coming 
home dead or bearing grievous chemical injuries. What will help is a 
treaty removing huge quantities of chemical weapons that could 
otherwise be used against us.
    Militarily, this treaty will make us stronger. During the Bush 
administration, our nation's military and political leadership decided 
to retire our chemical weapons. This wise move was not made because of 
treaties. Rather, it was based on the fact that chemical weapons are 
not useful for us.
    Politically and diplomatically, the barriers against their use by a 
First World country are massive. Militarily they are risky and 
unpredictable to use, difficult and dangerous to store. They serve no 
purpose that can't be met by our overwhelming conventional forces.
    So the United States has no deployed chemical weapons today and 
will have none in the future. But the same is not true of our potential 
adversaries. More than a score of nations now seek or possess chemical 
weapons. Some are rogue states with which we may someday clash.
    This treaty is entirely about eliminating other people's weapons--
weapons that may someday be used against Americans. For the American 
military, U.S. ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention is high 
gain and low or no pain. In that light, I find it astonishing that any 
American opposes ratification.
    Opponents argue that the treaty isn't perfect: Verification isn't 
absolute, forms must be filled out, not every nation will join at first 
and so forth. This is unpersuasive. Nothing in the real world is 
perfect. If the U.S. Navy had refused to buy any weapon unless it 
worked perfectly every time, we would have bought nothing and now would 
be disarmed. The question is not how a treaty compares with perfection. 
The question is how U.S. ratification compares with its absence.
    If we refuse to ratify, some governments will use our refusal as an 
excuse to keep their chemical weapons. Worldwide availability of 
chemical weapons will be higher, and we will know less about other 
countries' chemical activities. The diplomatic credibility of our 
threat of retaliation against anyone who uses chemical weapons on our 
troops will be undermined by our lack of ``clean hands.'' At the bottom 
line, our failure to ratify will substantially increase the risk of a 
chemical attack against American service personnel.
    If such an attack occurs, the news reports of its victims in our 
military hospitals will of course produce rapid ratification of the 
treaty and rapid replacement of Senators who enabled the horror by 
opposing ratification. But for the victims it will be too late.
    Every man and woman who puts on a U.S. military uniform faces 
possible injury or death in the national interest. They don't complain; 
risk is part of their job description. But it is part of the job 
description of every U.S. Senator to see that this risk not be 
increased.

    [See page 25 for the letter to which Admiral Zumwalt 
referred.]

    Senator Hagel [presiding]: Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very 
much.
    In the interest of time, what Senator Biden and I have 
agreed to do, if it is OK with your fellow panelists, is get 
the last 15 minutes we have with you, Admiral, with questions. 
So, with that, the Chairman had a question and I would turn to 
Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. I understand the Admiral has a 4:30 plane, 
if you guys do not mind. I will be very brief.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, did not the Nonproliferation Treaty regime help us 
mobilize the world reaction to North Korea's violations?
    Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, it did; yes, sir.
    Senator Biden. And would we have been able to make a 
credible threat of international sanctions had there been no 
such treaty?
    Admiral Zumwalt. Clearly the regime, the NPT, made that 
more feasible and more effective.
    Senator Biden. And did not that point you are making about 
the CWC, that, at least at a minimum, it establishes a norm 
against which, when violations are clear, we can mobilize world 
opinion and justify actions we would likely take that we might 
not be able to justify in world opinion?
    Admiral Zumwalt. Absolutely. It is a less than perfect 
step, but far better than the present system.
    Senator Biden. In the interest of time, obviously, this is 
going to be somewhat more of a statement than a question. I 
think you have made five very valid points. That is, as I 
translate them, everything the critics say is wrong with this 
treaty would be worse if you did not have the treaty. 
Everything that is wrong with the treaty would be worse if you 
did not have the treaty.
    The last point that you made, which you referenced, is 
political power. As it relates to Article X and Article XI, 
even if my interpretation is wrong, which I believe it is not--
and most legal scholars do not believe it is either--but even 
if it is wrong, the place in which we are going to be able to 
impact on whether or not another nation transfers technology, a 
defensive technology, to a rogue state will not be through a 
treaty provision, it will be through our economic power. We 
just flat say to Germany and Britain and France and the rest--
we will either say it or we will not--we will either say, if 
you do, you have got a problem, and here is the problem, let me 
define it for you.
    I know that Brent Scowcroft met with his counterparts in 
Germany, France, England, and Italy, and every other country in 
the world, when they were engaged in things that we might have 
had questions about. So the point you make, I think, should not 
be missed. Our significant political, military, and economic 
power with nations that have the capability of transferring 
technology is what is going to determine whether they transfer 
technology.
    The last point I would make is, the Australia Group, I 
think they all--and there are 26 of them who have ratified--
they all believe that Article XI in no way, in no way, impedes 
the organizational structure of the Australia Group and the 
commitment they have made to one another.
    Anyway, there is more to say, but I thank you for being 
here, and especially for the notice. I jerked you all around, 
because we were unable to get a commitment as to when. I 
apologize. But I thank you for being here.
    Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
    Senator Hagel. Senator Biden, thank you.
    If it is appropriate and OK, what I would like to do, we 
have got 10 minutes left, maybe we could break it down into 3-
minute pieces. That way we give our three colleagues an 
opportunity to each ask a question.
    Senator Frist.
    Senator Frist. Admiral, thank you for being here today. In 
the interest of time I have just one question regarding the 
countries who have not signed on, the so-called rogue nations, 
whether it be Syria or Iraq or North Korea or Libya. If we did 
not sign on or if we do sign on, either way, how do you see 
this treaty really impacting those particular nations?
    Admiral Zumwalt. I think, with or without the treaty, we 
can continue to impose sanctions on those rogue nations who 
have not come in. With the treaty, we can clearly impose 
sanctions on them if they do not respond to our right to 
inspect. So it seems to me that we lose nothing and gain 
something by the ratification. The fact that that regime exists 
as of April 29th, whether or not we are in it, means that we 
are foregoing a great opportunity to shape for the better a 
regime that does exist. We cannot stop that existence.
    Senator Frist. And by our not participating but still 
having the regime there, say once again how our presence is 
going to affect those nations.
    Admiral Zumwalt. Well, the Chairman of this committee, in 
my judgment, has done a good job of shaping up the United 
Nations by withholding funds. The same thing can be done, or 
the other means of asserting political power can be used, 
working within the organization, while having the influence of 
being a member.
    Senator Frist. Thank you, Admiral.
    Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
    Senator Kerry.
    Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
    Admiral, welcome. What do you think would be the impact 
with respect to Russia and their potential participation if we 
do not ratify?
    Admiral Zumwalt. I believe that Russia is likelier to come 
in if we ratify than if we do not--far likelier. I believe that 
we can continue to use all the same kind of methods that we 
have used to shape up, if I may use that expression, the 
Russians to date, by helping and withholding.
    Senator Kerry. Do you, in reading either Article XI or 
Article X, do you perceive any overt or discernible conflict or 
do you have to search for the conflict that has been described 
with respect to Article X and the rights and fundamental 
obligations of this treaty?
    Admiral Zumwalt. If I understand the points they have made, 
I do not--I think there is a consensus on both sides that we do 
not find ourselves forced, if we ratify, to do anything that is 
harmful to us. The issue is then, what about the other members 
of the regime? I repeat again, they are in that regime whether 
or not we ratify. So that their conduct is something that we 
will have more opportunity to influence from within than from 
without.
    Senator Kerry. Now, Admiral, you were Chief of Naval 
Operations and have had a remarkable career, in charge of our 
young people in harm's way. I think that you--and General 
Scowcroft likewise, and I will come to him later with this 
question--but based on your military career and the 
responsibilities that you have had to exercise, in your 
judgment, are our military forces and our young people in 
uniform better off with this treaty or without?
    Admiral Zumwalt. In my judgment, as I say in the documents 
that I will submit for the record, they are better off with us 
within the treaty than they are without. I believe that it 
would be a disservice to our men and women in uniform if we 
stay outside this regime, which in any event is going to come 
into existence on April 29.
    Senator Kerry. And the principal reason in shorthand for 
that is?
    Admiral Zumwalt. That we have the ability better to 
influence from within than from without. Pluses and minuses 
notwithstanding, the regime exists as of April 29th.
    I might also add, Senator, that you used to take orders a 
lot better than you do now.
    Senator Kerry. Well, I was elected not to take orders.
    Thank you. I share with my colleagues that the Admiral was 
my commanding officer when I was in Vietnam; yes, he was. I had 
the privilege of having him pin my Silver Star on my chest at a 
beach in Vietnam. So it is nice to have him here.
    Admiral Zumwalt. For a very well deserved act of courage.
    Senator Hagel. Senator, for that, you get an extra couple 
of minutes.
    Senator Kerry. For that, I have learned not to take them.
    Senator Hagel. I was going to say, your life is a lot 
easier right now, Senator. Seriously, if you would have any 
questions, we have a little extra time.
    Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, welcome.
    Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you.
    Senator Feinstein. I wanted to go back again to I think the 
central point that Mr. Perle made, which was developing a 
defense against chemical weapons is perhaps the greatest 
incentive to the development of chemical weapons, in the sense 
that if you can defend against them adequately, it creates 
perhaps an incentive to be able to use them--and particularly, 
I guess, with the mentality that might use these horrible 
things. Do you agree with that theory?
    Admiral Zumwalt. The regime makes it possible for defenses 
to be improved. That is unassailable. One has to make a 
judgment about the tradeoff between what that accomplishes for 
the good of the majority of the nations involved, versus what 
opportunities it gives the bad guys to take advantage of it.
    The fact that we have created an international regime that 
gives us at least some opportunity to provide sanctions, some 
opportunity to provide a regime of international law, makes me 
feel that, on balance, we are better off to go ahead and take 
the----
    Senator Feinstein. If you would permit me, the good guys 
really do not need this. Because the good guys are not going to 
use the chemical weapons. The good guys are going to respond to 
a neighbor in need like that and help. It is really the bad 
guys that you have got to deal with. My experience is, with the 
bad guys, they are going to use this kind of thing for every 
conceivable edge they can get. Therefore, why help them?
    Admiral Zumwalt. Well, Senator, let us take Iran as an 
example. I think we both agree that they are a bad guy. Iran is 
going to be within the regime. Based on my experience on the 
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, I would rather 
get the advantage of being able to demand the inspections that 
we get from this regime than I would to worry about the rather 
exotic strategy that my brilliant friend Richard Perle 
suggested they would follow. I think that the fact that we 
would have the pressure of public opinion, the opportunity to 
use political power, and so forth, would more restrain Iran 
that otherwise would be the case.
    Senator Feinstein. All right. Then take that example. Iran 
has an illegal insecticide plant or any kind of a manufacturing 
plant. Somewhere within this plant there is some capacity to 
make or combine or to produce a chemical weapon in some way. 
That is not necessarily going to be found on an inspection. It 
probably will not be.
    Admiral Zumwalt. There is some probability that it will not 
be found. There is some probability that it will be. Coupled 
with other intelligence capabilities, which are constantly 
improving, I think we can increase that probability over time. 
Therefore, I would rather be within the regime than without. I 
think we gain more than we lose. I do not trust Iran at all, 
but I think that there will be more restraint on them if we are 
within the regime and operating it in a vigorous way.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
    Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you.
    Admiral Zumwalt, thank you very, very much for taking the 
time.
    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral. I appreciate 
it.
    Admiral Zumwalt. Thank you, sir. Thank you for 
accommodating my schedule.
    Senator Hagel. I hope you are on your way to somewhere 
exotic.
    Admiral Zumwalt. I made a promise to a granddaughter.
    Senator Hagel. Oh, wonderful. General Rowny, welcome.

  STATEMENT OF EDWARD L. ROWNY, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. ARMY 
        (RETIRED), INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION CONSULTANT

    Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, sir.
    Before I start, I would like thank the Chairman, Senator 
Helms, who is my neighbor and good friend, who stood by me when 
I resigned from SALT II in protest over that flawed treaty. I 
think we got a good subsequent treaty as a result of turning 
down SALT II. I have him to thank for that.
    I also have tremendous respect for the minority leader 
here, Senator Biden, who attended to our negotiations in 
Geneva. While we did not always agree, he was always thoughtful 
and fair and never ad hominem. We had a great deal of respect 
for him.
    Senator Biden. Thank you, General.
    Ambassador Rowny. Rather than read my prepared statement, 
which I would like to put into the record, perhaps I could save 
some time by just hitting some of the high points.
    I will ad lib however. I would like to have my written 
statement put into the record.
    Senator Hagel. It will be, without objection.
    Ambassador Rowny. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, initially I was opposed to this treaty. I was 
opposed to it, because I didn't think it was verifiable. I 
didn't like the provisions about the inability to use tear gas 
in combat. I didn't like Article X and particularly paragraph 3 
of Article X. Most importantly, I felt that this treaty might 
lull us into a false sense of security and fail to provide 
protection for our troops.
    But after listening to various debates and following the 
fascinating evolvement of the 30 conditions, 22 of which have 
been agreed upon, I have changed my mind. Now I feel that on 
balance the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
    Let me give you my reasons.
    First, as to verifiability, this treaty is not effectively 
verifiable. I think that is clear, and I think we should not 
kid ourselves that might be.
    Second, as to tear gas, I would hope that one of the 
conditions that is placed on the treaty allows the use of tear 
gas in combat.
    Senator Biden. I think we can do that.
    Ambassador Rowny. I understand that the treaty allows us to 
use tear gas in domestic situations. But, for example, if in 
time of war it is necessary to go after a downed pilot, we 
should be able to use tear gas to do so.
    As for paragraph three of Article X, I think if we could 
interpret this in the U.S. way and not the Iranian way, this 
would be very helpful.
    I want to dwell on this idea of the ability to protect 
against chemical weapons. I was appalled when I spoke to 
several of my friends who were in the Gulf War that we had to 
go to Germany to get protective vehicles, that we had to go to 
Great Britain to get our sniffing devices, and that we had to 
go to the Czech Republic to get contamination equipment. This 
is no way for a great power to operate, to have to rely on its 
allies for essential defensive equipment and detection devices.
    Also, I think that there are more aspects to defense. We 
should help to defend against terrorists in this country, and I 
think the moneys and efforts should be put to that end. 
Furthermore, I believe that ballistic missile defenses should 
be deployed, because I feel that there are several rogue states 
which now have ballistic missiles capable of reaching our 
troops in time of combat with nuclear, biological, and chemical 
warheads. In a few years they will be able to reach the United 
States.
    I think that we should be able to defend not only our 
troops in combat but the United States against an accidental 
launch or limited attack. I am not talking about full scale 
attacks by China or a resurgent Russia but only about limited 
attacks.
    I am encouraged that the administration has now recognized 
our lack of defenses and has said that $225 million will be 
allocated to protect our troops.
     I hope that the Congress will fully support this $225 
million to provide the defenses against chemical attack.
    As for Russia, I have been working for 4 years since I left 
the government to try to get the Russians to ratify START II, 
and I have been finding this increasingly difficult. I think it 
is important, but in connection I think it is also important 
that we get Russia to join the states which would ratify the 
CWC.
    President Yeltsin has already signed the CWC, but the Duma 
is opposing ratification. I think if the U.S. fails to ratify 
the CWC, it will give the Russians an excuse for not ratifying 
it.
    The United States has been in the vanguard, asking 
countries to join this convention. For us to renege and not 
ratify the CWC will tarnish our international prestige.
    A great deal of the world looks up to us as leaders and for 
setting norms and standards. I think, as a minimum, this treaty 
would set norms and standards. I am in favor of that.
    Mr. Chairman, I was in the arms control business for over 2 
decades. I think that there are four criteria for any good 
treaty.
    First is verification. Second is that the treaty should not 
be flawed. Third is that it be enforceable, and fourth is that 
it be in the security interests of the United States.
    I have already said that this treaty is not effectively 
verifiable. On the other hand, if we were to enter into the 
treaty before the 29th of April, we would get a seat within the 
process and we would be able to help get violators exposed. I 
think on balance we gain more from being on the inside than we 
do by being on the outside, especially since this treaty is 
going to come into effect in any case.
    The second criterion is that a treaty not be fatally 
flawed. While the CWC is a flawed treaty, I don't think any of 
the flaws are fatal. The flaws that are there I think are 
fixable. I think the tear gas flaw is fixable. I think that 
paragraph 3 of Article X is fixable. Therefore, I do not think 
that the fatally flawed argument can apply against this treaty.
    As for the third criterion, enforceability, no arms control 
agreement can stand on its own. Even the START I and START II 
treaties, with which I was proud to be associated, can not 
stand on their own. To make a treaty effective you need a good 
defense posture. You have to have a credible way of enforcing 
it. If you don't have that, an arms control treaty is not worth 
the paper it is written on.
    I would hope, again as a matter of emphasis, that we give 
whatever moneys are necessary to defend ourselves against an 
attack in the field, terrorist attacks at home, and ballistic 
missile attacks.
    Finally, the vital fourth criterion of any treaty is that 
it be in the interest of the United States. On weighing the 
pros and cons I have concluded after a lot of thoughtful 
consideration, that the U.S. Senate should ratify this treaty.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of General Rowny follows:]

             Prepared Statement of General Edward L. Rowny

    Mr. Chairman: It is a privilege for me to testify once again before 
the Foreign Relations Committee.

    Until recently, I was opposed to the ratification of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) by the U. S. Senate. My initial reading of the 
CWC led me to believe that it was unverifiable, that it would prevent 
the U.S. from using tear gas in combat, and that it would obligate us 
to provide sensitive chemical technology to signatory rogue states. 
However, my major concern was that the United States might be lulled 
into a false sense of security and fail to provide adequate defenses 
for our men and women in uniform and citizens at home.

    I have now studied the treaty more carefully and have also followed 
the negotiations of the 30 conditions opponents want to attach to the 
convention. I have been impressed with the Administration's willingness 
to negotiate a number of these conditions. Accordingly, I have changed 
my mind, and I now feel that ratification of the CWC would be in the 
best interests of the United States.

    The treaty is clearly not verifiable. However, I believe that we 
can gain from being a member of the inspection framework. it is 
important that the U.S. Senate ratify the CWC before 29 April, 1997 so 
that we may be a party to the verification process and that American 
inspectors, who are among the best trained and experienced in the 
world, can become members of the international inspectorate. It is true 
that there are certain disadvantages to being a party to the inspection 
process. However, I am convinced that we have more to gain by being on 
the inside than on the outside looking in.

    I still have misgivings about the prohibition against the use of 
tear gas during time of war. While I understand that it is not 
prohibited for use in domestic situations, I can visualize many cases 
where non-lethal agents would be beneficial in combat.

    As for the obligation to share defensive technology in all cases, I 
do not subscribe to the Iranian interpretation of Article X. Rather, I 
am convinced that the treaty can be interpreted in a way that protects 
our interests without violating the terms of the CWC.

    When it comes to my major concern, I was appalled to learn from 
several officers that during the Gulf War they had to borrow detection 
equipment from Great Britain, protected vehicles from Germany, and 
decontamination equipment from the Czech Republic. I am encouraged by 
the Administration's recent request for funds which would eliminate or 
mitigate the dangers to our soldiers in combat and our civilian 
populace. This demonstrates an awareness of our inadequate defensive 
posture and progress to correct it. However, it is important that the 
$225 million in requested expenditures be approved by the Congress.

    I believe that it is also important that the Administration pursue 
a vigorous program to provide ballistic missile defenses for our forces 
overseas and for our people at home against accidental launches and 
limited attacks by rogue states. Several of these states now possess 
ballistic missiles equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical 
warheads capable of striking our U.S. troops deployed overseas and will 
soon be capable of striking the United States. Protecting our soldiers 
in combat and our civilians from terrorist activities, accidental 
launches, and rogue state attacks requires not only the request for 
funds by the administration, but the provision of such funds by the 
Congress.

    The CWC will come into effect on 29 April, 1997 whether the U.S. 
Senate ratifies it or not. A failure to ratify the treaty would place 
us outside the world's civilized nations and associate us with the 
pariahs. Additionally, failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CWC 
would give the Russian Duma an excuse to discard the treaty. It is 
important that Russia become a party to the treaty so that we can 
inspect their facilities which are reportedly developing new chemical 
agents.

    I am also concerned that our enviable position as leaders of the 
free world would suffer if we fail to ratify a treaty we have convinced 
scores of other nations to join. We are highly respected and admired 
abroad largely because of our leadership in establishing high standards 
and norms of international conduct. At the very least, the CWC will 
establish such norms and standards for others to follow.

    For more than two decades as an arms controller, I have maintained 
that arms control agreements must meet four criteria. First, they must 
be effectively verifiable; second, they must not contain fatal flaws; 
third, they must be enforceable; and fourth, they must serve the 
interests of the United States.

    The CWC does not meet the first criterion; it is not effectively 
verifiable. However, the problem of verifying the production and 
stockpiling of chemicals is more difficult than that of verifying the 
existence and storage of ballistic missiles, bombers, and air delivered 
weapons. I believe that under the CWC we stand to gain more information 
than we might lose.

    As for the second criterion, while the treaty is flawed, none of 
the flaws, in my opinion, is a fatal one. Moreover, I believe that 
continued discussions between the White House and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee can remove or mitigate some of the remaining flaws.

    The third criterion is a critical one. No arms control treaty, 
including the START treaties, of which I am proud, can stand alone. The 
CWC by itself will not protect our troops or citizens, but it will be 
useful if--and only if--we spend the funds to protect ourselves and 
have the will to do whatever is necessary to enforce the terms of the 
treaty.

    Finally, we come to the vital fourth criterion, that the treaty be 
in the best interests of the United States. The bottom line must answer 
the question, ``Are we better off with the CWC or without it?'' Careful 
analysis and my considered judgment lead me to conclude that we will be 
better off with it than without it.

    Accordingly, I respectfully urge the United States Senate to ratify 
the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Thank you Mr. Chairman.


    Senator Hagel. General Rowny, thank you.

    General Scowcroft, welcome.

  STATEMENT OF GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, FORUM FOR 
   INTERNATIONAL POLICY, AND FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
                   ADVISOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

    General Scowcroft. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great 
pleasure for me to appear before this distinguished committee 
on such an important issue.

    At the outset, I would like to make one thing clear. 
Chairman Helms made some comment about support being 
orchestrated by the White House. I want to make sure everybody 
understands I am not orchestrated by the White House. I am 
orchestrated by my concern for the national interest. It is in 
that capacity that I appear.

    We are talking about how best to deal with one of the 
scourges of modern man, one of the three weapons of mass 
destruction, and in some respects the most distasteful one.

    I am going to be very brief, because I am going to follow 
Senator Biden's prescription to keep my eye on the ball. I 
think a lot of the debate this afternoon has been on 
peripheries.

    We are not starting a treaty here. We are finishing a 
treaty. When you strip where we are now to its basic 
essentials, what is facing us in the Chemical Warfare 
Convention are very narrow and relatively straight-forward 
issues.

    First is: The United States is going out of the chemical 
weapons business. We were forbidden many years ago, quite a few 
years ago, by the Congress to modernize our chemical stocks by 
building the so-called binaries; and subsequent to that we 
agreed legislatively to mandate the unilateral destruction of 
our chemical weapons stocks.

    We are going out of the business. That is the first major 
point.

    The second one is that the Chemical Warfare Convention will 
enter into force whether or not the United States ratifies it. 
We are not dealing with a bunch of putty here that we can mold 
any way we want.

    So the basic question is really a very simple one: Is the 
national interest served better by acceding to the treaty or by 
staying outside the convention? The question is not whether 
this is the perfect treaty.

    As other witnesses today have said, there is no perfect 
treaty for chemical weapons. Their manufacture is a lot like 
insecticides and fertilizers. There is no truly verifiable 
treaty. So that is not the issue before us.

    There is not even a possible treaty written just as the 
United States would like it; because some 160 nations have 
signed this treaty, and any multilateral convention requires 
compromise of one way or another.

    There is only before us this particular treaty. Given the 
real world situation we are in, therefore, I think the answer 
to the question is a resounding yes to ratification of the 
treaty, because it is in the national interest of the United 
States. I want to digress to make just a couple of points about 
some of the earlier questions. First is about the 
Nonproliferation Treaty.

    As Ambassador Kirkpatrick was winding up, I was waiting for 
her real punch line, the logical conclusion to her remarks 
which should be that we would be better off had there been no 
Nonproliferation Treaty. I think General Rowny has clearly 
pointed out, as have you, Senator Biden, that that is not the 
case.

    Is it flawed? Sure. Do I have problems with it? Sure. But I 
think there is no question that the treaty played some kind of 
role in the fact that--I think it was President Kennedy who 
said that there were going to be 25 nuclear powers within the 
next decade, but that has not happened.

    So it is something better than nothing.

    Article X of the CWC has come in for a lot of discussion 
today. As I recall, the purpose for Article X was to help those 
countries who abided by the treaty who might be threatened by 
chemical attack to be able to defend themselves. Now that is a 
pretty logical kind of thing. This is not some nefarious thing 
that the negotiators just cooked up to make a bad treaty. It is 
a very logical course of action.

    Now as to the argument that one would never use chemical 
weapons until one had this perfect defense and, therefore, that 
is the real threat, I think that is not true. Chemical weapons 
are the poor man's nuclear weapons. But chemical weapons have, 
I think, demonstrated that they are not militarily useful 
weapons. There were masses of stocks of chemical weapons in 
World War II, which was certainly a no holds barred war. 
Against an enemy that has defenses, chemical weapons are an 
irritant; they are not overwhelming.

    Chemical weapons are valuable as a terror weapon, and you 
don't need defenses to fire missiles armed with chemical 
weapons, aircraft dropping chemical weapons. Therefore I think 
that is a very important aspect in which Article X needs to be 
looked at.

    As for reporting requirements, one of the things that has 
been overlooked, other than to complain about the 
administration's treaty, is that it does require reporting of 
shipments of chemical materials and so on.

    Right now, it is possible for a country to buy a few pounds 
of a precursor here or a few pounds there, a few pounds 
somewhere else, and to amass an abnormal supply without anybody 
ever noticing it. That won't be possible anymore. Therefore, we 
will have a better idea of what's going on and who the bad guys 
seem to be.

    We should ratify this treaty, recognizing that it is not a 
silver bullet. It is just one weapon--a good one, but just 
one--in our fight against chemical weapons, and we must 
continue to employ every weapon in the U.S. arsenal to fight 
this terror weapon. We cannot sit back and relax.

    I think one of the things this sharp debate has brought to 
the national attention is that this is important and we cannot 
just sign it and forget about it.

    Starting over, as was suggested this afternoon, I think is 
pure fantasy. If we reject this treaty, we will incur the 
bitterness of all of our friends and allies who followed us for 
10 years in putting this thing together. It is not a matter of, 
``Just well, let's scrap this and let's start over again.'' We 
will throw the whole civilized world into confusion, and the 
idea that we can then lead out again down a different path I 
think is just not in the cards. We have got to deal with the 
situation we face now, not an ideal one out in the future.

    Let me close by saying that I spoke to President Bush this 
morning, and he asked me to state for the record that he is a 
strong and enthusiastic supporter of the Chemical Warfare 
Convention and that it would be a severe blow to the U.S. role 
in the world were we to repudiate it.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Senator Hagel. General Scowcroft, as always, thank you.

    Again, General Rowny, we are pleased to have you both here.

    In consultation with my colleague, Senator Biden, what we 
will do is go back to the 5 minute rule, if that is 
appropriate.

    Is that OK, Senator Kerry?

    Senator Kerry. (Nods affirmatively)

    Senator Hagel. I will begin. Picking up, General Scowcroft, 
on your last comment about President Bush's continued 
commitment, full support of the CWC, I am intrigued in that 
yesterday we read a letter from former Secretary of Defense 
Cheney. You and Secretary Cheney are both highly respected, 
highly regarded, insightful leaders. You worked closely 
together. You fought a war together.

    My understanding is that President Bush has great 
confidence in each of you. Could you explain to me how the two 
of you have now come at this differently, why Secretary Cheney 
can feel as he does and you feel as you do?

    General Scowcroft. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would be uneasy 
putting words in Secretary Cheney's mouth. He is a dear friend 
of mine. We went through the last 4 years of negotiation of 
this treaty and evolution in what we were going to do, whether 
we were to going retain residuals until so many people 
ratified--the whole gamut of things.

    What I will say is that I think it is a fair statement--I 
don't think Dick would contest this--that Dick Cheney does not 
like arms control. He thinks we ought to do whatever we are 
going to do for our own national defense interest and not do it 
as an attempt to get somebody else to do something.

    That he would not have chosen to have the treaty signed I 
think is a fair statement. He did not resign over it. When 
President Bush decided to sign the CWC, he didn't make any 
comment on it. But I have talked to him, and he speaks for 
himself. But we simply differ on this issue.

    Senator Hagel. I don't know if you have had an opportunity 
to see the letter that he forwarded to us.

    General Scowcroft. I have not seen his letter. I talked to 
him about 3 weeks ago.

    Senator Hagel. If you're interested, we will give you a 
copy of it----

    General Scowcroft. I'd like that.

    Senator Hagel [continuing]. Because he gets into some 
specificity, as much as you can in a one page letter.

    Obviously you had some occasion, as you suggest, to work 
with him a little bit and talk with him about this issue.

    I have another question on Israel. My understanding is that 
they have not ratified this yet. Do you know why that would be?

    General Scowcroft. No, I really don't. As a matter of fact, 
I think I assumed they had ratified it. I am not clear about 
that.

    My guess is that they are waiting for the United States.

    Senator Hagel. General Rowny, would you care to make a 
comment?

    Ambassador Rowny. I subscribe to what Brent Scowcroft said. 
In the first place, I don't know. But I think they are waiting 
for the United States, and they want to follow our lead. I know 
that they were very worried during the Gulf War that they would 
be bombarded and, they were grateful for our help in trying to 
knock down those missiles and so forth. They were very keen on 
relying on our assistance to get a better defensive system, and 
I am sure that goes over into the chemical field as well.

    Senator Hagel. Thank you.

    I would be interested in both of your thoughts on this. I 
think you each were here when the panel before you addressed 
some of the issues. You will recall Ambassador Kirkpatrick, 
Secretary Perle, and yesterday Secretary Schlesinger all talked 
about the IAEA and some of the ramifications in this opinion as 
to what has happened and has occurred. Would either of you like 
to respond to some of what you heard today from some of the two 
panels before you?

    General Scowcroft. Let me just say that the IAEA was put 
together in a way which was not very effective. The terms under 
which it can inspect were not very effective. But we have some 
experience, and now I believe we are undertaking a way to make 
the IAEA very much tougher and to take over responsibilities 
for inspections that are now the responsibility of UNSCOM and 
so on.

    Incidentally, UNSCOM has done a fantastic job. So I think 
IAEA can be made a very effective instrument in nuclear 
nonproliferation. But it could not if we did not have it--if we 
did not have an NPT.

    Again, I would say that what we are really arguing is does 
this treaty help us at all. Since we are out of the chemical 
weapons business, if it gives us some help, we ought to look 
for help and take it anywhere we can find it; and I think we'd 
get some help here.

    Senator Hagel. General, thank you.

    General Rowny, I want to hear your response as well.

    Ambassador Rowny. My response is similar to that of General 
Scowcroft, though I would go a little further.

    The IAEA was initially inexperienced, but they have come a 
long way. That is one of the reasons that I think we ought to 
get in on the ground floor and the initial round of the CWC. 
The United States has the best trained inspectors in the world.

    Also, we have learned a lot about countering the 
restrictions. In the old days, we could not go in unless Iraq 
invited us to do so.

    This treaty has many inspection provisions. There are pages 
and pages of verification protocols which would bind any nation 
trying to get around the CWC.

    On the point that was made that we would train other people 
to be able to circumvent this treaty, I think that is somewhat 
overblown. Even if it is not overblown, I would take that risk. 
I would rather be able to go in and inspect, knowing how to 
inspect and having a lot of rules behind me, even if I knew 
that I might be giving inspection secrets away.

    Accordingly, I believe that this treaty would be more 
easily enforceable than its predecessors.

    Senator Hagel. Thank you.

    Senator Biden.

    Senator Biden. Thank you very much.

    General Scowcroft, the point that you made I think is a 
very important point to make, not merely about Secretary Cheney 
who is a wonderful, fine, bright American. As a matter of fact, 
just as an editorial comment, I thought for sure he was going 
to be your nominee. I mean that sincerely.

    This guy has a presence, an articulation. But I think the 
point you made is an important one to make here generally.

    If you look across the board, the bulk of the problem, the 
bulk of the opposition comes from people who legitimately, and 
truly consistent with their philosophy and intellectual 
predisposition, if you will, do not like arms control.

    One of the things that our distinguished Chairman said when 
he spoke on the floor the first time on this is he quoted what 
has been quoted 50 times by a lot of people. I do not say this 
in a derisive manner. It is: As so and so said, America has 
never lost a war or won a treaty.

    That is doctrine among an awful lot of people. I do not 
belittle it. I just think it is important that we put it in 
focus.

    I mean, we have in here a very bright young guy, Mr. 
Gaffney. In all fairness to Mr. Gaffney, who is sort of the 
intellectual engine on the right on this one right now, has he 
ever seen a treaty he likes? It's kind of like: Do you ever 
take yes for an answer?

    I understand that. But it is really important that we all 
understand it so that we can put into perspective some of the 
criticism.

    The second point I would like to make is, if you look at 
the argumentation against the treaty, it is the ultimate Catch 
22. The criticism my friends make of the treaty in terms of the 
Fourth Amendment: If you want to guarantee there is no 
possibility of ever arguing about it, you have to do something 
they also do not support, which is these onsite inspections 
without notification. If you eliminate those, then you have no 
Fourth Amendment debate. But guess what happens. You eliminate 
the ability for it to be verifiable and you diminish it.

    You can go down every single argument. I think we should 
just make this clear. There is no way to satisfy the critics, 
the strongest and most articulate critics of this treaty, other 
than by solving half of their problem. If you solve half their 
problem, that is the most you can solve. You can't solve it 
all, because it makes the other portions they criticize even 
worse.

    Now, General Rowny, I don't know whether people understand 
something. I have been here 24 years. I don't know whether they 
understand how significant your presence here is. I mean, I 
really don't know whether people fully understand it.

    In my humble opinion, in terms of bringing bona fides to 
this debate, with no disrespect to anyone, from General 
Scowcroft to the President of the United States of America, to 
President Bush or anybody, you are, in my view, the single most 
significant supporter of this treaty. You resigned--you 
resigned--on principle over an arms control agreement you said 
you didn't like. Here you are, a man whose credentials in terms 
of being tough, yet still who believes some treaties are 
useful, here you are supporting the treaty.

    Now I realize there are ad hominem arguments. I realize 
there are appeals to authority. I realize there are logical 
fallacies. But one of the things that, in fact, impacts on this 
debate overall is the vast majority of people do not have the 
time to do what the acting chairman and I are doing or any of 
the members of this committee, or that you all have done. You 
know it, we hopefully know it, but the vast majority of 
Americans do what we do on everything else. They are looking at 
people they respect and are saying well, if it is good enough 
for them, it is good enough for me as I respect them. Or if 
they don't like it, I don't like it.

    That is not an irrational thing to do. So, I want to tell 
you that I think it is very important you are both here.

    I think it is fair to say the three of us, you two and me, 
have been on the opposite sides of more debates than we have 
been on the same side.

    General Scowcroft. I believe so.

    Senator Biden. So I want to thank you for being here. I 
would conclude, Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Kerry is not here quite 
yet----

    Senator Hagel. Just go ahead, Senator Biden.

    Senator Biden [continuing]. By saying one of the things we 
talked about in terms of inspections before. Mr. Perle, who is 
always articulate, Mr. Perle made the point that what is going 
to happen here is we are going to have these rogue nation guys 
on the teams, meaning Iran, coming into the United States, 
inspecting, carrying little gadgets in their pockets and 
learning all there is to know about either trade secrets and/or 
a capacity to make chemical weapons better when they get home.

    On Part II, paragraphs 1 and 4 specify that we can deny 
individual inspectors if we give notice.

    So no Iranian ever has to inspect an American facility if 
that is the decision we make.

    It is not a requirement. The good news about this is you 
may ask well, couldn't they deny us inspection. Yes. Yes, but 
we have allies, like France, Britain, and Germany who are part 
of this operation. We share with them a lot of this, our 
technological capability of detection. So, the fact that we 
would be denied inspection does not hurt us very much, having 
an inspector on a team. But their being denied at least should 
satisfy some of our critics of this treaty as to somehow they 
are all of a sudden going to be able to learn all there is to 
learn.

    I find it interesting that when we thought, as a Nation, 
and other nations thought that chemical weapons were a useful 
tool of war, we did not have a vial of it, we did not have a 
canister of it, we did not have a truck load of it, we did not 
have a warehouse full of it. We had hundreds of tons of it.

    So the idea when people say to me, isn't it true that in a 
chemical plant, or a fertilizer plant, or a pharmaceutical 
plant they could be producing chemical weapons, the answer is 
yes, they could. We might not be able to detect it.

    But let me tell you something. I think the image, General 
Scowcroft, is people are thinking of a Japanese guy with sarin 
gas in the subway taking on the U.S. Army. I really mean that. 
I am not being facetious.

    Listen to the distinguished Senator from California. It is 
a legitimate concern.

    I think we have to kind of remind ourselves. We are not 
seeing the forest from the trees. Cheating will occur. But the 
idea that enough cheating could occur that the U.S. military 
would be in ulti- 
mate jeopardy of losing a war--not a single encounter but a 
war--that we would be prostrate is bizarre. It is absolutely 
bizarre.

    I just think in terms of keeping the focus here, when you 
argue on the other guy's terms, you tend to lose the argument. 
The terms we tend to argue on--at least I do, because I am so 
acquainted with the detail of this thing. I get so into the 
detail of it I argue about the specifics, when you can't lose.

    That is why I conclude by thanking you, General, for your 
overall statement of the generic approach to this thing and why 
this is in our interest. It is in our interest, because the 
idea that somebody can cheat is true. But the idea that 
somebody could cheat enough to become a world power that is 
going to defeat the United States of America, the idea that we 
are going to be in a position where these rogue nations are 
going to gain all our trade secrets and build better Chevettes 
or Corvettes that we build, or our pharmaceutical products, is, 
at best, to use your phrase, General Rowny--and you are always 
a diplomat. You said you think this example is a little 
overdrawn.

    I think that is a mild understatement, a mild 
understatement.

    You will be glad to know that wasn't a question. I just 
cannot tell you how much I appreciate people of your caliber 
being here. I know it is not easy, General, to be here. All 
those guys were here. You sat on the same side of the table 
with them for a long, long time, as have you, General 
Scowcroft. This is an issue on which reasonable and honorable 
men can disagree. But I think the break point basically divides 
generally those who think arms control can be a useful tool for 
national security, who fall on this side (indicating), and 
those who think arms control generally is a bad idea, who fall 
on that side.

    I think if you look down the line, that is the ultimate 
distinguishing feature about where people fall on this treaty.

    Ambassador Rowny. Senator, if I can elaborate on that, I 
agree with you that there are people who believe that all arms 
control treaties are good, and there are some who say all arms 
control treaties are bad. I happen to have been all along for 
good arms control.

    Senator Biden. I know that, General.

    Ambassador Rowny. When I resigned in protest over SALT II, 
it was difficult, because I was drummed out of the Army. But 
later, when we fixed the flaws of SALT II, we got a good 
treaty: START I. START I reduced from 15,000 to 8,000 weapons 
on each side.

    As I said before, you cannot do this in a vacuum. You have 
to always do it with the threat of being able to enforce the 
treaty, and without that, I don't think arms control is useful.

    That is why I would like to see pressure put on Russia now 
to have the Duma ratify START II. I have been working on this 
idea for 3 years, and believe that we should go even further by 
moving to START III.

    Senator Biden. I agree with you, General.

    Ambassador Rowny. The idea is to get good arms control 
agreements and also to have them bolstered with good, 
enforceable methods of carrying them out.

    Senator Biden. I'll make you a bet that I hope I never win. 
If we do not ratify the CWC, the chances of the Duma ratifying 
START II, irrespective of all other questions, I think is 
remote. It is remote at best. It is difficult now and you are 
right.

    The only point I want to make--and, Mr. Chairman, I have 
gone way over my time--is you are a man of principle, General. 
That is the only point I was making or attempting to make. I 
hope I made it clear. You are a man of principle. You gave up a 
lot on a principle, a principle. So, when people suggest--and 
no one here has, friend or foe--when people suggest that people 
are orchestrated to come here, General Scowcroft is a man who 
has taken on me in this committee, and the Democrats time and 
again. He is a guy who in my view educated my best friend, Bill 
Cohen, and that is why he is Secretary of Defense. General 
Rowny is a man of absolute principle who thinks that good arms 
control is as he defined it, and there is good arms control. 
The fact that you both are here I think is a big deal.

    It reinforces my view of this treaty, quite frankly, 
because we all look to the people we admire as to whether or 
not they like it; and it reinforces our sense of the place we 
intellectually arrived at. The fact that you both are there 
quite frankly just reinforces and makes me feel better about my 
decision.

    Senator Hagel. If I could follow up, General Rowny, on 
something you mentioned earlier, you mentioned that you thought 
this was a flawed treaty, like I believe you said most are, but 
fixable. I think you mentioned specifically Paragraph 3 of 
Article X.

    What other areas do you think need to be addressed?

    Ambassador Rowny. Just one other area, Senator. That is the 
one on tear gas. I have never understood this. It has a long 
history. As you know, President Ford issued an executive order. 
Brent Scowcroft played golf with him a good deal, and he might 
be able to understand that executive order at that time. But I 
felt that the idea of prohibiting the use of tear gas in times 
of war, I have always felt that was a mistake. I would like to 
see that one fixed in some way.

    That is the only other flaw that I see in the treaty.

    Senator Hagel. To each of you, Admiral Zumwalt mentioned 
sanctions on those signatories who might violate the 
convention.

    What realistically are we talking about when you say 
sanctions? Iran is a signatory. They violate inspections. If we 
find they have violated the convention, what do we do?

    General Scowcroft. Well, I think sanctions run all the way 
from doing something that makes you feel good when you really 
don't want to take action but you have to do something to what 
I would call sanctions on Iraq right now, which are effective. 
They are good. UNSCOM is over there, they are rooting around, 
and they are finding out all kinds of things. That is the 
ultimate in sanctions.

    Senator Hagel. Would the entire body, as you read this 
treaty, be involved in the sanctioning process of a violating 
nation?

    General Scowcroft. I think in the end, Mr. Chairman, 
sanctions depend on the national interest of the country 
whatever a treaty says. We could have responded when Iraq used 
chemicals against Iran or against its own people. Politically, 
nobody did; and they didn't, because there were other kinds of 
things that militated against it.

    I think you always have to look at sanctions in that light. 
Collective security is a chimera. It is never going to work, 
because when you don't know who the enemy is, then you cannot 
defend against it.

    So every country is going to consult its own national 
interest when it decides whether or not to go with sanctions. 
That is where the United States is so important, because when 
we decide, we can get a lot of people along with us. When we 
sit on the sidelines, there isn't anybody else to pick up the 
ball and carry it.

    Senator Hagel. Thank you.

    General Rowny.

    Ambassador Rowny. I have a less optimistic view about 
sanctions. I think that sanctions can be helpful, but I think 
in the end, you have to use more than sanctions in critical 
cases. So I would say: use sanctions. If they work, fine. If 
they don't, don't hesitate to use your military muscle, and I 
think in some cases you have to.

    The Chemical Weapons Convention is important; but we have a 
more sinister set of circumstances facing us down the road, and 
that is the biological warfare issue. The Biological Weapons 
Treaty does not have any of the verification procedures 
contained in the CWC. As you know, Russia denied developing 
anthrax. Now there are reports that they have developed a new 
biological weapon which is not detectable. There is a vast 
difference between chemical and biological weapons. A chemical 
weapon will disperse and you can protect against it. However, 
biological weapons do not disperse but grow.

    So I would hope as soon as this treaty is ratified that the 
Senate, and this committee in particular, turn their attention 
to the possible dangers of biological warfare, which, in my 
view, are more devastating than chemical weapons.

    In this connection, I would not hesitate to go beyond 
sanctions and use whatever it takes to prevent against this 
great scourge. If what happened with just a few whiffs of sarin 
gas in Japan were to happen in this country, I think we would 
never forgive ourselves.

    Senator Hagel. Thank you.

    Senator Biden.

    Senator Biden. General, you just made, again, the point 
that I think it is important to keep in mind. You heard the 
last panel, all brilliant people, all decent, honorable people. 
This is the dividing line again. They said not only is this 
treaty bad, but if we ever tried to do anything in biological 
weapons, which is less verifiable, it would be a disaster.

    I just want to keep reinforcing the point here. I happen to 
agree with you completely, General. People fall down on most of 
these issues based on which side of this treaty line they fall 
on.

    As you heard spontaneously, three of the four witnesses 
said by the way, this is bad, but if you guys ever start 
looking at biological weapons, that would even be worse.

    Now the question I would like to ask you is--or I guess I 
would make more of a point and would ask you to respond. In my 
view, when you were dealing and this administration was 
dealing, General Scowcroft, with Korea's attempt at, desire to, 
and potentially having achieved a nuclear capacity, nuclear 
weapons, there was a lot of loose talk up here with guys like 
me and others. It got all around. I refer not to you but to us, 
to me.

    We said if they do develop or are on the verge of 
developing that capacity, we may very well have to use 
preemptive military action. That was talked about around the 
world.

    I cannot fathom even being able to raise that issue had we 
not been part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. If there 
were not an international norm established, the idea that in 
capitals--and I was in Europe at the time as well--the idea 
that in capitals of the world there was no commitment to use 
force, but no commitment to rule out the use of force, there is 
no way, in my view, there would have been any--any--ability to 
even contemplate that and to gain anything remotely approaching 
international understanding for the possible need of 
preemptively using force.

    Now I am not suggesting that you suggested that, General. I 
want to make the record clear.

    General Scowcroft. I did.

    Senator Biden. Well, OK. I am not speaking for you now. But 
I was up here, as you will recall, saying the same thing that 
you recommended.

    So, again, I state it to reinforce a point that seems to 
get lost as we focus on these individual trees in this forest. 
This is that national and international norms make a 
difference. They make a difference. They are not dispositive in 
every case, but they make a difference.

    Had we followed Ambassador Kirkpatrick's notion of never 
having gone forward with the Nonproliferation Treaty, the idea 
that we would have had the consensus to consider--and I 
believe, General, your statements and recommendation were part 
of the reason why, ultimately, it did not go to the point we 
worried about it going. Now I am not now here positing where it 
is.

    At any rate, if you would like to comment, fine, but there 
is no need to comment. I just think international norms make a 
big difference.

    General Scowcroft. Well, one of the things that we did not 
really discuss this afternoon and that I thought about putting 
in my remarks, but I did not want to be accused of being 
``goody-goody'' is that the very fact that you mobilize world 
opinion and say these things are bad, we are going to mobilize 
the international community against them, this does put 
pressure on the hold-outs. If they are doing things wrong, it 
is easier to call attention to it.

    We have no coordinated kind of social, if you will, 
pressure on the rogue states right now in this area.

    Senator Biden. That's right. I agree.

    Senator Hagel. Senator, are there any more questions?

    Senator Biden. No. Again, gentlemen, particularly for the 
way you got bounced around by me in terms of timing on this, I 
just cannot tell you how much I appreciate your being here and 
how important I think it is that you are here.

    Thank you both.

    Senator Hagel. On behalf of the committee, thank you. Just 
as the other panel, you all have brought a tremendous amount of 
experience and insight to this. As you suggested, General 
Scowcroft, this is a critically important issue for this 
country and the world, and we need to spend as much time as we 
have been spending and that we will spend to air it all out.

    So on behalf of all of us, thank you.

    Senator Biden. Thank you.

    Senator Hagel. We are adjourned.

    [Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m. The committee adjourned, to 
reconvene at 2:03 p.m. on Tuesday, April 15, 1997.]


                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1997

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in 
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Brownback, Biden, and 
Kerry.
    The Chairman. The Committee will come to order, but we will 
stand relaxed until the staff gets its act together. Both 
parties are represented at another hearing, and it should not 
be very long. [Pause.]
    There is no Senate rule against a chairman doing what they 
do on television when they have got more time left than they 
expected. So they stretch it out.
    Our first witness this afternoon will be a long time friend 
of so many of us in the Senate. We have worked with him in 
various capacities, including broadcasting to foreign 
countries. Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., or Steve as he is known, is 
one of the most remarkable friends I have ever known; and I am 
going to give you one vignette for the record.
    Some years ago I happened to be on the same campus with him 
where he had spoken to the students, and following all of the 
formal doings there was a reception, and the reception went on 
and on and on, and he was shaking hands and answering of the 
students, and along about 10 or maybe a little bit earlier I 
sent word to Mr. Forbes that I would rescue him and he could go 
out a certain door, get on his airplane, and go back to New 
York. He said oh, no. He said, I have got some more friends I 
wish to talk with.
    Now, he was not a candidate for anything except the Kingdom 
of Heaven, I think, at that time. But I want to say to you, 
sir, that you won the hearts of those young people at that 
university. I still hear about your staying there until 11 
talking with them and answering questions. Maybe another fellow 
would have gotten up and left, but you did not.
    Mr. Biden, the ranking member of the committee, will be 
here momentarily, and we will just bide our time.
    We will have two panels, by the way. Steve Forbes, or 
Malcolm S. Forbes, Jr., will be the first witness and only 
witness on panel one. Panel two will have businessmen: Mr. 
Wayne Spears, President of the Spears Manufacturing Company and 
so forth; Mr. Ralph V. Johnson, Vice President of Environmental 
Affairs at Dixie Chemical Company; Mr. Kevin L. Kearns, 
President of the United States Business and Industrial Council; 
the Honorable Kathleen C. Bailey, Senior Fellow of the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
    This hearing is the third in the final round of Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the dangerously flawed 
Chemical Weapons Convention. Last week the committee heard from 
seven distinguished foreign and defense policy leaders about 
the national security implications of this treaty. This 
afternoon, our purpose is to discuss the destructive effects of 
this treaty, and what those effects will have on the American 
business community, the new regulations will be imposed, the 
intrusive and clearly unconstitutional inspections it will 
authorize, and the potential of abuse of the treaty by our 
foreign business competitors by industrial espionage.
    I can think of no one--no one--who can better speak to 
these issues than our lead witness today, Mr. Forbes. He is 
chairman and CEO of Forbes Magazine. He is a leading voice of 
American business, and in particular a champion of the small 
and medium-sized enterprises that will be disproportionately 
affected by this treaty.
    Last week we heard eloquent testimony from four former 
secretaries of defense of this country urging the Senate to 
reject this flawed treaty, and I want to quote something one of 
those witnesses said that day, because I think it will help us 
frame the discussion this afternoon.
    Let me preface what I am going to read by saying that there 
have been repeated suggestions by the proponents of the treaty 
implying that all businesses support this treaty. Well, this 
simply is not accurate. Don Rumsfeld eloquently reminded us 
last week that many big businesses, and he stressed the word 
big, do support the treaty, but it is not the security of big 
business that we need to worry about in this country, it is the 
smaller businesses.
    Here is what Don Rumsfeld said: Big companies seem to get 
along fine with big government. They get along with American 
government, they get along with foreign governments, they get 
along with international organizations, and they have the 
ability, with all their Washington representatives, to deal 
effectively with bureaucracies. Indeed, Mr. Rumsfeld said, and 
I am quoting him still, indeed, that capability on the part of 
the big companies actually serves as a sort of barrier to entry 
to small and medium-sized companies that lack that capability. 
So I do not suggest, he said, for 1 minute that large American 
companies are not going to be able to cope with the 
regulations. They will do it a whale of a lot better than small 
and medium sized companies, end of quote.
    Mr. Rumsfeld made a vitally important point. It is small 
and medium-sized businesses, the entrepreneurs who are creating 
all of the jobs in our economy today, who will be hurt worse by 
this treaty. It is they who will have trouble coping with all 
of the new regulations and all of the red tape and all of the 
intrusive and unconstitutional inspections and all of the legal 
fees and potential losses of proprietary information.
    The small businesses are the ones whose constitutional 
rights will be trampled because this administration refuses to 
require a criminal search warrant from involuntary challenge 
inspections granted to foreign inspectors. These inspections 
will be granted greater power of search and seizure than those 
granted to U.S. Law enforcement officers. These inspectors are 
the ones who may well confront officials from Iran and China, 
knocking on their doors, demanding the right to rifle their 
records and so forth and so on.
    Speaking of the law enforcement officers, they will 
interrogate the employees and remove chemical samples from 
their facilities, all because this administration has refused 
to ban inspectors from rogue regimes.
    Now, we hear over and over again that the Chemical 
Manufacturer's Association, which has been very active in 
promoting the treaty, we heard that they support the treaty, 
and we have had, certainly, the strong inferences, if not 
declarations. But let me tell you something about this 
association. And I speak as a guy who ran a pretty sizable 
association some years ago. The CMA operates and represents 
just 191 companies--1-9-1--but this treaty, at the 
administration's most conservative estimate, will affect at 
least 3,000 businesses, and may affect as many as 8,000.
    So I hope we can put an end to the notion that the CMA 
represents the interests of the thousands of small- and medium-
sized companies that will be hurt by this treaty. And as one of 
our witnesses will tell us today, I believe, even within the 
ranks of the CMA companies there is concern about the impact of 
this treaty, including the cost of regulations and the 
potential loss of confidential business information.
    The fact is there are literally thousands of companies 
across this country who do not know about this treaty, who do 
not understand it in any detail, who do not realize that it 
will affect them, who do not understand that they will be 
subjected to inspections, and are not aware what kind of 
unfunded mandates will be imposed on them should this treaty be 
ratified as is.
    Now, I have no doubt that the businessmen affected by the 
CWC are patriotic Americans who love their country and are 
willing to make sacrifices for our national security. And if 
this treaty could actually reduce the danger of chemical 
weapons, I am sure they would be willing to make necessary 
sacrifices to get rid of those terrible weapons. But as we have 
heard from so many experts, it just will not work.
    This treaty will not work. It will do nothing to reduce the 
danger of chemical weapons. If anything, we have learned that 
it will make the problem worse by giving rogue nations even 
greater access to dangerous chemical agents and technology and 
defensive gear. Even the treaty's proponents admit that it will 
not work, but they say we should ratify it anyhow; because it 
is better than nothing; because, they say, it will establish 
``norms.''
    Well, I do not believe that ratifying the treaty that 
cannot work just to make a statement is good policy; and when 
you take into consideration the fact that it will also create 
massive new burdens on businesses that are struggling to create 
jobs, that it will cost them money, time, and energy while 
trampling on their constitutional rights just to make a 
statement and establish norms, I say that this treaty is worse 
than nothing. The price of that kind of feel-good statement is 
just too high.
    So, Mr. Forbes, if you will take the seat in the middle, we 
thank you for being here, and look forw