<PRE>&lt;DOC&gt;
[109 House Committee Prints]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:29862.wais]


              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA


                             ANNUAL REPORT

                                  2006

=======================================================================

                       ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 20, 2006

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

                                 _____

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

29-862 PDF              WASHINGTON : 2006
_________________________________________________________________
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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

Senate

                                     House

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Chairman      JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Co-Chairman
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                DAVID DREIER, California
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina           JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida                ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
MAX BAUCUS, Montana                  SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota           MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                   STEVEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
                 PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
               FRANKLIN L. LAVIN, Department of Commerce
                CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
                BARRY F. LOWENKRON, Department of State

                David Dorman, Staff Director (Chairman)
               John Foarde, Staff Director (Co-Chairman)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
I. Commission Finding............................................     1

II. Executive Summary............................................     2

III. List of Recommendations.....................................    16

IV. Introduction.................................................    22

V. Monitoring Compliance With Human Rights.......................    25
    (a) Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression............    25
    (b) Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants...............    42
    (c) Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights....    60
    (d) Freedom of Religion......................................    75
    (e) Status of Women..........................................    97
    (f) The Environment..........................................   100
    (g) Public Health............................................   104
    (h) Population Planning......................................   109
    (i) Freedom of Residence and Travel..........................   113

VI. Political Prisoner Database..................................   118

VII. Development of the Rule of Law and Institutions of 
  Democratic Governance..........................................   119
    (a) Development of Civil Society.............................   119
    (b) Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative 
      Reform.....................................................   124
    (c) Access to Justice........................................   131
    (d) Commercial Rule of Law and the Impact of the WTO.........   142

VIII. Tibet......................................................   160

IX. North Korean Refugees in China...............................   172

X. Developments in Hong Kong.....................................   175

XI. Appendix: Commission Activities in 2005 and 2006.............   178

XII. Endnotes....................................................   180


          CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                       2006 ANNUAL REPORT

                         I. Commission Finding

     The Commission is deeply concerned that some Chinese 
government policies designed to address growing social unrest 
and bolster Communist Party authority are resulting in a period 
of declining human rights for China's citizens. The Commission 
identified limited improvements in the Chinese government's 
human rights practices in 2004, but backward-stepping 
government decisions in 2005 and 2006 are leading the 
Commission to reevaluate the Chinese leadership's commitment to 
additional human rights improvements in the near term. In its 
2005 Annual Report, the Commission highlighted increased 
government restrictions on Chinese citizens who worship in 
state-controlled venues or write for state-controlled 
publications. These restrictions remain in place, and in some 
cases, the government has strengthened their enforcement.
    The Communist Party's concern with growing social unrest 
dominated its policy statements over the past year, and served 
as 
justification for increased government interference with, and 
intimidation and harassment of, individuals and groups that the 
Party believes may threaten its authority or legitimacy. The 
government targeted social, political, and legal activists, as 
well as 
religious believers who violated strict government limitations 
on religious practice. In the past year, government efforts to 
maintain social stability have led to a greater reliance on the 
coercive powers of the police to subdue potential threats to 
Party rule. Chinese officials have also taken additional steps 
in the past year to curb the growth of China's emerging civil 
society. New government and Party controls have been imposed on 
courts and judges that may further weaken the independence of 
the Chinese judiciary. Moreover, the Chinese government 
continues to use its regulatory control over the Internet and 
print publishing to censor political and religious expression, 
to imprison journalists and writers, and to prevent Chinese 
citizens from having access to independent news sources.
    The Commission notes the progress that the Chinese 
government has made over the past 25 years in beginning to 
build a political system based on the rule of law and on 
respect for basic human rights. The twin demands of social 
stability and continued economic progress have spurred legal 
reforms that may one day be the leading edge of constraints on 
the arbitrary exercise of state power. The Chinese government 
continues to pursue judicial and criminal reforms, often in 
cooperation with international partners, that could lead to 
further protection of citizen rights. The government's 
achievements in the economic realm are impressive, none more so 
than its success in lifting more than 400 million Chinese 
citizens out of extreme poverty since the early 1980s. Economic 
reforms have also contributed to a growing middle class, 
expected to total 170 million people by 2010. China's WTO 
accession commitments have resulted in gradual improvements in 
transparency at all levels of government. Elections at the 
village level are now commonplace in China, and limited 
experiments with popular participation continue at other levels 
of government. Average Chinese citizens are free to discuss 
sensitive issues in a way that would have been unimaginable two 
decades ago.
    While all of these changes are important, the gap between 
forward-looking economic freedoms and a backward-looking 
political system remains significant. There are leaders now 
within China who comprehend the need for change, and who 
understand that inflexibility, secretiveness, and a lack of 
democratic oversight pose the greatest challenges to continued 
development. These leaders will need to gather considerable 
reformist courage to overcome obstacles and push for continued 
change. Such changes will not occur overnight, but rather in 
ways that Chinese society, culture, infrastructure, and 
institutions must be prepared for and willing to accept.

                         II. Executive Summary

    China has an authoritarian political system controlled by 
the Communist Party. Party committees formulate all major state 
policies before the government implements them. The Party 
dominates Chinese legislative bodies such as the National 
People's Congress (NPC), and fills all important government 
positions in executive and judicial institutions through an 
internal selection process. Party control extends throughout 
institutions of local government. Chinese authorities have 
ruled out building representative democratic institutions to 
address citizen complaints about corruption and abuse of power, 
and instead are recentralizing government posts into the hands 
of individual Party secretaries. The absence of popular and 
legal constraints to check the behavior of Party officials has 
led to widespread corruption and citizen anger. The Party has 
strengthened the role of internal responsibility systems to 
moderate official behavior, but these systems have provided 
some local Party officials with new incentives to conceal 
information and abuse their power. In 2005, the central 
leadership called for strengthened controls over society to 
address mounting social unrest and to suppress dissent.
    Since the 1980s, officials have introduced limited reforms 
to allow citizens to vote in village elections. While these 
reforms are a step forward in permitting citizen participation 
at the local level, the reforms are designed to strengthen 
Party governance and do not represent Party acceptance of 
representative government. Since the late 1990s, the Party has 
experimented with reforms that allow a limited degree of 
citizen participation in the selection of local Party cadres, 
but the Party retains tight control over the candidate pool and 
the selection process. Since 2000, Chinese authorities have 
experimented with the use of legislative hearings to solicit 
public views on pending legislation, and the NPC held its first 
controlled public hearing in September 2005. In March 2005, the 
central government announced new transparency requirements for 
local governments. The requirements mandate county and 
provincial governments to increase transparency and popular 
participation in government decisionmaking. Implementation of 
these ``open government'' requirements varies, but some local 
governments have taken steps toward greater transparency.
    The Chinese government continues to engage the 
international community on human rights and rule of law issues 
to varying degrees. The government announced in 2006 that it 
plans to amend its Criminal, Civil, and Administrative 
Procedure Laws and reform the judiciary to prepare for 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. The government hosted visits by the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture in late 2005 and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees in March 2006. Both UN officials 
commended the Chinese government for its open attitude toward 
increased dialogue, but Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, also reported that his work was monitored and 
obstructed by Chinese authorities. In May 2006, China was 
elected to serve for a three-year term on the newly established 
UN Human Rights Council. The government's application for 
membership in the Council noted that it has acceded to 22 
international human rights accords. As a member of the new 
Council, the government has pledged to fulfill its obligations 
under the terms of these accords, and is obligated under the 
rules of the Council to submit to peer review of its human 
rights record.
    Chinese scholars and officials continued to engage foreign 
governments and legal experts on a range of criminal justice 
issues during late 2005 and 2006. Chinese law enforcement 
agencies expressed a growing interest in cooperating with other 
countries to combat transnational crime, and in expanding 
cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies on money 
laundering, fighting terrorism, and other issues. Numerous 
international conferences and legal exchanges with Western 
NGOs, judges, and legal experts took place, including programs 
on public accountability, pretrial discovery, evidence 
exclusion, criminal trials and procedure, bail, capital 
punishment, and prison reform. In 2006, the U.S. and Chinese 
governments continued to conduct a series of bilateral 
cooperative activities on wage and hour laws, occupational 
safety and health, mine safety and health, and pension program 
oversight.
    Government censorship, while not total, is pervasive and 
highly effective, and denies Chinese citizens the freedoms of 
speech and of the press guaranteed to them in the Chinese 
Constitution. The government has imprisoned journalists who 
provide news to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and 
Ching Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize government 
policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing News and Li Datong of 
the China Youth Daily, have been dismissed. The government 
blocks the Web sites and radio and television broadcasts of 
foreign news organizations, such as those of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of 
America. In 2005, the government banned dozens of newspapers 
and confiscated almost one million ``illegal'' political 
publications. Beginning in May 2005, the government blocked the 
Commission's Web site from being viewed in China.
    Modern telecommunications technologies such as the 
Internet, cell phones, and satellite broadcasts, allow Chinese 
citizens access to more information sources, both state-
controlled and non-state-controlled. But government 
restrictions on news and information media, including on these 
new information sources, do not conform to international human 
rights standards for freedom of expression. The Chinese 
government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news and 
information media that includes oversight by government 
agencies with discretion to grant, deny, and rescind licenses 
based on political and economic criteria. The Chinese 
government's content-based restrictions include controls on 
political opinion and religious literature that are not 
prescribed by law, and whose primary purpose is to protect the 
ideological and political dominance of the Communist Party.
    The government's restrictions on religious literature do 
not conform to international human rights standards. Only 
government-
licensed printing enterprises may print religious materials, 
and then only with approval from both the provincial-level 
religious affairs bureau and the press and publication 
administration. In addition to confiscating religious 
publications, the Chinese government also has fined, detained, 
and imprisoned citizens for publishing, printing, and 
distributing religious literature without government 
permission. Cai Zhuohua, a house church pastor in Beijing, and 
two of his family members were imprisoned in 2005 for printing 
and giving away Bibles and other Christian literature. In Anhui 
province, house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 
2006 on the same charges.
    The Communist Party's concern with growing social 
instability dominated its policy statements over the past year, 
and served as justification for increased government vigilance 
over activities and groups that potentially threaten Party 
legitimacy. Top Party, court, and law enforcement officials 
repeatedly linked the government's policy of pursuing periodic 
anti-crime campaigns, referred to as ``Strike Hard'' campaigns, 
to the goal of maintaining social stability. Government efforts 
to maintain social stability have led to a greater reliance on 
the coercive powers of the police to subdue 
potential threats to Party rule.
    Abuse of power by local police forces remains a serious 
problem. The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) has 
acknowledged the existence of continuing and widespread abuses 
in law enforcement, including illegal extended detentions and 
torture. New SPP regulations that detail the criteria for 
prosecuting official abuses of power went into effect in July 
2006, and establish standards for the prosecution of police who 
abuse their power to hold individuals in custody beyond legal 
limits, coerce confessions under torture, acquire evidence 
through the use of force, maltreat prisoners, or retaliate 
against those who petition the government or file complaints 
against them.
    The Chinese government continues to apply vague criminal 
and administrative provisions to justify detentions based on an 
individual's political opinions or membership in religious, 
ethnic, or social groups. These provisions allow for the 
targeting and punishment of activists for crimes that 
``endanger state security'' or ``disturb public order'' under 
the Criminal Law. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
concluded in his March 2006 report to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights that the vague definition of these crimes leaves 
their application open to abuse, particularly of the rights to 
freedom of religion, speech, and assembly.
    Chinese authorities use reeducation through labor and other 
forms of administrative detention to circumvent the criminal 
process and imprison offenders for ``minor crimes,'' without 
judicial review and the procedural protections guaranteed by 
the Chinese Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law. The UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded in 2004 that the 
Chinese government has made no significant progress in 
reforming the administrative detention system to ensure 
judicial review and to conform to international law. Although 
proposed reforms would provide some added procedural 
protections, they would still not provide an accused individual 
the opportunity to dispute the alleged misconduct and contest 
law enforcement accusations of guilt before an independent 
adjudicatory body.
    Although illegal in China, torture and abuse by law 
enforcement officers remain widespread. Factors that perpetuate 
or exacerbate the problem of torture include a lack of 
procedural safeguards to protect criminal suspects and 
defendants, over reliance on confessions of guilt, the absence 
of lawyers at interrogations, inadequate complaint mechanisms, 
the lack of an independent judiciary, and the abuse of 
administrative detention measures. The Chinese government 
emphasizes its ongoing efforts to pass new laws and 
administrative regulations preventing, punishing, and 
compensating cases of torture by law enforcement officers. Both 
the SPP and the Ministry of Public Security have announced 
their support for audio and video taping of interrogations of 
criminal suspects accused of a limited number of crimes. The 
Chinese government recognizes that problems of misconduct, 
including physical abuse, exist within Chinese prisons and 
reeducation through labor centers, and it is making progress 
toward increasing accountability for such behavior.
    In 2006, Chinese authorities increased restrictions on 
lawyers who work on politically sensitive cases or cases that 
draw attention from the foreign news media. Law enforcement 
officials also intimidated lawyers defending these cases by 
charging them, or threatening to charge them, with various 
crimes. Since mid-2005, local authorities have also used 
harassment and violent measures against those who participated 
in criminal or civil rights defense in sensitive matters. 
Beijing lawyer Zhu Jiuhu was detained during the past year. 
Self-trained legal advocate Chen Guangcheng was sentenced on 
August 24, 2006, to four years and three months' imprisonment, 
and Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong is currently under house 
arrest after being released from prison on June 5, 2006. 
Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng has been held incommunicado since 
authorities reportedly abducted him on August 15 from his 
sister's home in Shandong province. Guo Feixiong, who served as 
a legal advisor to Gao's law firm, was arrested and later 
released in late 2005, and is currently in detention after 
being taken from his home on September 14.
    Chinese criminal law includes 68 capital offenses, over 
half of which are non-violent crimes. The Chinese government 
reportedly has adopted an ``execute fewer, execute cautiously'' 
policy. In 2006, the Chinese judiciary made reform of the death 
penalty review process a top priority and introduced new 
appellate court procedures for hearing death penalty cases. The 
Supreme People's Court announced that it would consolidate and 
reclaim the death penalty review power from provincial-level 
high courts. These reforms are designed to limit the use of 
death sentences, consolidate criteria used by courts to 
administer those sentences, and ensure constitutionally 
protected human rights.
    The Vice Minister of Health acknowledged that the majority 
of human organs used in transplants in China originate from 
executed prisoners. Under the World Health Organization's 
guiding principles on human organ transplantation, organ 
donations by prisoners, even when reportedly voluntary, may 
nonetheless violate international standards if the organs are 
obtained through undue influence and pressure. New Ministry of 
Health regulations include medical standards for organ 
transplants, but do not provide guidance on what type of 
consent is required for taking organs from 
executed prisoners.
    The Chinese government does not respect the internationally 

recognized right of workers to organize their own unions. The 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a Party-led mass 
organization, is the only legal labor federation in China. It 
controls local union branches and aligns worker and union 
activity with government and Party policy. The ACFTU began a 
campaign in March 2006 to establish union branches in foreign 
enterprises doing business in China. Chinese workers who 
attempt to form independent workers' organizations, or whom the 
government suspects of being leaders of such organizations, 
risk imprisonment. The government secretly tried labor rights 
activist Li Wangyang and sentenced him to 10 years' 
imprisonment in September 2001 for staging a peaceful hunger 
strike. Li had previously served most of a 13-year sentence for 
organizing an independent union. In May 2003, the government 
sentenced labor activist Yao Fuxin to a seven-year prison term 
for peacefully rallying workers to demand wage and pension 
arrearages from a bankrupt state-owned enterprise. Both Li and 
Yao remain in prison.
    Weak protection of worker rights has contributed to an 
increase in the number of labor disputes and protests. 
According to ACFTU figures, the number of labor disputes rose 
sharply in 2005. The ACFTU reports that there were 300,000 
labor-related lawsuits filed, a 20.5 percent increase over 2004 
and a 950 percent increase compared to 1995. Strikes, marches, 
demonstrations, and collective petitions increased from fewer 
than 1,500 in 1994 to about 11,000 in 2003, while the number of 
workers involved increased from nearly 53,000 in 1994 to an 
estimated 515,000 in 2003. Poor workplace health and safety 
conditions and continuing wage and pension arrearages were the 
most prominent issues resulting in labor disputes during the 
past year. Chinese industry continues to have a high accident 
rate, with death rates in the mining and construction 
industries leading other sectors. According to official 
statistics, 110,027 people were killed in 677,379 workplace 
accidents through December 2005, and more than 10,000 workers 
died in the mining and construction sectors during 2005.
    Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese 
administrative 
detention system. Authorities sentence some prisoners without 
judicial review to reeducation through labor (laojiao) centers, 
where they are forced to work long hours without pay to fulfill 
heavy production quotas, and sometimes are tortured for 
refusing to work. China's Labor Law prohibits forced labor 
practices in the workplace, and authorities have arrested 
employers who trap workers at forced labor sites. In 2002, the 
Chinese government began to cooperate with the International 
Labor Organization on broad issues of concern regarding forced 
labor, including on potential reforms to the reeducation 
through labor system, and on improving institutional capacity 
to combat human trafficking for labor exploitation.
    The use of child labor in some regions of China is 
reportedly on the rise. Labor shortages in the economically 
developed southern and eastern coastal provinces are causing 
employers to turn to child laborers, according to NGO reports. 
This development coincides with intensified efforts by the 
Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security to fight the illegal employment of children, 
suggesting that the government is more concerned about such 
abuses than before. Government authorities 
consider statistics on child labor that have not been 
officially 
approved for release to be state secrets, and this policy 
thwarts 
efforts to understand the extent and causes of the problem.
    Chinese government restrictions on the practice of religion 
violate international human rights standards. Freedom of 
religious 
belief is protected by the Chinese Constitution and laws, but 
government implementation of Party policy on religion, and 
restrictions elsewhere in domestic law, violate these 
guarantees. The 
Chinese government tolerates some aspects of religious belief 
and practice, but only under a strict regulatory framework that 
represses religious and spiritual activities falling outside 
the scope of Party-sanctioned practice. Religious organizations 
are required to register with the government and submit to the 
leadership of ``patriotic religious associations'' created by 
the Party to lead each of China's five recognized religions: 
Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Those 
who choose not to register with the government, or groups that 
the government refuses to register, operate outside the zone of 
protected religious activity and risk harassment, detention, 
imprisonment, and other abuses. Registered communities also 
risk such abuse if they engage in religious activities that 
authorities deem a threat to Party authority or legitimacy.
    The 2004 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) has not 
afforded greater religious freedom to Chinese citizens, despite 
government claims that it represented a ``paradigm shift'' by 
limiting state control over religion. Like earlier local and 
national regulations on religion, the RRA emphasizes government 
control and restrictions on religion. The RRA articulates 
general protection only for freedom of ``religious belief,'' 
but not for expressions of religious belief. Like earlier 
regulations, it also protects only those religious activities 
deemed ``normal,'' without defining this term. Although the RRA 
includes provisions that permit registered religious 
organizations to select leaders, publish materials, and engage 
in other affairs, many provisions are conditioned on government 
approval and oversight of religious activities.
    Chinese government enforcement of Party policy on religion 
creates a repressive environment for the practice of Tibetan 
Buddhism. Party policies toward the Dalai Lama and Panchen 
Lama, the second-ranking Tibetan spiritual leader, seek to 
control the fundamental religious convictions of Tibetan 
Buddhists. Government actions to implement Party policies 
caused further deterioration in some aspects of religious 
freedom for Tibetan Buddhists in the past year. Officials began 
a patriotic education campaign in Lhasa-area monasteries and 
nunneries in April 2005. Expressions of resentment by Tibetan 
monks and nuns against the continuing campaign resulted in 
detentions, expulsions, and an apparent suicide. Chinese 
officials continue to hold Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy the 
Dalai Lama recognized as the Panchen Lama in May 1995, in 
incommunicado custody along with his parents.
    Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns constituted 21 of the 24 
known political detentions of Tibetans by Chinese authorities 
in 2005, compared to 8 of the 15 such known detentions in 2004, 
based on data available in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database. None of the known detentions of monks and nuns in 
2005 took place in Sichuan province, a shift from the previous 
three years, but known detentions of monks and nuns in Qinghai 
and Gansu provinces increased during the same period. Based on 
data available for 50 currently imprisoned Tibetan monks and 
nuns, their average sentence length is approximately nine years 
and six months. In one positive development, the government 
permitted the resumption of a centuries-old Tibetan Buddhist 
tradition of advanced study that leads to the highest level of 
scholarly attainment in the Gelug tradition.
    Government repression of unregistered Catholic clerics 
increased in the past year. Based on NGO reports, officials in 
Hebei and Zhejiang provinces detained a total of 38 
unregistered clerics in 13 incidents in the last year, while in 
the previous year officials detained 11 clerics in 5 incidents. 
The government targets Catholic bishops who lead large 
unregistered communities for the most severe punishment. Bishop 
Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop of Zhengding diocese in 
Hebei province, has spent most of the past year in detention. 
Bishop Jia has been detained at least eight times since 2004.
    Government harassment and abuse of registered Catholic 
clerics also increased in the past year. In November and 
December 2005, three incidents were reported in which officials 
or unidentified 
assailants beat registered Catholic nuns or priests after they 
demanded the return of church property. In April and May 2006, 
officials began a campaign to increase control over registered 
Catholic bishops. Officials detained, sequestered, threatened, 
or exerted pressure on dozens of registered Catholic clerics to 
coerce them into participating in the consecration of bishops 
selected by the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association 
but not approved by the Holy See. Government authorities also 
restricted contact between registered clergy and the Holy See, 
denying bishops permission to travel to Rome in September 2005 
to participate in a meeting of Catholic bishops. Authorities 
continued to permit some registered priests and nuns to study 
abroad.
    The Chinese government also strictly controls the practice 
of Islam. Muslims face the same rigorous registration 
requirements as other religious groups. The state-controlled 
Islamic Association of China aligns Islamic practice to Party 
goals by directing the training and confirmation of religious 
leaders, the publication of religious materials, the content of 
sermons, and the organization of Hajj pilgrimages, as well as 
by indoctrinating religious leaders and adherents in Party 
ideology and government policy.
    The government severely represses Islamic practice in the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), especially among the 
Uighur ethnic group. Local regulations in the XUAR impose 
restrictions on religion that are not found in other parts of 
China. The government's religious repression in the XUAR is 
part of a broader policy aimed at diluting expressions of 
Uighur identity and tightening government control in the 
region. The government continues to imprison Uighurs who engage 
in peaceful expressions of dissent and other non-violent 
activities. Writer Nurmemet Yasin and historian Tohti Tunyaz 
remain in prison for writing a short story and conducting 
research on the XUAR.
    The Chinese government continues to repress Chinese 
Protestants who worship in house churches. From May 2005 to May 
2006, the government detained nearly 2,000 house church 
members, according to one U.S. NGO. Almost 50 percent of the 
reported detentions of Protestant house church members and 
leaders took place in Henan province, where the house church 
movement is particularly strong. In June 2006, Pastor Zhang 
Rongliang, the leader of one of China's largest house churches, 
was sentenced to seven years and six months in prison for 
``illegally crossing the national border'' and ``fraudulently 
obtaining a passport.'' Authorities have detained or imprisoned 
Pastor Zhang multiple times since 1976. Pastor Gong Shengliang 
is serving a life sentence in declining health, and was beaten 
in prison during the past year.
    The Chinese government continues to maintain strict control 
over the registered Protestant church. The RRA requires that 
all Protestants worship at registered churches, regardless of 
their differences in doctrine and liturgy. The state-controlled 
Three-Self Patriotic Movement, which leads the registered 
Protestant church in China, continues to impose a Party-defined 
theology, called ``theological construction,'' on registered 
seminaries that is intended to ``weaken those aspects within 
Christian faith that do not conform with the socialist 
society.'' In the past year, authorities detained a registered 
Protestant pastor in Henan province for conducting a Bible 
study meeting at a registered Protestant church outside his 
designated geographic area.
    The Chinese government continues to disrupt the 
relationships that many house churches maintain with co-
religionists outside China, including raiding meetings between 
house church leaders and overseas Protestants, and preventing 
foreign travel by house church leaders. The Chinese government 
also continues to restrict and monitor the ties between the 
registered Protestant Church and foreign denominations.
    Government persecution of the Falun Gong spiritual movement 
continued during the past year. Authorities use both criminal 
and administrative punishments to punish Falun Gong 
practitioners for peacefully exercising their spiritual 
beliefs. The state-controlled press has reported on at least 
149 cases of Falun Gong practitioners currently in prison, but 
Falun Gong sources estimate that up to 100,000 practitioners 
have been detained since 1999. Manfred Nowak, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, reported after his November 2005 visit 
to China that Falun Gong practitioners account for two-thirds 
of victims of alleged torture by Chinese law enforcement 
officers. Tsinghua University student Wang Xin was sentenced to 
nine years' imprisonment in 2001 for downloading Falun Gong 
materials from the Internet and printing leaflets.
    Despite strict government controls on the practice of 
religion, Chinese authorities accommodate the social programs 
of Buddhist, Catholic, Daoist, Muslim, and Protestant 
communities when these programs support Party goals. For 
example, domestic Muslim civil society organizations carry out 
social welfare projects, and international Muslim charities 
have supported projects in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, as well 
as in the XUAR. The Amity Foundation, affiliated with the 
registered Protestant Church, sponsors projects in social 
services and development aid, including education, health care, 
and care for the elderly.
    The Chinese Constitution and national laws provide that men 
and women should enjoy equal rights and list protections for 
the economic and social rights of women, but vague language and 
inadequate implementation hinder the effectiveness of these 
legal protections. Some provincial and municipal governments 
have passed regulations to strengthen the implementation of 
national laws. A 2005 amendment to the Law on the Protection of 
Rights and Interests of Women prohibits sexual harassment and 
domestic violence, promotes a greater voice for women in the 
government, and charges several government organizations with 
responsibility for preventing human trafficking and 
rehabilitating victims.
    Civil society groups in China advocate on behalf of women's 
rights within the confines of government and Party policy. The 
All-China Women's Federation, a Party-led mass organization, 
works with the Chinese government to support women's rights, 
implement programs for disadvantaged women, and provide a 
limited measure of legal counseling and training for women. 
Women, 
however, have limited earning power compared to men, despite 
government policies that guarantee women non-discrimination in 
employment and occupation.
    The Chinese government strictly controls the reproductive 
lives of Chinese women. Since the early 1980s, the government's 
population planning policy has limited most women in urban 
areas to bearing one child, while permitting many women in 
rural China to bear a second child if their first child is 
female. Officials have coerced compliance with the policy 
through a system marked by pervasive propaganda, mandatory 
monitoring of women's reproductive cycles, mandatory 
contraception, mandatory birth permits, coercive fines for 
failure to comply, and, in some cases, forced sterilization and 
abortion. The Chinese government's population planning laws and 
regulations contravene international human rights standards by 
limiting the number of children that women may bear, by 
coercing compliance with population targets through heavy 
fines, and by discriminating against ``out-of-plan'' children. 
Local officials have violated Chinese law by punishing 
citizens, such as legal advocate Chen Guangcheng, who have 
drawn attention to population planning abuses by government 
officials.
    Human trafficking remains pervasive in China despite 
efforts by government agencies to combat trafficking, a 
framework of domestic laws to address the problem, and ongoing 
cooperation with international anti-trafficking programs. The 
government's population planning policy has created a severe 
imbalance in the male-female birth ratio, and this imbalance 
exacerbates trafficking of women and girls for sale as brides. 
Between 10,000 and 20,000 men, women, and children are victims 
of trafficking within China each year, and NGOs estimate that 
90 percent of those victims are women and children trafficked 
for sexual exploitation. Authorities are working with the 
International Labor Organization to build anti-trafficking 
capacity and raise domestic awareness of the problem.
    The Chinese government acknowledges the severity of China's 
environmental problems and has taken steps to curb pollution 
and environmental degradation. Since 2001, it has formulated or 
revised environmental protection laws, administrative 
regulations, and standards, and has worked to strengthen 
enforcement of anti-pollution rules. The Chinese government has 
also welcomed international technical assistance to combat 
environmental degradation, and has increased cooperation with 
the U.S. government on environmental protection over the past 
year.
    Despite these initiatives, local enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations is poor, and under funding 
of environmental protection activities continues to hinder 
official efforts to prevent environmental degradation. A lack 
of transparency hampers the Chinese government's ability to 
respond to civil emergencies, including environmental 
disasters. Government efforts to impose greater control over 
environmental civil society groups during the past year have 
stifled citizen activism.
    The central government strengthened its commitment during 
the past year to address the severe shortage of affordable 
health care in rural China. Since the collapse of the rural 
public health infrastructure in the 1980s, the disparity in the 
availability and affordability of health care between urban and 
rural areas has increased. As a result, the medical needs of 
China's rural poor, including the diagnosis and treatment of 
infectious diseases, often go unaddressed. The government, 
however, has pledged to accelerate the establishment of rural 
health cooperatives and invest more than 20 billion yuan 
(US$2.5 billion) over the next five years to modernize 
hospitals, clinics, and medical equipment at the village, 
township, and county levels.
    The central government continued to take steps over the 
past year to prevent and control the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
Although the estimated number of HIV/AIDS cases nationwide has 
decreased, health officials still consider the disease to be a 
grave problem. Government efforts to prevent and control the 
transmission of HIV/AIDS continue to face serious challenges, 
as local implementation of national policy lags far behind 
central government attention to the problem. Victims of HIV/
AIDS and other infectious diseases also continue to face 
harassment and discrimination, despite legal protections.
    Chinese public health officials have shown increased 
commitment and responsiveness in their efforts to prevent and 
control the spread of avian flu, and have taken steps to 
improve government transparency following the mishandling of 
the SARS epidemic in 2003. International health experts, 
however, still consider China to be among the most likely 
incubators of a potential human influenza pandemic. Central 
government cooperation in sharing information and virus samples 
with international health organizations has been inconsistent, 
and international health organizations and central government 
officials continue to express concern about the speed and 
accuracy of local reporting on outbreaks among both humans and 
poultry.
    Since its implementation in the 1950s, the Chinese 
household registration (hukou) system has limited the rights of 
ordinary Chinese citizens to choose their permanent place of 
residence, receive equal access to social services, and enjoy 
equal protection of the law. Economic changes and relaxation of 
some hukou controls have eroded previously strict limits on 
citizens' freedom of movement, but these changes have also 
exported a discriminatory urban-rural social division to 
China's cities. Migrants who lack a local hukou for their new 
city of residence face legal discrimination in employment, 
education, and social services.
    Chinese leaders called for reforms to the hukou system 
during the past year. Central government interest in reform 
stems not only from concern over migrant rights and economic 
inequality, but also from concern over growing social 
instability and a desire for stronger government control over 
China's internal migrant population. New national goals for 
hukou reform, like similar proposals implemented periodically 
since the late 1990s, call for streamlined hukou categories, 
elimination of discriminatory regulations on employment, and 
improved migrant access to social services. Local governments 
and urban residents have resisted reforms to the hukou system 
because of the potential budgetary impact, fears of increasing 
population pressure in cities, and discriminatory attitudes 
toward migrants. Local opposition has limited the ability of 
central government authorities to achieve national reform 
goals.
    The number of civil society organizations in China is 
growing, with many organizations undertaking projects such as 
poverty alleviation, faith-based social work, and legal efforts 
to protect citizen rights. These organizations include national 
mass organizations that the Party created and funds, smaller 
citizen associations 
registered under national regulations, and loose networks of 
unregistered grassroots organizations. In February 2006, the 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation selected six groups as 
the first civil society organizations to receive Chinese 
government funding to run experimental anti-poverty programs, 
including the China office of a U.S.-based rural development 
organization.
    Central authorities seek to maintain control over civil 
society groups, halt the emergence of independent 
organizations, and prevent what they have called the 
``Westernization'' of China. While recognizing the utility of 
civil society organizations to address social problems, Chinese 
authorities use strict regulations to limit the growth of an 
independent civil society. Some Chinese citizens who attempt to 
organize groups outside of state control have been imprisoned. 
These include individuals who have attempted to establish 
independent labor unions and political associations, such as 
China Free Trade Union Preparatory Committee member Hu Shigen, 
and China Democracy Party member Qin Yongmin; or young 
intellectuals who organize informal discussion groups, such as 
New Youth Study Group members Jin Haike, Xu Wei, Yang Zili, and 
Zhang Honghai.
    Chinese officials have taken additional steps to curtail 
civil society organizations in the past year, but authorities 
are undecided on how to proceed. Since early 2005, Ministry of 
Civil Affairs (MOCA) officials have been researching a new 
administrative system to monitor and control civil society 
organizations. Many details of the new system are undetermined, 
such as who will conduct the required evaluations of civil 
society groups, how the evaluation results will be used, and 
who will fund the evaluations. At the same time, Chinese 
authorities have supported limited reforms to the status of 
civil society organizations. MOCA officials are advocating 
changes to the tax code to encourage private donations to civil 
society organizations. Central Party officials have expressed 
support for the creation of rural farmer cooperatives in annual 
policy guidelines issued each year since 2004.
    International human rights standards require effective 
remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Despite 
these guarantees, Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in 
seeking remedies to government actions that violate their legal 
rights and constitutionally protected freedoms. External 
government and Party controls continue to limit the 
independence of the Chinese judiciary. Party officials control 
the selection of top judicial personnel in all courts, 
including the Supreme People's Court, China's highest judicial 
authority. Since 2005, the government has restricted the 
efforts of private lawyers and human rights defenders who 
challenge government abuses. The All China Lawyers Association 
issued a guiding opinion that restricts the ability of lawyers 
to handle cases involving large groups of people. Local Chinese 
authorities have imposed additional restrictions on lawyer 
advocacy efforts.
    The constitutional and administrative mechanisms in Chinese 
law that allow citizens to challenge government actions do not 
provide effective legal remedies, and Chinese citizens seldom 
use them. Chinese citizens rarely submit proposals to the 
National People's Congress for constitutional and legal review 
because the review process lacks transparency and citizens 
cannot compel review. Administrative court challenges to 
government actions have not increased since 1998. Provincial 
authorities report an overall decline between 2003 and 2005 in 
applications for administrative reconsideration, and the total 
numbers of such applications in major Chinese municipalities is 
a few hundred per year.
    Chinese law also permits citizens to petition government 
officials directly to redress their grievances through the 
``letters and visits'' (xinfang) system. Official news media 
report that Chinese citizens presented 12.7 million petitions 
to county-level and higher xinfang bureaus during 2005, in 
contrast to the 8 million total court cases handled by the 
Chinese judiciary during the same period. Local officials are 
disciplined more severely for high incidences of petitioning. 
Absent alternative political or legal channels to check the 
power of local officials and obtain redress, this punishment 
structure provides an incentive for Chinese citizens to take 
their grievances to the streets in order to force local 
officials to act. But this punishment structure also gives 
local authorities an interest in suppressing mass petitions and 
preventing petitioners from approaching higher authorities. A 
December 2005 study of the xinfang system by a U.S. NGO found 
that some local authorities have resorted to ``rampant violence 
and intimidation'' to abduct or detain petitioners in Beijing 
and force them to return home.
    The Supreme People's Court 2004-2008 court reform program 
imposes stronger external and internal controls that may 
further weaken the independence of courts and judges. The court 
reform program, however, also sets some positive long-term 
goals for judicial reform in the areas of court financing, 
adjudication, retrial procedures, and juvenile justice. Party 
efforts to address growing 
social unrest have resulted in new government programs to 
strengthen institutions that assist citizens with legal claims 
and disputes. Official Chinese statistics show that the number 
of government legal aid centers rose from 2,774 in 2003 to 
3,081 in 2005. The total number of cases handled by these 
centers rose from about 166,000 in 2003 to an estimated 250,000 
in 2005, or roughly 3 percent of all cases handled by the 
Chinese courts in 2005.
    In 2005, the Dalai Lama increased his efforts to explain 
that he does not seek Tibetan independence from China. The 
Dalai Lama's envoys traveled to China for a fifth round of 
dialogue with Chinese officials in February 2006, relaying a 
request to Chinese leaders to permit the Dalai Lama to visit 
China as a religious pilgrim. Tibetans could benefit from full 
implementation of the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, but the 
lack of local self-government in Tibetan autonomous areas of 
China creates mistrust in the dialogue and demonstrates that 
authorities are not implementing this law.
    The Chinese government favors accelerating implementation 
of development initiatives, especially the Great Western 
Development program, that already erode Tibetan culture and 
heritage. The Qinghai-Tibet railway began passenger service in 
July 2006, increasing Tibetan concerns about the railway's 
potential effects on Tibetan culture and the environment. 
Education levels among Tibetans are much lower than those of 
ethnic Han Chinese, undermining the ability of Tibetans to 
compete for employment and other economic advantages in an 
emerging market economy that attracts an increasing number of 
Han.
    The Chinese government strictly limits the rights of 
Tibetans to exercise the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms 
of religion, speech, and assembly. Communist Party political 
campaigns promote atheism and strengthen government efforts to 
discourage 
Tibetan aspirations to foster their unique culture and 
religion. Chinese authorities have punished Tibetans, such as 
Jigme Gyatso, a former monk imprisoned in 1996 who is serving a 
17-year sentence and Choeying Khedrub, a monk serving a life 
sentence since 2000, for peaceful expressions and non-violent 
actions that officials believe could undermine Party rule. The 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database listed 103 known cases 
of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment as of 
August 2006, a figure that is likely to be lower than the 
actual number of Tibetan political prisoners. Based on sentence 
information available for 70 of the current prisoners, the 
average sentence is approximately 10 years and 11 months.
    The Chinese government forcibly repatriates North Korean 
refugees facing starvation and political and religious 
persecution in their homeland, contravening its obligations 
under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol. Chinese authorities detained and 
returned to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
thousands of North Koreans in 2005. The government classifies 
all North Koreans who enter China without documents as illegal 
economic migrants and claims it must return them to the DPRK, 
even though North Korean defectors meet the definition of 
refugees under international law. Repatriated North Koreans 
face long prison sentences, torture, and execution.
    Without legal status, North Korean refugees in China are 
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. There are an estimated 
20,000 to 50,000 North Koreans currently hiding in northeastern 
China, and some NGOs estimate that the number of refugees is 
much higher. The government refuses the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) access to North Korean refugees, and fines 
and imprisons humanitarian workers who assist North Koreans in 
China. 
Officials in Beijing met with UNHCR Antonio Guterres in March 
2006 during the first UNHCR visit to China since 1997. In July 
2006, the Chinese government for the first time allowed three 
North Korean refugees to travel directly from the U.S. 
Consulate in Shenyang, Liaoning province, to the United States 
to seek asylum.
    The people of Hong Kong continue to enjoy the benefits of 
an independent judiciary and an open society in which the 
freedoms of religion, speech, and assembly are respected. The 
Commission strongly supports the provisions of the Basic Law 
that provide for the election of the chief executive and the 
entire Legislative Council through universal suffrage, and 
highlights the importance of the central government's 
obligation to give Hong Kong the ``high degree of autonomy'' 
promised in the Basic Law. The Commission notes, however, that 
during the past year, no steps were taken that would move Hong 
Kong closer to the ``ultimate aim'' of universal suffrage as 
specified in the Basic Law.
    The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's 
Constitutional Development Task Force issued its fifth report 
in October 2005, which proposed modest measures to expand 
citizen participation in selecting the chief executive in 2007 
and forming the Legislative Council in 2008. A vigorous public 
debate on the merits of the Task Force proposals, and their 
lack of a timetable for universal suffrage, culminated in a 
December 2005 march by tens of thousands to protest the slow 
pace of democratization. Twenty-four Legislative Council 
members voted against the report in late December, blocking its 
passage. A last-minute package of adjustments offered by the 
government did not meet the lawmakers' demand for a specific 
timetable to realize universal suffrage.
    The Chinese government has made progress in bringing its 
laws and regulations into compliance with its World Trade 
Organization (WTO) commitments. Although significant flaws 
remain, the new body of commercial laws has improved the 
business climate for foreign companies in China. With new, more 
transparent rules, the Chinese trade bureaucracy has reduced 
regulatory and licensing delays in many sectors. The Chinese 
commercial regulatory regime remains, however, largely opaque 
to both domestic and foreign businesses. When China joined the 
WTO in December 2001, the government committed to establishing 
an official journal that would publish drafts of trade-related 
measures for notice and comment, and to publish trade-related 
measures no later than 90 days after they become effective. 
Although the government has acted to improve transparency, some 
central government agencies and many local governments are not 
consistent in publishing trade-
related measures in the official journal.
    The Chinese government tolerates intellectual property 
rights (IPR) infringement rates that are among the highest in 
the world. The Chinese government has not introduced criminal 
penalties sufficient to deter IPR infringement, and steps taken 
by Chinese government agencies to improve the protection of 
foreign intellectual property have not produced any significant 
decrease in infringement activity. The Chinese government's 
failure to provide effective criminal enforcement of IPR has 
led foreign companies to turn to civil litigation to obtain 
monetary damages or injunctive relief. Civil litigants continue 
to find, however, that most judges lack the necessary training 
and experience to handle IPR cases, and damage awards are too 
low to be an effective deterrent.
    Since acceding to the WTO, the Chinese government has used 
technical, regulatory, and industrial policies, some of which 
appear to conflict with its WTO commitments, to discriminate 
against foreign producers and investors and limit their access 
to the domestic market. U.S. rights holders and industry groups 
have complained that the government's censorship regime serves 
as a barrier to entry and encourages IPR violations. In 2005, 
the American Chamber of Commerce in China wrote that censorship 
clearance procedures severely restrict the ability to 
distribute CD, VCD, and DVD products in China and provide an 
``unfair and unnecessary advantage to pirate producers who 
bring their products to market long before legitimate copies 
are available for sale.''

                      III. List of Recommendations

    The Commission is working to implement the recommendations 
made in its 2002-2005 Annual Reports. Based on the information 
presented in this report and the Commission's belief that the 
United States must continue to pursue a dual policy of high-
level advocacy on human rights issues and support for legal 
reform efforts, the Commission makes the following additional 
recommendations to the President and the Congress for 2006:
Human Rights for China's Citizens
        &lt;bullet&gt; The UN Human Rights Council held its first 
        session from June 19 to June 30 in Geneva. As a 
        responsible member of the international community and 
        one of the 47 members of the new Council, China must 
        abide by the international norms of behavior 
        articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
        Rights and international covenants, and submit to peer 
        review of its human rights record. The President and 
        the Congress should continue to urge the Chinese 
        government to ratify the International Covenant on 
        Civil and Political Rights, and to adopt such 
        legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
        give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. 
        The President and the Congress should also encourage 
        the Council to fight human rights abuses and to speak 
        on behalf of Chinese prisoners of conscience who have 
        had their voices silenced, including: democracy and 
        labor activist Hu Shigen (imprisoned for helping to 
        establish an independent political party and trade 
        union), members Jin Haike, Xu Wei, Yang Zili, and Zhang 
        Honghai of the New Youth Study Group (imprisoned for 
        participating in a university discussion group), former 
        monk Jigme Gyatso (imprisoned for printing leaflets and 
        distributing posters), Uighur publisher Korash Huseyin 
        (imprisoned for publishing a short story), Uighur 
        writer Nurmemet Yasin (imprisoned for writing a short 
        story), democracy activist Qin Yongmin (imprisoned for 
        serving as a China Democracy Party spokesman), poet and 
        journalist Shi Tao (imprisoned for investigative 
        journalism), Uighur historian Tohti Tunyaz (imprisoned 
        for historical research), U.S. permanent resident and 
        democracy activist Yang Jianli (whose detention was 
        found to be arbitrary by the UN Working Group on 
        Arbitrary Detention), freelance writer Yang Tianshui 
        (imprisoned for writing articles critical of 
        authoritarian rule), labor rights activist Yao Fuxin 
        (imprisoned for rallying workers to seek back wages), 
        and New York Times researcher Zhao Yan (imprisoned for 
        investigative journalism).
        &lt;bullet&gt; China's leaders say they are committed to 
        building a fair and just society based on the rule of 
        law, and, in an effort to control social unrest, have 
        moved toward strengthening government institutions that 
        assist citizens with legal claims. Over the past year, 
        however, prominent Chinese criminal and civil rights 
        defense lawyers who have worked to advance the 
        development of the rule of law under the rubric of 
        ``rights defenders'' have met with government 
        intimidation, harassment, and imprisonment. The 
        President and the Congress should continue to discuss 
        with China's leaders the importance of an effective, 
        robust, and transparent legal defense in protecting 
        civil and political rights, and recall the 1998 UN 
        General Assembly declaration calling for the protection 
        of human rights defenders worldwide. The President and 
        the Congress should also continue to emphasize that 
        continued detention and imprisonment of rights 
        defenders such as Chen Guangcheng (sentenced in August 
        for speaking out against population planning abuses) 
        will only undermine the legitimacy of government 
        actions and of China's developing legal system. A full 
        commitment to the rule of law will also require the 
        Chinese government to cease its harassment, 
        surveillance, and abuse of citizens such as legal 
        advocates Guo Feixiong and Zhao Xin, who have suffered 
        repeated violence for working peacefully to defend 
        citizen rights, and to allow courageous lawyers such as 
        Gao Zhisheng and Zheng Enchong to resume their 
        important legal advocacy.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The future of Tibetans and their religion, 
        language, and culture depends on fair and equitable 
        decisions about future policies that can only be 
        achieved through dialogue. The Dalai Lama is essential 
        to this dialogue. To help the parties build on dialogue 
        held during visits by the Dalai Lama's representatives 
        each year since 2002, the President and the Congress 
        should continue to urge the Chinese government to 
        invite the Dalai Lama to visit China, so that he can 
        see for himself the changes and developments in China, 
        and so that he can seek to build trust through direct 
        contact with the Chinese leadership.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Rapid economic development without effective 
        environmental safeguards has resulted in severe 
        environmental degradation throughout China, poor air 
        and water quality in many areas, and increased risk of 
        disease. The Chinese government has acknowledged the 
        severity of China's environmental problems and has 
        taken steps to curb pollution. The United States and 
        China share a common interest in protecting the 
        environment, and the Chinese government has welcomed 
        international technical assistance to combat 
        environmental degradation. The President and the 
        Congress should discuss with China's leaders the 
        importance of citizen activism in protecting the 
        environment and in challenging governments to provide 
        clean air and drinking water. The President and the 
        Congress should also provide funding to support the 
        full range of activities envisioned in new Sino-U.S. 
        bilateral and international efforts to protect the 
        environment like the Joint Committee on Environmental 
        Cooperation and the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
        Development and Climate.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to apply 
        vague criminal and administrative provisions to justify 
        detentions based on an individual's political opinions 
        or membership in religious, ethnic, or social groups. 
        These provisions allow for the targeting and punishment 
        of activists for crimes that ``endanger state 
        security'' or ``disturb public order'' under the 
        Criminal Law. They also allow for administrative 
        detention for ``minor crimes'' in centers where 
        prisoners can be subjected to forced labor without 
        judicial review and the procedural protections 
        guaranteed by the Constitution and Criminal Procedure 
        Law. The President and the Congress should raise these 
        issues in discussions with UN oversight agencies and 
        the Chinese government, and recommend that the Criminal 
        Law be amended to define these crimes in precise terms, 
        and to create exceptions for the peaceful exercise of 
        fundamental rights guaranteed under the Chinese 
        Constitution and international declarations and 
        treaties. The President and the Congress should also 
        recommend that the administrative detention system be 
        reformed to conform to international law, including the 
        abolition of forced labor practices. Reforms should 
        ensure that Chinese citizens have the opportunity to 
        dispute any alleged misconduct and contest law 
        enforcement accusations of guilt before an independent 
        adjudicatory body.
Freedom for Religious Believers in China
        &lt;bullet&gt; Freedom of religion is a fundamental human 
        right. The freedom to believe and to practice one's 
        religion includes the right of religious adherents to 
        interact freely with their co-religionists abroad, and 
        to choose where they worship, who will teach them, the 
        texts they study, and whom they accept as their 
        leaders. The President and the Congress should continue 
        to foster the development of freedom of religion in 
        China by encouraging the Chinese government to 
        recognize that this freedom includes the right of 
        Tibetan Buddhists to freely express their religious 
        devotion to the Dalai Lama, of Chinese Catholics to 
        worship with bishops selected by the Holy See, of 
        Muslims to participate in religious pilgrimages without 
        government interference, of Protestants to worship in 
        house churches, and of adherents of spiritual belief 
        systems, like Falun Gong, to freely practice their 
        beliefs. In addition, the President and the Congress 
        should continue to encourage the Chinese government to 
        end the harassment, detention, and abuse of leaders and 
        members of unregistered religious organizations; raise 
        cases of religious imprisonment with the Chinese 
        government; and call for the immediate release of 
        religious prisoners of conscience, including house 
        church pastor Cai Zhuohua (imprisoned for printing and 
        giving away Bibles), Tibetan monk Choeying Khedrub 
        (sentenced to life imprisonment for printing leaflets), 
        South China Church leader Gong Shengliang (sentenced to 
        life imprisonment based on tortured confessions), 
        Catholic bishop Jia Zhiguo (detained for unauthorized 
        Catholic ministry), Catholic bishop Su Zhimin (held 
        incommunicado since 1997), and Tsinghua University 
        student and Falun Gong practitioner Wang Xin 
        (imprisoned for downloading Internet materials). The 
        President and the Congress should also continue to urge 
        the Chinese government to allow the UN Special 
        Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to visit China 
        without conditions, as the Chinese government has 
        committed to the U.S. government and to the Special 
        Rapporteur.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese central government policy, and some 
        local regulations, only recognize five government-
        defined religions. This restriction is neither 
        contained in national law nor in China's new Regulation 
        on Religious Affairs. In some parts of China, 
        Protestant communities that are not affiliated with the 
        state-controlled patriotic religious association have 
        been allowed to register with the government. Although 
        the government does not recognize Orthodox Christianity 
        as a religion, some Orthodox communities in China have 
        registered with a local government. These are welcome 
        developments, but they have been limited in scope. The 
        President and the Congress should continue to encourage 
        the Chinese government to eliminate its policy 
        restrictions on religion and to guarantee citizens 
        freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief in 
        accordance with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
        of Human Rights; to allow all religious and spiritual 
        groups to form independent organizations and practice 
        their faith free from interference by the government 
        and state-controlled religious associations; to remove 
        registration requirements or amend them so that the 
        government does not have the discretion to deny 
        registration to certain groups; and to provide 
        protections for individuals who choose to worship 
        outside the framework of organized 
        religion.
Labor Rights for China's Workers
        &lt;bullet&gt; Working conditions in China remain poor, and 
        Chinese workers are often unaware of the national laws 
        that protect their rights. The U.S. Department of Labor 
        has been working with the Chinese Ministry of Labor and 
        Social Security and the State Administration of Work 
        Safety to implement activities that focus on such labor 
        issues as occupational and mine safety and health, wage 
        and hour law administration, and education for Chinese 
        workers about national labor laws. The President and 
        the Congress should support expansion of these 
        cooperative activities to improve labor conditions for 
        Chinese workers. The President and the Congress should 
        also raise with Chinese leaders the critical role that 
        independent unions can play in achieving safer 
        workplaces, pressing factory owners to pay workers 
        fully and on time, and reducing accidents and 
        countering official corruption in the mining sector.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Human trafficking is a serious problem in 
        China. The government is cooperating with the 
        International Labor Organization's (ILO) Special Action 
        Program to Combat Forced Labor to strengthen the law 
        enforcement aspects of the trafficking cycle, but 
        government institutions lack the knowledge and capacity 
        to combat these practices effectively. China's Criminal 
        Law does not specifically address the issue of human 
        trafficking as it relates to forced labor, and although 
        the Labor Law outlaws forced labor practices in the 
        workplace, it only provides light penalties for 
        violators. The President should continue to support, 
        and the Congress should continue to fund, U.S. 
        assistance to the ILO's cooperative programs with China 
        on forced labor and trafficking; should urge the 
        Chinese government to ratify the two protocols to the 
        UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
        concerning trafficking in persons and smuggling of 
        migrants; and should encourage bilateral discussions on 
        ways that government agencies, domestic law, and 
        employers and business groups can deter human 
        trafficking more 
        effectively.
Free Flow of Information for China's Citizens
        &lt;bullet&gt; The National People's Congress is considering 
        a draft ``Law on the Handling of Sudden Incidents'' 
        that, in its current form, restricts domestic and 
        foreign news media reporting on natural and man-made 
        disasters. If passed, this law would not only impose a 
        prior restraint on the press that is inconsistent with 
        international human rights standards, but also impede 
        the efficiency of the Global Public Health Intelligence 
        Network, an electronic surveillance system used by the 
        World Health Organization to monitor the Internet for 
        reports of communicable diseases and communicable 
        disease syndromes. The President and the Congress 
        should continue to raise with China's leaders the 
        global nature of public health emergencies, the 
        importance of complete transparency in the 
        administration of public health, and the importance of 
        an unimpeded press in monitoring government performance 
        on public health and providing critical information to 
        the public in a timely manner.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government uses technology, prior 
        restraints, intimidation, detention, imprisonment, and 
        vague and arbitrarily applied censorship regulations to 
        suppress free expression and control the news media. 
        Because the government 
        restricts the free flow of information, many Chinese 
        citizens are unaware that official censorship policies 
        violate their rights to freedom of speech and freedom 
        of the press. The President and the Congress should 
        urge the Chinese government to eliminate prior 
        restraints on publishing, cease detaining journalists 
        and writers, stop blocking foreign news broadcasts and 
        Web sites, and specify precisely what kind of political 
        content is illegal to publish. The President should 
        propose, and the Congress should appropriate, funds to 
        support U.S. programs to develop technologies that 
        would help Chinese citizens access Internet-based 
        information currently unavailable to them, as well as 
        educational materials about their rights under 
        international law to freedom of speech and freedom of 
        the press.
Rule of Law and the Development of Civil Society
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese officials have taken additional steps 
        in the past year to curb the growth of China's emerging 
        civil society. Ministry of Civil Affairs officials are 
        currently researching a new administrative system to 
        supervise, control, and ``rate'' civil society 
        organizations. Many details of the plan, such as who 
        will conduct the evaluations and how the results will 
        be used, are not yet determined. The President and the 
        Congress should encourage bilateral discussion on the 
        issue of official control over civil society 
        organizations; reiterate statements made by Chinese 
        officials and scholars regarding the important role 
        independent civil society organizations can play in 
        resolving 
        conflict, protecting citizen rights, and maintaining 
        social stability; and encourage the Chinese government 
        to take steps that would promote the development of an 
        independent civil society, such as removing the sponsor 
        organization requirement.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government forcibly repatriates 
        North Koreans seeking refuge in China and denies the 
        Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
        access to this vulnerable population, contravening its 
        obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the 
        Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, as well as 
        the Chinese government's 1995 Agreement with the UN. 
        The State Council is currently considering new 
        Regulations on the Administration of Refugees. These 
        regulations could provide new protections for the 
        vulnerable North Korean refugee population, but little 
        is known about their contents. The President and the 
        Congress should continue to press the Chinese 
        government to immediately cease repatriation of North 
        Korean refugees and grant the UNHCR unimpeded access to 
        screen North Korean refugee petitions. The President 
        and the Congress should also encourage the Chinese 
        government to be transparent as it progresses in 
        drafting and adopting its new regulations on refugees, 
        and to work closely with the UNHCR to ensure that this 
        legislation will protect North Korean refugees in full 
        accordance with international law.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Abuse of power by local police forces remains 
        a serious problem throughout China. The Supreme 
        People's Procuratorate has acknowledged the existence 
        of continuing and widespread abuses in law enforcement, 
        including illegal extended detentions and torture. The 
        President and the Congress should work to expand 
        programs, such as funding a permanent Resident Legal 
        Advisor at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, that will help 
        foster dialogue between Chinese and U.S. counterparts, 
        and encourage Chinese procuratorates to exercise 
        greater oversight over police abuses. These programs 
        should encourage the Chinese government to continue 
        reform efforts such as providing criminal defense 
        lawyers with greater access to their clients and case 
        files, audio and video taping law enforcement 
        interrogations of criminal suspects, and excluding 
        evidence at trial that was obtained through torture or 
        other illegal means.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Upon joining the World Trade Organization 
        (WTO), the Chinese government committed to increasing 
        regulatory transparency, improving the protection of 
        intellectual property rights, and ensuring non-
        discrimination in administering trade-related measures. 
        The government has achieved incremental improvements in 
        regulatory transparency since WTO accession, but 
        continues to tolerate rampant infringement of 
        intellectual property rights. In addition, government 
        industrial policies promote and protect many domestic 
        industries, in some cases in a manner that appears to 
        contravene China's WTO commitments. The President and 
        the Congress should continue to urge the Chinese 
        government to ensure that relevant authorities publish 
        all measures affecting trade in a timely manner; to 
        enact and impose criminal and civil penalties severe 
        enough to deter intellectual property infringement; and 
        to 
        remove all non-prudential barriers to U.S. and other 
        foreign participation in those market sectors governed 
        by WTO commitments.

    The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission, including the 
preparation of this report. The views and recommendations 
expressed in this report, however, do not necessarily reflect 
the views of individual Executive Branch members or the 
Administration.
    This report was approved by a vote of 22 to 1.&lt;dagger&gt;

                            IV. Introduction

Domestic Challenges Growing Out of Economic Restructuring
    Since the beginning of the ``reform and opening up'' period 
in 1978, Chinese government policies have raised the national 
standard of living and lifted more than 400 million citizens 
out of extreme poverty, according to Chinese and World Bank 
statistics. This is an impressive achievement. But as incomes 
have risen, so too have inequalities created by economic 
restructuring policies that have favored urban over rural 
development. In 2005, the average income of China's urban 
residents was more than three times that of rural residents, an 
increase from two and one-half times in 1978. China's ethnic 
minorities, who live primarily in rural areas, constitute less 
than 10 percent of China's population, but represent more than 
40 percent of the nation's poorest citizens. The government 
also faces a growing population of new urban poor. Millions of 
Chinese citizens who lost their jobs and pensions because of 
the collapse of state-owned enterprises have not found new 
jobs. In addition, many rural to urban migrants survive in the 
low-wage informal economy without access to public services of 
any kind.
    Chinese leaders face enormous domestic challenges. The 
government estimated that it needs to create 25 million new 
urban jobs in 2006 just to keep unemployment levels in check. 
The dual problems of urban unemployment and growing rural-urban 
inequality have created diverse and competing societal 
interests that increasingly clash, fueling social unrest 
throughout China, and complicating the government's efforts to 
find solutions. Officials reported that ``disturbances of 
public order'' rose to a total of 87,000 in 2005, a 6.6 percent 
increase over the figure in 2004. Citizen protests broke out in 
several provinces during the past year over land 
expropriations, official corruption and abuse, low wages and 
poor working conditions in factories, and environmental 
degradation. In September 2005, police clashed with hundreds of 
residents in Taishi village, Guangdong province, over citizen 
attempts to remove a local official from office for embezzling 
land compensation funds. In October, police in Chongqing 
municipality broke up one of the largest worker protests in 
China in more than a decade. In December, forces from the 
paramilitary People's Armed Police shot at thousands of 
villagers and killed as many as 20 in Shanwei city, Guangdong 
province, in response to protests against the pollution and 
displacement caused by construction of a power plant. In July 
2006, hundreds of citizens rioted in Guiyang city, Guizhou 
province, after officials beat a migrant worker lacking a 
temporary residence permit.
Rural Inequality and Social Unrest
    Concerns about mounting social unrest because of rural-
urban inequality have reached the top levels of the Chinese 
leadership. In late 2005, Premier Wen Jiabao warned senior 
rural bureaucrats that more violence would result if they 
continued to commit the ``historic mistake'' of failing to 
protect farmers and their lands. Party and government leaders 
used the first major policy document of 2006 to announce a 
campaign for ``construction of a new socialist countryside.'' 
This campaign seeks to address the growing inequalities between 
rural and urban residents and commits the central government to 
increasing services to rural areas in health, education, and 
employment. In March, Wen told the National People's Congress 
(NPC) that the central government will invest more than 20 
billion yuan (US$2.5 billion) over the next five years to 
modernize hospitals, clinics, and medical equipment at the 
village, township, and county levels. Chinese officials also 
promised to spend 218 billion yuan (US$27.25 billion) over the 
next five years to improve rural education. In January, the 
central government stopped levying agricultural and livestock 
taxes on farmers in an effort to boost rural incomes. Although 
Chinese authorities remain sensitive to farmers' efforts to 
organize collectively to protect their interests, central 
policy documents issued each year since 2004 have given a 
limited degree of support to establishing farmer cooperatives, 
and the 2006 legislative calendar for the NPC contains a 
proposal for a national law on these organizations.
    The central government has also called for increased 
protections for the rights of migrant workers as part of its 
effort to increase social stability. The Central Party 
Committee and State Council issued a joint circular on social 
stability in October 2005 calling, in part, for greater 
protections of migrant rights and the creation of a permanent 
mechanism to address worker claims for unpaid wages, a problem 
that disproportionately affects migrants. China's Communist 
Party-led labor union federation responded to the new central 
government mandate by creating programs to help migrants avoid 
abuse and exploitation by employers. In the past year, the 
labor union federation has announced new programs to assist 
migrants in signing labor contracts with employers, recovering 
unpaid wages, improving work safety, and securing legal aid and 
job training. Concerns over social unrest growing out of rural-
urban inequality also have compelled the government to consider 
reforming some of the political tools it has used to control 
society. Chinese 
authorities announced in October 2005 that they were 
considering national reforms to the Chinese household 
registration (hukou) system, and have taken steps to remove 
restrictions on migrant 
employment in urban areas.
Political and Religious Repression and Social Unrest
    The largely positive government response to social unrest 
growing out of rural inequality stands in sharp contrast to the 
government response to citizen grievances over political and 
religious repression. The Chinese government has punished 
citizens who press for change and challenge government abuses, 
in disregard of the peaceful nature of their activities and in 
contravention of international human rights standards. The same 
October joint circular that detailed positive measures to help 
migrants and the rural poor also called for stronger controls 
over society. The central government has imposed 
countermeasures to rein in the Chinese press and to exercise 
greater control over the Internet. Officials are currently 
evaluating new measures to control civil society organizations. 
Party officials have warned about foreign ``hostile forces'' 
that push for ``color revolutions'' and ``infiltrate'' the 
press, civil society, the legal profession, and the Uighur and 
Tibetan autonomous areas of China.
    In the absence of a free press, civil society, democratic 
governance, and other mechanisms to allow citizens to press for 
change, Chinese human rights defenders have used legal advocacy 
and civil disobedience to promote democracy and the development 
of the rule of law. Wang Yi, a Chinese law professor and rights 
defender, said at a May 3 Congressional Human Rights Caucus 
roundtable, ``If even the rights defense movement cannot 
succeed, then there is really no hope for China.'' In February, 
Beijing lawyer and rights defender Gao Zhisheng began a hunger 
strike relay following months of government violence against 
large numbers of Chinese citizens. The hunger strike called 
attention to the illegal persecution and violent beatings of 
many groups in China, including workers, farmers, 
intellectuals, religious believers, petitioners, activists, and 
journalists. These groups suffered from government repression 
despite having maintained a strict policy of peaceful protest 
against government abuses. In response to his citizen activism 
and peaceful defense of basic human rights, authorities 
stripped Gao Zhisheng of his ability to practice law, targeted 
him for government intimidation and harassment, and accused him 
of criminal activity.
    The Chinese government's repressive measures threaten the 
Party's goal of maintaining social stability. The failure to 
provide effective mechanisms for citizens to voice their 
grievances and protect their civil and political rights fuels 
citizen anger and ultimately unrest, the very condition that 
China's leaders are seeking to prevent. Such a result can only 
undermine China's progress. Freedom of the press, a vibrant 
civil society, and democratic governance are the primary means 
for keeping officials accountable to the citizens they serve. 
They are also the essential building blocks for any long-term 
and successful system of government.

               V. Monitoring Compliance with Human Rights

           V(a) Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; Government censorship, while not total, is 
        pervasive and highly effective, and denies Chinese 
        citizens the freedoms of speech and of the press 
        guaranteed to them in the Chinese Constitution. The 
        government has imprisoned journalists who provide news 
        to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and Ching 
        Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize 
        government policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing 
        News and Li Datong of the China Youth Daily, have been 
        dismissed. The government blocks the Web sites and 
        radio and television broadcasts of foreign news 
        organizations, such as those of the British 
        Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the 
        Voice of America. In 2005, the government banned dozens 
        of newspapers and confiscated almost one million 
        ``illegal'' political publications. Beginning in May 
        2005, the government blocked the Commission's Web site 
        from being viewed in China.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Modern telecommunications technologies such as 
        the Internet, cell phones, and satellite broadcasts 
        allow Chinese citizens access to more information 
        sources, both state-controlled and non-state-
        controlled. But government restrictions on news and 
        information media, including on these new information 
        sources, do not conform to international human rights 
        standards for freedom of expression. The Chinese 
        government imposes a strict licensing scheme on news 
        and information media that includes oversight by 
        government agencies with discretion to grant, deny, and 
        rescind licenses based on political and 
        economic criteria. The Chinese government's content-
        based restrictions include controls on political 
        opinion and religious literature that are not 
        prescribed by law, and whose primary purpose is to 
        protect the ideological and political dominance of the 
        Communist Party.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The government's restrictions on religious 
        literature do not conform to international human rights 
        standards. Only government-licensed printing 
        enterprises may print religious materials, and then 
        only with approval from both the provincial-level 
        religious affairs bureau and the press and publication 
        administration. In addition to confiscating religious 
        publications, the Chinese government also has fined, 
        detained, and imprisoned citizens for publishing, 
        printing, and distributing religious literature without 
        government permission. Cai Zhuohua, a house church 
        pastor in Beijing, and two of his family members were 
        imprisoned in 2005 for printing and giving away Bibles 
        and other Christian literature. In Anhui province, 
        house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 
        2006 on the same charges.
Government Censorship in China
    Government censorship in China, while not total, is 
pervasive and highly effective, and denies Chinese citizens the 
freedom of the press guaranteed to them in the Chinese 
Constitution.\1\ As 13 Chinese scholars, lawyers, and editors 
wrote in a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao after the 
Communist Party's Central Propaganda Department (CPD) shut down 
a popular news weekly in February 2006, the CPD ``manipulates 
and controls the range of speech, and it has become the sole 
criterion for measuring truth.'' \2\ Another group, composed of 
13 former senior government, Party, and news media officials, 
wrote in an open letter regarding the same event that the CPD 
has ``stripped away freedom of speech in order to quash public 
opinion.'' \3\
    The Chinese government has imprisoned journalists who 
provide news to foreigners, such as Zhao Yan, Shi Tao, and 
Ching Cheong. Editors of publications that criticize government 
policies, such as Yang Bin of the Beijing News and Li Datong of 
the China Youth Daily, have been dismissed. The government 
blocks the Web sites and radio and television broadcasts of 
foreign news organizations, such as those of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Asia, and the Voice of 
America. In 2005, the government banned dozens of newspapers 
and confiscated almost one million ``illegal'' political 
publications. Beginning in May 2005, the government blocked the 
Commission's Web site from being viewed in China. The heads of 
government and Party agencies responsible for enforcing China's 
media regulations emphasize press control, not press freedom:

        &lt;bullet&gt; Liu Yunshan, director of the CPD, told 
        attendees at the National Propaganda Directors Seminar 
        in August 2005 that they should increase their 
        supervision of the media, impose content controls 
        earlier in the editorial process, and coordinate the 
        application of administrative, economic, legal, 
        ideological, and other controls.\4\ In a speech to the 
        same group the previous year, Liu said that no change 
        to the role of the news media as the mouthpiece of the 
        Party, or the Party's supervision of the media, would 
        be tolerated.\5\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Long Xinmin, Director of the General 
        Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), said in 
        a speech to the National Press and Publication 
        Directors Conference in December 2005 that Party 
        leaders had ordered press and publication officials to 
        increase their administration of press and publishing. 
        Long said that the key was to strengthen the leadership 
        of the Party and establish a ``grand cadre'' of 
        ``politically strong'' press and publication 
        workers.\6\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Liu Yuzhu, head of the Ministry of Culture's 
        Market Department, wrote in the January 2005 edition of 
        Seeking Truth, the official journal of the Chinese 
        Communist Party Central Committee, that Web sites 
        located in foreign countries such as the United States 
        represent a threat to China's political structure. He 
        encouraged increased censorship of foreign Web sites 
        and called on domestic Web site operators to step up 
        their self-censorship.\7\

    Despite pervasive censorship, state control of domestic 
news media is now less severe than before the ``reform and 
opening up'' period began in the late 1970s. Modern 
telecommunications technologies such as the Internet, cell 
phones, and satellite broadcasts allow Chinese citizens access 
to more information sources, both state-controlled and non-
state-controlled. More information is also available as a 
result of a dynamic domestic newspaper and book publishing 
industry. China also has a thriving underground publishing 
industry, and citizens may easily purchase many banned books 
from unlicensed publishers and retailers.\8\ By forcing 
unlicensed publishers to break the law, however, the government 
erodes respect for intellectual property rights and the rule of 
law because illegal publishers are also de facto copyright 
violators (the illegal works are ``pirated,'' and authors 
cannot collect royalties on them) and must bribe officials to 
keep operating.
    Chinese leaders and officials maintain that citizens enjoy 
freedom of the press, and that government restrictions on that 
freedom conform to international standards.\9\ While the Party 
does not screen content before publication to the same degree 
as in the past, the government continues to impose 
administrative restrictions on who may publish and what they 
may publish (``prior restraints'') that do not conform to the 
international human rights standards set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights\10\ and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\11\ These standards 
require the elimination of registration systems for the print 
media that grant government agencies the discretion to approve, 
deny, or rescind licenses based on the political and financial 
qualifications of the applicant (``licensing schemes'').\12\ 
These standards also prohibit government restrictions on the 
publication of political and religious ideas and information, 
other than restrictions that are both prescribed by law and 
necessary to protect an important state interest (``content-
based restrictions''). As two Chinese legal scholars noted in 
their study of the ICCPR:

          This principle [that the ICCPR prohibits prior 
        restraints] requires that government power may not be 
        employed to suppress expressive activities before they 
        are carried out, and no licensing measures or 
        ideological 
        content restrictions may be imposed on speech, books, 
        periodicals, or radio or television programs prior to 
        their dissemination, publication, distribution, or 
        broadcast.\13\

    The Chinese government imposes a strict licensing scheme on 
all newspaper, magazine, and book publishing and printing 
(public and private, for-profit and non-profit). The government 
uses this licensing scheme, as well as post-publication 
punishments, to enforce content-based restrictions that include 
prohibitions on the publication of political opinion and 
religious literature. These content-based restrictions on 
political opinion and religious literature are neither 
prescribed by law nor necessary to protect a legitimate state 
interest. Government and Party leaders state that these 
restrictions are intended to protect the ideological and 
political dominance of the Party.
Government Licensing for Print Media
    Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provide that people enjoy the right to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. The Chinese government's licensing 
scheme for print media does not conform to international 
standards for freedom of the press. Although no absolute 
international standard prescribes what constitutes freedom of 
the press, international human rights standards set forth a 
minimum prerequisite: no legal system can be said to respect 
freedom of the press if it subjects the print media to any 
prior restraint through a licensing scheme. In 2003, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression issued a joint declaration saying that licensing 
schemes are unnecessary and subject to abuse.\14\ Many nations, 
both developed and developing, have abolished licensing schemes 
for the print media. For example, the constitutions of many 
countries, including those of Brazil and South Korea, 
explicitly prohibit licensing schemes.\15\ In other countries, 
such as the United States and India, the right to publish 
without first having to obtain government authorization is 
protected through a combination of constitutional and court-
made law.\16\ In those countries with registration 
requirements, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom, the 
government does not have the discretion to refuse 
registration.\17\
    The Chinese government, like a number of governments in 
other countries, including Ethiopia,\18\ Iran,\19\ Jordan,\20\ 
Syria,\21\ Uzbekistan,\22\ and Yemen,\23\ imposes a strict 
licensing scheme on the print media.\24\ No one may legally 
publish a book, newspaper, or magazine in China unless they 
have a license from the General Administration of Press and 
Publication (GAPP).\25\ Chinese law requires that every book, 
newspaper, and magazine have a unique serial number, and the 
GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these 
numbers.\26\ GAPP officials have explicitly linked the 
allotment of book numbers to the political orientation of 
publishers.\27\ The Chinese government's licensing scheme 
includes substantive conditions on who may publish. To obtain a 
license to publish news, applicants must have a government 
sponsor.\28\ Although the average annual income in China is 
less than 10,000 yuan (US$1,250),\29\ the government also 
restricts the right to publish to those who can afford to 
invest at least 300,000 yuan (US$37,500) in registered 
capital.\30\ The Chinese government says that its licensing 
scheme is necessary to regulate the publishing market,\31\ but 
such reasoning does not conform to international human rights 
standards.\32\
    Chinese authorities banned 79 newspapers and periodicals 
and seized 169 million publications in 2005.\33\ From 2003 to 
2005, the government canceled the registrations of 202 news 
bureaus and shut down 73 others.\34\ Other examples of the 
government using its licensing authority to violate citizens' 
freedom of the press in the past year include:

        &lt;bullet&gt; In August 2005, GAPP officials in Luliang 
        city, Shanxi province, banned the Luliang Weekly, shut 
        down its editorial 
        department, and dismissed its staff. Officials imposed 
        these sanctions because the weekly had been published 
        without government authorization, and ``the articles it 
        carried were mostly negative reports, which severely 
        violated relevant national regulations, and which had 
        an adverse effect on society.'' \35\
        &lt;bullet&gt; In September 2005, the Hunan provincial 
        government shut down the news bureaus of four 
        publications established without government 
        permission.\36\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Also in September 2005, the Chinese government 
        reported that no illegal political materials had been 
        published in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region city 
        of Wuhai since 2002.\37\ The report attributed the city 
        government's ``success'' in part to a rigorous training 
        regime for publishers and printers and the fact that 
        authorities had closed 12 illegal printing enterprises. 
        The report said officials conducted daily inspection 
        tours and surprise raids to stop unauthorized 
        publications from entering or leaving the city.

    In addition to these administrative measures, Chinese 
authorities have used Article 225 of the Criminal Law, which 
defines operating a publishing business without government 
permission as an illegal business activity,\38\ to fine and 
imprison publishers:

        &lt;bullet&gt; In January 2004, authorities in Anhui province 
        sentenced two men to prison terms of nine and seven 
        years for publishing collections of love poems.\39\
        &lt;bullet&gt; In September 2004, a court in Xinxiang county, 
        Henan province sentenced Wang Lelan, a farmer who had 
        purchased two printing presses, to five years' 
        imprisonment and an 8,000 yuan (US$1,000) fine for 
        publishing ``illegal books'' such as ``China's Top 
        Level'' and ``Confidential Exclusive News.'' \40\
        &lt;bullet&gt; In August 2005, a court in Beijing sentenced 
        the head of the Beijing representative office of Hong 
        Kong's Credit China International Media Group Limited 
        to three years' imprisonment for publishing the 
        magazine ``Credit China'' without government 
        authorization.\41\

     New rules governing the publication of newspapers and 
magazines in China went into effect in December 2005.\42\ In 
addition to restricting the right to publish newspapers and 
magazines to government licensees, the rules also establish 
post-publication content screening and review systems. The 
rules require provincial-level GAPP offices to submit regular 
written reports to the GAPP and conduct annual ``verification 
and examination'' reviews. The rules stipulate that publishing, 
printing, and distribution enterprises may not provide services 
to any newspaper or magazine unless they have passed the 
previous year's inspection. The rules also require each 
newspaper and magazine publisher to submit regular reports to 
the GAPP, as well as annual ``self-examination reports'' with 
copies of its most recently published editions. The rules 
require the GAPP to assess the ``publishing quality'' of 
newspapers and magazines, and empower it to take the following 
actions against any publisher whose contents it deems incorrect 
or in violation of regulations:

        &lt;bullet&gt; order it to cease publication and 
        distribution;
        &lt;bullet&gt; order it to retract entire editions;
        &lt;bullet&gt; order supervising and sponsoring government 
        agencies to ``rectify'' the publisher;
        &lt;bullet&gt; revoke its publishing license.

    The Chinese government's press licensing scheme also 
extends to the Internet. According to the state-run media:

          Since 1996, 14 agencies, including the Central 
        Propaganda Department, State Council Information 
        Office, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of 
        Culture, and the 
        General Administration of Press and Publication have 
        participated in the administration of the Internet, 
        have promulgated nearly 50 laws and regulations, and 
        have put 
        together the world's most extensive and comprehensive 
        regulatory system for Internet administration. One 
        scholar who specializes in researching Internet Law 
        [said] China's emphasis on, and effectiveness of 
        administration over, the problem of Internet security 
        is ``rare in this world.'' \43\

    The government requires all Web sites in China to be either 
licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII).\44\ Web sites that fail to register or obtain a 
license may be shut down and their operators fined.\45\ As part 
of the registration process, the MII requires anyone who posts 
news on a Web site to confirm that the Chinese government has 
authorized him or her to do so.\46\ According to the OpenNet 
Initiative, ``In large measure, the registration regulation is 
designed to induce website owners to forego potentially 
sensitive or prohibited content, such as political criticism, 
by linking their identities to that content. The regulation 
operates through a chilling effect.'' \47\ In August 2005, the 
state-controlled news media reported that over 700,000 Web 
sites had registered,\48\ and that authorities had shut down a 
``large number of Web sites,'' using ``specialized software to 
render them inaccessible.'' \49\ In December 2005, the MII 
issued a notice to Internet service providers saying, ``The 
campaign to rectify unregistered Web sites has entered a period 
of severe sanctions,'' and demanded they shut down all 
unregistered Web sites.\50\
    In September 2005, the MII and the State Council 
Information Office promulgated new rules tightening the 
government's control over Internet news services.\51\ These 
rules prohibit anyone from using the Internet to post or 
transmit news reports or commentary relating to politics and 
economics, or military, foreign, and public affairs, without a 
government license. Chinese authorities used these rules to 
shut down at least five Web sites before the annual plenary 
sessions of the National People's Congress and the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in 
March 2006.\52\
    The MII crackdown coincided with a similar crackdown on the 
Internet by branches of China's Ministry of Public Security 
(MPS) in major cities.\53\ Throughout 2005 and 2006, public 
security bureaus in cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and 
Chongqing ordered Web sites to register with public security 
authorities or be shut down. In addition, in December 2005, the 
MPS promulgated new rules\54\ requiring Internet portals, Web 
sites, Web logs (``blogs''), and hosting services to record and 
retain any content that news providers post on their Web sites, 
as well as the time it was posted.
    Finally, the Chinese government instituted a licensing 
scheme for journalists in 2005,\55\ even though such schemes 
are incompatible with international human rights standards for 
freedom of the press.\56\ In January 2005, the GAPP issued two 
new regulations limiting ``lawful'' news gathering and 
editorial activities to government-licensed journalists.\57\ In 
March 2005, the GAPP, Central Propaganda Department, and State 
Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) jointly 
issued new rules specifying that journalists and editors must 
``support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, 
support the socialist system . . ., respect the Party's news 
propaganda discipline, [and] protect the interests of the Party 
and the government.'' \58\ SARFT used its authority to accredit 
television hosts to shut down the television show of well-known 
economist Lang Xianping (also known as Larry Lang) in February 
2006 on the grounds that he lacked required government 
certification.\59\
Restrictions on Political and Religious Publishing
    The Chinese government's restrictions on the publication of 
political opinion and religious literature do not conform to 
international human rights standards for freedom of the press 
and freedom of religion. Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the same article of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
provide that people enjoy the right to publish ``information 
and ideas,'' and the ICCPR adds ``of all kinds.'' International 
human rights standards permit restrictions on the press, 
provided they are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
prevent the dissemination of speech that is obscene or 
defamatory, or that poses a realistic threat to national 
security, or that is false and threatens public order.\60\ The 
Chinese government's restrictions on the press are not clearly 
prescribed in national law. In addition, the government uses 
discretionary and extralegal powers to restrict the publication 
of information and ideas that conflict with the Party's 
political and religious orthodoxy or that threaten its control 
over political and religious ideology.
Not Prescribed by Law
    National media regulations include vague and sweeping 
prohibitions on the publication of material that ``harms the 
honor or the interests of the nation,'' \61\ ``spreads 
rumors,'' \62\ or ``harms the credibility of a government 
agency.'' \63\ The Criminal Law punishes acts said to 
constitute ``rumor mongering'' to incite subversion or the 
overthrow of the socialist system with sentences of up to five 
years' imprisonment.\64\ Nothing in Chinese law specifies what 
constitutes the ``interests of the nation,'' a ``rumor,'' or 
``harming credibility.'' Chinese laws and regulations provide 
lists of what may be deemed a state secret, but these lists are 
broad and vague, encompassing essentially all matters of public 
concern.\65\ Moreover, Chinese law does not require the 
government to show that anyone committing any of these acts 
knew that the materials they published fell into one of these 
categories.\66\ Finally, Chinese courts do not require the 
government to show that the publication of the materials in 
question caused, or could have caused, any negative effect on 
the national interest.\67\
    Government agencies responsible for implementing and 
interpreting national security do not balance government 
interests against a citizen's right to freedom of the press, 
and instead consistently interpret laws in favor of the 
government. In recent years, more than 70 percent of all cases 
of criminal disclosure of state secrets were the result of a 
``faulty understanding of state secrets.'' \68\ None of the 17 
or more central government and Party agencies responsible for 
enforcing and interpreting national security and state secrets 
laws as they relate to freedom of the press has provided any 
public guidance about when it will or will not censor 
publications or pursue criminal complaints against 
publishers.\69\ In 2004, the Chinese government shut down 338 
publications for publishing ``internal'' information.\70\ In 
addition, the Chinese judiciary is not independent from Party 
control and does not issue instructive opinions in criminal 
trials (see discussion of Huang Qi below). [For more 
information on the Chinese judiciary, see Section VII(c)--
Access to Justice.]
    The Chinese government does not articulate content-based 
restrictions in statutes and court judgments, but instead 
relies upon detaining writers, indoctrinating journalists, and 
banning publications to encourage companies, institutions, and 
individuals to ``choose'' not to publicize views that a 
government official might deem politically unacceptable.\71\ An 
example of the Chinese government's indifference to freedom of 
the press is the case of Huang Qi. The Chengdu Intermediate 
People's Court sentenced Huang to five years' imprisonment in 
May 2003 for inciting subversion by operating a Web site that 
included articles on democracy and the 1989 Tiananmen democracy 
protests. The court's decision did not provide examples of any 
subversive language, and made no attempt to show that the 
articles on the Web site had caused, or were likely to cause, a 
threat to China's national security. Moreover, the court did 
not place any constitutional limitations on the authority of 
the government to criminalize certain types of speech, or 
balance the need to protect national security with Huang Qi's 
right to freedom of expression.\72\
    Another example of the Chinese government's opaque national 
security content-based restrictions occurred in October 2003, 
when a Shanghai court sentenced Zheng Enchong to three years' 
imprisonment for ``illegally providing state secrets to an 
entity or individual outside China.'' Zheng faxed a copy of a 
Xinhua news report to a U.S. NGO to get it published 
abroad.\73\ In rejecting Zheng's appeal, the Shanghai High 
People's Court said that, while the document in question 
included no markings indicating it was a ``state secret,'' 
Zheng ``should have known'' that it was a state secret 
because it had been published in a Xinhua publication called 
``Internal Selections.'' Xinhua is a government agency that 
reports directly to the State Council, and if an article 
included information that was a state secret, Xinhua had both 
the authority and the legal obligation to have it 
classified.\74\ Instead, Xinhua officials labeled the article 
``internal,'' and according to the Shanghai High People's 
Court, officials with the local state secrets bureau had it 
``certified'' as a state secret after Zheng was detained.\75\ 
Stories from ``Internal Selections,'' however, are freely 
available on Party Web sites, including those of the Beijing 
Municipal Party Committee and the Chongqing Municipal Party 
Committee.\76\
    The case of Zhao Yan, a researcher for the New York Times, 
is a more recent example. Authorities detained Zhao in 
September 2004 for ``illegally providing state secrets to an 
entity or individual outside China.'' Sources said the ``state 
secret'' was information that former President and Party 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin had offered to resign as Chairman 
of the Central Military Commission. His resignation was later 
reported in the official press.\77\ [See Section V(b)--Rights 
of Criminal Suspects and Defendants, for a discussion of Zhao's 
arbitrary and extended detention.]
    Chinese courts cannot consider Chinese citizens' 
constitutional right to freedom of the press in subversion and 
state secrets trials [see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice--
Constitutional Review]. Some cases have been reported, however, 
in which a court found insufficient evidence to hold a trial on 
the charges brought against a defendant. Such decisions are the 
result of international pressure rather than an interest in 
upholding the rights of the accused. For example, Chinese 
authorities detained Liu Di (also known as the ``Stainless 
Steel Mouse'') in November 2002 after she posted a series of 
essays on the Internet discussing political reform and 
criticizing the Party. They released her in November 2003 
without charges following widespread international pressure.
    The Chinese government also uses indoctrination as an 
extralegal means of restricting publishing of political 
opinions and religious literature. A January 2006 General 
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) report described 
an example of press indoctrination, saying that in 2005 the 
government carried out on-the-job training of Party officials 
holding leadership positions at news publishers, and ``deeply 
and meticulously performed worker and staff ideological and 
political work'' in order to ``safeguard stability and unity.'' 
\78\ Xinhua reported in May 2006 that the government and the 
Party expect Chinese journalists to be ``politically strong'' 
and ``strictly disciplined.'' \79\ The All China Journalists 
Association held a conference in April 2006 to study and 
implement the Party's propaganda campaign on ``Socialist Glory 
and Shame.'' \80\ The state-run news media reported that 
conference participants expressed a desire to reject 
``capitalist liberalism'' and to accept ``serving the general 
work of the Party and the nation'' as the ``sacred mission'' of 
journalists.\81\ Western news media have reported that the 
Beijing Municipal Information Office, an agency that reports to 
the Central Propaganda Department, summons executives from a 
dozen Internet news Web sites every Friday morning to attend a 
meeting. Chen Hua, Director of the Internet Propaganda 
Management Department, usually runs this meeting. According to 
one Western news report, ``[Chen] or one of his colleagues 
tells the executives what news they should keep off their sites 
and what items they should highlight in the week ahead.'' \82\
    The Chinese government and the Party often carry out 
censorship through informal and opaque procedures that are not 
subject to legal oversight or restraint. For example, according 
to Wang Yi, a law professor in Sichuan province, public 
security officials in Beijing had his Web site shut down by 
calling an employee of the Chinese Internet company Blogchina 
at home and ordering him to do it.\83\
    Chinese authorities used similar extralegal measures to 
censor two of China's most popular publications. The first 
incident occurred in December 2005, when the Party removed 
editor-in-chief Yang Bin and two deputy editors at the Beijing 
News, as part of an effort to curb that newspaper's aggressive 
reporting style.\84\ Central Propaganda Department director Liu 
Yunshan had told officials at an April 2005 meeting that 
``[t]he South has a newspaper that disgusts a lot of officials 
in the North, and the North has a paper that disgusts a lot of 
officials in the South.'' \85\ An unnamed source told a Western 
news magazine that the ``northern paper'' was the Beijing News, 
and a Beijing News editor noted that so many cadres had 
traveled to Beijing to complain about the paper that it was 
under ``heavy'' pressure to conform to new restrictions on 
``extra-territorial'' investigative reporting.\86\ In December 
2005, propaganda officials singled out the Beijing News for 
criticism at a meeting where it was decided that ``metropolitan 
newspapers'' such as the Beijing News should ``strengthen Party 
control'' and obey propaganda officials.\87\ Officials have 
said that the Beijing News ``committed errors in the 
orientation of opinion,'' and Liu Yunshan concluded that the 
Beijing News' ``problems'' must be ``fundamentally resolved.''
    A second example of official circumvention of the law to 
silence critics occurred in January 2006, when Party officials 
ordered the China Youth Daily (CYD) to suspend publication of 
its Freezing Point weekly because it had published an essay on 
Chinese history textbooks that officials claimed contradicted 
historical facts, violated news propaganda discipline, harmed 
the national sentiments of the Chinese people, harmed the image 
of the CYD, and had a detrimental social influence.\88\ The 
officials also ordered the CYD Publishing House to submit a 
report criticizing Li Erliang, CYD editor-in-chief, and Li 
Datong, editor-in-chief of the Freezing Point weekly. On 
February 16, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Qin Gang 
defended the Party's decision.\89\ On the same day, the 
Communist Party Youth League Publishing House Party Committee 
announced the conditions under which Freezing Point would 
resume publication. The CYD was required to dismiss Li Datong 
from his position as editor-in-chief, and Lu Yuegang from his 
position as deputy editor. In addition, it had to publish an 
essay in the first issue of the re-launched Freezing Point 
weekly that would 
refute the earlier objectionable essay.\90\
    Government and Party intimidation, harassment, and 
imprisonment of writers and journalists create a chilling 
effect on freedom of speech that results in self-censorship. 
For instance, Internet and software companies in China must 
either employ censorship technologies in their products or risk 
a government order to close. 
Although no Chinese law or regulation forbids specific words, 
companies such as Tencent and MSN embed a list of banned words 
and phrases in their Internet applications, including 
``freedom'' and ``democracy.'' \91\ Chinese search engines such 
as Baidu, and the China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, 
and Google filter search 
results, including those relating to the Voice of America, 
Radio Free Asia, and human rights. A senior corporate official 
from Google testified to the House Committee on International 
Relations in February 2006 that one of the factors leading to 
the company's decision to filter search results for its China-
based service was:

          Many queries, especially politically sensitive 
        queries, were not making it through to Google's 
        servers. And access became often slow and unreliable, 
        meaning that our service in China was not something we 
        felt proud of. Even though we weren't doing any self-
        censorship, our results were being filtered anyway, and 
        our service was being 
        actively degraded on top of that. Indeed, at some times 
        users were even being redirected to local Chinese 
        search engines.\92\

    Google designed its Chinese-language news aggregation 
service so that users in China cannot view materials from 
dissident news Web sites that Chinese authorities have blocked. 
Google has said that it will not deploy e-mail and blogging 
services in China because the company cannot meet its own 
standards for the privacy and security of users' sensitive 
information.\93\
    The Party and the government are seeking to expand self-
censorship by instituting ``industry self-discipline.'' During 
an August 2005 speech, Liu Yunshan called on propaganda 
officials to ``merge propaganda work into the self-supervision 
of mass groups and professional organizations,'' and said that 
requiring professional organizations to ``tightly integrate 
professional discipline and restraint with professional moral 
restraint'' will allow employees to ``voluntarily'' accept 
government supervision. In April 2006, 14 major Internet 
portals, including Sina.com, Sohu.com, Baidu.com, and Yahoo!'s 
Chinese Web site, issued a joint proposal calling for the 
Chinese Internet industry to censor harmful information, spread 
the ideas of President Hu Jintao, and voluntarily accept 
government supervision.\94\ Shortly after the Internet portals 
issued their 
proposal, Internet information providers and industry groups 
throughout China made similar announcements.
    The state-run media portrayed the Internet portals' 
participation as spontaneous and voluntary, but both the GAPP 
and State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television 
(SARFT) have either used or advocated the use of ``self-
discipline'' agreements and other informal methods to control 
the press in China. For example, in April 2006, GAPP Director 
Long Xinmin wrote that the government should establish an 
administrative system for newspapers and magazines 
characterized by Party leadership, government administration, 
and industry self-discipline.\95\ In September 2005, SARFT 
issued a notice saying that radio announcers and television 
hosts would ``voluntarily'' obey professional ethical standards 
that SARFT had issued in December 2004.\96\
Political Speech
    International human rights standards obligate the Chinese 
government to respect the rights of its citizens to publish 
political ideas or opinions, even when they are critical of the 
government.\97\ Chinese government and Party officials have 
said, however, that they will not tolerate the publication of 
political ideas or opinions with which they disagree:

        &lt;bullet&gt; Liu Binjie, a deputy director of the General 
        Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), has 
        said that political publications are the highest 
        priority target for the Sweep Away Pornography and 
        Strike Down Illegal Publications Task Force.\98\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Shi Feng, another GAPP deputy director, 
        complained in an October 2005 speech that some 
        newspapers and periodicals in China have exhibited 
        ``political orientation problems,'' by ``denying the 
        leading position of Marxism,'' ``violating the Party 
        line,'' and ``openly smearing the Party's leaders.'' 
        \99\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Officials have said that it is necessary to 
        ``strike hard at'' and ``tightly seal up and 
        investigate'' political publications that ``spread 
        political rumors and create ideological chaos.'' \100\

    The State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television 
(SARFT) issued ``propaganda priorities'' in 2005 that said 
broadcasters should ``refuse all incorrect ideological and 
political perspectives and expression.'' \101\ The GAPP has 
said that it will shut down publications with ``severe 
political errors,'' \102\ and in 2005, the Chinese government 
confiscated 996,000 publications because of their political 
content.\103\ Regulations require that everything published in 
China must adhere to Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and 
Deng Xiaoping Theory\104\ and prohibit the publication of 
anything that violates the propaganda discipline of the 
Party\105\ or contradicts the guiding policies of the 
Party.\106\ In addition, Chinese law requires that books and 
essays about Party and national government leaders must be 
``solemn and discreet,'' and their point of view must conform 
to the spirit of various Party documents.\107\
    To enforce these ideological restrictions, Chinese 
regulations require that publishers submit to the GAPP and the 
Central Propaganda Department a list of any ``important topic 
selections'' that they plan to publish.\108\ Only publishing 
houses that the GAPP specifically approves may publish works 
about government and Party leaders, foreign relations, 
religion, the history of the People's Republic of China, and 
the history of the People's Liberation Army.\109\ In February 
2005, a GAPP official warned in a report:

          If publishers are careless about strictly screening 
        topic selection, then serious orientation and quality 
        problems will occur. . . . Therefore, publishers' 
        screening of the selection of topics is not merely a 
        professional matter, but rather is a serious political 
        responsibility. Therefore, topic selection screening is 
        a political system.\110\

    The GAPP report also said that publishers must carry out 
registration procedures for all selections relating to 
politics, the military, security, foreign affairs, religion, 
ethnicities, and ``other 
sensitive issues.'' In addition, the report also noted that it 
is illegal to publish anything on these topics that has not 
been reported to, and approved by, authorities.
     New rules governing the publication of newspapers and 
periodicals that went into effect in December 2005\111\ include 
requirements that these publications must ``adhere to Marxism-
Leninism,'' ``follow correct guidelines of public opinion and 
publication orientation,'' and foster a ``good atmosphere for 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics.'' The rules 
also require newspapers and periodicals to obey unspecified 
``relevant regulations'' when publishing articles that relate 
to ``important state policies'' and ethnic and religious 
affairs.
    SARFT requires screenplays that depict major historic 
events and important leaders and their families to be approved 
by both the government and the Party.\112\ SARFT issued 
regulations in April 2006\113\ that removed the previous 
requirement that television producers obtain government 
approval for dramas, but 
programs relating to modern Chinese history must still have 
government approval.\114\ In addition, anyone wishing to film 
television programs with content relating to ``important or 
sensitive political issues, the military, foreign affairs, the 
Party's United Front, religion, ethnicities, the administration 
of justice, public security, education, and famous people'' 
must first request an ``opinion'' from the relevant department 
at the provincial level or higher.
    Government and Party intolerance of the independent 
political views of citizens is particularly apparent before and 
during government and Party plenary meetings and some national 
holidays. In the weeks before the annual plenary sessions of 
the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference, which concluded in March 
2006, Chinese officials took the following measures (in 
addition to the Web site closings that were described 
previously):

        &lt;bullet&gt; The Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down 
        Illegal Publications Task Force held a teleconference 
        in January 2006 and notified relevant agencies that 
        they should ``purify the publishing market'' and be on 
        duty 24 hours per day during the plenary sessions.\115\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Officials in Zhongshan city, Guangdong 
        province, issued a circular calling on local customs, 
        traffic, press and publications officials, and 
        commercial agencies, to step up their enforcement 
        measures against ``harmful information,'' including 
        illegal political publications.\116\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Officials in Henan province launched a 
        crackdown on political publications and Falun Gong 
        materials to ``ensure the health and stability of the 
        publications market'' during the plenary sessions.\117\

    During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to 
silence writers, journalists, and Web sites for expressing 
political ideas or opinions with which they disagree. In 
October, an Anhui court upheld Zhang Lin's sentence of five 
years' imprisonment for subverting state power in connection 
with articles he posted on the Internet and a radio interview 
he gave.\118\ Chinese authorities detained and imprisoned 
several others, including Yang Tianshui, Guo Qizhen, and Li 
Yuanlong for publishing articles on foreign Web sites 
criticizing the government and the Party.\119\ During the run-
up to the annual plenary sessions, Chinese authorities shut 
down the Aegean Sea [Aiqinhai] Web site, as well as four other 
sites that had complained on behalf of local workers.\120\ In 
June, authorities shut down two of China's major Internet 
portals, Sina.com and Sohu.com, for several days to allow the 
Internet portals to upgrade their censorship capabilities after 
authorities found that the Internet portals failed to filter 
certain key words deemed politically harmful.\121\ In July, the 
Beijing Communications Administration shut down the ``Century 
China'' Web site, a popular Internet discussion forum for 
commentary on political, historical, and cultural issues.\122\ 
In August, authorities shut down the ``Polls'' Web site and 
revoked its license after the Web site posted a poll asking 
visitors whether the General Secretary of the Communist Party 
should be chosen from among several candidates in differential 
voting.\123\
Religious Speech
    International human rights standards protect the printing 
and distribution of religious literature as a fundamental human 
right.\124\ The Chinese government asserts that its protection 
of freedom of religious belief ``is basically in accordance 
with the main contents of [relevant] international documents 
and conventions,'' and that everyone in China ``should have the 
freedom to compile and distribute printed materials pertaining 
to religion or belief.'' \125\ Only government-licensed 
printing enterprises may print such materials, however, and 
then only with approval from the provincial-level religious 
affairs bureau and a certificate of approval from the press and 
publication administration.\126\ Printing enterprises in China 
may print religious publications for in-house use by customers, 
but the printing enterprise must first receive approval from 
provincial-level religious and publishing authorities.\127\ 
Non-religious publications only require printing approval from 
publishing authorities at the county level.\128\ Publishing 
regulations mandate government authorization and screening of 
books and news reports that mention religious issues.\129\ [See 
Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion.]
    Chinese authorities confiscated 4.62 million items of Falun 
Gong and ``other cult organization propaganda material'' in 
2005.\130\ This included the confiscation of 9,860 printed 
materials in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region that were 
either illegal publications of a religious nature, Falun Gong 
materials, or publications related to ``feudal superstitions.'' 
\131\ In addition, authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region 
confiscated 54 ``Dalai Lama splittist group reactionary 
publications.'' \132\
    In addition to confiscating religious publications, the 
Chinese government also has fined, detained, and imprisoned 
citizens for publishing, printing, and distributing religious 
literature without government permission. In November and 
December 1999, officials detained and arrested Jiang Sunian, an 
unregistered Catholic priest from Wenzhou diocese in Zhejiang 
province who had published hymnals.\133\ Officials charged 
Jiang with illegal publishing.\134\ In April 2000, a court 
convicted Jiang under Article 225 of the Criminal Law, assessed 
a fine of 270,000 yuan (US$32,000), and sentenced him to six 
years' imprisonment. Officials released Jiang in December 
2003.\135\ In November 2005, a Beijing court sent Cai Zhuohua, 
a pastor of six house churches in Beijing, and two of his 
family members to prison under Article 225 of the Criminal Law 
for printing and giving away Bibles and other Christian 
literature without government permission.\136\ In Anhui 
province, house church pastor Wang Zaiqing was arrested in May 
2006 on the same charges.
    During the last year Chinese authorities have continued to 
detain people who express religious ideas or opinions which 
they consider incorrect. Chinese authorities detained 
documentary filmmaker Hao Wu for 140 days after they discovered 
him shooting a documentary about China's unregistered house 
churches.\137\ In July 2006, authorities shut down two blogs 
maintained by the popular Tibetan poet and writer Oezer, which 
she believed was a response to her posting a photograph of the 
Dalai Lama.\138\ In August 2006, authorities detained 
journalist Zan Aizong for one week after he posted reports on 
foreign Web sites about detentions of Protestants who were 
protesting the destruction of a church in Xiaoshan city, 
Zhejiang province.\139\
Ideological Uniformity
    International human rights standards prohibit content-based 
restrictions on the press except those necessary to protect the 
rights and reputations of others and to meet the requirements 
for morality, national security, and public order in a 
democratic society.\140\ The Chinese government and the 
Communist Party exceed these allowances, however, and control 
and censor the press to impose ideological uniformity. In one 
of his first speeches as head of the General Administration of 
Press and Publication (GAPP), Long Xinmin told officials 
attending a national conference in December 2005 to ``maintain 
a high degree of uniformity with the political ideology of the 
Party Central Committee under Comrade Hu Jintao as Secretary, 
and insist on never wavering from Marxism as the guiding 
principle of press and publication work.'' \141\ Liu Yunshan 
called on propaganda officials to leverage the advantage 
provided by the large circulation and distribution of the 
state-run news media to guide public opinion in an ``intimate, 
natural, quiet, and unobtrusive manner.'' \142\ Shi Feng has 
said that investigative reporting must ``serve the work of the 
Party and the government.'' \143\ In September 2005, the 
Guangming Daily published an editorial saying:

          [I]rresponsible expression online easily brings with 
        it ideological confusion, and creates a severe 
        challenge for college students' political ideological 
        education. An important and pressing question for 
        university political ideological education is how to 
        use positive and healthy ideological culture to capture 
        the Internet battlefield and prevent people with 
        ulterior motives from using the Internet to disseminate 
        incorrect ideology and information, and resist 
        infiltration by enemy forces and cult 
        organizations.\144\

    Government and Party leaders also have said that they 
intend to co-opt modern communications technologies such as the 
Internet and mobile communications, and have called on 
officials to ensure that their propaganda reaches newly 
emerging social groups.\145\ Liu Yunshan noted that Chinese 
society is becoming increasingly complex as it shifts from one 
dominated by people employed in state-run enterprises to one in 
which more and more people work for 
private enterprises.\146\ Given this shifting demographic, Liu 
said that Party propagandists must ``expand the targets of 
propaganda work'' to new groups, such as young intellectuals, 
and ``troubled'' groups, such as unemployed workers, migrant 
workers, and farmers who have lost their land.\147\ The Party 
also focuses political propaganda on Chinese youth. In late 
2005, the Party journal Seeking Truth called on Party cadres to 
focus on guiding the organization of college student 
groups,\148\ and the Guangming Daily published an editorial 
saying that schools should work to form ``united and positive 
online public opinion'' by organizing ``ranks of online 
commentators.'' \149\ Some Chinese universities have also 
instituted student-run monitoring groups to remove offensive 
content, including political dissent, from university Internet 
forums.\150\
    In December 2004, the State Administration of Radio, Film, 
and Television (SARFT) issued ethical guidelines requiring 
television editors, reporters, and hosts to be loyal to, and 
carry out the work of, the Party.\151\ Later the same month, 
SARFT announced that it would require television stations to 
increase control over what television interviewers say on the 
air, and only broadcast programs that ``comply with propaganda 
discipline'' produced by government-licensed production 
companies and screened by relevant officials.\152\ In March 
2005, the Central Propaganda Department, the GAPP, and SARFT 
jointly issued regulations requiring news reporting and editing 
personnel to support the leadership of the Party, focus on 
``correct propaganda'' as their guiding principle, and have a 
firm grasp of ``correct guidance of public opinion.'' \153\ In 
April 2005, SARFT issued ``Interim Implementation Rules for 
Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News 
Reporters and Editors,'' saying: ``It is necessary to instruct 
news reporting and editing personnel to strengthen their 
political consciousness.'' \154\ In September 2005, SARFT 
issued a notice requiring television 
announcers and hosts to increase their study of political 
theory, improve their political character and political 
proficiency, guide people with correct public opinion, 
passionately love the motherland, serve the greater interests 
of the work of the Party and the government, and implement the 
Party's ``line, principles, and policies.'' \155\ The same 
month, SARFT also issued a notice warning that reports relating 
to politics and government policies must be handled carefully 
to avoid ``problems.'' In addition, to ``ensure the correct 
guidance of public opinion,'' radio and television broadcasters 
must 
receive approval from SARFT before making any ``large-scale 
live broadcast reports of significant events . . . especially 
those live broadcast reports of activities chaired by central 
leading cadres.'' \156\ The notice also requires all 
broadcasters to be sensitive to ``political'' issues and to 
screen live broadcasts to ``ensure their orientation is 
correct.''
    The government and the Party remain concerned that Chinese 
citizens have increased access to foreign sources of 
information that may dilute the Party's control over public 
opinion. Senior officials portray the news and information 
media as a battlefield for the Party's propaganda work that 
must either be occupied or lost to Western countries. For 
example, Liu Yunshan has called on Party propagandists to learn 
how to open to the outside world but prevent ``Western enemy 
forces'' from using their ``economic and technical superiority 
to carry out ideological infiltration and cultural expansion'' 
in order to ``Westernize and divide'' China.\157\ Shi Feng has 
said the government must not abandon the battlefield of public 
opinion, and has complained that, despite strict government 
prohibitions on private and foreign investment in newspaper and 
periodical publishing, people continue to ``illegally enter the 
newspaper and periodical publication domain,'' and that illegal 
publishers are a ``serious threat'' to the Party's ability to 
use propaganda to influence ideology.\158\
    The Supreme People's Court also supports censorship to 
prevent Chinese citizens from having access to ``foreign'' 
political ideas. In 1998, the same year it issued a judicial 
interpretation expanding the scope of Article 225 of China's 
Criminal Law to include unauthorized publishing,\159\ it warned 
China's judges, ``Foreign enemy forces are using publishing as 
a channel to carry out infiltration and aggravation of our 
ideology and culture, and there are numerous publications with 
political problems circulating within the country's borders.'' 
\160\
    The Chinese government attempts to prevent its citizens 
from having access to uncensored political ideas and 
information by banning the general distribution of foreign 
newspapers, news magazines, and television news programs, and 
by restricting the ability of foreign news agencies to 
distribute news domestically. In November 2005, Shi Zongyuan, 
then Director of the GAPP, said that Chinese authorities had 
halted plans to allow foreign newspapers to print in China 
because of concerns raised by the recent ``color revolutions'' 
in former Soviet republics.\161\ Also in 2005, the GAPP 
introduced internal restrictions on foreign magazines, limiting 
approvals to science and technology publications.\162\ In 
October 2004, SARFT issued regulations prohibiting joint 
ventures from producing programs on ``political news.'' \163\ 
In March 2005, SARFT issued an interpretive notice on these 
regulations that further limits foreign companies to investing 
in a single joint venture, saying:

          [W]e must control the contents of all products of 
        joint ventures in a practical manner, understand the 
        political inclinations and background of foreign joint 
        venture parties, and in this way prevent harmful 
        foreign ideology and culture from entering the realm of 
        our television program production through joint 
        investment and cooperation.\164\

    In September 2006, Xinhua issued new rules prohibiting 
foreign news agencies from distributing news to Chinese 
citizens without government permission.\165\ The new rules 
require foreign news agencies to be licensed by Xinhua and to 
submit all articles to a government-approved agency for 
distribution.\166\ The new rules give Xinhua the authority to 
select the news and information that foreign news agencies 
release, and to delete any information that the government has 
banned.\167\ [For information on the commercial implications of 
the new rules, see Section VII(d)--Commercial Rule of Law and 
the Impact of the WTO.]
    To prevent Chinese citizens from using television and radio 
to access ideas and opinions that may conflict with the Party 
line, the government jams programming offered by the Voice of 
America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. The 
government also has enacted regulations that restrict private 
satellite dish ownership and only permit foreign television 
news from broadcasters that are ``friendly'' to China and that 
offer their programs through government-controlled 
channels.\169\ In August 2005, SARFT issued three notices 
restricting Chinese citizens' access to foreign television and 
radio content.\166\ In April 2006, SARFT issued a circular\170\ 
repeating the restrictions on the dissemination of foreign news 
reports that were first put in place in 2002.\171\ Both 
circulars prohibit local television stations from using news 
footage taken from foreign satellite programs and require them 
to use only international news 
reports provided by China Central Television and China Radio 
International. The new circular said these restrictions are 
required to ``ensure correct orientation of public opinion,'' 
because some foreign wire services and news media have 
distributed international news to local television stations 
with ``blatant political intentions.'' The circular calls on 
television regulators to ``firmly establish political 
consciousness'' and ``increasingly bring the administration of 
international news within the administration of propaganda 
work.''
    Chinese officials attempt to prevent citizens who use the 
Internet from gaining access to ideas and opinions that the 
government and Party cannot censor. In February 2006, Liu 
Zhengrong, Deputy Chief of the Internet Affairs Bureau of the 
State Council Information Office, said Chinese citizens can 
access the Web freely, except for ``a very few'' foreign Web 
sites that are blocked because their contents mostly involve 
pornography or terrorism.\172\ According to one study, however, 
Chinese authorities operate ``the most extensive, 
technologically sophisticated, and broad-reaching system of 
Internet filtering in the world'' to prevent access to 
``sensitive'' religious and political material on the 
Internet.\173\ The central government blocks the Web sites of 
foreign news providers such as the Voice of America, Radio Free 
Asia, and the British Broadcasting Corporation, and of human 
rights advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights 
in China, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to 
Protect Journalists. Since May 2005, the Chinese government has 
prevented its citizens from accessing the Commission's Web 
site.

            V(b) Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Communist Party's concern with growing 
        social instability dominated its policy statements over 
        the past year, and served as justification for 
        increased government vigilance over activities and 
        groups that potentially threaten Party legitimacy. Top 
        Party, court, and law enforcement officials repeatedly 
        linked the government's policy of pursuing periodic 
        anti-crime campaigns, referred to as ``Strike Hard'' 
        campaigns, to the goal of maintaining social stability. 
        Government efforts to maintain social stability have 
        led to a greater reliance on the coercive powers of the 
        police to subdue potential threats to Party rule.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Abuse of power by local police forces remains 
        a serious problem. The Supreme People's Procuratorate 
        (SPP) has acknowledged the existence of continuing and 
        widespread abuses in law enforcement, including illegal 
        extended detentions and torture. New SPP regulations 
        that detail the criteria for prosecuting official 
        abuses of power went into effect in July 2006, and 
        establish standards for the prosecution of police who 
        abuse their power to hold individuals in custody beyond 
        legal limits, coerce confessions under torture, acquire 
        evidence through the use of force, maltreat prisoners, 
        or retaliate against those who petition the government 
        or file complaints against them.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to apply 
        vague criminal and administrative provisions to justify 
        detentions based on an individual's political opinions 
        or membership in religious, ethnic, or social groups. 
        These provisions allow for the targeting and punishment 
        of activists for crimes that ``endanger state 
        security'' or ``disturb public order'' under the 
        Criminal Law. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture 
        concluded in his March 2006 report to the UN Commission 
        on Human Rights that the vague definition of these 
        crimes leaves their application open to abuse, 
        particularly of the rights to freedom of religion, 
        speech, and assembly.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese authorities use reeducation through 
        labor and other forms of administrative detention to 
        circumvent the criminal process and imprison offenders 
        for ``minor crimes,'' without judicial review and the 
        procedural protections guaranteed by the Chinese 
        Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law. The UN Working 
        Group on Arbitrary Detention concluded in 2004 that the 
        Chinese government has made no significant progress in 
        reforming the administrative detention system to ensure 
        judicial review and to conform to international law. 
        Although 
        proposed reforms would provide some added procedural 
        protections, they would still not provide an accused 
        individual the opportunity to dispute the alleged 
        misconduct and contest law enforcement accusations of 
        guilt before an independent adjudicatory body.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Although illegal in China, torture and abuse 
        by law enforcement officers remain widespread. Factors 
        that perpetuate or exacerbate the problem of torture 
        include a lack of procedural safeguards to protect 
        criminal suspects and defendants, over reliance on 
        confessions of guilt, the absence of lawyers at 
        interrogations, inadequate complaint mechanisms, the 
        lack of an independent judiciary, and the abuse of 
        administrative detention measures. The Chinese 
        government emphasizes its ongoing efforts to pass new 
        laws and administrative regulations preventing, 
        punishing, and compensating cases of torture by law 
        enforcement officers. Both the SPP and the Ministry of 
        Public Security have announced their support for audio 
        and video taping of interrogations of criminal suspects 
        accused of a limited number of crimes. The Chinese 
        government recognizes that problems of misconduct, 
        including physical abuse, exist within Chinese prisons 
        and reeducation through labor centers, and it is making 
        progress toward increasing accountability for such 
        behavior.
        &lt;bullet&gt; In 2006, Chinese authorities increased 
        restrictions on lawyers who work on politically 
        sensitive cases or cases that draw attention from the 
        foreign news media. Law enforcement officials 
        intimidated lawyers defending these cases by charging 
        them, or threatening to charge them, with various 
        crimes. Since mid-2005, local authorities have also 
        used harassment and violent measures against those who 
        participated in criminal or civil rights defense in 
        sensitive matters. Beijing lawyer Zhu Jiuhu was 
        detained during the past year. Self-trained legal 
        advocate Chen Guangcheng was sentenced on August 24, 
        2006, to four years and three months' imprisonment, and 
        Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong is currently under house 
        arrest after being released from prison on June 5, 
        2006. Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng has been held 
        incommunicado since authorities reportedly abducted him 
        on August 15 from his sister's home in Shandong 
        province. Guo Feixiong, who served as a legal advisor 
        to Gao's law firm, was arrested and later released in 
        late 2005, and is currently in detention after being 
        taken from his home on September 14.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese criminal law includes 68 capital 
        offenses, over half of which are non-violent crimes. 
        The Chinese government reportedly has adopted an 
        ``execute fewer, execute cautiously'' policy. In 2006, 
        the Chinese judiciary made reform of the death penalty 
        review process a top priority and introduced new 
        appellate court procedures for hearing death penalty 
        cases. The Supreme People's Court announced that it 
        would consolidate and reclaim the death penalty review 
        power from provincial-level high courts. These reforms 
        are designed to limit the use of death sentences, 
        consolidate criteria used by courts to administer those 
        sentences, and ensure constitutionally protected human 
        rights.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Vice Minister of Health acknowledged that 
        the majority of human organs used in transplants in 
        China originate from executed prisoners. Under the 
        World Health Organization's guiding principles on human 
        organ transplantation, organ donations by prisoners, 
        even when reportedly voluntary, may nonetheless violate 
        international standards if the organs are obtained 
        through undue influence and pressure. New Ministry of 
        Health regulations include medical standards for organ 
        transplants, but do not provide guidance on what type 
        of consent is required for taking organs from executed 
        prisoners.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to engage the 
        international community on human rights and rule of law 
        issues, including those related to the criminal justice 
        system. The government's application for membership in 
        the UN Human Rights Council noted that it has acceded 
        to 22 international human rights accords, and that it 
        plans to amend its Criminal, Civil, and Administrative 
        Procedure Laws and reform the judiciary to prepare for 
        ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
        Political Rights. As a member of the new Council, the 
        government has pledged to fulfill its obligations under 
        the terms of these accords, and is obligated under the 
        rules of the Council to submit to peer review of its 
        human rights record.
Public Security and Coercive Use of Police Power
    The Communist Party's concern with growing social 
instability dominated its policy statements over the past year, 
and served as justification for increased government vigilance 
over activities and groups that potentially threaten Party 
legitimacy. Top Party, court, and law enforcement officials 
repeatedly linked the government's policy of pursuing periodic 
anti-crime campaigns, referred to as ``Strike Hard'' campaigns, 
to the goal of maintaining social stability.\1\ On a national 
level, the government's ``Strike Hard'' campaigns included 
crackdowns on the publication of materials, including Falun 
Gong literature, that the government deemed to be ``illegal 
political publications'' or that allegedly ``spread political 
rumors and create ideological chaos'' \2\ [see Section V(a)--
Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression]. Regionally, 
provincial-level officials used ``Strike Hard'' campaigns to 
justify crackdowns on ``ethnic separatist forces'' in the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region\3\ and those who might 
threaten the operation of the new Qinghai-Tibet railroad,\4\ 
among other groups. [See Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion--
Religious Freedom for China's Muslims; Section VIII--Tibet for 
additional information.]
    Government efforts to maintain social stability have led to 
a greater reliance on the coercive powers of the police to 
subdue potential threats to Party rule.\5\ In late 2005, a land 
dispute between local government officials and villagers in 
Shanwei city, Guangdong province, escalated into a mass protest 
and then a violent confrontation between villagers and the 
paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP).\6\ Both domestic and 
international human rights activists condemned the coercive use 
of police power to subdue the Shanwei villagers, and called for 
an investigation into the PAP's decision to open fire on the 
crowd.\7\ Shanwei authorities detained Deputy Director Wu Sheng 
of the local public security bureau for mishandling the 
situation,\8\ but one month later, Public Security Minister 
Zhou Yongkang and the PAP's top two officials reaffirmed the 
role of the PAP as a prominent force in guarding against 
threats to public order, particularly large-scale mass 
incidents.\9\ In May 2006, domestic news media reported that 
Party officials delivered a ``stern internal warning'' to Wu 
and fired him from office.\10\ No criminal charges were filed 
against Wu, but 13 of the villagers who participated in the 
protest received sentences ranging from three to seven years' 
imprisonment for allegedly ``gathering people to disturb public 
order,'' among other crimes.\11\
    Party concerns over the type of unrest that occurred in 
Shanwei have prompted new government measures that allow for 
greater discretion by local police in responding to 
``disturbances of public order.'' \12\ In late 2005, Premier 
Wen Jiabao warned senior rural bureaucrats that more violence 
would result if they continued to commit the ``historic 
mistake'' of failing to protect farmers and their lands.\13\ In 
April 2006, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) denied the 
existence of conflict between police and villagers.\14\ 
Instead, MPS officials maintained that China faces ``conflicts 
among the people,'' high crime rates, and struggles against 
unnamed ``enemies.'' \15\ The MPS reported that crimes of 
``disturbing public order'' rose to a total of 87,000 in 2005, 
a 6.6 percent increase over the figure in 2004.\16\ Officials 
declined to provide a figure for mass incidents in 2005, but 
previously reported a rise from 58,000 mass incidents in 2003 
to 74,000 in 2004.\17\ In March, a new Public Security 
Administration Punishment Law went into effect nationwide and 
added 165 new offenses that are subject to administrative 
punishments at the discretion of public security agencies, 
rather than according to the procedures required under the 
criminal justice system.\18\ In a press conference about the 
new law, MPS officials 
explained that the law entrusts public security agencies and 
the police with greater powers and means for protecting social 
stability and public order.\19\
    Abuse of power by local police forces remains a serious 
problem. The government does not encourage external supervision 
over police affairs or prosecution of police abuses by the 
procuratorate,\20\ as mandated by law.\21\ Instead, the MPS 
maintains a system of self-discipline carried out by the police 
affairs supervisory departments within local public security 
bureaus.\22\ Between 2001 and 2005, 1.5 million on-site 
inspections resulted in 330,000 findings of abuse by police 
officers.\23\ Of those, 4,321 offending officers were suspended 
and 2,576 were taken into custody as punishment for their 
wrongdoing.\24\ In February 2006, the MPS announced that it had 
suspended a total of 10,034 police officers since 1997 for 
breaches of discipline.\25\ The announcement acknowledged the 
problem of police misconduct and expressed a high-level 
commitment to confront the problem and improve the image of the 
police. At the same time, it also confirmed that local police 
in some areas openly collude with criminals, without fear of 
reprisal. In one case in Hunan province, a court convicted 
three senior public security officials for ties to organized 
crime, but ultimately suspended their two- and three-year 
sentences.\26\
    The Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP) has acknowledged 
the existence of continuing and widespread abuses in law 
enforcement, including illegal extended detentions and 
torture.\27\ New SPP regulations that detail the criteria for 
prosecuting official abuses of power went into effect on July 
26, 2006, and establish standards for the prosecution of police 
who abuse their power to hold individuals in custody beyond 
legal limits, coerce confessions under torture, acquire 
evidence through the use of force, maltreat prisoners, or 
retaliate against those who petition the government or file 
complaints against them.\28\ Domestic news media reported in 
2006 on the convictions of several public security officials 
who had beaten to death criminal suspects or prisoners in their 
custody.\29\ In one case, two public security officials 
received sentences of 1 year and 12 years' imprisonment, 
respectively, for beating a woman to death during police 
interrogation.\30\ The local procuratorate did not launch an 
investigation until two years after the incident occurred, and 
only in response to persistent efforts by the woman's husband 
to petition the government.\31\ In response to these reports, 
one Chinese legal scholar criticized authorities for being too 
lenient and for shielding one another from punishment.\32\ In 
July, an SPP spokesperson stated that local procuratorates do 
not lack potential cases against official abuses of power, but 
that ``many of them are cases that [the procuratorates] don't 
dare handle, are unlikely to handle, and cannot handle.'' \33\
Political Crimes
    The Chinese government continues to harass, detain, and 
imprison citizens for the peaceful exercise of fundamental 
rights guaranteed under the Chinese Constitution and 
international declarations and treaties such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\34\ In some 
cases, police detain individuals without formal charge or 
judicial review, in contravention of provisions in both the 
UDHR and the ICCPR.\35\ Arbitrary detentions intensified during 
politically sensitive periods, such as the periods both 
preceding and following the visits of U.S. President George W. 
Bush and Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, in 
November and December 2005, respectively.\36\ Police also 
detained, placed under surveillance, and harassed citizens 
before the first anniversary of former Communist Party General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang's death in January 2006,\37\ and before 
and after the March 2006 plenary sessions of the National 
People's Congress (NPC) and Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference.\38\ A senior official from the 
Ministry of Public Security justified police use of mass 
roundups during the plenary sessions by stressing the need to 
``manage public order'' and ``reduce some of the factors 
threatening social stability'' \39\ [see Section VII(c)--Access 
to Justice--Citizen Petitioning]. In most cases, police 
released individuals after a few days in detention.
    The Chinese government continues to apply vague criminal 
and administrative provisions to justify detentions based on an 
individual's political opinions or membership in religious, 
ethnic, or social groups, even when authorities identify a 
formal charge and initiate the legal process. These provisions 
allow for the targeting and punishment of activists for crimes 
that ``endanger state security'' or ``disturb public order'' 
under the Criminal Law.\40\ After a 2004 visit to China, the UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) recommended that 
the Chinese government define these crimes in precise terms and 
create exceptions under the Criminal Law for the peaceful 
exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by the UDHR.\41\ 
Nowak noted after his visit to China in late 2005 that the 
UNWGAD's recommendations have not been implemented to date.\42\ 
He concluded in his March 2006 report to the UN Commission on 
Human Rights: ``The vague definition of these crimes leaves 
their application open to abuse, particularly of the rights to 
freedom of religion, speech, and assembly.'' \43\
    Courts convict 99 percent of those tried for crimes that 
allegedly ``endanger state security,'' and the Dui Hua 
Foundation, a U.S. NGO that advocates for political prisoners 
in China, reports: ``The great majority were detained for non-
violent expression of their political and religious beliefs.'' 
\44\ ``Splittism'' and ``inciting splittism,'' \45\ as well as 
``subversion of state power'' and ``inciting subversion of 
state power,'' \46\ are classified as crimes that endanger 
state security under the Criminal Law. Chinese authorities 
continue to use charges of ``splittism'' and ``inciting 
splittism'' to target and punish peaceful activities by ethnic 
Uighurs and Tibetans [see Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion--
Religious Freedom for China's Muslims; Section VIII--Tibet]. 
They continue to apply charges of ``subversion'' and ``inciting 
subversion'' to target and punish the peaceful activities of 
writers, journalists, and publishers [see Section V(a)--Special 
Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression], as well as those who 
have supported the creation of independent political parties or 
associations [see Section VII(a)--Development of Civil 
Society].
    Faced with an increasing number of ``public order 
disturbances'' in 2005, Chinese authorities have applied 
criminal provisions to crack down on otherwise lawful citizen 
attempts to challenge government abuses.\47\ Many of the 
``public order disturbances'' that 
occurred in 2005 involved alleged crimes of ``gathering people 
to disturb public order,'' \48\ ``obstructing public 
services,'' \49\ ``gathering people to engage in affrays,'' 
\50\ and ``creating disturbances.'' \51\ From 2004 to 2005, 
these ``public order disturbances'' increased by 13 percent, 
18.9 percent, 5.8 percent, and 11.8 percent, respectively.\52\ 
In one case, a local people's court in Yulin city, Shaanxi 
province, sentenced private investor and former Party official 
Feng Bingxian to three years' imprisonment for ``gathering 
people to disturb public order'' and obstructing the work of 
government agencies.\53\ Feng's conviction was based on his 
efforts to meet with local officials and discuss compensation 
for private property that the government seized in 2003.\54\ 
The procuratorate charged that the presence of too many 
investor representatives led to traffic congestion, disturbance 
of public order, and interference with the work of the 
government.\55\ At the time that the procuratorate indicted 
Feng, the NPC was publicizing efforts to increase legal 
protection for property rights.\56\
    Since late 2005, government officials have abused Criminal 
Law provisions on ``public order disturbances'' to silence 
property rights advocates in particular. In 2004, the 
government amended the 
Constitution to recognize explicitly the private property 
rights of Chinese citizens.\57\ One year later, at the same 
time that Shaanxi officials detained Feng Bingxian, Guangdong 
provincial authorities used force to suppress citizen efforts 
to defend property rights in Shanwei city\58\ and Taishi 
village\59\ in Guangzhou city. In October 2005, Guangdong 
authorities arrested legal advocate Yang Maodong (who uses the 
pen name Guo Feixiong) for ``gathering people to disturb public 
order.'' \60\ The charge was based on Guo's efforts to advise 
Taishi villagers in their recall campaign against the village 
committee head, who allegedly had embezzled compensation funds 
for government seizures of farmland [see Section VII(b)--
Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative Reform]. 
In February 2006, the Guangdong Public Security Bureau 
circulated a report that blamed a succession of mass protests 
in 2005 on ``disputes over so-called rights defense.'' \61\ 
With the release of this report, Guangdong authorities made 
explicit their campaign against legal advocates such as Guo and 
directly linked the activities of these individuals to crimes 
of ``disturbing public order.''
    The Chinese government has released a small number of 
political prisoners since August 2005, but many Chinese 
citizens continue to serve long prison or reeducation through 
labor sentences for political or religious activities.\62\ In 
April 2005, the Chinese government insisted that authorities do 
not apply a stricter standard for evaluating sentence 
reductions and parole in crimes that ``endanger state 
security.'' \63\ Between early 2005 and 2006, however, 
officials granted sentence reductions or early releases to 
political prisoners in only a few cases.\64\ Authorities 
released most political prisoners only when their court-imposed 
sentences expired. The list of released political prisoners 
includes political activist Wang Wanxing, journalist Liu Shui, 
legal advocate Guo Feixiong, journalist Jiang Weiping, Falun 
Gong practitioner Charles Lee, labor activist Xiao Yunliang, 
journalist and Tiananmen democracy activist Yu Dongyue, 
Internet publisher Cai Lujun, China Democracy Party member Tong 
Shidong, Internet writer Luo Changfu, house church activist 
Xiao Gaowen, Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enchong, Gyatso Children's 
Home founder Nyima Choedron, and Catholic auxiliary bishop An 
Shuxin.\65\ Despite the Chinese government's pledge to conduct 
a national review of cases involving political acts that are no 
longer crimes under Chinese law,\66\ some prisoners are still 
serving sentences for counterrevolutionary and other crimes 
that were removed from the Criminal Law in 1997.\67\
Arbitrary Detention in the Formal Criminal Process
     The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) 
defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary'' 
if it meets one of the following conditions:

        (1) there is clearly no legal basis for the deprivation 
        of liberty;
        (2) an individual is deprived of his liberty because he 
        has exercised rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
        Universal 
        Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) or the International 
        Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); or
        (3) non-compliance with the standards for a fair trial 
        set out in the UDHR and other relevant international 
        instruments is sufficiently grave to make the detention 
        arbitrary.\68\

    Chinese authorities use measures such as surveillance or 
house arrest\69\ to punish and control political activists, 
even when no legal basis exists for such deprivations of 
liberty. Authorities in Linyi city, Shandong province, placed 
Chen Guangcheng, a legal advocate who exposed and challenged 
the abuses of local population planning officials [see Section 
V(h)--Population Planning], under house arrest on September 6, 
2005.\70\ In March 2006, Chen's house arrest exceeded the six-
month limit permitted by Chinese law.\71\ A network of Chinese 
human rights activists and groups subsequently worked with 
Chen's defense lawyers to submit information about his case to 
the UNWGAD, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers, and the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General for Human Rights Defenders.\72\ From March 
until formal notification of Chen's criminal detention on June 
10, Linyi authorities held Chen without charge or trial.\73\ 
Since March, authorities have kept Chen's wife under 
surveillance at their home, formally arrested several of Chen's 
relatives, beaten and summoned Chen's lawyers for 
interrogation, and placed other activists under house arrest to 
prevent them from holding a press conference about Chen's 
case.\74\
    Chinese authorities also have used incommunicado detention 
to punish and control particularly high-profile political 
offenders who exercise their fundamental rights. The Criminal 
Procedure Law (CPL) permits detention without arrest or charge, 
but generally requires notification of family members or the 
detainee's workplace within 24 hours of custody.\75\ Despite 
this legal safeguard, a number of activists, including Hu Jia, 
disappeared in February 2006 after launching a nationwide 
hunger strike to protest government abuses [see Section IV--
Introduction]. Hu, who has campaigned on behalf of HIV/AIDS 
patients [see Section V(g)--Public Health--HIV/AIDS], was 
missing from February 16 to March 28. When Hu reappeared, he 
reported that security officers took him from his home and held 
him on the outskirts of Beijing without any legal formalities 
and without notifying his family.\76\ In February, a UN agency 
expressed concern about Hu's disappearance and reported his 
case to the Ministry of Health.\77\ Others who have been held 
incommunicado include Gedun Choekyi Nyima and his parents, 
abducted by Chinese officials in 1995 after the Dalai Lama 
recognized him as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, and 
Catholic Bishop Su Zhimin, who reportedly has been detained in 
a form of house arrest since 1997. Both Gedun Choekyi Nyima and 
Bishop Su have been the subject of frequent U.S. and 
international inquiries, but the Chinese government denies that 
it took coercive measures against either of them. [See Section 
V(d)--Freedom of Religion--Religious Freedom for Tibetan 
Buddhists; Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion--Religious Freedom 
for China's Catholics and China-Holy See Relations for 
additional information.]
    Law enforcement authorities continue to detain Chinese 
citizens for long periods without formal charge or trial, 
despite official statements to the contrary. In January 2006, 
the Chinese government reported to Manfred Nowak, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, that serious cases of extended detention 
lasting more than three years had been eliminated, and that the 
number of individuals held beyond time limits was at an all-
time low.\78\ The government further reported that the number 
of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities in which 
there were no cases of extended detention had risen from 14 at 
the end of 2003 to 29.\79\ In May 2006, the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate (SPP) identified Beijing as one of nine 
municipalities or provinces where no cases of extended 
detention had occurred in 2005.\80\ Despite these claims, 
Beijing authorities repeatedly used provisions in Chinese law 
to hold New York Times researcher Zhao Yan from September 17, 
2004, until his trial date on June 16, 2006.\81\ After invoking 
several legal exceptions to extend Zhao's pretrial detention, 
authorities indicted him on December 23, 2005, for disclosing 
state secrets and for fraud.\82\ The Beijing procuratorate 
withdrew its case against Zhao on March 17, 2006,\83\ shortly 
before President Hu Jintao's visit to the United States, but 
resumed legal proceedings based on the same charge in May, 
after Hu returned to China.\84\ The court permitted the 
procuratorate to resume its case, despite objections from 
Zhao's defense lawyer that this action was illegal.\85\ The 
UNWGAD has concluded that Zhao's detention was arbitrary 
because it resulted from the exercise of rights guaranteed 
under the UDHR and the ICCPR, and because official non-
compliance with the international standards for a fair trial 
was sufficiently grave.\86\
    Chinese authorities do not comply with the minimum 
international standards for prompt judicial review of criminal 
detention and arrest. Both the UDHR and the ICCPR prohibit 
arbitrary detention or arrest. Under the ICCPR, anyone detained 
or arrested on a criminal charge must be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise 
adjudicatory powers, for review of the lawfulness of his 
detention or arrest.\87\ In December 2004, the UNWGAD found 
that the CPL and related regulations on pretrial detention fail 
to meet this basic standard because: (1) Chinese suspects 
continue to be held for too long without judicial review; (2) 
procurators, who review arrest decisions, only examine case 
files and do not hold a hearing; and (3) a procurator cannot be 
considered an independent adjudicator under applicable 
international standards.\88\ In May 2006, the SPP acknowledged 
that unlawful extended detentions remain problematic, and that 
Chinese authorities misuse provisions in the CPL to disguise 
this problem.\89\ The SPP is currently working with the Supreme 
People's Court and Ministry of Public Security to finalize new 
regulations that will seek to address the problem of extended 
detention.\90\
Administrative Detention
    The Chinese government continues to punish large numbers of 
citizens administratively, without effective judicial review 
and in contravention of human rights standards under the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).\91\ Public security agencies reported that they 
investigated and charged a total of 6.3 million ``public 
security'' (zhi'an) offenses in 2005, up from 5.4 million in 
2004.\92\ ``Public security'' offenses include public order 
disturbances, traffic offenses, prostitution, drug use, and 
other ``minor crimes'' that the Chinese government typically 
sanctions with administrative punishments rather than formal 
criminal sentences.\93\ In some instances, public security 
agencies handle cases administratively because they do not have 
enough evidence for a formal prosecution,\94\ or because it is 
a convenient method for detaining and harassing activists.\95\ 
Administrative punishments can range from a warning or fine to 
detention in a reeducation through labor (RTL) center for up to 
three years, with the possibility of a one-year extension.\96\ 
Administrative punishments such as RTL can be harsher than some 
criminal punishments such as fines, public surveillance, and 
criminal detention of one to six months.\97\
    In March 2006, Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, concluded that the RTL system and other forms of 
administrative detention ``go beyond legitimate rehabilitation 
measures provided for in [A]rticle 10 of the ICCPR.'' \98\ 
Forms of administrative detention include short-term detention 
under the Public Security Administration Punishment Law (PSAPL) 
and long-term 
detention such as RTL, forced psychiatric commitment, ``custody 
and education'' of prostitutes and their clients, forced drug 
detoxification, work-study schools, and discipline and 
inspection of corrupt officials under Party rules.\99\ Although 
many public security cases do not result in detention, the U.S. 
State Department estimates that at least 260,000 to 310,000 
individuals are currently detained in approximately 340 RTL 
centers.\100\ In addition, another 350,000 individuals were 
held in facilities for drug offenders and prostitutes as of 
2004.\101\ The government consistently has emphasized the 
beneficial ``reeducation'' function of administrative detention 
measures,\102\ but Nowak found that ``some of these measures of 
[reeducation] through coercion, humiliation and punishment aim 
at altering the personality of detainees up to the point of 
even breaking their will.'' \103\
    The Chinese government is in the process of reforming the 
administrative punishment system, but these reforms seek to 
codify rather than abolish it. In August 2005, the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee passed the PSAPL to 
provide a basis in national law for short-term detentions of up 
to 20 days. In addition to establishing more severe punishments 
than its predecessor, the Regulations on Public Security 
Administration Punishment, the new law creates 165 new offenses 
subject to administrative punishment effective March 1, 
2006.\104\ These offenses include, among other things, ``taking 
on the name of religion or qigong to carry out activities 
disturbing public order'' \105\ and ``inciting or plotting 
illegal assemblies, marches, or demonstrations.'' \106\ The new 
law reaffirms the role of public security bureaus as the 
entities that determine and administer punishments for public 
security violations. Ministry of Public Security officials have 
interpreted this provision to mean greater powers and means for 
public security agencies and police to carry out their duties 
and protect stability.\107\ The new law provides for 
disciplinary sanctions and criminal liability to address 
violations of human rights, such as coercing confessions under 
torture or exceeding time limitations on interrogation.\108\ 
The law, however, lacks mechanisms for external supervision of 
public security agencies and police, and lacks standards for 
imposing disciplinary and criminal sanctions on police abuses.
    Although short-term administrative detention of up to 20 
days for public security offenses now has a basis in national 
law under the PSAPL, long-term administrative detention, 
including RTL, is authorized only under administrative 
regulations and therefore violates Chinese law. The Legislation 
Law requires that all deprivations of personal liberty be 
authorized by national law, and not by administrative 
regulation.\109\ Under the criminal justice system, a Chinese 
citizen cannot be found guilty of any crime, even a ``minor 
crime,'' without being judged guilty by a people's court.\110\ 
The Constitution makes explicit the inviolable nature of a 
person's liberty and further dictates:

        No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or 
        by decision of a people's procuratorate or by decision 
        of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a 
        public security organ. Unlawful deprivation or 
        restriction of citizens' freedom of person by detention 
        or other means is prohibited. . . .\111\

Nonetheless, Chinese authorities use RTL and other forms of 
long-term administrative detention to circumvent the criminal 
process and imprison offenders for ``minor crimes,'' without 
judicial review and the procedural protections guaranteed by 
the Chinese Constitution and Criminal Procedure Law.\112\
    The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) 
concluded that between its 1997 and 2004 visits, the Chinese 
government had made no significant progress in reforming the 
administrative detention system to ensure judicial review and 
to conform to international law.\113\ Domestic pressure is 
building to reform the RTL system, particularly in the National 
People's Congress (NPC).\114\ Since March 2005, the NPC has 
been considering a new Law on the Correction of Unlawful Acts 
that would provide a basis in national law for RTL.\115\ The 
draft law reportedly enhances the rights of RTL prisoners by 
setting a maximum sentence of 18 months, and by permitting 
defendants to hire a lawyer, request a hearing, and appeal 
sentences imposed by public security officials in RTL 
cases.\116\ Although the reforms would provide some added 
procedural protections, the draft law would still not provide 
an accused individual the opportunity to dispute the alleged 
misconduct and contest law enforcement accusations of guilt 
before an independent adjudicatory body.\117\ Public security 
officials continue to dominate the decisions of RTL 
administration commissions,\118\ which consist of officials 
from the public security, civil affairs, and labor 
bureaus.\119\ The Chinese government has argued that 
administrative detention decisions are subject to judicial 
review under the Administrative Procedure Law (APL), but the 
UNWGAD found APL review ``of very little value'' and maintained 
that ``no real judicial control has been created over the 
procedure to commit someone to [reeducation] through labor.'' 
\120\
    The UNWGAD also has found that the government's practice of 
forced psychiatric commitment of criminal offenders is a ``form 
of deprivation of liberty, since it lacks the necessary 
safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse.'' \121\ The U.S. 
State Department estimates that there are at least 20 
ankang,\122\ or special psychiatric institutions for mentally 
ill criminal offenders, in China. Public security officials can 
forcibly commit ``political maniacs,'' and increasingly have 
done so as a measure against those who repeatedly petition the 
government such as Liu Xinjuan,\123\ or political activists 
such as Wang Wanxing.\124\ The government deprives these 
individuals of their liberty without judicial review.\125\ 
Treatment in these institutions is sometimes brutal, and 
political prisoners are held along with patients suffering from 
true mental illnesses.\126\ Upon his release in August 2005, 
Wang called for the government to cease psychiatric detention 
of those without mental illness and transfer administration of 
ankang hospitals from public security 
officials to psychiatric professionals.\127\ He added that the 
inability to object to public security officials' determination 
that one is 
mentally ill ``makes it so difficult for the inmates to hope 
for release--more difficult than in prison or in a labor camp, 
where the punishments are for a fixed term.'' \128\
Torture and Abuse in Custody
    Although illegal in China, torture and abuse by law 
enforcement officers remain widespread.\129\ In March 2006, 
Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported that 
Falun Gong practitioners make up the overwhelming majority of 
victims of alleged torture [see Section V(d)--Freedom of 
Religion--Government Persecution of Falun Gong], and that other 
targeted groups include Uighurs, Tibetans, human rights 
defenders, and political activists.\130\ About half of all 
alleged acts of torture take place in pretrial criminal 
detention centers or reeducation through labor (RTL) centers, 
and 47 percent of alleged perpetrators are police or other 
public security officials.\131\ Forms of torture and abuse 
cited in Nowak's report include beating, electric shock, 
painful shackling of the limbs, denial of medical treatment and 
medication, and hard labor.\132\ Foreign news media and NGOs 
reported that torture by law enforcement officers resulted in 
the death of at least one detainee during the past year.\133\
    The widespread use of torture in China violates both 
domestic and international law. Chinese domestic law prohibits 
judicial officers from coercing confessions under torture or 
acquiring evidence through the use of force, and imposes 
criminal liability on police and other corrections officers who 
beat or maltreat prisoners, if the circumstances are 
particularly ``serious.'' \134\ The government is further bound 
by the provisions of the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) that 
prohibit the use of torture.\135\ Nowak has said that the 
government's definition of torture under the Criminal Law and 
administrative regulations does not correspond fully to the 
international standard as outlined in Article 1 of the 
CAT.\136\ In addition, the government does not recognize the 
competence of the Committee against Torture authorized under 
the CAT to investigate allegations of systematic torture.\137\
    Factors that perpetuate or exacerbate the problem of 
torture in China include a lack of procedural safeguards to 
protect criminal suspects and defendants, over reliance on 
confessions of guilt, the absence of lawyers at interrogations, 
inadequate complaint mechanisms, the lack of an independent 
judiciary, and the abuse of administrative detention 
measures.\138\ In late 2005 and early 2006, the U.S. State 
Department and several faith-based organizations reported that 
these factors and the pervasiveness of torture and abuse by 
public security officials contributed to the conviction of 
Pastor Gong Shengliang of the banned South China Church.\139\ 
Following their release from prison in late 2003 and early 
2004, several female members of the church disclosed that 
public security 
officials tortured and forced them to sign statements accusing 
Pastor Gong of the sexual crimes for which he was ultimately 
convicted.\140\ Pastor Gong reportedly continues to be tortured 
in prison,\141\ and is confined for a life term.
    The Chinese government emphasizes its ongoing efforts to 
pass new laws and administrative regulations preventing, 
punishing, and compensating cases of torture by law enforcement 
officers.\142\ Some of these new measures appeared after a 
series of news media reports in 2005 on wrongful convictions 
drew national attention to widespread abuses in the criminal 
justice system and the continuing problem of torture.\143\ In 
April 2005, the Sichuan provincial government prohibited the 
use of evidence acquired through illegal means and introduced a 
requirement that interrogation in ``major'' cases be 
taped.\144\ Other provincial governments have not followed 
Sichuan's lead in excluding illegally acquired evidence,\145\ 
but have shown more willingness to adopt the practice of audio 
and video taping of interrogations as a preventive measure 
against torture. In early 2006, the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate mandated that by October 1, 2007, all 
procuratorate interrogations of criminal suspects in job-
related crimes such as graft and dereliction of duty be audio 
and video taped.\146\ At the March 2006 plenary session of the 
National People's Congress, one deputy submitted a proposal 
calling on the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to mandate 
tapings of police interrogations in cases of crimes punishable 
by death.\147\ The MPS has announced that it will promote audio 
and video taping of police interrogations in homicide and 
organized crime cases, and that public security bureaus in 
economically developed areas such as Shanghai and Beijing 
municipalities have already adopted this practice.\148\ It has 
no formal plans for nationwide implementation.
    The Chinese government recognizes that problems of 
misconduct, including physical abuse, exist within Chinese 
prisons and RTL centers, and it is making progress toward 
increasing accountability for such behavior. In February 2006, 
the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) established punishments ranging 
from warnings to dismissal and criminal liability for prison 
and RTL police found to violate prohibitions against beating, 
or instigating others to beat, prisoners.\149\ Under these new 
regulations, police activities will be subject to regular 
supervision and investigation by the MOJ and local justice 
bureaus, to ensure that they comply with legal requirements. 
Beijing municipal authorities have also imposed quality control 
measures on prison police that authorize warnings, demotions, 
and dismissals for misconduct including insults, beatings, 
prolonged confinement, and isolation of inmates.\150\
Access to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense
    Most defendants in China go to trial without a lawyer, and 
domestic sources cite fear of law enforcement retribution and 
the lack of legal protections for lawyers as major factors in 
the low rate of representation.\151\ Chinese law grants 
criminal defendants the right to hire an attorney, but 
guarantees pro bono legal defense only if the defendant is a 
minor, faces a possible death sentence, or is blind, deaf, or 
mute.\152\ In other cases in which defendants cannot afford 
legal representation, courts may appoint defense counsel or the 
defendant may apply for legal aid.\153\ In late 2005, the 
Chinese government expanded the scope of legal aid in criminal 
cases and required public security bureaus and procuratorates 
to notify all criminal suspects of their right to apply for 
legal aid.\154\ Criminal suspects who cannot afford legal 
services can now make a request for legal aid as early as the 
investigative stage of their case, and do not have to wait 
until formal indictment.\155\ Despite these advances, lawyers 
represent criminal defendants in, at most, 30 percent of all 
cases, and the rate of representation continues to drop.\156\
    Government abuses of provisions in the Criminal Procedure 
Law (CPL) have prevented some criminal defendants who are able 
to find lawyers from meeting with them. Under Chinese law, 
suspects have a right to meet with their lawyers after police 
interrogation or from the first day of their formal 
detention.\157\ Nevertheless, after the first interrogation, 
police have manipulated legal exceptions to deny lawyers access 
to their clients or otherwise obstruct or encumber such 
access.\158\ The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
identified China's use of the ``state secrets'' exception as 
one area of particular concern, noting that authorities apply 
the exception to improperly interfere with access to defense 
counsel.\159\ In late 2005, Beijing lawyer Gao Zhisheng 
attempted to register as defense counsel for democracy activist 
Xu Wanping, but authorities refused to grant him access to Xu 
on the grounds that the case involved ``state secrets.'' \160\ 
Authorities also held freelance writer Yang Tongyan (who uses 
the pen name Yang Tianshui) without access to a lawyer or 
contact with his family, again citing ``state secrets.'' \161\ 
According to Yang's lawyer, the inability of lawyers to get 
involved during the investigative stage is a ``tacitly 
understood, unwritten rule'' in political cases.\162\ Chinese 
scholars have urged amending the CPL to allow for lawyers to be 
present throughout the criminal process, beginning with the 
interrogation of a criminal suspect, to help guard against 
coerced confessions under torture and other abuses.\163\
    Chinese law imposes procedural obstacles that make it 
difficult for lawyers to build and present an adequate defense. 
In practice, defense lawyers cannot start building a case until 
the official investigation ends and a case is transferred to 
the procuratorate.\164\ Even then, police and procurators often 
deny lawyers access to government case files and information, 
despite provisions in the CPL that are intended to guarantee 
access to those materials.\165\ Defense lawyers can gather 
information in support of their case from a witness, but must 
obtain the consent of the witness or permission from a 
procuratorate or court.\166\ In June and July, authorities 
obstructed attempts by lawyers to meet with witnesses and 
gather evidence in defense of legal advocate Chen 
Guangcheng.\167\ Li Jinsong, one of Chen's defense lawyers, 
reported that unidentified assailants attacked him during a 
visit to Chen's home village, and that police officers stood by 
and watched.\168\ In order to interview crime victims, defense 
lawyers must obtain both the consent of the victim and 
permission from a procuratorate or court.\169\ In addition, 
about 95 percent of witnesses in criminal cases do not appear 
in court to testify, in part due to hardship or fear of 
reprisals.\170\ The inability of defense lawyers to cross-
examine witnesses undermines their ability to represent their 
clients.\171\ Chinese scholars involved in the discussion of 
potential amendments to the CPL suggest that a provision 
requiring witnesses to appear in court should be written into 
the law.\172\
    In 2006, Chinese authorities increased restrictions on 
lawyers who work on politically sensitive cases or cases that 
draw attention from the foreign news media. The All China 
Lawyers Association issued a guiding opinion that restricts and 
subjects to punishment lawyers who handle collective cases 
without authorization [see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice--
Access to Legal Representation]. Defense lawyers have also 
reported that local authorities apply added pressure in cases 
that involve systemic problems or large groups of people.\173\ 
In April 2006, local justice bureaus in at least two provinces 
formalized this growing practice by issuing opinions to 
restrict the scope of activities that lawyers are permitted to 
undertake in particularly sensitive or high-profile cases [see 
Section VII(c)--Access to Justice--Access to Legal 
Representation].\174\ The opinion issued by the justice bureau 
in Shenyang city, Liaoning province, emphasized the role of 
Chinese lawyers as protectors of social stability and builders 
of a harmonious society, and implied that these functions may 
outweigh the defense of legally protected rights.\175\
    Law enforcement officials intimidated lawyers defending 
these cases by charging them, or threatening to charge them, 
with various crimes [see Section IV--Introduction], including 
``evidence fabrication'' under Article 306 of the Criminal 
Law.\176\ Such charges often prove to be groundless.\177\ At 
the March 2006 plenary session of the National People's 
Congress, one delegate submitted a motion to eliminate the 
Criminal Law's provision on evidence fabrication and noted its 
chilling effect on criminal defense work.\178\ Since mid-2005, 
local authorities have also used harassment and violent 
measures against those who participated in criminal or civil 
rights defense in sensitive matters such as the Shaanxi oil 
case and Taishi recall election\179\ [see Section IV--
Introduction]. Asia Weekly included prominent legal advocates 
and scholars Chen Guangcheng,\180\ Fan Yafeng,\181\ Gao 
Zhisheng,\182\ Guo Feixiong,\183\ Guo Guoting,\184\ Li 
Baiguang,\185\ Li Heping,\186\ Xu Zhiyong,\187\ Zhang 
Xingshui,\188\ Zheng Enchong,\189\ and Zhu Jiuhu\190\ among 
China's 14 ``Icons of 2005,'' \191\ but all have been placed 
under surveillance or other government restrictions after 
drawing news media attention to themselves and their legal 
cases. Zhu Jiuhu was detained during the past year. Chen 
Guangcheng was sentenced on August 24, 2006, to four years and 
three months' imprisonment, and Zheng Enchong is currently 
under house arrest after being released from prison on June 5, 
2006. Gao Zhisheng has been held incommunicado since 
authorities reportedly abducted him on August 15 from his 
sister's home in Shandong province. Guo Feixiong was arrested 
and later released in late 2005, and is currently in detention 
after being taken from his home on September 14.
Fairness of Criminal Trials and Appeals
    China's criminal justice system is strongly biased toward 
presumptions of guilt, particularly in cases that are high-
profile or politically sensitive.\192\ The conviction rate for 
first instance criminal cases rose slightly and remained above 
99 percent in 2005.\193\ After Chinese reports disclosed in 
2005 that official malfeasance had led to the wrongful murder 
conviction of She Xianglin, a local court official blamed the 
miscarriage of justice on negligence by investigative 
personnel, intense public pressure, and a heavy presumption of 
guilt throughout the criminal process.\194\ The local court, 
city government, and public security bureau all acknowledged 
wrongdoing in She's case and agreed to provide compensation or 
subsidy based on his wrongful imprisonment, physical and 
emotional damages, lost wages, and reintegration into 
society.\195\ She Xianglin's case sets a potential precedent 
for similar claims based on wrongful conviction and 
imprisonment. Reports of wrongful murder convictions in Hebei, 
Henan, Liaoning, and Shaanxi provinces appeared in the news 
throughout 2005, and similarly called into question the 
fairness of those trials and the criminal process.\196\
    Reports of wrongful convictions indicate that public 
security officials and procurators rely heavily on pretrial 
witness statements to support their case,\197\ despite 
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) that say such 
statements cannot serve as the sole basis for a criminal 
judgment.\198\ In February 2006, an intermediate people's court 
in Chongqing municipality reversed its original death sentence 
against a man convicted of robbery, and called into question 
the procuratorate's heavy reliance on pretrial statements that 
were later retracted during the trial.\199\ One Chinese legal 
scholar has reported that retraction of pretrial statements is 
increasing, and that in recent years, the reliability of 
pretrial statements has become increasingly suspect.\200\
    According to one criminal defense lawyer, even when lawyers 
and judges believe that a defendant may be innocent, ``external 
factors'' may nonetheless lead to a criminal conviction.\201\ 
Senior court officials and Party political-legal committees 
continue to influence judicial decisionmaking, particularly in 
sensitive or important criminal cases\202\ [see Section 
VII(c)--Access to Justice--The Chinese Judicial System]. In 
addition, Chinese procurators may appeal acquittals as a matter 
of right or request ``adjudication supervision'' from higher 
courts until they obtain a guilty verdict.\203\ In practice, 
procurators have incentives to do so, since they face potential 
liability and professional sanction for wrongful detention if a 
criminal suspect is acquitted.\204\
    Chinese defendants who are judged to be guilty face limited 
prospects for reversal of their conviction, due to procedural 
and other barriers. In one case during the past year, Beijing 
court officials pressured house church pastor Cai Zhuohua into 
giving up his right to an appeal,\205\ even though provisions 
under the CPL guarantee this right.\206\ If an appeals court 
finds a case to be based on questionable or incomplete 
evidence, it may send the case back to a court of first 
instance for retrial.\207\ However, courts of first instance 
have incentives not to change their original judgments because 
they face potential liability and professional sanction for 
incorrect decisions\208\ [see Section VII(c) --Access to 
Justice--The Chinese Judicial System]. Procedural provisions do 
not limit the number of times an appeals court may send the 
case back for retrial, so some cases based on questionable or 
incomplete evidence have bounced back and forth between courts, 
sometimes for several years while the defendant remains in 
prison.\209\
Capital Punishment
    Chinese criminal law includes 68 capital offenses, over 
half of which are non-violent crimes such as tax evasion, 
bribery, and embezzlement.\210\ The Chinese government 
reportedly has adopted an ``execute fewer, execute cautiously'' 
policy, but the government publishes no official statistics on 
the number of executions and considers this figure a state 
secret.\211\ Some Chinese sources have estimated that the 
annual number of executions in China is in the thousands.\212\
    In 2006, the Chinese judiciary made reform of the death 
penalty review process a top priority and introduced new 
appellate court procedures for hearing death penalty cases. 
After news accounts of several wrongful murder convictions in 
2005, the Supreme People's Court (SPC) convened seminars to 
help lower-level courts draw lessons from judgments made in 
error.\213\ In October 2005, the SPC announced that it would 
consolidate and reclaim the death penalty review power from 
provincial-level high courts, as part of a five-year court 
reform program for 2004 to 2008.\214\ Court officials emphasize 
that returning the power of death penalty review to the SPC 
will play a significant role in limiting the use of death 
sentences, consolidating criteria used by courts to administer 
those sentences, and ensuring constitutionally protected human 
rights.\215\ The SPC's five-year court program also mandates 
that in 2006, provincial-level high courts will begin to 
conduct hearings on all death penalty appeals.\216\ At these 
hearings, courts are required to conduct a ``comprehensive 
examination'' of the trial court's conclusions of fact and law, 
and to ensure that key witnesses, expert witnesses, 
procurators, and lawyers appear in court.\217\ Some provincial-
level high courts began implementing these requirements in 
January 2006, and have commented that court hearings help them 
to minimize wrongful executions and to provide greater 
protection to criminal defendants.\218\
    The Chinese government took positive steps toward reform of 
death penalty procedures in 2006, but legal scholars and 
professionals question how these steps will be implemented in 
practice. In 2005, provincial-level high courts reviewed nearly 
90 percent of death sentences handed down in China.\219\ The 
SPC has added three criminal tribunals to cope with the 
additional work from 
reclaiming death penalty review from the high courts, and has 
already transferred hundreds of court personnel to staff the 
new tribunals.\220\ Scholars at the National Judges College, 
however, expressed concern that three new criminal tribunals 
would require training at least 300 new judges.\221\ Moreover, 
early reports indicate that provincial-level high courts do not 
agree about which cases require court hearings under the law, 
or about the specific procedures that they should apply to 
hearings.\222\ The SPC has not yet issued a judicial 
interpretation to help settle unresolved issues in the death 
penalty review process and further clarify its own 
procedures.\223\
Harvesting of Organs From Executed Prisoners
    In July 2005, Huang Jiefu, Vice Minister of Health, became 
the first senior official to acknowledge that the majority of 
organs used in transplants in China originate from executed 
prisoners.\224\ Other officials maintain that organ harvesting 
is limited to a few cases in which the express consent of the 
condemned convicts has been obtained, and pursuant to strict 
legal regulations.\225\ In 2006, new reports from overseas 
medical and legal experts condemned the government's continuing 
practice of harvesting organs from executed prisoners without 
their consent.\226\
    Existing Chinese law legalizes the harvesting of organs 
from executed prisoners, but does not regulate the practice in 
a way that conforms to international standards. Under the World 
Health Organization's guiding principles on human organ 
transplantation, organ donations by prisoners, even when 
reportedly voluntary, may nonetheless violate international 
standards if the organs are obtained through undue influence 
and pressure, or if insufficient information prevents the donor 
from understanding the consequences of consent.\227\ Ministry 
of Health regulations that became effective on July 1, 2006, 
include new medical standards for organ transplants in 
China.\228\ These regulations do not provide guidance, however, 
on what type of consent is required for taking organs from 
executed prisoners, and leave intact 1984 provisions that 
legalize organ harvesting if no one claims the prisoner's body 
for burial.\229\
Criminal Justice Exchanges
    Chinese scholars and officials continued to engage foreign 
governments and legal experts on a range of criminal justice 
issues during late 2005 and 2006. Chinese law enforcement 
agencies expressed a growing interest in cooperating with other 
countries to combat transnational crime,\230\ and in expanding 
cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies on money 
laundering, fighting terrorism, and other issues.\231\ Numerous 
international conferences and legal exchanges with Western 
NGOs, judges, and legal experts took place, including programs 
on public accountability, pretrial discovery, evidence 
exclusion, criminal trials and procedure, bail, capital 
punishment, prison reform, and other subjects.\232\ 
Participants in these programs encouraged more such 
exchanges.\233\
    The Chinese government continues to engage the 
international community on human rights and rule of law issues, 
including those related to the criminal justice system. The 
government hosted visits by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture from November to December 2005\234\ and the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees in March 2006.\235\ Both UN officials 
commended the Chinese government for its open attitude toward 
increased dialogue,\236\ but Manfred Nowak, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, also reported that his work was 
monitored and obstructed by Chinese authorities.\237\ On May 9, 
2006, China was elected to serve for a three-year term on the 
newly established UN Human Rights Council.\238\ The 
government's application for membership in the Council noted 
that it has acceded to 22 international human rights accords, 
including five of the seven core conventions.\239\ In addition, 
the government reports that it plans to amend its Criminal, 
Civil, and Administrative Procedure Laws and reform the 
judiciary to prepare for ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\240\ As a member of the 
new Council, the government has pledged to fulfill its 
obligations under the terms of these accords,\241\ and is 
obligated under the rules of the Council to submit to peer 
review of its human rights record.\242\

       V(c) Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government does not respect the 
        internationally recognized right of workers to organize 
        their own unions. The All-China Federation of Trade 
        Unions (ACFTU), a Party-led mass organization, is the 
        only legal labor federation in China. It controls local 
        union branches and aligns worker and union activity 
        with government and Party policy. The ACFTU began a 
        campaign in March 2006 to establish union branches in 
        foreign enterprises doing business in China. Chinese 
        workers who attempt to form independent workers' 
        organizations, or whom the government suspects of being 
        leaders of such organizations, risk imprisonment. The 
        government secretly tried labor rights activist Li 
        Wangyang and sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment in 
        September 2001 for staging a peaceful hunger strike. Li 
        had previously served most of a 13-year sentence for 
        organizing an independent union. In May 2003, the 
        government sentenced labor activist Yao Fuxin to a 
        seven-year prison term for peacefully rallying workers 
        to demand wage and pension arrearages from a bankrupt 
        state-owned enterprise. Li and Yao remain in prison.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Weak protection of worker rights has 
        contributed to an increase in the number of labor 
        disputes and protests. According to ACFTU figures, the 
        number of labor disputes rose sharply in 2005. The 
        ACFTU reports that there were 300,000 labor-related 
        lawsuits filed, a 20.5 percent increase over 2004 and a 
        950 percent increase compared to 1995. Strikes, 
        marches, demonstrations, and collective petitions 
        increased from fewer than 1,500 in 1994 to about 11,000 
        in 2003, while the number of workers involved increased 
        from nearly 53,000 in 1994 to an estimated 515,000 in 
        2003. Poor workplace health and safety conditions and 
        continuing wage and pension arrearages were the most 
        prominent issues resulting in labor disputes during the 
        past year. Chinese industry continues to have a high 
        accident rate, with death rates in the mining and 
        construction industries leading other sectors. 
        According to official statistics, 110,027 people were 
        killed in 677,379 workplace accidents through December 
        2005, and more than 10,000 workers died in the mining 
        and construction sectors during 2005.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Forced labor is an integral part of the 
        Chinese administrative detention system. Authorities 
        sentence some prisoners without judicial review to 
        reeducation through labor (laojiao) centers, where they 
        are forced to work long hours without pay to fulfill 
        heavy production quotas, and sometimes are tortured for 
        refusing to work. China's Labor Law prohibits forced 
        labor practices in the workplace, and authorities have 
        arrested employers who trap workers at forced labor 
        sites. In 2002, the Chinese government began to 
        cooperate with the International Labor Organization on 
        broad issues of concern regarding forced labor, 
        including on potential reforms to the reeducation 
        through labor system, and on improving institutional 
        capacity to combat human trafficking for labor 
        exploitation.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The use of child labor in some regions of 
        China is reportedly on the rise. Labor shortages in the 
        economically developed southern and eastern coastal 
        provinces are causing employers to turn to child 
        laborers, according to NGO reports. This development 
        coincides with intensified efforts by the Ministry of 
        Justice and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
        to fight the illegal employment of children, suggesting 
        that the government is more concerned about such abuses 
        than before. Government authorities consider statistics 
        on child labor that have not been officially approved 
        for release to be ``state secrets,'' and this policy 
        thwarts efforts to understand the extent and causes of 
        the problem.
        &lt;bullet&gt; In 2006, the U.S. and Chinese governments 
        continued to conduct a series of bilateral cooperative 
        activities on wage and hour laws, occupational safety 
        and health, mine safety and health, and pension program 
        oversight.
Internationally Recognized Labor Rights
    The Chinese government is committed through its membership 
in the International Labor Organization (ILO) to respect a 
basic set of internationally recognized labor rights for 
workers: the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining, the elimination of forced labor, the abolition of 
child labor, and non-discrimination in employment and 
occupation. The ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to 
respect, to promote and to realize'' these fundamental rights 
based on ``the very fact of [ILO] membership.'' \1\ China is a 
founding member of the ILO, and has been a member of the ILO 
Governing Board since June 2002.\2\
    The ILO's eight core conventions provide guidance on the 
full scope of worker rights and principles enumerated in the 
1998 Declaration.\3\ Many ILO members have not ratified all of 
these core conventions, but each member is committed to respect 
the fundamental right or principle addressed in each.\4\ China 
has ratified four of the eight ILO core conventions, including 
two core conventions on the abolition of child labor (No. 138 
and No. 182) and two on non-discrimination in employment and 
occupation (No. 100 and No. 111).\5\ The ILO reports that the 
Chinese government is preparing to ratify the two core 
conventions on forced labor (No. 29 and No. 105).\6\
    Chinese labor law generally incorporates the basic 
obligations of the ILO's eight core conventions, with the 
exception of the provisions relating to the freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining.\7\ The 
Chinese government's failure to implement existing labor 
regulations, however, and the general lack of awareness 
regarding worker rights among citizens, renders most of the 
protective aspects of Chinese labor law ineffective. The 
administrative detention system prescribes forced labor as a 
punishment for those accused of ``minor crimes'' [see Section 
V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--
Administrative Detention],\8\ in contravention of the 1998 
Declaration, relevant ILO conventions,\9\ and Article 8 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).\10\
    In March 2001, the Chinese government ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which guarantees the right of workers to strike, the 
right of workers to organize independent unions, the right of 
trade unions to function freely, the right of trade unions to 
establish national federations or confederations, and the right 
of the latter to form or join international trade union 
organizations. The Chinese government took a reservation to 
Article 8(1)(a) of the ICESCR, which guarantees workers the 
right to form free trade unions. The government asserted that 
application of the article should be consistent with the 
Chinese Constitution and the Trade Union Law. The Trade Union 
Law does not allow for the creation of independent trade 
unions.\11\
 Freedom of Association
    The Chinese government does not respect the internationally 
recognized right of workers to organize their own unions. 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights guarantees that ``[e]veryone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form 
and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.'' 
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), a Communist 
Party-led mass organization, is the only legal labor federation 
in China. It controls local union branches and aligns worker 
and union activity with government and Party policy.\12\ The 
Trade Union Law requires the ACFTU to ``uphold the leadership 
of the Communist Party.'' \13\ Wang Zhaoguo, the current ACFTU 
chairman, is a Politburo member, and the Party, not union 
members, selected him as ACFTU chairman.\14\ Article 10 of the 
Trade Union Law establishes the ACFTU as the ``unified national 
organization,'' and Article 11 mandates that all unions must be 
approved by the next higher-level union body, giving the ACFTU 
an absolute veto over the establishment of any local union and 
the legal authority to block the formation of independent 
workers' associations.\15\ Article 15 of the ACFTU constitution 
stipulates that the establishment of an ACFTU branch in a 
factory ``must be endorsed by its general membership or 
membership congress.'' \16\ Most workers, however, do not vote 
in union elections and most officials are appointed to their 
union posts.\17\
    Since 2004, ACFTU and Party officials have made major 
efforts to expand their control over non-unionized groups of 
workers. In 2004, the ACFTU announced the target of recruiting 
6.6 million workers per year from 2004 to 2008.\18\ It also 
launched a major recruitment drive aimed at migrant 
workers.\19\ Authorities permitted migrant workers to become 
union members for the first time in 2003, but ACFTU officials 
announced in 2006 that only 13.8 percent of the total migrant 
workforce has been ``unionized.'' \20\
    The ACFTU began a campaign in March 2006 to establish 
unions in foreign enterprises doing business in China, 
including Wal-Mart, Kentucky Fried Chicken, McDonald's, and 
Samsung.\21\ ACFTU officials noted in July that some 60 percent 
of the 500,000 foreign enterprises in China have not 
established ACFTU branches,\22\ and made the promotion of 
unions within foreign enterprises a priority for the second 
half of 2006.\23\ ACFTU Chairman Wang Zhaoguo proposed an 
amendment to the Trade Union Law on July 5 that would 
specifically require foreign enterprises to establish ACFTU-
affiliated unions.\24\ ACFTU pressure has led to the creation 
of some local branches in foreign enterprises doing business in 
China. In July and August, unions were established in 17 Wal-
Mart stores in China.\25\ The ACFTU's campaign to establish 
unions in foreign enterprises followed a March directive issued 
by top Party leaders ordering the establishment of Party 
committees and trade unions in foreign enterprises as a means 
to counter social unrest.\26\ Labor experts have noted that the 
ACFTU's 2006 efforts to expand the number of local branches in 
foreign enterprises is an effort to respond to declining ACFTU 
membership, increasing labor protests, efforts by Chinese 
workers to organize independent unions, and an increase in the 
percentage of the workforce composed of non-unionized migrant 
workers.\27\
    Some local authorities have experimented with using direct 
elections to choose the leaders of union branches, but Party 
authorities and higher-level ACFTU officials retain control 
over the selection and approval of candidates.\28\ ACFTU 
officials in Hubei province began an experimental program of 
direct elections for union officials in 2004, and issued a 
directive in July 2005 to implement the program on a province-
wide basis by 2009.\29\ The Hubei regulations provide that 
higher-level ACFTU officials and Party authorities are 
responsible for choosing the electoral leadership groups that 
determine candidate eligibility. These authorities also approve 
the specific proposals of individual union branches about how 
to conduct their direct elections.\30\
    Chinese workers who attempt to form independent workers' 
organizations, or whom the government suspects of being leaders 
of such organizations, risk imprisonment. The government 
secretly tried labor rights activist Li Wangyang and sentenced 
him to 10 years' imprisonment in September 2001 for staging a 
peaceful hunger strike. Li had previously served most of a 13-
year sentence for organizing an independent union.\31\ In May 
2003, the government sentenced labor activist Yao Fuxin to a 
seven-year prison term for rallying workers to demand payment 
of wage arrearages and pension benefits from a bankrupt state-
owned enterprise in Liaoning province.\32\ Yao reportedly 
suffers from serious medical problems resulting from his 
imprisonment.\33\ Li and Yao remain in prison.
Right to Collective Bargaining
    Chinese labor law does not prohibit collective bargaining, 
but the absence of independent unions to represent worker 
interests makes the concept of bargaining with employers on 
behalf of workers incompatible with the Chinese labor 
system.\34\ Trade union officials at the enterprise level 
function as part of the enterprise management structure for 
whom, according to three Western and Chinese labor experts, 
``the idea of representing and protecting the legitimate rights 
and interests of their members in opposition to those of the 
employer is something unfamiliar, if not totally alien.'' \35\ 
Although collective bargaining does not exist, trade union 
officials are permitted under Article 20 of the Trade Union Law 
to facilitate a process of ``equal consultations'' between 
workers and employers that can result in a ``collective 
contract.'' \36\ The Provisions on Collective Contracts, issued 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) in January 
2004, detail the specific content which may be included, and 
the procedures for negotiating, such contracts.\37\ Once 
concluded, the collective contract is legally binding on both 
employer and employees, but the contract generally 
includes only the ``bare-boned reflections of labor statutory 
minimums,'' according to one Western scholar.\38\ Another group 
of Western and Chinese academics examining collective contracts 
and the consultation process concluded in 2004 that trade 
unions defer to the employer on any contentious issue. Both the 
union and the employer are reluctant to include any provisions 
in the collective contract that ``might subsequently provide 
grounds for a grievance or dispute.'' \39\ Collective contracts 
covered more than 103 million Chinese workers at the end of 
September 2005, out of a total urban labor force of around 250 
million.\40\ The majority of collective contracts are not 
actually negotiated, but rather model agreements endorsed by 
the employer and union without the direct involvement of 
workers.\41\ In addition, most collective contracts are 
``single-issue'' agreements, usually pertaining to wages, 
rather than comprehensive agreements covering all aspects of 
labor relations.\42\
    The Chinese labor dispute resolution process does not 
provide workers with meaningful union support to address 
workplace grievances. Labor disputes in China are channeled 
through the government's three-stage labor dispute resolution 
process: mediation, 
arbitration, and litigation.\43\ Workers enter the first stage 
of dispute resolution without union representation. Article 80 
of the Labor Law designates the union branch chief to serve as 
chair of the labor dispute mediation committee.\44\ As chair, 
the union official mediates on an equal basis between employer 
and employee, and does not represent the employee in the 
dispute. If mediation fails, either party may apply to an 
arbitration committee for a hearing.\45\ The high cost of 
arbitration discourages workers from applying. According to one 
National People's Congress (NPC) delegate, labor arbitration 
typically costs 420 yuan (US$52.39), about half the average 
monthly wage for Chinese workers.\46\ Workers who choose to 
arbitrate face other obstacles to achieving a fair outcome. 
Article 81 of the Labor Law designates a ``tripartite 
structure'' for the arbitration committee: the employer's 
representative, the union's representative, and the 
government's local labor bureau representative, who serves as 
chair.\47\ In effect, the local labor bureau representative, in 
consultation with two representatives from the enterprise 
management team, decides how to rule on a worker's 
complaint.\48\
    Chinese authorities currently are experimenting with 
reforms to the labor dispute resolution system. The Supreme 
People's Court issued a judicial interpretation on August 14 
that allows workers seeking to recover back wages to bypass the 
labor arbitration process and sue directly in court.\49\ Some 
authorities have supported the creation of arbitration 
tribunals, which are specialized sub-divisions of arbitration 
committees, to resolve labor disputes. Chinese news media 
reports note that the creation of these tribunals is an effort 
to make arbitration determinations ``more neutral'' by 
separating the administrative functions of the arbitration 
committees from hearing and deciding cases.\50\ These tribunals 
also conduct mediation in addition to their arbitration work. 
Shenzhen authorities created the first such tribunal in 
2001,\51\ and the MOLSS reported in May 2006 that Chinese 
authorities have since established 116 of the tribunals 
throughout China.\52\ Descriptions of the work responsibilities 
for some of the provincial tribunals emphasize that they should 
handle ``major,'' ``cross-provincial,'' or ``emergency'' 
events, suggesting that the tribunals may be focused on 
handling specifically designated, high-profile cases.\53\
    The courts are the final recourse for resolving labor 
disputes, pursuant to Article 83 of the Labor Law.\54\ The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) reports that there 
were 300,000 labor-related lawsuits filed in 2005, a 20.5 
percent increase over 2004 and a 950 percent increase compared 
to 1995.\55\ Like arbitration, litigation costs are high, which 
``results in many workers being unable to afford a lawyer or to 
even bring the case to court,'' according to one Chinese legal 
scholar.\56\ The scholar 
recommended in December 2005 to the NPC Standing Committee that 
the NPC should enact a labor dispute resolution law that would 
allow courts to hear labor cases with simplified, less 
expensive procedures that better protect worker rights. The law 
should include evidentiary rules that do not discriminate 
against workers, the scholar said.\57\ She criticized the 
current three-stage process for labor dispute resolution as 
``more complex than the procedure for resolving regular civil 
disputes,'' and recommended that parties to certain types of 
labor disputes be able to choose to litigate directly without 
meeting the current precondition that parties first complete 
arbitration.\58\
Draft Labor Contract Law
    The National People's Congress (NPC) circulated a draft of 
a new Labor Contract Law for public comment in early 2006,\59\ 
the first law that would govern exclusively the establishment, 
revocation, and termination of labor contracts, and the rights 
of workers and employees who sign them.\60\ During the one-
month period for public comment, the NPC received over 190,000 
comments, and claimed that over 65 percent of these were 
submitted by Chinese workers.\61\
    Current Chinese law mandates labor contracts, but 
implementation and enforcement of this mandate have been poor. 
Chapter 3 of the Labor Law outlines the requirements and 
procedures for individual and collective labor contracts, and 
Article 16 mandates labor contracts between workers and 
employers.\62\ A recent NPC survey found that less than 20 
percent of small- and medium-size private enterprises use labor 
contracts.\63\ According to a survey published in 2006, 46 
percent of migrant workers did not have labor contracts with 
their employers.\64\ Current law is deficient in that the 
contractual relationship between enterprises and workers hired 
though labor contractors is not defined. The widespread use of 
both legal and illegal labor contractors results in numerous 
cases of non-payment, underpayment, or late payment of wages, 
especially in the construction sector. Moreover, when labor 
contractors fail to give contracts to the workers they hire and 
assign to enterprises, the workers often cannot prove a 
contractual relationship with the enterprise, which is the 
principal employer for whom they have performed the work.\65\
    The State Council compiled the draft Labor Contract Law for 
NPC consideration to increase the formation rate for written 
labor contracts. The draft law provides for a ``contractual 
relationship'' in situations where employers do not sign 
written contracts with their employees,\66\ and it standardizes 
labor contract rules and procedures in a way that ``tilts more 
toward workers,'' according to an All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions official.\67\ The Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
began a three-year effort, concurrent with consideration of the 
draft law, to compel all employers to sign labor contracts with 
their workers, as required under the existing Labor Law.\68\
    Some companies that have complied with Chinese labor 
contract regulations are concerned that the draft law includes 
provisions that would be both expensive and cumbersome to 
business owners,\69\ and would take away market-driven 
flexibility in hiring and firing.\70\ These provisions include 
a requirement that workers receive severance pay if fixed-term 
contracts expire and are not renewed, and a mandatory payment 
equaling an employee's annual salary to enforce non-compete 
agreements.\71\
    One article in the Chinese state-controlled media 
criticized portions of the proposed draft for being too weak, 
pointing out that it does not cover part-time workers or 
students engaged in work-study programs, that it fails to 
provide definitions for key terms such as ``technical'' and 
``non-technical'' positions, and that the sanctions it applies 
on employers who withhold workers' wages in bad faith do not 
exceed the requirements of existing labor regulations.\72\
 ACFTU Role in Protecting Worker Rights
    The careers of union leaders are tied to their rank in the 
Communist Party, and local union officials generally are 
recruited from enterprise management. This system compromises 
the ability and willingness of unions to defend worker rights 
when they conflict with Party or employer interests.\73\ 
Article 6 of the Trade Union Law calls on unions to ``represent 
and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers,'' 
\74\ but in practice this directive means that unions help 
workers only in ways that do not conflict with government and 
Party policy, such as by managing welfare assistance programs 
for workers and organizing social events. Some local unions, 
however, have developed innovative programs to help workers, 
within the limits of government and Party policy. For example, 
the Tianjin Trade Union Council has developed new procedures to 
aid unemployed workers, monitor safety problems and accidents, 
and resolve employee-employer disputes.\75\
    Some national-level All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) programs have had a positive impact on worker rights, 
while also maintaining consistency with government policy 
goals. ACFTU efforts in the past year to expand the 
availability of legal aid services to workers, and to improve 
worker knowledge of the dispute resolution process, are part of 
the central government's policy responses to Party concerns 
about growing social unrest\76\ [see Section VII(c)--Access to 
Justice]. According to news media reports from early 2006, 
nearly 4,000 legal aid offices were established by ACFTU 
branches in 2005. Provincial branches must establish a legal 
aid office by the end of 2006, but county branches have three 
years to do so.\77\ In 2005, the Shenzhen Federation of Trade 
Unions' legal aid efforts included outreach to ensure that 
workers understand their rights in cases of unlawful discharge, 
occupational injury, and compensation arrearages.\78\ In June 
2006, the ACFTU and the State Administration of Work Safety 
began a program to inspect mining, construction, and 
manufacturing worksites to ensure safe conditions for migrant 
workers.\79\
Elimination of Forced Labor
    Forced labor is an integral part of the Chinese 
administrative detention system [see Section V(b)--Rights of 
Criminal Suspects and Defendants--Administrative Detention]. 
Authorities sentence some prisoners without judicial review to 
reeducation through labor (RTL, or laojiao) centers, where they 
are forced to work long hours without pay to fulfill heavy 
production quotas, and sometimes are tortured for refusing to 
work.\80\ Prisoners in RTL centers have suffered physical 
injuries from extended periods of repetitive labor, and former 
prisoners report that fainting from exhaustion is common.\81\ 
The Chinese government continues to deny the International 
Committee of the Red Cross access to such centers.
    China's Labor Law prohibits forced labor practices in the 
workplace,\82\ and authorities have arrested employers who trap 
workers at forced labor sites. Article 96 of the Labor Law 
prohibits employers from ``compelling workers to work by the 
use of force, threat or by resorting to the means of 
restricting personal freedom,'' \83\ but only specifies light 
penalties for violators including a warning, fine, or 15 days 
in custody for the person in charge.\84\ Chinese press 
reports over the past year, however, have described some 
instances of overseers coercing workers to remain in factories 
or fields for work without pay, and beating or torturing those 
who try to 
escape.\85\
    In 2002, the Chinese government began to cooperate with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) on broad issues of 
concern regarding forced labor, including potential reforms to 
China's RTL system, to prepare for the eventual ratification of 
the ILO's two conventions on forced labor.\86\ Since September 
2004, the ILO's Special Action Program to Combat Forced Labor 
has been working with the Chinese Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security to improve institutional capacity within China to 
address the law enforcement aspects of the trafficking cycle, 
and to assist employers' and workers' organizations in 
identifying cases of forced labor\87\ [see Section V(e)--Status 
of Women--Human Trafficking].
Prison Labor Products
    Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits the import 
of goods made by prisoners into the United States.\88\ The 
United States and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 
1992 to prevent the import into the United States of prison 
labor products. A subsequent agreement in 1994 permits U.S. 
officials, with Chinese government permission, to visit prison 
facilities suspected of producing products for export to the 
United States.\89\ The U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 created 
a Prison Labor Task Force to monitor and promote enforcement of 
U.S. law in this area.\90\ In 2005, the Chinese government 
cooperated with the Task Force to resolve a number of alleged 
cases of prison labor products being exported to the United 
States.\91\
    Although goods made in Chinese prisons probably do not 
constitute a large percentage of overall Chinese imports into 
the United States, the types of products produced by prisoners, 
and the commercialization of the Chinese prison system, make 
prison labor products difficult to detect. Many prison labor 
goods are produced under abusive conditions,\92\ and Chinese 
prisoners cannot refuse to produce goods for the commercial 
market.\93\ Although the term laogai, or reform through labor, 
has been expunged from the Criminal Law as a term describing 
one form of criminal punishment, Western and Chinese experts 
estimate the number of commercial prison factories in China to 
be in the thousands.\94\ One senior Chinese official expressed 
concern in 2004 about the commercial use of prison labor as a 
source of official corruption, and noted instances of prison 
administrators mixing prison-made goods with those from 
ordinary commercial enterprises.\95\
 Abolition of Child Labor
    The use of child labor in some regions of China is 
reportedly on the rise, according to analyses over the past 
year by NGOs with expertise on Chinese labor issues.\96\ State-
controlled media reported in June that the Ministry of Justice 
and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security intensified their 
efforts ``to fight illegal employment of child laborers,'' 
suggesting that the government is more concerned about such 
abuses than before.\97\ Article 15 of the Labor Law prohibits 
employing children under the age of 16, and Article 94 provides 
for punishment of businesses that employ children, including 
revocation of their business licenses.\98\ Chinese law bars 
employers from hiring juvenile workers between 16 and 18 years 
old to engage in mining, or highly strenuous or hazardous work, 
and requires employers to provide such workers with regular 
health inspections.\99\ The State Council issued a rule in 
September 2002 requiring employers to check identity cards to 
verify age, and imposing fines of 5,000 yuan (US$625) a month 
for each child laborer employed.\100\ Government authorities 
consider statistics on child labor that have not been 
officially approved for release to be state secrets, and this 
policy thwarts efforts to understand the extent and causes of 
the problem.\101\
    Labor shortages in the economically developed southern and 
eastern coastal provinces are causing employers to turn to 
child laborers, according to NGO reports.\102\ Hong Kong news 
media has reported on employers who exploit child labor by 
recruiting underage students to work in factories as 
``interns.'' In one press report, teachers at a school in 
Shaanxi province arranged for about 600 students to be employed 
in a joint venture electronics factory in southern China. At 
the time of the report, more than 240 students were working on 
the factory's assembly lines for up to 14 hours a day of 
``practical training.'' \103\ Although factory owners may 
legally employ interns, employers abuse internship programs 
when they rely on students as a large percentage of their 
workforce and do not pay them fairly for work performed, 
according to one publication on corporate social responsibility 
issues in China.\104\
    Hong Kong based experts have asserted that the Chinese 
education system is partly to blame for the problem of child 
labor because insufficient state funding, expensive local 
surcharges, and an excessive focus on college entrance exams 
leads many students to drop out of school.\105\ Poverty also 
leads to child labor abuses. Some poor families send children, 
frequently girls, to find work as a means of support.\106\ 
Other children work because their families cannot afford to pay 
school tuition fees, or because schools have hired them out to 
fill budget shortfalls.\107\
Non-discrimination in Employment and Occupation
    The Constitution, Labor Law, and Law on the Protection of 
Interests and Rights of Women all contain provisions that 
guarantee women non-discrimination in employment and 
occupation\108\ [see Section V(e)--Status of Women]. The Rules 
on Collective Contracts issued in December 2003 contain 
``special protections'' for women, including provisions on 
pregnancy and breastfeeding in the workplace.\109\ The Chinese 
government has also begun national development programs to 
improve the status of women.\110\ Despite these efforts and 
legal protections, both urban and rural women in China have 
limited earning power compared to men, and women lag behind men 
in finding employment in higher-wage urban areas.\111\
    Some local authorities provide job training and 
reemployment services for women,\112\ and civil society groups 
may advocate for women's rights within the confines of 
government and Party policy [see Section V(e)--Status of 
Women--Gender Disparities]. For example, the Center for Women's 
Law and Legal Services at Peking University submitted a 
petition in March 2006 to the National People's Congress (NPC) 
Standing Committee requesting constitutional review of a 
regulation that requires women workers to retire five years 
before men.\113\ The petition recommended that a future Chinese 
Pension Law include a provision for a flexible retirement 
system that allows both men and women to retire at or around 60 
years of age.\114\ As of August 2006, the NPC Standing 
Committee had not responded to the petition,\115\ and it has no 
legal obligation to do so [see Section VII(c)--Access to 
Justice--Constitutional 
Review].
    Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution prohibits ethnic 
discrimination,\116\ and Article 12 of the Labor Law forbids 
discrimination in job hiring on the basis of ethnicity.\117\ 
Nevertheless, ethnic discrimination continues to exist 
throughout China in both private and governmental hiring 
practices. Some Han Chinese entrepreneurs in ethnic minority 
areas recruit Han workers from other areas rather than hiring 
local minorities.\118\ Tibetans have reported discrimination in 
job hiring.\119\ According to the head of the Qinghai-Tibet 
railway construction project, 10,000 of 100,000 workers 
employed were Tibetan,\120\ and most of the Tibetan workers 
were employed in menial labor positions.\121\ In the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), personnel decisions in 2005 
and 2006 explicitly favored Han Chinese over minorities. In 
April 2005, for example, the government specified that 500 of 
700 new civil service positions in the southern XUAR would be 
reserved for Han Chinese.\122\ In June 2006, the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps announced it would recruit 
840 civil servants from the XUAR, designating almost all of the 
job openings for Han Chinese and reserving 38 positions for 
members of specified minority groups.\123\
Conditions for China's Workers
    Weak protection of worker rights has contributed to an 
increase in the number of labor disputes and protests. 
According to All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 
figures, the number of labor disputes rose sharply in 2005. The 
ACFTU reports that there were 300,000 labor-related lawsuits 
filed, a 20.5 percent increase over 2004 and a 950 percent 
increase compared to 1995.\124\ Strikes, marches, 
demonstrations, and collective petitions increased from 1,482 
in 1994 to about 11,000 in 2003, while the number of workers 
involved increased from 52,637 in 1994 to an estimated 515,000 
in 2003.\125\ Participants in all labor disputes rose from 
77,794 in 1994 to nearly 800,000 in 2003.\126\ Poor workplace 
health and safety conditions and continuing wage and pension 
arrearages were the most prominent issues resulting in labor 
disputes during the past year. Workers in all parts of China 
have difficulty collecting the wages that they are owed for 
work performed. Workers in the construction sector have the 
most problems with wage arrearages,\127\ and the continuing 
building boom, along with new construction for the 2008 
Olympics in Beijing, will challenge central and local 
governments to ensure that workers are paid promptly.
            Workplace Health and Safety Conditions
    Workplace health and safety conditions in China remain 
poor, despite central government statements about the need to 
improve safety and despite efforts at the enterprise level to 
cut the rate of industrial accidents. Chinese industry 
continues to have a high accident rate, with death rates in the 
mining and construction industries leading other sectors. 
According to State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) 
statistics, 110,027 people were killed in 677,379 workplace 
accidents through December 2005, and more than 10,000 workers 
died in the mining and construction sectors during 2005.\128\
    The government has continued to take steps to address 
China's poor workplace safety record. In February 2006, SAWS 
ordered the closure of 35,842 companies that failed to meet a 
requirement to obtain safety licenses by the end of 2005, 
warning that it would 
ensure compliance by cutting off electric power to the 
companies' facilities.\129\ SAWS also announced in February 
2006 that the government is drafting legislation that would 
hold top provincial and city government and Party officials 
responsible for fatal accidents that result from lapses in 
workplace safety.\130\ Criminal Law amendments passed in June 
2006 strengthen punishments for work safety violation, 
including new penalties for personnel who hinder rescue efforts 
by covering up or failing to report accidents.\131\ In July, 
the government ratified a safety plan for the 11th Five-Year 
Program aimed at addressing major problems in workplace 
safety.\132\ In August, the government announced it would 
dedicate 467.4 billion yuan (US$58.81 billion) over the next 
five years to curb workplace accidents.\133\
    The Ministry of Health implemented a plan in May 2006 to 
improve rural migrant worker health that includes a number of 
goals for improving workplace health and safety conditions for 
migrant workers. These goals include implementing health and 
safety training and instruction programs in mid- and small-
scale businesses, and undertaking collaborative efforts with 
the World Health Organization and the International Labor 
Organization.\134\ Many migrant workers are employed in 
industries in which they are exposed to occupational diseases 
and other workplace safety hazards, according to an expert with 
the Chinese Center for Disease Control.\135\
            Occupational Health
    Occupational diseases and injuries are widespread in many 
Chinese industries. Estimates of the incidence rate of 
occupational diseases and injuries caused by chemicals, toxic 
fumes, and machinery vary and are difficult to confirm. For 
example, one Chinese press report estimates that 200 million 
workers suffer from occupational diseases.\136\ The SAWS 
officials who provided the estimate note that the number of 
workers suffering from occupational diseases is increasing, and 
describe the victims as mostly younger, poor workers.\137\
            Coal Mine Safety
    Deaths in the coal mining sector totaled 5,938 in 2005, 
according to official Chinese statistics,\138\ but some NGOs 
estimate that the number of deaths is much higher.\139\ A 
political scientist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
offered the view that ``China is so hungry for energy that safe 
coal produced by safe mines is not enough to quench its 
thirst.'' \140\ Press reports suggest that Chinese coal mines 
are the world's deadliest.\141\ Fires, explosions, and floods 
occur in Chinese mines almost daily.\142\ The government has 
set the modest goal of reducing coal mine deaths during 2006 by 
3.5 percent, but one workplace safety activist believes that 
``even this will take a great effort to realize.'' \143\
    Chinese officials have ordered the closure of dangerous 
mines, most of which are small, privately run mines, in an 
attempt to control the number of coal mine accidents.\144\ 
Small mines produce one-third of China's coal output, but are 
responsible for two-thirds of coal mine deaths.\145\ The 
government deems mines that produce under 30,000 tons per year 
as most vulnerable to accidents, and intends to close all such 
mines by the end of 2007.\146\ Most of these small mines are 
expected to merge administratively with larger mines with 
better safety records.\147\
    Pervasive official corruption impedes implementation of 
coal mine safety programs. Local officials often receive income 
from mines, and therefore are reluctant to enforce safety 
regulations that will affect production.\148\ In an August 2005 
circular, the State Council ordered the managers of state-owned 
enterprises and government officials to divest themselves of 
all financial interests in coal mines other than stock of 
publicly listed companies.\149\ By January 2006, official news 
media reported that more than 7,000 officials had given up 
investments in coal mines.\150\
    The government has prosecuted officials responsible for 
serious coal mine disasters. A December 2005 State 
Administration of Work Safety announcement described the 
prosecution and punishment of over 200 officials involved in 
six large coal mine disasters in 2004.\151\
            Wages
    Article 8 of the Provisions on Minimum Wages, issued by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) in January 2004, 
charges provincial MOLSS authorities with drafting minimum wage 
rules in cooperation with provincial-level unions and 
industrial associations.\152\ In July 2006, the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone, which is not a provincial-level 
government, raised its minimum wage to 810 yuan per month 
(US$101).\153\ The previous minimum wage rate in Shenzhen had 
been the same as Jiangsu province and Shanghai municipality: 
690 yuan per month (US$86).\154\ At the lower end of the 
minimum wage scale are Gansu province at 340 yuan per month 
(US$43) and Jiangxi and Jilin provinces at 360 yuan per month 
(US$45).\155\
    Provincial governments in China are reluctant to review 
their minimum wage levels every two years, even though the 2004 
provisions require it.\156\ In March 2006, at least four 
provincial governments were out of compliance with the two-year 
rule, according to the MOLSS.\157\ Official news media suggests 
that provincial officials fear that higher minimum wages will 
force companies to relocate manufacturing facilities to 
provinces where wages are lower.\158\ A Xinhua editorial 
recommended that the central government develop a more clearly 
defined method to determine that the minimum wage is not 
artificially low, and monitor how local governments apply this 
method. An All-China Federation of Trade Unions official said 
in May that the minimum wage levels set by most provincial-
level governments did not meet national guidelines.'' \159\
            Wage Arrearages
    Employers illegally withhold or refuse to pay wages earned 
by millions of Chinese workers.\160\ Employers owe millions of 
migrant workers more than US$12 billion in unpaid wages, a 
problem that is particularly acute in the construction 
industry, which employs many migrant workers.\161\ Some 
employers make only minimal wage payments through the year in 
addition to providing room and board. Others withhold payments 
over the New Year holiday as a means of compelling workers to 
return.\162\ A State Council report estimates that employers do 
not pay about half of migrant workers on time.\163\
    Despite central government pledges beginning in 2003 to 
clear up wage arrearages for migrant workers in the 
construction sector, the problem persists. In some cases where 
the government has reported success in clearing arrearages, the 
workers have, in fact, accepted less than full pay in order to 
get any cash at all. Many wage arrearages also go unreported, 
and new arrearages continue to accumulate, despite the creation 
of programs to discourage them.\164\
    Some local governments have taken steps to help workers 
recover wages. In February 2006, the Shenzhen Labor and Social 
Security Bureau sanctioned 1,300 companies and imposed 47 
million yuan (US$5.8 million) in fines for not paying wages 
owed to workers. The Bureau reclaimed about 70 million yuan 
(US$8.6 million) in unpaid wages.\165\ Since July 2006, 
employers in Shaanxi province who have not met time limits set 
by the provincial government for paying back wages have been 
subject to fines totaling 50 to 100 percent of the 
arrearages.\166\ In 2005, the Guangdong Provincial Labor and 
Social Security Bureau began posting the names of companies 
that continued to default on wages after ``repeated education, 
warnings, or even heavy punishments.'' \167\ Although these 
programs are positive developments, they have not been highly 
successful.\168\
            Benefits
    Employers in China rarely comply with laws and regulations 
on benefits.\169\ In one 2004 study, a Western auditing firm 
found that only 5 of 80 Chinese factories surveyed were in 
compliance with benefits laws.\170\ Compliance problems 
included failure to grant workers paid vacations and failure to 
enroll workers in the social security system (including 
pensions).\171\ Companies also have failed to provide workers 
with medical benefits, including treatment for workplace 
injuries and maternity benefits.\172\ Some employers circumvent 
their obligation to provide benefits by refusing to sign labor 
contracts.\173\
    The State Council adopted a decision on basic old-age 
insurance in December 2005 with the stated goal of shifting 
Chinese pensions from an enterprise-based system to a market-
oriented system with personal accounts.\174\ The decision also 
seeks to address the underfunding of personal accounts, 
guarantee the short-term availability of pension funds, and 
expand coverage of the funds.\175\ One U.S. expert said, ``For 
this patchwork [of pensions], covering perhaps a sixth of the 
total Chinese workforce, the net present value of unfunded 
liabilities is estimated to exceed current GDP--perhaps 
substantially.'' \176\ Problems in the pension system spurred 
large-scale worker protests in 2005 and 2006.\177\
    The government announced plans in 2006 to expand coverage 
of on-the-job injury insurance to 140 million people by 
2010\178\ and said it would take compulsory measures to promote 
employer participation.\179\ As of April 2006, 87 million 
workers were covered, the government reported.\180\ In June, 
the Shanxi province government announced that all employers 
must provide injury insurance to migrant workers.\181\ By the 
end of July 2006, 18.7 million migrant workers nationwide had 
such insurance, according to government figures.\182\
U.S.-China Bilateral Programs
    The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and two Chinese 
government agencies continued to conduct cooperative activities 
during 2006 on wage and hour laws, occupational safety and 
health, mine safety and health, and pension program 
oversight.\183\ The DOL-sponsored mine safety program provided 
training to 55 Chinese mine managers and over 400 miners. Under 
the Labor Law Cooperation Project, four legislative drafters 
participated in internship programs in the United States to 
learn about legislative and labor law systems and enforcement 
practices. The project also produced information, education, 
and communication materials on labor law that were distributed 
to tens of thousands of Chinese workers. Under the project, 
2,437 migrant workers received labor law training, 380 workers 
received counseling services, and 24 were provided with legal 
assistance.\184\
    The DOL, in cooperation with central and local Chinese 
government agencies, completed five baseline surveys on labor 
dispute resolution that served as references for drafting a new 
Dispute Resolution Law, scheduled for consideration in August 
2006. In addition, the Project selected 15 diverse enterprises 
(including joint venture, foreign-owned, state-owned, small, 
medium, and large enterprises) to participate in a pilot 
project to improve labor relations. Training for some 80 
individuals began in April 2006 to establish and operate in-
plant labor-management committees. Trainees 
include officials from district labor dispute tribunals, 
company human resource directors, and workers from the 
enterprises.\185\
Migrant Workers
    Official statistics suggest 120 million rural migrants 
worked in China's urban cities in 2005.\186\ These migrant 
workers often face discrimination and violations of their legal 
rights. Over 81 percent of rural migrant workers currently work 
outside of their place of residence for more than six months 
out of the year, an increase of 6.4 percent compared to 2002, 
according to a State Council research report.\187\ Since many 
local regulations limit the ability of poor migrants to obtain 
local hukou (household registration) in the urban areas where 
they live and work, migrant workers are often unable to obtain 
public services such as health insurance and education for 
their children on an equal basis with urban residents [see 
Section V(i)--Freedom of Residence and Travel].
    Migrant workers also frequently have difficulties 
protecting their legal rights under China's labor laws. Fewer 
than 54 percent of rural migrant workers have signed labor 
contracts with their 
employers. Excessive work hours and unpaid wages are common 
problems.\188\ Over 35 percent of rural migrant workers report 
``sometimes'' having difficulty being paid on time, while 
nearly 16 percent say they ``frequently'' have problems being 
paid.\189\ Seventy-six percent of migrant workers report that 
they have not received overtime pay owed to them.\190\
    Chinese authorities have attempted to address the problems 
of migrant workers. The Ministry of Health announced a plan in 
May 2006 to improve the health of rural migrant workers. The 
plan includes goals for preventing and controlling the spread 
of HIV/AIDS among rural migrants, improving infectious disease 
monitoring capabilities in large urban areas with migrant 
workers, as well as improving workplace health and safety 
conditions for migrant workers.\191\ The central government has 
also included in its 2006 rural development campaign for a 
``new socialist countryside'' such components as reform of the 
hukou system, protection of the legal rights of migrant 
workers, and the elimination of discriminatory regulations that 
restrict urban job opportunities for migrants.\192\ In 2005, 
both Beijing municipal authorities and national Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security officials eliminated rules that limit 
employment in cities for migrants.\193\ Chinese authorities 
also have called for creating better mechanisms for addressing 
workers' claims for unpaid wages and for expanding workers' 
compensation insurance programs to cover migrants.\194\ The 
State Council's research report on migrant workers notes that 
despite central government policies regarding the abolition of 
discriminatory permits and fees for rural migrant workers, 
``the phenomenon of illegal charges continues to exist'' in 
some areas.\195\

                        V(d) Freedom of Religion


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese government restrictions on the 
        practice of religion violate international human rights 
        standards. Freedom of religious belief is protected by 
        the Chinese Constitution and laws, but government 
        implementation of Communist Party policy on religion, 
        and restrictions elsewhere in domestic law, violate 
        these guarantees. The Chinese government tolerates some 
        aspects of religious belief and practice, but only 
        under a strict regulatory framework that represses 
        religious and spiritual activities falling outside the 
        scope of Party-sanctioned practice. Religious 
        organizations are required to register with the 
        government and submit to the leadership of ``patriotic 
        religious associations'' created by the Party to lead 
        each of China's five recognized religions: Buddhism, 
        Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Those 
        who choose not to register with the government, or 
        groups that the government refuses to register, operate 
        outside the zone of protected religious activity and 
        risk harassment, detention, imprisonment, and other 
        abuses. Registered communities also risk such abuse if 
        they engage in religious activities that authorities 
        deem a threat to Party authority or legitimacy.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The 2004 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) 
        has not afforded greater religious freedom to Chinese 
        citizens, despite government claims that it represented 
        a ``paradigm shift'' by limiting state control over 
        religion. Like earlier local and national regulations 
        on religion, the RRA emphasizes government control and 
        restrictions on religion. The RRA articulates general 
        protection only for freedom of ``religious belief,'' 
        but not for expressions of religious belief. Like 
        earlier regulations, it also protects only those 
        religious activities deemed ``normal,'' without 
        defining this term. Although the RRA includes 
        provisions that permit registered religious 
        organizations to select leaders, publish materials, and 
        engage in other affairs, many provisions are 
        conditioned on government approval and oversight of 
        religious activities.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese government enforcement of Party policy 
        on religion creates a repressive environment for the 
        practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Party policies toward the 
        Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, the second-ranking Tibetan 
        spiritual leader, seek to control the fundamental 
        religious convictions of Tibetan Buddhists. Government 
        actions to implement Party policies caused further 
        deterioration in some aspects of religious freedom for 
        Tibetan Buddhists in the past year. Officials began a 
        patriotic education campaign in Lhasa-area monasteries 
        and nunneries in April 2005. Expressions of resentment 
        by Tibetan monks and nuns against the continuing 
        campaign resulted in detentions, expulsions, and an 
        apparent suicide. Chinese officials continue to hold 
        Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the boy the Dalai Lama recognized 
        as the Panchen Lama in May 1995, in incommunicado 
        custody along with his parents.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns constituted 21 
        of the 24 known political detentions of Tibetans by 
        Chinese authorities in 2005, compared to 8 of the 15 
        such known detentions in 2004, based on data available 
        in the Commission's Political Prisoner Database. None 
        of the known detentions of monks and nuns in 2005 took 
        place in Sichuan province, a shift from the previous 
        three years, but known detentions of monks and nuns in 
        Qinghai and Gansu provinces increased during the same 
        period. Based on data available for 50 currently 
        imprisoned Tibetan monks and nuns, their average 
        sentence length is approximately nine years and six 
        months. In one positive development, the government 
        permitted the resumption of a centuries-old Tibetan 
        Buddhist tradition of advanced study that leads to the 
        highest level of scholarly attainment in the Gelug 
        tradition.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Government repression of unregistered Catholic 
        clerics increased in the past year. Based on NGO 
        reports, officials in Hebei and Zhejiang provinces 
        detained a total of 38 unregistered clerics in 13 
        incidents in the last year, while in the previous year 
        officials detained 11 clerics in 5 incidents. The 
        government targets Catholic bishops who lead large 
        unregistered communities for the most severe 
        punishment. Bishop Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered bishop 
        of Zhengding diocese in Hebei province, has spent most 
        of the past year in detention. Bishop Jia has been 
        detained at least eight times since 2004.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Government harassment and abuse of registered 
        Catholic clerics also increased in the past year. In 
        November and December 2005, three incidents were 
        reported in which officials or unidentified assailants 
        beat registered Catholic nuns or priests after they 
        demanded the return of church property. In April and 
        May 2006, officials began a campaign to increase 
        control over registered Catholic bishops. Officials 
        detained, sequestered, threatened, or exerted pressure 
        on dozens of registered Catholic clerics to coerce them 
        into participating in the consecration of bishops 
        selected by the state-controlled Catholic Patriotic 
        Association but not approved by the Holy See.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Government authorities also restricted contact 
        between registered clergy and the Holy See, denying 
        bishops permission to travel to Rome in September 2005 
        to participate in a meeting of Catholic bishops. 
        Authorities continued to permit some registered priests 
        and nuns to study abroad.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government strictly controls the 
        practice of Islam. The state-controlled Islamic 
        Association of China aligns Islamic practice to Party 
        goals by directing the training and confirmation of 
        religious leaders, the publication of religious 
        materials, the content of sermons, and the organization 
        of Hajj pilgrimages, as well as by indoctrinating 
        religious leaders and adherents in Party ideology and 
        government policy.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The government severely represses Islamic 
        practice in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
        (XUAR), especially among the Uighur ethnic group. Local 
        regulations in the XUAR impose restrictions on religion 
        that are not found in other parts of China. The 
        government's religious repression in the XUAR is part 
        of a broader policy aimed at diluting expressions of 
        Uighur identity and tightening government control in 
        the region. The government continues to imprison 
        Uighurs who engage in peaceful expressions of dissent 
        and other non-violent activities. Writer Nurmemet Yasin 
        and historian Tohti Tunyaz remain in prison for writing 
        a short story and conducting research on the XUAR.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to repress 
        Chinese Protestants who worship in house churches. From 
        May 2005 to May 2006, the government detained nearly 
        2,000 house church members, according to one U.S. NGO. 
        Almost 50 percent of the reported detentions of 
        Protestant house church members and leaders took place 
        in Henan province, where the house church movement is 
        particularly strong. In June 2006, Pastor Zhang 
        Rongliang, the leader of one of China's largest house 
        churches, was sentenced to seven years and six months 
        in prison for 
        ``illegally crossing the national border'' and 
        ``fraudulently obtaining a passport.'' Authorities have 
        detained or imprisoned Pastor Zhang multiple times 
        since 1976. Pastor Gong Shengliang is serving a life 
        sentence in declining health, and was beaten in prison 
        during the past year.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to maintain 
        strict control over the registered Protestant church. 
        The RRA requires that all Protestants worship at 
        registered churches, regardless of their differences in 
        doctrine and liturgy. The state-controlled Three-Self 
        Patriotic Movement, which leads the registered 
        Protestant church in China, continues to impose a 
        Party-defined theology, called ``theological 
        construction,'' on registered seminaries that is 
        intended to ``weaken those aspects within Christian 
        faith that do not conform with the socialist society.'' 
        In the past year, authorities detained a registered 
        Protestant pastor in Henan province for conducting a 
        Bible study meeting at a registered Protestant church 
        outside his designated geographic area.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government continues to disrupt 
        the relationships that many house churches maintain 
        with co-religionists outside China, including raiding 
        meetings between house church leaders and overseas 
        Protestants, and preventing foreign travel by house 
        church leaders. The Chinese government also continues 
        to restrict and monitor the ties of the registered 
        Protestant Church with foreign denominations.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Government persecution of the Falun Gong 
        spiritual movement continued during the past year. 
        Authorities use both criminal and administrative 
        punishments to punish Falun Gong practitioners for 
        peacefully exercising their spiritual beliefs. The 
        state-controlled press has reported on at least 149 
        cases of Falun Gong practitioners currently in prison, 
        but Falun Gong sources estimate that up to 100,000 
        practitioners have been detained since 1999. Manfred 
        Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported after 
        his November 2005 visit to China that Falun Gong 
        practitioners account for two-thirds of victims of 
        alleged torture by Chinese law enforcement officers. 
        Tsinghua University student Wang Xin was sentenced to 
        nine years' imprisonment in 2001 for downloading Falun 
        Gong materials from the Internet and printing leaflets.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Despite strict government controls on the 
        practice of religion, Chinese authorities accommodate 
        the social programs of Buddhist, Daoist, Catholic, 
        Muslim, and Protestant communities when these programs 
        support Party goals. For example, domestic Muslim civil 
        society organizations carry out social welfare 
        projects, and international Muslim charities have 
        supported projects in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, as 
        well as in the XUAR. The Amity Foundation, affiliated 
        with the registered Protestant Church, sponsors 
        projects in social services and development aid, 
        including education, healthcare, and care for the 
        elderly.
Introduction
    Chinese government restrictions on the practice of religion 
violate international human rights standards.\1\ Freedom of 
religious belief is protected by the Chinese Constitution\2\ 
and laws,\3\ but government implementation of Communist Party 
policy on religion, and restrictions elsewhere in domestic law, 
violate these guarantees. Although Party doctrine acknowledges 
the presence of religion in Chinese society, the Party's 
central tenets remain at odds with religion.\4\ The Party 
promotes atheism among Chinese citizens, and has continued 
efforts to dismiss religious believers from its ranks.\5\
    The government acknowledges only five belief systems as 
religions entitled to legal protection: Buddhism, Catholicism, 
Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. While the State 
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) has established an 
office to oversee religions and folk beliefs other than these 
five,\6\ legal protections are restricted to these five in 
practice,\7\ with only limited exceptions.\8\ Some local 
regulations also restrict legal protections to these five 
religions.\9\ Religious organizations affiliated with 
recognized religions must register with the government and 
apply for government approval to establish churches, mosques, 
temples, or other religious venues. The government claims that 
citizens do not need official approval to conduct worship 
services in private homes ``mainly 
attended by relatives and friends for religious activities such 
as praying and Bible reading,'' \10\ but no national law or 
regulation specifically protects worship at home,\11\ and 
authorities have shut down services held in private homes.\12\
    The Chinese government tolerates some aspects of religious 
belief and practice, but only under a strict regulatory 
framework that represses religious and spiritual activities 
falling outside the scope of Party-sanctioned practice. The 
government's policies create a hierarchy of religious 
communities subject to different forms of government control. 
The government and Party exercise control over registered 
religious communities through the ``patriotic religious 
associations'' created by the Party to lead each recognized 
religion.\13\ The patriotic associations ensure that religious 
doctrine conforms to state policy by controlling such matters 
as the training of religious leaders, contacts with religious 
groups outside China, the 
interpretation of religious texts, the content of sermons, and 
the publication of religious materials.\14\ Despite such 
controls, a visiting delegation from the U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom found that the government 
nonetheless provides a ``zone of toleration'' for registered 
religious communities acting within the parameters set by the 
government.\15\ Religious adherents also have reported being 
able to worship in authorized venues without direct government 
interference.\16\ Those who choose not to register with the 
government, or groups that the government refuses to register, 
operate outside the zone of protected religious activity and 
risk harassment, detention, imprisonment, and other abuses. 
Members of approved organizations also risk harassment, 
detention, imprisonment, and other abuses if they engage in 
religious activities that authorities deem a threat to Party 
authority or legitimacy.
    Legal protections for freedom of religion are narrow. By 
stating only that ``religious belief'' is under constitutional 
protection,\17\ the Constitution does not broadly protect the 
exercise of religion, including public expressions of belief. 
Instead, the Constitution and Chinese laws and regulations 
provide protection only for ``normal religious activity.'' Laws 
and regulations do not clearly define what constitutes ``normal 
religious activity,'' and this vague term is subject to 
arbitrary interpretation by implementing officials.\18\
    Officials interpret and implement domestic laws and 
policies on religion inconsistently, resulting in uncertainty 
among religious believers about potential government actions. 
Such inconsistencies have led to additional restrictions in 
practice beyond those specified in law. In some cases, regional 
variations in implementation have resulted in more official 
tolerance for religion, and in unregistered groups being 
allowed to operate.\19\ In a few cases, local authorities have 
registered groups affiliated with a religion not recognized by 
the central government, as well as groups that are part of a 
recognized religion but have not affiliated with a patriotic 
religious association.\20\ In other cases, however, variations 
in implementation have resulted in official abuses and 
repression of religious activities.
    Although the SARA acknowledges and manages some ``folk'' 
beliefs, the government does not give them the same protections 
as recognized religions, despite widespread practice throughout 
China. The government tolerates some practices associated with 
``folk'' religions,\21\ but also designates some other popular 
practices as ``feudal superstitions,'' which it denounces and 
in some cases penalizes.\22\
    The government does not recognize spiritual movements as 
belief systems protected under the law, and in some cases, the 
government persecutes practitioners. The government designates 
some spiritual movements, such as the Falun Gong, as ``cults'' 
and applies criminal and administrative punishments against 
them.\23\ In 2006, the government continued its campaign of 
persecution against Falun Gong members.
    Foreign residents or visitors may conduct worship services 
for foreign members of their own religious communities,\24\ and 
foreign faith-based NGOs operate in China.\25\ National rules 
governing 
foreigners' religious activities forbid them, however, from 
``cultivating followers from among Chinese citizens,'' 
distributing ``religious propaganda materials,'' and carrying 
out other missionary 
activities.\26\
Regulation on Religious Affairs
    The 2004 Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA)\27\ has not 
afforded greater religious freedom to Chinese citizens, despite 
government claims that it represented a ``paradigm shift'' by 
limiting state control over religion.\28\ Like earlier local 
and national regulations on religion,\29\ the RRA emphasizes 
government control and restrictions on religion. The RRA 
articulates general protection only for freedom of ``religious 
belief,'' \30\ but not for expressions of belief. Like earlier 
regulations, it also protects only those religious activities 
deemed ``normal,'' \31\ without defining this term. Although 
the RRA includes provisions that permit registered religious 
organizations to select leaders, publish materials, and engage 
in other affairs, many provisions are conditioned on government 
approval and oversight of religious activities.\32\
    Party doctrine guides implementation of the RRA. The 
Party's United Front Work Department continues to administer 
religious matters alongside the government's religious affairs 
bureaus,\33\ and in doing so, ensures that the RRA is 
implemented in line with Party directives. During 2006, local 
authorities cited Party policy as a guiding influence when 
addressing religious issues and implementing the RRA.\34\
    The RRA and related regulations\35\ subject religious 
communities to onerous and arbitrary registration requirements 
that give the government discretion to deny recognition to 
religious communities. Like earlier regulations,\36\ the RRA 
requires religious groups to apply for approval from the 
government to operate as an organization or to establish a 
venue for religious activities.\37\ Among other requirements, a 
group must have 50 or more members to apply for recognition as 
an official organization.\38\ Once recognized, religious 
organizations must fulfill conditions such as demonstrating a 
``necessity to frequently carry out collective religious 
activities'' to gain permission to build a venue for religious 
activities.\39\
    The RRA's protections for religious activities are limited. 
Although the RRA states that it protects the ``lawful rights 
and interests'' of religious believers, it does not 
specifically protect individual public displays of religious 
belief, which is a protected component of religious freedom 
under international human rights standards.\40\ In addition, it 
requires collective religious activities ``in general'' to be 
conducted at registered venues\41\ and does not specify that 
religious believers or religious members of a family may 
practice a 
religion within their own homes, although some local 
regulations appear to permit this practice.\42\
    International human rights standards define freedom of 
religion to include the ``freedom to prepare and distribute 
religious texts or publications.'' \43\ While the RRA provides 
that authorized religious organizations and venues may compile 
and print materials for internal and public distribution, the 
RRA requires such publications to be prepared in accordance 
with national regulations.\44\ The Chinese government imposes 
strict prior restraints on religious literature in national 
regulations that go beyond restrictions on other types of 
publications\45\ [see Section V(a)--Special Focus for 2006: 
Freedom of Expression].
    The RRA provides for government oversight of the 
appointment of religious personnel. Although the RRA permits 
authorized religious organizations to select religious 
personnel, it requires them, in most cases, to report this 
selection to the local religious affairs bureau.\46\ In 
addition, the RRA singles out the appointment of reincarnated 
Tibetan Buddhist lamas and Catholic bishops for reporting to 
higher levels of government, and in the case of reincarnated 
Tibetan Buddhist lamas, appointments require government 
approval.\47\
    The RRA provides administrative penalties, ranging from 
fines to the possibility of administrative detention, for 
violations of its provisions.\48\ While it sanctions government 
officials who abuse their authority when administering 
religious policy,\49\ it is unclear whether this provision 
protects unregistered organizations and venues that lack legal 
standing. The RRA directs most of its provisions on legal 
liability at ordinary citizens, religious organizations, or 
venues that violate its provisions.\50\ Some of the RRA's 
penalties are absent in earlier regulations. For example, the 
RRA for the first time proscribes Hajj pilgrimages that are 
organized without government authorization and subjects 
violators to fines.\51\
    The RRA also represents a codification, and in some cases 
expansion, of limited protections for authorized religion found 
in older regulations on religion. For example, the RRA permits 
registered religious organizations and venues to engage in 
social welfare activities, as earlier local regulations have 
allowed.\52\ It also permits registered religious organizations 
and venues to accept contributions from abroad,\53\ while 
previous regulations have not granted this permission in such 
explicit terms.\54\ The RRA specifies time limits for 
decisionmaking by government agencies, and permits 
administrative appeal of actions and decisions by religious 
affairs 
bureaus.\55\
    At the same time, the RRA lacks some of the restrictions 
found in earlier regulations. For example, the RRA does not 
specify that only the five recognized religions are protected, 
and does not reinforce the authority of patriotic religious 
associations by naming them, as in the case of some local 
regulations.\56\ Some observers suggest that the omission of 
previous controls, coupled with vague language within the RRA, 
may signify more tolerance toward religion.\57\ Without further 
clarification, however, such omissions and wording do not grant 
new rights. Moreover, the RRA's vague 
language, including the lack of a definition of ``normal 
religious activity,'' generates inconsistent interpretations 
not only in the implementation of the RRA itself but also in 
the drafting of new local regulations.
    The RRA does not mention the status of local 
regulations.\58\ Since the RRA entered into force, however, at 
least six provincial-level governments have issued new or 
amended comprehensive regulations on religion. These 
regulations are generally consistent with the RRA with respect 
to provisions on establishing religious organizations and 
venues,\59\ but differ in other areas. For example, a new 
regulation from Henan province restricts the term ``religion'' 
to Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism.\60\ 
In April 2005, the Shanghai municipal government amended its 
1995 regulation on religious affairs to remove a previous 
reference to the five recognized religions.\61\ All of the new 
and amended regulations appear to provide citizens with a 
degree of permission to practice an authorized religion at 
home, but the wording of each regulation on this issue 
varies.\62\ The amended Shanghai regulation expands its 
previous section on legal liability, increasing both penalties 
and protections for religious believers;\63\ the Henan 
regulation contains the most detailed provision on the 
liability of government officials.\64\
Other Developments
    In December 2005, the government announced the 
establishment of the China Religious Culture Communication 
Association (CRCCA), which it described as a non-profit social 
organization designed to promote religious exchanges, 
cooperation with other countries, and the dissemination of 
information about religion in China. Ye Xiaowen, Director of 
the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), leads 
the association. CRCCA honorary chairman Bishop Fu Tieshan, 
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress and Chairman of the Catholic Patriotic 
Association, called the association's establishment 
``beneficial for accurately publicizing China's policies on 
freedom of religious belief and the real state of affairs for 
religious belief.'' \65\
    The government adopted measures during 2005 that provide 
freer access to information on religious regulations and to 
religious sites that charge admission. The SARA launched a Web 
site on December 1, 2005, that posts religion-related news and 
regulations, bringing greater transparency to the 
administration of religious affairs.\66\ The government also 
issued a circular in December 2005 requiring that religious 
sites charging admission to tourists must provide free entrance 
to religious adherents, although Chinese journalists 
investigating the circular in January 2006 found that 
implementation was inconsistent.\67\
Religious Freedom for Tibetan Buddhists
    Chinese government enforcement of Communist Party policy on 
religion creates a repressive environment for the practice of 
Tibetan Buddhism. The Party tolerates religious activity only 
within the strict requirements of the Chinese Constitution, 
laws, regulations, and policies.\68\ The government interprets 
and enforces these requirements in a manner that interferes 
with the Tibetan Buddhist monastic education system and 
discourages devotion to the Dalai Lama and other important 
Tibetan Buddhist teachers who live in exile.\69\
    Party polices toward the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, the 
second-ranking Tibetan spiritual leader, seek to control the 
fundamental religious convictions of Tibetan Buddhists. 
Government actions to implement Party policies caused further 
deterioration in some aspects of religious freedom for Tibetan 
Buddhists during the past year. Officials began a patriotic 
education campaign in Lhasa-area monasteries and nunneries in 
April 2005.\70\ The Chinese government and the Party mandate 
patriotic education as a recurrent feature of religious 
education to indoctrinate Tibetans on the relationship between 
religion and patriotism toward China, and to end the Dalai 
Lama's influence among Tibetans. Monks and nuns must pass 
examinations on political texts,\71\ agree that Tibet is 
historically a part of China, accept the legitimacy of the 
Panchen Lama installed by the Chinese government, and denounce 
the Dalai Lama.
    In May 2006, Zhang Qingli,\72\ Secretary of the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Committee, called on senior 
government and Party officials to widen the patriotic education 
campaign to include a broader population, and to intensify the 
``rectification'' and 
restructuring of each monastery and nunnery's Democratic 
Management Committee (DMC),\73\ according to the TAR Party 
newspaper.\74\ Zhang told the officials that the Party is 
engaged in a ``fight to the death struggle'' against the Dalai 
Lama and his supporters, and that the Dalai Lama is ``the 
biggest obstacle hindering Tibetan Buddhism from establishing 
normal order.'' Comprehensive implementation of the Regulation 
on Religious Affairs (RRA)\75\ will lead to the ``normalization 
of religious order'' and the ``standardization of religious 
activity,'' Zhang said. Li Guangwen, Executive Vice Chairman of 
the TAR People's Congress Standing Committee, stressed ``the 
need to step up legislative work in the area of the anti-
separatism struggle and the management of religious affairs'' 
\76\ at a meeting of Standing Committee members, probably in 
early June. In August, Zhang confirmed the Party's plans to 
broaden patriotic education in an interview with Western media: 
``We are organizing patriotic education everywhere, not just in 
monasteries. Those who do not love their country are not 
qualified to be human beings.'' \77\
    Expressions of resentment by Tibetan monks and nuns against 
the continuing campaign resulted in detentions, expulsions, and 
an apparent suicide. At Sera Monastery, when monks were to be 
tested on patriotic education in July 2005, officials 
reportedly expelled 18 monks, of whom police detained 8.\78\ At 
about the same time, public security officials detained monk 
Tsering Dondrub and subjected Jangchub Gyaltsen, a Sera 
``disciplinarian,'' \79\ to one year of surveillance\80\ for 
their roles in arranging an oral reading of a prayer that 
mentioned the Dalai Lama.\81\ Drepung Monastery monk Ngawang 
Jangchub apparently committed suicide in October 2005, after he 
argued with patriotic education instructors.\82\ Public 
security officials detained five Drepung monks (Abbot Ngawang 
Phelgyal, Ngawang Namdrol, Ngawang Nyingpo, Ngawang Thubten, 
and Phuntsog Thubwang) on November 23 after they refused 
instructions from patriotic education instructors to sign a 
document denouncing the Dalai Lama as a splittist, pledging 
loyalty to the Chinese government, and agreeing that Tibet is 
part of China.\83\ On November 25, some 400 monks gathered in 
Drepung's main courtyard and protested together silently 
against the patriotic education campaign and the accompanying 
crackdown.\84\ Authorities threatened to remove them by force 
and sealed the monastery for two days.\85\ Officials conducting 
patriotic education at Gyabdrag Nunnery in June 2005 expelled 
more than 40 nuns, and authorities expelled 13 nuns from 
Shugsib Nunnery.\86\
    In December 2005, the government and Party stepped up a 
campaign to challenge the Dalai Lama's role as the spiritual 
leader of Tibetan Buddhists by increasing the prominence of 
Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy the State Council installed in 1995 as 
the 11th Panchen Lama.\87\ An official Chinese report on the 
10th anniversary of Gyaltsen Norbu's installation referred to 
him as ``the highest ranking figure in Tibetan Buddhism'' and 
``the leader of Tibetan Buddhism.'' \88\ Chinese news media 
reports that rank Gyaltsen Norbu above the Dalai Lama, however, 
contradict previous official statements about the relationship 
between the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. In November 1995, Li 
Ruihuan, then a senior Politburo member, described the late 
10th Panchen Lama\89\ as ``a prominent leader of China's 
Tibetan Buddhism,'' \90\ and a 1992 Chinese government White 
Paper described the 10th Panchen Lama as the ``co-leader of 
Tibetan Buddhism with the Dalai Lama.'' \91\
    Gyaltsen Norbu demonstrated support of the Party's 
policy\92\ to merge Tibetan Buddhism with patriotism toward 
China when he pledged at a December 2005 ceremony to be ``a 
good living Buddha who loves his motherland, his religion, and 
serves his country and its people.'' \93\ A week later, he 
concluded a Buddhist ritual at the tombs of his predecessors by 
saying that he would ``live up to the expectations of the 
Chinese Communist Party and the central government.'' \94\ 
Gyaltsen Norbu made his first appearance before an 
international gathering at the First World Buddhist Forum in 
Hangzhou city, Zhejiang province, on April 13, 2006.\95\ He 
told some 1,000 monks, nuns, and scholars from more than 30 
countries that, ``Defending the nation and working for the 
people is a solemn commitment Buddhism has made to the nation 
and society.'' \96\ The forum's organizers\97\ did not allow 
the Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhism's foremost representative, to 
attend. Qi Xiaofei, Deputy Director of the State Administration 
of Religious Affairs (SARA) told reporters on April 12 that the 
Dalai Lama is a stubborn secessionist who would ``surely pose a 
really disharmonious note'' if he had been invited.\98\
    Chinese officials continue to hold Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the 
boy the Dalai Lama recognized as the Panchen Lama in May 1995, 
in incommunicado custody along with his parents.\99\ After the 
Dalai Lama announced his recognition of Gedun Choekyi Nyima, 
Chinese officials took the then six-year-old boy and his 
parents into custody. The State Council declared the Dalai 
Lama's announcement ``illegal and invalid'' \100\ and installed 
Gyaltsen Norbu, whose appointment continues to stir widespread 
resentment among Tibetans. The UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child recommended in September 2005 that the Chinese 
government ``allow an independent expert to visit and confirm 
the well-being'' of Gedun Choekyi Nyima.\101\ In an official 
response to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in September 2005, Chinese officials claimed that Gedun 
Choekyi Nyima is leading a ``normal, happy life and receiving a 
good cultural education.'' \102\
    The Party intends to strengthen its authority over Tibetan 
Buddhism by controlling the selection of the religion's most 
important leaders, including the Dalai Lama. Party officials 
assert that the next Dalai Lama will be selected in the same 
manner as Gyaltsen Norbu: by drawing a name from a golden urn. 
In July 2005, Jampa Phuntsog (Xiangba Pingcuo), Chairman of the 
TAR government, referred to the Dalai Lama's advancing age and 
told reporters that the next Dalai Lama will be identified by 
``the traditional rules of Tibetan Buddhism since the Qing 
dynasty.'' \103\ He denied that the Party interferes in the 
process.\104\ In 1995, however, Party Central Committee member 
and State Councilor Luo Gan, who is now a Politburo Standing 
Committee member, presided when Gyalsten Norbu's name was 
pulled from a golden urn.\105\ Jampa Phuntsog's comment about 
``the traditional rules of Tibetan Buddhism'' refers to a 1792 
Qing Dynasty edict demanding that the Tibetan government in 
Lhasa reform religious, administrative, economic, and military 
practices to suit the Qing court.\106\ The first of the edict's 
29 articles directed that the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama be 
selected by drawing lots from a golden urn, and that a high-
ranking Chinese official must be present to confirm the result. 
Tibetans used their own methods, however, to identify the 
current Dalai Lama and his predecessor.\107\ Article 27 of the 
Regulation on Religious Affairs issued in 2004 includes the 
principle of the Qing directive by requiring that the 
identification of reincarnated lamas be performed in accordance 
with ``religious ritual and historic conventions'' and be 
subject to government approval.\108\
    Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns constituted 21 of the 24 
known political detentions of Tibetans by Chinese authorities 
in 2005, compared to 8 of the 15 such known detentions in 2004, 
based on data available in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database (PPD) as of August 2006. This increased proportion in 
part reflects monks imprisoned for expressing their resentment 
of the patriotic education campaign. None of the known 
detentions of monks and nuns in 2005 took place in Sichuan 
province, a shift from the previous three years,\109\ but known 
detentions of monks and nuns in Qinghai and Gansu provinces in 
2005 increased during the same period.\110\ Tibetan monks and 
nuns make up about 70 percent of the 103 currently detained or 
imprisoned Tibetan political prisoners, according to PPD data. 
Thirty-two of the monks and nuns were detained or imprisoned in 
the TAR, 22 in Sichuan province, 12 in Qinghai province, and 6 
in Gansu province. Based on data available for 50 currently 
imprisoned Tibetan monks and nuns, their average sentence 
length is approximately nine years and three months. Several 
monks reportedly detained during patriotic education in Lhasa 
in 2005 remain unidentified and these figures do not reflect 
their cases.\111\
    In one positive development, the government permitted the 
resumption in July 2004\112\ of a centuries-old Tibetan 
Buddhist tradition of advanced study that leads to the highest 
level\113\ of scholarly attainment in the Gelug tradition.\114\ 
A small number of lamas successfully completed the program in 
2005 and 2006.\115\ Tibetan human rights monitors pointed out 
that even advanced lamas are required to study political texts 
promoting patriotism toward China,\116\ but also noted that the 
resumption of the program is a ``welcome gesture.'' \117\ 
Chinese authorities shut the program down in 1966 at the start 
of the Cultural Revolution, and did not allow it to resume 
until 1986.\118\ Officials closed it again in March 1988 after 
Tibetan monks staged a peaceful pro-independence protest march 
in central Lhasa.\119\
Religious Freedom for China's Catholics and China-Holy See Relations
    Government repression of unregistered Catholics increased 
in the past year.\120\ Based on NGO reports, officials in Hebei 
and Zhejiang provinces detained a total of 38 unregistered 
clerics and 90 unregistered laypersons in 13 incidents during 
the past year, while the preceding year officials detained 11 
clerics in 5 incidents.\121\ Twelve of the 13 detention 
incidents reported since October 2005 occurred in Hebei 
province, where the unregistered Catholic community is 
particularly strong.\122\ The other reported detention incident 
occurred in Zhejiang province.\123\ Officials in Fujian 
province demolished an unregistered Catholic church in 
September.\124\
    The government targets Catholic bishops who lead large 
unregistered communities for the most severe punishment. The 
government has detained Bishop Jia Zhiguo, the unregistered 
bishop of Zhengding diocese in Hebei province, at least eight 
times since 2004.\125\ Bishop Jia has spent most of the past 
year in detention. The government detained Bishop Jia from 
November 2005 to April 2006, when officials released him into 
residential surveillance.\126\ In May 2006, officials admitted 
Bishop Jia to the hospital for medical treatment, releasing him 
the following month into detention at an unknown location.\127\ 
Su Zhimin, the unregistered bishop of Baoding diocese in Hebei 
province, was detained in October 1997, and the government has 
refused to provide any information about his health or 
location.\128\ Su's auxiliary bishop, An Shuxin, was released 
after 10 years' detention in August 2006. An reportedly agreed 
to register with the government but not with the state-
controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA).\129\
    Government harassment and abuse of registered Catholic 
clerics also increased in the past year. In November and 
December 2005, three incidents were reported in which officials 
or unidentified 
assailants beat registered Catholic nuns or priests after they 
had demanded that local governments return church property. In 
November 2005, officials beat a group of registered Catholic 
nuns in Tongyuan village, Shaanxi province.\130\ Also in 
November, unidentified assailants beat a group of registered 
Catholic nuns in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province.\131\ In December 
2005, unidentified assailants beat a group of registered 
Catholic priests in Tianjin municipality.\132\ A Catholic news 
service reported additional incidents in which officials beat 
registered priests in Hebei province, but supplied no 
details.\133\ The recent increase in reports of violence toward 
registered clergy contrasts sharply with the situation between 
2000 and 2004, during which there were no such reports. The 
same period was marked by a relative relaxation of control over 
registered bishops.\134\
    In the beating incidents in Tongyuan, Xi'an, and Tianjin, 
the nuns or priests sought to recover property that had once 
belonged to Catholic dioceses or religious orders and that 
local governments had confiscated during the 1950s and 
1960s.\135\ In violation of a 1980 State Council directive, 
local officials had refused to return the properties.\136\ One 
NGO reported that local governments in Xi'an and Tianjin have 
rented or sold church properties to third parties and retained 
the income.\137\ Incidents like these have 
occurred elsewhere in China.\138\
    In April and May 2006, officials began a campaign to 
increase control over registered Catholic bishops, coercing 
bishops and priests to participate in episcopal consecrations 
not approved by the Holy See, and demanding that registered 
bishops uphold the government's authority to select bishops. 
Since the 1950s, the government has insisted that the Holy See 
lacks the authority to 
select Chinese bishops, and the state-controlled Catholic 
Patriotic Association (CPA) has selected bishops for the 
registered Church.\139\ Nevertheless, the registered Catholic 
community has increasingly acknowledged the spiritual 
leadership of the Holy See, and Catholic bishops and news 
agencies outside China have reported that, in recent years, the 
CPA has accepted the Holy See's discreet involvement in the 
selection process. Most or all recently consecrated registered 
bishops had been approved by the Holy See before their 
consecration.\140\
    In April 2006, however, officials detained, sequestered, 
threatened, or otherwise exerted pressure on dozens of 
registered Catholic clerics to coerce them into participating 
in the consecration of bishops selected by the CPA but not 
approved by the Holy See. On April 30 and May 3, a group of 
registered bishops consecrated two new bishops who had not been 
approved by the Holy See.\141\ The CPA installed the new 
bishops in episcopal sees in Kunming city, Yunnan province, and 
Wuhu city, Anhui province. The CPA also installed a bishop, who 
was consecrated in 2000 without the approval of the Holy See, 
in the see of Mindong diocese in Fujian province.\142\ On May 
19, the CPA convened a meeting of 18 registered bishops 
involved in recent episcopal consecrations and demanded they 
uphold the CPA's authority to select bishops without seeking 
approval from the Holy See.\143\ On May 27, CPA officials 
announced their refusal to recognize a bishop in Shaanxi 
province, a former registered priest who was consecrated by a 
registered bishop without the approval of the CPA, but with the 
approval of the Holy See. Officials forbade him to act as a 
bishop, harassed him for several months, and on September 11 
detained him at an unknown location.\144\
    Although a generation of elderly bishops has been passing 
away, the CPA has been slow to approve candidates for the 
registered sees. Over 40 registered dioceses had no bishops in 
April 2006.\145\ Because no priests were ordained during the 
Cultural Revolution period in the 1960s and 1970s, new bishops 
must be selected from priests in their thirties and early 
forties.\146\ Government officials and the Holy See are 
competing for the loyalty of the new bishops, since many who 
will be selected in the next few years are likely to be young 
men who will govern the Church into the distant 
future.\147\
    The Holy See has not approved the consecration of new 
bishops for the unregistered community since 1999.\148\ In 
October 2005, an authoritative Vatican periodical recommended 
that the Holy See should unite the unregistered and registered 
communities by continuing its policy of approving the 
consecration of bishops only for the registered community.\149\ 
According to the proposal, as the unregistered bishops pass 
away, Holy See-approved registered bishops would become the 
sole point of reference for both communities. As a result of 
reports from authoritative Catholic sources abroad that most 
registered bishops have been legitimated or approved by the 
Holy See, unregistered Catholics increasingly have accepted 
Catholics practicing in the registered church.\150\
    Government authorities restricted contact between 
registered clergy and the Holy See over the past year. In 
September 2005, the CPA denied bishops permission to travel to 
Rome to participate in a meeting of Catholic bishops.\151\ 
Since 2005, authorities have required registered clergy to 
report on their activities on a weekly basis.\152\ Authorities 
continued to permit some registered priests and nuns to study 
abroad, including in the United States. Authorities also 
permitted the continued development of the registered 
community's Catholic social service agencies, and new 
charitable groups have reportedly been founded.\153\
    The Chinese government has not altered its longstanding 
public position that the Holy See must break relations with 
Taiwan and renounce its role in the selection of Chinese 
bishops before the 
government will open formal talks on establishing diplomatic 
relations.\154\ After the election of Pope Benedict XVI, the 
Chinese government reiterated its desire for diplomatic 
relations with the Holy See, but the tone of these public 
statements became progressively cooler during late 2005.\155\ 
In February 2006, the government responded to the elevation to 
the College of Cardinals of Bishop Zen Ze-kiun of Hong Kong by 
warning him to stay out of politics.\156\ In April 2006, Ye 
Xiaowen, Director of the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs, said that the issue of whether the CPA or the Holy See 
has the authority to select Catholic bishops ``may be open to 
consultation.'' \157\ Church figures, however, interpreted the 
government's coerced consecration of bishops without Holy See 
approval in April and May as a diplomatic rebuff to the Holy 
See.\158\ In June, Chinese government officials met with Holy 
See representatives in Beijing, although the meeting reportedly 
yielded few concrete results.\159\
Religious Freedom for China's Muslims
    The Chinese government strictly controls the practice of 
Islam. The state-controlled Islamic Association of China\160\ 
aligns Islamic practice to Communist Party goals by directing 
the training and confirmation of religious leaders, the 
publication of religious materials, and the content of sermons, 
as well as by indoctrinating religious leaders and adherents in 
Party ideology and government policy.\161\ The Regulation on 
Religious Affairs acknowledges that Muslims may make 
pilgrimages abroad but limits such trips to those organized by 
the Islamic Association of China\162\ and penalizes those 
organizing pilgrimages without authorization.\163\ In May 2006, 
the Islamic Association of China announced it would establish 
an office to manage pilgrimages to Mecca.\164\ In 2005, the 
Association's Islamic Affairs Steering Committee, which 
controls the content of religious publications, announced that 
it was compiling a fourth edition of its ``new collected 
sermons,'' noting that messages on patriotism and unity within 
the text contribute to building a ``socialist harmonious 
society.'' \165\ In May 2006, the China Islamic Congress, which 
met to define the goals of the Islamic Association for the 
coming five years, passed a measure on confirming religious 
personnel that requires knowledge of the sermons.\166\
    Official policy toward Islam reflects government and Party 
concern about maintaining control over, and stability within, 
China's Muslim population, which includes 10 ethnic groups 
under the government's classification system.\167\ In November 
2005, the government said it was formulating national 
legislation to regulate halal foods, in part because of 
concerns that misuse of the halal label could ``influence 
ethnic unity and social stability, and harm ethnic relations.'' 
\168\ After Muslims protested the publication of materials that 
they found offensive to Islam, the government issued a national 
circular in 1993 requiring strict examination of publications 
that ``touch upon the Islamic religion'' in order to ``uphold 
social stability'' and avoid ``hurting the feelings of 
religious believers.'' \169\ A 1995 national circular on 
pilgrimages abroad requires provincial-level authorities to 
instruct pilgrims before departure on patriotism, socialism, 
``defending the unity of the motherland,'' and ethnic 
unity.\170\
    The government accommodates Muslim communities in certain 
respects. Outside the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 
some Muslim communities and mosques have openly set up schools 
to provide children and adults with secular and religious 
education.\171\ Domestic Muslim NGOs carry out social welfare 
projects,\172\ and international Muslim charities have 
supported projects in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces, as well as 
in the XUAR.\173\
Islam in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
    The Chinese government severely represses Islamic practice 
in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), especially 
among the Uighur ethnic group.\174\ Some restrictions on 
religion in the XUAR are not found elsewhere in China. The 
XUAR's 1993 Implementing Measures for the Law on the Protection 
of Minors forbid parents and guardians to allow minors to 
engage in religious activity.\175\ No other provincial-level or 
national regulation on minors or religion contains this 
restriction.\176\ Amendments\177\ in 2001 to the XUAR's 1994 
Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs eliminated a 
clause that protected ``normal religious activities,'' and 
limited the publication of religious materials to provincial-
level religious organizations.\178\ Internal policy directives 
and handbooks also control the practice of religion in the 
region.\179\ One Chinese official said, ``Xinjiang is different 
from other places in China. Islam is administered much more 
strictly there than elsewhere.'' \180\
    In addition to these formal legal strictures, the 
government also implements harsh policies in practice. 
Authorities have detained Muslims for unauthorized possession 
and study of religious materials,\181\ forbidden students and 
discouraged adults from fasting during Ramadan,\182\ barred 
university students from conducting prayers in dormitory 
rooms,\183\ posted signs forbidding children from entering 
mosques,\184\ and revoked the credentials of imams deemed not 
to uphold Communist Party policy.\185\ The government limits 
the ability of Muslim communities in the XUAR to support social 
welfare programs.\186\ A visiting U.S. delegation in 2005 was 
told that the government has not authorized Uighurs to build 
new mosques since 1999.\187\
    The government continued severe repression of religious 
practice in the XUAR during 2006, including a reported new 
restriction on who may enter mosques. According to one report, 
authorities now have included women in restrictions on mosque 
entry already 
enforced against children, Party members, and government 
workers, including retirees.\188\ Another report stated in 
January that authorities were conducting a month-long 
investigation aimed at ``the masterminds of religious extremist 
forces'' and other groups.\189\ In February, authorities raided 
a minority-language publishing market and confiscated 350 
``illegally printed'' religious posters.\190\ During the same 
month, official news media reported that XUAR authorities had 
confiscated 9,860 illegal publications involving religion, 
Falun Gong, or ``feudal superstitions'' during 2005.\191\ In 
April, Wang Lequan, XUAR Party Secretary, said that the XUAR 
government would intensify its work on religion and called for 
``resolutely curb[ing] illegal religious activities'' and 
strengthening the ``ideological and political consciousness'' 
of religious figures.\192\
    The government uses counterterrorism policies as a pretext 
for severely repressing religion in the XUAR.\193\ The 
government describes security conditions in the XUAR in a 
manner that suggests terrorist attacks continue in the 
region,\194\ even as official sources indicate that no 
terrorist attacks have taken place in the XUAR since 1999.\195\ 
Authorities continue to detain and arrest XUAR residents 
engaged in religious activities deemed unauthorized and have 
charged them with a range of offenses, including state security 
crimes.\196\ The government targets ``religious extremism,'' 
splittism, and terrorism in anti-crime campaigns, calling them 
the ``three evil forces.'' \197\ The government began 
tightening control over religious practice in the region in the 
early 1990s, following unrest in the region, but intensified 
its crackdown after September 11, 2001.\198\ Official sources 
published in 2001 recorded an increase in the number of Uighurs 
sent to prison or reeducation through labor centers since the 
mid-1990s because of religious 
activity.\199\
    The government's religious repression in the XUAR is part 
of a broader policy aimed at diluting expressions of Uighur 
identity and tightening government control of the region. The 
government promotes Han migration to the XUAR, claiming it is 
necessary to foster ``social stability,'' ``ethnic unity,'' and 
the ``unity of the state,'' \200\ and has staffed top 
government and Party positions with high numbers of ethnic Han 
Chinese [see Section V(c)--Protection of Internationally 
Recognized Labor Rights--Non-discrimination in Employment and 
Occupation].\201\ In January and February 2006, the XUAR 
government acknowledged that migrants contribute to the 
region's high population growth rate, even as it announced 
plans to direct its population planning measures at controlling 
birth rates in impoverished ethnic minority regions.\202\ The 
government also announced plans throughout the year to promote 
language programs that decrease the use of ethnic minority 
languages in XUAR schools and preschools.\203\ The government 
continues to imprison Uighurs who engage in peaceful 
expressions of dissent and other non-violent activities. 
Foreign news media reported in November 2005 that Korash 
Huseyin, editor of the Kashgar Literature Journal, received a 
three-year sentence for publishing writer Nurmemet Yasin's 
story ``Wild Pigeon.'' \204\ Yasin received a 10-year sentence 
in February 2005 for ``inciting splittism.'' Other Uighurs 
engaged in peaceful activities, including Tohti Tunyaz, 
Abdulghani Memetemin, and Abduhelil Zunun, remain in 
prison.\205\ In addition, since Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer's 
2005 release into exile in the United States, the government 
has continued to harass her relatives in the XUAR.\206\ In June 
2006, authorities charged Alim, Ablikim, and Qahar Abdurehim, 
three of Kadeer's sons, with state security and economic 
crimes.\207\ Authorities beat Alim and Ablikim, and in early 
July, Alim confessed to the charges against him after 
reportedly being tortured.\208\ The local procuratorate 
indicted Alim and Qahar on July 10.\209\ Authorities also have 
placed other family members under house arrest and 
surveillance.\210\
Religious Freedom for China's Orthodox Christians
    The Chinese government has not officially recognized its 
small and slowly reawakening Orthodox Christian community, nor 
has it accommodated its need for priests and bishops.\211\ In 
recent years, Chinese officials have met with representatives 
of the Russian Orthodox Church to discuss these issues.\212\ 
The central government has not recognized Orthodoxy as a 
religion, as many had hoped after the 2004 Regulation on 
Religious Affairs omitted mention of the government's five 
recognized religions. The provincial regulations of 
Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia, however, have recognized 
Orthodoxy, and some other localities have published documents 
that appear to recognize Orthodoxy while including it under the 
category of Protestantism.\213\ Local authorities have not 
accepted the registration of any Orthodox parishes other than 
the four that were registered before 2005 in Harbin city, 
Heilongjiang province, Labdarin city, in the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, and Ghulja and Urumqi cities, in the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).\214\ In the XUAR, 
authorities have reportedly advised Orthodox Christians not to 
communicate with foreigners.\215\ The Chinese government has 
not permitted Chinese Orthodox priests trained in Russia to 
minister to Chinese Orthodox, who still have no priests to 
conduct divine liturgy and administer sacraments.\216\
Religious Freedom for China's Protestants
    The Chinese government continues to repress Chinese 
Protestants who worship in house churches. According to reports 
from a U.S. NGO that monitors religious freedom in China, 
officials raided house church services or meetings, and 
detained and questioned leaders and members.\217\ Although 
public security officials held most of those whom they detained 
in such raids for short periods, they held house church leaders 
for more extended periods, sometimes for weeks or months.\218\ 
Officials also reportedly tortured or physically abused some of 
the house church detainees.\219\ Officials confiscated personal 
property belonging to house church leaders and members, and 
officials also detained foreign missionaries who provided 
training to house church leaders.\220\
    From May 2005 to May 2006, the government detained nearly 
2,000 house church members, according to the same U.S. 
NGO.\221\ Almost 50 percent of the reported detentions of 
Protestant house church members and leaders took place in Henan 
province, where the Protestant house church movement is 
particularly strong.\222\ Detentions were also reported in 
Beijing municipality and in Anhui, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jilin, 
Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Zhejiang provinces, and 
in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).\223\ In 
addition, officials demolished a large house church in Hangzhou 
city, Zhejiang province, and beat hundreds of house church 
members. Municipal officials had denied repeated requests for 
permission to build a church.\224\
    The government targets house church leaders for the most 
severe punishment. In November 2005, officials convicted Cai 
Zhuohua, a house church pastor in Beijing, of ``illegal 
operation of a business'' for printing and giving away Bibles 
without government authorization\225\ [see Section V(a)--
Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression]. The court 
sentenced Cai to three years' imprisonment. Xiao Yunfei and 
Xiao Gaowen, his wife and brother-in-law, were sentenced to 
shorter terms.\226\ House church pastors Liu Yuhua and Wang 
Zaiqing also reportedly printed Bibles without permission, and 
in 2006 officials detained the former and formally arrested the 
latter.\227\ In December 2004, officials arrested Zhang 
Rongliang, a leader of the China for Christ house church 
network in Henan province, and several months later charged him 
with ``illegally crossing the national border'' and 
``fraudulently obtaining a passport.'' \228\ In June 2006, 
Pastor Zhang was sentenced to seven years and six months in 
prison.\229\ Officials convicted Gong Shengliang, founder of 
the South China Church in Hubei province, of premeditated 
assault and rape in 2001. Gong continues to serve a sentence of 
life in prison in Hubei province, although nine of the 
government's witnesses against him have recanted their 
testimony, alleging that their testimony was extracted under 
torture [see Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and 
Defendants--Torture and Abuse in Custody]. In 2006, Gong's 
daughters reported that he is in poor health, and that another 
inmate beat Gong in prison. His lawyers have applied for his 
release on medical parole.\230\
    Chinese authorities have banned some house churches as 
``cults,'' and harassment and repression of unregistered 
Protestants for involvement in ``cults'' became more prominent 
in mid-2006. Religious practitioners involved in what the 
government classifies as a ``cult'' are subject to prosecution 
under Article 300 of the Criminal Law. On five occasions in 
June and July 2006, officials reportedly accused or 
investigated house church members for involvement in ``cults'' 
(xiejiao).\231\ In July 2006, Xu Shuangfu and 15 additional 
leaders of the Three Grades of Servants house church, which was 
banned as a ``cult'' in 1999, were convicted on charges of 
murder and fraud.\232\
    The Chinese government continues to maintain strict control 
over the registered Protestant church. The Regulation on 
Religious Affairs (RRA) requires that all Protestants worship 
at registered churches,\233\ regardless of their differences in 
doctrine and liturgy. The state-controlled Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement (TSPM), which leads the registered Protestant church 
in China, does not allow Protestants to express these 
differences freely.\234\ The TSPM continues to impose a 
Communist Party-defined theology, called ``theological 
construction,'' on registered seminaries that, according to 
TSPM leader Ding Guangxun, will ``weaken those aspects within 
Christian faith that do not conform with the socialist 
society.'' \235\ TSPM publications indicate that the aspects to 
be weakened include fundamental Protestant beliefs, such as 
justification by faith alone.\236\ TSPM publications also 
contain indications that some Chinese Protestants resist 
``theological construction,'' and that this resistance may be 
gaining in strength.\237\ In the past year, one instance was 
reported in which officials detained a 
registered Protestant pastor in Henan province, when the pastor 
conducted a Bible study meeting at a registered Protestant 
church outside his designated geographic area.\238\ The Henan 
provincial Regulation on Religious Affairs requires visiting 
registered 
religious personnel to secure permission from both the 
religious 
organization in their designated geographic area and the 
religious organization in the area they propose to visit.\239\ 
A TSPM official in the XUAR, where Protestantism is spreading 
rapidly among the Han Chinese population, has reportedly said 
that, although several years ago children used to attend 
church, authorities now have forbidden this throughout the 
region.\240\ A foreign expert who has done extensive research 
on the TSPM has said that authorities have been ``siphoning off 
the church's main source of revenue--rental income.'' \241\
    The Chinese government continues to restrict the 
relationships of unregistered Chinese Protestants with their 
co-religionists abroad, in contravention of international human 
rights standards.\242\ House church Protestants reported that 
authorities raided meetings 
between house church leaders and Protestants visiting China to 
conduct theological or organizational training.\243\ Officials 
have prevented some house church leaders from traveling abroad, 
and imprisoned others upon their return.\244\ Senior government 
officials continue to incite suspicion of overseas Christians 
by accusing them of ``religious infiltration'' intended to 
weaken China. Press reports have associated Protestantism with 
``foreign imperialism'' and warn that Protestantism must be 
``patriotic'' and not harm China.\245\ Despite these 
restrictions, Chinese house churches have become increasingly 
interested in theological and denominational issues,\246\ and 
major house church networks continued to have regular contacts 
with each other and with Protestants abroad.\247\
    The government also restricts and monitors the foreign 
relationships of the registered Protestant church. Although the 
government permits the TSPM to maintain contact with foreign 
denominations and educational institutions, and to conduct 
exchanges with interdenominational Protestant organizations 
abroad, it strictly regulates these contacts and limits them to 
the TSPM's top leadership.\248\ Registered churches, however, 
continue to receive financial support from abroad, a right 
protected by Article 35 of the RRA.\249\
    The number of reported house church and registered 
Protestants in China continued to increase in the past 
year.\250\ Foreign estimates of the total number of Protestants 
range from 30 million to 100 million. Official Chinese 
estimates exclude those who worship in unregistered house 
churches.\251\ In response to the rapid growth in the numbers 
of unregistered house churches, the government has instructed 
registered churches to hold home services.\252\ According to 
some reports, Protestants constitute a significant proportion 
of the religious practitioners within the Communist Party.\253\ 
An internal Party study found that of some 60 million Party 
members, 20 million engage in religious activities (9 million 
do so regularly), and that a majority of them are 
Christians.\254\ In October 2005, Party leaders concluded that 
this high level of religious practice will ``change the 
ideology of Party members and lead to the disintegration of 
their political belief . . . and this will create all kinds of 
social and political crises in the Party and in the country.'' 
The same leaders also called for all religious adherents to be 
expelled from the Party.\255\ Party members in Liaoning 
province and certain members of the Party Central Committee in 
Beijing reportedly expressed their disagreement with this 
policy, and said that it is time to permit Party members to be 
believe in and practice a religion.\256\
    The government continues to welcome some of the effects and 

influences of Protestantism, specifically those that support 
the 
Party's societal goals. Chinese Protestants report that many 
local officials believe that religious influence reduces 
criminality and contributes to social welfare.\257\ The 
government continues to welcome social service projects 
undertaken by the Amity Foundation, a Protestant foundation 
that recently sponsored projects in social services and 
development aid, including education, healthcare, and care for 
the elderly.\258\ A U.S.-based NGO plans to open the first 
private university with an openly Christian mission in China 
since 1949.\259\ A growing number of urban entrepreneurs who 
have become Protestants use their influence to protect and 
promote their religious communities.\260\ Likewise, a growing 
number of urban intellectuals who have joined the house church 
movement advocate for political and legal reform in China.\261\
Government Persecution of Falun Gong
    Government persecution of Falun Gong practitioners, which 
began in 1999 after thousands of practitioners demonstrated 
peacefully outside the senior leadership compound in 
Beijing,\262\ continued during the past year. Falun Gong and 
other sources reported cases of arrest, abuse, detention, 
torture, and execution of practitioners in 2005 and 2006.\263\ 
Based on official Chinese government information, at least 202 
Falun Gong practitioners are currently in prison.\264\ Falun 
Gong sources estimate that since 1999, at least 6,000 
practitioners have been sentenced to prison, over 100,000 
practitioners have been sentenced to reeducation through labor 
(RTL), and almost 3,000 Falun Gong practitioners have died from 
torture while in custody.\265\ Manfred Nowak, UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, reported after his November 2005 visit 
to China that Falun Gong practitioners account for 66 percent 
of victims of alleged torture while in government custody.\266\ 
Multiple allegations of government-sanctioned organ harvesting 
from Falun Gong prisoners surfaced in 2006. The U.S. State 
Department investigated one set of charges, but was unable to 
confirm them.\267\ A former senior Canadian government official 
provided transcripts of telephone calls to detention facilities 
and transplant centers in China, where officials there 
confirmed the availability of organs from Falun Gong 
prisoners.\268\ [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects 
and Defendants--Harvesting of Organs from Executed Prisoners.]
    Chinese government persecution of Falun Gong practitioners 
contravenes the standards in Article 18 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\269\ Article 
18(1) of the ICCPR guarantees everyone ``the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion . . . [and] to manifest 
his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and 
observance.'' Article 18(3) specifies that ``freedom to 
manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the 
fundamental rights or freedoms of others.'' \270\ The Chinese 
government justifies its persecution of Falun Gong on the 
grounds that it is necessary to protect public safety, order, 
and morals, an argument based on Article 36 of the 
Constitution.\271\ The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
(UNWGAD), however, has rejected this argument. In 2004, the 
UNWGAD found the detention of Falun Gong practitioner Qiu 
Minghua arbitrary, and added that the Chinese government had 
``failed to adduce any argument explaining why and how Ms. 
Qiu's affiliation with, or profession of, the ideas or 
principles of Falun Gong was or could have been detrimental to 
the society as a whole, or to other individuals.'' \272\
    Article 300 of the Criminal Law\273\ and Article 27 of the 
newly enacted Public Security Administration Punishment 
Law\274\ provide the legal pretext for penalizing Falun Gong 
activities. Public security officials punish the majority of 
detained Falun Gong practitioners administratively, including 
by detaining them in RTL centers.\275\ [See Section V(b)--
Rights of Criminal Suspects and 
Defendants--Administrative Detention.] According to a 1999 
joint Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate 
interpretation, ``cult'' activities that merit punishment under 
the Criminal Law include publishing sect-related materials and 
inciting others to disturb public order.\276\ Individuals 
sentenced under Article 300 of the Criminal Law for organizing 
the April 1999 demonstration in Beijing, and who remain in 
prison today, include Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, Ji Liewu, and Yao 
Jie. In 2001, officials sentenced Chongqing practitioners Chen 
Qi, He Haiou, Li Zongyu, and Xu Linfen to sentences from 8 to 
12 years in prison for using the Internet to create and 
distribute information about Falun Gong. In December 2001, a 
Beijing court sentenced Wang Xin, Dong Yanhong, Meng Jun, Yao 
Yue, and Liu Wenyu, five practitioners associated with Tsinghua 
University, and Wang Xuefei, a university student from 
Shanghai, to sentences ranging from 3 to 12 years. The 
practitioners were convicted of using the Internet to download 
materials from foreign Falun Gong Web sites and printing 
leaflets for posting and distribution on Beijing streets.\277\
    Officials harass and punish Chinese rights defenders and 
lawyers who defend Falun Gong practitioners against government 
persecution. [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and 

Defendants--Access to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense.] 
In November 2005, authorities suspended the operating license 
of the Beijing Shengzhi Law Firm and its director Gao Zhisheng 
after he wrote an open letter to President Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiabao criticizing official abuses against Falun 
Gong practitioners.\278\ In January 2006, a Guangxi law firm 
dismissed lawyer Yang Zaixin after he represented three Falun 
Gong practitioners.\279\
    The Chinese government continues its propaganda campaign 
against Falun Gong and other qigong disciplines that it has 
designated as ``cults.'' The government alleges that ``Falun 
Gong is not only a cult but also an anti-China political 
organization with base political intentions.'' \280\ The 
government reports that ``in some places, the illegal 
activities of Falun Gong and other cults are not completely 
contained,'' and has maintained a campaign to distribute 
posters illustrating the ``nature and danger'' of these 
organizations throughout the country.\281\ The government 
campaign against Falun Gong extends to all written materials 
that practitioners use. In 2005, the government confiscated 
4.62 million ``illegal'' Falun Gong and ``other cult propaganda 
materials.'' \282\ One email provider in China blocked almost 
20,000 emails relating to Falun Gong and other ``reactionary'' 
topics in 2005.\283\

                          V(e) Status of Women


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese Constitution and national laws 
        provide that men and women should enjoy equal rights 
        and list protections for the economic and social rights 
        of women, but vague language and inadequate 
        implementation hinder the effectiveness of these legal 
        protections. Some provincial and municipal governments 
        have passed regulations to strengthen the 
        implementation of national laws. A 2005 amendment to 
        the Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of 
        Women prohibits sexual harassment and domestic 
        violence, promotes a greater voice for women in the 
        government, and charges several government 
        organizations with responsibility for preventing human 
        trafficking and rehabilitating victims.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Civil society groups in China advocate on 
        behalf of women's rights within the confines of 
        government and Communist Party policy. The All-China 
        Women's Federation, a Party-led mass organization, 
        works with the Chinese government to support women's 
        rights, implement programs for disadvantaged women, and 
        provide a limited measure of legal counseling and 
        training for women. Women, however, have limited 
        earning power compared to men, despite government 
        policies that guarantee women non-discrimination in 
        employment and occupation.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Human trafficking remains pervasive in China 
        despite 
        efforts by government agencies to combat trafficking, a 
        framework of domestic laws to address the problem, and 
        ongoing cooperation with international anti-trafficking 
        programs. The government's population planning policy 
        has created a severe imbalance in the male-female birth 
        ratio, and this imbalance exacerbates trafficking of 
        women and girls for sale as brides. Between 10,000 and 
        20,000 men, women, and children are victims of 
        trafficking within China each year, and NGOs estimate 
        that 90 percent of those victims are women and children 
        trafficked for sexual exploitation. Authorities are 
        working with the International Labor Organization to 
        build anti-trafficking capacity and raise domestic 
        awareness of the problem.
Laws and Institutions
    The Chinese Constitution and national laws provide that men 
and women should enjoy equal rights and list protections for 
the economic and social rights of women.\1\ A 2005 amendment to 
the Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women 
(LPRIW) prohibits sexual harassment and domestic violence, 
promotes a greater voice for women in the government, and 
charges several government organizations with responsibility 
for preventing human trafficking and rehabilitating victims.\2\ 
Some provincial and municipal governments have passed 
regulations to strengthen the implementation of national laws. 
For example, 15 provinces and cities have passed anti-domestic 
violence regulations, and some localities have rules mandating 
that police respond to domestic abuse calls.\3\
    Vague language and inadequate implementation hinder the 
effectiveness of these legal protections. The editor of the 
Beijing newspaper Women's News points out that the LPRIW does 
not define sexual harassment and domestic violence.\4\ 
According to one expert, many women know that laws exist to 
protect their rights, but do not understand what these rights 
are.\5\ Moreover, judges lack training on the laws protecting 
women's rights. One Peking University Law School professor 
notes that case rulings in domestic violence cases are 
inconsistent because Chinese laws and judicial explanations 
lack clear standards.\6\ Under a 1978 State Council regulation, 
employers can require women workers to retire five years 
before men.\7\ Courts have used this regulation to rule against 
women in employment cases, even though the practice contravenes 
the LPRIW.\8\ [See Section V(c)--Protection of Internationally 
Recognized Labor Rights--Non-discrimination in Employment and 
Occupation.] When determining who is eligible to receive shares 
of collectively owned village assets, village committees have 
made decisions that legitimize discrimination against women who 
have moved to their husband's village, or who have remained in 
the village in contravention of traditional marriage 
arrangements.\9\ The Law of the PRC on Land Contract in Rural 
Areas and the Marriage Law guarantee women the same land rights 
as men, including land contracts and compensation for 
requisitioned land, and since August 2005, judges have ruled in 
favor of women in four lawsuits concerning land rights.\10\
    The All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), a Communist Party-
led mass organization, works with the Chinese government to 
support women's rights, implement programs for disadvantaged 
women, and provide a limited measure of legal counseling and 
training for women. The ACWF's close ties to the government 
allow it to secure funding for innovative methods to deal with 
women's problems.\11\ According to one Chinese official, ACWF 
loans have helped increase education and employment 
opportunities for rural women living in poverty.\12\ Urban 
district-level ACWFs are cooperating with judicial and law 
enforcement agencies to combat domestic violence by ensuring 
police intervention and improving evidence collection in 
domestic violence cases.\13\ The ACWF does not promote women's 
interests, however, when such interests conflict with Party 
policies that limit women's rights. For example, an ACWF 
representative in Yunnan refused to allow a leading women's 
rights activist to represent over 500 women in Yunnan who were 
seeking redress for lost land, on the grounds that such 
interference could ``influence stability.'' \14\ In addition, 
the ACWF has been silent about the abuses of the government 
population planning policy and is complicit in coercive 
enforcement of birth limits\15\ [see Section V(h)--Population 
Planning].
    Civil society groups in China advocate for women's rights 
within the confines of government and Party policy. Working 
with the ACWF, the Chinese Legal Aid Foundation has set up a 
fund to encourage volunteers to provide expert legal advice for 
economically disadvantaged women.\16\ Women lawyers represent 
women in lawsuits involving sexual harassment, domestic 
violence, and compensation for land seizures, and newspapers 
such as Women's News publicize the cases.\17\ In October 2005, 
six domestic Chinese women's organizations attended a symposium 
to share best practices,\18\ and women lawyers, entrepreneurs, 
mayors, and reporters have also begun to form associations to 
raise the profile of women in these professions.\19\
Gender Disparities
    Women have limited earning power compared to men, despite 
government policies that guarantee women non-discrimination in 
employment and occupation. [See Section V(c)--Protection of 
Internationally Recognized Labor Rights--Nondiscrimination in 
Employment and Occupation.] Women have fewer opportunities for 
promotion than men\20\ and have lower rates of employment at 
high-paying jobs than men.\21\ Employers demand that women have 
higher education levels than men to be hired for equivalent 
white-collar positions.\22\ Middle-aged women have lost their 
jobs more quickly than men as the state-owned manufacturing 
sector has undergone economic restructuring.\23\ Some local 
governments have established programs to provide loans and 
training to women who have lost their jobs.\24\
    In rural areas, women have fewer economic opportunities 
than men and have less access to education. Men have more 
opportunities to engage in non-agricultural employment, and 
women are increasingly taking up uncompensated farming 
responsibilities.\25\ Women now account for 60 percent of total 
rural laborers.\26\ Some families emphasize the education of 
male children over female children.\27\ According to statistics 
in a 2006 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences report, 61 percent 
of boys and 43 percent of girls in rural areas have completed 
education higher than lower middle school.\28\ Young women 
migrate to urban areas to find work, leaving them vulnerable to 
trafficking, forced labor, and other abuses.\29\ According to a 
2005 survey conducted in Hunan province, 74.8 percent of 
migrant women respondents in Changsha, the capital of Hunan 
province, had experienced sexual harassment while working.\30\
    Chinese health statistics reflect women's disadvantaged 
status. Chinese women have a higher overall rate of infectious 
disease and disability than men.\31\ A lack of gender-sensitive 
anti-HIV/AIDS policies has led to a growing risk of infection 
for women\32\ [see Section V(g)--Public Health--HIV/AIDS]. 
According to one Chinese 
report, since the late 1990s, the proportion of female HIV/AIDS 
patients has risen. In the late 1990s, the ratio of infected 
men to women was 9:1. In 2006, the ratio was reported to be 
3:1.\33\ China is the only country in the world where the rate 
of suicide is higher among women than among men.\34\ In rural 
areas, the instance of suicide among women is three to four 
times higher than the rate among men.\35\
Human Trafficking
    Human trafficking remains pervasive in China despite 
efforts by government agencies to combat trafficking, a 
framework of domestic laws to address the problem, and ongoing 
cooperation with international anti-trafficking programs. 
Traffickers are often linked to organized crime and specialize 
in abducting infants and young children for adoption and 
household service.\36\ They also abduct girls and women for the 
bridal market in China's poorest areas and for sale as 
prostitutes.\37\ According to the U.S. State Department's 
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, between 
10,000 and 20,000 men, women, and children are victims of 
trafficking within China each year, and NGOs estimate that 90 
percent of those victims are women and children trafficked for 
sexual 
exploitation.\38\ The government's population planning policy 
has created a severe imbalance in the male-female sex ratio, 
and the imbalance exacerbates trafficking of women for sale as 
brides [see Section V(h)--Population Planning]. The Chinese 
official media reported that employees at state-run welfare 
organizations in Hunan province and the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region engaged in infant trafficking in 2005.\39\
    Article 240 of the Criminal Law provides for severe 
punishment, including the death penalty, for abducting and 
trafficking women and children, and Article 416 contains 
provisions to punish officials who fail to rescue women and 
children who are abducted and trafficked.\40\ Efforts by the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS), however, have not kept pace 
with increased trafficking. The number of victims of child 
trafficking increased by 15 percent over a two-year period 
beginning in 2003, according to unofficial government sources 
cited by foreign news media,\41\ but the number of trafficking-
related arrests has declined since reaching a peak during an 
MPS enforcement campaign that began in 2000.\42\ China is a 
signatory to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, but not to its two protocols that address human 
trafficking and smuggling of migrants.\43\ China's Criminal Law 
does not specifically address the issue of human trafficking as 
it relates to forced labor, and although the Labor Law outlaws 
forced labor practices in the workplace, it only provides light 
penalties for violators.\44\ [For more information on forced 
labor, see Section V(c)--Protection of Internationally 
Recognized Labor Rights--Elimination of Forced Labor.]
    State Council ministries, as well as employers' and 
workers' organizations, are cooperating with the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) to build anti-trafficking capacity and 
raise domestic awareness of the problem.\45\ For example, an 
ILO pilot program begun in 2000 to reduce the vulnerability of 
women and children to trafficking in Yunnan province has 
coordinated the resources of the All-China Women's Federation 
and other local agencies to raise awareness and rehabilitate 
victims of trafficking. The program has been expanded to five 
other provinces.\46\

                          V(f) The Environment


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government acknowledges the 
        severity of China's environmental problems and has 
        taken steps to curb pollution and environmental 
        degradation. Since 2001, it has 
        formulated or revised environmental protection laws, 
        administrative regulations, and standards, and has 
        worked to strengthen enforcement of anti-pollution 
        rules. The Chinese government has also welcomed 
        international technical assistance to combat 
        environmental degradation, and has increased 
        cooperation with the U.S. government on environmental 
        protection over the past year.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Despite these initiatives, local enforcement 
        of environmental laws and regulations is poor, and 
        underfunding of environmental protection activities 
        continues to hinder official efforts to prevent 
        environmental degradation. A lack of transparency 
        hampers the Chinese government's ability to respond to 
        civil emergencies, including environmental disasters. 
        Government efforts to impose greater control over 
        environmental civil society groups during the past year 
        have stifled citizen activism.
Government Response to Environmental Degradation
    The Chinese government acknowledges the severity of China's 
environmental problems. The State Council's White Paper on 
``Environmental Protection (1996-2005),'' issued in June 2006, 
notes that ``the contradiction between economic growth and 
environmental protection is particularly prominent'' as the 
``relative shortage of resources, a fragile ecological 
environment and insufficient environmental capacity are 
becoming critical problems hindering China's development.'' \1\ 
Senior government officials also acknowledge the possible 
threat to social stability posed by severe environmental 
degradation.\2\ A U.S. expert has observed that environmental 
degradation and pollution ``constrain economic growth, 
contribute to large-scale migration, harm public health, and 
engender social unrest.'' \3\ According to official Chinese 
estimates, environmental degradation and pollution cost China 
an estimated 8 to 12 percent of annual GDP,\4\ and the number 
of mass protests over pollution has increased by 29 percent per 
year since 2000.\5\
    The Chinese government has taken steps to curb pollution 
and environmental degradation. In both its 10th (2001-2005) and 
11th (2006-2010) Five-Year Programs, the government formulated 
or revised environmental protection laws, administrative 
regulations, and standards,\6\ and has worked to strengthen 
enforcement of anti-pollution rules.\7\ The State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) announced in October 2005 that 
city governments will be penalized if they fail to attain 
national air quality standards.\8\ SEPA has also continued to 
close factories and halt construction projects that violate the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Law and other environmental 
protection laws.\9\ In September 2005, a Sichuan court found 
environmental protection officials and commercial enterprise 
officers criminally liable for severely polluting the Tuojiang 
(Tuo River). This case is the first in which environmental 
protection authorities investigated officials and company 
officers at the same time for an environmental crime.\10\
    Despite these initiatives, local enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations is poor, and underfunding of 
environmental protection activities continues to hinder 
official efforts to prevent environmental degradation.\11\ 
Officials often seek to protect enterprises that pollute 
because local governments derive income from these enterprises 
and job evaluations for officials are based on local economic 
performance, not improvements in health or safety.\12\ Local 
officials have also pressured local environmental protection 
bureaus (EPBs) to overlook pollution and take no action against 
polluters. Moreover, EPB officials sometimes allow polluting 
enterprises to continue operation, because their often 
underfunded bureaus derive additional funds by collecting fines 
from polluters.\13\ In late 2005, poor local enforcement of 
environmental laws and corruption triggered mass protests by 
villagers in Zhejiang province.\14\
Government Transparency and Environmental Protection
    A lack of transparency hampers the Chinese government's 
ability to respond to civil emergencies, including 
environmental disasters. An explosion in November 2005 at a 
petrochemical plant in Jilin province released over 100 tons of 
benzene and other toxic chemicals into the Songhua River.\15\ 
The Songhua flows into neighboring Heilongjiang province and is 
the main water source for Harbin, the provincial capital, and 
surrounding areas.\16\ Jilin officials and plant managers 
initially denied that the explosion caused any pollution and 
tried to dilute the spill by discharging water from a 
reservoir.\17\ Jilin officials also waited approximately five 
days to inform Heilongjiang provincial officials and the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) about the 
spill.\18\ Once informed, Harbin officials announced that the 
water supply system would be shut down for ``routine 
maintenance.'' Harbin officials revised the announcement amid 
rumors of a chemical spill, and informed the public 10 days 
after the spill that the water system would be unavailable for 
4 days due to ``possible'' contamination.\19\ This delayed 
local government response impeded central government efforts to 
manage the crisis, led to panic among the citizens of Harbin 
city, and created a diplomatic incident with Russia.\20\ 
According to a U.S. expert, ``there are few incentives for 
local officials in China to be bearers of bad news within the 
system, because they believe they will likely be penalized for 
it politically from the higher-ups.'' \21\
    After the Songhua spill, the central government dismissed 
some officials and passed rules to discourage provincial and 
local officials from concealing information from the central 
government.\22\ These reforms were not intended to relax the 
government's control over the media or over the free flow of 
information to the general public. Rather, the goal was to 
increase the flow of information to central authorities in 
Beijing. In January 2006, the State Council issued a general 
plan on emergency response, stipulating that Class I (``most 
serious'') or Class II (``serious'') incidents must be reported 
to the State Council within four hours, and that the public 
should be provided with accurate information in a timely 
manner.\23\ In February 2006, SEPA issued a notice stating that 
serious incidents must be reported to SEPA within an hour of 
being discovered.\24\ Despite these steps to improve local 
reporting to higher authorities, the central government did not 
address the larger issue of government control over the news 
media,\25\ which led to a nearly two-week press blackout on the 
Songhua spill. Moreover, the National People's Congress is 
considering a new draft law that would fine news media 
organizations that report on sudden incidents, such as 
environmental disasters, without prior government 
authorization.\26\
Public Participation in Environmental Protection
    The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) 
has continued efforts to expand public participation in 
environmental protection work. In February 2006, SEPA released 
two provisional measures on public participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures. These 
measures are the first to contain specific arrangements and 
procedures for public involvement in environmental issues.\27\ 
The measures allow a limited role for the public in the EIA 
process through attendance at symposiums or public hearings, 
answering questionnaires, and consulting experts. In July 2006, 
a SEPA official announced that public hearings may be held on 
important, complex, or difficult environmental matters.\28\ In 
addition, before contractors launch a project, they are 
required to provide the public with details on how construction 
could affect the environment and what preventive measures will 
be taken.\29\
    The Chinese government has altered or delayed some 
development projects in response to environmental concerns from 
civil society groups, but a continued lack of transparency 
limits public 
involvement and violates the government's own environmental 
protection laws. In February 2004, the government responded to 
citizen environmental concerns and agreed to suspend all 13 
proposed hydroelectric dam projects on the Nujiang (Nu River) 
in Yunnan province, pending further review.\30\ In 2005, 
Chinese officials reversed this decision after a closed 
internal review, said that four of the proposed dams would be 
built, and banned further news media coverage of the topic.\31\ 
Officials released information regarding the proposed dam 
project under public pressure. In September 2005, environmental 
activists posted an open letter to the State Council on the 
Internet, pointing out violations of the EIA law and demanding 
that officials organize a public hearing on the dam 
project.\32\ Provincial authorities subsequently released the 
government's order approving the EIA report, after refusing to 
do so for two years.\33\
    Despite these positive steps, government efforts to impose 
greater control over environmental civil society groups during 
the past year have stifled citizen activism. In June 2006, an 
unidentified assailant assaulted Three Gorges resettlement 
activist Fu Xiancai, leaving him paralyzed from the shoulders 
down, after he met with a public security official to discuss 
his interview with a German television station in May. Fu had 
been harassed and threatened for more than a year as a result 
of his petitioning efforts.\34\ The official investigation into 
the assault concluded in August that Fu's injuries were self-
inflicted, a finding that is disputed by observers and those 
close to him.\35\ This assault follows the detention of 
environmental activists in October 2005 and April 2006.\36\ Tan 
Kai, who was detained in October 2005 for his involvement in 
the environmental group ``Green Watch,'' went to trial in May 
on charges of illegally obtaining state secrets and was 
sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in August.\37\ Authorities 
tried a villager from Zhejiang province in November 2005 for 
his role in a protest against air pollution.\38\ In August 
2005, senior officials announced that the All-China Environment 
Federation would conduct a survey of environmental 
organizations.\39\ Some analysts believe that the goal of the 
survey is to rein in the activities of civil society 
organizations.\40\
International Environmental Cooperation
    The Chinese government has welcomed international technical 
assistance to combat environmental degradation. The United 
States and China share a common interest in protecting the 
environment, and over the past year the two governments have 
increased bilateral cooperation on environmental protection, 
including:

        &lt;bullet&gt; In November 2005, the Joint Committee on 
        Environmental Cooperation (JCEC) met in the United 
        States for its inaugural session. The JCEC was formed 
        on the basis of a 2003 agreement between the U.S. 
        Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the China 
        State Environmental Protection Administration to 
        collaborate on environmental issues, beginning with air 
        pollution, water contamination, and the environmental 
        impact of toxic substances.\41\
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean 
        Development and 
        Climate, a U.S. initiative to promote the development 
        and deployment of clean energy technologies to meet 
        pollution reduction, energy security, and climate 
        change concerns, was launched in January 2006. Member 
        countries include the United States, China, Australia, 
        India, Japan, and South Korea.\42\ One priority of the 
        Partnership is to strengthen U.S.-China cooperation on 
        environmental protection.\43\
        &lt;bullet&gt; In April 2006, EPA Administrator Stephen 
        Johnson met in China with his counterpart, Minister 
        Zhou Shengxian, to sign an agreement on hazardous-waste 
        management, including finding and disposing of 
        polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). Johnson also toured 
        an EPA-funded project to encourage the use of cleaner, 
        safer home cooking fuels in Lijiang city, Yunnan 
        province, and an EPA-supported project between the Port 
        of Los Angeles and the Shanghai Municipal Port 
        Administration to reduce air pollution.\44\
        &lt;bullet&gt; In May 2006, the U.S. Trade and Development 
        Agency awarded a grant to the Shandong Provincial 
        Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) to develop 
        cleaner energy sources and another grant to the Shanxi 
        Provincial EPB to improve air quality.\45\

                           V(g) Public Health


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The central government strengthened its 
        commitment during the past year to address the severe 
        shortage of affordable health care in rural China. 
        Since the collapse of the rural public health 
        infrastructure in the 1980s, the disparity in the 
        availability and affordability of health care between 
        urban and rural areas has increased. As a result, the 
        medical needs of China's rural poor, including the 
        diagnosis and treatment of infectious diseases, often 
        go unaddressed. The government, however, has pledged to 
        accelerate the establishment of rural health 
        cooperatives and invest more than 20 billion yuan 
        (US$2.5 billion) over the next five years to modernize 
        hospitals, clinics, and medical equipment at the 
        village, township, and county levels.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The central government continued to take steps 
        over the past year to prevent and control the spread of 
        HIV/AIDS. Although the estimated number of HIV/AIDS 
        cases nationwide has decreased, health officials still 
        consider the disease to be a grave problem. Government 
        efforts to prevent and control the transmission of HIV/
        AIDS continue to face serious challenges, as local 
        implementation of national policy lags far behind 
        central government attention to the problem. Victims of 
        HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases also continue to 
        face harassment and discrimination, despite legal 
        protections.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese public health officials have shown 
        increased commitment and responsiveness in their 
        efforts to prevent and control the spread of avian flu, 
        and have taken steps to improve government transparency 
        following the mishandling of the SARS epidemic in 2003. 
        International health experts, however, still consider 
        China to be among the most likely incubators of a 
        potential human influenza pandemic. Central government 
        cooperation in sharing information and virus samples 
        with international health organizations has been 
        inconsistent, and international health organizations 
        and central government officials continue to express 
        concern about the speed and accuracy of local reporting 
        on outbreaks among both humans and poultry.
Rural Poverty and Public Health
    The central government strengthened its commitment during 
the past year to address the severe shortage of affordable 
healthcare in rural China. Premier Wen Jiabao announced the 
launching of a Plan for Establishing and Developing a Rural 
Healthcare Service System in a March 2006 work report to the 
annual plenary session of the National People's Congress. The 
Chinese leadership highlighted these goals in their December 
2005 Opinion Promoting the Construction of a New Socialist 
Countryside, a document that enumerated key policy goals 
related to rural development for 2006.\1\
    According to the plan, the government will invest more than 
20 billion yuan (US$2.5 billion) over the next five years to 
modernize hospitals, clinics, and medical equipment at the 
village, township, and county levels.\2\ In an effort to 
accelerate the establishment of rural health cooperatives, 
Premier Wen pledged to expand experimental health cooperative 
coverage from 671 counties to 1,145 counties (over 70 percent 
of the counties in China) by the end of 2006, and double the 
healthcare allowances paid to rural residents in the program 
from 20 yuan (US$2.5) to 40 yuan (US$5).\3\ Wen also said that 
central and local governments will build rural health 
cooperatives across the entire country by 2008.\4\
    Since 2002, the central government has encouraged the 
formation of rural health cooperatives, which receive local 
government subsidies to cover a portion of the medical expenses 
for farmers who pay an annual 10 yuan (US$1.25) premium. 
Despite these 
improvements, healthcare costs have become one of the greatest 
financial burdens for those living in rural areas.\5\ The 
poorest residents in rural areas frequently do not enroll in 
health cooperatives because of the modest annual fee.\6\ Even 
for participants, the cooperative plan covers only between 30 
and 40 percent of hospitalization costs, leaving many rural 
families in debt after a serious 
illness.\7\ Yang Lixiong, a social security expert at Renmin 
University in Beijing, found that since 2001, the per capita 
income of those living in rural areas increased 2.4 percent, 
while the per capita yearly expenditure on healthcare services 
among rural residents rose 11.8 percent.\8\
    Since the dissolution of the commune-based rural public 
health infrastructure in the 1980s, the disparity between urban 
and rural areas in the availability and affordability of 
healthcare has increased.\9\ China's healthcare system 
underwent privatization beginning in 1978, and by 1999 the 
central government's share of 
national healthcare spending fell from 32 percent to 15 
percent.\10\ From 1977 to 2002, the number of doctors in rural 
China decreased from 1.8 million to 800,000, and the number of 
rural healthcare workers decreased from 3.4 million to 
800,000.\11\ Eighty percent of medical resources are now 
concentrated in cities, and the new rural healthcare system 
covers less than 23 percent of rural residents.\12\ The rural-
urban disparity is also apparent in mortality statistics. 
Residents of large cities in China live 12 years longer than 
rural residents, and the infant mortality rate in some rural 
areas is nine times higher than in large cities.\13\
Infectious Diseases and Public Health
    Infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis B 
continue to be a major challenge for China's public health 
system. According to the Ministry of Health (MOH), a total of 
4.42 million infectious disease cases were reported in 2005, an 
increase of 12.7 percent from 2004.\14\ Over 13,000 people died 
from infectious diseases in 2005, and the mortality rate 
increased more than 80 percent from 2004, according to a MOH 
report.\15\ Among the top killers were tuberculosis, rabies, 
AIDS, hepatitis B, and neonatal tetanus.\16\ Unofficial 
estimates place the number of hepatitis B carriers in China at 
120 million.\17\ In an attempt to reduce hepatitis B infection, 
the MOH issued the ``2006-2010 National Plan on Hepatitis B 
Prevention and Control.'' The plan's top priority is to 
strengthen vaccination programs, especially among young 
children.\18\ The plan sets the goal of lowering the infection 
rate to 1 percent among those five years old and younger, and 
to less than 7 percent nationwide by 2010. The MOH has 
acknowledged the limitations of the current public health 
system in addressing the growing medical needs of hepatitis 
carriers.\19\ A survey conducted by the China Foundation for 
Hepatitis Prevention and Control (CFHPC) found that a majority 
of Chinese physicians do not have adequate knowledge of 
hepatitis B or of ways to prevent and treat the disease.\20\
    Victims of infectious diseases, like hepatitis B, continue 
to face discrimination in schooling and employment, despite 
protections in the Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Infectious Diseases, as amended in 2004.\21\ The amended law 
prohibits discrimination against people with infectious 
diseases, people carrying the pathogen of an infectious 
disease, and people who are suspected of having an infectious 
disease. A 2005 CFHPC survey, covering 583 hepatitis patients 
in 18 provinces, found that 52 percent of the respondents had 
faced discrimination in employment and education.\22\ Some 
carriers, however, have become aware of their legal rights and 
have taken legal action against unfair treatment. In November 
2005, university authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region ordered 156 students, diagnosed as hepatitis B positive 
in their matriculation health checks, to suspend their 
schooling ``for the sake of public health.'' Students formed an 
action group and circulated fliers to protest the unfair 
treatment, and one student started legal proceedings against 
university authorities.\23\ One student also filed a lawsuit 
against a university in Henan province alleging that the school 
denied him admission because he is a carrier of the hepatitis B 
virus. The university had denied the student admission, despite 
the fact that he scored above the cut-off point on the entrance 
examination. His application showed that he had tested positive 
for hepatitis B.\24\
HIV/AIDS
    The central government continued to take steps over the 
past year to prevent and control the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 
January 2006, the State Council issued its most comprehensive 
HIV/AIDS regulations since the government first adopted 
guidelines in 1987.\25\ The new regulations address the 
dominant modes of HIV/AIDS transmission in China: intravenous 
drug use and sexual contact. The regulations call for 
cooperative measures among health authorities to provide 
treatment for drug addicts, require that local governments 
organize HIV/AIDS prevention action plans and monitoring 
systems, and encourage local governments to post material about 
HIV/AIDS transmission in public places. The new regulations 
also require that governments at the county level and above 
provide free anti-HIV/AIDS drugs for rural and poor urban AIDS 
patients.\26\ A March 2006 UNAIDS report found that China was 
only half way to meeting its goal under the UN's ``3 by 5'' 
initiative of providing 30,000 HIV/AIDS carriers access to 
anti-HIV drugs by the end of 2005.\27\ The new regulations also 
address discrimination against HIV patients, mandating that 
``no work unit or individual shall discriminate against HIV 
carriers, AIDS patients, or their families.'' \28\ The 
regulations, however, do not specify legal redress for victims 
who face such discrimination.
    Health officials still consider HIV/AIDS in China to be a 
``grave'' problem.\29\ Although the World Health Organization 
and UNAIDS program decreased the estimated number of HIV/AIDS 
cases nationwide from 840,000 to 650,000, health officials 
calculate that there were on average 200 new cases of HIV/AIDS 
infection in China each day in 2005.\30\ Government efforts to 
prevent and control the transmission of HIV/AIDS continue to 
face serious challenges. Central government officials expressed 
frustration during 2005 and 2006 with local-level 
implementation of national HIV/AIDS policy. During a November 
29, 2005, meeting of the State Council Work Committee on AIDS 
Prevention and Treatment, Vice Premier Wu Yi criticized some 
local officials for failing to recognize the severity of the 
HIV/AIDS problem, and criticized others for neglecting and, at 
times, obstructing HIV/AIDS prevention and control efforts.\31\ 
Wang Longde, Vice Minister of Health, criticized local 
governments in November 2005 for only providing HIV/AIDS 
prevention services to urban residents with local residential 
registration, thus excluding migrant workers who are a high-
risk group for HIV/AIDS infection.\32\ To address this 
discrimination, the State Council and the Ministry of Health 
announced a new program in November 2005 that aims to provide 
more than 65 percent of migrant workers with access to HIV/AIDS 
prevention information by the end of 2006, and more than 85 
percent by 2010.\33\
    Reports of government harassment of HIV/AIDS carriers 
continued throughout the year, as some local officials 
retaliated against AIDS victims who expressed their 
grievances.\34\ Local government harassment of Chinese civil 
society organizations dealing with HIV/AIDS also continued, 
undermining efforts to combat the disease. Public security 
officials detained activist Hu Jia, co-founder of the Beijing 
Aizhixing Institute and of Loving Source, both HIV/AIDS 
advocacy groups, when he attempted to deliver a petition on 
behalf of more than 50 AIDS patients to Vice Premier Wu Yi at a 
November 2005 AIDS conference in Henan province.\35\ Citing 
government pressure, Hu subsequently resigned from Loving 
Source in February 2006.\36\ [See Section VII(a)--Development 
of Civil Society.]
Avian Flu
    Chinese public health officials have shown increased 
commitment and responsiveness in their efforts to prevent and 
control the spread of avian flu, and have taken steps to 
improve government transparency following the mishandling of 
the SARS epidemic in 2003.\37\ Since a series of outbreaks in 
poultry occurred in the fall of 2005, the central government 
has appropriated over 2 billion yuan (US$250 million) for the 
establishment of an avian flu prevention fund, and initiated 
avian flu emergency management and monitoring plans through the 
Ministry of Health and the Chinese Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention.\38\ Local officials have culled or vaccinated 
millions of poultry in affected areas.\39\ International health 
experts, however, still consider China to be among the most 
likely incubators of a potential human influenza pandemic.\40\ 
International health officials have continued to express 
concern about the effectiveness of animal disease surveillance 
methods at the local level, as the majority of reported human 
infections have occurred in regions in which no previous bird 
infections had been reported.\41\
    Central government cooperation in sharing avian flu 
information and virus samples with international health 
organizations has been inconsistent. Although the Ministry of 
Health has cooperated with international health organizations, 
the Ministry of Agriculture has been less forthcoming.\42\ 
Testifying before a Commission roundtable, one health expert 
said, ``Unfortunately, the lessons learned from SARS by the 
Ministry of Health do not seem to have translated as well to 
the Ministry of Agriculture.'' \43\ In an attempt to improve 
the transparency of official reporting on avian flu outbreaks, 
the State Council issued regulations in November 2005 requiring 
provincial governments to report ``major'' animal epidemics to 
the State Council within four hours of discovering them, and 
county and city governments to report cases to provincial 
authorities within two hours.\44\ Officials who are found 
negligent in reporting outbreaks face removal from office and 
potential prosecution.\45\ Despite these regulations, 
international health organizations and central government 
officials continue to express concern about the speed and 
accuracy of local reporting of outbreaks among both humans and 
poultry.\46\ The reporting of domestic outbreaks by Chinese 
news media sources also has frequently lagged behind that of 
international news media organizations.\47\ In an October 2005 
editorial discussing the government's response to avian flu, Hu 
Shuli, editor of Caijing, a government-sponsored magazine, 
wrote that, ``if one wants to do things even better, one should 
admit that announcements of avian influenza outbreaks to the 
domestic public are still obviously delayed and incomplete. 
This is inappropriate in every way.'' \48\

                        V(h) Population Planning


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government strictly controls the 
        reproductive lives of Chinese women. Since the early 
        1980s, the government's population planning policy has 
        limited most women in urban areas to bearing one child, 
        while permitting many women in rural China to bear a 
        second child if their first child is female. Officials 
        have coerced compliance with the policy through a 
        system marked by pervasive propaganda, mandatory 
        monitoring of women's reproductive cycles, mandatory 
        contraception, mandatory birth permits, coercive fines 
        for failure to comply, and, in some cases, forced 
        sterilization and abortion.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government's population planning 
        laws and regulations contravene international human 
        rights standards by limiting the number of children 
        that women may bear, by coercing compliance with 
        population targets through heavy fines, and by 
        discriminating against ``out-of-plan'' children. Local 
        officials have violated Chinese law by punishing 
        citizens, such as legal advocate Chen Guangcheng, who 
        have drawn attention to population planning abuses by 
        government officials.
Population Planning Policy
    The Chinese government strictly controls the reproductive 
lives of Chinese women, but population planning policy varies 
by locality. Since the early 1980s, the government's population 
planning policy has limited most women in urban areas to 
bearing one child, while permitting many women in rural China 
to bear a second child but generally restricting the additional 
birth to women whose first child is female.\1\ Officials have 
coerced compliance with the policy through a system marked by 
pervasive propaganda, mandatory monitoring of women's 
reproductive cycles, mandatory contraception, mandatory birth 
permits, coercive fines for failure to comply, and, in some 
cases, forced sterilization and abortion. Since the early 
1980s, population planners have frequently revised provincial 
and local rules and quotas as the result of evolving national 
population targets.\2\ Current policies concerning the 
circumstances under which women may bear two children vary at 
the provincial and local level, depending on changes in the 
national plan, on changes in provincial and local quotas, and 
on whether provinces or localities have met or exceeded 
previous quotas.\3\ Local regulations permit ethnic minorities 
to have additional children. Ethnic minorities in the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region are permitted to have more than two 
children if they reside in rural areas, and the Communist 
Party's official journal, Seeking Truth, has claimed that in 
the Tibet Autonomous Region there are no restrictions on the 
number of children that farmers and herders may have.\4\
    The government coerces compliance with its restrictions on 
birth principally through a system of harshly coercive fines, 
which are termed ``social compensation fees.'' \5\ Provincial-
level governments determine the criteria for issuing these 
fines, their amounts, and the method for collecting them 
``based on local conditions.'' \6\ In Beijing municipality, 
officials file a case, investigate, and deliver a ``Social 
Compensation Fee Decision'' to parents when they suspect an 
illegal birth. The parents must pay in full within 30 days of 
receiving the ``Social Compensation Fee Decision'' or file an 
application to pay the fine in installments. The first payment 
must be 50 percent of the total fine, and the parents must make 
full payment within three years. Parents in Beijing who violate 
regulations on having a second child, or unmarried persons who 
violate regulations on having a child, are fined 3 to 10 times 
the area's average annual income. Parents who have a second 
child in accordance with regulations, but less than four years 
after the first child, or when the mother is less than 28 years 
old, are fined one-fifth of the area's average disposable 
annual income for urban residents, and one-fifth of the area's 
average gross annual income for rural residents. When the 
parents' actual income exceeds the area's average income, the 
regulations provide that the actual income should be the basis 
for computing the fine. If the parents ``practice deception,'' 
obstruct official processes, or ``exert negative social 
influence,'' fines can be doubled.\7\ Practices for assessing 
fees against parents who violate population planning 
regulations differ in Shandong province, where incomes are 
lower than in Beijing municipality. The fine is set at 30 
percent of a given area's average annual income.\8\ Families 
forced to pay these heavy fines can be financially devastated 
for years. When parents do not pay the fines, population 
planning officials can file legal cases, and one Chinese media 
report from 2006 described a local court acting ``vigorously'' 
to collect fees and to ``uphold the authority'' of population 
planning officials.\9\ Officials also have reportedly destroyed 
the homes of those who do not pay the fines.\10\
Violations of Chinese Law and International Human Rights 
        Standards
    The Chinese government's population planning laws and 
regulations contravene international human rights standards. 
For example, the Population and Family Planning Law, which 
became 
effective in 2002, contravenes the standards set by the 1995 
Beijing Declaration and the 1994 Programme of Action of the 
Cairo International Conference on Population and Development 
(1994 Programme) by limiting the number of children that 
married women may bear and by banning unmarried women from 
bearing any children.\11\ Population planning laws coerce 
compliance by penalizing women who bear an ``out-of-plan'' 
child with a ``social compensation fee'' that ranges from 
roughly one-half to 10 times an individual's average annual 
income, based on locality.\12\ Moreover, 7 provinces require 
``termination'' of pregnancies that violate provincial 
regulations, while 10 provinces require unspecified ``remedial 
measures.'' \13\ The government contravenes the standards set 
by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights by 
discriminating against ``out-of-plan'' children in health care 
and education.\14\ The government also contravenes the 1994 
Programme by setting population targets.\15\
    Some local officials charged with implementing the national 
population planning policy violate Chinese law by physically 
coercing abortions and sterilizations. Although physical 
coercion violates Article 4 of the Population and Family 
Planning Law,\16\ local officials continue to use physical 
coercion, or the threat of physical coercion, to enforce 
compliance with population planning laws and regulations. In 
December 2005, Western media reported that officials in Hebei 
province forced a Falun Gong practitioner to have an abortion, 
and in 2006, officials in Chongqing municipality and in Fujian 
province forcibly sterilized women.\17\ In June 2006, Western 
media reported that a woman fell to her death while fleeing 
Anhui provincial officials who were attempting to force her to 
abort twins, since she had previously given birth to one 
child.\18\ Central government personnel policies encourage the 
coercive practices of local officials by making the local 
officials' promotions and bonuses dependent on meeting 
population targets.\19\ Little public evidence is available to 
show that officials who employ physical coercion against 
pregnant women have been punished for their illegal acts.\20\ 
Two committees of the U.S. House of Representatives heard 
testimony in 2004 and 2006 that some Chinese officials continue 
to physically coerce compliance with the population planning 
policy. Witnesses said that the means employed against pregnant 
women include forced abortion, sterilization, and implantation 
of contraceptive devices. Other forms of physical coercion are 
exercised against friends and relatives who try to assist 
them.\21\ The government uses group rewards and punishments, 
denying benefits or imposing penalties on entire villages, 
factories, or work units in the event of a single ``out-of-
plan'' birth. As a result, women with ``out-of-plan'' 
pregnancies are ostracized and placed under great pressure to 
have an abortion.\22\ These abuses have created an atmosphere 
of fear in which most Chinese women feel they have little 
choice but to comply with the population planning policy.\23\
    Officials charged with implementing these laws and 
regulations have also violated Chinese law by punishing 
citizens, such as legal advocate Chen Guangcheng, who have 
publicized population planning abuses by local authorities.\24\ 
In early 2005, authorities in Linyi city, Shandong province, 
directed a campaign against ``out-of-plan'' births in which 
local officials reportedly committed physical abuses, including 
forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and beatings. The 
authorities profited from their abuses by charging illegal fees 
to those detained.\25\ Although Article 41 of the Chinese 
Constitution guarantees Chinese citizens ``the right to 
criticize and make suggestions to any state organ or 
functionary,'' Chen was beaten, placed under house arrest, 
detained, arrested, tried, and sentenced to four years and 
three months in prison for peacefully drawing attention to the 
abuses in Linyi.\26\ A number of his relatives, supporters, and 
attorneys were also harassed, beaten, or 
detained [see Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and 
Defendants--Arbitrary Detention in the Formal Criminal 
Process]. In September 2005, an official from the National 
Population and Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) responded to 
international news media attention by admitting that Linyi 
officials had committed unspecified ``practices that violated 
law'' and declaring that ``the 
responsible persons have been removed from their posts.'' \27\ 
In October 2005, however, foreign journalists reported that 
forced abortions continued in Linyi, and in February 2006, 
foreign journalists were unable to confirm that any Linyi 
officials had been punished for these acts.\28\
    Victims and activists have accused officials of other 
instances of corruption and abuse of power in implementing the 
population planning program. Article 4 of the Population and 
Family Planning Law requires officials to perform their 
administrative duties strictly in accordance with the law, and 
Article 39 provides that population planning officials may be 
subject to criminal punishment for ``abusing [their] power . . 
. demanding or accepting bribes. . . .'' \29\ In Hunan 
province, approximately 60 villagers claimed that population 
planning officials took 11 adopted and ``out-of-plan'' children 
away from their homes and demanded money for their return.\30\ 
Xinhua reported that government authorities punished 13 
officials in Shaanxi province after investigators found that a 
population planning official and a village head took bribes 
from a woman and her husband, supplied them with fraudulent 
documents, and forged the woman's contraception records.\31\ 
Some wealthy Chinese choose to pay the fines for ``out-of-
plan'' children to have a large family.\32\ The head of the 
NPFPC said in an interview that a minority of wealthy and 
famous people, as well as leading cadres, violate the birth 
restrictions and, although they ``should be legally punished . 
. . our supervision has not yet reached the desired level.'' 
\33\
Social Crises Resulting From the Population Planning Policy
    Chinese population planning policies, combined with a 
cultural preference for sons, produce sex ratio imbalances and, 
in some cases, lead families to abort female infants. The 
current male-female birth ratio for first births is 121:100 and 
152:100 for second births. Some foreign experts believe that 
the actual ratios are even more imbalanced,\34\ and some 
reports claim that the imbalance is worsening.\35\ Demographers 
and population experts consider a normal male-female birth 
ratio to be between 103 to 107:100.
    In June 2006, the National People's Congress (NPC) withdrew 
a proposed law that would have criminalized sex-selective 
abortion. Article 35 of the 2002 Population and Family Planning 
Law prohibits, but does not penalize, sex-selective abortion. 
The prohibition has been widely ignored by medical personnel 
and parents.\36\ In December 2005, the National Population and 
Family Planning Commission (NPFPC) reported that the government 
had submitted a draft Criminal Law amendment to the NPC under 
which parents or medical personnel involved in sex-selective 
abortions would face fines and up to three years in prison.\37\ 
In an April 2006 interview, Zhang Weiqing, Director of the 
NPFPC, emphasized the long-term nature of the sex-ratio 
imbalance and the need to support the draft amendment.\38\ 
Xinhua later reported that the proposed amendment had resulted 
in a ``controversial debate'' that left the NPC Standing 
Committee ``sharply divided.'' \39\ In June, the NPC decided to 
withdraw the proposed law.\40\ Some officials opposed the law 
on the grounds that a woman has the right to know the sex of 
her child, that harsh penalties would create a black market in 
fetal sex determination, and that prosecution of offenders 
under the proposed amendment would prove difficult.\41\ Yu 
Xuejun, Director of the NPFPC's Department of Policies and 
Regulations, told a foreign newspaper that he regretted that 
the amendment had been withdrawn and that he would continue 
lobbying for it.\42\ Subsequent 
reports in the state-run press have not disclosed whether the 
government plans to submit a similar amendment to the NPC in 
the future, but stated that curbing the sex ratio imbalance 
remained a ``top priority'' and that the imbalance could become 
a major obstacle to economic development. Other reports have 
also discussed the means by which the sex-ratio imbalance might 
be addressed. These included closing more clinics involved in 
sex-selective abortions; strengthening and geographically 
expanding implementation of the Care for Girls Program; raising 
the criteria for licensing medical institutes and 
practitioners; implementing preferential policies for girls and 
women in health care, education, and employment; and 
dispatching 60 teams to evaluate sex ratios, trends, and the 
efficiency of government policies.\43\ The government has also 
said that it plans to create a system to punish local officials 
who fail to control sex ratio imbalances.\44\
    The population planning policy has contributed to an 
increasing number of elderly Chinese citizens without children 
to support them financially. Director Zhang of the NPFPC has 
noted that ``[t]here is a definite relationship between the 
acceleration of the aging of the population and the strict 
birth control policy.'' \45\ During the past year, the 
government established a national program that grants a small 
sum of money to rural couples who have one child or two 
daughters.\46\ Some Chinese demographers predict that the aging 
of the Chinese population and the sex-ratio imbalance will 
create additional economic and social problems in the future, 
and therefore advocate moving toward a ``two-child policy.'' 
\47\ One Chinese demographer at a December 2005 forum contended 
that the Chinese population is aging faster than expected, 
while others predicted that the population will begin to 
decrease earlier and more sharply than expected.\48\ Others 
predict worsening labor shortages and insufficient numbers of 
working-age people to cover social insurance and pensions, and 
foresee economic stagnation or recession in the next 20 
years.\49\ Although many provinces have adopted policies that 
expand the number of people permitted to have two children, not 
all Chinese demographers agree with these forecasts or advocate 
a ``two-child policy.'' \50\ NPFPC officials maintain that the 
population planning policy will not change in the near future 
and that preventing overpopulation will remain the government's 
top priority for the foreseeable future.\51\ Director Zhang of 
the NPFPC said in April that the policy was open to change, but 
not in the short term. He claimed that China faces an impending 
``baby boom.'' \52\

                  V(i) Freedom of Residence and Travel


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; Since its implementation in the 1950s, the 
        Chinese hukou (household registration) system has 
        limited the rights of ordinary Chinese citizens to 
        choose their permanent place of residence, receive 
        equal access to social services, and enjoy equal 
        protection of the law. Economic changes and relaxation 
        of some hukou controls have eroded previously strict 
        limits on citizens' freedom of movement, but these 
        changes have also exported a discriminatory urban-rural 
        social division to China's cities. Migrants who lack a 
        local hukou for their new city of residence face legal 
        discrimination in employment, education, and social 
        services.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese leaders called for reforms to the 
        hukou system during the past year. Central government 
        interest in reform stems not only from concern over 
        migrant rights and economic inequality, but also from 
        concern over growing social instability and a desire 
        for stronger government control over China's internal 
        migrant population. New national goals for hukou 
        reform, like similar proposals implemented periodically 
        since the late 1990s, call for streamlined hukou 
        categories, elimination of discriminatory regulations 
        on employment, and improved migrant access to social 
        services.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Local governments and urban residents have 
        resisted reforms to the hukou system because of the 
        potential budgetary impact, fears of increasing 
        population pressure in cities, and discriminatory 
        attitudes toward migrants. Local opposition has limited 
        the ability of central government authorities to 
        achieve national reform goals.
The Hukou System
    Since its implementation in the 1950s, the Chinese hukou 
(household registration) system has limited the rights of 
ordinary Chinese citizens to choose their permanent place of 
residence, receive equal access to social services, and enjoy 
protection of the law. Urban residents received preferential 
employment opportunities, favorable educational quotas, and 
old-age pensions. Rural residents did not. Hukou status, and 
the accompanying right to receive these benefits, is inherited 
at birth. Only limited methods exist for citizens to change 
their hukou status.\1\ During the late 1970s, the system became 
so rigid that rural residents risked arrest for entering urban 
areas. These limits effectively blocked upward mobility for 
most rural citizens.\2\
    Economic changes and relaxation of some hukou controls have 
eroded previously strict limits on citizens' freedom of 
movement,\3\ but these changes have also exported a 
discriminatory urban-rural social division to China's cities. 
Official statistics suggest 120 million rural migrants worked 
in Chinese cities in 2005, about a quarter of China's total 
urban population.\4\ Official reforms undertaken since the late 
1990s have allowed migrants to obtain hukou in urban areas 
where they have a ``stable source of income'' and a ``stable 
place of residence.'' \5\ Local officials, however, often 
interpret these terms to exclude low-income rural migrants.\6\ 
As a result, poor rural migrants may live in Chinese cities for 
long periods, even from birth, but retain hukou registration 
inherited from their parents because they are unable to obtain 
a local hukou in their new city of residence.
    Migrants who lack a local hukou for their new city of 
residence face legal discrimination. They cannot receive social 
services such as healthcare or schooling for their children on 
the same basis as other residents.\7\ Local authorities also 
condition government employment, old-age benefits, and low-
interest housing loans on having a local hukou in the city of 
residence.\8\ The Supreme People's Court issued a judicial 
interpretation in 2003 regarding compensation for deaths in 
personal injury cases that mandates a lower rate of 
compensation for deceased rural hukou holders, even if they 
have been resident in urban areas for many years.\9\ 
Representation in local legislative bodies favors urban hukou 
holders; an individual rural local people's congress deputy 
represents four times as many citizens as his or her urban 
counterpart.\10\
    Chinese laws and regulations that condition citizen legal 
rights and social services on hereditary hukou status conflict 
with international human rights standards on non-discrimination 
and have generated criticism in China. Article 26 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees 
equal protection of the law and non-discrimination based on 
``national or social origin . . . birth or other status.'' 
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights also prohibits discrimination on the same 
grounds in fields such as employment, education, health, and 
social security benefits. In early 2006, Chinese news media 
carried a series of critical reports on cases of long-term 
migrants in urban areas who held non-local rural hukou and who 
were killed in traffic accidents. Families of the deceased 
received substantially less in compensation than families of 
residents who held local urban hukou and who were killed in the 
same or similar accidents.\11\ The father of one deceased 
migrant student said, ``My daughter had lived in the city for 
10 years. She didn't pay less for her school fees because she 
had [a] rural hukou. Why was her life worth less than half of 
that of her classmates? '' \12\
Reform Efforts in 2005 and 2006
    Chinese leaders called for reforms to the hukou system 
during the past year. Communist Party scholars and government 
officials publicly raised the subject of hukou reform in 
October 2005, after the conclusion of the Party plenum.\13\ The 
joint opinion issued by the Party Central Committee and the 
State Council in December 2005 made hukou reform part of the 
Party's ``new socialist countryside'' campaign on rural reform, 
and a policy goal for 2006.\14\
    Central government interest in reform stems not only from 
concern over migrant rights and economic inequality, but also 
from concern over growing social instability and a desire for 
stronger government control over China's internal migrant 
population. The December joint opinion emphasized the need to 
protect the ``legitimate rights and interests of farmers who 
seek work.'' \15\ Accompanying press statements noted a large 
and increasing gap 
between urban and rural incomes, with the former totaling 3.22 
times the latter in 2005.\16\ An earlier October 2005 joint 
Party and State Council opinion on public security and social 
stability also highlighted the need to better protect migrant 
rights, but also called for ``new techniques to manage China's 
migrant population.'' \17\ In December 2004, Chen Jiping, 
Director of the General Office of the Party's Committee for 
Comprehensive Management of Public Security, the office that 
drafted the October joint opinion, called for improving systems 
used to keep track of temporary residents, including better 
monitoring of migrant housing rentals.\18\
    New national goals for hukou reform, like similar proposals 
implemented periodically since the late 1990s, call for 
streamlined hukou categories, elimination of discriminatory 
regulations on employment, and improved migrant access to 
social services.\19\ Public Security Vice Minister Liu Jinguo 
said in October 2005 that the government was considering 
elimination of the distinction between ``agricultural'' and 
``non-agricultural'' hukous nationwide, a reform already 
adopted in 11 provinces.\20\ Chinese academics noted that this 
reform ``has not involved substantive content,'' since it does 
not affect the requirement that migrants must obtain a hukou in 
a particular city in order to receive equal access to social 
services.\21\ Liu also said that Chinese authorities will 
continue to require a ``stable place of residence'' to 
determine which migrants may obtain hukou in larger cities.\22\
    Both Liu's speech and the December joint opinion also 
called for elimination of discriminatory regulations that limit 
the ability of rural migrants to work in urban areas.\23\ The 
State Council issued a similar directive in December 2004.\24\ 
Some ministries and local authorities have taken steps to 
implement these directives. In late 2005, the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Services (MOLSS) issued a migrant rights handbook 
that says that MOLSS officials will not require migrants to 
obtain a work registration card from their place of origin 
before they seek jobs in urban areas.\25\ In early 2005, 
Beijing municipal authorities abolished regulations that 
prohibited renting apartments to migrants and that allowed 
labor officials to exclude migrants from certain 
occupations.\26\
    Finally, central government authorities have called for 
improving migrant access to urban social services as a national 
reform goal. Public Security Vice Minister Liu said that local 
governments should make serious efforts to address migrant 
housing, education, and healthcare needs.\27\ The December 
joint opinion calls for ``gradually constructing a social 
security network for migrants,'' ``exploring the provision of 
medical insurance for serious illnesses to migrants,'' and 
``solving the problem of educating migrant children'' \28\ [see 
Section IV--Introduction]. Draft amendments to the Law on 
Compulsory Education would charge local governments with 
providing equal educational opportunities to the children of 
migrants.\29\ The Ministry of Health has announced projects to 
educate migrant workers about HIV/AIDS, provide occupational 
healthcare, and vaccinate migrant children against infectious 
diseases.\30\
    Local governments and urban residents have resisted reforms 
to the hukou system because of the potential budgetary impact, 
fears of increasing population pressure in cities, and 
discriminatory attitudes toward migrants. Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) officials said in November 2005 that national 
hukou reform efforts had encountered resistance from local 
authorities who would bear responsibility for funding the 
additional services to migrants.\31\ In the fall of 2005, 
Shenzhen authorities announced tighter rules for migrants in an 
effort to control the growth rate of the temporary resident 
population. The new Shenzhen measures temporarily suspend 
processing of local hukou applications for the dependent 
children of current Shenzhen migrant residents, limit the 
growth of private schools for migrant children, and require 
migrant parents to pay additional fees to enroll their children 
in public schools.\32\ Some urban residents oppose improved 
treatment for migrants, expressing concern about urban 
population growth and the influx of poor, less educated 
migrants. Citizens invited to comment on Beijing's municipal 
development plans in August 2005 demanded tighter restrictions 
on rural migrants, including strict hukou policies and strict 
controls on providing housing and employment to migrants.\33\
    Local opposition has limited the ability of central 
government authorities to achieve national reform goals. Lu 
Hongyan, Deputy Director of the MPS General Office, said that 
hukou reform ``is not entirely within the power or 
responsibility of the MPS,'' but that the MPS would attempt to 
coordinate with local governments and other ministries to 
present a hukou reform program by late December 2005 or early 
2006.\34\ Neither official sources nor the state-controlled 
news media have reported the completion of work on such a 
program. Chen Xiwen, Deputy Director of the General Office of 
the Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics, remarked 
at a press conference accompanying the issuance of the December 
2005 joint opinion that the ``attached benefits'' linked to 
hukou identification, such as education or healthcare, hinder 
reform efforts. Chen said that the central government will not 
press for a single plan for hukou reform, but will instead 
allow localities to adopt their own reforms.\35\
    Some provincial governments have made efforts to address 
discrimination against migrants. For example, Henan provincial 
authorities announced that starting in October 2005 they would 
include several urban medical facilities in the local rural 
health cooperative system. The plan allows migrants and rural 
residents to receive health services at the designated 
facilities, and forbids health providers from discriminating 
between urban and non-urban residents in assessing fees.\36\ In 
June 2006, the Henan High People's Court (HPC) issued an 
opinion setting death or injury compensation awards for some 
rural migrants at the same level as long-term urban residents. 
The opinion requires that rural migrants have a ``regular place 
of residence in the city'' and that their ``main source of 
income be earned in the city.'' \37\ The Anhui HPC has issued 
rules stipulating that injury or death compensation for minors 
who hold a rural hukou but attend school and live in urban 
areas shall be computed using the urban standard.\38\ Other 
courts and legislative bodies are considering issuing similar 
directives.\39\
    Other local reforms have been limited, or have reversed 
previous efforts to relax hukou controls. In January 2006, the 
Shanghai local people's congress (LPC) for the first time 
allowed two migrant workers from Jiangsu province to attend a 
session of the Shanghai LPC as observers. The China Economic 
Times, a State Council-sponsored publication, criticized the 
Shanghai LPC, however, for not allowing the two migrants to 
serve as full representatives. It noted that hukou restrictions 
bar migrants from standing for election, and that none of the 
1,000 LPC delegates attending the session represented 
Shanghai's 4 million migrant workers.\40\ Shenyang municipal 
authorities announced in December 2005 that they would resume 
requiring temporary residence permits for migrants. Authorities 
had abolished these permits in July 2003, 
requiring only that migrants sign in with local public security 
officials upon arrival in the city. Shenyang authorities noted 
that they reinstated the temporary residence permits to comply 
with provincial and national guidelines on hukou reform.\41\
International Travel
    The National People's Congress Standing Committee passed a 
new Law on Passports in April 2006 that will take effect in 
January 2007. The law narrows the legal authority of Chinese 
officials to deny passports to Chinese citizens.\42\ Article 13 
of the new law specifies the conditions under which Chinese 
authorities may deny a citizen's passport application, 
including document falsification, failure to prove citizenship, 
pending fulfillment of a criminal sentence or other criminal 
punishment, or a court order not to leave the country as a 
result of an ongoing civil case.\43\ Authorities may also deny 
a passport application if they determine that the applicant's 
activities abroad would harm national security or state 
interests.\44\ This language is narrower than that of the 
previous 1980 Regulations on Passports and Visas, which set no 
limits on the government's authority to deny passport 
applications.\45\ Article 12 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides both that ``[e]veryone 
shall be free to leave any country, including his own,'' and 
that ``[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to 
enter his own country.'' Chinese authorities have denied 
passports to Chinese citizens who express views they find 
objectionable. In May 2006, Chinese authorities refused to 
issue passports to two Chinese lawyers who applied for 
permission to travel to the United States to assist a Falun 
Gong practitioner who faced criminal charges.\46\ Chinese 
authorities have also prevented Protestant house church leaders 
from traveling abroad [see Section V(d)--Freedom of Religion--
Religious Freedom for China's Protestants]. Yang Jianli, a 
Chinese citizen and democracy activist, is currently serving a 
five-year prison sentence in China on charges of illegal entry 
and espionage after entering the country on another person's 
passport. Throughout the 1990s, Yang was unable to secure a 
passport from Chinese consular officials in the United 
States.\47\ The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has 
found his detention to be arbitrary.\48\

                    VI. Political Prisoner Database

    The Commission made the CECC Political Prisoner Database 
(PPD) globally accessible via the Internet in November 2004. 
The PPD serves as a unique and powerful resource for 
individuals, educational institutions, NGOs, and governments 
that wish to research political and religious imprisonment in 
China or advocate on behalf of prisoners. The Commission 
routinely uses the database for its own advocacy work, and to 
prepare summaries of information about political and religious 
prisoners for Members of Congress and senior Administration 
officials. The Commission uses the database to alert the public 
about upcoming dates of parole eligibility, and about dates 
when sentences expire and prisoners are due for release. The 
PPD received approximately 150,000 online requests for prisoner 
information since last October.
    The PPD is designed to allow anyone with Internet access to 
query the database and download prisoner data without providing 
personal information. Users also have the option to create a 
user account, which allows them to save, edit, or reuse 
queries. A user-specified ID and password is the only 
information required to set up a user account. The PPD does not 
download or install any software or Web cookies to a user's 
computer.
    The PPD currently allows users to conduct queries on 19 
categories of prisoner information.\1\ The Commission intends 
to upgrade the PPD software and interface to make it possible 
to search and retrieve more categories of prisoner information, 
such as the names and locations of the courts that convicted 
political and religious prisoners, and the dates of key events 
in the legal process such as sentencing and decision upon 
appeal. The Commission also plans future upgrades that will 
make it possible for users to navigate between reports on 
political imprisonment in the CECC Virtual Academy and records 
of political and religious prisoners in the PPD. The Virtual 
Academy is accessible on the Commission's Web site.
    Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights 
violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her 
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom 
of expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful 
social or political change, and to criticize government policy 
or government officials. Many records feature a short summary 
of the case that includes basic details about the political or 
religious imprisonment and the legal process leading to 
imprisonment. Users may download information about prisoners 
from the PPD as Adobe Acrobat files or Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets.
    As of September 2006, the PPD contained more than 3,900 
individual case records of political and religious imprisonment 
in China. The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and 
the Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious 
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the 
database.\2\ The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The 
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner 
information, as well as on information provided by NGOs and 
other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and 
opposing political and religious imprisonment.
    The PPD is accessible on the Internet at http://
ppd.cecc.gov. The Commission Web site contains instructions on 
how to use the PPD.

  VII. Development of the Rule of Law and Institutions of Democratic 
                               Governance

                  VII(a) Development of Civil Society


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The number of civil society organizations in 
        China is growing, with many organizations undertaking 
        projects such as poverty alleviation, faith-based 
        social work, and legal efforts to protect citizen 
        rights. These organizations include national mass 
        organizations that the Communist Party created and 
        funds, smaller citizen associations registered under 
        national regulations, and loose networks of 
        unregistered grassroots 
        organizations. In February 2006, the China Foundation 
        for Poverty Alleviation selected six groups as the 
        first civil society organizations to receive Chinese 
        government funding to run experimental anti-poverty 
        programs, including the China office of a U.S.-based 
        rural development organization.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Central authorities seek to maintain control 
        over civil society groups, halt the emergence of 
        independent organizations, and prevent what they have 
        called the ``Westernization'' of China. While 
        recognizing the utility of civil society organizations 
        to address social problems, Chinese authorities use 
        strict regulations to limit the growth of an 
        independent civil society. Some Chinese citizens who 
        attempt to organize groups outside of state control 
        have been imprisoned. These include individuals who 
        have attempted to establish independent labor unions 
        and political associations, such as China Free Trade 
        Union Preparatory Committee member Hu Shigen and China 
        Democracy Party member Qin Yongmin; or young 
        intellectuals who organize informal discussion groups, 
        such as New Youth Study Group members Jin Haike, Xu 
        Wei, Yang Zili, and Zhang Honghai.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese officials have taken additional steps 
        to curtail civil society organizations in the past 
        year, but authorities are undecided on how to proceed. 
        Since early 2005, Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) 
        officials have been researching a new administrative 
        system to monitor and control civil society 
        organizations. Many details of the new system are 
        undetermined, such as who will conduct the required 
        evaluations of civil society groups, how the evaluation 
        results will be used, and who will fund the 
        evaluations. At the same time, Chinese authorities have 
        supported limited reforms to the status of civil 
        society organizations. MOCA officials are advocating 
        changes to the tax code to encourage private donations 
        to civil society organizations. Central Party officials 
        have expressed support for the creation of rural farmer 
        cooperatives in annual policy guidelines issued each 
        year since 2004.
Civil Society and Government Controls
    The number of civil society organizations in China is 
growing, with many organizations undertaking projects such as 
poverty alleviation, faith-based social work, and legal efforts 
to protect citizen rights.\1\ These organizations include 
national mass organizations that the Communist Party created 
and funds, smaller citizen associations registered under 
national regulations, and loose networks of unregistered 
grassroots organizations.\2\ According to official Chinese 
statistics, the number of registered civil society 
organizations increased from 288,936 in 2004 to 317,000 in 
2006, but one Chinese source estimates the number of 
unregistered organizations to be as high as 3 million.\3\ 
Chinese authorities support the growth of civil society 
organizations to help address social problems such as poverty 
and AIDS.\4\ Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) officials 
acknowledge that these organizations have ``exerted [a] 
positive influence in boosting China's economic growth and 
helping maintain social stability.'' \5\ In February 2006, the 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation selected six groups to 
be the first civil society organizations to receive Chinese 
government funding to run experimental anti-poverty programs, 
including the China office of a U.S.-based rural development 
organization.\6\
    While recognizing the utility of civil society 
organizations to address social problems, Chinese authorities 
use strict regulations to limit the growth of an independent 
civil society. National regulations issued in 1998 require that 
civil society organizations have a government-approved sponsor 
organization to register and obtain legal status.\7\ The 
government limits sponsor organizations to designated 
government and Party bureaus.\8\ This requirement contravenes 
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which provides that:

          [N]o restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of 
        [the freedom of association] other than those which are 
        prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
        democratic society in the interests of national 
        security or public safety. . . .\9\

    Chinese regulations that require a government sponsor 
organization for registration, and that consider all groups 
that do not register to be illegal, differ from legal standards 
in many countries and regions, including India, South Korea, 
the European Union, and the United States.\10\ Other countries, 
such as Moldova, Singapore, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have 
legal requirements similar to those in China.\11\
    Chinese civil society organizations also have difficulty 
raising funds, which limits their ability to act independently. 
The majority of funds raised by environmental civil society 
organizations is monopolized by a small group of organizations 
with close official ties, according to a 2005 survey by the 
All-China Environment Federation (ACEF).\12\ As a result, these 
groups avoid direct confrontation with the government. Almost 
65 percent of environmental organizations say that they would 
prefer to cooperate with authorities, while 32.1 percent said 
they would neither cooperate with nor oppose the 
government.\13\ As one officer of a Chinese civil society 
organization noted, ``[we] all recognize that keeping in line 
with government policies and receiving government approval are 
indispensable prerequisites for successful action.'' \14\ These 
pressures are heightened by legal rules that hamper the ability 
of civil society organizations to raise funds from private 
domestic donors.\15\ Current law provides that Chinese 
corporations may only deduct charitable donations for tax 
purposes that are made to a few specified groups, and limits 
tax exemptions to 3 percent of income.\16\
    Central authorities seek to maintain control over civil 
society groups, halt the emergence of truly independent 
organizations, and prevent what they have called the 
``Westernization'' of China. Top government and Party officials 
have stopped citizen efforts to 
register groups that they perceive as a threat, such as qigong 
associations and organizations of veterans, laborers, and the 
unemployed.\17\ Party officials have ordered the establishment 
of Party cells within civil society organizations.\18\ Chinese 
authorities periodically issue warnings against the use of 
civil society organizations by ``hostile Western forces'' to 
``combat'' or ``infiltrate'' China\19\ [see Section V(a)--
Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression and Section 
V(d)--Freedom of Religion]. Some Chinese citizens who attempt 
to organize groups outside of state control have been 
imprisoned. These individuals include those who have attempted 
to establish independent labor unions and political 
associations, such as China Free Trade Union Preparatory 
Committee member Hu Shigen and China Democracy Party member Qin 
Yongmin, and young intellectuals who organize informal 
discussion groups, such as New Youth Study Group members Jin 
Haike, Yang Zili, Xu Wei, and Zhang Honghai.\20\
    Official reluctance to permit independent citizen 
associations limits the options of Chinese citizens seeking to 
protect their interests. According to the 2005 ACEF survey, 
only 23.3 percent of Chinese environmental civil society groups 
are registered.\21\ The absence of applicable national legal 
standards hampers the development of the approximately 140,000 
rural farmer cooperatives established as of 2003. Farmers use 
these cooperatives to pool resources, increase their 
competitiveness, and undertake limited collective action 
against government authorities. National law does not provide 
clear legal standards for the registration of these 
organizations. Without legal status, they cannot borrow money 
from institutional lenders or sign legally binding contracts. 
Their tax obligations are also unclear. Some have registered 
with MOCA, others with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
and others choose not to 
register.\22\
Developments During 2005 and 2006
    Chinese officials have taken additional steps to curtail 
civil society organizations in the past year, but recent 
developments indicate that authorities are undecided on how to 
proceed with additional controls. In early 2005, an article in 
an academic journal sponsored by the State Council pressed 
officials to prevent Western ``infiltration and sabotage of 
China through political NGOs.'' \23\ International NGOs with 
U.S. ties operating in China subsequently have reported Chinese 
partners cancelling or withdrawing from projects under 
government pressure.\24\ Since 2005, Chinese public security 
officials have investigated the operations of domestic and 
international civil society organizations and questioned their 
staff.\25\ In February 2006, prominent Chinese AIDS activist Hu 
Jia resigned from Loving Source, an organization that he helped 
establish to assist the orphans of AIDS victims, citing 
pressure on the organization's international donors. Hu said 
that the Chinese government ``is using soft methods to narrow 
the space NGOs can exist in. The authorities are worried a 
civil society would bring about a strong force that challenges 
its rule.'' \26\ In August 2006, one Western expert on Chinese 
civil society said that there has been a ``virtual paralysis'' 
of official registration by civil society organizations in 
China, contrasted this with a more permissive climate two years 
ago, and also noted an increase in self-censorship on the part 
of civil society organizations that seek to avoid antagonizing 
the government.\27\
    Since early 2005, Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) 
officials have been researching a new administrative system to 
supervise and control civil society organizations. In March 
2005, MOCA established a leading group to develop this system. 
During the summer of 2005, MOCA sponsored research on the new 
system in Jinan and Qingdao municipalities in Shandong 
province, and participated in international conferences 
regarding new management techniques for civil society 
organizations in the fall of 2005.\28\ News media reports and 
official statements say that the system will be designed to 
``evaluate'' and ``rate'' civil society organizations.\29\ Many 
details of the new system have not been determined, such as who 
will conduct the evaluations, how the evaluation results will 
be used, and who will fund the evaluations.\30\ Provincial 
efforts to implement the new system suggest that it will 
augment rather than replace existing controls. For example, 
Jiangxi provincial officials called for the implementation of 
the new administrative system in March 2006, and said that it 
should operate in addition to existing registration authorities 
and official sponsor organizations.\31\ A MOCA official said 
these efforts seek to improve the ``quality'' of civil society 
organizations,\32\ while MOCA-sponsored conferences have linked 
these efforts to the elimination of ``illegal organizations.'' 
\33\
    Central government officials continue to consider draft 
revisions to the 1998 regulations that govern civil society 
organizations. Although MOCA officials have suggested that the 
sponsor organization requirement be abolished,\34\ other 
central government officials have rejected this option. State 
publications note that ``there are no fundamental changes in 
the draft revision[s]'' and that the sponsor organization 
requirement will remain unchanged.\35\ News reports suggest 
that the planned revisions contain a degree of liberalization, 
allowing authorities discretion to register multiple civil 
organizations of the same type in the same administrative area, 
and 
removing high capital requirements for registration.\36\ 
Reports also indicate that the revisions will allow 
international organizations that operate in China to register, 
but will also require them to have approved sponsor 
organizations.\37\ Existing regulations do not specify a 
procedure for most foreign NGOs to register, and therefore 
their status is unclear.\38\ The reported content of the 
revisions corresponds to the approach taken in 2004 national 
regulations on foundations, which replaced a prior set of rules 
on the same 
subject.\39\
    Chinese authorities have supported limited reforms to the 
status of civil society organizations. MOCA officials are 
advocating changes to the tax code to encourage private 
donations to civil society organizations.\40\ Central Communist 
Party officials have expressed support for the creation of 
rural farmer cooperatives in annual policy guidelines issued 
each year since 2004.\41\ Zhejiang provincial officials have 
experimented with granting legal status to these cooperatives, 
passing the first set of provincial regulations in 2004, and 
registering the first group of associations under these rules 
in 2005.\42\ In 2006, Chinese leaders voiced support for 
national legislation to reform lending, tax, and registration 
treatment of rural farmer cooperatives.\43\ The National 
People's Congress (NPC) has placed relevant proposals on the 
2006 legislative calendar. Nonetheless, NPC delegates say that 
the central government's attitude toward these organizations 
remains ``cautious'' and that central officials only support 
these reforms because they have concluded that these 
cooperatives are economic in nature, and will not become 
involved in political issues.\44\

  VII(b) Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative Reform


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; China has an authoritarian political system 
        controlled by the Communist Party. Party committees 
        formulate all major state policies before the 
        government implements them. The Party dominates Chinese 
        legislative bodies such as the National People's 
        Congress (NPC), and fills all important government 
        positions in executive and judicial institutions 
        through an internal selection process. Party control 
        extends throughout institutions of local government.
        &lt;bullet&gt; In 2005, the central leadership called for 
        strengthened 
        controls over society to address mounting social unrest 
        and to suppress dissent. Chinese authorities have ruled 
        out building representative democratic institutions to 
        address citizen complaints about corruption and abuse 
        of power, and instead are recentralizing government 
        posts into the hands of individual Party secretaries.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The absence of popular and legal constraints 
        to check the behavior of Party officials has led to 
        widespread corruption and citizen anger. The Party has 
        strengthened the role of internal responsibility 
        systems to moderate official behavior, but these 
        systems have provided some local Party officials with 
        new incentives to conceal information and abuse their 
        power.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Since the 1980s, officials have introduced 
        limited reforms to allow citizens to vote in village 
        elections. While these reforms are a step forward in 
        permitting citizen participation at the local level, 
        the reforms are designed to strengthen Party governance 
        and do not represent Party acceptance of representative 
        government.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Since the late 1990s, the Party has 
        experimented with reforms that allow a limited degree 
        of citizen participation in the selection of local 
        Party cadres, but the Party retains tight control over 
        the candidate pool and the selection process. Since 
        2000, Chinese authorities have experimented with the 
        use of legislative hearings to solicit public views on 
        pending legislation, and the NPC held its first 
        controlled public hearing in September 2005.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Since 2000, the central government has 
        announced new transparency requirements for local 
        governments. In March 2005, central authorities 
        specifically required county and provincial governments 
        to increase transparency and popular participation in 
        government decisionmaking. Implementation of these 
        ``open government'' requirements varies, but some local 
        governments have taken steps toward greater 
        transparency.
Introduction
    China has an authoritarian political system controlled by 
the Communist Party. Party committees formulate all major state 
policies before the government implements them. The Party 
dominates Chinese legislative bodies such as the National 
People's Congress (NPC), and fills all important government 
positions in executive and judicial institutions by an internal 
selection process. The State Council's White Paper on 
``Building Political Democracy in China,'' issued in October 
2005, says that:

          Party committees serve as the leadership core over 
        all [government and mass] organizations at the same 
        level . . . and through Party committees and cadres in 
        these organizations, ensure that the Party's policies 
        are carried out. . . . Through legal procedures and 
        democratic discussion, Party committees ensure that 
        Party proposals become the will of the state and that 
        candidates recommended by Party organizations become 
        leaders in the institutions of state power.\1\

    Party control extends throughout institutions of local 
government. Party institutions control the selection of judges, 
and local Party committees influence which judges are posted to 
their localities.\2\ Many local Party secretaries serve 
concurrently as head of the local people's congress (LPC).\3\ 
County and township Party secretaries also control LPC and 
village elections through the election leadership groups which 
they often head.\4\ The Party constitution charges delegates to 
Party congresses with selecting and controlling local Party 
committees,\5\ but, as a U.S. expert noted at a Commission 
roundtable, delegates ``are generally uninformed as to the 
content of the Party congress or who they are to vote for until 
just before the congress meets.'' \6\
    China's authoritarian one-party system does not comply with 
international human rights standards contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).\7\ Article 25 of the ICCPR requires that citizens be 
allowed to ``take part in the conduct of political affairs'' 
and ``to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections.'' Under General Comment 25 to the ICCPR, this 
language requires that:

        &lt;bullet&gt; The right of persons to stand for election 
        should not be limited unreasonably by requiring 
        candidates to be members of parties or of specific 
        parties;
        &lt;bullet&gt; Party membership should not be a condition of 
        eligibility to vote;
        &lt;bullet&gt; It is implicit in Article 25 that [elected] 
        representatives do in fact exercise governmental power 
        and that they are accountable through the electoral 
        process for their exercise of that power;
        &lt;bullet&gt; An independent electoral authority should be 
        established to supervise the electoral process and to 
        ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially, and in 
        accordance with established laws which are compatible 
        with the ICCPR;
        &lt;bullet&gt; Freedom of expression, assembly, and 
        association are essential conditions for the effective 
        exercise of the right to vote and must be fully 
        protected.

    The absence of popular and legal constraints to check the 
behavior of Party officials has led to widespread corruption 
and citizen anger. Although Party policy documents assert that 
one-party control is necessary for social stability,\8\ senior 
Chinese officials have acknowledged that the inability of local 
Party cadres to respond to citizen grievances is contributing 
to rising social unrest.\9\ As one U.S. expert noted, ``the 
power concentrated in the hands of the Party secretary and 
standing committee has led to corruption and other abuses of 
power that have fed social protests and a general decline in 
the legitimacy of the Party in recent years.'' \10\ For 
example, thousands of local Chinese officials have used their 
positions to acquire financial interests in local mines, 
hampering efforts to improve their safety [see Section V(c)--
Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights]. In some 
localities, police collude with criminal forces\11\ [see 
Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants--
Public Security and Coercive Use of Police Power]. In June 
2005, local officials hired armed thugs to break up a protest 
by farmers in Shengyou village, Hebei province, killing six 
villagers and wounding more than 100. Villagers had opposed 
local government efforts to seize their land and claimed that 
local officials had embezzled money that should have gone to 
the villagers.\12\ Ministry of Public Security statistics show 
that incidents of ``mass gatherings to disturb social order'' 
rose by 13 percent from 2004 to 2005.\13\ Weak protection of 
labor rights and worker discontent over unpaid wages and 
benefits resulted in an increase in mass labor disputes from 
1,482 in 1994 to 11,000 in 2003.\14\ Both collective and 
individual citizen petitions seeking official redress have 
increased steadily from 1993 to 2004.\15\
    Party secretaries can block access to local information 
sources that might challenge their control,\16\ which stifles 
the role of the media as a check on the abuse of government 
power. In November 2005, Jilin provincial officials prevented 
the news media from reporting on an industrial accident and 
massive benzene leak on the Songhua River for more than a week. 
The delayed local government response impeded central 
government efforts to manage the crisis, caused panic among the 
citizens of Harbin city, and created a diplomatic incident with 
Russia\17\ [see Section V(f)--The Environment]. In June 2005, 
Hong Kong news media reported that Party propaganda officials 
issued a directive limiting publication of critical 
investigative reports by local news media through a requirement 
that state-run news media first clear the articles with the 
local Party committee.\18\ [See Section V(a)--Special Focus for 
2006: Freedom of Expression.]
    Chinese authorities have ruled out building representative 
democratic institutions to address citizen complaints about 
corruption and abuse of power,\19\ and are recentralizing 
government posts into the hands of individual Party 
secretaries. Officials are also relying on top-down personnel 
controls to address local governance problems,\20\ but these 
measures have increased incentives for some local Party 
secretaries to conceal problems from their superiors, and thus 
risk compounding the issue.\21\ One Commission roundtable 
witness noted that ``rural governance can only be improved 
within the current framework by strengthening the measures to 
monitor government by the local congress[es] and farmers' 
organizations,'' but that ``Chinese rural governments have no 
impetus to initiate their own reform. . . .'' \22\
Stronger Party Controls
    In 2005, Communist Party officials called for strengthened 
controls over society to address mounting social problems and 
suppress dissent. In October 2005, the Party Central Committee 
and State Council issued an opinion calling for strengthened 
controls over society, and the accompanying press statement set 
a 2006 goal to reduce the number of ``mass incidents'' that 
disturb public order, including strikes, marches, 
demonstrations, and collective petitions to government 
authorities.\23\ In January 2005, Party leaders launched an 
``advanced education'' campaign to strengthen Party 
organizations and to conduct political education for Party 
cadres. Officials expanded the campaign to rural areas in 
November 2005.\24\ Party officials assert that this propaganda 
campaign will help reduce social unrest.\25\ A December 2005 
Party and State Council joint opinion called for strengthening 
village autonomous institutions (such as elected village 
committees), but ``under village Party leadership.'' \26\ 
Government officials tightened controls over the press and 
imposed new restrictions on the Internet [see Section V(a)--
Special Focus for 2006: Freedom of Expression]. Authorities 
issued warnings about the activities of civil society 
organizations, and are preparing new measures to monitor and 
control them [see Section VII(a)--Development of Civil 
Society].
    Party officials say that the Chinese government ``will 
absolutely not imitate Western political models,'' and they are 
strengthening Communist consultative institutions instead of 
creating representative political bodies.\27\ At the March 2005 
meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), Central Party School Vice President Li 
Junru contrasted the Chinese system of ``elections plus 
consultation'' with ``discredited'' Western liberal democratic 
models.\28\ The CPPCC is a Party-led organization that includes 
Party members, representatives of Party mass organizations, and 
non-Party members that closely align themselves with Party 
goals, including members of the eight minor ``democratic'' 
parties permitted under Chinese law.\29\ Li said, ``[i]n order 
to 
address foreign and domestic challenges regarding the issue of 
democracy, particularly the challenge of the `color 
revolutions,' the advantages of the CPPCC need to be brought 
into play more effectively.'' \30\ In February 2006, Party 
authorities issued an opinion on strengthening the CPPCC.\31\ 
It described ``Chinese socialist democracy'' as including not 
only elections but also ``political consultation'' between 
CPPCC and Party officials before important policy decisions are 
made.\32\ It emphasized the role of the CPPCC in reflecting 
popular opinion and providing government and Party leaders with 
suggestions.\33\ It also called for stronger guarantees that 
non-Party members may participate in consultations about 
government policies.\34\ Foreign and Chinese news media have 
noted that Chinese government and Party officials see the CPPCC 
as a means to address mounting social unrest and popular 
grievances.\35\
    Party officials are recentralizing government posts into 
the hands of Party secretaries, reversing reforms from the late 
1980s in which Party leaders took some steps toward separating 
government and Party roles.\36\ Chinese authorities now 
encourage local Party secretaries to serve as the heads of 
local people's congresses (LPCs), and also encourage the same 
person to be village Party secretary and village committee 
head.\37\ The Party's September 2004 ``Decision on 
Strengthening the Party's Ruling Capacity'' instructed 
officials to increase the number of dual Party-government 
appointments.\38\ In 2005, Anhui provincial authorities 
expanded to 17 counties an experimental program that implements 
the 2004 Decision.\39\ The Anhui program promotes having 
township Party secretaries serve concurrently as the head of 
township governments.\40\ Reforms in individual townships 
require other government positions to be held by lower-ranking 
Party committee members.\41\ Local officials say that the 
reforms seek to reduce overlapping responsibilities between 
government and Party officials, thereby decreasing the size of 
government and the local tax burden. Chinese domestic media has 
raised concerns about the wisdom of concentrating power in the 
hands of a single Party official.\42\
    Chinese authorities increasingly use responsibility systems 
that, in the absence of popular and legal constraints on their 
power, provide incentives for local Party officials to conceal 
information and engage in illegal behavior. Responsibility 
systems link career rewards and sanctions to the success of 
local officials in meeting government and policy goals for 
social order, population planning, and other issues.\43\ 
Because no meaningful popular participation constrains the 
behavior of local officials, responsibility systems create 
incentives for abuse of authority, as officials try to fulfill 
the goals set by their superiors. Such abuses include covering 
up mining 
accidents to meet safety goals [see Section V(c)--Protection of 
Internationally Recognized Labor Rights], coercing women to 
have abortions to meet population planning targets [see Section 
V(h)--Population Planning], and illegally detaining petitioners 
to meet social order objectives [see Section VII(c)--Access to 
Justice]. In July 2005, the State Council issued an opinion 
promoting the use of these top-down personnel systems.\44\ 
Since that time, authorities have ordered responsibility 
systems to be implemented widely for officials in charge of 
enforcing intellectual property rights,\45\ prohibiting illegal 
mining,\46\ protecting the environment,\47\ and supervising the 
judiciary [see Section VII(c)--Access to Justice]. In 
December 2005, central Party officials said that government and 
Party leaders at all levels should bear personal responsibility 
for maintaining social order.\48\
Limited Public Participation Reforms
    Since the 1980s, officials have introduced limited reforms 
to allow citizens to vote in village elections. While these 
reforms are a step forward in permitting citizen participation 
at the local level, the reforms are designed to strengthen 
Party governance and do not represent Party acceptance of 
representative government.\49\ Since the 1990s, Chinese 
authorities have pursued other reforms to increase citizen 
political participation, including the use of public hearings, 
greater government transparency requirements, and citizen 
participation in Party elections.\50\ As one U.S. expert noted 
at a Commission roundtable, Chinese leaders have introduced 
these reforms to

          allay local discontent, to respond to growing demands 
        for greater participation in politics, and to better 
        monitor local agents of the state. . . . [They intend 
        to] improve Party responsiveness both to reduce 
        societal discontent and to preserve the Party's ruling 
        position.\51\

    These reforms attempt to ``gain the sort of input that 
elections normally provide, but without introducing electoral 
democracy.'' \52\ In an October 2005 joint opinion, Party and 
State Council officials specified that they want to create a 
system in which ``the Party leads, the government bears 
responsibility, society assists, and the people participate.'' 
\53\
    Since the late 1990s, the Party has experimented with 
reforms that allow a limited degree of citizen participation in 
the selection of local Party cadres, but the Party retains 
tight control over the candidate pool and the selection 
process. Party regulations adopted in 1995 and 2002 granted 
officials the discretion to permit public participation in 
nominations of government and Party leaders.\54\ But the 
regulations warned that Party selection of nominees should not 
depend solely on the total number of votes received in the 
nomination process.\55\ ``Public nomination, direct election'' 
experiments are currently under way in 217 counties in 13 
provinces.\56\ These experiments, however, grant citizens only 
a small role in the nomination of potential candidates, while 
allowing Party committees to strike names from the nominee 
lists, and giving Party members the final authority to choose 
officials.\57\ For example, in February 2006 elections for the 
township Party committee in Longtoupu, Hunan province, Party 
members and non-Party citizen delegates first selected 
candidates from 16 nominees. The system weighted the selection 
process in favor of Party members, however, by restricting the 
proportion of citizen delegates to 30 percent (136) of the 
number of Party members (433). Party members then participated 
in a Party-only election to choose seven township committee 
members from the nine remaining candidates.\58\
    Since 2000, Chinese authorities have experimented with the 
use of hearings to solicit public views on pending 
legislation.\59\ The National People's Congress held its first 
controlled public hearing in September 2005. It chose 20 
people, including academics and migrant workers, from among 
nearly 5,000 applicants to offer opinions on a proposal to 
raise the minimum taxable income.\60\ The 2002 Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) Law generally requires authorities and 
developers to hold public hearings or use other means to 
solicit public and expert input when projects may have a 
significant environmental impact.\61\ The 2003 Administrative 
Licensing Law places similar requirements on government 
efforts to create administrative licensing schemes.\62\ 
National authorities at the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) and local authorities in cities such as 
Shenyang city in Liaoning province have adopted implementing 
measures for holding hearings under these two laws.\63\ 
Environmental authorities and activists used public hearings in 
2004 and 2005 to challenge some development projects.\64\
    Citizen efforts to use hearings to advocate for change have 
been hampered both by the opposition of some central government 
officials and by rules that do not require hearings until late 
in the 
regulatory drafting process. SEPA sponsored two environmental 
hearings in Beijing that received wide news media coverage and 
allowed the public to air concerns about the projects, but the 
hearings had limited impact on the projects. Some Western 
experts have noted that the hearings occurred well after the 
projects were under way.\65\ Government authorities responded 
to public opposition to government plans to dam the Nujiang (Nu 
River) by temporarily halting the project, conducting a closed 
internal review, and banning further news media coverage of the 
topic\66\ [see Section V(f)--The Environment--Public 
Participation in Environmental Protection]. Chinese officials 
have taken steps to curb SEPA's activism in the field of 
environmental protection. Soon after SEPA ordered the closure 
of 30 construction projects in early 2005 for failure to comply 
with EIA procedures, other central government officials 
overruled the decision.\67\
    The central government has also announced transparency 
requirements for local governments. In 2000, the Party and 
State Council issued a joint opinion directing township 
authorities to make information available to the public on 
government administration and local finances. The joint opinion 
also encouraged authorities at the county level and above to 
experiment with such policies.\68\ A March 2005 opinion 
expanded these requirements, announced the principle that 
government information generally should be made public, placed 
specific requirements on county and provincial governments, and 
linked these steps to efforts to increase popular participation 
in supervising government decisions.\69\ Neither opinion 
requires officials to make Party information public. 
Implementation of these ``open government'' requirements 
varies, but some local governments, including the cities of 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, have taken steps toward greater 
openness.\70\
    Local experiments with governance reform can result in 
positive changes when they are linked to substantive and 
independent citizen oversight. Officials in Wuyi county in 
Zhejiang province have allowed the creation of ``village 
affairs supervision committees'' with veto power over the 
financial decisions of the local Party branch and the village 
committee.\71\ Villagers select supervision committee members 
through direct election, and the committee may not include 
Party branch or village committee members. The reforms have 
helped check official corruption and have provided limited 
space for citizen political participation.\72\ Nonetheless, 
supervision committees in Wuyi remain dependent on the support 
of individual reform-minded Party cadres, and officials 
threatened by these reforms have resisted such efforts.\73\
    In December 2005, the government placed reform of laws 
governing village and residents' committees (VCs, RCs) on the 
national 2006 legislative plan.\74\ In October 2005, provincial 
Ministry of Civil Affairs officials prepared draft proposals 
for reform of the Organic Law on Village Committees. The 
proposed changes would regularize and clarify campaign rules, 
allow village representative assemblies to choose the village 
election committee, and require townships to organize village 
recall elections if a village assembly fails to handle a 
recall.\75\ These changes do not address issues such as 
township government and local Party control over VCs. Party 
regulations and directives require local Party branches to 
direct VC election work.\76\ One local Party organization 
bureau official explained that this mandate requires the local 
Party secretary to head the election committee that is charged 
with supervising the elections; to organize Party members to 
serve on the election committee; to encourage Party members to 
run for the position of VC head; and to bar the registration of 
candidates who belong to unregistered religious groups, oppose 
population planning policies, or organize mass petitions.\77\
    Local Party and township government control over local 
elections undermines the protections granted to citizens by 
national law. In July 2005, residents of Taishi village, 
Guangdong province, launched a recall campaign pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 16 of the Organic Law on Village 
Committees that authorize such efforts.\78\ The recall sought 
to remove the official serving as both local Party branch 
secretary and village committee head, whom they accused of 
misusing village revenue from land sales.\79\ In September 
2005, township and village officials suppressed the recall 
effort. They removed village financial documents from 
government offices, forced popularly elected members of the 
recall committee to resign, arrested and beat dozens of 
residents and activists, and barred reporters from entering the 
village.\80\ In March 2006, a leader of the Taishi recall 
effort lost a township local people's congress election bid 
against a rival candidate supported by local officials. The 
defeated candidate and his supporters alleged that the rival 
candidate bought votes and that the election committee and 
local officials tampered with the ballots.\81\

                        VII(c) Access to Justice


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; International human rights standards require 
        effective remedies for official violations of citizen 
        rights. Despite these guarantees, Chinese citizens face 
        formidable obstacles in seeking remedies to government 
        actions that violate their legal rights and 
        constitutionally protected freedoms. External 
        government and Communist Party controls continue to 
        limit the independence of the Chinese judiciary. Party 
        officials control the selection of top judicial 
        personnel in all courts, including the Supreme People's 
        Court, China's highest judicial authority. Since 2005, 
        the government has restricted the efforts of private 
        lawyers and human rights defenders who challenge 
        government abuses. The All China Lawyers Association 
        issued a guiding opinion that restricts the ability of 
        lawyers to handle cases involving large groups of 
        people. Local Chinese authorities have imposed 
        additional restrictions on lawyer advocacy efforts.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The constitutional and administrative 
        mechanisms in Chinese law that allow citizens to 
        challenge government actions do not provide effective 
        legal remedies, and Chinese citizens seldom use them. 
        Chinese citizens rarely submit proposals to the 
        National People's Congress for constitutional and legal 
        review because the review process lacks transparency 
        and citizens cannot compel review. Administrative court 
        challenges to government actions have not increased 
        since 1998. Provincial authorities report an overall 
        decline between 2003 and 2005 in applications for 
        administrative reconsideration, and the total numbers 
        of such applications in major Chinese municipalities is 
        a few hundred per year.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Chinese law also permits citizens to petition 
        government officials directly to redress their 
        grievances through the xinfang (``letters and visits'') 
        system. Official news media report that Chinese 
        citizens presented 12.7 million petitions to county-
        level and higher xinfang bureaus during 2005, in 
        contrast to the 8 million total court cases handled by 
        the Chinese judiciary during the same period. Local 
        officials are disciplined more severely for high 
        incidences of petitioning. Absent alternative political 
        or legal channels to check the power of local officials 
        and obtain redress, this punishment structure provides 
        an incentive for Chinese citizens to take their 
        grievances to the streets in order to force local 
        officials to act. But this punishment structure also 
        gives local authorities an interest in suppressing mass 
        petitions and preventing petitioners from approaching 
        higher authorities. A December 2005 study of the 
        xinfang system by a U.S. NGO found that some local 
        authorities have 
        resorted to ``rampant violence and intimidation'' to 
        abduct or detain petitioners in Beijing and force them 
        to return home.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Supreme People's Court 2004-2008 court 
        reform program imposes stronger external and internal 
        controls that may further weaken the independence of 
        courts and judges. The court reform program, however, 
        also sets some positive long-term goals for judicial 
        reform in the areas of court financing, adjudication, 
        retrial procedures, and juvenile justice. Party efforts 
        to address growing social unrest have resulted in new 
        government programs to strengthen institutions that 
        assist citizens with legal claims and disputes. 
        Official Chinese statistics show that the number of 
        government legal aid centers rose from 2,774 in 2003 to 
        3,081 in 2005. The total number of cases handled by 
        these centers rose from about 166,000 in 2003 to an 
        estimated 250,000 in 2005, or roughly 3 percent of all 
        cases handled by the Chinese courts in 2005.
Access to Justice and International Human Rights Standards
    Chinese citizens face formidable obstacles in seeking 
remedies to government actions that violate their legal rights 
and constitutionally protected freedoms. Party and government 
controls limit the independence of Chinese courts and weaken 
the ability of individual judges to decide cases fairly. The 
government restricts lawyer advocacy efforts, particularly in 
politically sensitive cases. 
Although Chinese law provides citizens with Constitutional, 
judicial, and administrative mechanisms to challenge official 
violations of their rights, these mechanisms do not provide 
effective legal remedies.
    International human rights standards require effective 
remedies for official violations of citizen rights. Article 8 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that 
``Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.'' Article 2 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) requires that all parties to the ICCPR ensure that 
persons whose rights or freedoms are violated ``have an 
effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.'' \1\
The Chinese Judicial System
    External government and Communist Party controls continue 
to limit the independence of the Chinese judiciary. Party 
officials control the selection of top judicial personnel in 
all courts, including the Supreme People's Court (SPC), China's 
highest judicial authority. Party interests guide judicial 
reform efforts. SPC President Xiao Yang has linked official 
efforts to improve the funding and professionalization of rural 
Chinese courts to the core Party goals of establishing a 
``harmonious society'' and ``increasing the Party's governance 
capacity.'' \2\ In January 2006, the Party's Political and 
Legislative Affairs Committee issued a circular directing 
courts to improve enforcement efforts ``under the leadership of 
local Party committees,'' apparently in response to the Party's 
broader effort to address mounting social unrest.\3\
    The SPC's 2004-2008 reform program imposes stronger 
external controls on courts.\4\ The program directs courts to 
permit officials from local procuratorates to participate in 
adjudication committees, the highest authorities within Chinese 
courts. Since the procuratorate represents the government in 
cases pending before the courts, this directive raises issues 
of judicial independence and conflict of interest.\5\ The 
program also directs local officials to strengthen court 
mechanisms for receiving criticism and recommendations from 
local people's congresses (LPCs). The Chinese Constitution 
grants the standing committees of LPCs the authority to 
supervise local courts,\6\ and court procedures facilitate the 
intervention of LPC delegates in individual cases.\7\
    The SPC also announced stronger internal controls over 
Chinese courts that may weaken the independence of individual 
judges to decide cases fairly. The SPC's 2004-2008 program 
requires that Chinese courts implement responsibility systems 
for individual judges and judicial panels.\8\ These systems 
discipline judges for a range of errors, including reversals by 
a higher court for legal errors.\9\ Chen Youxi, Vice President 
of the Constitutional and Human Rights Committee of the All 
China Lawyers Association, noted that because such systems 
``have a direct impact on personal interests such as bonuses 
and benefits of those trial judges with high rates of 
overturned cases,'' trial judges ``commonly resort to seeking 
advance guidance from higher courts before making a decision, 
and run to appeals courts to convince them not to overturn 
their verdicts.'' \10\ Such systems encourage judges to violate 
the principles of openness and transparency in judicial 
decisionmaking.\11\ In November 2005, Chi Qiang, the president 
of the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court, announced the 
abolition of his court's 
responsibility system, and said that his court will attempt to 
move toward a disciplinary system that sanctions judges for 
illegal behavior rather than ``incorrect'' outcomes.\12\ The 
wider adoption of such innovative local reforms remains in 
doubt, however, given the SPC's requirement that courts 
implement responsibility systems.
    Some local Party officials have called for a degree of 
judicial independence, even as they press for strengthened 
controls over courts.\13\ State-controlled news media announced 
in January that Jiangxi provincial Party officials had issued a 
decision pressing local Party committees to strengthen their 
controls over the selection of court personnel. The decision, 
however, also called on local Party officials to support 
judicial independence and guard against local protectionism. 
The decision warned local Party committees against organizing 
court personnel to participate in campaigns to enforce 
administrative decisions or to attract investment in the local 
economy.\14\
    The SPC's 2004-2008 court reform program sets some positive 
long-term goals for judicial reform. The SPC announced that it 
will consolidate and reclaim the death penalty review power 
from provincial-level high courts, and will require court 
hearings to resolve death penalty appeals [see Section III(b)--
Rights of Criminal Defendants and Suspects]. The program also 
proposes steps to implement other positive reforms,\15\ 
including:

        &lt;bullet&gt; Court financing. Local governments influence 
        courts through their control over judicial funding and 
        appointments, and use this influence to protect local 
        interests. The program directs court officials to 
        explore national financing for court operations.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Court adjudication committee system. 
        Adjudication committees include court presidents and 
        other administrative personnel and are the highest 
        authorities in Chinese courts. They are often the 
        vehicle for outside pressure to reverse individual 
        decisions. The program directs committees to adopt more 
        open decisionmaking procedures and to guarantee that 
        experienced judges are able to serve on adjudication 
        committees.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Retrial procedures. Chinese court decisions 
        often lack finality, as the result of extensive use of 
        retrial procedures with vague rules and few 
        limitations. [See Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal 
        Suspects and Defendants--Fairness of Criminal Trials 
        and Appeals for the impact that this has had on 
        criminal trials.] The program directs officials to 
        clarify the criteria, limits, jurisdiction, and 
        procedures for granting retrial. Officials have drafted 
        two proposed judicial interpretations that seek to 
        address some of these questions.\16\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Advisory opinion system. Lower courts often 
        rely on advisory opinions from higher courts for 
        specific guidance on how to decide pending cases. This 
        system undermines judicial fairness by separating 
        actual court decisions from trials and by making 
        subsequent appeals (to the same entity that responded 
        to the request for review) no more than a formality. 
        The program directs courts to limit use of advisory 
        opinions to general questions of law rather than 
        determinations of fact.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Use of official authentication conclusions and 
        expert testimony. The program directs court officials 
        to implement a 2005 National People's Congress decision 
        that forbids courts from establishing for-profit 
        authentication centers to provide expert testimony. The 
        Ministry of Justice issued relevant implementing 
        measures in September 2005.\17\
        &lt;bullet&gt; Juvenile justice system. China currently has 
        2,400 juvenile tribunals.\18\ The program directs 
        courts to improve their work in handling criminal, 
        civil, and administrative cases affecting the rights of 
        juveniles. It also provides for the establishment of 
        experimental juvenile courts.
Access to Legal Representation
    Communist Party efforts to address growing social unrest 
have resulted in government programs to strengthen institutions 
that assist citizens with legal claims and disputes. To help 
reduce the number of citizen protests and mass petitions, 
provincial and municipal Party committees have directed local 
officials to improve legal aid and mediation efforts.\19\ 
Minister of Justice Wu Aiying said in February that:

          [We must] bring into play the professional strengths 
        of lawyers in resolving disputes. [We must] take 
        further steps to organize and guide lawyers, basic 
        legal service workers, and legal aid personnel to 
        actively participate in the work of handling mass 
        incidents and citizen petitions involving legal issues. 
        [We must] actively explore methods and measures that 
        press parties to settle out-of-court and in non-
        litigation forums, in order to better resolve disputes 
        and prevent them from escalating.\20\

    Central government officials also are strengthening the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) presence at the local level, 
particularly in western China and at the level of township 
governments. MOJ offices guide the work of local mediation 
committees, run government legal aid programs that provide pro 
bono legal representation to citizens who meet designated 
criteria, and supervise and license Chinese lawyers.\21\ In 
2005, Chinese authorities set the goal of ensuring that 91 
percent of Chinese townships had a MOJ office by the end of 
2006.\22\ Chinese authorities designated 7.4 billion yuan 
(US$920 million) to improve housing and work conditions for 
township court, justice, and public security bureaus in western 
China from 2004 to 2008.\23\ The MOJ has made the strengthening 
of township mediation and legal aid programs part of its effort 
to implement the Party's ``new socialist countryside'' 
campaign.\24\
    Chinese authorities have expanded the scope of government 
legal aid efforts. Official Chinese statistics show that the 
number of government legal aid centers rose from 2,774 in 2003 
to 3,081 in 2005. The total number of cases handled by these 
centers rose from about 166,000 in 2003 to an estimated 250,000 
in 2005, or roughly 3 percent of all cases handled by the 
Chinese courts in 2005.\25\ In July 2005, the All-China 
Environment Federation and the State Environmental Protection 
Administration announced the creation of a joint legal aid 
program for the victims of environmental pollution.\26\ In 
September 2005, the Shanghai People's Congress issued a 
decision clarifying the eligibility of migrant workers for 
legal aid in cases of labor disputes, occupational injuries, 
and domestic violence.\27\ In May, the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) announced that 669 of its legal staff 
would be permitted to acquire bar licenses and provide 
increased legal services to workers [see Section V(c)--
Protection of Internationally Recognized Labor Rights].
    At the same time that it has promoted efforts to expand 
legal assistance to citizens, the government also has 
restricted the efforts of private lawyers and human rights 
defenders who challenge government abuses [see Section IV--
Introduction; Section V(b) --Rights of Criminal Suspects and 
Defendants--Access to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense]. 
The MOJ's ``2006 Report on the Policy for Development of 
China's Legal Profession'' emphasized its role in ``guiding'' 
the legal profession and the need for all lawyers to ``serve 
the harmony and stability of society.'' \28\ The All China 
Lawyers Association (ACLA) issued a guiding opinion that went 
into effect on March 20 and restricts the ability of lawyers to 
handle cases involving representative or joint litigation by 10 
or more litigants, or cases involving both litigation and non-
litigation efforts.\29\ The guiding opinion further instructs 
law firms to assign only ``politically qualified'' lawyers to 
conduct the initial intake of these cases, and to obtain the 
approval of at least three law firm partners before taking them 
on.\30\ Lawyers who handle mass cases must accept supervision 
and guidance by judicial administration departments, attempt to 
mitigate conflict, and propose mediation as the method for 
conflict resolution.\31\ Local lawyers' associations may 
sanction any lawyer or law firm that fails to follow these 
guidelines and causes a ``negative impact.'' \32\
    Local Chinese authorities have imposed additional 
restrictions on lawyer advocacy efforts. The Henan Provincial 
Justice Bureau has issued an opinion that forbids lawyers from 
using the news media and engaging in various other activities 
when handling ``major, sensitive, mass'' cases.\33\ The opinion 
says that lawyers in Henan province cannot ``use the media to 
stir things up or create a negative impact on domestic or 
international public opinion.'' It prohibits lawyers and law 
firms from publishing commentary to affect the outcome of a 
case or the mood of the public, and warns them not to establish 
contact with foreign organizations or news media in violation 
of disciplinary rules. The Shenyang Municipal Justice Bureau 
has also issued an opinion that requires lawyers to seek 
instruction from the Justice Bureau before they handle ``major, 
difficult, and sensitive'' cases.\34\
Constitutional Review
    The National People's Congress (NPC) wields exclusive power 
to amend the Constitution and to enact and amend national laws, 
particularly through its Standing Committee (NPCSC). The NPC is 
the only governmental body with the power to interpret the 
Constitution and supervise its enforcement. Chinese courts do 
not have the power either to apply constitutional provisions in 
the absence of concrete implementing legislation or to strike 
down laws or regulations that are inconsistent with the Chinese 
Constitution.\35\ In December 2005, the NPCSC enacted new 
procedures that require the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate to submit judicial 
interpretations to the NPCSC within 30 days of 
promulgation.\36\ At least one Chinese scholar has said that 
these new procedures represent an NPC move to rein in the SPC 
and to ensure that the SPC does not erode the NPC's power as 
China's sole legislator and interpreter of the 
Constitution.\37\ The NPC supervises both the SPC, China's 
highest judicial authority, and the State Council, China's 
executive authority, but the NPC remains subject to tight Party 
control [see Section VII--Development of the Rule of Law and 
the Institutions of Democratic Governance].
    Some scholars have suggested removing the power of 
constitutional review from the NPC and vesting it in a 
``dedicated judicial agency,'' \38\ but the government has 
ruled out establishing a specialized court to review the 
constitutionality of laws and administrative regulations.\39\ 
Senior government and Party leaders have warned officials to 
guard against the promotion of ``Western-style constitutional 
reform.'' \40\ They also reject adopting a ``Western separation 
of powers,'' \41\ and insist that any restraint on the central 
government's power must not diminish the leadership of the 
Communist Party.\42\
    Under Article 90 of the Legislation Law, Chinese citizens 
may propose NPCSC review of whether or not a State Council 
regulation violates the Constitution or any national law.\43\ 
The Chinese government has taken some limited steps to 
formalize the constitutional and legal review system. For 
example, the NPCSC announced in 2004 the formation of a new 
Legislation Review and Filing Office (LRFO) to assist its 
Legislative Affairs Commission in reviewing regulations that 
may conflict with the Constitution and national laws.\44\ In 
December 2005, the NPCSC amended the ``Working Procedures for 
the Filing and Review of Administrative Rules, Local Rules, 
Autonomous Region and Special Purpose Regulations, and Special 
Economic Zone Rules'' (Legislation Procedures).\45\ The 
Legislation Procedures stipulate three phases for 
constitutional and legal review: consultation between the NPCSC 
and the formulating agency; NPCSC submission of a written 
request to the formulating agency that it revise or rescind the 
legislation; and, if the formulating agency does not accept the 
request, consultation within the NPCSC to determine whether or 
not to rescind the legislation. The amendments include a new 
provision authorizing the special committees of the NPC to 
review laws and regulations on their own initiative, with a 
deadline of two months for formulating agencies to respond to 
NPCSC special committee requests that a regulation be revised 
or rescinded.
    Chinese citizens rarely submit proposals to the NPCSC for 
constitutional and legal review because the review process 
lacks transparency and citizens cannot compel review.\46\ 
During the run-up to the annual plenary sessions of the NPC and 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Chinese 
authorities shut down the Aegean Sea (Aiqinhai) Web site, as 
well as four other sites that had complained on behalf of local 
workers.\47\ The Web site operators sought relief through the 
constitutional and legal review system in April 2006.\48\ As of 
September 2006, the NPCSC had not yet responded to the request 
for review. To address these problems, some Chinese legal 
experts have called for requiring the LRFO to notify those 
seeking review whether or not it will accept their proposal, 
and to provide explanations to those whose proposals it 
rejects.\49\ Others have suggested that the NPCSC report each 
year to the full NPC, describing the previous year's 
constitutional review work.\50\ Some legal experts in China 
also have advocated that the NPCSC establish a dedicated 
Constitutional Commission staffed by scholars, judges, and 
lawyers.\51\
    NPC special committees and other central government 
agencies have the power to compel the NPCSC to act on their 
applications,\52\ but they have an interest in maintaining the 
national status quo and not creating conflicts among 
themselves.\53\ Thus, they have little incentive to request 
review of national laws, State Council regulations, or other 
central government agencies' rules on major issues relating to 
civil or human rights.\54\ Citizens may only offer proposals to 
the LRFO, which stands between them and the NPCSC and lacks the 
power to issue binding decisions that would resolve 
disputes.\55\ In addition, unlike other laws that compel State 
Council departments, courts, and local governments to act on 
citizens' applications and lawsuits,\56\ the Legislation Law 
merely provides that the NPCSC may react to citizens' proposals 
``if necessary.'' Finally, the government is not required to 
inform citizens whether or not it will act on a proposal, and 
the 2005 amendments to the Legislation Procedures revised the 
provision concerning government notification to a citizen that 
a review is complete, making such notification voluntary.\57\
    The NPCSC has enacted and amended laws and regulations that 
protect citizens from government abuses in response to public 
pressure\58\ and new legislative mandates,\59\ but it has never 
rescinded a law or administrative regulation in direct response 
to a citizen proposal.\60\ The primary purpose of the 
constitutional and legal review system is to safeguard the 
unity of China's legal system rather than to give citizens an 
effective remedy by a competent national tribunal.\61\ The 
system is based on the constitutional and legal 
presumption that the NPC and its Standing Committee are 
paramount,\62\ and therefore not subject to checks, balances, 
or oversight.\63\ The China Law Society's Democracy and Law 
Times summarized the situation as follows:

          As a system, constitutional review comprises 
        proposal, acceptance, review, determination, and 
        resolution. If it lacks any one of these, then the 
        constitutional review system is not complete. Although 
        the meaning of citizens having been granted the right 
        to submit proposals for constitutional review is very 
        important, if all they have is the right of proposal, 
        and do not have the right of acceptance, review, 
        determination, and resolution, then the right of 
        proposal exists in name only. This also explains the 
        reason why so few citizens propose constitutional 
        review.\64\
Judicial and Administrative Review of State Action
    Chinese law provides methods for citizens to seek a remedy 
when they believe the government has violated their rights. 
These methods allow Chinese citizens limited legal recourse 
against individual officials or local governments that exceed 
their authority.\65\ Under the Administrative Reconsideration 
Law (ARL), Chinese citizens may submit an application to State 
Council departments for administrative review of specific 
government actions that violate their legal rights and 
interests.\66\ Under the Administrative Procedure Law (APL), 
citizens may file a lawsuit in a people's court to challenge 
government actions.\67\ Under the State Compensation Law, 
citizens may request compensation for illegal government acts 
along with an ARL or APL action, or present them directly to 
the relevant government bureau.\68\ Some local Party 
disciplinary committees are also experimenting with procedural 
changes that grant cadres in specific cases the ability to 
mount a defense, present evidence, and receive a hearing on the 
charges against them.\69\
    These methods, however, do not allow Chinese citizens to 
challenge administrative regulations that violate 
constitutional or legal rights. Article 12 of the APL forbids 
courts from accepting citizen challenges of administrative 
rules and regulations that have ``general binding force.'' 
Article 7 of the ARL allows citizens to apply to administrative 
agencies for review of the legality of decrees\70\ of State 
Council departments and local people's governments at or above 
the county level, and any provisions enacted by town or 
township people's governments.\71\ The ARL does not, however, 
allow reconsideration of State Council rules or 
regulations.\72\
    Citizens are making only limited use of laws that protect 
their rights by granting judicial and administrative review of 
government actions. For example, Hubei provincial authorities 
report an overall decline between 2003 and 2005 in applications 
for administrative reconsideration, from 3,468 to 3,336.\73\ 
Total numbers of such applications in major Chinese 
municipalities is a few hundred per year.\74\ Administrative 
court challenges to government actions have not increased since 
1998. In 2005, first-instance administrative law cases totaled 
95,707, nearly twice the 52,596 reported in 1995, but a decline 
from the 101,921 recorded in 2001. This decline parallels a 
similar stagnation in citizens using the judiciary generally. 
In 2005, the Chinese judiciary handled 4.3 million first-
instance civil cases, down from 4.73 million reported in 2001, 
and only slightly higher than the 4 million recorded in 
1995.\75\
    Chinese laws that grant judicial and administrative action 
to citizens to protect their rights do not provide mechanisms 
to compel effective judicial or government review. When the 
government shut down the Aegean Sea Web site, along with four 
other Web sites, in March 2006, authorities cited Article 5 of 
the Provisions on the Administration of Internet News 
Information Services (Provisions),\76\ which grant the State 
Council Information Office (SCIO) the authority to license Web 
sites that report and comment on politics, economics, fast-
breaking social events, and military, foreign, social, and 
public affairs. The operators of the closed Web sites believed 
that the Provisions violated their constitutional and legal 
rights,\77\ but they had no way to compel judicial or other 
government review of the Provisions. Government authorities 
were acting under the authority of the Provisions when they 
shut down the Web sites, and so the issue was whether the 
Provisions violated the Constitution, a national law, or a 
State Council regulation. Administrative review under the ARL 
could not provide the Web site operators an effective remedy 
because the Provisions are ``department rules,'' and a 2005 
State Council decision (Decision) explicitly provides for the 
licensing authority granted to the SCIO.\78\ Because citizens 
may not use the administrative reconsideration system to 
question the constitutionality or legality of State Council 
regulations (such as the Decision) or State Council department 
rules (such as the Provisions), the Web site operators would be 
unlikely to obtain effective relief based on an application for 
administrative reconsideration attacking the Provisions 
directly.
    The ARL provides that citizens who do not accept an 
administrative reconsideration decision may file a lawsuit with 
a people's court under the APL.\79\ Like the ARL, however, the 
APL explicitly prohibits constitutional or legal review of 
State Council departments' rules.\80\ A court could refuse to 
enforce the Provisions if they conflicted with a national law 
or a State Council regulation,\81\ but since the SCIO's 
licensing authority is derived from the Decision, a court would 
lack the authority to declare the Provisions unconstitutional 
or illegal.\82\
Citizen Petitioning
    Since the 1950s, xinfang (``letters and visits'') offices 
have provided a channel outside court challenges for citizens 
to appeal government decisions and present their 
grievances.\83\ Under the new national Regulations on Letters 
and Visits (RLV) issued in January 2005, citizens may ``give 
information, make comments or suggestions, or lodge 
complaints'' to xinfang bureaus of local governments and their 
departments.\84\ Individual petitioning may be as simple as one 
dissatisfied citizen visiting multiple xinfang bureaus within 
government agencies. Collective or mass petitioning may involve 
organized demonstrations, speeches, or marches of hundreds or 
thousands of people seeking to present their grievances, 
despite an official prohibition on such activities.\85\ 
Official news media report that Chinese citizens presented 12.7 
million petitions to county-level and higher xinfang bureaus 
during 2005,\86\ in contrast to the 8 million total court cases 
handled by the Chinese judiciary during the same period.\87\ 
The total number of petitions increased each year from 1993 to 
2004.\88\ Petitioning is common even within the judiciary. 
Chinese courts handled four million petitions in 2005, a number 
roughly equal to the total number of civil court cases for the 
year.\89\
    Authorities launched an implementation campaign for the RLV 
in 2005 aimed at reducing the number of citizen petitions. The 
government tasked the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) with 
coordinating official responses to citizen petitions, required 
local MPS heads to meet personally with petitioners in a May-
to-September campaign, and increased propaganda efforts 
pressing local officials to resolve citizen petitions.\90\ 
Chinese authorities have ordered the nationwide adoption of 
responsibility systems that discipline local officials who fail 
to prevent mass petitions.\91\ Concerned about the rising 
number of mass petitions, central Party officials have set a 
goal to decrease the number during 2006.\92\ Party and 
government officials have called for strengthening xinfang 
institutions in conjunction with stronger efforts to maintain 
social order.\93\
    Chinese authorities and state-run news media report that 
official measures to address citizen petitions in 2005 were a 
major policy success,\94\ but official statistics provide 
conflicting support for this claim. Official statistics show 
total citizen petitions declined for the first time in 12 
years, from 13.7 million in 2004 to 12.7 million in 2005.\95\ 
Although officials reported a 90 percent success rate in 
resolving petitions,\96\ scholars commissioned by the 
government to study the issue say that only 0.2 percent of 
petitions filed receive a response.\97\ Official news media 
report that government and Party xinfang bureaus at the county 
level and above have handled some 917,000 petitions since the 
beginning of the campaign, but this represents less than a 
tenth of the total number of petitions received in 2005 by 
xinfang bureaus. Since MPS rules issued in August 2005 provide 
for disciplining local MPS officials who fail to prevent 
collective petitions, MPS officials may be suppressing 
petitioners or misreporting their numbers rather than resolving 
the underlying problems.\98\
    The 2005 RLV requires local governments to adopt official 
xinfang responsibility systems, and some local governments have 
done so.\99\ These systems punish local officials more harshly 
for mass petitions that reach higher-level authorities, 
depending on the numbers of petitioners involved and the level 
of government that they reach.\100\ Absent alternative 
political or legal channels to check the power of local 
officials and obtain redress, this punishment structure 
provides an incentive for Chinese citizens to take their 
grievances to the streets in order to force local officials to 
act.\101\ But this punishment structure also gives local 
authorities an interest in suppressing mass petitions and 
preventing petitioners from approaching higher authorities. A 
December 2005 NGO study of these systems found that some local 
authorities have resorted to ``rampant violence and 
intimidation'' to abduct or detain petitioners in Beijing and 
force them to return home.\102\ The report alleges that Beijing 
police often ignore such abductions or detentions and sometimes 
assist with abductions.\103\
    The government uses harsh measures to repress petitioners 
during high-profile national events. In March 2006, a senior 
MPS official confirmed that MPS officials would engage in mass 
roundups to ``strongly encourage'' those ``people without 
proper professions, fixed places of residence, or stable 
incomes who have been hanging around Beijing for a long time'' 
to leave the capital before the annual plenary session of the 
National People's Congress (NPC).\104\ Other repressive 
measures include:

        &lt;bullet&gt; During the annual NPC plenary session in March 
        2006, authorities detained AIDS activist Hu Jia for 41 
        days without legal formalities and without notifying 
        his family [see Section V(b)--Rights of Criminal 
        Suspects and Defendants--Arbitrary Detention]. Hu had 
        attempted to submit petitions on behalf of AIDS victims 
        to central government officials during high-profile 
        conferences [see Section V(g)--Public Health--HIV/
        AIDS].
        &lt;bullet&gt; In December 2005, Beijing police arrested 
        several hundred petitioners who gathered outside the 
        offices of China Central Television to present their 
        grievances on ``Popularize Law Day.''
        &lt;bullet&gt; In December 2005, Shanghai police arrested 
        over 200 petitioners who sought to present their 
        grievances to municipal Party officials and were 
        gathered outside a building in which the local Party 
        branch was holding a conference.
        &lt;bullet&gt; In November 2005, police in a number of cities 
        arrested or detained dozens of petitioners before an 
        official visit by U.S. President George W. Bush.\105\

    Chinese court officials are pursuing reforms to the process 
of handling citizen petitions that may weaken the ability of 
individual judges to decide cases according to law. The Supreme 
People's Court (SPC) announced in November 2005 that it will 
require Chinese courts to establish procedures to resolve 
citizen petitions about judicial decisions. Trial judges will 
be responsible for responding to parties who visit the court 
and raise complaints about judgments, and their record for 
handling such complaints will be made part of their performance 
reviews.\106\ Similarities between the SPC announcement and the 
RLV suggest that the central government seeks to implement a 
common set of reforms for addressing citizen petitions to both 
the courts and local governments.\107\ The SPC reforms may 
encourage Chinese litigants to resort to post-decision 
petitioning rather than appeals to reverse verdicts, increase 
pressure on Chinese trial judges to alter verdicts to satisfy 
persistent petitioners, and weaken the finality of 
judgments.\108\

        VII(d) Commercial Rule of Law and the Impact of the WTO


                                findings


        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government has made progress in 
        bringing its laws and regulations into compliance with 
        its World Trade 
        Organization (WTO) commitments. Although significant 
        flaws remain, the new body of commercial laws has 
        improved the business climate for foreign companies in 
        China. With new, more transparent rules, the Chinese 
        trade bureaucracy has reduced regulatory and licensing 
        delays in many sectors.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese commercial regulatory regime 
        remains, however, largely opaque to both domestic and 
        foreign businesses. When China joined the WTO in 
        December 2001, the government committed to establishing 
        an official journal that would publish drafts of trade-
        related measures for notice and comment, and to 
        publishing trade-related measures no later than 90 days 
        after they become effective. Although the government 
        has acted to improve transparency, some central 
        government agencies and many local governments are not 
        consistent in publishing trade-related measures in the 
        official journal.
        &lt;bullet&gt; The Chinese government tolerates intellectual 
        property rights (IPR) infringement rates that are among 
        the highest in the world. The Chinese government has 
        not introduced criminal penalties sufficient to deter 
        IPR infringement, and steps taken by Chinese government 
        agencies to improve the protection of foreign 
        intellectual property have not produced any 
        significant decrease in infringement activity. The 
        Chinese government's failure to provide effective 
        criminal enforcement of IPR has led foreign companies 
        to turn to civil litigation to obtain monetary damages 
        or injunctive relief. Civil litigants continue to find, 
        however, that most judges lack the necessary training 
        and experience to handle IPR cases, and damage awards 
        are too low to be an effective deterrent.
        &lt;bullet&gt; Since acceding to the WTO, the Chinese 
        government has used technical, regulatory, and 
        industrial policies, some of which appear to conflict 
        with its WTO commitments, to discriminate against 
        foreign producers and investors and limit their access 
        to the domestic market. U.S. rights holders and 
        industry groups have complained that the government's 
        censorship regime serves as a barrier to entry and 
        encourages IPR violations. In 2005, the American 
        Chamber of Commerce in China wrote that censorship 
        clearance procedures severely restrict the ability to 
        distribute CD, VCD, and DVD products in China and 
        provide an ``unfair and unnecessary advantage to pirate 
        producers who bring their products to market long 
        before legitimate copies are available for sale.''
Introduction
    On December 11, 2001, China formally became a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, the Chinese 
government agreed to abide by the rules governing trade 
relations among most of the nations in the world, and voiced 
its willingness to make fundamental changes to its trade regime 
to conform with the WTO's rules-based system, affecting China's 
system of governance at all levels. The WTO agreements and 
China's accession documents contain many core elements of the 
rule of law. When China joined the WTO, the Chinese government 
committed to ensuring that all trade-related measures be 
administered in a non-discriminatory manner. The WTO also 
imposes transparency on its members by requiring that all laws, 
regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings 
relating to trade be published promptly.
    The government's implementation of its WTO non-
discrimination and transparency obligations is a useful measure 
of the overall development of the rule of law in China, 
including the extent to which the government treats individuals 
equally under the law and makes laws and administrative 
regulations accessible to the public. The Chinese government 
has made progress in bringing its laws and regulations into 
compliance with its WTO commitments. The new body of commercial 
laws has improved the business climate for foreign companies in 
China. With new, more transparent rules, the Chinese trade 
bureaucracy has reduced regulatory and licensing delays in many 
sectors. Nevertheless, serious problems remain in such areas as 
regulatory transparency, the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR), and discrimination against goods and 
services of foreign origin. Most of China's WTO commitments 
were to have been phased in by December 2004, and the past year 
therefore provides an indication of what Chinese citizens and 
foreign investors can expect of China as a WTO member with its 
full range of WTO commitments in place.
    The U.S. and Chinese governments established the U.S.-China 
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) in 1983 as a 
government-to-government mechanism to develop and facilitate 
the bilateral commercial relationship. The two governments held 
the 17th plenary session of the JCCT on April 11, 2006, in 
Washington, D.C. The Chinese delegation made a number of 
commitments on trade issues of priority concern to the United 
States, such as fighting piracy of U.S. intellectual property; 
increasing transparency in China's domestic regulatory process; 
ending duplicative testing of U.S. medical products entering 
the Chinese market; resuming sales of U.S. beef; and making 
progress toward accession to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement. The U.S. Department of Commerce is the lead U.S. 
government agency in the JCCT process, and engages the Chinese 
government to ensure compliance with commitments made at JCCT 
meetings.
Transparency
    The Chinese commercial regulatory regime continues to 
exhibit what the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
describes as ``systemic opacity.'' \1\ China's Protocol of 
Accession to the WTO requires that the Chinese government 
translate all trade-related laws, regulations or other measures 
into one or more of the WTO's official languages.\2\ In 
addition, to the maximum extent possible, it must make these 
laws, regulations and other measures available before they are 
implemented or enforced, but in no case later than 90 days 
after the date of implementation or enforcement.\3\ Moreover, 
the government committed to designating an official journal to 
regularly publish trade-related laws, regulations, and other 
measures, and to provide additional relevant information, such 
as the effective date for a particular measure and the identity 
of the governmental and non-governmental authorities 
responsible for authorizing, approving, or regulating services 
activities.\4\ Before implementing or enforcing trade-related 
laws, regulations, and other measures, the Chinese government 
has committed to publishing them in an official journal and to 
providing a reasonable period for public comment to the 
appropriate government authorities, except in extraordinary 
circumstances.\5\
    The government, in particular the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM), has taken steps toward improving transparency, but 
still does not consistently publish trade-related measures\6\ 
and does not always translate those measures that it 
publishes.\7\ Some government agencies do not circulate drafts 
of trade-related measures to outside groups or individuals, 
domestic or foreign, or do so only on the condition that the 
outside party promises not to share the draft more widely.\8\
    In March 2006, the State Council issued a circular 
providing that the ``Chinese Foreign Economic Trade Gazette'' 
would be the government's official journal for the publication 
and registration of ``all laws, regulations, or other measures 
pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs), or the 
control of foreign exchange.'' \9\ The 
circular reiterated that all local governments and government 
agencies are required to forward to MOFCOM any trade-related 
regulations that they promulgate or make available in draft 
form for public comment. MOFCOM is then responsible for 
publishing the regulations. MOFCOM began making the Gazette 
available on its Web site in 2003.\10\ A Commission review of 
the Gazette indicates, however, that few trade-related measures 
below the central government level have been published there.
    Poor transparency has made it difficult for the U.S. 
government to obtain accurate information on the Chinese 
government's subsidy programs.\11\ The WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures requires each WTO member 
to submit an annual notification of all the subsidies that it 
maintains, and provides that members shall respond to requests 
for information regarding practices that appear to constitute 
subsidies ``as quickly as possible and in a comprehensive 
manner.'' \12\ To date, however, the Chinese government has not 
met its annual notification commitment. The United States 
submitted a request to the Chinese government in October 2004 
regarding a number of subsidy programs.\13\ The Chinese 
government did not respond until April 2006,\14\ and that 
response was limited to subsidies that existed between 2001 and 
2004.
    Chinese officials credit China's accession to the WTO as 
having increased the government's attention to transparency. 
Zhou Hanhua, the head of the State Council-designated drafting 
team on open government measures [see Section VII(b)--
Institutions of Democratic Governance and Legislative Reform], 
said WTO accession has raised awareness about citizen rights 
and the importance of openness and transparency.\15\ Some local 
governments also have cited the WTO transparency principle as 
support for their own reforms. For example, officials in 
Changzhou city, Jiangsu province, announced in November 2005 
that the city government would no longer enforce regulatory 
documents that have not been published first in the local 
newspaper, the government's gazette, or other publications 
specified by the city government. In the circular announcing 
this requirement, the Changzhou government said that, 
``[A]ccording to the WTO `principle of openness and 
transparency,' there is generally one month between the time 
that regulatory documents and other policies and proceedings 
are promulgated and the time that they are implemented.'' \16\ 
The new procedures provided that the public could ``inspect and 
review'' any such draft measure before the government makes it 
effective if it has been published in one of the three approved 
media.
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement
    Intellectual property counterfeiting and piracy in China 
are rampant, according to Chinese\17\ and U.S. government 
sources.\18\ Industry reports indicate that infringement levels 
in China range from 85 to 95 percent for all copyrighted 
works.\19\ In 2005, the value of copyrighted works that were 
pirated exceeded US$2.3 billion.\20\ China is now the second-
largest legal music market in Asia, with sales worth US$212 
million in 2004. Sales of pirated discs were, however, worth 
approximately US$400 million.\21\ Ninety percent of the 
software used in China is pirated,\22\ and business software 
losses were estimated at US$1.27 billion in 2005.\23\ A study 
commissioned by the Motion Picture Association of America found 
that 93 percent of the Chinese film market is lost to 
piracy,\24\ costing U.S. rights holders nearly US$300 million 
per year, according to industry estimates.\25\ According to 
U.S. customs statistics, 69 percent of all counterfeit products 
seized at the U.S. border in 2005 were of Chinese origin,\26\ 
and the volume of seized Chinese goods continues to rise.\27\ 
U.S. industry reports of piracy levels in China ranged from an 
assessment that ``no significant reduction in IPR infringement 
levels'' had taken place in 2005,\28\ to a more positive 
assessment that there had been sharp improvement in some 
regions.\29\
    Some Chinese officials have characterized their 
government's IPR enforcement efforts as effective, or 
downplayed the seriousness of IPR issues.\30\ In November 2005, 
the head of China's WTO delegation responded to simultaneous 
requests under Article 63 of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights from the United States, 
Japan, and Switzerland for information on the Chinese 
government's IPR enforcement, by saying that the blame laid on 
China for being one of the top producers and exporters of 
counterfeit and infringing automotive parts was groundless.\31\ 
One report in the state-run Chinese news media cited the United 
States and other developed countries as being the source of 
intellectual property piracy.\32\ A Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) analyst said that the U.S. government exaggerates IPR 
issues because it fears China's surging exports.\33\ According 
to one senior Chinese customs official, IPR infringement in 
China is ``not that serious'' when compared with international 
standards and when viewed in proportion to China's total 
exports to the United States.\34\
    Chinese officials cite enforcement statistics and 
legislative activities to demonstrate a strong respect for 
IPR.\35\ In the weeks before the April 2006 meeting of the 
bilateral Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), 
Chinese officials made several announcements regarding 
administrative IPR enforcement measures that the government had 
recently undertaken.\36\ The State Council and its agencies 
continue to issue new regulations regarding intellectual 
property rights.\37\ In March 2006, the MOFCOM National IPR 
Protection Working Group Office issued an ``Action Plan on IPR 
Protection 2006'' outlining how 11 government ministries and 
agencies will coordinate in nine areas to work on the 
protection of trademarks, copyrights, and patents, and 
formulate and revise IPR-related laws and regulations.\38\ In 
July 2006, a new regulation on Internet copyright protection 
went into effect.\39\ Chinese officials said this regulation 
would form the basis of China's ratification of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Internet treaties in the 
second half of 2006.\40\ In November 2005, the Supreme People's 
Court published four draft interpretations for comment 
regarding unfair competition, plant patents, civil IPR 
disputes, and civil disputes regarding music television 
broadcasting rights.\41\
    Ongoing enforcement and legislative activity, however, has 
not translated into decreased IPR infringement. At the 
conclusion of a review conducted under Special 301 provisions 
of U.S. trade law in April 2005, the United States elevated 
China to the ``Priority Watch'' list. In its report, the USTR 
noted that ``[i]nadequate IPR enforcement is one of China's 
greatest shortcomings as a trading partner,'' and that ``China 
suffers from chronic over reliance on toothless administrative 
enforcement and underutilization of criminal remedies.'' \42\
    At the 2005 JCCT Plenary, the Chinese government committed 
to completing its legalization program to ensure that all 
central, provincial, and local governments offices would use 
only licensed software, and would extend that program to 
enterprises in 2006.\43\ In March 2006, the National Copyright 
Administration, Ministry of Information Industry, Ministry of 
Finance, and State Council jointly reiterated requirements set 
forth in previous regulations that 
ordered Chinese government agencies to use legitimate copies of 
software. According to Chinese officials, all government 
departments had complied with this mandate.\44\ The software 
industry 
reports, however, that the level of new government purchases 
does not support this claim.\45\
    Current provisions in the Criminal Law are inadequate to 
deter infringement.\46\ While China has said that the absolute 
number of criminal IPR infringement cases rose from 2004 to 
2005,\47\ the number remains small in comparison to the volume 
and value of IPR violations that occur in China each year. The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs) 
requires WTO members to maintain criminal IPR infringement 
penalties, including monetary fines ``sufficient to provide a 
deterrent.'' \48\ China's state-run media, however, cites 
``experts'' to support the position that, because intellectual 
property is a private right, the government should prosecute 
IPR violations only in those cases that ``negatively influence 
the public interest,'' and that if the government were to focus 
on assisting foreign companies in protecting their IPR, ``it 
would be an infringement on the rights of Chinese individuals 
and companies.'' \49\
    High thresholds for criminal liability make it difficult 
for the Chinese government to prosecute illegal commercial 
operations.\50\ Although some high-profile prosecutions have 
been undertaken,\51\ because the government calculates criminal 
thresholds using the retail value of the illegal goods rather 
than the value of genuine products, the current procedure 
creates a ``safe harbor'' for commercial infringers. In 
addition, because a government agency that successfully 
prosecutes an IPR case is eligible to receive a portion of any 
fines assessed, current rules create a disincentive to transfer 
cases to law enforcement officials.\52\ The Supreme People's 
Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate issued an 
interpretation in 2004 on transferring IPR infringement cases 
from administrative to criminal enforcement,\53\ but the U.S. 
government subsequently determined that the revisions did not 
go far enough,\54\ and less than 25 percent of respondents in 
one survey of U.S. businesses believed the interpretation would 
aid IPR protection to a moderate or great extent.\55\ In 
response to expressions of concern from the United States 
regarding the availability of remedies to address commercial-
scale counterfeiting and piracy, as well as reliance on non-
deterrent administrative penalties rather than transferring 
cases for criminal prosecution,\56\ China's WTO delegation said 
that the National People's Congress had no plans to amend 
China's Criminal Law or other intellectual property laws.\57\
    A lack of interagency cooperation is at least partly to 
blame for the government's continued failure to impose criminal 
sanctions on IPR infringers, according to Zhu Xiaoqing, Deputy 
Procurator General of the Supreme People's Procuratorate.\58\ 
The government has begun, however, to address this problem. In 
January and March 2006, the Ministry of Public Security and 
several other government agencies enacted rules intended to 
improve interagency coordination in handling criminal trademark 
and copyright infringement cases.\59\
    The Chinese government's failure to provide effective 
administrative and criminal enforcement of IPR has led foreign 
companies to turn to civil litigation to obtain monetary 
damages or injunctive relief.\60\ Civil litigants continue to 
find, however, that most judges lack the necessary training and 
experience to handle IPR cases. In addition, the evidentiary 
and other rules governing civil lawsuits are generally vague or 
ineffective, and damage awards are too low to be an effective 
deterrent.\61\ Despite these challenges, some high-profile 
lawsuits have been filed in which foreign IPR holders have 
succeeded in suing infringers as well as the Chinese 
government. For example, in December 2005, the Shanghai No. 2 
Intermediate People's Court ordered a Chinese coffee retailer 
to pay Starbucks Corporation 500,000 yuan (US$62,000), saying 
the Chinese retailer had engaged in unfair competition by using 
Starbucks's Chinese name and imitating the design of its 
cafes.\62\ In June 2006, the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate 
People's Court ordered the State Intellectual Property Office 
to withdraw its decision to invalidate Pfizer, Inc.'s patent on 
the active ingredient in the drug Viagra.\63\
    The central government has begun to make policy statements 
emphasizing the importance of IPR protection, specifically 
about how this protection will benefit domestic Chinese IPR 
holders. At its October 2005 plenum, the Communist Party 
included ``innovation'' in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), 
and since then Chinese officials\64\ and the state-run 
media\65\ have called for increasing IPR protection to further 
the innovation of Chinese companies and increase China's 
international trade. In 2004, China overtook the United States 
to become the world's largest exporter of information and 
communication technology goods.\66\ Although the majority of 
these goods are made by foreign-invested enterprises,\67\ some 
high-technology Chinese manufacturers, such as Huawei and 
Lenovo, are garnering global name recognition and market share. 
In 2005, the first Chinese company with independently developed 
intellectual property was listed on the NASDAQ.\68\
    The Chinese government possesses the resources necessary to 
enforce IPR, but appears to lack the resolve to do so with 
respect to foreign rights holders. The government's position is 
that its failure to enforce IPR is a result of China's current 
stage of economic development.\69\ According to Chinese and 
U.S. experts, however, the problem is that local police 
generally resist efforts to shut down commercial infringers 
because large-scale pirating efforts support local economies 
and have the financial support of key local officials.\70\ In 
2002, the State Council enacted regulations specifically 
addressing protection of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games' 
trademark symbol from counterfeiting.\71\ Western news media 
reports indicate that vendors who otherwise sell counterfeit 
goods are avoiding the new Olympic symbol out of fear of 
government reprisals.\72\
Financial Services
    In 2004, the United States recorded a US$145 million 
financial services surplus with China, according to the U.S. 
International Trade Commission.\73\ Exports of U.S. banking and 
securities services to China were down, however, from 2003.\74\ 
Although the 
Chinese government has acknowledged the value that foreign 
investment and exchanges can bring to its financial services 
sector,\75\ it continues to impose strict limits and high 
barriers to entry on foreign investment in its banking, 
insurance, and securities sectors.
            Banking
    The Chinese government has committed to eliminating all 
non-prudential measures that restrict ownership, operation, and 
juridical form of foreign financial institutions, including 
measures on 
internal branching and licenses, before 2007.\76\ The 
government currently imposes tighter limitations and higher 
barriers to entry on foreign banks than on Chinese banks.
    In its WTO accession agreement, the government also set 
different restrictions and schedules on foreign banks based on 
whether they conduct business in domestic or foreign currency. 
With respect to business in domestic currency, the government 
has met its WTO commitment regarding lifting geographic 
restrictions. The Chinese WTO accession agreement provides 
that, immediately upon joining the WTO, the government would 
allow foreign banks to conduct domestic currency business with 
foreign-invested enterprises and foreign individuals, subject 
to certain geographic restrictions. Within two years after 
accession, foreign banks were also to be able to conduct 
domestic currency business with Chinese enterprises, subject to 
certain geographic restrictions, which were to be lifted 
gradually over the following three years.\77\ The Chinese 
government met these commitments, and opened several cities 
ahead of schedule.\78\ In addition, in December 2005, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) announced that it was 
lowering the minimum operating capital requirement to conduct 
domestic currency businesses from 500 million yuan to 400 
million yuan for a foreign bank branch, and from 300 million 
yuan to 200 million yuan for a wholly foreign-owned or a joint 
venture bank.\79\
    With respect to foreign currency business, the Chinese 
government agreed as part of its WTO accession agreement that, 
immediately upon joining the WTO, it would allow foreign banks 
to 
conduct foreign currency business without any geographic or 
client restrictions. According to the U.S. Trade 
Representative, although the Chinese government has permitted 
licensed foreign banks to freely engage in foreign currency 
business with any customer, only a limited number of banks are 
allowed to enter into forward foreign exchange contracts.\80\ 
In addition, according to one industry group, measures issued 
in May 2004 limit the foreign currency financing of foreign 
banks in China and, although identical restrictions are 
applicable to domestic banks, their effects on foreign banks 
are disproportionately negative.\81\
    Market entry requirements for foreign banks are higher than 
those for domestic banks. For example, domestic banks need only 
100 million yuan in registered capital to establish an urban 
commercial bank.\82\ Foreign banks seeking to establish a 
market presence through a wholly foreign-owned or joint venture 
bank must have at least 300 million yuan in registered 
capital.\83\ In addition, Chinese regulations, consistent with 
China's WTO services schedule, provide that these banks must 
have total assets of at least US$10 billion.\84\ Finally, a 
wholly foreign-owned bank must have had a representative office 
in China for at least two years.\85\ Even if a foreign bank 
meets these requirements, it is restricted to conducting 
foreign currency business with a limited category of clients, 
unless it meets higher registered capital requirements.\86\
    The prudential thresholds to establish a branch are much 
higher for wholly foreign-funded banks or joint venture banks 
than for domestic commercial banks.\87\ A wholly foreign-funded 
bank or joint venture applying to establish a branch must have 
three years of business operation experience in China, and have 
been profitable for two consecutive years before applying.\88\ 
In addition, Chinese law, consistent with its WTO services 
schedule, provides that a foreign bank applying to establish a 
branch in China must have at least US$20 billion in total 
assets.\89\ In its accession agreement, the Chinese government 
agreed that qualified foreign financial institutions could 
establish joint venture banks immediately after accession. The 
government currently caps total foreign investment in any 
single Chinese bank at 25 percent, however, with no single 
foreign investor allowed to hold more than 20 percent.\90\
    In December 2005, it was reported that a group of investors 
led by Citigroup had successfully bid for the right to 
negotiate to purchase an 85 percent stake in the Guangdong 
Development Bank, with Citigroup taking a 40 percent stake.\91\ 
This led to speculation and conflicting reports that Chinese 
authorities might be considering raising limits on foreign 
investment in Chinese banks.\92\ In April 2006, however, 
China's state-run media reported that, ``It is certain that the 
banking regulatory agency will not let the ceiling be broken in 
this case.'' \93\ The same month, the CBRC sent a letter to the 
Guangdong provincial government saying: ``The case of Guangdong 
Development Bank has been looked into many times by the CBRC 
and other related administrations, and it is hard to break the 
present restrictions on foreign strategic investor issues.'' 
\94\ In July, Chinese-language news media in Hong Kong reported 
that Citigroup would lower its offer to below 20 percent.\95\
            Insurance
    According to the USTR's 2005 report on China's WTO 
compliance, opaque regulatory processes and overly burdensome 
licensing and operating requirements continue to hinder U.S. 
insurance companies' access to China's insurance market.\96\ In 
its accession agreement, the Chinese government agreed that it 
would phase out geographic restrictions on all types of 
insurance operations by 2004.\97\ The China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) approved life insurance operations 
for U.S. insurers in Beijing municipality, Suzhou city, and 
Tianjin municipality two years ahead of schedule, in Chongqing 
municipality one year ahead of schedule,\98\ and removed all 
geographic restrictions in 2004.\99\
    Foreign insurance companies may enter the Chinese market as 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries selling insurance policies 
other than life insurance, but foreign investment in domestic 
life insurance providers is capped at 51 percent,\100\ and the 
Chinese government does not plan to lift this restriction.\101\ 
To obtain a license, foreign insurance companies must have at 
least 30 years of experience in the insurance business, have 
had a representative office in China for no less than two 
years, and have no less than US$5 billion in total assets.\102\
    According to the USTR, every U.S. insurer that has applied 
to enter the China market has received a license.\103\ At the 
end of 2005, the CIRC had approved 40 overseas insurers, which 
operated 99 offices and held a combined market share of almost 
7 percent.\104\ In May 2006, the CIRC authorized subsidiaries 
of American International Group, Inc. to expand their 
businesses in Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces and to issue 
group contracts throughout China covering life insurance, 
personal accident and health insurance, and other 
products.\105\
    U.S. companie