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109th Congress                                                  S. Prt.
 1st Session             JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT                   109-33
_______________________________________________________________________
 
                    COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
                           PRACTICES FOR 2004

                               VOLUME II

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                            SUBMITTED TO THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                              U.S. SENATE

                                AND THE

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                 BY THE

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

     IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN 
                   ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

                                     
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>





                             SEPTEMBER 2005

 Printed for the use of the Committees on Foreign Relations of the U.S.
  Senate and International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives
  respectively

                                  ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

23-016 PDF             WASHINGTON : 2005
_________________________________________________________________
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                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                  RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island         PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia               CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota              JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio            RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire        BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska               BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
                 Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
              Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director

                                 ------                                

                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                   HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa                 TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey,    HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
  Vice Chairman                      GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana                  ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 
ELTON GALLEGLY, California               Samoa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California         ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
PETER T. KING, New York              BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado         ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas                      WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
DARRELL ISSA, California             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  BARBARA LEE, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin                EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY WELLER, Illinois               SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
MIKE PENCE, Indiana                  GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan       ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida            DIANE E. WATSON, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas               BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina   BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CONNIE MACK, Florida                 DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL McCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
         Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Staff Director/General Counsel
               Robert R. King, Democratic Staff Director

                                  (ii)














                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................    ix

Letter of Transmittal............................................    xi

Preface..........................................................  xiii

Overview and Acknowledgments.....................................    xv

Introduction.....................................................   xix

                                Volume I

Africa
    Angola.......................................................     1

    Benin........................................................    15

    Botswana.....................................................    24

    Burkina Faso.................................................    33

    Burundi......................................................    43

    Cameroon.....................................................    59

    Cape Verde...................................................    79

    Central African Republic.....................................    84

    Chad.........................................................    97

    Comoros......................................................   112

    Congo, Democratic Republic of the............................   117

    Congo, Republic of...........................................   143

    Cote d'Ivoire................................................   151

    Djibouti.....................................................   180

    Equatorial Guinea............................................   188

    Eritrea......................................................   199

    Ethiopia.....................................................   209

    Gabon........................................................   231

    Gambia, The..................................................   239

    Ghana........................................................   249

    Guinea.......................................................   266

    Guinea-Bissau................................................   278

    Kenya........................................................   284

    Lesotho......................................................   304

    Liberia......................................................   310

    Madagascar...................................................   321

    Malawi.......................................................   329

    Mali.........................................................   340

    Mauritania...................................................   349

    Mauritius....................................................   360

    Mozambique...................................................   366

    Namibia......................................................   380

    Niger........................................................   389

    Nigeria......................................................   398

    Rwanda.......................................................   420

    Sao Tome and Principe........................................   438

    Senegal......................................................   441

    Seychelles...................................................   451

    Sierra Leone.................................................   457

    Somalia......................................................   468

    South Africa.................................................   478

    Sudan........................................................   495

    Swaziland....................................................   513

    Tanzania.....................................................   522

    Togo.........................................................   547

    Uganda.......................................................   559

    Zambia.......................................................   577

    Zimbabwe.....................................................   592

East Asia and the Pacific
    Australia....................................................   615

    Brunei.......................................................   628

    Burma........................................................   636

    Cambodia.....................................................   664

    China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).........................   682

    China (Taiwan only)..........................................   755

    East Timor...................................................   769

    Fiji.........................................................   779

    Indonesia....................................................   786

    Japan........................................................   817

    Kiribati.....................................................   828

    Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................   832

    Korea, Republic of...........................................   843

    Laos.........................................................   855

    Malaysia.....................................................   869

    Marshall Islands.............................................   891

    Micronesia, Federated States of..............................   895

    Mongolia.....................................................   901

    Nauru........................................................   910

    New Zealand..................................................   914

    Palau........................................................   920

    Papua New Guinea.............................................   925

    Philippines..................................................   932

    Samoa........................................................   949

    Singapore....................................................   955

    Solomon Islands..............................................   972

    Thailand.....................................................   979

    Tonga........................................................  1000

    Tuvalu.......................................................  1004

    Vanuatu......................................................  1008

    Vietnam......................................................  1014

Europe and Eurasia

    Albania......................................................  1037

    Andorra......................................................  1052

    Armenia......................................................  1055

    Austria......................................................  1066

    Azerbaijan...................................................  1076

    Belarus......................................................  1095

    Belgium......................................................  1118

    Bosnia-Herzegovina...........................................  1126

    Bulgaria.....................................................  1146

    Croatia......................................................  1160

    Cyprus.......................................................  1178

    Czech Republic...............................................  1194

    Denmark......................................................  1205

    Estonia......................................................  1212

    Finland......................................................  1218

    France.......................................................  1223

    Georgia......................................................  1234

    Germany......................................................  1252

    Greece.......................................................  1266

    Hungary......................................................  1279

    Iceland......................................................  1293

    Ireland......................................................  1301

    Italy........................................................  1308

    Kazakhstan...................................................  1317

    Kyrgyz Republic..............................................  1339

    Latvia.......................................................  1356

    Liechtenstein................................................  1364

    Lithuania....................................................  1369

    Luxembourg...................................................  1380

    Macedonia....................................................  1385

    Malta........................................................  1402

    Moldova......................................................  1407

    Monaco.......................................................  1421

    Netherlands, The.............................................  1425

    Norway.......................................................  1432

    Poland.......................................................  1436

    Portugal.....................................................  1450

    Romania......................................................  1456

    Russia.......................................................  1478

    San Marino...................................................  1526

    Serbia and Montenegro........................................  1529

    Slovak Republic..............................................  1571

    Slovenia.....................................................  1582

    Spain........................................................  1589

    Sweden.......................................................  1597

    Switzerland..................................................  1604

    Tajikistan...................................................  1616

    Turkey.......................................................  1629

    Turkmenistan.................................................  1656

    Ukraine......................................................  1670

    United Kingdom...............................................  1698

    Uzbekistan...................................................  1709

                               Volume II

Near East and North Africa

    Algeria......................................................  1733

    Bahrain......................................................  1750

    Egypt........................................................  1770

    Iran.........................................................  1793

    Iraq.........................................................  1816

    Israel and the occupied territories..........................  1830

    Jordan.......................................................  1865

    Kuwait.......................................................  1881

    Lebanon......................................................  1901

    Libya........................................................  1919

    Morocco......................................................  1926

    Western Sahara...............................................  1942

    Oman.........................................................  1945

    Qatar........................................................  1953

    Saudi Arabia.................................................  1963

    Syria........................................................  1979

    Tunisia......................................................  1995

    United Arab Emirates.........................................  2013

    Yemen........................................................  2027

South Asia

    Afghanistan..................................................  2043

    Bangladesh...................................................  2055

    Bhutan.......................................................  2071

    India........................................................  2079

    Maldives.....................................................  2112

    Nepal........................................................  2120

    Pakistan.....................................................  2140

    Sri Lanka....................................................  2158

Western Hemisphere

    Antigua and Barbuda..........................................  2173

    Argentina....................................................  2177

    Bahamas......................................................  2187

    Barbados.....................................................  2195

    Belize.......................................................  2200

    Bolivia......................................................  2208

    Brazil.......................................................  2219

    Canada.......................................................  2245

    Chile........................................................  2252

    Colombia.....................................................  2263

    Costa Rica...................................................  2292

    Cuba.........................................................  2302

    Dominica.....................................................  2321

    Dominican Republic...........................................  2325

    Ecuador......................................................  2341

    El Salvador..................................................  2352

    Grenada......................................................  2367

    Guatemala....................................................  2371

    Guyana.......................................................  2393

    Haiti........................................................  2403

    Honduras.....................................................  2419

    Jamaica......................................................  2436

    Mexico.......................................................  2444

    Nicaragua....................................................  2464

    Panama.......................................................  2480

    Paraguay.....................................................  2494

    Peru.........................................................  2505

    St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................  2523

    Saint Lucia..................................................  2528

    Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.............................  2532

    Suriname.....................................................  2537

    Trinidad and Tobago..........................................  2548

    Uruguay......................................................  2552

    Venezuela....................................................  2559

                               Appendixes

A.  Notes on Preparation of the Reports..........................  2579

B.  Reporting on Worker Rights...................................  2583

C.  Selected International Human Rights Conventions..............  2585

D.  Description of Conventions in Appendix C.....................  2593

E.  FY 2004 Selected U.S. Assistance Programs--Actual Obligations  2594

F.  60th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting 
  Record.........................................................  2605

G.  60th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting Table  2611

H.  United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.........  2615




















                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    The country reports on human rights practices contained 
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance 
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative 
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations 
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not. 
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the 
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance 
legislation.

                                  Richard G. Lugar,
                          Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.

                                     Henry J. Hyde,
                    Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

                                  (ix)

                                     

















                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                                     Washington, DC, March 31, 2005
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I 
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2004, prepared in compliance with sections 
116(d)(1) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we 
can provide any further information.
            Sincerely,
                                     Paul V. Kelly,
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosure.

                                  (xi)









                                     
                                PREFACE

                              ----------                              



                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

    In his second inaugural address, President Bush renewed 
America's commitment to stand for freedom and human dignity 
throughout the world:

          America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are 
        now one. From the day of our founding, we have 
        proclaimed that every man and woman on this earth has 
        rights, and dignity, and matchless value, because they 
        bear the image of the maker of heaven and earth. Across 
        the generations we have proclaimed the imperative of 
        self-government, because no one is fit to be a master, 
        and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these 
        ideals is the mission that created our nation. It is 
        the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the 
        urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the 
        calling of our time.
          So it is the policy of the United States to seek and 
        support the growth of democratic movements and 
        institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
        ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.

    The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices provide a key 
framework that the United States and others around the world 
use in assessing the state of human freedom and in marshalling 
efforts to advance it. The conscientious compiling of these 
reports equips us to more effectively stand against oppression 
and for human dignity and liberty. Our embassies and Washington 
staff work closely with local citizens, human rights and other 
organizations, and community leaders to identify, investigate, 
and verify information. These volumes, available in the 
languages of most of the world's peoples, foster discussion, 
promote advocacy, permit the measurement of progress, and show 
where improvements are needed.
    Over the last 12 months, we have worked closely with the 
international community to enable citizens in countries such as 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Ghana, Ukraine, and Afghanistan to make 
their votes truly count in selecting their governments. This 
fundamental right to effective suffrage opens the door for 
advancing a wide range of other rights, as the records in these 
countries have already begun to show.
    This 28th edition of our Country Reports turns our 
spotlight on 196 countries, ranging from the stoutest defenders 
to the worst violators of human dignity. We take seriously our 
responsibility to report as accurately, as sensitively, and as 
carefully as possible the information in these reports.
    The information contained in this report allows us to 
construct strategies for promoting freedom and individual 
liberty. In the coming month we will report on the specific 
steps we have taken over the past year to support human rights 
and democracy.
    Mindful of the diligent effort and widespread cooperation 
both within and outside the Department that has gone into 
preparing these reports, I am pleased to transmit the 
Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 2004 to the U.S. Congress.

                       Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State






















                     OVERVIEW AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

                              ----------                              


                      HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

                      Why the Reports Are Prepared

    This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department 
of State in compliance with Sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended. The law 
provides that the Secretary of State shall transmit to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate by February 25 ``a full and 
complete report regarding the status of internationally 
recognized human rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) 
in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) 
in all other foreign countries which are members of the United 
Nations and which are not otherwise the subject of a human 
rights report under this Act.'' We have also included reports 
on several countries that do not fall into the categories 
established by these statutes and that thus are not covered by 
the congressional requirement.
    The responsibility of the United States to speak out on 
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized 
in the early 1970s. In 1976, Congress enacted legislation 
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of 
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In 
1994, the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for 
Women's Rights. Congress has also written into law formal 
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into 
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance 
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an 
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only the 82 
countries receiving U.S. aid; this year 196 reports are 
submitted.

                      How the Reports Are Prepared

    In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen 
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections 
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to 
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts 
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of 
human rights and democracy. In 1994, the Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, reflecting both a 
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking 
issues of human rights, worker rights and democracy. The 2004 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices reflect a year of 
dedicated effort by hundreds of State Department, Foreign 
Service, and other U.S. Government employees.
    Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the 
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a 
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including 
government officials, jurists, armed forces sources, 
journalists, human rights monitors, academics, and labor 
activists. This information-gathering can be hazardous, and 
U.S. Foreign Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, 
under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate 
reports of human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to 
the aid of individuals at risk, such as political dissidents 
and human rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their 
governments.
    After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were 
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, in cooperation with other 
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate, 
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on 
their own sources of information. These included reports 
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign 
government officials, representatives from the United Nations 
and other international and regional organizations and 
institutions, experts from academia, and the media. Officers 
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee 
issues, military and police topics, women's issues, and legal 
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant 
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly and fairly 
as possible.
    The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for 
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, 
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve 
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private 
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized 
human rights.
    The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover 
internationally recognized individual, civil, political and 
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These rights include freedom from torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, from 
prolonged detention without charges, from disappearance or 
clandestine detention, and from other flagrant violations of 
the right to life, liberty and the security of the person.
    Universal human rights seek to incorporate respect for 
human dignity into the processes of government and law. All 
persons have the inalienable right to change their government 
by peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom 
of expression, association, assembly, movement and religion, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a 
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the 
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights, 
including the right of association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor, the status of child labor practices, and the minimum age 
for employment of children, and acceptable work conditions.
    Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the 
editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: 
Editor-in-Chief: Nadia Tongour; Deputy Editor-in-Chief: LeRoy 
G. Potts; Senior Advisors: Elizabeth Dugan, and Gretchen 
Birkle; Senior Editors: Cortney Dell, Dan Dolan, Stephen 
Eisenbraun, Leonel Miranda, Jennifer M. Pekkinen and Stan 
Ifshin; Editors: Joseph S. Barghout, Jonathan Bemis, Ryan J. 
Casteel, Sharon C. Cooke, Stuart Crampton, Frank B. Crump, 
Mollie Davis, Sajit Gandhi, Joan Garner, Solange Garvey, Jerome 
L. Hoganson, Victor Huser, Kari Johnstone, David T. Jones, 
Sandra J. Murphy, Daniel L. Nadel, Donald E. Parker, Gary V. 
Price, Elizabeth Ramborger, Peter Sawchyn, and Julie Turner; 
Assistant Editors: Lori Rothamel, Janet Mayland, Editorial 
Assistants: Gene Bigler, Kent Brokenshire, Sally I. Buikema, 
Lynda Walker-Johnson and Carol G. Finerty; Technical Support: 
Linda C. Hayes, Mancharee Junk, Alonzo Simmons, and Tanika N. 
Willis.
 INTRODUCTION TO THE COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004

    On September 17, 2002, President Bush presented a new 
National Security Strategy for the United States based on the 
principle that promoting political and economic freedom and 
respect for human dignity will build a safer and better world. 
To guide and focus the national effort that had grown out of 
the war on terrorism, the strategy outlined a series of 
fundamental tasks which, among others, required our Government 
to champion aspirations for human rights and build democracy. 
In his second inaugural address on January 20, 2005, President 
Bush elaborated on that principle: ``The survival of liberty in 
our land depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The 
best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in 
all the world.''
    The United States and its international partners worked 
with many countries during 2004 to expand freedom by helping to 
protect the political rights of their citizens and to advance 
the rule of law in their societies. In a few cases, where 
concerns centered on the rights of the people to choose their 
own governments, dramatic developments focused global attention 
on their struggles and landmark achievements.
    In the past three years since the removal of the Taliban 
regime, the people of Afghanistan have worked to diminish 
terrorism and improve security; to bridge traditional ethnic, 
religious, and tribal divides; to craft a new constitution 
faithful to their values and way of life; to extend fundamental 
rights to women and minorities; and to open their society to 
unprecedented political competition and freedom of expression. 
The international community responded to this undertaking by 
helping to register voters across a geographically scattered, 
largely illiterate population; by educating cadres of Afghan 
election workers and political participants in the conduct of 
elections and campaigns and by joining with Afghan forces to 
provide security during pre-election preparations and during 
the actual voting. In the presidential election, which took 
place in October, 18 candidates vied for the votes of the 10 
million registered Afghans, more than 40 percent of whom were 
women. Despite threats and attacks before the vote and serious 
technical challenges, more than 8 million Afghans--including 
more than 3.2 million women--cast ballots to choose their 
leader in a truly democratic election for the first time, with 
a majority selecting President Hamid Karzai.
    In Ukraine, the presidential election campaign was marred 
by government pressure on opposition candidates and by 
widespread violations and fraud during the voting. The Kuchma 
government engaged in fraud and manipulation during the 
presidential election in both the first and second round of 
voting on October 31 and November 21. The Government censored 
media outlets and journalists to influence news coverage, which 
sparked the so-called ``journalist rebellion'' among reporters 
who refused to follow government directives. Eventually, 
popular demonstrations against the official results of the 
flawed November 21 vote gradually swelled into an ``Orange 
Revolution,'' the campaign color associated with opposition 
leader Viktor Yushchenko, who was widely believed to have won 
the election.
    Respect for human rights in Ukraine took a decided turn for 
the better when, on December 3, the country's Supreme Court 
invalidated the runoff election as fraudulent, vindicating the 
observations of many domestic and international monitors about 
numerous violations of electoral procedures, harassment of 
opposition candidates, heavily biased coverage in government-
controlled media, and widespread voting and counting fraud. In 
the court-mandated repeat election on December 26, the people 
of Ukraine selected their new President. International 
observers of that vote, won by Yushchenko, noted the 
improvements in media coverage, increase in transparency of the 
voting process, decrease in government pressure to support a 
particular candidate, and fewer disruptions at the polls. The 
new President expressed a strong commitment to democracy, the 
rule of law, and observance of human rights.
    In Iraq, people faced a series of difficult tasks as they 
prepared to choose their own leader through democratic 
elections, while the severity and ubiquity of terrorist attacks 
expanded the dimensions of the challenges. First, the Iraqi 
Governing Council achieved consensus on a framework for the 
transition of sovereignty back to Iraqi authorities under the 
aegis of the rule of law and clearly defined procedures by 
which Iraq's citizens would be able to choose their own 
authorities and construct their own constitutional order. In 
March, the approval of the Transitional Administrative Law 
(TAL) achieved these objectives and paved the way for the 
second step, the transition of sovereignty from the Coalition 
Provisional Authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on 
June 28.
    Working with the assistance of the United Nations and other 
international advisors, the IIG established the Independent 
Electoral Commission of Iraq, an independent election authority 
that established procedures for registration of and voting by 
Iraqis and expatriates in 14 other countries. On August 15-18, 
the National Conference convened and elected a 100-member 
Interim National Council. Elections for the Transitional 
National Assembly, the country's legislative authority and the 
first step in the formation of an Iraqi Transitional 
Government, were scheduled to take place on January 30, 2005. 
According to the TAL, the transitional government will draft a 
permanent constitution that is to be ratified by August 2005, 
and new elections are to be held for a permanent government 
under that Constitution by December 2005.
    We believe events like these elections will increase the 
prospects for peace, provide a solid grounding for self-
government in these countries and help create momentum for the 
improvement of human rights practices for all people 
participating in them. Yet progress along this path will not be 
easy or rapid, at least at first, as the 196 detailed reports 
in this volume amply demonstrate. In a number of cases, these 
reports will show that human rights practices may actually have 
eroded despite the successful completion of internationally 
accepted elections, as has occurred in some respects with the 
judiciary and the media since the voting that took place last 
year in Venezuela.
    It was in part the recognition of the complexity and 
difficulty of the task of promoting human rights that led 
Congress in 1977 to institutionalize the Department of State's 
process of compiling these annual Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices. By providing this compendium of witness to 
the global human rights experience, we hope that the record of 
this work in progress will help illuminate both future tasks 
and the potential for greater cooperation in advancing the 
aspirations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

         The Year in Review: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

    Behind the detail of 196 country reports contained in the 
pages that follow, the developments and experiences in certain 
countries stand out due not only to the intensity of the human 
rights problems but also to our involvement with the victims 
and their governments during 2004.
    The Government of Sudan's human rights record remained 
extremely poor as it continued to restrict freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, association, religion and movement. It 
arrested and harassed those who exercised these rights.
    At year's end, there were more than 1.5 million Internally 
Displaced Person (IDPs) in the Sudanese Province of Darfur, and 
another 200,000 civilians had fled to Chad, where the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) coordinated a massive refugee 
relief effort. Approximately 70,000 people reportedly died as a 
result of the violence and forced displacement.
    Despite the Government's repeated commitments to refrain 
from further violence in Darfur, the atrocities continued. 
Government and government-supported militias known as the 
Jinjaweed routinely attacked civilian villages. Typically, the 
Jinjaweed, often in concert with regular government forces, 
conducted attacks under cover of military aerial support. In 
September, after carefully reviewing a detailed study conducted 
by independent experts covering the experience of more than 
1,100 refugees, Secretary of State Colin Powell concluded that 
genocide had been committed against the people of Darfur, 
saying that ``Genocide has been committed in Darfur and that 
the Government of Sudan and Jinjaweed bear responsibility and 
that genocide may still be occurring.''
    Government forces in that region routinely killed, injured, 
and displaced civilians, and destroyed clinics and dwellings 
intentionally during offensive operations. There were confirmed 
reports that government-supported militia also intentionally 
attacked civilians, looted their possessions, and destroyed 
their villages.
    At the same time, year-end developments in negotiations 
related to the North-South conflict provided hope for peace and 
improvement of human rights practices in other areas of Sudan. 
By year's end, the State Department saw significant movement on 
the preliminary accords between the Government and the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement Army after 21 years of low 
intensity conflict.
    In response to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's 
(North Korea) continued brutal and repressive treatment of its 
people, the United States Congress enacted the North Korea 
Human Rights Act of 2004. The Act seeks to address the serious 
human rights situation in North Korea and to promote durable 
solutions for North Korean refugees, transparency in provision 
of humanitarian assistance, a free flow of information, and a 
peaceful reunification on the Korean peninsula.
    In Belarus, police abuse and occasional torture of 
prisoners and detainees continued. The security forces 
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens for political 
reasons; in addition, individuals were sued and sentenced to 
jail terms for such political crimes as ``defamation'' of state 
officials, often interpreted to include criticism of their 
policies. The Government of Belarus persisted in discounting 
credible reports regarding the role of government officials in 
the long-term disappearances of a journalist and well-known 
opposition political figures and failed to conduct full, 
transparent investigations into these disappearances. Instead, 
the Government appointed Viktor Sheiman, linked to 
disappearances by credible evidence in a Council of Europe 
report, as Head of the Presidential Administration, thus 
perpetuating a climate of abuse with impunity.
    In Burma, the Junta ruled by decree and was not bound by 
any constitutional provisions providing any fundamental rights. 
Security forces carried out extrajudicial killings. In 
addition, disappearances continued, and security forces raped, 
tortured, beat, and otherwise abused prisoners and detainees. 
Arbitrary arrests and incommunicado detention were frequent. 
Security forces also regularly infringed on citizens' privacy, 
forcibly relocated populations, and conscripted child soldiers.
    The Government of Iran was responsible for numerous 
killings during the year, including executions following trials 
that lacked due process. There were numerous reports that 
security forces tortured prisoners and detainees. Additionally, 
there were arbitrary arrests, extended incommunicado detention, 
poor and overcrowded prisons, lack of access to counsel, 
punishment by the lash, and violation of personal privacy.
    China's cooperation and progress on human rights during 
2004 was disappointing. China failed to fulfill many of the 
commitments it made at the 2002 U.S.-China Human Rights 
Dialogue. However, at the end of the year, working level 
discussions on human rights, which had been suspended when the 
U.S. supported a resolution on China's human rights practices 
at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), were resumed. 
During 2004, the government continued to arrest and detain 
activists, such as individuals discussing freely on the 
Internet, defense lawyers advocating on behalf of dissidents 
and the dispossessed, activists arguing for HIV/AIDs issues, 
journalists reporting on SARS, intellectuals expressing 
political views, persons attending house churches, and workers 
protesting for their rights. Abuses continued in Chinese 
prisons. The Government continued its crackdown against the 
Falun Gong spiritual movement, and tens of thousands of 
practitioners remained incarcerated in prisons, extrajudicial 
reeducation-through-labor camps, and psychiatric facilities. 
The National People's Congress amended the Constitution to 
include protection of human rights, yet it is unclear to what 
extent the Government plans to implement this amendment.
    In Saudi Arabia, there were positive developments in a few 
areas, including a government-sponsored conference on women's 
rights and obligations and the formation of the first formal 
human rights organization permitted in the Kingdom. In October, 
the Government issued an executive by-law entitling some long-
term residents to apply for citizenship, and by year's end, 
voter and candidate registration, albeit only for men, was well 
advanced for municipal elections scheduled for February 2005.
    The record of human rights abuses and violations for Saudi 
Arabia, however, still far exceeds the advances. There were 
credible reports of torture and abuse of prisoners by security 
forces, arbitrary arrests, and incommunicado detentions. The 
religious police continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain 
citizens and foreigners. Most trials were closed, and 
defendants usually appeared before judges without legal 
counsel. Security forces arrested and detained reformers. The 
Government continued to restrict freedoms of speech and press, 
assembly, association and movement, and there were reports that 
the Government infringed on individuals' privacy rights. 
Violence and discrimination against women, violence against 
children, discrimination against ethnic and religious 
minorities, and strict limitations on worker rights continued.
    In contrast to developments in a number of countries that 
increased direct citizen control over government authorities, 
in Russia changes in parliamentary election laws and a shift to 
the appointment, instead of election, of regional governors 
further strengthened the power of the executive branch. Greater 
restrictions on the media, a compliant Duma (Parliament), 
shortcomings in recent national elections, law enforcement 
corruption, and political pressure on the judiciary also raised 
concerns about the erosion of government accountability. 
Racially motivated violence and discrimination increased, 
despite considerable legislative prohibitions. Authorities 
failed to investigate actions against minorities while 
subjecting them to more frequent document checks, targeting 
them for deportation from urban centers, and fining them in 
excess of permissible penalties or detaining them more 
frequently. Government institutions intended to protect human 
rights were relatively weak.
    The Government of Zimbabwe has conducted a concerted 
campaign of violence, repression, and intimidation. This 
campaign has been marked by disregard for human rights, the 
rule of law, and the welfare of Zimbabwe's citizens. Torture by 
various methods is used against political opponents and human 
rights advocates. War veterans, youth brigades, and police 
officers act with sustained brutality against political 
enemies. The Mugabe regime has also targeted other institutions 
of government, including the judiciary and police. Judges have 
been harassed into submission or resignation, replaced by 
Mugabe's cronies. The news media have been restricted and 
suppressed, with offending journalists arrested and beaten. 
Land seizures continue to be used as a tool for political and 
social oppression, and opponents of these destructive policies 
are subject to violent reprisals.
    Respect for human rights remained poor in Venezuela during 
2004, despite the Government victory in an August referendum to 
recall President Chavez. Opponents charged that the process was 
fraudulent, but Organization of American States (OAS) and 
Carter Center observers found that the official results 
``reflected the will of the electorate.'' Throughout the year, 
the Government increased its control over the judicial system 
and its interference in the administration of justice. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were subject to threats 
and intimidation by government supporters. In December, the 
legislature passed laws that erode freedom of the media, 
freedom of speech, and which in effect make criticism of the 
government a criminal offense. The U.S. Government sanctioned 
the Venezuelan Government for continuing to fall short in 
efforts to combat trafficking in persons.
    Fidel Castro added another year to his record as the 
longest serving dictator in the world. The Government retained 
its stance of rejection of all democratic processes and 
continued its harassment and intimidation of pro-democracy 
activists, dissidents, journalists and other professionals and 
workers seeking to undertake economic activities not controlled 
by the state. The majority of the 75 dissidents sentenced to 
long jail terms in 2003 remained incarcerated despite 
international protests, and the authorities arrested 22 
additional human rights activists and sentenced them for acts 
such as ``contempt for authority.'' Addressing abuses in Cuba 
continued to be a priority for the United States as a member of 
the UNCHR.
    During its 2004 session, the UNCHR formally adopted a U.S.-
sponsored resolution on Cuba, as well as resolutions on 
Turkmenistan, North Korea and Belarus for the second year in a 
row. A resolution on Burma was approved by consensus. With such 
member countries as Zimbabwe, Cuba, Sudan, and China, which 
fail to protect their own citizens' rights, the 2004 session of 
the UNCHR fell short in several respects. The Commission failed 
to adopt resolutions on the human rights situations in China, 
Zimbabwe and Chechnya. The United States continued to emphasize 
the need to improve the functioning of the Commission, 
especially by supporting the inclusion of more countries with 
positive human rights records.
    The United States believes that democratically elected 
governments are more likely to respect their citizens' human 
rights. For this reason, the United States collaborated with 
other participating countries of the Community of Democracies 
(CD), a network of democratic countries working together to 
promote, solidify, and advance democracy throughout the world. 
In 2004, the U.S. joined other CD countries to help launch the 
formation of a democracy caucus, a group of like-minded 
countries that coordinates more closely in the UNCHR and other 
UN settings to advance goals consistent with democratic values. 
At the UNCHR, the United States--jointly with Peru, Romania and 
East Timor--introduced and succeeded in having adopted a 
resolution to enhance the UN's role in promoting democracy. 
Among the resolution's recommendations is a call for the 
establishment of a mechanism--a ``Focal Point''--within the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, dedicated to 
helping new and emerging democracies access UN resources 
available to support them.
    In addition to its support for the creation of the UN 
democracy caucus, the CD sought to support the development of 
democratic institutions and values through projects linking 
democratic countries. It sent a multinational delegation of 
democracy practitioners to East Timor to share best practices 
with Timorese officials. Likewise, a group of Iraqi, election-
related officials traveled from Iraq to Lithuania to observe 
and learn about election processes. Unifying democratic voices 
against violations of basic human rights--rights that have been 
codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and that 
were reaffirmed in the CD's Warsaw Declaration and Seoul Plan 
of Action--is an essential way to maintain pressure on 
governments that deny and violate the rights of their own 
citizens.

                         INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

    In Qatar, the process of constitutional change continued 
with the Emir's approval of the draft of a new constitution 
that voters overwhelmingly had approved in 2003. Although the 
Emir's family will maintain hereditary rule, the new 
constitution expected to be enacted in June 2005, contains a 
number of human rights provisions.
    In Pakistan, President Musharraf continued as Chief of the 
Army Staff, despite his promise to step down by year's end.
    In Africa, the Central African Republic (CAR) enacted a new 
constitution and took a number of other steps to further an 
announced transition to democracy under President Bozize, who 
seized power in a March 2003 coup. In Guinea-Bissau, following 
a military coup in September 2003, the military installed a 
civilian government. In both cases, the stabilization of post-
coup situations has been accompanied by a decline in the number 
of reported violations of human rights.
    Turkey's desire to meet the EU Copenhagen Criteria to begin 
the accession process moved the Government to pass an important 
package of reforms, including a new, relatively more liberal 
penal code and a set of constitutional amendments to combat 
honor killings and torture; expand the freedom of religion, 
expression, and association; and reduce the role of the 
military in government. However, implementation of these 
reforms lagged. Security forces continued to commit numerous 
abuses, including torture, beatings, and arbitrary arrest and 
detention, although observers noted a decrease in such 
practices and the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture reported that local authorities were making efforts to 
comply with the Government's "zero tolerance" policy on 
torture. Honor killings continued. The Government relaxed some 
restrictions on the use of Kurdish and other languages, but 
restrictions on free speech and the press remained.
    The year witnessed increasing efforts by some governments 
to fight corruption. Costa Rica was the most ambitious in 
actually investigating former high-level officials, as it 
launched separate investigations for misuse of funds, 
kickbacks, and illegal contracts by three former presidents. In 
Africa, anti-corruption campaigns focused on pecuniary as well 
as human rights abuses by officials. Gambian President Jammeh's 
campaign centered on curbing official corruption to restore 
international credibility, and the work of the Commission of 
Inquiry led to the dismissal of a number of top officials and 
some prosecutions for economic crimes. Kenya created an anti-
corruption czar, and the Government opened a number of 
investigations into allegations of extrajudicial killings. In 
Zambia, a Police Complaints Authority instituted in 2003 to 
combat police misconduct continued investigations into 
complaints.

                            POLITICAL RIGHTS

    Regrettably, with the exception of Georgia and Ukraine, 
political developments in Eurasia remain a serious concern. 
Progress continues to be measured largely in terms of civil 
society development. More and more NGOs, opposition parties, 
and citizens are willing to organize and advocate for 
government accountability. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
opposition parties are unable to register. At the same time, 
governments of the regions are drawing the wrong lessons from 
Ukraine and Georgia and attempt to stifle civil society by 
harassing democracy NGOs through bureaucratic obstacles and 
specious legal means.
    In Georgia, the progress that international observers noted 
in last January's presidential election set the stage for ``the 
most democratic elections in Georgia's history'' in 
parliamentary voting in March. Other governments in the region 
have made some limited progress in improving electoral 
processes by drafting new election codes. New election laws 
introduced in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are an 
improvement in some areas, but in all three countries, the laws 
continue to fall short of international standards. Likewise, 
elections in 2004 in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan marked limited 
improvements over previous ones, but domestic and international 
observers raised questions about voting irregularities, abuse 
or harassment of opposition candidates, or limitations on equal 
access to the media.
    In Belarus, the Government continued to deny citizens the 
right to change their government through a democratic political 
process. A seriously flawed referendum on October 17 removed 
constitutional term limits on the presidency. In advance of the 
referendum and the equally flawed parliamentary elections held 
simultaneously, the Government suspended independent newspapers 
and disqualified many parliamentary candidates. The Government 
used excessive force and in some cases beat and arrested 
political leaders who peacefully protested electoral fraud and 
the journalists covering the protests. During the year, the 
Government also shut down a number of major registered NGOs 
that focused on political rights, and state security 
authorities increasingly harassed those that remained.
    In October, Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first self-
administered municipal elections since the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Accords. The elections were judged to meet 
international democratic standards.
    A notably high voter turnout in a series of three elections 
in Indonesia paved the way for the transition in political 
power there from a defeated incumbent to an elected opposition 
leader. The process also marked the defeat of military and 
police candidates who stood for seats in Parliament. In 
noteworthy elections in Africa, the incumbent political parties 
of Ghana and Mozambique gained re-election in processes that 
were judged generally free and fair. Sierra Leone held its 
first local government elections in 32 years, although there 
were irregularities in some areas.
    In Burundi, concern focused on the delay in holding 
elections and the progress of the country's transition to 
democracy. The Transitional Government failed to hold the local 
and national elections that are stipulated by the Arusha Peace 
and Reconciliation Agreement, and at the end of the year it 
also delayed indefinitely a referendum on a draft constitution. 
The Maoist insurgency and the deadlock among Nepal's political 
parties also prevented the holding of elections there during 
the year and helped deepen the country's political crisis.
    In Rwanda, greatly circumscribed political rights were 
further limited when leading human rights organizations were 
either shut down or effectively dismantled. The action was 
justified as part of a campaign against ``divisionism,'' 
according to a government report that accused human rights 
groups, journalists, teachers, and churches of promoting an 
``ideology of genocide.''
    The Iranian Government's respect for the freedom and 
political participation of its citizens continued to 
deteriorate. Elections that were widely perceived as neither 
free nor fair were held for the 290-seat Majlis (Parliament) in 
February. The conservative, cleric-dominated Guardian Council 
excluded virtually all reformist candidates, including 85 
incumbent members of parliament. Reasons cited included not 
showing "demonstrated obedience" to the current system of 
government. As a result of the seriously-flawed elections, 
reformers were reduced to a small minority of the parliament. 
Meanwhile, the conservative backlash against reformist trends 
and parties continues.

                      INTERNAL AND OTHER CONFLICTS

    The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone 
completed public hearings in which approximately 10,000 
citizens participated to air grievances as victims or provide 
confessions from the civil war. The Commission suggested legal, 
political and administrative reforms to the Government. The 
Government also released numerous children who had fought as 
child soldiers. By year's end, the UN Mission to Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) had handed over responsibility countrywide to the 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Sierra Leone Police, as 
UNAMSIL began preparations to withdraw by June 2005 as 
stipulated by its Security Council mandate.
    After being elected in a runoff at the end of 2003, 
Guatemalan President Oscar Berger ``re-launched'' the 1996 
Peace Accords as a national agenda and symbolically apologized 
to citizens on behalf of the State for human rights violations 
committed during that country's protracted civil war. The 
Government also reduced the size of the military, eliminated 
some major commands and units and reduced the military budget. 
In August, the military made public a new doctrine, which 
includes provisions on the importance of protecting human 
rights.
    As a result of negotiations throughout the year, the 
Government of Colombia demobilized approximately 3,000 fighters 
from the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
(AUC) in November and December. In addition, hundreds of 
municipal officials returned to their towns after the 
government established a permanent police presence in every 
urban center in the country. As a result, rates for homicides, 
kidnappings, and other violent crimes decreased.
    In Haiti, domestic conflict continued throughout the year. 
The political impasse, combined with increasing violence 
between pro- and anti-Aristide factions, culminated on February 
29, when President Aristide submitted his resignation and left 
the country. Despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, 
the constitutionally-established Interim Government remained 
weak. In September, pro-Aristide partisans in Port-au-Prince 
launched a campaign of destabilization and violence known as 
"Operation Baghdad." This campaign included kidnapping, 
decapitation and burning of police officers and civilians, 
indiscriminate shootings, and the destruction and incineration 
of public and private property. The violence prevented the 
normal functioning of schools, public markets, the seaport, and 
the justice system in Port-au-Prince for several weeks.
    A series of conflicts continued to trouble South Asia. In 
Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states of India, 
violence continued, and security forces committed abuses with 
impunity, killing civilians and not just armed combatants. In 
Sri Lanka, both the Government and the terrorist organization, 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, violated the ceasefire. In 
Nepal, the disappearance of persons in custody remained a very 
serious problem, and government security forces continued to 
have broad authority to arrest and detain individuals suspected 
of sympathizing with the Maoist insurgents. Security forces 
also used arbitrary and unlawful lethal force. As the Maoist 
insurgency continued, rebel militants tortured civilians, while 
government agents forcibly conscripted children as soldiers and 
conducted bombings that killed civilians.
    The Great Lakes region of central Africa, which encompasses 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Burundi and 
Uganda, has been plagued by civil war, large-scale interethnic 
violence, and massive human rights abuses associated with them 
for well over a decade due to the continuing presence of armed 
groups and militia that move between the countries. These 
groups compete with one another for strategic and natural 
resources and inhabit an environment of shifting alliances. 
Among the most worrisome groups in the eastern Congo are those 
who took sanctuary in the region after the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. This same group continues to oppose the Government of 
Rwanda and launch cross-border campaigns, as well as attack 
civilians in the DRC and commit numerous other abuses. There 
are also armed groups in the region who oppose the governments 
and peace process in Uganda and Burundi.
    While prospects for peace in the Great Lakes region are 
promising, human rights abuses are almost routine. Children are 
the primary victims and are forcefully recruited, abducted, and 
turned into soldiers, although some of the governments have 
made progress in demobilizing child soldiers in their ranks. 
Some militia groups are predominantly comprised of children. 
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable, as rape 
increasingly is used as a weapon of war. The region is a home 
to approximately five million of the world's 25 million 
internally displaced persons and hosts a number of refugees. 
The United States is actively pursuing talks between the DRC, 
Uganda and Rwanda. We continue to monitor the situation in all 
the countries in the region by focusing attention on the threat 
posed by armed groups.
    In Cote d'Ivoire, an attack on the rebel positions and an 
air strike on French peacekeeping troops in November broke the 
tenuous 18-month ceasefire between the Government and rebels. 
Despite the embargo and threat of sanctions, the Government has 
threatened to pursue a military solution to the conflict. 
President Bush determined that Cote d'Ivoire, once one of the 
United States' largest trading partners in the region through 
the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), was ineligible 
for AGOA this year due to concerns about the security situation 
and the general decline in the rule of law that make it a 
hostile place for foreign investment.
    In Russia, the September attack on a school in Beslan in 
North Osettia and the ongoing disappearances of civilians 
detained by security forces underscored the extent to which 
both sides in the expanding conflict in the North Caucasus 
continue to demonstrate little respect for basic human rights. 
There were credible reports of serious violations, including 
politically motivated disappearances and unlawful killings, by 
both the government and Chechen rebels. Individuals seeking 
accountability for these abuses also continued to be targeted, 
and Chechen rebels continued to attack Russian civilians, 
including a bombing of a Moscow subway.

                        INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON

    After years of controversy, the Chilean Supreme Court 
upheld an appeals court decision to lift the judicial immunity 
of former President Augusto Pinochet. On December 13, a 
prosecuting judge indicted Pinochet for crimes committed as 
part of ``Operation Condor'' during the 1970s. In Central 
African Republic as the process of transition to civilian rule 
continued, the government disbanded the Security Investigation 
Division, a military intelligence unit that was accused of 
committing numerous human rights abuses, including torture, 
rape and extortion, during 2003. In December 2003, President 
Bozize reconvened the permanent military tribunal after an 
eight-year suspension. The tribunal considered cases on a 
variety of alleged human rights abuses including extrajudicial 
killings, rape and armed robbery.
    North Korea remains one of the world's most repressive and 
brutal regimes. An estimated 150,000-200,000 persons are 
believed to be political prisoners in detention camps in remote 
areas, and defectors report that many prisoners have died from 
torture, starvation, disease, exposure, or a combination of 
causes. The regime also subjects citizens to rigid controls 
over many aspects of their lives.
    In Egypt, the 1981 Emergency Law, extended in February 2003 
for an additional three years, restricted many basic rights. 
The security forces continued to mistreat and torture 
prisoners, which resulted in at least ten reported deaths in 
custody at police stations or prisons during the year. 
Arbitrary arrest and detention and prolonged pretrial detention 
remained serious problems. Dismal prison conditions persisted.
    Widespread use of torture by the Government of Syria 
resulted in at least eight deaths during the year. Arbitrary 
arrest and detention, prolonged pre-trial detention without 
trial, fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts, and 
deteriorating prison conditions all persisted. Throughout the 
year, the security services conducted mass arrests of Kurds in 
Hassakeh province, Aleppo, Damascus, and other areas. On March 
12, security forces in Qamishli, in the northeastern Hassakeh 
province, opened fire on a crowd at a soccer match after 
clashes between Arab and Kurdish fans erupted. In the days of 
rioting that followed, dozens were killed, as many as 2,000 
Kurds were detained, and nearly 300 Kurds remained in custody 
and were awaiting trial before the State Security Court and 
Military Court at year's end. The Government also continued to 
withhold information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons 
who have been held incommunicado for years.
    In Uzbekistan, torture was routine in prisons, pretrial 
facilities, and local police and security service precincts, 
and members of the security forces responsible for documented 
abuses were rarely punished. However, the government took some 
notable steps to address torture and establish police 
accountability. It created preliminary procedures within some 
divisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for investigating 
and disciplining officers for human rights abuses and allowed 
NGO access to its prisons and to train prison guards in human 
rights practices. The Government also cooperated with 
international forensic experts to take part in investigations 
of deaths in custody in which torture had been alleged.

                          FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

    A conservative backlash to democratic demands in Iran 
extended into a number of areas beyond explicit questions of 
political rights. For example, the investigation into the 2003 
death of a Canadian/Iranian photographer who suffered a brain 
hemorrhage after sustaining injuries while in an Iranian prison 
stagnated during 2004. The Government also gradually suppressed 
all independent domestic media outlets and arrested or 
intimidated their journalists into silence. In 2004 the last 
forum for free debate, weblogs, came under pressure when the 
government began arresting their creators and forcing them to 
sign false confessions. The increase in government pressure and 
control of media in Russia continued to weaken freedom of 
expression and independence of the media there, as a trend of 
increasing control and harassment of the press was noted in a 
number of Eurasian countries, especially Belarus and some 
countries in Central Asia. The Russian approach centered on use 
of controlling ownership of broadcast media to limit access to 
information on sensitive issues, such as Chechnya. Government 
pressure also increased self-censorship of journalists.
    In Togo, after the Government undertook formal political 
consultations with the European Union, it adopted a new press 
code with mixed results. It eliminated prison sentences for 
most journalistic offenses, but maintained them for inciting 
certain actions, such as ethnic hatred or violation of the law, 
as well as for publishing under a false name. The law also sets 
standards of professionalism for journalists and requires 
independent newspapers to ensure that at least one third of 
their staff meet the Government's standards.
    While Algeria experienced its first contested democratic 
election in 2004, leading to the reelection of President 
Bouteflika, the Government acted to increase restrictions on 
the media. The use of defamation laws and government harassment 
of the press significantly increased, leading to the 
imprisonment of several journalists for terms from two to 24 
months, closure or suspension of two newspapers, and more self-
censorship by the press.
    In Venezuela, international organizations and domestic 
journalists charged the government with encouraging a climate 
of hostility toward the media. Administrative acts, combined 
with a new law passed in December, created a climate of 
hostility toward the independent media with increasing threats 
of prosecution.

                          FREEDOM OF RELIGION

    These issues are discussed in depth in the Annual Report on 
International Religious Freedom, released in September 2004, 
while these Country Reports further highlight and update 
important developments.
    The International Religious Freedom Act requires that those 
countries that engage in particularly severe violations of 
religious freedom be designated as Countries of Particular 
Concern (CPC). In September 2004, the Secretary of State re-
designated Burma, China, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan as CPCs, 
and designated for the first time Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, and 
Vietnam.
    With the cessation of government-sponsored violations of 
religious freedom under Saddam Hussein, the Secretary acted to 
remove Iraq's CPC designation in June 2004. Since the 
liberation of Iraq by coalition forces, there have been no 
governmental impediments to religious freedom, and the Iraqi 
Transitional Administrative Law provides for ``freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice.''
    The Government of Saudi Arabia's actions in the area of 
religious freedom were disappointing. Throughout 2004, senior 
U.S. officials engaged Saudi authorities in an intense 
discussion of religious practices, and in September, the 
Secretary of State designated Saudi Arabia as a "Country of 
Particular Concern" under the International Religious Freedom 
Act for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. 
The Government rigidly mandates religious conformity. Non-
Wahabi Sunni Muslims, as well as Shia and Sufi Muslims, face 
discrimination and sometimes severe restrictions on the 
practice of their faith. A number of leaders from these 
traditions have been arrested and imprisoned. The government 
prohibits public non-Muslim religious activities. Non-Muslim 
worshippers risk arrest, imprisonment, torture, or deportation 
for engaging in religious activities that attract official 
attention. There were frequent instances in which mosque 
preachers, whose salaries are paid by the government, used 
violent language against non-Sunni Muslims and other religions 
in their sermons.
    Vietnam continued to restrict freedom of religion and the 
operation of religious organizations other than those approved 
by the State. The Government failed to issue a nationwide 
decree banning forced renunciations of faith, did not end the 
physical abuse of religious believers, continued to hold a 
significant number of religious prisoners, and although it 
permitted the re-opening of some churches closed in the Central 
Highlands in 2001, it refused to allow the re-opening and 
registration of hundreds of others. However, following CPC 
designation, some improvements in religious freedom were 
evident. Some religious leaders expressed cautious optimism 
about a new Ordinance on Religion that the Government released 
in November, and in December, the Evangelical Church of Vietnam 
North (ECVN) held its first National Congress in 20 years and 
named a new, independent leadership board. Among the gains in 
freedom of religion covered by the Country Reports, the 
Jehovah's Witnesses in Armenia succeeded in October to register 
with the government after they had experienced a string of 
rejected applications. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a new state-
level law on religious freedom passed both houses of the 
legislature. The law provides comprehensive rights to religious 
communities and confers a legal status upon them they had not 
held previously. And in Georgia, there were fewer reports of 
violence against minority religious groups this year.

              TREATMENT OF MINORITIES, WOMEN AND CHILDREN

    On December 30, the Department of State completed its 
Report on Global Anti-Semitism, July 1, 2003-December 15, 2004. 
Drawing extensively on material from our embassies, NGOs and 
accounts submitted for these Country Reports, this separate 
compendium was prepared in accordance with a separate 
legislative provision.
    In the Czech and Slovak Republics, discrimination against 
Roma persisted, although both governments made efforts to 
improve the situation through such measures as revising legal 
norms and recruiting Roma to serve as community liaisons with 
the police forces or as health assistants.
    In Croatia, the restitution of property to mostly Serb 
refugees has improved significantly, although local obstruction 
to the return of minority groups remained a problem. In Kosovo, 
acts of violence against the minority Kosovo Serb population 
and other non-Serb minorities took place during a series of 
riots over two days in March, demonstrating the continued 
tenuousness of minority rights there.
    In Thailand, the government's human rights record was 
marred by abuses committed by security forces against Muslim 
dissidents in the southern part of the country. On April 28, 
elements of the police and military killed more than 100 
persons while repelling attacks by Muslim separatists in Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. On October 25, 78 Muslim 
detainees being transported to an army camp died from 
asphyxiation after police and military forces stacked them into 
overcrowded truck beds.
    In Afghanistan and Iraq, women made unprecedented strides 
in exercising political rights by voting, holding public office 
and standing for election as candidates. In education and other 
areas as well, women made increasing strides in achieving basic 
rights. In Pakistan, special women's police stations with all 
female staff have been established in response to complaints of 
custodial abuse of women. Additionally, while honor killings 
continued in Pakistan, new legislation stiffened penalties for 
honor killings and criminal proceedings for the blasphemy laws 
and Hudood ordinances were changed to reduce abuses.
    In a number of countries, one of the most significant 
problems related to the abuse of women and children is the 
failure of the state to combat vigorously against conditions 
that engender the trafficking of women and children.
    In Burma, women and girls from villages were trafficked for 
prostitution at truck stops, fishing villages, border towns, 
and mining and military camps. Burmese men, women and children 
are also trafficked to other countries. Government economic 
mismanagement and forced labor policies worsen the situation.
    In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), women and girls are used 
as prostitutes and domestic servants, and young boys are 
exploited as camel jockeys. A recent documentary on camel 
jockeys notes the very young age at which abuse often begins, 
the harsh conditions that may lead to serious injuries or 
death, and the malnutrition, and physical and sexual abuse by 
employers. The Government has pledged and taken some measures 
of limited effectiveness against these practices.
    State promotion of tourism drives the predatory interests 
that promote sex tourism and sexual exploitation of underage 
girls for prostitution in Cuba.
    The booming oil sector in Equatorial Guinea contributes to 
making the country both a transit point and destination for 
trafficking of women for prostitution.
    The estimate of the number of Indians trafficked into 
forced labor and the sex trade runs into the millions, in 
addition to thousands of Nepalis and Bangladeshis trafficked to 
India for sexual servitude. Trafficking in persons in India is 
a significant problem, and some government officials 
participated in and facilitated the practice. While India 
continues to lack a national law enforcement response to its 
trafficking in persons problem, some progress has been noted in 
individual states and the central government recently expressed 
a commitment to establishing and implementing a national anti-
trafficking policy.
    Violence and discrimination towards vulnerable groups 
continued to be a problem in Tanzania. In August, the semi-
autonomous island of Zanzibar outlawed homosexuality and set 
severe penalties for it in its autonomous island territory. On 
mainland Tanzania, 4 million women and girls have undergone 
female genital mutilation (FGM), and despite a law partially 
outlawing the practice, police rarely enforced the law and the 
average age of the practice appeared to have decreased in an 
effort to avoid detection.

                             WORKER RIGHTS

    In Iraq, the exercise of labor rights remained limited, 
largely due to violence, unemployment, and maladapted labor 
organizational structures and laws, although, with 
international assistance, some progress was underway at year's 
end. According to the Brussels-based International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), workers reported 
organizing unions in workplaces where they were forbidden under 
the laws of the former regime and revitalized union structures 
previously dominated by the Ba'ath party. The International 
Labor Organization (ILO) provided technical assistance to Iraq 
throughout the year to help bring its labor laws into line with 
international labor standards, rebuild the capacity of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, establish emergency 
employment services, and put in place training and skills 
development programs.
    In April, a Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 
26 of the ILO Constitution visited Belarus to investigate a 
complaint that the Government was systematically violating its 
obligations under the ILO's fundamental Conventions on freedom 
of association and protection of the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, both of which it has ratified. The 
Commission's report, issued in October, concluded that the 
country's trade union movement was subject to significant 
government interference. The Commission recommended that the 
government take all necessary steps to register independent 
unions, amend laws and decrees restricting freedom of 
association, protect independent trade unionists from anti-
union discrimination, and disseminate the Commission's 
conclusions and recommendations. It stated that most of these 
recommendations should be implemented by June 2005 at the 
latest.
    Under the leadership of President Bush the United States 
has stepped forward with its democratic allies to reaffirm our 
commitment to human rights and democracy. We rest upon the 
principle that nations governed by free people will be the 
cornerstone for the development of a world that is more 
peaceful for all. The execution of our democratic duty depends 
on the determination and passion of its promoters. Let the 
following Country Reports serve as an indicator of the progress 
made and as a guide for the challenges ahead.
                       NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                                ALGERIA

    Algeria is a multi-party republic based on a constitution and a 
presidential form of government. The head of state is elected by 
popular vote to a 5-year term. The President has the constitutional 
authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, as well as the prime 
minister, who acts as the head of the Government. The president also 
serves as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. President Bouteflika, 
elected in 1999 in an uncontested election, completed a full term in 
office, the first president to do so since the adoption of the multi-
party system in 1989. In Algeria's first democratic, contested 
presidential elections, he was re-elected in April from among five 
other candidates while the military remained neutral.
    The security apparatus comprises the army, consisting of ground, 
naval, and air defense forces; the national gendarmerie; the national 
police; communal guards; and local self-defense forces. All of these 
elements were involved in counterterrorism operations. The Ministry of 
National Defense and the Ministry of the Interior oversee the 
maintenance of order within the country. The military has traditionally 
influenced government decisions beyond defense and foreign policy and 
is widely believed to have orchestrated the outcome of the 1999 
presidential elections. More recently, however, with increased civic 
peace and the president's re-election, there has been a trend toward 
more civilian control, a reduced role for the military in day-to-day 
decision-making, and an increased military focus on modernization and 
professionalism. During the April elections, the Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff ordered all members of the military to maintain strict political 
neutrality, and a law was passed ending military/security force voting 
in their barracks, a practice that was thought to have been a source of 
voting irregularities in previous elections. Although the Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary, it continued to be restricted by 
executive influence and internal inefficiencies. While the Government 
generally maintained effective control of the security forces, there 
were some instances in which security force elements acted 
independently of government authority. Some security force members 
committed serious human rights abuses.
    Algeria is emerging from over a decade of terrorism and civil 
strife in the 1990s, in which between 100,000 and 150,000 persons were 
estimated to have been killed. It is making a slow, uneven, and 
incomplete transition from a military-dominated state with a state-
administered economy toward democracy and an open market economy. The 
country has a population of approximately 33 million. The hydrocarbon 
sector was the backbone of the economy, accounting for 55 to 60 percent 
of budget revenues, 35 percent of Gross Domestic Product, and over 95 
percent of export earnings. Government statistics put the economic 
growth rate at 6.8 percent. Unemployment has been estimated at 20 to 30 
percent; for citizens between the ages of 20 and 30, unemployment is 
even higher.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor overall and 
worsened in the area of press freedoms; however, there were significant 
improvements in some areas. There continued to be problems with 
excessive use of force by the security forces as well as failure to 
account for past disappearances. New allegations of incidents and 
severity of torture continued. Citing the country's ongoing struggle 
against armed terrorist groups, civilian and military police 
arbitrarily detained and arrested persons and incommunicado detention 
continued. The Government routinely denied defendants fair and 
expeditious trials. Despite judicial reforms, prolonged pretrial 
detention and lengthy trial delays were problems. Denial of defendants' 
rights to due process, illegal searches, and infringements on privacy 
right also remained problems. The Government did not always punish 
abuses, and official impunity remained a problem. The Government 
continued to restrict freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, 
and movement during the year. The use of defamation laws and government 
harassment of the press significantly increased, leading to the 
imprisonment of several journalists for terms ranging from 2 to 24 
months, the closure or suspension of two newspapers, and more self-
censorship by the press. The Government also continued some 
restrictions on freedom of religion. Domestic violence against women, 
the Family Code's limits on women's civil rights, and societal 
discrimination against women remained serious problems. Child abuse was 
a problem. Despite the Government's recognition of Tamazight as a 
national language, restrictions on Amazigh (Berber) ethnic, cultural, 
and linguistic rights continued to provoke occasional demonstrations. 
Child labor was a problem in some sectors. The Government continued to 
restrict workers' rights by not officially recognizing some unions.
    Despite these problems, the Government took several notable steps 
to improve human rights. There was a significant reduction in reported 
abuses by the security forces. Government actions reduced the number of 
terrorism-related civilian deaths and strengthened the basic human 
right to life and security. The Government oversaw generally free fair 
elections, according to international observers, including a 
representative from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE). The government-appointed Ad Hoc Mechanism on the 
Disappeared recommended and the Government agreed to accept 
responsibility for unauthorized actions by security forces and pay 
indemnities to families of the disappeared. The Government also 
negotiated in good faith with the Berber group ``Arouch'' as part of 
its National Reconciliation plan. In October, the Government passed new 
Penal Code legislation criminalizing both torture and sexual harassment 
for the first time.
    Terrorist groups committed numerous, serious abuses. Terrorists 
continued their campaign of insurgency, targeting government officials, 
families of security force members, and civilians. The death of 
civilians often was the result of rivalries between terrorist groups or 
to facilitate the theft of goods needed to support their operations. 
Terrorists used violence to extort money, food, and medical supplies. 
Terrorists also used vehicle-borne explosive devices to attack 
infrastructure targets and also used ambushes to attack military 
convoys. The violence occurred primarily in the countryside, as the 
security forces largely forced terrorists out of the cities. Successful 
operations by security forces helped to eliminate terrorist cells and 
leaders, weakened terrorist groups, and resulted in significantly lower 
casualty levels for the year.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--Citing the 
Government's continued struggle against terrorism, security forces 
killed terrorists in armed confrontations. There were no politically 
motivated killings by the Government or its agents; however, communal 
guards killed one unarmed person allegedly without warning. The 
Government stated that, as a matter of policy, disciplinary action is 
taken against soldiers or policemen who are guilty of violating human 
rights. In December, Ali Tounsi, head of security forces in the 
Ministry of the Interior, announced that 300-400 police officers are 
dismissed every year due to stricter disciplinary standards and better 
recruitment. The Government did not routinely release specific 
information regarding punishments of military and security force 
personnel.
    According to credible reports in May, adolescents Chouaib Argabi 
and Ali Remili stole food, hid it in a palm grove, and attempted to 
retrieve it in the night. In an area where armed militants are known to 
be active, Communal Guards (GLD) noticed their movements and allegedly 
fired without warning, killing Argabi, an ethnic Berber, and sparking 
demonstrations the next day (see Section 1.c.). No investigation was 
conducted into the incident, but the commander of the GLD denied his 
guards fired summarily.
    The gendarme responsible for the death of a Kabylie youth that 
sparked the 2001 Black Spring was tried in 2002 by a military tribunal 
and sentenced in 2003 to 2 years in prison for involuntary homicide. He 
was released during the year (see Section 1.d).
    No disciplinary action was taken in the March 2002 case where 
hundreds of persons died in riots between gendarmes and protesters and 
the April 2002 case in which numerous persons were injured and killed 
during street battles between Kabylie protesters and riot police.
    During the year, security forces killed numerous suspected 
terrorists. In September, Interior Minister Zerhouni stated publicly 
that 450 terrorists had been killed, arrested, or had surrendered 
during the first 8 months of the year. According to press reports, an 
estimated 219 terrorists were killed and 444 arrested during the year.
    Terrorists targeted both civilians and security forces. According 
to press reports, there were 93 civilian deaths at the hands of 
terrorists, compared to 198 in 2003. Terrorists were also responsible 
for the deaths of 117 members of the security forces, compared to 223 
last year.
    According to the Government, the total number of terrorist, 
civilian, and security force deaths during the year was approximately 
429, compared to 1,162 in 2003.
    Terrorist groups mainly targeted infrastructure and security 
forces. These groups also committed acts of extortion by carrying out 
violent reprisals against those who failed to pay a ``tax.'' Other 
tactics included creating false roadblocks outside the cities, often by 
using stolen police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Some killings, 
including massacres, also were attributed to revenge, banditry, and 
disputes over private land ownership. The violence appears to have 
occurred primarily in the countryside, as the security forces largely 
forced the terrorists out of the cities.

    b. Disappearance.--During the year, there were no reports of 
politically motivated disappearances. There have been credible reports 
of thousands of disappearances occurring over a period of several years 
in the mid-1990s, many of which involved the security forces. The last 
known disappearance, according to local and international NGOs, 
occurred in 2002.
    The total number of disappeared continued to be debated. 
Officially, the Government estimated that approximately 7,200 persons 
were missing or disappeared as a result of government actions and 
approximately 10,000 additional persons missing or disappeared as a 
result of terrorist kidnappings and murders. Local NGOs reported 
security forces played a role in the disappearances of approximately 
8,000 persons. Amnesty International (AI), in its 2003 report, stated 
that 4,000 men and women disappeared from 1993-2000 after being 
arrested by members of the security forces or state-armed militias. In 
November, Farouk Ksentini, Director of the Ad Hoc Mechanism on the 
Disappeared, said that 5,200 cases of the disappeared were attributable 
to security force abuses. Human rights attorney Ali Yahia Abdenour 
placed the combined number of missing from both security force and 
terrorist actions, based on the testimony of family members, at 18,000, 
which is comparable to the official government estimation.
    In 2003, local NGOs reported a trend of prolonged detentions 
ranging from 8 to 18 months that were frequently characterized as 
disappearances until the prisoners were released to their families. 
Disappearances resulting from prolonged detention or other factors 
remain contrary to the legal procedures stipulated in the country's 
Penal Code and its Constitution.
    Nearly all of the disappearances remained unresolved. Local offices 
of the Ministry of Interior in each district accept cases from resident 
families of those reported missing. Credible sources stated that the 
offices provided little useful information to the families of those who 
disappeared. In September 2003, the Government announced the 
establishment of the Ad Hoc Mechanism on the Disappeared (the 
``Mechanism'') and named Farouk Ksentini as director. Ksentini 
described the Mechanism as an interface between the Government and 
victims' families with the authority to request information from 
governmental agencies in order to research familial claims of 
disappearances. Ksentini has noted that the Mechanism is not an 
investigative body and cannot force the cooperation of other 
governmental agencies or the security forces.
    In February, President Bouteflika publicly declared that the State 
must accept responsibility for the actions of security personnel, even 
though such actions were not authorized by Government policy. On April 
28, the Mechanism provided President Bouteflika with recommendations 
for dealing with disappearances. One recommendation was that, for cases 
verifiable by the Mechanism's files, an indemnity should be paid to the 
families of the disappeared. According to Ksentini, the Mechanism had 
files on 5,000 such cases, although an NGO claimed in September that 
the Mechanism only had 300 files, despite the large numbers of 
disappearances and records maintained by local NGOs. In December, 
during Human Rights Day, President Bouteflika announced that the 
Mechanism would present further recommendations on the disappeared by 
March 2005.
    Local human rights NGO groups severely criticized the Mechanism for 
its ineffectiveness during its 18-month mandate. NGOs were not invited 
to give any input related to the Mechanism's creation nor consulted for 
recommendations. However, the Mechanism has met, on a case-by-case 
basis, with individual NGOs that requested a meeting. NGOs also claimed 
the Mechanism could not provide any guarantee of its independence and 
impartiality. After some reflection, local NGOs generally welcomed 
indemnities in some form. However, local NGOs and family members of the 
disappeared continued to demand that the Government make greater 
efforts to locate the remains of the missing, investigate 
disappearances, determine responsibility, and to hold perpetrators 
accountable.
    There were no reported prosecutions of security force personnel 
stemming from these cases. According to some local NGOs, the Government 
has refused to investigate cases for fear of raising criminal charges 
against security forces or other government officials. One group also 
claimed that the Government feared investigations leading to the 
prosecution of terrorists who received an amnesty under the Civil 
Concord would embarrass President Bouteflika, who has been a driving 
force behind the Concord and the policy of national reconciliation. In 
its 2003 report, Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that the Mechanism's 
mandate fell short of holding perpetrators accountable and bringing 
them to justice. For courts to hear charges of disappearance, the law 
requires at least two eyewitnesses. Courts have therefore refused to 
consider several cases where a family member, as a single eyewitness to 
an abduction, had identified specific policemen as the abductors.
    The Government asserted that the majority of reported 
disappearances either were committed by terrorists disguised as 
security forces or involved former armed Islamist supporters who went 
underground to avoid terrorist reprisals. However, there is no evidence 
that the Government investigated any of the 5,200 cases that it 
admitted were caused by security forces. Ksentini reiterated throughout 
the year previous statements that if security forces had played a role 
in the disappearances, it was due to the actions of individuals 
operating outside the scope of their superior's orders and not on the 
orders of any specific government institution. While acknowledging 
government responsibility for protecting its citizens, Ksentini said 
the Mechanism would forward evidence of responsibility to the judiciary 
for prosecution, but had not done so because there was not enough 
evidence in any case.
    In October 2003, Salah-Eddine Sidhoum, physician and human rights 
activist, was acquitted of subversion and jeopardizing the State. Dr. 
Sidhoum had been convicted in absentia in 1997.
    The Government also placed restrictions on the international NGO 
Freedom House's efforts to investigate the issue of the 
``disappeared.'' The Government required Freedom House to submit its 
proposed activities in advance for governmental approval. Government 
officials said technical assistance was welcomed, but no political 
activities would be allowed. As a result, some proposed activities were 
denied. The Government also denied visas to Freedom House associates, 
causing some events to be cancelled.
    In November 2003, a suspected mass gravesite was discovered in 
Relizane and the personal effects of El Hadj Abed Saidane, who 
disappeared in 1996, were identified. The family of Saidane accused 
Mohamed Fergane, the former mayor of the local town and the head of a 
self-defense militia at the time of Saidane's disappearance. Fergane 
had previously been accused of being responsible for 212 forced 
disappearances between 1994 and 1997 by families of the disappeared. 
The Relizane prosecutor's office agreed to conduct an investigation 
into this case, but failed to do so after the remains were removed by 
unknown persons. Government authorities did not pursue an investigation 
into who was responsible for the removal of the remains.
    In February 2003, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat, or GSPC) kidnapped 38 
foreign tourists in the southwestern part of the country but released 
them 6 months later after crossing into Mali. One of the hostages died 
from exposure.

    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation prohibit such 
practices; however, according to local human rights groups, defense 
lawyers, and media reports, security forces continued to use torture 
when interrogating persons.
    Although torture had been denounced in the Penal Code, new 
legislation enacted in September criminalizes torture, and government 
agents may face prison sentences for up to 3 years for committing such 
acts. However, during the year, there were no reports of police or 
security forces receiving punishment for torturing suspects. Impunity 
remained a problem (see Section 1.d.).
    Though human rights lawyers have stated that the incidence and 
severity of torture is on the decline--in part due to better training 
of the security forces and alternative intelligence gathering 
techniques--they maintained that torture still occurred in military 
prisons, more frequently against those arrested on ``security 
grounds.'' Last year, the independent press reported that the 
``chiffon'' method--placing a rag drenched in dirty water in someone's 
mouth--was the preferred method of torture because it left no physical 
traces of assault. In 2003, AI reported an increased number of accounts 
detailing the usage of the wet rag method.
    In May, 24 adolescents were arrested in T'kout following 
demonstrations protesting the death of Chouaib Argabi (see Section 
1.a.). Six of the adolescents alleged to their lawyer that they were 
tortured and sexually abused by the gendarmerie during their detention. 
Their attorney, Salah Hanoun, reported to the press that he saw the 
physical proof of mistreatment and took photographs. During their 
trial, defense lawyers raised the issue of torture, but the judge 
refused any discussion of the matter.
    In March 2003, according to AI, a 42-year-old restaurant manager 
from Bouira was tortured for 10 days at the military security center in 
the Ben Aknoun quarter of Algiers. He stated he was tied down and 
forced to swallow large quantities of dirty water, beaten, subjected to 
electric shocks, and forced to sign a statement ``admitting'' links to 
armed groups. He was remanded in pre-trial detention. The Government 
did not investigate his alleged torture.
    No action was taken in the 2002 cases in which security forces 
allegedly tortured a shopkeeper in Surcouf or in which security forces 
tortured four members of the political party Rally for Democratic 
Culture (RCD) and their families.
    Prison conditions generally met international standards, and the 
U.N. Development Program (UNDP) noted improved conditions in civilian 
and low security prisons as a result of prison reform efforts 
undertaken by the Ministry of Justice. The UNDP also worked with the 
Government to improve educational programs in prisons.
    However, overcrowding, insufficient medical treatment, and the 
Government's continued refusal to allow international observers access 
to military and high security prisons remained problems. In October 
2003, the media reported there was 1 doctor for every 300 prisoners. 
While the Government permitted visits by independent human rights 
observers to regular, non-military prisons, it did not permit visits to 
its military or high security prisons. In October, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited civilian prisons and pre-
trial detention centers, but it was still barred from the country's 
military and high security prisons
    Hunger strikes were held in several prisons throughout the country 
in protest over the length of detentions before trial.

    d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice the security 
forces continued arbitrarily to arrest and detain citizens, although 
reportedly less frequently than in previous years.
    The national police or General Directorate for National Security 
(DGSN) falls under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Gendarmerie, under the Ministry of Defense, also performs police-like 
functions throughout the country. Police are generally effective at 
maintaining order throughout the country. Low levels of corruption do 
exist, especially in the customs police, but appear to be limited to 
individuals and not sanctioned by the state.
    Impunity remained a problem, and the Government did not publicize 
the numbers, infractions or punishments of police officials. According 
to human rights attorneys, police officials, and local NGOs, most 
abuses of police authority occurred as a result of officers not 
following established guidelines for arrests.
    The Ministries of Justice and Interior told AI in April 2003 that 
at least 23 gendarmes had been prosecuted and sentenced in military 
tribunals for ``abusive use of firearms.'' However, the National 
Consultative Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights (Commission Nationale Consultative de Promotion et de Protection 
des Droits de l'Homme, or CNCPPDH) told the AI delegation that only one 
gendarme had been sentenced. The Government has not provided an 
explanation for this discrepancy.
    The police are required to obtain a summons from the prosecutor's 
office in order to bring a person in to a police station for 
questioning.
    Police may make arrests without a summons if they witness the 
offense taking place. Arrest warrants are only issued when a suspect is 
a flight risk. The Constitution requires that a suspect may be held in 
incommunicado pretrial detention for no longer than 48 hours before the 
prosecutor must determine if enough evidence exists to continue to hold 
or release them. If more time is required for gathering additional 
evidence, the police may request the prosecutor to extend the suspect's 
detention from 48 to 72 hours. In practice, the security forces 
generally adhered to the 48-hour limit in non-terrorism cases.
    Persons accused of acts against the security of the state, 
including terrorism, may be held in pre-trial detention no longer than 
12 days.
    Prolonged pre-trial detention remained a problem. If the prosecutor 
determines enough evidence exists to pursue a trial and the suspect is 
also a flight risk or has committed a serious felony offence, the 
suspect may be held in investigative detention (``detention 
preventive'') for 4 months with trial extensions not to exceed 16 
months. Ksentini, CNCPPDH President, said that there has been an 
abusive use of investigative detention by prosecutors and that its use 
should remain an exceptional measure according to law.
    While in pretrial detention, detainees must be informed of their 
right to communicate immediately with family members, receive visitors, 
and to be examined by a doctor of their choice at the end of their 
detention. However, there have been frequent reports of these rights 
not being extended to detainees, and, in some cases, local NGOs and 
human rights attorneys noted that the detention period extended beyond 
the legal limit.
    There is no system of bail, but in non-felony cases suspects are 
usually released on ``provisional liberty'' while waiting for their 
trial. Under provisional liberty, suspects are required to report 
weekly to the police station of their district and are forbidden from 
leaving the country.
    Local prosecutors are required to grade the performance of police 
captains operating in their jurisdiction to ensure that they comply 
with the law in their treatment of suspects. Police captains 
subsequently grade their officers. In addition, any suspect can request 
a medical examination once on police premises or before facing the 
judge.
    On August 10, Belaid Abrika, the leader of the autonomy-seeking 
Berber Arouch Citizen's Movement, was arrested by Tizi-Ouzou police 
during a protest at a hospital. The previous day, Abrika and 10 
delegates of the Citizen's Movement had called on the mayor of Tizi-
Ouzou to leave his position, as had been negotiated with the Government 
in January. The Mayor lodged a complaint against Abrika, who was 
arrested the following day. No arrest warrant was produced and no 
notification of the summons had been sent to Abrika, who spent 28 hours 
in jail. He was charged with participation in a riotous assembly and 
breaking the peace. The prosecutor placed Abrika on probation and 
forbade him from organizing or taking part in any type of meeting.
    On November 1, President Bouteflika issued a presidential pardon to 
3,822 prisoners on the occasion of the anniversary of the country's 
revolution. The prisoners released were convicted of petty crimes

    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was not independent in 
practice. Executive branch decrees and influence, interference by the 
Ministry of the Interior, and inefficiency within the justice system 
restricted the independence of the judiciary. The Government continued 
to utilize international technical assistance for the reform of its 
judiciary during the year. In March 2003 the legislature passed 
significant reforms to revise the role, power, and structure of the 
judiciary by granting more authority to prosecutors; by providing more 
specialized judicial functionality in creating law enforcement, 
administrative, and commercial courts; by initiating a thorough review 
of the civil and penal codes; and by establishing penitentiary reforms 
focusing on prisoner rights.
    The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which hear cases 
involving civilians facing charges not related to security or 
terrorism; and the military courts, which hear cases involving 
civilians facing security and terrorism charges. Long-term detentions 
of suspects awaiting trial continued as reported the previous year (see 
Section 1.d.).
    The Constitutional Council reviews the constitutionality of 
treaties, laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of 
the judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found 
unconstitutional, to confirm the results of any type of election, and 
to serve as the final arbiter of amendments that pass both chambers of 
the parliament before becoming law. The Council has nine members: three 
of the members (including the council president) are appointed by the 
president; two are elected by the upper house of the Parliament; two 
are elected by the lower house of the Parliament; one is elected by the 
Supreme Court; and one is elected by the Council of State. Regular 
criminal courts try those persons accused of security-related offenses.
    The Minister of Justice appoints judges who serve 10-year terms. 
The Minister of Justice may, according to the Constitution, remove 
judges for violations of the law or if they are involved in a situation 
that jeopardizes the reputation of justice.
    According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent 
until proven guilty. Trials are public, and defendants have the right 
to be present and to consult with an attorney, which is provided at 
public expense. Defendants can confront or question witnesses against 
them or present witnesses and evidence on their behalf. Defendants also 
have the right to appeal and the testimonies of minorities and women 
have equal individual weight.
    However, government authorities did not always respect all legal 
provisions regarding defendants' rights, and they continued to deny due 
process. Women were denied equal rights in practice before the law due 
to the court's application of the Family Code, based on Shari'a 
(Islamic law) (see Section 5). Defendants and their attorneys were 
sometimes denied access to government-held evidence relevant to their 
cases. There were no reports of political prisoners.
    In February, Judge Mohamed Ras El Ain was permanently dismissed as 
a judge in a disciplinary hearing held by the Superior Council of 
Judges. Judge El Ain was not afforded due process during the trial. 
Among a number of procedural problems, Ras El Ain was denied access to 
the evidence of his disciplinary file. A request for a continuation to 
review the file was denied. Human rights lawyers and local and 
international press reported that Ras El Ain was brought up on 
disciplinary charges for criticizing the politicization of the 
judiciary and an October 2003 court decision preventing oppositionists 
within the National Liberation Front from holding a party congress.

    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such actions; however, in 
practice government authorities at times infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Government actively monitored the communications of 
political opponents, journalists, human rights groups, and suspected 
terrorists (see Section 4). Journalists from the independent press 
complained that emails sometimes took several days to deliver.
    Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of violations of 
Ordinance 95-11, passed in 1995 to rescind the use of exceptional 
warrants accorded under the 1992 Emergency Law.
    Armed terrorists entered private homes either to kill or kidnap 
residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food (see Section 1.a.). 
Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of violence to extort 
money from businesses and families across the country.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and press; however, in practice, the Government 
markedly increased restrictions on these rights. The Government's use 
of defamation laws to harass and arrest journalists, its closure of two 
papers for debts to the state-owned printing house, and its continued 
grant of an advertising monopoly to the state-owned advertising agency 
intimidated papers into practicing a degree of self-censorship. 
Although the press was able to criticize government shortcomings and to 
highlight pressing social and economic problems, it faced significant 
repercussions from the Government for doing so.
    The law specifies that freedom of speech must respect ``individual 
dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the national defense.'' 
The State of Emergency decree gives the Government broad authority to 
restrict these freedoms and to take legal action against what it 
considers to be threats to the state or public order. These regulations 
were heavily applied throughout the year, and in some instances the 
Government targeted specific media organizations and their staff.
    The country's independent media consisted of nearly 43 publications 
that supported or opposed the Government in varying degrees. Few papers 
have a circulation exceeding 15,000; however, the 7 largest papers had 
substantial circulations: El-Khabar (circulation 530,000), Quotidien 
d'Oran (circulation 195,000), Liberte (circulation 120,000), El-Watan 
(circulation 70,000), L'Expression (circulation 29,000), Djazair News 
(circulation 20,000) and Chorouk El-Youmi (circulation 9,000). Two 
French-speaking papers, El-Moudjahid and Horizons, and two Arab 
speaking papers, El-Chaab and El-Massa, are owned by the state. There 
were no newspapers owned by political parties, although several 
newspapers reflected a clear and often critical political perspective. 
Many parties, including legal Islamic political parties, had access to 
the independent press, in which they expressed their views without 
government interference. The three largest papers in circulation are 
owned and managed by employees. Opposition parties also disseminated 
information via the Internet and in communiques.
    Radio and television are government-owned, with coverage favoring 
President Bouteflika and the Government's policies. Presidential 
candidates received equal amounts of time on the state-owned radio and 
television channels during the 3-week official campaign season prior to 
the April elections. However, both before the official campaign and in 
the period following the elections, opposition candidates were 
generally denied access to the public radio or television.
    Satellite dish antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens 
had access to European and Middle Eastern broadcasting. While in the 
past the Government hindered the publication of some books related to 
Tamazight and Amazigh culture, during the year the Government began to 
print schoolbooks in Tamazight, through the introduction of a Tamazight 
curriculum in Tamazight-speaking provinces. Government-owned radio 
broadcast Tamazight language programming almost 24 hours a day and 
government-owned television broadcast a nightly news bulletin in this 
language.
    Restrictions were also placed on the international media, limiting 
its ability to report freely. In June, the Ministry of Communication 
closed the office of the Al-Jazeera television station for an 
unspecified period. The Government said the closure was related to 
``work it had to do on regulating foreign media offices'' even though 
Al-Jazeera had been in the country since the 1990s. The Government's 
decision to close the station was made a week after an Al-Jazeera 
broadcast that criticized high-ranking officers who worked in the 
French army during the war for independence; criticized the president's 
national reconciliation policy; and aired the results of a poll that 
indicated 72 percent of viewers felt there had been no improvement in 
the country's economic, social, and political situation. During a June 
press conference, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia called Al-Jazeera ``a 
channel whose sole aim was to tarnish Algeria's image.'' Reporters 
Without Borders (Reporters sans Frontieres, or RSF) condemned the 
decision and called for a lifting of the ban. Although the station is 
still available to viewers, the Government continued to deny 
accreditation to its, journalists, and the office remained closed at 
year's end.
    In February, the Ministry of Communication and Culture prevented 
the distribution of an issue of the French magazine Jeune Afrique 
l'Intelligent. The issue contained the article ``Who the Generals Vote 
For,'' which speculated on the private involvement of generals in 
supporting presidential candidates. RSF issued a communique condemning 
the censorship. Additionally, the March edition of Le Monde 
Diplomatique, with the articles ``Algeria: From Terror to 
Normalization'' and ``The Cogs of A Secret War,'' was prevented from 
reaching newsstands. The Government did not offer any explanation for 
the ban.
    Two foreign journalists were denied re-accreditation. In February, 
Christian Lecompte of the Swiss journal Le Temps Suisse was denied re-
accreditation after publication of his critical article ``Bouteflika 
Dictator.'' Ahmed Megaache of Dubai-based Al-Arabiya television was 
also denied re-accreditation after having covered several stories on 
press harassment, a 2003 teachers' strike, Ali Benflis' presidential 
campaign, and discontent in the Kabylie.
    In March, for the first time since the 1992 State of Emergency, the 
Government granted increased freedom of movement to foreign journalists 
covering an election by permitting them to decline a ``security 
detail.'' Journalists were able to move without a police escort on 
condition that they sign a liability waiver with the Government.
    There was a marked increase in the level of harassment, arrest, and 
intimidation towards journalists following President Bouteflika's 
presidential victory. Human rights observers and media watch groups 
viewed this year's increased press harassment as politically motivated, 
targeting journalists that were critical of President Bouteflika and 
the Minister of the Interior, Norredine Zerhouni.
    The law permits the Government to levy fines and jail time against 
the press in a manner that restricts press freedom. The most common 
form of harassment was through the use of defamation laws. The Penal 
Code imposes high fines and prison terms of up to 24 months for 
defamation or ``insult'' of government figures, including the 
President, members of Parliament, judges, members of the military and 
``any other authority of public order.'' Those convicted face prison 
sentences that range from 3 to 24 months and fines of 50,000 to 500,000 
dinars ($704 to $7,042). During the year, at least 10 prosecutions 
occurred under the Penal Code. Djamel Benchenouf, Farid Allilat, and 
Ali Dilem from Liberte; Mohamed Benchicou and Sid Ahmed Semiane from Le 
Matin; Hafnaoui Ghoul of Djazair News; and Ali Boughanem, Mohamed 
Bouhamidi, and Kamel Amarni from le Soir d'Algerie were all charged for 
libel or slander under the Penal Code.
    Four journalists were imprisoned for the first time, unlike in 
previous years when only fines were imposed. The most prominent case 
was against Mohamed Benchicou, the managing editor of the opposition 
paper Le Matin and author of a book critical of the president, 
``Bouteflika--An Algerian Imposter.'' In February, plainclothes 
policemen instructed several bookstores not to display Benchicou's book 
or attempt to sell it; otherwise their copies would be seized. 
According to the independent press, Minister of the Interior Zerhouni 
ordered the police to conduct an investigation to determine the 
publisher of the book and to take all measures to prevent the book from 
being marketed. Police searched vehicles and the headquarters of Le 
Matin for copies of the book. Others were detained for questioning by 
plainclothes policemen in Algiers: Saida Azzouz, a journalist for Le 
Matin; Ali Dilem, the cartoonist for Liberte; and Hamou L'hadj Azouaou, 
a chauffeur for Le Matin. While no official reason was given for their 
detention, the police questioned them about the book and seized their 
copies.
    Benchicou was also sentenced to 2 years in prison and fined for 
violating foreign exchange controls. In August 2003, after returning 
from abroad, Benchicou's luggage was searched and 13 cash receipts 
worth 11.7 million dinars ($167,142) were discovered. The point of law 
in question was debatable since the money remained in a local bank, not 
with Benchicou. His 2-year sentence was upheld on appeal, and his fine 
was tripled. Benchicou was also charged with six counts of defamation, 
five of which were still pending at year's end, and the sixth resulting 
in a fine of 50,000 dinars ($684).
    In May, Hafnaoui Ben Ameur Ghoul, a journalist for el-Youm and a 
member of the Algerian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), 
was arrested and sentenced two days later to 6 months in prison and 
fined 50,000 dinars ($704). In June, he was sentenced in another 
defamation case to 2 months in prison and 10,000 dinars ($140). Ghoul's 
defamation cases were related to articles alleging that the governor of 
Djelfa and others in his administration mismanaged funds and were 
involved in a public health crisis. Ghoul's appeals resulted in an even 
harsher punishment of 3 months in prison and a fine of 100,000 dinars 
($1,400) in the first case; and 3 months in prison, 10,000 dinars in 
fines, and 100,000 dinars in damages in the second case. There were 
approximately 30 other charges of defamation still pending against him. 
Ghoul was also given an additional 2-month sentence in August for 
passing a letter to his daughter via another journalist during a court 
hearing rather than through the prison authorities. Ghoul conducted a 
hunger strike in August that postponed the appeal of this latter case. 
On October 3, Ghoul was sentenced to an additional 3 months in prison. 
He was released on November 24 after serving 6 months out of a 
combination of sentences amounting to 11 months.
    Ahmed Benaoum, Ahmed Oukili, and Ali Djerri were also given jail 
sentences. Additionally, Kamel Gaci and several other journalists and 
editors were charged with defamation and given fines and/or probation 
throughout the year. Kamel Gaci was also charged with ``failing to 
report a fugitive'' after his meeting with a former police officer who 
had escaped from prison and wanted to speak to him.
    In February, the imam of a mosque in Constantine verbally attacked 
the independent press, in particular the newspaper Liberte, during the 
Friday sermon broadcast on state-owned television and radio. Similar 
pleas were heard during sermons in Batna, Khenchela, Guelma, and 
Algiers. The Government controls the mosques and directs the content of 
sermons. Minister of Religious Affairs Bouabdellah Ghoulamallah told 
Reuters news agency that the Government did counsel the imams about the 
content of their sermons, but only with respect to religious concepts. 
Prime Minister Ouyahia called the sermon ``a regrettable event.''
    In December, an imam from an Algiers mosque accused journalists 
from the independent press, particularly the journal El-Watan, of being 
``missionaries of the Christian church in Algeria'' and exhorted his 
followers to boycott the independent press. He also said, ``the 
journalists deserved to be stoned to death.''
    All newspapers are printed at government-owned presses, and the 
Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent press 
through the state-owned advertising company, Agence Nationale d'Edition 
et de Publicite (ANEP), which decided which independent newspapers 
could benefit from advertisements placed by state-owned companies. 
Unlike in previous years, government agencies had to channel all their 
advertising through ANEP, which in turn decided in which papers to 
purchase ad space for the various agencies. This move gave ANEP, and 
therefore the Government, centralized control over the largest source 
of potential income for Algerian newspapers, putting ad placement in 
the hands of ANEP instead of individual agencies.
    According to a 1994 inter-ministerial decree, independent 
newspapers may print security information only from official government 
bulletins carried by the government-controlled Algerian Press Service 
(APS). However, independent newspapers openly ignored the directive. 
Since 2002, the Government has been more open and factual regarding 
security information. This trend continued this year.
    Most independent newspapers continued to rely on the Government's 
four publishers for printing presses and newsprint. In July, SIMPRAL, 
the Algiers-based government publisher, stopped printing Le Matin for 
its failure to pay a debt of 38 million dinars ($535,200). The paper 
was out of business by September.
    The Government imposed restrictions on the international media's 
coverage of issues relating to ``national security and terrorism.'' In 
July 2003, the Government deported four journalists for their coverage 
``outside of their hotel rooms'' of released political prisoners Ali 
Belhadj and Abassi Madani. The Government threatened similar action 
against others who violated the guidelines of the Ministry of 
Communication communique forbidding media coverage of the prisoners' 
release (see Section 1.d.).
    Unlike in previous years, the independent press reported openly 
about allegations of torture, government corruption, and human rights 
abuses. There also was significant coverage of NGO activity aimed at 
publicizing government abuses committed in the past.
    The Government generally did not restrict academic freedom. A 
growing number of academic seminars and colloquiums occurred without 
governmental interference. However, there were extensive delays in 
issuing visas to international participants and instances of refusal to 
allow international experts into the country (see Section 4).

    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the Emergency Law and 
government practice sharply curtailed this right. Citizens and 
organizations were required to obtain permits from their appointed 
local governor before holding public meetings. The Government 
frequently granted licenses to political parties, NGOs, and other 
groups to hold indoor rallies, although licenses were often granted 
only a few days before events were to take place, thus impeding event 
publicity and outreach.
    A decree issued in 2000 continued to ban demonstrations in Algiers. 
In January, 200 citizens including members of parliament and former 
ministers were clubbed by riot police when they tried to march from the 
Parliament to downtown in protest of a court decision invalidating the 
National Liberation Front (FLN)'s Eighth Party Congress (see Section 
3). As a result, several persons were injured or hospitalized.
    Despite official restrictions, the Government tolerated numerous 
marches, protests, and demonstrations during the year in other parts of 
the country. In May, the citizens of Beni Mered in the province of 
Blida staged a sit-in in front of the municipality headquarters to 
protest a housing list giving some people preferential treatment.
    In May and June, riots took place in the district of Les Genets in 
the Berber province of Tizi-Ouzou. Rioters protesting the arrest of a 
Berber youth placed barricades and set fire. The police were present, 
but did not intervene to avoid provoking a response. The protesters 
were detained for 8-10 hours and then released.
    In July 2003 in Oran, members of an NGO working on disappearances, 
SOS Disparus, were forcibly dispersed during a protest seeking 
government redress of the question of the disappeared. Sixty persons 
were arrested, and police injured numerous individuals, including many 
women over the age of 40.
    Every Tuesday morning throughout the year, families of the 
disappeared staged a sit-in before the Government's human rights 
ombudsman, the National Consultative Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights (Commission Nationale Consultative de 
Promotion et de Protection des Droits de l'Homme, or CNCPPDH). The 
police did not intervene to break up the demonstrators, the majority of 
whom were older women. Approximately 200 family members of disappeared 
persons also attempted to hold a march on October 5, but were prevented 
from doing so by riot police.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
the Emergency Law and government practice severely restricted this 
right. The Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before 
they may be established (see Section 3). The Government restricted the 
registration of certain NGOs, associations, and political parties on 
``security grounds,'' but refused to provide evidence or legal grounds 
for its refusal to authorize other organizations that could not be 
disqualified under articles pertaining to national security. The 
Government frequently failed to grant official national recognition to 
NGOs, associations, and political parties in an expeditious fashion. 
SOS Disparus, as well as the Democratic Front of Sid-Ahmed Ghezali and 
the Wafa party of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi are still not officially 
recognized.
    The Government issued licenses to domestic associations, especially 
medical and neighborhood associations. The Interior Ministry reported 
that many inefficient associations, especially cultural ones, died out 
due to poor management, poor finances, and lack of interest. Youth, 
medical, literacy, and neighborhood associations continued to benefit 
from government support and the interest of members. The Interior 
Ministry regarded those organizations unable to attain government 
licenses as illegal. Domestic NGOs were prohibited from receiving 
funding from abroad, although this restriction was unevenly enforced.
    The Southern Movement for Justice (SMJ) was organized in March with 
the objective of creating political awareness for politicians to 
address the South's high rates of poverty, illiteracy, and 
unemployment. In October, the Government arrested several SMJ members 
for organizing meetings of a non-recognized association following two 
peaceful protests.
    The Ministry may deny a license to, or dissolve, any group regarded 
as a threat to the Government's authority, or to the security or public 
order of the State. After the Government suspended the parliamentary 
election in 1992, it banned the FIS as a political party, and the 
social and charitable groups associated with it (see ion 3). Membership 
in the FIS, although a defunct organization, remained illegal.
    In September 2003, police forces in Algiers arrested and physically 
assaulted Arouch delegate Belaid Abrika during the breakup of a public 
rally before the Court of Algiers held to protest government actions 
against the independent press (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Abrika was 
taken into custody and after refusing to state his name, beaten so 
severely that upon his release, doctors at Mustapha Hospital ordered 
him to undergo 21 days of bed rest. At the same rally, police detained 
a noted human rights attorney. Credible sources report that three 
police officers had to be restrained from attacking the individual once 
witnessing officers recognized him.

    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the 
state religion and prohibits discrimination based on various individual 
liberties; however, the Constitution does not specifically prohibit 
religious discrimination. In practice, the Government generally 
respected religious freedom; however, there were some restrictions. The 
law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a faith other 
than Islam, prohibits proselytizing, and controls the importation of 
religious materials. However, the Government follows a de facto policy 
of tolerance by allowing, in limited instances, the conduct of 
religious services by registered non-Muslim faiths which are open to 
the public.
    The Government requires organized religions to obtain official 
recognition prior to conducting any religious activities. The 
Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Seventh-day Adventist churches are the 
only non-Islamic faiths authorized to operate in the country. Members 
of other religions, particularly protestant Evangelicals, are forced to 
operate without government permission or register as a part of the 
Protestant Church. According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the 
Ministry of the Interior is responsible for determining the punishment 
against a non-recognized religion.
    Islamic law (Shari'a) does not recognize conversion from Islam to 
any other religion; however, conversion is not illegal under civil law. 
Because of safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, 
Muslim converts practiced their new faiths clandestinely. There are no 
specific laws against proselytizing; however the Government can 
consider proselytizing as a subversive activity. The Government 
restricted the importation of non-Islamic religious literature for 
widespread distribution, although it did not restrict such materials 
for personal use. Over the last few years, non-Islamic religious texts 
and music and video selections have become easier to locate for 
purchase. However, restrictions on the importation of Arabic and 
Tamazight-language translations of non-Islamic texts were periodically 
enforced. The government-owned radio station provided broadcast time to 
a Protestant radio broadcast. The Government prohibited the 
dissemination of any literature portraying violence as a legitimate 
precept of Islam.
    The Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs strictly require, 
regulate and fund the study of Islam in public schools. The Government 
monitored activities in mosques for possible security-related offenses, 
barred their use as public meeting places outside of regular prayer 
hours, and convoked imams to the Ministry of Religious Affairs for 
``disciplinary action'' when deemed appropriate. The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs provided financial support to mosques and paid the 
salaries of imams. The Ministry of Religious Affairs frequently 
appointed selected imams to mosques throughout the country, and the law 
allows it to pre-screen religious sermons before they are delivered 
publicly. (see Section 2.a.).
    The Penal Code provides prison sentences and fines for preaching in 
a mosque by persons who have not been recognized by the Government as 
imams. Persons (including imams recognized by the Government) were 
prohibited from speaking out during prayers at the mosque in a manner 
that was ``contrary to the noble nature of the mosque or likely to 
offend the cohesion of society or serve as an apology for such 
actions.''
    There were no anti-Semitic incidents during the year, although 
anti-Semitic political commentary appeared periodically in the Arabic-
language press without government response. The Government did not 
promote tolerance or anti-bias education, and there is no hate crime 
legislation.
    The country's decade-long civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed 
radical Muslims belonging to the Armed Islamic Group and its later 
offshoot, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour 
la Predication et le Combat, or GSPC), against moderate Muslims. 
Radical Islamic extremists have issued public threats against all 
``infidels'' in the country, both foreigners and citizens. As a rule, 
the majority of the country's terrorist groups did not differentiate 
between religious and political killings.
    For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International 
Religious Freedom Report.

    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic 
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government 
sometimes restricted these rights in practice. The Government does not 
permit young men who are eligible for the draft and who have not yet 
completed their military service to leave the country if they do not 
have special authorization; however, such authorization may be granted 
to students and to those persons with special family circumstances.
    Under the State of Emergency, the Interior Minister and the 
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons 
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also maintained 
restrictions on travel into the four southern provinces of Ouargla, El-
Oued, Laghouat and Ain-Salah where much of the hydrocarbon industry and 
many foreign workers were located, to enhance security in those areas.
    The police and the communal guards operated checkpoints throughout 
the country. They routinely stopped vehicles to inspect identification 
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes 
detained persons at these checkpoints.
    Armed bandits and terrorists intercepted citizens at roadblocks, 
often using stolen police uniforms and equipment to rob them of their 
cash and vehicles. On occasion, armed groups killed groups of civilian 
passengers at these roadblocks (see Section 1.a.). Such acts were not 
performed or imposed by government forces.
    The Family Code does not permit married females younger than 18 
years of age to travel abroad without their guardian's permission (see 
Section 5).
    Neither the Constitution nor the law provides for forced exile, and 
it was not known to occur.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee status or asylum to 
persons who meet the definition in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In practice, the 
Government provided protection against refoulement, the return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution, and granted refugee 
status and asylum. There were no reports of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution. The Government 
provided temporary protection to approximately 160,000 refugee 
Sahrawis, former residents of the Western Sahara who left that 
territory after Morocco took control of it in the 1970s. The office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program 
(WFP), the Algerian Red Crescent, and other organizations assisted 
Sahrawi refugees. The Government cooperated with UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to peacefully 
change their Government; however, there are limitations on this right 
in practice. The Constitution also mandates presidential elections 
every 5 years.
    For the first time since the end of the one-party system and after 
more than a decade of civil strife and continuing acts of terrorism, a 
sitting president not only completed his full 5-year term of office, 
but was re-elected in a contested election of transparency which was 
unprecedented for the country; however, the election and the electoral 
system were not without flaws. President Bouteflika was re-elected in 
April to his second term, winning approximately 85 percent of the vote 
according to the official results. Voter participation was 58 percent, 
remaining steady from the 1999 elections and reflecting stable public 
confidence in the political process, which had steadily dropped over 
the past decade.
    Unlike previous elections, there was marked improvement towards a 
more free and transparent electoral process. The military was generally 
neutral in the election, upholding the Chief of Staff's promise not to 
intervene and abiding by a January electoral reform law that eliminated 
the practice of voting in barracks a day before the ``general vote.'' 
Six candidates representing parties with a wide-range of political 
views participated, and they were able to campaign publicly on 
television and radio. A woman also ran for president for the first time 
in the country's history. Unlike in 1999, the candidates did not drop 
out on the eve of the election; and for the first time, candidates and 
party representatives were able to review the voter lists prior to the 
election. The lists were made available to the heads of political 
parties on CD-ROM, reducing the possibility of election fraud. An 
election observer from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe stated in a press conference that the election was generally 
free and fair, though not without flaws.
    Problems with the electoral system persisted. The Administrative 
Court of Algiers was criticized among the country's political class and 
independent media for having invalidated the National Liberation 
Front's Eighth Party Congress. The invalidation was viewed as 
politically motivated and a setback to the president's main opponent, 
former Prime Minister and FLN Secretary-General Ali Benflis, because 
the party representatives chosen during the Eighth Party Congress were 
Benflis supporters. The invalidation also froze the FLN's bank 
accounts.
    Opposition candidates also complained that the Ministry of the 
Interior regularly blocked registered parties from holding meetings; 
denied them access to larger and better equipped government conference 
rooms; and pressured hotels into not making conference rooms available, 
while facilitating the activities of the pro-Bouteflika FLN. According 
to the Constitutional Council, which validates election results and 
determines whether candidates meet all the requirements, three 
potential candidates did not receive sufficient numbers of signatures 
for placement of their names on the ballot. Two candidates claimed the 
Council's invalidation of their signatures was politically motivated, 
but they were unable to provide any evidence of fraud. Despite 
opposition candidates' access to the state-controlled media during the 
official 3-week election campaign period, they were systematically 
denied similar access both before the campaign and following the 
election.
    Furthermore, the incumbent's ability to use state largesse in 
government work projects in every wilaya to amass political support 8 
months before the election created inequitable campaign advantages. 
Additionally, opposition candidates, primarily the (Islamist) ``Islah'' 
or Renaissance Party, expressed concern over potential tampering of the 
voter lists. Candidates filed numerous complaints that the lists were 
neither alphabetized nor classified by voting station or gender; that 
the lists did not conform to the electoral lists used during election 
day (which comprised full name, date and place of birth, and address 
for each voter); and that the number of voters on the list was 
inflated. The Electoral Commission made hundreds of corrections based 
on these filed complaints.
    In April 2003, Prime Minister Benflis resigned and was replaced by 
the head of the RND Party, Ahmed Ouyahia. Prime Minister Ouyahia 
maintained the same cabinet until September 2003 when there was a 
reshuffle of FLN ministers. In April, following the presidential 
election, Prime Minister Ouyahia presented his resignation as required 
by the Constitution and was reappointed as Prime Minister with a new 
cabinet.
    The country has a bicameral parliament consisting of the 389-seat 
National People's Assembly (lower house) and the 144-seat Council of 
the Nation (upper house or Senate). All members of the Assembly are 
elected by popular vote to 5-year terms. In the Council, two-thirds of 
the members are elected by the regional assemblies (the Popular 
Communal Assemblies and the Popular State Assemblies), and the 
remaining one-third is appointed by the President; all members serve 6-
year terms, and the Constitution requires that half the elected portion 
of the Council and one-third of the appointed portion be replaced every 
3 years. The Constitution provides the President with the authority to 
rule by executive order in special circumstances. In cases when 
Parliament is not in session, the President has the right to legislate 
by order. However, he must submit the executive order to Parliament for 
approval upon its return, first to the Assembly then to the Council. If 
the Assembly disapproves the executive order twice, the President must 
dissolve the Assembly. Assembly elections were held in May 2002, and 
indirect elections for the Council of the Nation were held in December 
2003.
    The law requires that potential political parties receive official 
approval from the Interior Ministry before they may be established. To 
obtain approval, a party must have 25 founders from across the country 
whose names must be registered with the Interior Ministry. The 
Government has refused to register two parties: Wafa and Front 
Democratique. No party may use religion, Amazigh heritage, or Arab 
heritage as a basis to organize for political purposes. The law also 
bans political party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates 
party financing and reporting requirements.
    In December 2003, indirect elections for one-third of the Council 
of the Nation (upper house) were held. The National Democratic Rally 
(RND) won 17 seats, and the FLN won 22 seats (split evenly amongst 
Benflis and Bouteflika supporters). The two conservative Islamic 
parties, MSP and El Islah, won four and two seats respectively, marking 
the first time members from Islamic parties have been elected to the 
Council. One independent member was also elected. Members of the 
regional assemblies in the Kabylie wilayats of Tizi-Ouzou and Bejaia 
did not participate due to their longstanding boycott of national 
elections.
    Corruption in the executive and legislative branches of Government 
continued to be a serious problem. There are anti-corruption 
regulations in the Penal Code that call for prison sentences of up to 2 
years and increase to up to 10 years' imprisonment for high executives; 
however, they are not widely implemented. During the year, the 
Government established a new anti-money laundering law and installed a 
financial intelligence unit to aid in the fight against corruption.
    There is no government transparency in the country. The Government 
routinely does not provide any access to government information.
    There were 32 women serving in senior positions in the executive 
and legislative branches. There were four women in the Cabinet: as 
Minister of Culture; and as Minister Delegates for Family and Female 
Condition, for the Algerian Community Living Abroad, and for Scientific 
Research. Women also held 24 of the 389 seats in the lower house of 
Parliament and 4 of the 144 seats in the upper house. In 2002, women 
held 19 seats in the lower house and 6 seats in the upper house, and 
held 5 ministerial positions during President Bouteflika's first term. 
A woman led the Workers' Party, and all the major political parties 
except the Islah Party had women's divisions headed by women.
    The ethnic Amazigh minority of about 9 million centered in the 
Kabylie region participated freely and actively in the political 
process and represented one-third of the Government; however, Amazigh 
protests and boycotts surrounding the May and October 2003 and the 
April elections underscored the economic and social neglect felt by 
many in this community, which makes up nearly one-third of the overall 
population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups were not 
able to operate without government interference while trying to 
investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases. The 
Government continued to harass local NGOs, and it utilized bureaucratic 
hurdles to impede the work of international NGOs. While some human 
rights groups were allowed to move about freely, the most active and 
visible organizations reported harassment by government authorities, 
including surveillance and monitoring of telephone services, arbitrary 
detention, questionable and repeated police summonses, and false arrest 
(see Section 1.f.). Domestic NGOs must be licensed by the Government 
and are prohibited from receiving funding from abroad, although they 
may receive donations in-kind. Some unlicensed NGOs operated openly. 
International NGOs continued to experience visa delays or refusals.
    The most active independent human rights group was the Algerian 
League for the Defense of the Rights of Man (LADDH), an independent 
organization that had members throughout the country; however, the 
LADDH was not permitted access to government officials for human rights 
advocacy or research purposes, or to prisons, except for normal 
consultations allowed between lawyer and client.
    The less active Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an 
independent organization based in Constantine. LADH has members 
throughout the country who followed individual cases. In September 
2003, Mohamed Smain, President of LADH, was summoned to the local 
police precinct and arrested without charge. The presiding judge 
dismissed the court case the following day. Smain had been sentenced to 
1 year in prison for the defamation of the mayor of Relizane and eight 
members of its local self-defense force. He alleged in a published 
report on human rights abuses that his nine accusers had participated 
in the abduction, torture, killing, and disappearance of dozens of 
people. Smain was granted ``provisional liberty'' the same year while 
the Supreme Court reviewed his case.
    Visits by international human rights NGOs occurred both at the 
invitation of the Government and independently, when the Government 
chose to issue visas. Representatives of the National Endowment for 
Democracy, Freedom House, and Global Rights all visited the country 
during the year. However, numerous international human rights groups 
continued to encounter visa difficulties following the publication of 
reports deemed critical of the Government. Difficulty with obtaining 
visas also occurred when groups intended to hold meetings, conferences, 
or workshops related to what the Government considered sensitive 
issues, such as disappearances or electoral reform. The Moroccan 
employees of Global Rights experienced lengthy visa delays that forced 
them to cancel several meetings in the first quarter of the year. 
Representatives of the Fund for Global Human Rights and the 
International Foundation for Election Systems were denied visas in 
September. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied Freedom House (FH) 
permission to open an office in Algiers until, according to an official 
at the MFA, FH wrote a more ``balanced'' annual report. The Government 
also told FH that its activities related to disappeared persons would 
be approved on a case-by-case basis. FH was also forced to cancel a 
seminar on disappearances because some of the seminar participants' 
visa applications were denied. Representatives of Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International were also denied visas during the year.
    The ICRC has full access to civilian prisons and pre-trial 
detention centers; however, it has not been granted access to the 
country's military or high-security prisons (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to deny requests for visits from the U.N. 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Extra-judicial Executions. The U.N. Rapporteur on the Freedom of 
Religion was allowed to visit the country in September 2002.
    The government-established Consultative Commission for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (Commission Nationale 
Consultative de Promotion et de Protection des Droits de l'Homme, or 
CNCPPDH) is its Ombudsman for human rights. Directed by Farouk 
Ksentini, the Commission is made up of 45 members, 22 of whom belong to 
governmental bodies and 23 of whom come from civil society and NGOs. 
The nongovernmental members include representatives of Islamic 
religious organizations, the Red Crescent Society, and women's rights 
advocacy groups. The President approves nominees, and the Commission's 
budget and secretariat come from his office. The Commission is mandated 
to report on human rights issues, coordinate with police and justice 
officials, advocate domestic and international human rights causes, 
mediate between the Government and the population, and provide 
expertise on human rights issues to the Government.
    In December, Ksentini announced that the Government was considering 
working more closely with international and local NGOs. He mentioned, 
however, that it was important for NGOs to cooperate and ``not 
interfere in the country's domestic affairs.''
    In September 2003, the President announced the creation of a 
government commission dedicated to the issue of the disappeared and 
named Farouk Ksentini to head the body, which would serve as an ``Ad 
Hoc Mechanism'' between the families of the disappeared and the 
Government (see Section 1.b.). Both the CNCPPDH and the Ad Hoc 
Mechanism were perceived to be government-influenced and not effective, 
lacking investigative or enforcement powers. Their reports go directly 
to the President of the Republic and are not made public.
Section 5. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race, 
sex, language, and social status; however, women continued to face 
legal and social discrimination.

    Women.--Spousal abuse was common. In March, the National Institute 
of Public Health hosted a seminar on violence against women. Seminar 
statistics showed that 69.5 percent of female victims of violence were 
housewives, 27 percent were illiterate, and that rape constituted more 
than 55 percent of all sexual assaults.
    Spousal abuse was more frequent in rural than urban areas and also 
more frequent among less-educated persons. Spousal rape also occurred. 
Prison sentences for non-spousal rape range from 1-5 years; however, 
there are no specific laws against spousal rape. There are strong 
societal pressures against a woman seeking legal redress against her 
spouse for rape, and there were few reports of the law being applied in 
such cases. Battered women must obtain medical certification of the 
physical effects of an assault before they lodge a complaint with the 
police. Because of societal pressures however, women frequently were 
reluctant to endure this process. According to a study by the Ministry 
of Justice, women's associations, and the National Institute of Public 
Health, 70 percent of women refused to lodge a complaint.
    SOS Femmes en Detresse and the Wassila Network are two prominent 
associations for women that have received recognition by the Government 
and the international community. Both groups provided judicial and 
psychological counseling to abused women. Women's rights groups 
experienced difficulty in drawing attention to spousal abuse as an 
important social problem, largely due to societal attitudes. There were 
several rape-crisis centers run by women's groups, but they had few 
resources. The Working Women section of the state union, the General 
Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), established a counseling center with 
a toll free number for women suffering from sexual harassment in the 
workplace.
    The law prohibits prostitution; however, for economic reasons, 
prostitution was reported to be a growing problem, according to the 
National Institute of Public Health.
    Some aspects of the law and many traditional social practices 
discriminated against women. The Family Code, adopted in 1984 and based 
in large part on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal 
guardianship of a husband or male relative. Under the Code, Muslim 
women are prevented from marrying non-Muslims, although this regulation 
was not always enforced. The Code does not restrict Muslim men from 
marrying non-Muslim women. Under both Shari'a and civil law, children 
born to a Muslim father are Muslim, regardless of the mother's 
religion. Divorce is difficult for a wife to obtain. Husbands generally 
obtain the right to the family's home in the case of divorce. Custody 
of the children normally is awarded to the mother, but she may not 
enroll them in a particular school or take them out of the country 
without the father's authorization. Only males are able to confer 
citizenship on their children.
    The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man 
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs in practice. 
Approximately 5 percent of marriages are polygynous. A wife may sue for 
divorce if her husband does not inform her of his intent to marry 
another woman prior to the marriage.
    Women suffered from discrimination in inheritance claims. In 
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an 
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers. 
According to Shari'a, such a distinction is justified because other 
provisions require that the husband's income and assets are to be used 
to support the family, while the wife's remain, in principle, her own. 
However, in practice women do not always have exclusive control over 
assets that they bring to a marriage or income that they earn 
themselves. Married females under 18 years of age may not travel abroad 
without their husbands' permission. Married women may take out business 
loans and use their own financial resources.
    Despite constitutional and legal provisions providing equality 
between men and women, in practice women still faced discrimination in 
employment resulting from societal stereotypes. Leaders of women's 
organizations reported that discriminatory violations are common. Labor 
Ministry inspectors did little to enforce the law.
    Social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a career 
was greater in rural areas than in major urban areas. Women made up 
more than half of the university student population; however, women 
constituted only 19.7 percent of the work force. Nonetheless, women may 
own businesses, enter into contracts, and pursue careers similar to 
those of men. About 25 percent of judges were women, a percentage that 
has been growing in recent years.
    There were numerous women's rights groups, although the size of 
individual groups was small. Their main goals were to foster women's 
economic welfare and to amend aspects of the Family Code.

    Children.--Child abuse was a problem. Hospitals treat numerous 
child abuse cases every year, but many cases go unreported. Laws 
against child abuse have not led to notable numbers of prosecutions. 
NGOs that specialized in care of children cited continued instances of 
domestic violence aimed at children, which they attributed to the 
``culture of violence'' developed since the civil conflict of the 1990s 
and the social dislocations caused by the movement of rural families to 
the cities to escape terrorist violence. One study performed by the 
National Institute of Public Health in 2002 reported that 62 percent of 
children have been victims of physical abuse.
    Children continued to be victims of terrorist attacks. In one 
November incident in the wilaya of Relizane, a whole family, including 
children, was killed. In April, two children and their mother were 
killed by a homemade bomb.
    The Government is generally committed to the welfare, rights, 
health and education of children. The Government provides free 
education for children through high school. Education is compulsory 
until the age of 16 and is free and universal. In 2004, more than 90 
percent of children completed the ninth grade, on average the highest 
grade level normally attained by students. Boys and girls generally 
received the same treatment in education, although girls were slightly 
more likely to drop out of school in rural areas because of familial 
financial reasons, as sons were sometimes given educational priority 
over daughters. The girls were then sent to vocational training 
schools.
    The Government provided free medical care for all citizens, albeit 
in often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports had 
programs for children, but such programs faced serious funding 
problems.
    Economic necessity compelled many children to resort to informal 
employment, such as street vending (see Section 6.d.).

    Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking in 
persons and there were reports that such practices occurred. The 
Government did not acknowledge trafficking to be a problem, as the 
Government is mostly concerned with the increasing rate of illegal 
immigration. According to the Government, laws against illegal 
immigration, prostitution, and forced labor are used to enforce anti-
trafficking standards, in the absence of specific anti-trafficking 
laws.
    According to media reports and a local NGO, forced prostitution and 
domestic servitude of illegal immigrants from West Africa occurred as 
immigrants transited through the country seeking economic opportunity 
in Europe. Official statistical estimates of the severity of 
trafficking do not exist. Since the Government did not acknowledge 
trafficking to be a problem, there were no government assistance 
programs for victims or any information campaigns about trafficking.

    Persons With Disabilities.--The Government did not mandate 
accessibility to buildings or government services for persons with 
disabilities. Public enterprises, in downsizing their work forces, 
generally ignored a law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of 
their jobs for persons with disabilities. Social security provided 
payments for orthopedic equipment, and some NGOs received limited 
government financial support.
Section 6. Workers Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--About two-thirds of the labor force 
belonged to unions. Workers are required to obtain government approval 
to establish a union, and the Government may invalidate a union's legal 
status if its objectives are determined to be contrary to the 
established institutional system, public order, good morals or the laws 
or regulations in force. There were no legal restrictions on a worker's 
right to join a union. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the 
General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities. 
The UGTA encompasses national unions that are specialized by sector. 
The law on labor unions requires the Labor Ministry to approve a union 
application within 30 days and allows for the creation of autonomous 
unions, others than those affiliated to UGTA. However, attempts by new 
unions to form federations or confederations have been obstructed by 
delaying administrative maneuvers. The Autonomous Unions Confederation 
(CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the autonomous unions, 
but without success. The CSA continued to function without official 
status.
    The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union members 
and organizers and provides mechanisms for resolving trade union 
complaints of antiunion practices by employers. It also permits unions 
to recruit members at the workplace. Unions may form and join 
federations or confederations, affiliate with international labor 
bodies, and develop relations with foreign labor groups. For example, 
the UGTA is a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). However, the law prohibits unions from associating with 
political parties and also prohibits unions from receiving funds from 
foreign sources. The courts were empowered to dissolve unions that 
engaged in illegal activities.

    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to strike, and workers exercised this right in 
practice, subject to some conditions. The law provides for collective 
bargaining for all unions, and the Government permitted this right in 
practice for authorized unions. Under the State of Emergency, the 
Government can require public and private sector workers to remain at 
work in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to 
the Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14 days 
of mandatory conciliation or mediation. The Government on occasion 
offered to mediate disputes. The law states that decisions reached in 
mediation are binding on both parties. If no agreement is reached in 
mediation, the workers may strike legally after they vote by secret 
ballot to do so. A minimum level of public services must be maintained 
during public sector service strikes.
    The law provides that all public demonstrations, protests, and 
strikes must receive government authorization prior to commencement. 
Strikes and labor gatherings occurred throughout the year in various 
sectors, including the construction, medical, port facility, education, 
and customs sectors. The 2001 ban on marches in Algiers remained in 
effect.
    In 2004, the ILO Committee of Experts requested the Government take 
steps through legislation to ensure that no provisions of Legislative 
Decree 92-03 were applied against workers peacefully exercising the 
right to strike. The decree defines as subversive acts, or acts of 
terrorism, those offenses directed against the stability and normal 
functioning of institutions through any action taken with the intention 
of ``obstructing the operation of establishments providing public 
service'' or of ``impeding traffic or freedom of movement in public 
places.'' The Government did not act, claiming that the Decree was not 
directed against the right to strike or the right to organize and has 
never been used against workers exercising the right to strike 
peacefully.
    The Government eliminated free trade zones in November; labor laws 
now apply equally throughout the country.
    On June 6, the National Committee for Union Freedom (CNLS) gathered 
8 autonomous unions in health, education, and public administration 
(unaffiliated with the UGTA) to denounce infringements on the unions' 
freedoms, the right to strike, and on union pluralism.
    During August, workers at southern facilities of Sonatrach, the 
state-owned oil and gas production company, protested inadequate 
salaries and benefits.
    On September 30, employers in the health sector began a weeks-long 
``unlimited'' strike at the appeal of the National Federation of Health 
Sector Workers (FNTS), an affiliate of the UGTA. The federation sought 
increases in salaries and benefits. The National Union of Public Health 
Practitioners (SNPSP) went on strike on October 10, seeking salary 
increases of up to 80 percent.

    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded 
labor is prohibited by the Constitution's provisions on individual 
rights, and the Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including forced 
or compulsory labor by children. The Government generally enforced the 
ban effectively.

    d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The 
minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors from the Ministry of 
Labor supposedly enforced the minimum employment age by making periodic 
or unannounced inspection visits to public sector enterprises. They did 
not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private sectors. 
UNICEF reported in 2003 that approximately 3 percent of children worked 
in some capacity. No child labor was reported in the industrial sector; 
however, economic necessity compelled many children to resort to 
informal employment. Many children worked part time or full time in 
small workshops, on family farms, and in informal trade. One report 
stated that more than 25,000 children between the ages of 6 and 14 were 
working in the informal economy.

    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall 
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific 
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the 
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The monthly 
minimum wage was insufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The minimum wage was approximately 8000 dinars 
($105) per month. Ministry of Labor inspectors were responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the minimum wage regulation; however, 
enforcement was inconsistent.
    The standard workweek was 37.5 hours. Employees who worked beyond 
the standard workweek received premium pay on a sliding scale from 
``time-and-a-half'' to ``double time,'' depending on whether the 
overtime was worked on a normal work day, a weekend, or a holiday.
    There were well-developed occupation and health regulations 
codified in the law, but government inspectors did not enforce these 
regulations effectively. There were no reports of workers being 
dismissed for removing themselves from hazardous working conditions. 
Because employment generally was based on very detailed contracts, 
workers rarely were subjected to conditions in the workplace about 
which they were not previously informed. If workers were subjected to 
such conditions, they first could attempt to renegotiate the employment 
contract and, that failing, resort to the courts; however, the high 
demand for employment in the country gave the advantage to employers 
seeking to exploit employees.

                               __________

                                BAHRAIN

    Bahrain is a monarchy, which in 2002 adopted a constitution that 
reinstated a legislative body with one elected chamber. The Al Khalifa 
extended family has ruled the country since the late 18th century and 
continues to dominate all facets of society and government. The King, 
Sheikh Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa, governs the country with the 
assistance of his uncle, the Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Al-Khalifa; 
his son, the Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad; and an appointed cabinet of 
ministers. Members of the Al Khalifa family hold 8 out of 23 cabinet 
positions, including all strategic ministries. The 2002 Constitution 
provides that the King is head of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the Government. The King also chairs the Higher 
Judicial Council, which appoints members of the Constitutional Court. 
The bicameral National Assembly consists of the elected Council of 
Representatives and the appointed Shura (Consultative) Council. The 
Constitution gives the Council of Representatives a role in considering 
legislation, but most legislative authority still resides with the 
King, and he appoints members of the Shura Council. The Constitution 
provides for a nominally independent judiciary; however, the judiciary 
was not independent because courts were subject to government pressure 
regarding verdicts, sentencing, and appeals.
    The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It 
controls the Public Security Force (police) and the extensive security 
service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against 
external threats. It also monitors internal security. The Government 
maintained effective control of the security forces. The security 
forces did not commit any serious human rights abuses during the year. 
Impunity remained a problem, and there were no known instances of 
security forces personnel being punished for abuses of authority 
committed during the year or in the past.
    The country had a population of approximately 710,000, an estimated 
one third of whom were noncitizens, primarily from Asia. It had a mixed 
economy, was a regional financial services center, derived income from 
exports of petroleum and petroleum products, and depended on tourism 
from Saudi Arabia. The Government estimated Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate at 6.8 percent. Higher average oil prices and 
increased construction activity fueled by deficit government spending 
contributed to higher GDP growth during the year. Real wages have been 
falling for more than 10 years.
    Problems remained in the Government's respect for human rights. 
Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The 
Government prohibits political parties, and none exist. Impunity of 
government officials remained a problem, as did the lack of 
independence of the judiciary and discrimination against the Shi'a 
population, women, and foreign nationals. The press reported that some 
judges were corrupt. The Parliament investigated an instance of 
government corruption involving the government pension funds. The 
Government continued to infringe to some extent on citizens' privacy 
rights, and it restricted the freedoms of speech, the press, assembly, 
and association. Journalists routinely practiced self censorship. The 
Government also imposed some limits on freedom of religion and freedom 
of movement. Violence against women and discrimination based on sex, 
religion, and ethnicity remained a problem. There was reported 
discrimination in the job market. In May, the Council of 
Representatives rejected a law making discrimination a crime punishable 
under the country's 1976 Penal Code. Abuse of foreign workers occurred, 
including numerous instances of forced labor and some instances of 
trafficking.
    The Government took initial steps to improve the judiciary process 
with the transparent recruitment of new judges, training of judges and 
prosecutors, establishment of an office of mediation, and steps to 
speed up the court process that automates case management. Five judges 
were dismissed for corruption. The Government also provided increased 
human rights training to law enforcement officers.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no 
reports of arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life committed by the 
Government or its agents.
    On April 27, the High Civil Court ordered the Ministry of Interior 
to pay BD 40,000 ($106,100) to the family of the 21-year old Bahraini 
man killed in a demonstration in April 2002.

    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.

    c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. During protests on May 
21, two civilians were injured by rubber bullets fired by the police. 
On October 28, rubber bullets or tear gas canisters fired by the police 
injured two protestors (see Section 2.b.). There were no known 
instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses committed 
either during the year or in any previous year.
    Several cases of police abuse remain unresolved since 2002. In 
April 2002, police beat a human rights activist who came to the aid of 
another demonstrator. The investigation into this incident concluded 
that the police were not at fault. In May 2002, the Department of 
Military Intelligence (DMI) reportedly kidnapped a citizen and beat him 
in retaliation for his involvement in another demonstration. At year's 
end, there was no government investigation into this incident nor was 
any punishment exacted.
    In September 2003, three ex-detainees filed a criminal complaint 
against an ex senior intelligence official and a retired security 
intelligence officer, Colonel Adil Jassim Flaifel, accusing them of 
torturing detainees from 1981 to 1996. Colonel Flaifel denied any 
wrongdoing, and the Public Prosecutor rejected the detainees' 
complaint. In 2002, lawyers for eight citizens made allegations against 
Colonel Flaifel for routinely engaging in torture and mistreatment of 
prisoners. According to Amnesty International (AI), the general 
prosecutor in the Legal Affairs Bureau did not acknowledge receipt of 
the complaint. He asserted that the general amnesty issued by the King 
in 2001 applied to government employees as well as citizens
    Unlike last year, there were incidents of violent societal abuse by 
vigilantes. On March 12, following liquor vendors' refusal to suspend 
operations after their neighbors' demands, between 100 and 200 Shi'a 
protestors entered 4 houses and destroyed a large number of bottles of 
liquor. Police eventually defused the violence hours later. The 
Interior Minister issued a statement that citizens may not take the law 
into their own hands, and instead should address complaints to the 
ministry.
    On March 17, as many as 150 Shi'a youths attacked a Manama 
restaurant located near a conservative Shi'a neighborhood. The 
restaurant was known to serve alcohol and was frequented by foreigners. 
The youths arrived with knives, rocks, and Molotov cocktails. They set 
fire to five vehicles and doused the back wall of the restaurant with 
gasoline. Police were slow to respond and stood outside the restaurant 
for 20 minutes before engaging the mob. Police arrested 12 teenagers 
and detained 4 more for questioning; however, the King pardoned all 16 
teenagers at the request of their families.
    In 2003, credible reports of prisoner beatings and mistreatment 
surfaced during three strikes at Jaw prison, in the southern part of 
the country. In August 2003, a prisoner was allegedly beaten in front 
of his family. News of the mistreatment reached 282 prisoners in 
Building 4, who proceeded to take over the building and stage a 14-day 
hunger strike. Press reports stated that the prisoners sought better 
living conditions, medical treatment, monitoring by human rights 
organizations, and a halt to beatings by prison guards. The Ministry of 
Interior negotiated the end of the strikes by promising to establish a 
joint parliamentary and Ministry of Interior commission to investigate 
claims. The commission began work in April 2003; however, findings of 
the commission's investigation have still not been made public. In 
February, the Ministry of Interior improved medical care, social 
services, and food at Jaw prison.
    In December, several dozen prisoners at Jaw Prison started a hunger 
strike and called for an end to delays in the justice system. The press 
reported that some inmates were held for up to 9 months while waiting 
for the courts to hear their cases. The prisoners claimed that once 
they started the strike, they were denied hot water, phone calls, and 
outdoor exercise.
    Other prisons in the country generally met international standards.
    Women prisoners were housed separately from and in better 
conditions than men, and juveniles were housed separately from adults 
until the age of 15 in a section of the women's prison. On April 13, 
the Labor Ministry announced plans to open a separate center for the 
care of juvenile delinquents, but it has not yet opened. In August, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) met with government 
officials and NGOs. The ICRC did not monitor prisons.
    Political and ``security'' prisoners are not held in special 
prisons or in special sections of regular prisons. Pretrial detainees 
are housed separately from convicted prisoners.

    d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government generally observed 
these prohibitions. At year's end, there were no reports of government 
investigations into claims that the Directorate of Military 
Intelligence (DMI) officers detained and beat a citizen in 2002.
    There continued to be no known instances of police officers being 
punished for human rights abuses committed either during the year or in 
any previous year. The King ordered an investigation into police 
conduct at a demonstration in May in which two civilians were injured 
by rubber bullets (see Section 2.b.).
    According to the Interior Ministry, its Disciplinary Court 
convicted three police officers during the year for criminal activities 
of property theft and disobedience.
    From April 17 to 21, 40 ranking law enforcement officers from the 
Interior Ministry, National Guard, Bahrain Defense Force and the Public 
Prosecutor's office attended a 5-day U.N. Development Program seminar 
entitled ``Training Course in the Human Rights Field for Law 
Enforcement in the Ministry of the Interior.'' This training, the first 
of its kind for the country's law enforcement officers from these 
organizations, focused on protecting the rights of suspects and inmates 
in accordance with international standards.
    On March 30, police arrested the President of the National 
Committee for Martyrs and Victims of Torture days before his group 
planned to demonstrate against Law 56, the government decree that gives 
immunity to past and present government officials responsible for 
serious human rights abuses. Facing charges of un-Islamic behavior and 
indecency, he was denied legal representation for the 5 days he was 
detained in jail. This case was still pending at year's end. The 
Government also broke its own laws and released his name and the nature 
of the case to the local press. Releasing such information is illegal 
in alleged vice cases.
    Police must inform suspects of the charges against them within 48 
hours of the arrest. The law provides a detained person the right to a 
judicial determination on the legality of the detention within 45 days 
of the arrest.
    Judges may grant bail to a suspect and do so regularly.
    The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the assignment and 
management of public prosecutors, while the Ministry of Interior 
oversees security and all aspects of prison administration. Access to 
attorneys was often restricted; in the early stages of detention, 
attorneys must seek a court order to confer with clients. The state 
provides counsel if the defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney. 
After conviction, attorneys require the prison director's permission to 
visit a client in jail.
    Prisoners may receive visits from family members, usually once a 
month.
    Since the 2001 abolition of the State Security Act, courts have 
refused police requests to detain suspects longer than 48 hours without 
referring the case to the Public Prosecutor, and police have complied 
with court orders to release suspects. Prisoners must see a judge 
within 3 days of arrest. In December, inmates in Jaw Prison went on a 
hunger strike to protest delays in the judicial system. Some claimed 
they were spending up to 9 months in cells waiting for the courts to 
hear their cases (see Section 1.c.).

    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a 
nominally independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was not 
independent, and courts were subject to government pressure regarding 
verdicts, sentencing, and appeals. In the past, the King, the Prime 
Minister, and other senior government officials lost civil cases 
brought against them by private citizens; however, the court ordered 
judgments were not always implemented expeditiously. Members of the 
ruling Al Khalifa family were well represented in the judiciary and 
generally did not recuse themselves from cases involving the interests 
of the Government. The King chairs the Higher Judicial Council, which 
appoints members of the Constitutional Court.
    The country's legal system is based on a mix of British Common Law, 
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes, regulations, 
and traditions. The judiciary is organized into two separate branches: 
the civil law courts; and the Shari'a law courts.
    The civil law courts adjudicate all civil and commercial, cases, 
and all personal status cases involving non-Muslims. The Courts of 
Minor Causes (the Lower Courts and the Court of Execution) have one 
judge with jurisdiction over minor civil and commercial disputes. The 
High Civil Court has three judges with jurisdiction over larger civil 
and commercial disputes and personal status cases involving non-
Muslims. Appeals are made at the Civil High Court of Appeal, which is 
presided over by three judges. The criminal law courts adjudicate 
criminal cases. The Lower Criminal Court has one judge and rules on 
misdemeanor crimes. The High Criminal Court has three judges and rules 
on felonies. Appeals are made at the Criminal High Court of Appeal, 
which also has three judges. Both the civil and criminal court systems 
have a Supreme Court of Appeal (Court of Cassation), the final 
appellate court.
    In September 2003, the High Civil Court considered a lawsuit 
brought against the Government by the family of a citizen, who died in 
2002 during a violent demonstration in front of a foreign embassy. On 
April 27, 2004, the Court ordered the Ministry of the Interior to 
compensate the family (see Section 1.a.).
    The Shari'a Law Courts have jurisdiction over personal status cases 
involving citizen and non-citizen Muslims. There are two levels: the 
Senior Shari'a Court; and the High Shari'a Court of Appeal. At each 
level is a Sunni Shari'a Court with jurisdiction over all personal 
status cases brought by Sunni Muslims, and a Jaafari Shari'a Court with 
jurisdiction over cases brought by Shi'a Muslims. The High Shari'a 
Court of Appeal must be composed of a minimum of two judges. In the 
event of a disagreement, the Ministry of Justice provides a third judge 
and the decision will be based on a majority vote.
    Finally, the 2002 Constitution established the Constitutional Court 
to rule on the constitutionality of laws and statutes. The Court's 
membership consists of a president and six members, all appointed by 
the King's royal decree. These seven judges serve 9 year terms and 
cannot be removed before their terms expire. The King may present draft 
laws to the Court to determine the extent of their agreement with the 
Constitution. The Court's determination is final and ``binding on all 
state authorities and on everyone,'' according to the Constitution.
    The Constitution provides that the King appoints all judges by 
royal decree. The King also serves as chairman of the Supreme Judicial 
Council, the body responsible for supervising the work of the courts 
and the Public Prosecution Office. The Constitution does not provide a 
legislative branch confirmation process for judicial appointees nor 
does it establish an impeachment process.
    In March, the Justice Minister dismissed five Shari'a court judges 
and suspended a sixth for corruption and disreputable behavior.
    In February 2003, a citizen lost custody of her two children in a 
Shari'a court. Her appeal was denied by the original judge on February 
21, 2003. On January 11, the Shari'a court overturned its 2003 decision 
and granted custody of the children to their mother.
    In September 2003, a group of women's rights activists, attorneys, 
and journalists who were critical of various decisions of Shari'a 
judges published their views in the daily newspaper Akhbar Al-Khaleej. 
Eleven Shari'a court judges brought slander charges against this group, 
which was led by Anwar Abdulrahman, editor-in-chief of the newspaper. 
Abdulrahman challenged the constitutionality of laws for the press, 
judicial authority, and criminal procedures. In December 2003, the High 
Shari'a Court of Appeal suspended his trial and passed the case to the 
Constitutional Court. On July 13, seven of the Shari'a court judges 
dropped the criminal case against Abdulrahman. The Ministry of Justice 
dismissed the other four judges on charges of corruption. On October 
10, the High Criminal Court rejected the judges' case. A newspaper 
called the result a ``triumph for the press and social reformers'' in 
the country (see Section 2.a.).
    The Women's Petition Committee is a group of women who were 
negatively affected by Shari'a court decisions. Since 2003, they have 
called for the issuance of a long-promised personal status law. In a 
petition to the King, they requested that the Supreme Judicial Council 
intervene in matters of inspection, supervision, and reform of the 
religious judiciary. There was no response from the Supreme Judicial 
Council by the year's end; however, the King spoke of the necessity of 
a personal status law during his address at the opening of Parliament 
on October 9.
    Civil and criminal trial procedures provided for an open trial, the 
right to counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the 
right to appeal. Juries are not a part of the judicial system.
    Defendants may choose their own attorneys. If they are unable to 
afford a private attorney, defendants may ask the Justice Ministry to 
appoint an attorney to represent them in court. In the past, some 
attorneys and family members involved in politically sensitive criminal 
cases claimed that the Government interfered with court proceedings to 
influence the outcome or to prevent judgments from being carried out; 
however, there were no such reports during the year. There were 
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
    Court procedures do not meet internationally accepted standards for 
fair trials.
    The BDF maintains a separate court system for military personnel 
accused of offenses under the Military Code of Justice. The Ministry of 
Interior has a similar system for trying police officials. Neither 
court reviewed cases involving civilian, criminal, or security 
offenses.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.

    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for freedom from arbitrary 
interference with privacy, home, and correspondence except under the 
provisions of law and under judicial supervision; however, the 
Government continued to infringe on citizens' right to privacy. The 
Government continued to carry out some illegal searches. Telephone 
calls and personal correspondence remained subject to monitoring. A 
government controlled proxy prohibited user access to Internet sites 
considered to be antigovernment or anti Islamic, but these restrictions 
were often circumvented (see Section 2.a.). Police informer networks 
were extensive and sophisticated.
    According to press reports on August 15, the BDF denied one of its 
high-ranking officers permission to marry a woman from a different 
sect.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
freedom of speech and of the press, but the Government limited these 
rights in practice, especially in the media.
    Local press coverage and commentary on international issues was 
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also was 
relatively unrestricted. However, representatives from the Information 
Ministry actively monitored and blocked local stories on sensitive 
matters, especially those related to sectarianism, national security, 
or criticism of the royal family, the Saudi ruling family, and judges. 
In April, the country's third independent daily newspaper, Al-Meethaq, 
issued its first edition and soon discussed the issue of homosexuality, 
creating a controversial debate throughout the country. The Government 
did not participate in this debate. In October 2003, the Bahrain 
Journalists Association (BJA) became a full member of the International 
Federation of Journalists (IFJ).
    In 2002, a press law was issued by royal decree. The Government 
began implementing the law but ``froze'' it due to a public outcry. 
Although suspended, the law continued to be enforced at the 
Government's discretion. The suspended press law provides for freedom 
of press and speech; however, it also contains restrictions on these 
``rights.'' The law provides for prison sentences in three general 
categories of offenses: criticizing the State's official religion; 
criticizing the King; and inciting actions that undermine state 
security. In addition, the law allows fines up to BD 2,000 ($5,300) for 
14 other offenses, including publicizing statements issued by a foreign 
state or organization before obtaining the consent of the Minister of 
Information; publishing any news reports which may adversely affect the 
value of the national currency; reporting any offense against the head 
of a state which maintains diplomatic relations with the country; or 
publishing offensive remarks towards an accredited representative of a 
foreign country because of acts connected with his post.
    In March, Sunni religious leaders and several Sunni 
parliamentarians compelled the Dubai-based Middle East Broadcasting 
Channel 2 (MBC 2) to halt its production of the reality television show 
``Big Brother'' in the country, despite general public support for the 
program. The show was to be based on the original Dutch version but 
with some changes due to Islamic sensitivities. Whereas, in the 
original, 12 female and male contestants were filmed 24 hours per day 
as they lived together and periodically took votes to dismiss each 
other, the local version separated the males from the females so that 
they interacted only in communal areas. The Information Minister 
accepted the program in this format, provoking attacks from 
conservative parliamentarians who demanded his removal from office. 
Outside parliament, conservative religious leaders denounced the 
immoral nature of the program. Sunni conservatives organized a public 
protest that attracted more than 1,000 demonstrators. On March 3, MBC 2 
announced that it was halting production. It made no reference to 
government pressure in its public statement.
    In March, the Council of Representatives' Legal and Legislative 
Affairs Committee approved amendments to the Penal Code that provide 
for the imprisonment or fine of any person who publicly humiliates 
members of the National Assembly or who publishes the content of closed 
sessions.
    In May, the Ministry of Information confiscated the May 9-15 issues 
of Al-Mushahid Al-Siyasi magazine that contained articles on the recent 
petition for constitutional change (see Section 2.b). Al-Mushahid Al-
Siyasi is a well-known Arabic magazine, published in London by the BBC, 
and has a local circulation of 500 in Bahrain. Many issues of the 
magazine have been confiscated in the past, particularly ones 
containing articles critical of the country.
    On July 27, the Al-Jazeera Theater staged a political comedy ``Mr. 
MP'' under the patronage of Parliament Chairman Khalifa Al-Dhahrani. 
The play addressed the Parliament's performance over the last 2 years, 
making fun of individual parliamentarians and their proposals. There 
were no reports of censorship.
    Individuals openly expressed critical opinions regarding some 
domestic political and social issues in private settings, internet chat 
rooms, occasionally on State run television call in shows, and 
increasingly in organized public forums. Some citizens criticized 
leading government officials and one, Abd al-Hadi al-Khawaja, was 
jailed. On September 25, police arrested al-Khawaja, former Director of 
the Bahrain Center for Human Rights Executive, for criticizing the 
Prime Minister, Sheikh Khalifa al-Khalifa (the King's uncle) during his 
presentation on poverty at the Al-Aruba Club. Al-Khawaja accused the 
Prime Minister of squandering public money and blocking key economic 
and social reforms.
    Shortly thereafter, the Government temporarily closed Al-Aruba Club 
and dissolved the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights. On November 21, al-
Khawaja was sentenced to 1 year in prison for violating Article 165 
(public incitement against the regime) and Article 168 (spreading 
rumors that could disrupt national security) of the Penal Code. Several 
hours after the court case concluded, the King suspended al-Khawaja's 
sentence and ordered authorities to release him. The Bahrain Center for 
Human Rights challenged its closure. Court proceedings on that case 
were set to begin in January 2005 (see Section 2.b.).
    On October 10, criminal charges of slander were dropped against the 
editor of Akhbar Al-Khaleej (see Section 1.e.). The other two court 
cases brought by the Government against the country's newspapers in 
2003 under the ``frozen law'' were ongoing at year's end.
    In June 2003, Mansour al-Jamry, editor in chief of the independent 
newspaper Al Wasat, was interrogated, sentenced, and fined for 
allegedly publishing sensitive information on an ongoing investigation 
of a locally based terrorist cell. Al-Jamry has appealed his case to 
the Constitutional Court, citing discrepancies in the procedural 
enactment of laws 42, 46, and 47 which deal with judicial authority, 
criminal procedure, and the press. In May, a Higher Criminal Court 
judge referred Al-Jamry's appeal to the Constitutional Court. At year's 
end, this case was ongoing.
    In September 2003, Radhi Mouhsin al-Mousawi, editor in chief of The 
Democrat, a newsletter published by the National Democratic Action 
Society, appeared before the High Criminal Court on charges of 
impropriety, breach of trust, fraud, and forgery of a written document 
after writing an article about corruption in the tourism sector and 
making allegations against an unnamed tourism inspector. Al-Mousawi 
also presented his case to the Constitutional Court, claiming that 
discrepancies in the procedural enactment of the press, judicial 
authority, and criminal procedures laws renders them unconstitutional. 
The Constitutional Court rejected Al-Mousawi's case. The High Criminal 
Court resumed the tourist inspector's defamation case against Al-
Mousawi in September.
    Public demonstrations increased over foreign policy, unemployment, 
family status law, housing shortages, and human rights abuses. These 
were covered in the print media but not always on government owned 
television.
    The Ministry of Information banned the publication of any news or 
information regarding six local men detained in July on suspicion of 
planning terrorist attacks. The Minister of Information issued a 
written decree, explaining that the measure was intended to protect the 
suspects' legal rights. The Minister cited articles 19, 21, and 70D of 
the 2004 Press and Publications law that had not been approved by 
Parliament. Parliamentarians and commentators asserted that such a ban 
must be passed through the legislative branch, not the executive 
branch.
    In February 2003, under the 2002 Publication Laws, the Ministry of 
Information seized copies of ``Mohammed's Character,'' a book 
considered blasphemous for insulting the character of the Prophet 
Mohammed. The Ministry also confiscated books and international 
magazines that featured articles criticizing the 2002 Constitution and 
articles discussing the naturalization of foreigners, which is called 
``political naturalization'' within the country.
    The 2002 Election Law regulated candidates' political activities, 
prohibiting speeches at most public locations and limiting the areas 
where campaign materials could be placed. However, these regulations 
were only sporadically enforced.
    The Information Ministry controlled local broadcast media and 
exercised considerable control over privately owned local print media. 
The most independent of the country's newspapers, Al-Wasat, was subject 
to occasional Government harassment. The Government generally afforded 
foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit their 
contacts; however, the Government continued to ban correspondents from 
the Qatar based Al Jazeera satellite television channel, accusing the 
station of using sensationalized and one sided coverage to unfairly 
project a negative image of the Government.
    The Government owned and operated all local radio and television 
stations. Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from 
neighboring and regional countries were received without interference. 
Al Jazeera was available in the country via satellite.
    In October 2003, a foreign correspondent advised that the Ministry 
of Information threatened to expel him if he did not retract his draft 
article on political naturalization in the country. The correspondent 
reportedly withdrew the story. In December 2003, another foreign 
correspondent was threatened with expulsion if he did not reveal his 
source for his story on a December 17, 2003 illegal political 
demonstration that turned violent when demonstrators attacked police. 
When he reportedly refused, the Ministry of Interior gave him 24 hours 
notice to leave the country. The correspondent's regional bureau chief 
intervened with the Information Minister to keep the correspondent in 
the country.
    The National Telephone Company (BATELCO) provided access to the 
Internet. E mail use was reportedly unimpeded, although it was subject 
to monitoring (see Section 1.f.). More than one third of the population 
used the Internet. There were 140,000 web-based e-mail accounts that 
the Government cannot monitor in the country. Many districts of Manama 
have cyber cafes, and there are 80 chat rooms visited by more than 
1,000 persons daily. It was estimated that 22 percent of the population 
owned personal computers.
    Although there were no formal regulations limiting academic 
freedom, in practice academics avoided contentious political issues, 
and the University of Bahrain did not have a political science program. 
University hiring and admissions policies favored Sunnis and others who 
were assumed to support the Government, rather than focusing on 
professional experience and academic qualifications. However, there 
continued to be some improvement in nondiscriminatory hiring of 
qualified individuals during the year. A few Shi'a professors, 
including women, were hired, and a Shi'a female professor was promoted 
to Dean of the College of Sciences at the University of Bahrain. Larger 
numbers of Shi'a students were accepted into the national university, 
but this was still a smaller proportion than in the general population.

    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of free assembly; however, the Government 
requires organizers to notify the Ministry of Interior 72 hours before 
a public gathering or demonstration takes place. The law prohibits 
unauthorized public gatherings of more than five persons.
    The Government periodically limited and controlled political 
gatherings. On February 14, Bahrain's four main political opposition 
societies launched a 2-day conference on constitutional reform entitled 
``Towards a Contractual Constitution for a Constitutional Monarchy.'' 
Participants examined changes to the 1973 Constitution. Just prior to 
the conference, the Government barred 15 international speakers and 
participants from entering Bahrain, including a prominent MP and former 
Parliamentary Chairman from Kuwait. The Government alleged that the 
conference organizers had not obtained permission to hold the event. 
However, the law requires only that societies notify the Government, 
which the four opposition societies had done. Publicly, the Minister of 
Information justified the participation restrictions by stating that it 
would not allow foreigners to interfere in internal affairs.
    On February 21, Al-Ayam fired its foreign news editor and columnist 
allegedly because he participated in the Constitutional Conference. The 
columnist claimed that his employer was instructed by the Information 
Ministry to fire him.
    Demonstrations occurred throughout the year, not all of which were 
approved by the Government. Unless violent, the Government generally 
did not intervene. During the year, there were four violent incidents 
of political unrest. Numerous peaceful demonstrations protesting 
government policies also occurred, many organized by Al-Wifaq National 
Islamic Society, the country's largest political society. While the 
Government does not permit political parties, it has permitted some 
political activity by several political ``societies,'' including Al-
Wifaq. Since 2001, gatherings at social and political clubs for 
political discussions have been held regularly and without any obvious 
obstruction by the Government.
    Citizens peacefully demonstrated against the French law banning the 
hijab (head scarf) in public schools and government offices in France, 
the cancellation of the ``Big Brother'' television show, the frequency 
of electrical blackouts, the lack of housing, and high unemployment.
    On April 6, the press reported that the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs sent letters to the four main opposition political 
societies threatening legal action if they followed through on their 
plan to hold a popular petition on April 21 to call for rejection of 
the 2002 Constitution. The Labor Minister previously made public 
announcements that such an action by the societies violated Article 29 
of the Law on Societies, which states that only duly constituted 
organizations and corporate bodies may address public authorities 
collectively. The four societies held the petition drive on April 30. 
During the event, police stormed the signature-collection stands and 
arrested 17 petitioners. Three detainees were released on bail on May 2 
for lack of evidence; 14 remained in prison (see Section 3).
    In early May, ``Relatives of the Constitutional Petition 
Detainees'' organized a series of demonstrations outside Parliament to 
protest the detention of the 14 petition gatherers. Approximately 150 
relatives gathered on several occasions in May to protest silently. 
During the last protest, four demonstrators were arrested for defying 
police orders to disperse. Three were released immediately; the fourth 
was released on bail of BD 200 ($530) after being charged with calling 
for unauthorized gatherings and gathering without permission. The law 
requires persons to notify police in writing 72 hours prior to a 
gathering. On May 20, the King released the 14 detainees, stressing the 
importance of democracy in the country. He also announced the opening 
of a dialogue between the Government and the four political opposition 
societies aimed at resolving the dispute over the 2002 constitution.
    The two violent demonstrations this year focused on international 
issues. On March 26, demonstrators marched from Al Suboor Mosque to a 
diplomatic mission after Friday prayers to hold a peaceful protest of 
the assassination of Hamas' founder and spiritual leader Ahmed Yassin. 
The crowd of demonstrators grew to 400, and a group of young rioters 
threw rocks at the police, who responded with tear gas. Rioters then 
burned refuse, tires, and trees. One demonstrator was injured, and a 
house reportedly caught fire after tear gas shells exploded inside. 
Police arrested eight protesters.
    On May 21, approximately 5,000 protesters expressed anger at U.S. 
military operations in Najaf and Karbala as well as U.S. support for 
Israel. Halfway through the rally, organized by the Islamic 
Enlightenment Society and the Al-Wifaq National Islamic Society, riot 
police attempted to redirect the protestors by setting up a roadblock. 
When the crowd refused to turn back, police fired tear gas and rubber 
bullets. Protesters responded by throwing stones at the police and 
burning a police jeep. There were 13 persons injured, including 5 
policemen. Shortly after the demonstration, King Hamad appointed a new 
Interior Minister and ordered an investigation of police conduct at the 
event. At the same time, he confirmed the people's right to protest 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In August, demonstrators protested against U.S. military operations 
in Najaf and demanded protection for the Imam Ali shrine. On August 13, 
a group of 8,000 demonstrators peacefully gathered around 2 main public 
squares in Manama. Parliament also condemned the attacks in Najaf, and 
Members of Parliament took part in the protest.
    On October 28, more than 1,000 persons demonstrated against the 
arrest of human rights activist Abd Al-Hadi Al-Khawaja. The protestors 
formed a ``car parade'' that disrupted traffic in the capital for 
hours. The press reported that police blocked the protesters and fired 
tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the restless crowd. Two 
protestors were injured by rubber bullets or tear gas canisters. 
Twenty-five persons were arrested. All but 13 were released in the 
following weeks. The King ordered the other 13 released with Al-Khawaja 
on November 21 (see Section 2.a.).
    The Political Rights Law promulgated in July 2002 had a negative 
effect on the freedoms of speech and association (see Section 2.a.). 
The law, which the King told political societies to ignore, is intended 
to regulate election campaigns and prohibits ``election meetings'' at 
worship centers, universities, schools, government buildings, and 
public institutions. After this law's promulgation, the occurrence of 
public meetings declined precipitously and they received little 
coverage in the local press. One leader of a popular public forum 
reported that he had been told by a high level government official to 
reduce the attendance at meetings and make them ``less political.''
    The Constitution provides for the right of free association; 
however, the Government limited this right by preventing the formation 
of political parties, although the Government has authorized political 
societies to run candidates and support them financially, and it has 
permitted several NGOs, including human rights organizations, to 
conduct political activities.
    The 1989 Societies Law prohibits any activity by an unlicensed 
society and any political activity by a licensed society. The Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs has the right to reject the registration of 
any society whose services it deems unnecessary to society, are already 
being provided by another society, are contrary to state security, or 
are aimed at reviving a previously dissolved society.
    In May, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs warned the Bahrain 
Center for Human Rights (BCHR) for the second time since October 2003 
that it would revoke the Center's license if the center continued to 
conduct activities of a political nature (see Section 4). On September 
27, the Labor Minister dissolved the Center after holding a seminar on 
poverty at which a BCHR member criticized the Prime Minister (see 
Section 2.a.).

    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, in practice the Government placed some limitations 
on this right. The Constitution declares Islam as the official 
religion, and all other religious groups must obtain a permit from the 
Ministry of Justice and Islamic affairs in order to operate and hold 
religious meetings. Depending on circumstances, a religious group may 
also need approvals from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the 
Ministry of Information, and/or the Ministry of Education to manage a 
school. There were four Sikh temples, a synagogue, and several official 
and unofficial Hindu temples, located in Manama and its suburbs.
    The Government funds, monitors, and subjects all official religious 
institutions to some controls. These include Shi'a and Sunni mosques, 
Shi'a ma'tams (religious community centers), Shi'a and Sunni waqfs 
(charitable foundations), and the religious courts, which represent 
both the Ja'afari (Shi'a) and Maliki (one of the four Sunni) schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Although the region of Rifaa constitutes 
approximately 40 percent of the country's landmass, the Royal Court, in 
a letter dated April 27, denied an application for a Shi'a mosque 
citing that land in Rifaa cannot be allocated for commercial 
enterprises.
    Thirteen Christian congregations that were registered with the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operated freely and allowed other 
Christian congregations to use their facilities. In May, Ministry of 
Islamic Affairs officials participated in the Conference for Religious 
Freedom in Qatar. The 3-day seminar focused on Islamic-Christian 
dialogue. Since 1950, the Mar Thoma Syrian Church of Malabar has sought 
land from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to build a church and to hold 
religious services. Though Mar Thoma is registered with the Government, 
the Ministry has still not responded to the church's formal 
applications. The National Evangelical Church allows Mar Thoma's 
congregation to use its facilities for early morning services; however, 
the facility can only accommodate half of Mar Thoma's congregation at 
any time.
    The Government discourages proselytizing by non Muslims and 
prohibits anti Islamic writings; however, Bibles and other Christian 
publications were displayed and sold openly in local bookstores. 
Religious tracts of all branches of Islam, cassettes of sermons 
delivered by sheikhs from other countries, and publications of other 
religions were readily available. However, on April 2, the Ministry of 
Information banned the film ``The Passion of the Christ'' because it 
depicts the prophet Isa (Jesus).
    The Ministry of Islamic Affairs has repeatedly denied a Baha'i 
congregation a license to operate. The Ministry views Baha'ism as an 
inauthentic offshoot of Islam, and it therefore refuses to recognize 
the congregation. The Baha'i congregation continued to practice its 
faith without government interference.
    The Government rarely interferes with what it considers legitimate 
religious observations. Public religious events, most notably the large 
annual 2-day national Shi'a holiday of Ashura, were permitted but 
monitored closely by police. The King ordered the Ministry of 
Information to provide full media coverage of Ashura events. There were 
no restrictions on the number of citizens permitted to make pilgrimages 
to Shi'a shrines and holy sites in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The 
Government monitored travel to Iran and scrutinized carefully those who 
chose to pursue religious study there.
    The Political Rights Law promulgated in July 2002 forbids election 
speeches in worship centers, but political sermons continued (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). There were no reported closures of ma'tams or 
mosques during the year. The Government also may appropriate or 
withhold funding in order to reward or punish particular individuals or 
places of worship.
    In April 2003, the Ministry of Interior lifted its ban on 
policewomen wearing veils, or headscarves. In July 2003, the King 
granted veiled women the right to drive, ending a decade-long ban. In 
July 2004, the Ministry of Defense lifted its ban on growing beards, a 
practice common among many Muslims. All military personnel who had been 
terminated for growing beards were reinstated. In August, the Cabinet 
reviewed a proposal to permit men to grow beards and women to wear 
veils while working for government departments.
    Discrimination against the Shi'a population remained a problem. 
Sunnis received preference for employment in sensitive government 
positions and in the managerial ranks of the civil service. The royal 
family is Sunni, and the defense and internal security forces were 
predominantly Sunni. Shi'a citizens were allowed to hold posts in these 
forces, though not in positions of significance. In September, the 
Interior Ministry established a community police program to train 500 
Shi'a men and women to patrol Shi'a neighborhoods. In the private 
sector, Shi'a citizens tended to be employed in lower paid, less 
skilled jobs. In private conversations, Shi'a consistently complained 
of discrimination, especially in public sector jobs and positions at 
the university. While Shi'a acknowledged that the situation was 
improving slowly, they still compose a disproportionately high 
percentage of the country's unemployed. Educational, social, and 
municipal services in most Shi'a neighborhoods, particularly in 
villages, were inferior to those found in Sunni urban communities.
    There were no acts of physical violence or harassment of Jewish 
persons or acts of violence against or vandalism of Jewish community 
institutions, such as schools, synagogues, or cemeteries. The 
Government has not enacted any laws protecting the right of Jews to 
religious freedom; however, it has not interfered with their religious 
freedom. The Government makes no effort to specifically promote anti-
bias and tolerance education. Some anti-Semitic political commentary 
and editorial cartoons appeared, usually linked to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
    On April 30, unknown assailants vandalized the Zainab mosque. The 
mosque restrooms were rendered inoperable. The assailants destroyed all 
water faucets, fans, electrical switches, lamps, microphones, clocks, 
and audiotapes. The Director of the government agency responsible for 
managing government-held Shi'a properties sought police assistance to 
investigate the crime. At year's end, there were no results of the 
investigation.
    For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International 
Religious Freedom Report.

    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution prohibits restrictions 
on freedom of movement, except as provided by law and judicial 
supervision. Banishment and prevention of return are prohibited. The 
Government generally respected these rights. Citizens were free to move 
within the country and change their place of residence or work.
    The 1963 Citizenship Law provides that the Government may reject 
applications to obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the 
applicant has the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil 
Court. A noncitizen resident may obtain a travel document, usually 
valid for 2 years and renewable at the country's embassies overseas. 
The holder of a travel document also required a visa to reenter the 
country.
    The Constitution permits the Government to revoke citizenship only 
in the cases of treason and other such cases ``according to the law.'' 
The Government has not revoked the citizenship of any person under the 
2002 Constitution.
    Opposition groups claimed that the naturalization process was 
politically driven to manipulate demographics for voting purposes and 
to avoid addressing the question of discrimination against Shi'a in 
sensitive government positions where employment is allegedly dominated 
by non indigenous groups. The Government complied with a 2003 
parliamentary committee's request for official naturalization data with 
the understanding that the committee keep the data confidential. The 
Government occasionally granted citizenship to Sunni residents, most of 
whom are from Jordan, Syria, the Arabian Peninsula, and Egypt. The 
Government stated that Saudis who recently received citizenship are the 
grandchildren of citizens who had emigrated to Saudi Arabia. According 
to the country's Nationality Law, these persons have a legal right to 
citizenship.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports 
of new cases of forced exile during the year. In May, the Royal Court 
granted 34 citizens living in exile the right to return to the country.
    Although the law does not include provisions for the granting of 
refugee status or asylum to persons who meet the definition in the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 
Protocol, there were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
    The Government has not established a system for providing 
protection to refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their Government or their 
political system; however, the Constitution provides for a 
democratically elected Council of Representatives, the lower house of 
Parliament. The King appoints the Prime Minister, who then proposes 
Cabinet Ministers who are appointed by the King. Members of the ruling 
family held all security related Cabinet positions.
    The bicameral National Assembly consists of the elected Council of 
Representatives and the appointed Shura (Consultative) Council. Either 
of these chamber may propose legislation, but the Cabinet's Office of 
Legal Affairs must draft the text of laws. The King may veto laws 
passed by the National Assembly, which in turn may override a veto by a 
two thirds majority vote. If the legislature overrides a veto, the King 
must promulgate the law within 1 month.
    The King may dissolve the Representative Council at his discretion, 
and he retains the power to amend the Constitution and propose, ratify, 
and promulgate laws. Either council may question government ministers, 
and the Representative Council may pass a two thirds majority vote of 
no confidence that requires a minister's resignation. The Council of 
Representatives may also introduce a resolution indicating it cannot 
cooperate with the Prime Minister. The entire National Assembly would 
then have to pass the resolution by a two thirds majority that would 
require the King to either dismiss the Prime Minister or dissolve the 
Council of Representatives.
    In 2002, the country held its first national elections in nearly 3 
decades. Fifty-three percent of eligible voters elected 40 members to 
the Council, who shared legislative powers with the King and with the 
40 members of the Shura Council appointed by the King. The country also 
elected municipal councils, whose role is still being defined.
    There were no government candidates in the 2002 elections. Informed 
observers reported that the election campaigning and voting was 
generally free and fair; however, some candidates were not allowed to 
visually observe ballot counting, and there was incomplete reporting of 
election results. The Bahrain Transparency Society monitored the 
elections, in addition to a number of other local NGOs. Significantly, 
the Government drew the electoral districts in both the municipal 
council and the legislative elections to protect Sunni interests by 
creating several districts with small populations likely to elect a 
Sunni candidate. In contrast, districts where a Shi'a candidate was 
likely to win were drawn to include large numbers of voters, a formula 
that diluted the voting strength of the Shi'a community. International 
observers commented that this gerrymandering generally violated the one 
man, one vote principle common to most democracies.
    Women accounted for 52 percent of voters in the 2002 municipal 
election. The Government did not publish the percentage of women voters 
in the legislative election. Although no women were elected in either 
election, two of the six women that that ran for the Council of 
Representatives forced their competitors into run offs in which each 
woman received more than 40 percent of the vote.
    Political parties are prohibited, but a number of ``societies'' 
operate much like political parties, holding internal elections, 
campaigning for public support, and hosting political gatherings (see 
Section 2.b.). Al-Wifaq National Islamic Society, the country's largest 
political society, was joined by three other political societies in 
boycotting the elections, citing grievances over the constitutional 
provisions that equalize the powers of the elected Council of 
Representatives and the appointed Shura Council. On June 7, the 
Parliament defeated a political parties draft law. The Political Rights 
and Election Laws restrict the freedoms of speech and association (see 
Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    On April 30, police arrested 14 opposition society youths for 
distributing pamphlets and collecting signatures for a petition calling 
for constitutional reform (see Section 2.b.). The youths were charged 
under Articles 160, 165, 166, and 169 of the 1976 Penal Code, all of 
which pertain to ``crimes against the internal security of the state.'' 
Specifically, the Public Prosecutor accused them of not limiting 
signatures to society members and using coercive language in the 
pamphlets. One newspaper reported that many elderly and illiterate 
citizens were brought to centers to sign the petition despite not 
understanding its content. The Minister of the Royal Court also stated 
that collecting signatures on a petition is illegal because only the 
King and the National Assembly may call for constitutional change.
    The parliamentary investigation into the alleged financial 
corruption involving management of government-controlled pension funds 
continued. The director general of the General Organization for Social 
Insurance first raised concerns about the funds in April 2003 when he 
announced that the organization would be bankrupt by 2023. According to 
the investigation's initial findings in January 2004, the Government 
lost BD 750 million ($ 1.9 billion) due to poor investments and 
administrative mismanagement. The Parliamentary Investigative Committee 
demanded that the Government repay the lost funds, implement oversight, 
and restructure fund boards. The Prime Minister publicly endorsed the 
Committee's recommendations. This investigation was marked by open 
discussion of this financial scandal. The Prime Minister personally 
appointed directors-general to each fund and restructured the pension 
fund board to consist of 15 members. The country's labor federation, 
the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions (GFBTU), criticized the 
Cabinet for changing the pension fund laws without its consultation, 
and segments of the public called for the dismissal of the ministers 
responsible for the mismanagement. The Parliament did not call for a 
vote of no confidence to remove the three ministers involved.
    The King has appointed six women to the Shura Council. The Ministry 
of Cabinet Affairs reported that women held nine percent of senior 
civil service posts. Health Minister Dr. Nada Haffadh, appointed April 
27, was the first female minister in the country. There were four 
female assistant secretaries and 52 female general directors in the 
Government. Four women were appointed as Bahrain's first female 
prosecutors, representing 15 percent of all public prosecutors.
    The majority of women in Government worked in positions of lower 
significance; only a few attained senior positions within their 
respective ministries or agencies. In May, the Ministry of Defense 
promoted two women officers to the rank of colonel. They were the first 
women to hold this rank in the BDF.
    The majority of citizens belong to the Shi'a and Sunni sects of 
Islam, with the Shi'a constituting approximately two thirds of the 
indigenous population. However, Sunnis predominate politically and 
economically. The ruling family is Sunni and is supported by the armed 
forces, the security services, and influential Sunni and Shi'a merchant 
families who benefit from a relatively open economy.
    The King appointed a Christian and a Jewish member to the Shura 
Council. Twenty one Shura Council members were Shi'a Muslims and 
seventeen were Sunni. Approximately one third of the cabinet ministers 
were Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Restrictions on freedom of association and expression sometimes 
hindered investigation or public criticism of the Government's human 
rights policies. There are 386 NGOs registered in the country. NGOs 
must report to the Ministry of Labor when their members participate in 
international NGO events.
    In July, the Bahrain Human Rights Society (BHRS) released its 
second annual report in which it praised the Government's commitment to 
human rights and the democratic process; however, the report pointed 
out insufficient legislation in various sectors. The report noted for 
instance that the law does not adequately protect domestic servants 
against abuse. The report also criticized political societies for 
mixing politics with religion and using mosques and community centers 
to promote their agendas. The BHRS offered recommendations, which 
included amending legislation to bring it in line with the principles 
of the constitution and international resolutions, ratifying 
international resolutions, and implementing domestic law to protect the 
rights of expatriate workers.
    On May 12, the Labor Ministry sent a letter to the BCHR stating 
that it would revoke the Center's license if it continued to conduct 
political activities, which are prohibited according to Article 18 of 
the Law on Societies. The letter did not specify the political 
activities in which BCHR had engaged. However, on April 30, the BCHR 
had organized a peaceful protest calling for the release of 25 persons 
detained for petitioning for constitutional change. On June 27, the 
Labor Ministry sent a letter instructing BCHR to stop working on 
establishing a victim assistance shelter, citing that this activity is 
not within the purview of its bylaws; however, with the endorsement of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BCHR raised more than BD30,000 
($75,000) to establish a shelter for abused runaway housemaids. On 
September 27, the Labor Ministry issued a press release to the local 
newspapers announcing the dissolution of BCHR prior to any notification 
to BCHR President or the board. The property was locked and bank 
accounts frozen. The BCHR challenged its closure, and the case remained 
in the courts at year's end (see Section 2.a.).
    In recent years, the Government has allowed increased access 
between civil society and international human rights organizations. 
During the year, there were no reports of Government harassment of 
these groups or their members.
    On March 15, the ICRC held its fourth annual Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) conference in the country.
    In March, an official from Human Rights Watch (HRW) participated in 
a BCHR fundraiser for a victim assistance shelter and spoke at a BCHR 
public forum on human rights.
    In August, Amnesty International visited the country to gather 
information on violence against women.
    There are no parliamentary human rights committees; however, the 
efforts of a Shura Council member led to the establishment of the 
Bahrain Human Rights Watch Society (BHRWS) on December 11. The Society 
planned to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the 
country.
Section 5. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
    The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the 
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work 
for all citizens; however, in practice these rights were protected 
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or 
sex.

    Women.--Spousal abuse was widespread, particularly in poorer 
communities. In August, a prominent clinical psychologist, based on a 
study of 605 women of varying ages, social statuses, and educational 
backgrounds, concluded that 30 percent of the country's married women 
have been subjected more than once to verbal, physical, or 
psychological spousal violence. However, there were very few known 
instances of women seeking legal redress for violence, and there was 
little public attention to or discussion of the problem. Incidents 
usually were kept within the family.
    No government policies or laws explicitly addressed violence 
against women. Rape is illegal; however, because marital relations are 
governed by Shari'a, spousal rape is not illegal.
    It was not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers 
to be beaten or sexually abused by their employers and recruiting 
agents (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.). Numerous cases were reported to 
local embassies, the press, and the police; however, most victims were 
too intimidated to sue their employers. Courts reportedly allowed 
victims who did appear to sue for damages, return home, or both.
    Although prostitution is illegal, some foreign women, including 
some who worked as hotel and restaurant staff, engaged in prostitution 
(see Section 6.f.). In September 2003, the National Democratic Action 
Society (a political society that boycotted the 2002 elections) alleged 
that the Ministry of Tourism's Inspectorate Division was corrupt and 
had allowed a flourishing trade of trafficking in persons and 
prostitution. The Government refuted the charge, and the author of the 
article has been charged with defamation of character under the press 
law (see Section 2.a.).
    In July, authorities rounded up hundreds of women from Uzbekistan, 
Ukraine, and Bulgaria who had entered the country on 2-week multiple 
entry visas. They were charged with overstaying their visas. Some 
runaway housemaids resorted to prostitution because they were unable to 
legally secure a new employer. On July 10, the Central Security 
Directorate raided an establishment that held four runaway housemaids 
engaged in prostitution.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM) is not practiced in the country. 
There is no specific law that prohibits FGM.
    Women's specific legal rights vary according to Shi'a or Sunni 
interpretations of Islamic law, as determined by the individual's 
faith, or by the court in which various contracts, including marriage, 
are made. Since 2002, women have filed complaints with the Ministries 
of Justice and Islamic Affairs against several Shari'a judges, arguing 
that women were often treated unfairly in these courts. In March, the 
Justice Minister dismissed five Shari'a court judges and suspended a 
sixth for corruption and disreputable behavior (see Section 1.e.).
    Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a divorce; 
however, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local 
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases, 
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances 
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available 
in the country. Women of either sect may own and inherit property and 
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the 
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In 
contrast, in the absence of a direct male heir, Sunni women inherit 
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among the 
brothers or male relatives of the deceased. In practice, better 
educated families use wills and other legal maneuvers to ameliorate the 
negative effect of these rules.
    In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni 
mothers custody of daughters under age 9 and sons under age 7, although 
custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those 
ages. Regardless of custody decisions, the father retains the right to 
make certain legal decisions for his children--such as guardianship of 
any property belonging to the child--until the child reaches the legal 
age of 21. A noncitizen woman automatically loses custody of her 
children if she divorces their citizen father. A Muslim woman legally 
may marry a non Muslim man if the man converts to Islam. In such 
marriages, the children are automatically considered to be Muslim. 
Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the permission 
of the male head of the household.
    In July, Parliament amended Article 13 of the 1975 Passports Law 
and granted a married woman the right to apply for a passport without 
her husband's consent. On August 7, the Government announced that 
children born to citizen mothers and foreign fathers would receive 
citizenship.
    In February, the Public Works and Housing Minister issued an order 
granting widows, divorcees, and other women with child dependents the 
ability to apply for government housing and loans. The Government also 
granted divorcees the right to remain in their ex-husband's home while 
they raised their children. However, the new regulation applies only to 
homes granted by the Ministry or built with loans from the Ministry. In 
December 2003, more than 100 protesters, including many divorced women, 
staged a sit-in outside of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, 
demanding the settlement of their housing and loan requests. The 
protesters claimed that the distribution of housing was discriminatory; 
thousands of persons had been on the waiting list for 15 to 20 years 
while some recent applicants received housing immediately. On October 
4, in response to parliamentary demands, the Prime Minister announced 
plans to reduce the waiting period for families to receive housing, to 
make more land available for construction of new housing units, to 
devote more attention to the housing demands of low income families, 
and to ease the housing loan process. He said that the cost for these 
plans will be reflected in the 2005-06 national budget.
    On September 19, the Government approved a plan to establish an 
alimony fund for divorced women with children whose ex-husbands did not 
pay required alimony. The fund had not been established at year's end.
    According to the Ministry of Commerce, women constituted 16.6 
percent of the total workforce. The Government has publicly encouraged 
women to work and was a leading employer of women, who constituted 40.4 
percent of the government workforce and included university professors, 
public school teachers, and employees in the public health and social 
sectors. In August, the Traffic Directorate started training women to 
become traffic police. On September 6, the Ministry of Interior 
accepted applications for 100 women to serve on community police 
forces.
    Labor laws do not discriminate against women; however, in practice 
there was discrimination in the workplace, including inequality of 
wages and denial of opportunity for advancement, and the influence of 
religious traditionalists sometimes has hampered women's constitutional 
rights despite their participation in the work force.
    Laws do not recognize the concept of equal pay for equal work, and 
women frequently were paid less than men. In November, the Cabinet 
Affairs Ministry reported that women hold 9 percent of senior civil 
service posts, up from 7 percent in 2003. In December 2003, the BCHR 
released a report on employment discrimination. According to the 
report, Shi'a citizens, who account for 66 percent of the country's 
citizens, held 101 of 572 (18 percent) high-ranking posts.
    Sexual harassment is prohibited; however, it was a widespread 
problem for women, especially foreigners working as domestics and other 
low level service jobs. In May, a Lower Criminal Court official dropped 
a case of sexual harassment against a Member of Parliament when the 
general prosecutor's office sent a letter to the court stating that the 
MP had immunity. The offenses allegedly took place in 2001 before he 
became a parliamentarian in 2002.
    The number of women holding business licenses has increased 41.7 
percent from 2001-03 and 7 percent from 2003-04. According to the 
Ministry of Commerce, commercial registrations for women accounted for 
31 percent of all registrations.
    The president of the University of Bahrain is a woman. Women 
compose 70 percent of the students at the country's universities, 
although some women complained that admissions policies at the 
University of Bahrain discriminated against qualified female 
applicants, especially Shi'a women. This year, 68 percent of new 
students accepted into the university were women.
    Large numbers of women's organizations seek to improve the status 
of women under both civil and Islamic law. Some of the most active 
women's groups are the Bahrain Businesswomen Society (BBS), Bahrain 
Women's Society (BWS), and the Mustaqbal Society. The Supreme Council 
of Women was established by royal decree and is directed by the First 
Lady, Her Highness Shaikha Sabika bint Ebrahim Al-Khalifa.

    Children.--The Government has often stated its commitment to the 
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and 
religious framework of society. It generally honored this commitment 
through enforcement of civil and criminal laws and an extensive social 
welfare network.
    Public education for citizen children below the age of 15 was free. 
While the Constitution provides for compulsory education at the primary 
levels (usually up to 12 or 13 years of age), the authorities did not 
enforce attendance. Starting in the 2004-05 academic year, ``family 
education'' will be taught to both boys and girls in the last year of 
primary school. Previously, only girls were instructed in this subject, 
which covers reproductive education and nutrition. According to the 
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), 85 percent of school-aged children are 
enrolled. Most students finish secondary school.
    Limited medical services for infants and preadolescents were 
provided free of charge. Non-citizen adults and children pay less than 
$3 per visit for care at health centers. Fees for operations vary 
according to the costs of the hospital.
    Civil law based on tradition and religion shape the social status 
of children. Child abuse was rare, as was public discussion of it; the 
preference of the authorities was to leave such matters within the 
purview of the family or religious groups. In 2002, a 13-year old girl 
disappeared after reportedly being abused by members of her family. 
According to the local media, the case received attention at the 
highest levels of Government, but despite the Prime Minister's public 
charge to the police to find her, she remained missing.
    The authorities actively enforced the laws against prostitution, 
including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. Violators were 
dealt with harshly and may be imprisoned or, if a noncitizen, deported. 
There were no reports of child prostitution during the year.
    Independent and quasi governmental organizations, such as the 
Bahraini Society for the Protection of Children and the Mother and 
Child Welfare Society, played an active part in protecting children by 
providing counseling, legal assistance, advice, and, in some cases, 
shelter and financial support to distressed children and families. The 
Child Care Home, funded from both the Government and private sources, 
provided shelter for children whose parents were unable to care for 
them. The Bahrain Women Society has established a ``healing center'' to 
offer counseling, workshops, and therapy to victims of child abuse. The 
Society implemented a 24-hour hotline for victims of sexual and 
physical abuse.
    There were very few reports of arrests and detentions of juveniles 
during the year, and those who were arrested reportedly were released 
soon thereafter.

    Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons, and there were reports that some foreign 
workers were recruited for employment on the basis of fraudulent 
contracts and then forced to work under conditions different from what 
was promised. Workers from Southeast Asia, South Asia, Ethiopia, and 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc reported being forced into 
conditions that amounted to trafficking. Some of these victims reported 
being sexually exploited or being forced to work as prostitutes; 
however, the most common forms of trafficking in persons involved 
unskilled construction laborers and domestic workers. Up to half of low 
and unskilled expatriate workers were subjected to contract 
substitution and this was often due to the duplicity of recruiting 
agents in the worker's home country. Victims of this form of 
trafficking experienced withholding of passports by employers, 
alteration of contracts without their consent, nonpayment of salaries, 
or extremely long working hours.
    There were also allegations from runaway housemaids that 
recruitment agencies make it a practice to rape incoming housemaids.
    Frequently, citizen traffickers within the country--including those 
within influential families--bribed new workers to pay a substantial 
fee (up to $1,200) to receive what turned out to be fraudulent visas 
for nonexistent jobs. The Government has taken measures to fight this 
illegal practice. In June, 10 companies faced court action for selling 
over 150 fraudulent visas. On August 3, the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (MOLSA) referred 43 business owners to the Public 
Prosecutor on allegations of selling fraudulent visas.
    On July 17, MOLSA revoked the licenses of two manpower agencies for 
overcharging housemaids for processing work contracts. Two other 
agencies were under investigation for allegations of raping housemaids.
    Although prostitution is illegal, some foreign women, including 
some who worked as hotel and restaurant staff, engaged voluntarily in 
prostitution. There were also reports that some women were forced into 
prostitution. When the Government discovered this kind of abuse, it 
generally responded by prosecuting the offender and often the victim's 
sponsor or employer. There were persistent reports that some women 
working in hotels and restaurants were locked in a communal house or 
apartment when not working and driven to work in a van (see Section 
6.c.).
    The Government has taken positive steps to combat trafficking; 
however, trafficking remains a problem. A ``National Task Force'' 
committee published pamphlets on expatriate workers' rights in several 
languages, provided manuals on these rights to local diplomatic 
missions, and installed a telephone hotline for victims. Victims of 
trafficking may seek assistance from their embassies, although the 
Government did not provide direct assistance to victims. On July 18, 
the Labor Ministry established a joint subcommittee with the Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Filipino, and Indian Ambassadors. The committee will meet 
semiannually to address labor issues affecting foreign workers.
    In 2003, the Labor Ministry increased the number of inspectors from 
9 to 40 and granted them the authority to inspect foreign labor camps. 
During the year, MOLSA trained an additional 30 inspectors. There were 
an additional 20 inspectors for entertainment outlets under the 
Information Ministry's Tourism Affairs Office.
    In December 2003, the Parliament ratified the U.N. Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and two protocols to prevent, 
suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and 
children and smuggling of migrants by land, sea, and air.

    Persons With Disabilities.--The Labor Ministry estimated the number 
of persons with disabilities at 7,000 in 2002, but the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) estimated that persons with disabilities 
accounted for 4 percent of the population--approximately 24,000 
persons.
    There were no reports of discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in employment, education, or access to health care. The 
law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and a variety of 
governmental, quasi governmental, and religious institutions are 
mandated to support and protect persons with disabilities.
    The Government's housing regulations require that access be 
provided to persons with disabilities, although enforcement is random. 
Greater emphasis has been given in recent years to public building 
design that incorporates access for persons with disabilities; however, 
the law does not mandate access to non-residential buildings for 
persons with disabilities.
    Society tended to view persons with disabilities as special cases 
in need of protection rather than as fully functioning members of 
society. Nonetheless, the Government is required by law to provide 
vocational training for persons with disabilities who wish to work, and 
it maintains a list of certified, trained persons with disabilities. 
The Directorate of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation announced that 577 
students with disabilities will start vocational training at centers 
for persons with disabilities, an increase of 87 students from last 
year and 187 from 2 years ago.
    The 1976 Labor Law requires that any employer of more than 100 
persons must hire at least 2 percent of its employees from the 
Government's list of workers with disabilities; however, the Government 
does not monitor compliance. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
placed persons with disabilities in public sector jobs, such as public 
telephone exchanges.
    A regional Center for the Treatment of the Blind was headquartered 
in the country, and a similar Center for the Education of Deaf Children 
was established in 1994.

    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Article 3 of the 1963 
Citizenship Law grants naturalized citizenship to Arab applicants 
residing in the country for 15 years and to non-Arab applicants 
residing in the country for 25 years.
    In 2003, the Council of Representatives formed a committee to 
investigate the naturalization process and allegations that the 
Government illegally naturalized persons who did not reside in the 
country. On January 25, the Committee reported to the press that 
citizenship was granted to more than 300 persons who did not have 
permanent residence in the country. The committee's report pointed out 
that political naturalization has a negative impact on security and 
socio-economic conditions. It recommended amending the law and 
restructuring the Citizenship Directorate. On March 13, six political 
societies submitted detailed reports and photographic samples of 
naturalized passports to the Undersecretary of Immigration and 
Passports. To date, the Government has not responded.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--In 2002, the King promulgated a new 
law on labor unions that, for the first time, granted workers the right 
to form and join unions. The law also grants noncitizens the right to 
join unions. There were 39 trade unions in the country. In June 2003, 
the King confirmed the right to form unions at government ministries. 
Since then, five public unions have been established. This law and the 
Labor Union Law also improved the legal status of foreign workers.
    The Labor Union Law established a union federation, the General 
Federation of Bahraini Workers (GFBW) which provides that all unions be 
members of the GFBW. During the year, the GFBW board renamed the 
federation the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions. The law does 
not restrict who may be a union official other than to stipulate that a 
member of a company's management may not be a union member. The law 
also states that no more than one union per establishment may be 
created and prohibits unions from engaging in political activities. As 
of September, only one federation of trade unions existed in the 
country, despite criticism from the ILO, which called for multiple 
federations.
    The law allows union membership for private sector, civil service, 
and maritime workers; however, soldiers (or members of the military) 
are prohibited from joining workers in unions of the civil service, and 
of maritime workers.
    The law does not address anti-union discrimination, and no reports 
of such behavior were reported. Nothing in the law prohibits unions 
from access to the legal system. The law encourages unions to 
participate in international labor forums and events; however, none 
have yet joined an internationally affiliated trade union organization. 
No internationally affiliated trade unions exist in the country.
    Women activists have been trying since 2001 to establish the 
Bahrain Women's Union and continued to face setbacks during the year. 
The Labor Ministry refused to issue the license because it insists that 
the group change their name to the Bahrain Women's Society. The women 
disagreed with the name change since the union would bring together 12 
societies to advocate women's rights, press for legislative changes, 
and prepare women for political roles. One of the group's priorities is 
the creation of a personal law to protect the rights of families, 
women, and children. In September, the preparatory committee filed a 
civil suit against the Government. To date, this case has not been 
decided.

    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Unions can 
be formed at establishments of any size. Employers and the Government 
are required to treat unions as independent juristic entities.
    The law states that ``the right to strike is a legitimate means for 
workers to defend their rights and interests''; however, the law also 
places some restrictions on this right. The law requires arbitration 
before a vote to strike and that three quarters of a union's members 
approve the strike in a secret ballot. It is not yet clear whether the 
arbitration is binding.
    Although government sources say the arbitration provision will not 
preempt the right to strike, the text of the law does not clearly 
specify that a union may proceed to a strike vote if it disagrees with 
the arbitrator's decision. Officials from the labor and business 
sectors and from the Government have examined this ambiguity but are 
not interested in changing it.
    In March, Seef Properties fired 34 employees without notice or 
severance. The President of the workers' union negotiated the highest 
compensation package ever paid to a dismissed private sector employee, 
a 6-month severance package. Union negotiators hoped for re-employment.
    There are no special laws or exemptions from regular labor laws in 
export processing zones.

    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded 
labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice, the labor laws 
applied for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occurred, 
particularly in the cases of domestic servants and those working 
illegally. The Government also prohibits forced or compulsory child 
labor, and there were no reports that such practices occurred.
    Foreign workers, who make up approximately two thirds of the 
workforce, in many cases arrived in the country under the sponsorship 
of an employer and then switched jobs while continuing to pay a fee to 
their original sponsor. This practice made it difficult to monitor and 
control the employment conditions of domestic and other workers. The 
Government issued new regulations granting foreigners more freedom to 
change jobs, but the process is legally cumbersome and many foreign 
workers remain unaware of their rights and obligations under the law. 
After 1 year in a position, a foreign worker is allowed to break this 
contract and look for other work. Prospective employees must present 
the new employer with a ``No Objection Certificate'' (NOC) from the 
previous employer. After 2 years in a position, expatriate employees 
may change jobs locally without the approval of the original sponsor 
and within the duration of their contract period, provided the original 
employer was notified in writing months in advance. Many foreigners 
have been unable to obtain NOCs to get a new job.
    Unskilled foreign workers can become indentured servants and often 
lacked the knowledge to exercise their legal right to change 
employment.
    There were numerous credible reports that employers withheld 
salaries from their foreign workers for months and even for years, and 
refused to grant them the necessary permission to leave the country. 
The Government and the courts generally worked to rectify abuses if 
they were brought to their attention, but they otherwise focused little 
attention on the problem. The fear of deportation or employer 
retaliation prevented many foreign workers from making complaints to 
the authorities (see Section 6.e.).
    Statistics provided by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights Migrant 
Workers Group indicated that 22 construction workers committed suicide 
in 2003. In the first 3 months of the year, 11 expatriate workers 
committed suicide. According to the report and related press articles, 
many of these workers were under financial strain, suffered exhaustion, 
and missed their families back in their home countries.
    In May, 10 Filipino retail workers presented their case to the 
Justice Ministry charging their employer with contract substitution, 
unpaid overtime, and sexual harassment. The case was settled amicably. 
At the workers' request, the employer gave them their overdue salaries 
and paid for their plane tickets to the Philippines.
    On July 5, BCHR negotiated a BD 15,000 ($40,000) settlement with 
employer Al Owainati Construction Company to pay 22 Indian runaway 
workers their overdue salaries, unpaid overtime, leave entitlement, and 
indemnity pay.
    On July 5, the Cabinet approved legal action to establish a Control 
Bureau to resolve disputes between workers and employers through 
negotiations.
    The Government worked to decrease instances of abuse by passing a 
law assessing a BD 500 to BD 1,000 ($1,300 to $2,650) fine for 
employers found guilty of forced labor. Claims of runaway workers in 
the country have dropped dramatically since May 2003. The new rules 
require sponsors to pay a BD 250 ($600) deposit per employee for each 
report of a runaway.
    Labor laws do not apply to domestic servants. There were numerous 
credible reports that domestic servants, especially women, were forced 
to work 12 or 16 hour days, given little time off, malnourished, and 
subjected to verbal and physical abuse, including sexual molestation 
and rape. Between 30 to 40 percent of the attempted suicide cases 
handled by the Government's psychiatric hospitals were foreign maids 
(see Section 6.e.).
    It was estimated that there were 50,000 foreign housemaids working 
in the country who are predominantly of Sri Lankan, Indonesian, Indian, 
and Filipino origins. During the year, there were 19 incidents of 
seriously abused housemaids reported in the press and another 50 cases 
that have been reported directly to the Philippine Embassy. In 2003, 
the Philippine, Indian, and Bangladeshi embassies proposed a four point 
agenda to ensure the protection of housemaids. The agenda included 
creating a separate labor law for housemaids, formulating a standard 
contract guiding the hiring of housemaids, setting a standard minimum 
wage, and abolishing the practice of employers retaining the 
housemaids' passports. This agenda has not yet been introduced to the 
National Assembly.
    Housemaids that have no embassy representation in the country 
(Indonesian and Sri Lankan) are often subject to the worst types of 
physical and sexual abuse. With no diplomatic mission to protect them 
and no established victim assistance shelter, runaway housemaids have 
often been returned by untrained police to abusing employers.
    Since February 2003, the Philippine Embassy has requested that all 
Filipinos register with the embassy so it can track ``undocumented'' 
workers. Registration with the Philippine Embassy allows them certain 
benefits, including scholarships for vocational courses and medical 
insurance.
    In August, the Indian Embassy held an open house to register all 
Indian workers in the country. The mission announced its disappointment 
with the low turnout.
    As in 2003, there were numerous reports of employers and recruiting 
agents raping and beating housemaids. Some housemaids also suffered 
injuries escaping employers. On February 8, two Indian housemaids who 
were physically abused fled their employers. They lived on the street 
for two months before church staff found them and referred them to the 
Bahrain Center for Human Rights.
    On March 6, a 13-year old Indonesian housemaid (whose passport 
indicated she was 24 years old) was found severely beaten and burned 
wandering downtown Manama. The same night a Sri Lankan housemaid was 
dropped off at a manpower agency after her employer tied her to a table 
and raped her repeatedly at knife-point.
    On March 14, an Indian housemaid committed suicide in her 
employer's home.
    On July 4, a man visited a recruitment agency in search of work. 
There he saw an Indian housemaid who was beaten and locked in the back 
room. He reported it to BCHR and the police. Police visited the agency 
and received assurances from the agency owner that he would take the 
housemaid to the Indian embassy. Instead, he took her to the airport 
where she was arbitrarily deported. The BCHR filed a case with the 
Public Prosecutor. The case is pending.
    On July 26, a Filipino housemaid fell four stories from the window 
of a manpower agency while attempting to escape after being locked for 
days in the agency offices. She suffered serious spinal and leg 
injuries.
    On July 27, a Bangladeshi housemaid accused her employer of rape. 
The employer's brother-in-law turned him in to the police.
    On August 9, police took a citizen owner of a manpower agency into 
custody after an Indonesian housemaid alleged he raped her.
    On August 20, an Indian housemaid who was locked in her room for 3 
months was freed by police after alerting them by screaming from her 
window.
    On January 28, the Higher Civil Appellate Court commuted the 
sentence of the Ethiopian maid who killed her employer in 2003 from 
death to life in prison.
    There were persistent reports that some foreign women working as 
hotel and restaurant staff were locked in a communal house or apartment 
when not working and driven to work in a van. Many reportedly traded 
sexual favors with hotel managers in exchange for time off from work 
(see Section 5, Trafficking). In September 2003, the press reported 
allegations of corrupt Ministry of Tourism inspectors. The inspectors' 
job ensures hotels' compliance with tourism and labor laws. To date, an 
investigation into the problem remained pending.

    d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The 
minimum age for employment is 14 years of age. Juveniles between the 
ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in hazardous conditions or at 
night, and may not work more than 6 hours per day or on a piecework 
basis. Child labor laws were enforced effectively by Ministry of Labor 
inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor outside that sector 
was monitored less effectively, but it was not believed to be 
significant outside family operated businesses, and even in such 
businesses, it was not widespread.
    The law prohibits forced and compulsory child labor, and the 
Government enforced this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).

    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country does not have an 
official minimum wage; however, the Government issued guidelines in 
2002 that the public and private sectors should pay workers no less 
than BD150 ($398) per month, and the Government observed this standard 
in paying its employees. Compliance with these guidelines was not 
actively monitored, and few unskilled foreign laborers earned as much 
as the guidelines suggested. For foreign workers, employers considered 
benefits such as annual trips home, housing, and education bonuses as 
part of the salary. However, these guidelines did not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family.
    The Labor Law is enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs and mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult 
workers, including adequate standards regarding hours of work (a 
maximum of 48 hours per week) and occupational safety and health. Under 
the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued 
employment.
    In June 2003, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs established 
a hotline to take calls to respond to complaints about working 
conditions, delay in salary payments, and other related issues. A 
separate hotline was established to receive information about illegal 
workers. Due to limited training for staff, it was reported that 
sometimes calls went unanswered. In December, an international NGO 
trained the hotline staff.
    The Ministry enforced the law with periodic inspections and routine 
fines for violators. In February 2003, the first group of 11 new labor 
inspectors graduated from training. In May 2003, the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs increased the number of inspectors to 40. These 
trained inspectors will also visit labor barracks to ensure that 
workers' accommodations meet the necessary safety and hygiene 
standards. The inspectors are only authorized to inspect premises that 
have a commercial registration.
    Most of the 50 Asian workers who filed complaints at the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs after falling victim to fraud by a local 
company were repatriated.
    The press often performed an ombudsman function on labor problems, 
reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases brought before 
the courts. The BCHR has also volunteered to assist the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs with inspections and monitoring. Once a worker 
lodges a complaint, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs opens an 
investigation and often takes remedial action. The Fourth High Court 
consists of three labor courts and has jurisdiction over cases 
involving alleged violations of the Labor Law. Complaints brought 
before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs that cannot be settled 
through arbitration must be referred to the Court within 15 days. In 
practice, most employers preferred to settle such disputes through 
arbitration, particularly since the court and labor law generally are 
considered to favor the employee.
    The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and 
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing. 
Because employers included housing and other allowances in their salary 
scales, foreign workers legally may be paid lower regular wages than 
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes received the same 
or a greater total compensation package because of home leave and 
holiday allowances. Some foreign workers and citizen workers were paid 
comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly 
greater for the former. Women in most jobs were entitled to 60 days of 
paid maternity leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women 
generally were paid less than men.
    The law provides that fines and jail sentences would be imposed 
upon private sector employers who failed to pay wages required by law. 
This law applied equally to employers of citizens and foreign workers 
and was intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers, who at times 
were denied the required salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law provides 
equal protection to citizen and foreign workers; however, all foreign 
workers require sponsorship by citizens or locally based institutions 
and companies. According to representatives of several embassies with 
large numbers of workers in the country, the Government was generally 
responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign worker complaints 
regarding unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign workers, 
particularly those from developing countries, often were unwilling to 
report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and having to return 
to their countries of origin.
    Legislation permits all workers except domestics to change jobs 
without obtaining a NOC from their employers. However, the process for 
utilizing these new rules was not well understood among expatriate 
workers. They were also often unwilling to challenge their employers 
for fear of being punished or deported. In addition, domestic workers 
were exempted from this legislation, and many of them remained in 
essence indentured workers, unable to change employment or leave the 
country without their sponsors' consent (see Section 6.c.).
    Foreign women who worked as domestic workers often were beaten or 
sexually abused (see Section 5). In 2003, between 30 and 40 percent of 
attempted suicide cases handled by the Government's psychiatric 
hospitals were foreign maids (see Section 6.c.). Unverified reports 
suggested that unskilled foreign laborers were also at risk of suicide.
    The Government has set occupational health and safety standards and 
identified agencies responsible for enforcement. Under the Labor Law, 
workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work 
situations without jeopardy to their continued employment, but during 
the year there were no reports of workers attempting removal.
    On April 10, a Bangladeshi construction worker died when he fell 
from a four-story building. On July 17, a housing camp for 60 
construction workers collapsed. No one was injured in the collapse but 
the 60 workers had to find temporary shelter. On July 26, three 
construction workers suffered extreme exhaustion, collapsing from 
working in excessive heat.
    The Government and NGOs held several occupational safety seminars 
throughout the year.

                               __________

                                 EGYPT

    The Arab Republic of Egypt has been governed by the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) since the party's establishment in 1978. The NDP 
continues to dominate national politics and has maintained an 
overriding majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the 
partially elected Shura (Consultative) Council. Islam is the state 
religion. In 1999, President Hosni Mubarak was reelected unopposed to a 
fourth 6-year term in a national referendum. The President appoints the 
Cabinet and the country's 26 governors and may dismiss them at his 
discretion. The 1971 Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, it is subject to influence by the Executive, and 
application of the 1981 Emergency Law undermined its independence. The 
Government continued to use the Emergency Law to try non-security cases 
in the emergency and military courts. Corruption was a problem.
    The Ministry of Interior controls the State Security Investigations 
Service (SSIS), which conducts investigations and interrogates 
detainees, and the Central Security Force (CSF), which enforces curfews 
and bans on public demonstrations. Security forces continued to arrest 
and detain suspected terrorists. The President is commander-in-chief of 
the military. The Government maintained effective control of the 
security forces, which committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    The country is transforming from a government-controlled economy to 
a free market system; however, state-owned enterprises still dominated 
some key sectors of the economy. The country had a population of 
approximately 70.5 million. Approximately 30 percent of the population 
worked in the agriculture sector, which is almost entirely privately 
owned. An estimated 3 to 5 percent of the population were subsistence 
farmers. Income from tourism, remittances from approximately 2 million 
citizens working abroad, petroleum exports, and Suez Canal revenues 
were the other principal sources of foreign currency and were 
vulnerable to external shocks. Approximately 17 percent of the 
population live in poverty, but the poor performance of the economy 
over the past 4 years likely has increased that figure.
    The Government respected human rights in some areas; however, its 
record was poor, and in many areas serious problems remained. Citizens 
did not have the meaningful ability to change their government. The use 
of military courts to try civilians and Emergency Courts to try 
political cases continued to infringe on a defendant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial before an independent judiciary. The 1981 
Emergency Law, extended in February 2003 for an additional 3 years, 
continued to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued 
to mistreat and torture prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain 
persons, hold detainees in prolonged pretrial detention, and 
occasionally engage in mass arrests. Local police killed, tortured, and 
otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other persons. Police 
continued to arrest and detain homosexuals. The Government partially 
restricted freedom of the press and significantly restricted freedom of 
assembly and association. The Government placed some restrictions on 
freedom of religion. Domestic violence against women remained a 
problem. Female genital mutilation (FGM) persisted, despite government 
and nongovernmental efforts to eradicate the practice. Tradition and 
some aspects of the law discriminated against women and religious 
minorities, including Christians and particularly Baha'is. The 
Government limited workers' rights. Child labor remained widespread, 
despite government efforts to eradicate it. Exposure of workers to 
hazardous working conditions and other employer abuses continued.
    During the year, the Government convicted 14 police officers for 
abuse and torture of prisoners. The Government abolished State Security 
Courts in 2003 but continued to use Emergency Courts. The Government 
established the National Council for Human Rights. The Government 
generally permitted human rights groups to operate without 
restrictions; although several groups encountered difficulty 
registering under the NGO law, they developed alternate means to 
conduct their work.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Arbitrary and Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, during the year, human rights 
organizations and the press reported that at least 10 persons died in 
custody at police stations or prisons.
    In June, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) issued a 
report entitled ``Torture: An Unchecked Phenomena,'' in which it 
documented 41 cases of torture in police stations resulting in 15 
deaths in custody from April 2003 to April 2004. EOHR also asserted 
that from April 1993 to April 2004, it documented 412 cases of torture 
in police stations, including 120 cases where detainees died as a 
direct result of torture.
    On February 25, police arrested Sayyed Mustafa for defaulting on a 
loan. They tortured him at Awseem police station in Giza Governorate. 
On March 20, police transferred him to Qasr El Eini hospital, which 
declined to admit him, apparently for fear that the hospital would be 
held liable for his condition. The police returned him to Awseem, where 
he died the same day. The Public Prosecutor ordered an investigation, 
the results of which remained unavailable at year's end.
    Following the arrest of 52 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) members in May, 
one of the detainees, Akram Abdel Aziz El Zuhairy, died in custody. The 
MB leadership said that he died from torture. MB members of Parliament 
called for an immediate investigation, which led to the formation of a 
committee that visited Tora prison in June where the other 51 MB 
members were being held. The Ministry of Interior denied the torture 
allegations, and instead claimed that Zuhairy hit his head while being 
transported between detention and a meeting with prosecutors. On June 
15, the Office of Forensic Medicine issued a report asserting that 
there were no signs of injury to Zuhairy's body.
    On August 27, 2 detainees died and 18 others required 
hospitalization for asphyxiation/heat exhaustion after police 
transported them in poorly ventilated trucks to Cairo from Saloum, on 
the Libyan border. These dead and injured were part of a group of 80 
young men who had illegally crossed the Libyan border for the eventual 
purpose of seeking work in Italy. Libyan authorities arrested the men 
and deported them in air-conditioned buses. Egyptian authorities, 
however, used two enclosed non-air-conditioned police trucks for the 
12-hour trip to Cairo. Upon arrival at Khalifa Police Station, 2 
detainees had died and 18 others needed hospitalization. A number of 
the detainees further said that police officers beat them during the 
trip after they pleaded for better ventilation. The Minister of 
Interior and the Office of the Public Prosecutor ordered immediate 
investigations, but at year's end had not publicized their findings.
    The investigation into the deaths of five prisoners in 2002 at 
Ghurbaniyat Prison in Alexandria reportedly was completed, although the 
Government has declined to publicize its findings.

    b. Disappearance.--Human rights monitors continued to call 
attention to unresolved cases of disappearance during the year. The 
February 2003 disappearance of Adel Mohammed Kamiha, a coffee shop 
owner who reportedly disappeared following his transfer from police 
custody to State Security in Alexandria, remained unsolved.
    In August 2003, Reda Helal, a journalist, disappeared. The police 
initiated an investigation into his disappearance; however, Helal's 
whereabouts continued to be unknown at year's end. Despite continued 
speculation by human rights groups that the Government might be 
withholding information about his disappearance, there was no evidence 
to support this assertion.
    On March 31, the Human Rights Association for the Assistance of 
Prisoners (HRAAP) filed suit against the Ministry of Interior and the 
Yemeni Embassy in Cairo to determine the whereabouts of Brigadier Ahmed 
Salem Ebeid, a Yemeni citizen and former Yemeni Deputy Minister of 
Defense and former Minister of Information. Ebeid, who had resided in 
Egypt since 1994, disappeared on February 18. HRAAP asserted that the 
Government exchanged Ebeid, alleged by Yemeni authorities to be an 
opposition member, for an Egyptian terror suspect in Yemeni custody. In 
a December 8 hearing, HRAAP lawyers showed that Ebeid was no longer in 
Egypt. The next hearing is scheduled for February 2005.
    On April 18, HRAAP appealed to President Mubarak to investigate the 
disappearances of 29 individuals who had been arrested by State 
Security officers, dating back to 1989. Most prominent among these 
cases is a former Libyan Deputy Foreign Minister who disappeared in 
1992.
    During the year, EOHR reported that it was following 59 cases of 
disappearance within the country since 1992. Domestic human rights 
organizations provided names to the U.N. Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances; the Government reportedly has denied 
involvement in any of the cases.

    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or 
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however, 
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and 
prison guards remained common and persistent. According to the U.N. 
Committee Against Torture, a systematic pattern of torture by the 
security forces exists, and police torture resulted in deaths during 
the year (see Section 1.a.).
    Under the Penal Code, torture or giving orders to torture are 
felonies punishable by 3 to 10 years imprisonment. For death resulting 
from torture, the crime is considered intentional murder punishable by 
a life sentence. Arrest without due cause, threatening death, or using 
physical torture are crimes punishable by imprisonment. Abuse of power 
to inflict cruelty against persons is a crime punishable by 
imprisonment and fines. In June 2003, the Government abolished hard 
labor as a punishment.
    Victims may also bring a criminal or civil action for compensation 
against the responsible government agency. There is no statute of 
limitations in such cases.
    Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous, credible 
reports that security forces tortured and mistreated detainees. Human 
rights groups reported that the State Security Investigations Service 
(SSIS), police, and other government entities continued to employ 
torture to extract information, coerce opposition figures to cease 
their political activities, and to deter others from similar 
activities. Reports of torture and mistreatment at police stations 
remained frequent. In prominent cases, defendants alleged that police 
tortured them during questioning (see Sections 1.e. and 2.c.). Although 
the Government investigated torture complaints in some criminal cases 
and punished some offending officers, punishments generally have not 
conformed to the seriousness of the offense.
    Principal methods of torture reportedly employed by the police and 
the SSIS included stripping and blindfolding victims; suspending 
victims from a ceiling or doorframe with feet just touching the floor; 
beating victims with fists, whips, metal rods, or other objects; using 
electrical shocks; and dousing victims with cold water. Victims 
frequently reported being subjected to threats and forced to sign blank 
papers for use against themselves or their families should they in the 
future complain about the torture. Some victims, including male and 
female detainees and children, reported sexual assaults or threats of 
rape against themselves or family members. While the law requires 
security authorities to keep written records of detentions, human 
rights groups reported that the lack of such records often effectively 
blocked investigation of complaints.
    The Emergency Law authorizes incommunicado detention for prolonged 
periods. Detentions under this law frequently were accompanied by 
allegations of torture (see Section 1.d.).
    In May, the Government's Central Audit Agency directed the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) to require any security/police officers found to be 
responsible for torture to be financially liable for any judgments 
levied against the MOI. The Audit Agency noted during the prior year 
that punitive damages awarded by the courts to victims of torture 
amounted to approximately LE 2.8 million ($450,000) in the 8 
governorates (of 26 in the country) where data was available.
    In October 2003, according to media accounts and human rights 
monitors, police in Helwan stormed a house searching for two suspects 
in a homicide. Although the suspects were not present, police took into 
custody between 11 and 15 members of their family, including 4 women. 
The detained family members allege they were beaten, whipped, 
suspended, stripped, and molested as police attempted to extract 
information about the whereabouts of the two suspects. On October 24, a 
criminal court scheduled the next hearing on the case for February 
2005.
    The Government continued efforts during the year to hold security 
personnel accountable for torturing prisoners in their custody; 
however, the Government continued its practice of giving light 
sentences to security personnel convicted of serious abuses, including 
torture resulting in death. Human rights organizations and the press 
reported that 14 police officers in 5 separate cases, 2 of which 
involved deaths in custody, were held publicly accountable. Eight 
police officers in 1 case involving 1 death were acquitted; and 6 
cases, including 2 that led to deaths in custody involving charges 
against 15 police officers, remained before the courts at year's end. 
Some of the cases involved incidents that took place in previous years.
    In a 2002 report ``The Truth,'' HRAAP (previously HRCAP, the Human 
Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners), commended judicial 
efforts to prosecute security officers for torture, but it also 
outlined current obstacles, including a vague legal definition of 
torture and the inability of victims to sue perpetrators directly.
    In May 2003, a court of appeal upheld the December 2002 conviction 
of police officer Arafa Hamza, who had been sentenced to 1 year in 
prison for the death from torture of 21-year-old student Ahmed Mahmoud.
    There were no developments in the prosecution of Luxor Police Major 
Magdy Awad and an assistant for the May 2003 torture of Nagdy Mohamed 
Gad El Rub.
    Numerous cases of torture were documented. For example, on October 
11, the North Cairo Criminal Court sentenced policeman Ashraf El 
Ganzouri from the Azbakiya Police Station to 5 years in prison after he 
was convicted of illegally detaining and torturing to death Mohamed 
Hassan Abdallah in 2003. Ganzouri was charged with beating Abdallah 
during an identity card investigation. Abdallah resisted and Ganzouri's 
final attack resulted in Abdallah's death due to blunt trauma to the 
head.
    On January 22, the Public Prosecutor indicted Major Yasser Ibrahim 
El Akkad, the head of the Criminal Investigations Department at Haram 
Police Station, on charges that he tortured actress Habiba while 
investigating the 1999 killing of Habiba's husband. Habiba was 
convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. After serving 5 years of 
her sentence, new evidence emerged, implicating five other persons in 
the murder. The Public Prosecutor also indicted these five new 
suspects. On February 17, the Court of Cassation accepted Habiba's 
appeal and ordered a retrial. The prosecution of Major El Akkad is 
scheduled to begin in February 2005.
    On April 23, the Public Prosecutor directed a Qalyoubiya criminal 
court to charge a police captain from Kafr Shukr with excessive use of 
force. The captain had sought to arrest the son of Mabrouka Ibrahim 
Moselhi for theft. When Moselhi told the captain that her son was not 
at home, the captain assaulted her. After the assault, she required 
hospital treatment, and filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor. 
By year's end, the Public Prosecutor had announced no additional 
developments in the case.
    On April 5, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal of Captain 
Ashraf Gohar of the Nasr City II police station. Gohar's conviction of 
charges stemming from the illegal detention, torture, and killing of 
Sayyed Eissa originally resulted in a 3-year sentence in 2002. A 2003 
appeal to a lower court had reduced Gohar's sentence to 1 year, but the 
Court of Cassation affirmed the original penalty.
    In May and again in December, the Alexandria Criminal Court 
postponed the case of Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim. Two officers and four 
policemen, including Yasser Youssri, had been charged with torture 
leading to the death of Ibrahim in 2002, as well as falsification of 
official documents to cover up the crime. The Association for Human 
Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) also filed a civil case on behalf of Ibrahim's 
family seeking LE 10 million ($1.6 million) in compensation. The Court 
is scheduled to consider the case in March 2005.
    On June 6, the Banha Criminal Court (in Qalyoubiya Governorate) 
began the trial of four police officers accused of forcing three 
members of a family to make a wrongful murder confession. The family 
members were convicted in 2003 and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. 
Shortly after they began their sentences, a serial killer confessed to 
the crime. The trial of the police officials was underway at year's 
end.
    During the year, civil courts continued to review cases and 
frequently awarded compensation to victims of police abuse. Human 
rights observers recommended that rules and standards for victims be 
established to obtain redress and parity in compensation.
    Civil cases won compensation for some victims of torture. For 
example, on February 25, the South Cairo Court of Compensations awarded 
Mustafa Ibrahim Amin Ibrahim LE 5,000 ($806) in punitive damages as a 
result of torture during his detention from 1999 to 2001. On July 26, 
the South Cairo Court of Compensations awarded Ibrahim an additional LE 
10,000 ($1,612) in punitive damages for torture during detention from 
1993 to 1995. Ibrahim, who spent 12 years in detention, was released in 
October 2003. HRAAP raised the case on Ibrahim's behalf.
    On March 31, the South Cairo Court of Compensations awarded Hamdy 
Mahmoud Abdel Latif Emara LE 14,000 ($2,258) in punitive damages from 
torture during his detention from 1996 to 1998. Hamdy, who spent 6 
years in detention, was finally released in July 1998. HRAAP raised the 
case on behalf of Hamdy. On April 14, another branch of the same court 
granted Hamdy an additional LE 7,000 ($1,129) in punitive damages for 
torture during his detention from 1992 to 1993.
    On May 12, the South Cairo Court of Compensations awarded LE 15,000 
($2,419) punitive damages to Tarek Abdel Sattar Ahmed Murad as a result 
of torture during detention from 1997 to 1999. On May 26, another 
branch of the compensation court granted him an additional LE 15,000 
($2,419) in punitive damages. Notwithstanding his award, Murad remained 
in detention without charge. HRAAP pled the case on Murad's behalf.
    On September 13, the South Cairo Court of Compensations awarded 
Abdel Fattah Mohamed LE 24,000 ($3,871) in punitive damages for torture 
during his detention period from 1994 to 1996. Mohamed spent 12 years 
in detention without charge through renewed detention orders. HRAAP 
raised the case on Mohammad's behalf.
    In 2002, police arrested Zaki Saad Zaki Abd al-Malak, a 23-year 
resident of Ismailia in an Internet sting operation. Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) reported that police beat him daily during 2 weeks of detention 
in Agouza Police Station. Malak was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, 
followed by 3 years' police supervision. According to reports, he was 
being held in Borg al-Arab prison near Alexandria. On October 17, the 
Court of Cassation overturned Zaki's conviction on appeal, and he was 
released.
    In 2002, three domestic human rights associations, as well as two 
international organizations, presented their allegations and findings 
to the U.N. Committee Against Torture (the ``Committee''), a 
subcommittee of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. The Committee's 
report expressed concerns about the continued implementation of the 
state of emergency; consistent reports of torture and ill treatment; 
abuse of juveniles and homosexuals; the continued use of administrative 
detention; the lack of access by victims of torture to the courts and 
lengthy proceedings; and disparities in the awarding of compensation.
    The report included several recommendations: ending the state of 
emergency; the adoption of a clear legal definition of torture; the 
abolition of incommunicado detention; the review of military court 
decisions by a higher tribunal; the removal of ambiguities in the law 
that allow the prosecution of individuals for their sexual orientation; 
the acceptance of a visit by a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture; the 
establishment of rules and standards for victims; and allowing human 
rights organizations to pursue their activities unhindered. The 
Government maintained that the Committee's recommendations were under 
review at year's end.
    Actions cited by the Government include the abolition of flogging 
in prisons; unannounced inspections of places of detention; court 
decisions that disregarded confessions obtained under duress; increased 
human rights training for police officials; and the establishment of 
several human rights committees and departments within government 
ministries. With assistance from the U.N. Development Program, the 
Government began to implement the Committee's recommendation for 
increased human rights training for law enforcement personnel and 
prosecutors.
    The Government did not permit a visit to the country by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture during the year.
    Prison conditions remained poor. EOHR and HRAAP both stressed the 
deteriorating conditions in prisons, especially overcrowded cells and a 
lack of medical care, proper hygiene, food, clean water, proper 
ventilation, and recreational activities. Tuberculosis was widespread; 
overcrowded cells remained a problem. Some prisons continued to be 
closed to the public.
    In July, HRAAP stated in its 2003 annual report that prison 
conditions remained dismal. HRAAP emphasized the deteriorating 
conditions in temporary detention.
    In October, Al-Ahram newspaper reported that the MOI was planning 
to deliver a statement to the People's Assembly (Committee for Defense 
and National Security) on the violation of rights of detainees at 
police stations. This initiative came in response to the 
interpellations by several Members of Parliament concerning the deaths 
of two detainees who were being transported from the Libyan border to 
Cairo (see Section 1.a.). At year's end, the Ministry had not provided 
its statement to the People's Assembly.
    Failure to implement judicial rulings regarding the release of 
administrative detainees and the opening of prisons to visits remained 
a problem. Relatives and lawyers often were unable to obtain access to 
prisons for visits. Restrictions were placed on visits to prisoners 
incarcerated for political or terrorist crimes, limiting the number of 
visits allowed for each prisoner and the total number of visitors 
allowed in the prison at one time.
    On August 22, Dar al-Ifta, the official body responsible for 
issuing Islamic fatwas (legal opinions) issued a legal opinion that all 
prisoners should be allowed spousal visits on a monthly basis.
    As required by law, the public prosecutor continued to inspect all 
regular prisons during the year; however, findings were not made 
public. The SSIS ``detention centers'' were excluded from mandatory 
judicial inspection.
    There were separate prison facilities for men, women, and 
juveniles. In practice, the separation of adults from juveniles did not 
always occur, and abuse of minors was common. Civilians were not 
detained in military prisons. Political prisoners generally were 
detained separately from prisoners convicted of violent crimes.
    Lawyers were permitted to visit prisoners in their capacity as 
legal counsel; however, in practice, they often faced considerable 
bureaucratic obstacles that prevented them from meeting with their 
clients (see Section 1.d.). The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and other domestic and international human rights monitors 
did not have access to prisons or to other places of detention.
    On November 1, inmates at Abu Zabal prison began a hunger strike to 
protest conditions at the prison, which was ongoing at year's end. The 
prisoners' complaints included mistreatment, inadequate medical care, 
poor sanitation, and limits on visitors.

    d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, during the year, security 
forces conducted large-scale arrests and detained hundreds of 
individuals without charge. Police also at times arbitrarily arrested 
and detained persons.
    Previously, to obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor, the 
Constitution provided that police had to show that an individual likely 
committed a specific crime. The Emergency Law nullified this 
requirement in 1981 and provides that in order to obtain a warrant, 
police must show only that an individual poses a danger to security and 
public order.
    The country has both local and national law enforcement agencies, 
all of which fall under the Ministry of Interior. Local police operate 
in large cities and governorates. State Security and Central Security 
Force officers are responsible for law enforcement at the national 
level and for providing security for infrastructure and key officials, 
both domestic and foreign. Single-mission agencies, such as the Tourist 
and Antiquities Police and the Anti-Narcotics General Administration, 
also work at the national level.
    There were continued instances of torture by police, and human 
rights monitors believed the use of torture by police was widespread. 
Although some police were prosecuted, human rights monitors believed 
most incidents of torture went unpunished. There was widespread petty 
corruption in the police force, especially below senior levels. There 
is an internal affairs mechanism, the workings of which are not 
publicized, which was regularly employed for investigating corruption 
and other instances of police malfeasance. Judicial recourse was also 
employed (see Section 1.c.).
    The Emergency Law allows detention of an individual without charge 
for up to 30 days, after which a detainee may demand a court hearing to 
challenge the legality of the detention order, and may resubmit his 
motion for a hearing at 1-month intervals thereafter. There is no limit 
to the detention period if a judge continues to uphold the detention 
order or if the detainee fails to exercise his right to a hearing. 
Incommunicado detention is authorized for prolonged periods by internal 
prison regulations. Human rights groups and the U.N. Committee Against 
Torture both expressed concern over the application of measures of 
solitary confinement.
    Access to counsel is provided in normal cases, but there were 
reports that some suspects detained under the normal Penal Code 
experienced difficulties meeting with counsel. In Emergency Law cases, 
however, access to counsel was often restricted or denied prior to the 
transfer of the accused to a courtroom for the start of proceedings. 
Many detainees under the Emergency Law remained incommunicado in State 
Security detention facilities without access to lawyers. After these 
cases are transferred to trial, the court appoints a lawyer from a duty 
roster issued by the Bar Association.
    In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the 
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must 
bring charges within 48 hours following detention or release the 
suspect. However, they may detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months 
pending investigation. Arrests under the Penal Code occurred openly and 
with warrants issued by a district prosecutor or judge. There is a 
functioning system of bail for persons detained under the Penal Code. 
The Penal Code contains several provisions to combat extremist 
violence, which broadly define terrorism to include the acts of 
``spreading panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
    Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of persons have been detained 
administratively in recent years under the Emergency Law on suspicion 
of terrorist or political activity. Several thousand others have been 
convicted and were serving sentences on similar charges (see Section 
1.e.). In a July 2003 interview published in Al-Ahram Weekly, HRAAP 
(formerly HRCAP) estimated that the total number of persons held in 
administrative detention was approximately 15,000. HRAAP further 
estimated that about 7,000 additional persons have been released over 
the past 3 years. According to HRAAP, approximately 300 detainees, 
including convicts with remaining sentences and those who had been held 
under emergency administrative detention, were released during the 
year. In addition to these individuals, a much larger number of regular 
convicts were released during the year, as result of having completed 
their sentences.
    In August 2003, 37 men suspected of belonging to the banned Gama' 
al-Islami (Islamic Group, IG), which took part in a violent campaign to 
overthrow the Government in the 1990s, were arrested. The men remained 
in detention at year's end.
    On March 22, HRAAP appealed to the President for the release of 55 
Egyptians and Palestinians arrested in 2000 for participating in pro-
Palestinian/Intifada demonstrations. The 55 detainees remain in 
Gharbaniyat Prison in Alexandria. HRAAP claimed that many suffered 
serious health problems.
    On May 9, the leftist Al Arabi newspaper reported that the MOI 
``secretly'' released 100 detained members of Gama' al-Islami who had 
served their terms or whose administrative detention orders had 
expired.
    On June 18, in an interview with Al-Wafd newspaper, General Mahmoud 
Wagdy, Assistant to the Minister of Interior and Director of the Prison 
Authority, stated that 500 detainees had been released in April. In the 
past, these types of releases often included a mix of two groups: 
prisoners detained for political or security reasons; and ordinary 
convicts who have completed their sentences. The Government has not 
normally provided details on categories of prisoners released.
    On June 10, the Minister of Interior established a permanent 
``probation board'' to review cases of inmates eligible for early 
releases. The board planned to tour one prison each month. On August 
16, a first group of 164 inmates--including 8 political detainees--was 
released.
    On July 5, HRAAP issued a statement claiming that police arrested 
51 relatives of escaped convict Mohamed Saleh Abdel Mohsen in order to 
pressure him to surrender to police. The MOI admitted that the arrests 
occurred, but denied that any of the detainees were tortured. Mohsen 
was a drug kingpin who escaped from Mansoura prison along with seven 
other prisoners.
    In mid-November, HRAAP and EOHR issued press releases calling on 
the Government to release detainees, estimated to number 3,000, whom 
government security forces arrested in the Sinai, mostly around the 
town of Al-Arish, after the October 7 terrorist bombings in Taba and 
Nuweiba that killed 34 people. On November 29, Amnesty International 
(AI) also condemned the detentions and called on the Government to 
release the detainees. Government officials acknowledged that they made 
an unspecified number of arrests in connection with the investigation, 
but insisted that the reports by human rights groups were exaggerated.
    In mid-November, on the occasion of the Eid al-Fitr holiday at the 
end of Ramadan, the local and international media reported that the 
Government released approximately 700 Islamist detainees.
    During the year, security forces arrested approximately 90 persons 
allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which has been 
an illegal organization since 1954. Charges leveled against members 
included membership in and revival of a banned organization; 
obstructing the laws and Constitution of the country; inciting the 
masses against the Government; organizing demonstrations critical of 
the Government's policies; and attempting to infiltrate student bodies 
to spread the ideology of a banned organization.
    On January 8, security forces arrested 13 MB members in Giza. On 
May 15, security forces arrested 59 MB members, mainly from Alexandria. 
On September 17, security forces arrested 11 MB members, mostly Zaqaziq 
University students. On or about October 11, security forces arrested 
eight MB members in separate incidents at Cairo airport, Minya, and 
Beni Suef. Among those detained was Ahmed Ezz Iddine of the suspended 
Al-Shaab newspaper. On December 31, he was released after public calls 
for his release by the Arab Press Federation. Also during the year, the 
Government released at least 31 other MB members.

    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the President may invoke the Emergency 
Law to refer any criminal case to the Emergency Courts, in which the 
accused does not receive most of the constitutional protections of the 
civilian judicial system. The Government has asserted that referral to 
Emergency Courts usually has been limited to terrorism or national 
security cases, as well as major cases of drug trafficking; however, 
the Government also has occasionally used Emergency Courts to prosecute 
homosexuals, heterodox religious groups, and political dissidents. 
Government authorities ignored judicial orders in some cases. The 
Government has used the Emergency Law, which was established to combat 
terrorism and grave threats to national security, to try cases outside 
of this scope.
    In May 2003, the Government formally abolished State Security 
Courts. The courts had been criticized for restricting the rights of 
defendants, particularly the right to appeal. A number of cases 
referred to the State Security Courts were transferred to regular 
criminal courts. However, skeptical observers of the legal system 
argued that as long as the Government retained and used Emergency 
Courts, the abolition of State Security Courts did not constitute a 
fundamental improvement.
    The Constitution provides for the independence and immunity of 
judges and forbids interference by other authorities in the exercise of 
their judicial functions. This provision generally was observed in 
practice. The President appoints all judges upon recommendation of the 
Higher Judicial Council, a constitutional body composed of senior 
judges. Judges are appointed for life, with mandatory retirement at age 
64. Only the Higher Judicial Council may dismiss judges for cause, such 
as corruption. Headed by the President of the Court of Cassation, the 
Council regulates judicial promotions and transfers. The Government 
included lectures on human rights and other social issues in its 
training courses for prosecutors and judges.
    In the civilian court system, there are criminal courts, civil 
courts, administrative courts, and a Supreme Constitutional Court. 
There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts, 
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final 
stage of criminal appeal. Civil courts hear civil cases and 
administrative courts hear cases contesting government actions or 
procedures; both systems have upper-level courts to hear appeals. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court hears challenges to the constitutionality 
of laws or verdicts in any of the courts.
    A lawyer is appointed at the state's expense if the defendant does 
not have counsel. Appointed lawyers are drawn from a roster chosen by 
the Bar Association. Defendants can appeal if denied this right; 
however, detainees in certain high-security prisons continued to allege 
that they were denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed 
until trial, thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate 
defense (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). A woman's testimony is equal to 
that of a man's in court. There is no legal prohibition against a woman 
serving as a judge; however, there has only been one female judge (see 
Section 5).
    In 1992, following a rise in extremist violence, the Government 
began using military tribunals to adjudicate cases involving persons 
accused of terrorist activity or membership in terrorist groups. In 
1993, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the President may 
invoke the Emergency Law to refer any crime to a military court. The 
1993 ruling in effect removed hundreds of civilian defendants from the 
normal process of trial by a civilian judge. The Government defended 
the use of military courts as necessary to try terrorism cases, 
maintaining that trials in the civilian courts were protracted and that 
civilian judges and their families were vulnerable to terrorist 
threats. One case involving civilian defendant Ahmed Hussain Agiza was 
referred to a military court during the year.
    Military verdicts were subject to a review by other military judges 
and confirmation by the President, who in practice usually delegated 
the review function to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys 
claimed that they were not given sufficient time to prepare and that 
military judges tended to rush cases involving a large number of 
defendants. Judges had guidelines for sentencing, defendants had the 
right to counsel, and statements of the charges against defendants were 
made public. Observers needed government permission to attend. 
Diplomats attended some military trials during the year. Human rights 
activists have attended, but only when acting as lawyers for one of the 
defendants.
    On April 27, the Supreme Military Court convicted Ahmad Hussein 
Agiza, rendered from Sweden in 2001, of crimes in connection with his 
membership in Islamic Jihad. Agiza was sentenced to 25 years in prison, 
although in June his sentence was commuted to 15 years. The Swedish 
Embassy in Cairo closely monitored Agiza's detention conditions in an 
apparent effort to ensure that he was not mistreated.
    The Emergency Courts share jurisdiction with military courts over 
crimes affecting national security. The President can appoint civilian 
judges to these courts upon the recommendation of the Minister of 
Justice or military judges upon recommendation of the Minister of 
Defense. Sentences are subject to confirmation by the President. There 
is no right to appeal. The President may alter or annul a decision of 
an Emergency Court, including a decision to release a defendant.
    During the year, Emergency Courts handed down verdicts in three 
cases. On March 25, the Supreme Emergency Court issued a guilty verdict 
in the case of 12 members of the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-
Tahrir al-Islami). Several of the defendants, including three Britons, 
alleged they had been tortured to compel them to sign confessions. 
Sentences for the group ranged from 1 to 3 years.
    On March 11, an Emergency Court acquitted Ashraf Ibrahim and four 
co-defendants who had been accused of sharing information about human 
rights abuses with foreign groups and of belonging to the 
``Revolutionary Socialists'' group, alleged to be seeking to overthrow 
the Government. The co-defendants had been listed as fugitives and 
remained at large. Ibrahim was arrested in March 2003 following 
demonstrations against the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Human rights 
advocates had argued that the Government was persecuting Ibrahim for 
peaceful political activities (see Section 1.d.).
    On March 31, the Supreme Emergency Court sentenced a law student to 
15 years of ``strict imprisonment'' for communicating with a foreign 
country and offering to provide it with sensitive information.
    During the year, the Government continued to try and convict 
journalists and authors for libel, as well as for expressing their 
views on political and religious issues (see Sections 2.a. and 2.c.).
    According to local human rights organizations, there were 
approximately 13,000 to 16,000 persons detained without charge on 
suspicion of illegal terrorist or political activity (see Section 
1.d.). In addition, several thousand others were serving sentences 
after being convicted on similar charges.
    The Government did not permit international humanitarian 
organizations access to political prisoners (see Section 1.c.). In 
2002, an AI delegation was permitted to visit the country, but 
authorities denied the group's request to visit detainees. There were 
no prison visits by international organizations during the year, 
although the National Council for Human Rights did conduct a series of 
prison visits during the second half of the year.
    On August 1, the Public Prosecutor Maher Abdel Wahed told the press 
that the State intended to limit trials in Emergency Courts only to 
cases that touch upon security of the State. As an example, Abdel Wahed 
said that a case where two jewelry store robbers had used a bomb was 
referred to a regular criminal court. Nothwithstanding this assertion, 
the Government initiated Emergency Court proceedings against a self-
proclaimed prophet and his followers in December (see Section 2.c.).

    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy 
of the home, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of 
communication; however, the Emergency Law suspends the constitutional 
provisions regarding the right to privacy, and the Government used the 
Emergency Law to limit these rights. Under the Constitution, police 
must obtain warrants before undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts 
have dismissed cases in which warrants were issued without sufficient 
cause. Police officers who conducted searches without proper warrants 
were subject to criminal penalties, although penalties seldom were 
imposed. However, the Emergency Law empowers the Government to place 
wiretaps, intercept mail, and search persons or places without 
warrants. Security agencies frequently placed political activists, 
suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners, and writers under 
surveillance, screened their correspondence (especially international 
mail), searched them and their homes, and confiscated personal 
property.
    A telecommunications law allows telephone and Internet wiretaps 
only by court order. However, some human rights observers alleged that 
the Government routinely violated this law.
    Although the law does not explicitly criminalize homosexual acts, 
police have targeted homosexuals using Internet-based ``sting'' 
operations leading to arrests on charges of ``debauchery.'' There were 
no reports of new internet entrapment cases during the year (see 
Sections 1.c, 1.e., and 2.a.).
    The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues 
of foreign newspapers from entering the country on the grounds of 
protecting public order. There were no reports that it had exercised 
this authority during the year (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially 
restricted these rights in practice. The Government used the Emergency 
Law to infringe on citizens' civil liberties. Citizens openly expressed 
their views on a wide range of political and social issues, including 
vigorous criticism of government officials and policies, but generally 
avoided certain topics, such as direct criticism of the President. 
Journalists and writers practiced self-censorship.
    In March 2003, the Court of Cassation, ending a long-standing legal 
case that had broad implications for freedom of expression and human 
rights advocacy, acquitted Saad Eddin Ibrahim and his codefendants on 
charges of defaming the State and illegally accepting foreign funds. 
During the year, Ibrahim and his colleagues resumed their publishing 
and advocacy operations.
    The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or 
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There 
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish 
their own newspapers, including a limit of 10 percent ownership by any 
individual; however, this limit appeared to have been enforced 
sporadically.
    On July 13, the Shura Council's Higher Council for the Press 
approved the publication of 16 new newspapers; and on December 29, it 
approved an additional 9 newspapers, including ``Al-Ghad,'' the new 
publication of the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party.
    The Government owned stock in the three largest daily newspapers, 
and the President appointed their top editors. These papers generally 
followed the government line. The Government also held a monopoly over 
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the 
opposition parties. The Government used its monopoly on newsprint to 
limit opposition publications.
    Opposition political parties published their own newspapers but 
received a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies 
from foreign interests. Most opposition newspapers were weeklies, with 
the exception of the dailies Al-Wafd and Al Ahrar, both of which had 
small circulation. Opposition newspapers frequently published criticism 
of the Government. They also gave greater prominence to human rights 
abuses than did state-run newspapers.
    According to a 2003 announcement by the Shura Council, the total 
number of licensed periodicals in the country was 534, including 64 
national papers, 40 opposition party papers, 7 private newspapers, 252 
``specialized'' publications, 142 scientific journals, and 67 local 
publications.
    In March, the Government lifted its ban on the London-based Arabic 
newspaper al-Quds al-Araby, and the paper is now back in circulation.
    Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license from the Higher 
Council for the Press, several publishers of newspapers and magazines 
obtained foreign licenses. The Supreme Constitutional Court still had 
not reached a decision by year's end on a 1999 legal challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Information Ministry's practice of censoring 
offshore publications.
    On February 20, then-Minister of Information Safwat El Sherif 
announced a cabinet decision to limit print runs for foreign-licensed 
publications to between 5,000 and 25,000 copies, ordered that the 
papers must pay 36 percent tax on advertising revenues, and prohibited 
foreign funding.
    According to press reports, on June 14 the Administrative Court 
overturned a decision by the Ministry of Information to prevent a 
foreign publication from entering the country. The Court clarified that 
only the Cabinet can place a long-term ban on a foreign publication. 
The Ministry of Information is empowered only to ban particular issues/
editions in the interest of public order.
    The Penal Code, Press Law, and Publications Law govern press 
issues. The Penal Code stipulates fines or imprisonment for criticism 
of the President, members of the Government, and foreign heads of 
state. The Press and Publication Laws ostensibly provide protection 
against malicious and unsubstantiated reporting. In recent years, 
opposition party newspapers have published within limits articles 
critical of the President and foreign heads of state without being 
charged or harassed. However, the Government continued to charge 
journalists with libel. An editor-in-chief found to be negligent could 
be considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion 
of the newspaper.
    On November 1, unknown assailants detained and beat Abdul Halim 
Qandil, editor of Al-Araby, the Nasserist opposition party newspaper. 
Qandil and many others in the media attributed the attack to elements 
of the State Security apparatus who were angered by Qandil's editorial 
calls for public opposition to the Government. Qandil had also publicly 
cast doubt on the MOI's claims to have solved the October 7 bombings 
that targeted tourist sites in the Sinai.
    During the year, the courts tried a number of prominent cases of 
libel, filed both by government officials and private citizens. On 
January 28, the Qasr El Nil Court of Misdemeanors sentenced writers 
Etemad Khorshid and Anis El Degheidy, along with publisher Hassan 
Ghazal, each to 1 year of imprisonment and LE 1,000 ($160) fine. The 
Court ruled that the trio had insulted Egyptian actress Sherihan in 
their book ``Witness to the Transgressions of Art and Politics.''
    On March 14, the Cairo Criminal Court fined Mahmoud El Askalany, a 
journalist with al-Araby newspaper, LE 20,000 ($3,225) for libel 
against Minister of Housing Mohammed Ibrahim Soliman. On May 15, 
lawyers appealed the fine to the Court of Cassation on the grounds that 
the law does permit criticism of public figures so long as the 
criticism is limited to public matters of job performance and does not 
delve into personal issues. By year's end, the Court had still not 
issued a judgment.
    On June 16, the Cairo Criminal Court sentenced tabloid daily al-
Osbu'a journalist Ahmed Ezz Eddine to 2 years in prison (with labor) 
and a fine of LE 20,000 ($3,225) for libel of former Agriculture 
Minister Wally. Ezz Eddine had written an article accusing Wally of 
perjury in a corruption case. The former minister contended that the 
accusation was against his person and not against his capacity as a 
minister.
    On June 27, the Bulaq Aboul Ela Court of Misdemeanors sentenced 
Mohammed Abu Liwaya of the banned al-Shaab newspaper and Fayez Abdel 
Hamid of the Parliament News to 6 months' imprisonment, fines of LE 
7,500 ($1,209) each, and damages of LE 20,000 ($3,225) for libeling Al-
Ahram Chairman Ibrahim Nafei through articles and leaflets.
    On July 27, the Cairo Criminal Court fined an editor and journalist 
of al-Haqiqa newspaper LE 10,000 ($1,612) for libeling the head of the 
Qussiya City Council.
    On September 14, the Cairo Criminal Court began to hear another 
case of libel filed by Minister of Housing Soliman against three 
journalists with al-Masri al-Youm. Following questioning by the 
prosecutor, the three journalists were released on September 21. The 
case was ongoing at year's end.
    In December 2003, Mustafa Bakry, Chief Editor of al-Osbu'a, filed a 
lawsuit with the office of the Public Prosecutor accusing activist Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim of working for a foreign government in exchange for 
financial support. One week later, Ibrahim filed a libel suit against 
Bakry. The Public Prosecutor's investigation was ongoing at year's end, 
and the case had still not been referred to trial.
    In March and April, four separate courts acquitted or ordered 
retrials for four unrelated lawsuits against journalists working for 
al-Osbu'a.
    Under the law, the Public Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on 
the publication of news related to national security. The length of the 
ban is based on the length of time required for the prosecution to 
prepare its case.
    In December 2003, the Public Prosecutor issued a press ban on a 
corruption investigation of the director of the National Heart 
Institute. The ban continued to limit reporting on the case throughout 
the year.
    The law provides penalties for individuals who disclose information 
about the State during emergencies, including war and natural 
disasters. The penalties include fines of up to LE 6,000 ($1,000) and 
prison sentences of up to 3 years. There were no reports that the law 
was applied during the year.
    The law prohibits current or former members of the police from 
publishing work related information without prior permission from the 
MOI.
    The law authorizes various ministries to ban or confiscate books 
and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. There were no 
court-ordered book confiscations during the year, but the Government 
permitted greater confiscatory authority to al-Azhar University.
    On May 26, the Islamic Research Center (IRC) at al-Azhar University 
formally recommended banning four books: Nawal El Sadawi's ``The Fall 
of the Imam''; Iskander Shaheen's ``Freemasonry: Religion or Fraud''; 
Ali Youssef's ``The Call of Consciousness''; and Hisham El Bahrani's 
``City of Miracles.'' Sadawi's book was first published 20 years ago 
and has been translated into 14 languages. Although the IRC's 
recommended bans led to widespread criticism from writers and human 
rights activists, the Ministry of Justice decided on June 1 to 
authorize al-Azhar's ``inspectors'' to seize publications, tapes, 
speeches, and artistic material that deviated from the IRC's 
interpretation of Shari'a. Prior to June 1, the IRC could not 
confiscate books it disapproved without first seeking a court order.
    On August 18, the IRC banned ``The Responsibility for the Failure 
of the Islamic State,'' by Gamal El Banna, a liberal Islamist thinker. 
The IRC ruled that Gamal El Banna's book deviated from Islamic 
orthodoxy, and began efforts to confiscate the book from the 
marketplace.
    On October 24, EOHR issued a report which criticized IRC's book 
confiscations, terming them ``a hammer blow to freedom of thought.''
    In September, the Alexandria Administrative Court heard a lawsuit 
filed by lawyer Nabih al-Wahsh demanding the confiscation of a book, 
``The Hijab: A Modernist Approach,'' by writer Ikbal Baraka. The suit 
also sought the dismissal of Baraka as chief editor of Hawwa Magazine 
and her dismissal from the Press Syndicate. The suit alleged that 
Baraka's book denied the religious sanction for the veiling of women. 
The suit also charged the ministers of culture, aviation, education, 
and information, as well as the Grand Imam of al-Azhar University, with 
having failed to block Baraka's book. A wide cross-section of writers 
and intellectuals, including Islamist writers, have criticized the 
effort to ban Baraka's book.
    The MOI regularly confiscated leaflets and other works by Islamists 
and other critics of the State. Members of the illegal Muslim 
Brotherhood also were arrested in connection with publications (see 
Sections 1.d. and 3). In many cases, the press reported that police 
confiscated written materials such as leaflets during the arrests.
    Although the MOI has in previous years sporadically prevented 
specific issues of foreign published newspapers from entering the 
country on the grounds of protecting public order, there were no 
reports of such actions during the year (see Section 1.f.). The 
Ministry of Defense may ban works about sensitive security issues. The 
Council of Ministers may order the banning of works that it deems 
offensive to public morals, detrimental to religion, or likely to cause 
a breach of the peace.
    The Government controlled and censored the state-owned broadcast 
media. The Ministry of Information owned and operated all ground-based 
domestic television and radio stations. Two private satellite stations, 
al-Mihwar and Dream TV, began broadcasting in 2001 and have operated 
without direct government interference. The Government has a 20 percent 
financial stake in al-Mihwar and a 10 percent stake in Dream TV. The 
Government did not block reception of foreign channels via satellite. 
The percentage of citizens who received satellite television broadcasts 
has grown steadily but remained small, while many coffee shops and 
other public places offered satellite television.
    Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as 
scripts and final productions. The Ministry of Culture censored foreign 
films to be shown in theaters, but was more lenient regarding the same 
films in videocassette format. Government censors ensured that foreign 
films made in the country portrayed the country in a favorable light.
    On April 20, the Censorship Department refused to permit public 
viewing of an American film, ``The Code,'' on grounds that it depicted 
a gang of outlaws with Arabic names.
    Also in June, the Censorship Department formed a committee of 
cultural figures (both Muslim and Christian) to review a new film (``I 
Love the Cinema'' / ``Bahebb El-Cinma'') which told the story of 
Egypt's Coptic Orthodox minority during the Nasser era. After initial 
screenings, Muslim and Christian lawyers filed a complaint with the 
Public Prosecutor, seeking to have the film removed from distribution 
and the film producers tried for ``contempt for religion.'' There was 
no final decision by year's end. Audiences were able to see the film at 
a number of theaters during the year. It was also well received at 
international film festivals.
    In August, the Censorship Department rejected a screenplay by 
writer Wahid Hamed on the subject of government corruption and 
influence of the media. Without the Censorship Department's approval, 
Hamed was unable to proceed with making his film.
    Government and private industry experts estimated that 
approximately 3.8 million persons in the country used the Internet. The 
Government did not restrict Internet use, but selectively monitored 
Internet use (see Section 1.f.).
    On May 15 and again on September 1, the Muslim Brotherhood website 
became temporarily unavailable to Egyptian Internet users. Since the 
May outage corresponded to the arrest of 59 MB members, there was 
widespread belief that the security services shut down the website.
    The Government did not explicitly restrict academic freedom at 
universities; however, the Government selected deans rather than 
permitting the faculty to elect them. The Government justified the 
measure as a means to combat Islamist influence on campus. Unlike in 
the past, the Government did not ban books for use on campuses during 
the year.

    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association; however, the 
Government significantly restricted freedom of assembly. Citizens must 
obtain approval from the MOI before holding public meetings, rallies, 
and protest marches. Many demonstrations were not approved, and the 
Government tightly controlled public demonstrations that did occur. 
However, on December 12, 300 activists from the Kifaya (Enough) 
movement staged a protest against President Mubarak running for a fifth 
term in office. There was little direct government interference in the 
December 12 demonstration, although security personnel significantly 
outnumbered demonstrators (see Section 3). The MOI selectively 
obstructed some meetings scheduled to be held on private property and 
university campuses (see Section 4).
    On a number of occasions, worshippers at the Al-Azhar mosque in 
Central Cairo held mainly impromptu demonstrations at the conclusion of 
Friday prayers. These were tolerated but carefully watched by the 
Government.
    Some smaller anti-Iraq war demonstrations were held with and 
without permission. In both cases, the Government deployed large 
numbers of security personnel to contain the demonstrations. In a 
number of unauthorized demonstrations, police detained suspected 
organizers, some of whom alleged mistreatment while in detention (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government significantly restricted it in practice. The Minister of 
Insurance and Social Affairs has the authority to dissolve NGOs by 
decree. The law also requires NGOs to obtain permission from the 
Government before accepting foreign funds. According to government 
officials, funds from foreign government donors with established 
development programs in the country were excluded from this 
requirement.
    During the year, a number of organizations active in human rights 
advocacy and civil society development were allowed to register and 
thus became officially recognized. However, several other groups, 
including the Egyptian Association Against Torture, the Center for 
Housing Rights, and the Word Center, continued to be denied 
registration as NGOs. On October 25, the Governor of Aswan issued an 
administrative decree dissolving the board of directors of the Aswan-
based Association for Health Development and the Environment and 
appointed a new board. The association's leadership countered with a 
lawsuit against the Governor, charging that his act was in direct 
contradiction to the NGO law (Act 84 of 2002). In at least two cases, 
obscure ``security objections'' were cited in their rejection letters. 
These groups were challenging these decisions at year's end.
    On January 29, the Ministry denied the application for registration 
of a human rights NGO in Qena Governorate. In January, a MB member, 
Mukhtar Nouh, who had spent 3 years in prison, sought to register a NGO 
called ``The Association for the Protection of Constitutional Values.'' 
The 18-member board consisted exclusively of lawyers. The Association's 
plan was to be limited to lawyers and to work, independently of the Bar 
Syndicate, to improve the profession and promote liberal ideas, and to 
improve the status of women and Coptic Christians. On July 7, the 
Association's lawyers appealed to the courts after the Ministry of 
Social Affairs rejected the application. The case was still pending at 
year's end.
    On February 8, an Administrative court ordered the Ministry to 
approve and register the ``Sons of the Land Association for Human 
Rights.'' The Court ruled that the new organization had met all 
registration requirements and did not pose a security threat. The 
Ministry registered the organization, and it was functioning at year's 
end.
    In June, the ``Sawasiya Center for Human Rights and Anti-
Discrimination'' registered as a regional NGO with a board of 15 
prominent Arab personalities from the region and Europe. The center's 
Executive Director, Abdel Moneim Abdel Maksoud, is a leading member of 
the MB, as well as its lawyer. Abdel Maksoud told the press that 
Sawasiya included various political thinkers from around the world and 
that it was not directly or indirectly affiliated with the MB.
    In May, 18 human rights organizations signed an agreement 
establishing the Egyptian Human Rights Organization collective. On July 
3, 14 human rights groups announced the formation of a national 
federation of human rights NGOs. In October, three leading NGOs (HRAAP, 
the Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary, and the Group 
for Democratic Development) established the ``Alliance for Democracy 
and Reform.''
    In September 2003, the ``New Woman Center for Research,'' a human 
rights group previously denied registration by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs, won a court judgment ordering the Ministry to allow it to 
register as an NGO. The Ministry implemented the judgment 1 year later 
in September (see Section 4).
    Under legislation governing professional syndicates, at least 50 
percent of the general membership of an association must elect the 
governing board. Failing a quorum, a second election must be held in 
which at least 30 percent of the membership votes for the board. If 
such a quorum is unattainable, the judiciary may appoint a caretaker 
board until new elections can be scheduled. The law was adopted to 
prevent well organized minorities, specifically Islamists, from 
capturing or retaining the leadership of professional syndicates. 
Members of the syndicates have reported that Islamists have used 
irregular electoral techniques, such as physically blocking polling 
places and limiting or changing the location of polling sites.

    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, in practice the 
Government placed restrictions on these rights. The Constitution 
provides that Islam is the official state religion and the primary 
source of legislation. Religious practices that conflict with Islamic 
law (Shari'a) are prohibited. However, significant numbers of the 
Christian and Jewish minorities worshipped without harassment and 
maintained links with coreligionists in other countries.
    Most citizens (approximately 90 percent) are Sunni Muslims. There 
is a very small number (a fraction of 1 percent) of Shi'a Muslims. 
Approximately 10 percent of the population are Christian, the majority 
of whom belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are other small 
Christian denominations, a small Baha'i community, and a Jewish 
community of approximately 200 persons.
    All mosques must be licensed, and the Government was engaged in an 
effort to control them. The Government appointed and paid the salaries 
of the imams who led prayers in mosques, proposed themes for them, and 
monitored their sermons. In 2003, Dr. Hamdy Zaqzouq, Minister of 
Religious Endowments, said there were 30,000 imams in the country, who 
preached at 82,000 mosques and zawaya (smaller prayer halls in private 
buildings). He said that his ministry annexed approximately 6,000 
unregistered mosques and zawaya every year.
    Neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes prohibit 
proselytizing or conversion; however, the Government discouraged 
proselytizing by non-Muslims, and those who did so risked prosecution 
under the Penal Code, which prohibits citizens from ridiculing or 
insulting heavenly religions or inciting sectarian strife.
    There were no restrictions in practice on the conversion of non-
Muslims to Islam; however, in cases involving conversion of Muslims to 
Christianity, the Government generally denied requests by converts to 
amend civil records to reflect their new religious status. The law 
prescribes steps to register the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, 
but does not recognize the conversion of Muslims to other religions. 
Some converts resorted to changing their documents themselves, or 
bribing a civil servant to do so. Authorities have charged several 
converts with violating laws prohibiting the falsification of 
documents. In such instances, converts have themselves altered their 
identification cards and other official documents to reflect their new 
religious affiliation because of fear of government harassment if they 
officially registered the change from Islam to Christianity. For 
example, in 2002, Malak Fahmi, a Christian, and his wife Sarah, a 
Christian convert from Islam, were arrested while attempting to leave 
the country with their two children. The couple was charged with 
falsification of documents. Sarah, who changed her name and religious 
affiliation on her marriage certificate only, reportedly stated that 
she did so without her husband's assistance. The couple was released 
from prison in February, but was awaiting trial on charges of document 
fraud. At year's end, there had been no developments in the case.
    Converts to Islam are not permitted to revert to their original 
religion. The minor children of converts to Islam, and in some cases 
adult children, may automatically become classified as Muslims in the 
eyes of the state regardless of the status of the other spouse. This 
automatic classification is in accordance with established Shari'a 
rules, which dictate ``no jurisdiction of a non-Muslim over a Muslim.''
    In some cases, converts reported being subjected to harassment from 
the Government, including regular questioning and restriction of travel 
abroad. Converts from Islam to Christianity continued to report 
societal discrimination.
    Hisham Samir Abdel Lateef Ibrahim, a convert to Christianity first 
detained in 2002 and believed to have been charged with ``forging 
identity documents'' and ``contempt of religion,'' was reportedly 
released during the year but remained on probation.
    Repairs to all places of worship are subject to a 1976 civil 
construction code which governs church repairs. The decree was 
significant symbolically because it made churches and mosques equal 
under the law. Christians reported that local permits still were 
subject to approval by security authorities.
    Although the Official Gazette only publicized government issuance 
of less than a dozen church construction and repair permits during the 
year, government officials asserted that most permits were not 
published in the Official Gazette, and said that they issued 254 
permits for building and repair of churches between January 1 and June 
15.
    The approval process for church construction suffered from delays 
and was considered to be insufficiently responsive to the Christian 
community, although the President reportedly approved all requests for 
permits that were presented to him. The incidence of blocked or delayed 
orders varied, often depending on the church's relationship with local 
security officials and the level of support of the local governor. 
Christian activists, including church officials, consistently remarked 
that regardless of the formal approval process and the stated support 
of senior government officials for church construction, local officials 
in some governorates opted to take an uncooperative and obstructionist 
approach to church construction and repair.
    The Constitution requires schools to offer religious instruction. 
Public and private schools provided religious instruction according to 
the faith of the student.
    The Government occasionally prosecuted members of religious groups 
whose practices deviated from mainstream Islamic beliefs and whose 
activities were believed to jeopardize communal harmony. On January 28, 
a State Security Emergency Court reduced the sentences of Sayed Tolba 
and 20 of his associates to time served. They were convicted 2002 on 
the charge of insulting heavenly religions, as a result of Tolba's 
claim that he was a prophet and could cure illnesses.
    On December 1, the Public Prosecutor referred 13 individuals to 
trial by a State Security Emergency Court on charges of insulting 
heavenly religions. The leader of the 13, who were arrested in August 
in Qaloubiya, was Ahmed Ibrahim Abou Shousha, who had asserted that he 
was a prophet on par with the Prophet Mohammad. Shousha had called for 
various innovations on orthodox Islamic practice.
    In December 2003, State Security Court forces arrested and detained 
without charge 20 suspected Shi'a Muslim citizens, reportedly due to 
concerns that they were a threat to petroleum facilities and were 
engaging in anti-State activity. A leading Egyptian civil rights group 
reported that the authorities tortured several in the group before 
releasing 16 of them. The four remaining detainees were held at Wadi 
Natroun prison. Three detainees were released in August, although 
Mohammad Ramadan El Dereiny remained in custody at year's end.
    The Islamic Research Center of Al-Azhar University has authority to 
recommend that the Government censor books on religious grounds (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for equal public rights and duties 
without discrimination based on religion or creed; however, 
discrimination against minority religions, including Christians and 
Baha'is, existed. There were no Christians serving as governors, police 
commissioners, city mayors, public university presidents, or deans. 
There were few Christians in the upper ranks of the security services 
and armed forces. Discrimination against Christians also continued in 
public sector employment; in staff appointments to public universities; 
in failure (with the exception of one case in 2002) to admit Christians 
into public university training programs for Arabic language teachers 
that involved study of the Koran; and in payment of Muslim imams 
through public funds (Christian clergy are paid with private church 
funds).
    There were no new reports of violent assaults by Gama' al-Islami 
(Islamic Group, IG) or other suspected terrorists against the 
approximately 7 million Coptic Christians. In a number of cases where 
victims alleged violence to be driven by sectarian tensions, 
particularly regarding murder, it was difficult to determine whether 
religion was a factor.
    The prosecution failed to bring a successful case against those 
alleged to be responsible for the killing of 21 Christians during 
sectarian strife in early 2000 in the town of al-Kush, in Sohag 
Governate, Upper Egypt. On June 14, the Court of Cassation, the 
country's highest appellate court, upheld the acquittal of 94 of 96 
suspects who were charged with various offenses committed in this 
incident. The Court's decision left no further legal options.
    In the investigation of an earlier incident in al-Kush in 1998 
involving the killing of two Coptic Christians, police detained 
hundreds of citizens that same year, including relatives of suspects, 
women, and children. Local observers reported that many of these 
detainees were subjected to torture and mistreatment. An investigation 
of police torture of the mostly Christian detainees made little 
progress and has appeared effectively closed since 2001. Shayboub 
William Arsal, a Coptic Christian, was convicted and sentenced for the 
two murders and his appeal, which has been pending for 4 years, has not 
been heard. The local Christian community believes that Shayboub was 
accused and convicted of the crime because of his religion.
    In January, Christian workers at the Patmos Center, a Coptic 
Orthodox social service facility on the Suez road east of Cairo, 
confronted soldiers and an army bulldozer dispatched from a military 
base adjacent to the facility. During the confrontation, one of the 
Christian workers was fatally struck by a private bus attempting to 
drive around the crowd. This incident was the latest in a series 
involving Patmos and the neighboring military base. The army's reported 
motive for bulldozing the gate was that the Patmos Center's wall stands 
50 meters from the highway, while local zoning regulations require a 
distance of 100 meters. Christian sources noted that the army base's 
perimeter wall also is only 50 meters from the road, and they charged 
that the army's intent was to harass the Christians until they left the 
site so that it could be annexed by the military. Other observers 
believed the military's enmity was engendered by the ``stealthy'' way 
the church developed a Christian service facility on a site originally 
billed as an agricultural ``desert reclamation project.'' The 
controversy subsided, and the Patmos gate remained in its original 
location.
    There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam. 
Reports of such cases were disputed and often included inflammatory 
allegations and categorical denials of kidnapping and rape. Observers, 
including human rights groups, found it extremely difficult to 
determine whether compulsion was used, as most cases involved a Coptic 
girl who converted to Islam when she married a Muslim man. According to 
the Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with 
her priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to 
convert.
    However, there were credible reports of government harassment of 
Christian families that attempted to regain custody of their daughters. 
The law states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is 
prohibited. Between the ages of 16 and 21, marriage is illegal without 
the approval and presence of her guardian. The authorities also 
sometimes failed to uphold the law in cases of marriage between 
underage Christian girls and Muslim boys.
    There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to 
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim man. However, if a 
Christian woman marries a Muslim man, the Coptic Orthodox Church 
excommunicates her. Ignorance of the law and societal pressure, 
including the centrality of marriage to a woman's identity, often 
affect her decision. Family conflict and financial pressure also are 
cited as factors. Conversion is regarded as a disgrace to the convert's 
family, so most Christian families would object strongly to a 
daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian girl converts to 
Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers to a Muslim 
custodian, who is likely to grant approval.
    Anti-Semitism is found in both the pro-government and opposition 
press; however, there have been no violent anti Semitic incidents in 
recent years.
    Anti-Semitic articles and opinion pieces in the print media and 
editorial cartoons appeared in the press and electronic media. For 
example, on March 18, Abdelwahab Ads, deputy editor of Al Jumhuriya, 
accused the Jews of the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11 as well 
as of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S.
    On June 24 and July 1, the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
newspaper al-Lewa al-Islami published articles by Professor Refaat 
Sayed Ahmed in which he denied the Holocaust. On August 25, the NDP 
announced that it had banned Professor Ahmed from future publishing, 
that the editor who approved his article had been fired, and that the 
NDP and the Government rejected anti-Semitism and acknowledged the 
reality of the Holocaust.
    The Government reportedly advised journalists and cartoonists to 
avoid anti-Semitism. Government officials insisted that anti-Semitic 
statements in the media were a reaction to Israeli government actions 
against Palestinians and did not reflect historical anti-Semitism; 
however, there were relatively few public attempts to distinguish 
between anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli sentiment.
    On January 5, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld a 2001 lower 
court decision to recommend the cancellation of the Abu Hasira festival 
(for Jewish pilgrims) in the Beheira Governorate. In 2003, the Ministry 
of Culture designated Abu Hasira's tomb as a ``historic site'' and 
ruled that an annual festival could be held. Villagers around the 
shrine protested, claiming that the Jewish visitors aggravated the 
locals with their drinking. There were reports in December, however, 
that Jewish pilgrims were again welcome to celebrate the Abu Hasira 
festival, scheduled for early January 2005.
    In December 2003, following international expressions of concern, 
the special collections section of the Alexandria Library removed a 
copy of ``The Protocols of the Elders of Zion'' from a display of 
religious manuscripts. In a statement, the director of the library 
denied allegations that the book had been displayed next to the Torah, 
but nonetheless stated that its inclusion was a ``bad judgment'' and 
regretted any offense the incident might have caused.
    Law 263 of 1960, which is still in force, bans Baha'i institutions 
and community activities. During the Nasser era, the Government 
confiscated all Baha'i community properties, including Baha'i centers, 
libraries, and cemeteries. The problems of Baha'is, who number fewer 
than 2,000 persons in the country, have been compounded since the MOI 
began to upgrade its automation of civil records, including national 
identity cards. The Government asserted that its new software requires 
all citizens to be categorized as Muslims, Christians, or Jews, 
although some Baha'is initially received identity cards which listed 
their religion as ``other.'' During the year, Baha'is and other 
religious groups who did not choose to describe themselves as Muslim, 
Christian, or Jewish, were compelled either to misrepresent themselves 
as members of one of these three religions, or to go without valid 
identity documents, passports, birth and death certificates, and 
marriage licenses. Most Baha'is have chosen the latter course. The 
Government's unwillingness to issue Baha'is identity cards and other 
necessary documents made it increasingly difficult for Baha'is to 
register their children in school, to open bank accounts, and to 
register businesses. At year's end, some Baha'is reported that 
government representatives had offered them passports, but no other 
documents. The Baha'i leadership noted that while this would enable 
them to leave the country, it would not facilitate their continued 
residence in the country.
    For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International 
Religious Freedom Report.

    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government generally respected them in practice; however, there 
were some notable exceptions. Citizens and foreigners were free to 
travel within the country, except in certain military areas. Males who 
have not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or 
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed under 
special circumstances. Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have 
permission from their fathers to obtain passports and travel. Married 
women no longer legally require the same permission from their 
husbands; however, in practice police reportedly still required such 
permission in most cases (see Section 5). Citizens who leave the 
country had the right to return.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not 
use it during the year.
    The Constitution includes provisions for the granting of refugee 
status or asylum to persons who meet the definition in the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; 
however, the Government limited the ease with which the refugee 
population could integrate locally. The Government generally did not 
issue work permits to refugees. The Government admitted refugees on the 
understanding that their presence in the country was temporary. Because 
the country lacked national legislation or a legal framework governing 
the granting of asylum, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) assumed full responsibility for the determination of 
refugee status on behalf of the Government. The Government generally 
cooperated with the UNHCR and treated refugees in accordance with 
minimum standards and agreed arrangements. The UNHCR provided 
recognized refugees with a refugee identification card that was 
considered a residence permit and bore the stamp of the national 
authorities. Refugees generally may not obtain citizenship.
    During the year, approximately 9,000 recognized refugees, the 
majority of whom were Sudanese, resided in the country. In addition, 
70,000 Palestinian refugees are registered with government authorities. 
There were also approximately 16,000 asylum seekers awaiting status 
determination. Although there was no pattern of abuse of refugees, 
during random security sweeps the Government temporarily detained some 
refugees who were not carrying proper identification. Following 
intervention by the UNHCR, the refugees were released.
    There were occasional reports that human rights activists were 
briefly detained for questioning at international ports of entry/
departure. On May 19, Cairo airport security personnel prohibited four 
members of a delegation from the Egyptian Center for Housing Rights 
from traveling to Thailand to attend a workshop. The delegation 
canceled its trip and complained to the Ministry of Interior, but it 
never learned the reason for the ban.
    Also during the year, the security services prevented three members 
of the MB (Essam El Erian, Abdel Hamid El Ghazaly, and Mohsen Radi), as 
well as MB-affiliated journalist Ahmed Ezz Eddine, from traveling to 
meetings outside the country (see Section 4).
    The disappearance of Yemeni dissident Ahmed Salem Ebeid, who EOHR 
alleged was sent by the Government to Yemen, may have involved the 
forced return of a person to a country where he feared prosecution (see 
Section 1.b.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens did not have the meaningful right to change their 
government. The ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) dominated the 
454 seat People's Assembly, the 264-seat Shura Council, local 
governments, the mass media, labor, and the large public sector, and 
controlled the licensing of new political parties, newspapers, and 
private organizations to such an extent that, as a practical matter, 
citizens did not have a meaningful ability to change their government.
    In 1999, President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to a fourth 
6-year term in a national referendum. According to official results, he 
received 94 percent of the vote. Mubarak had been previously nominated 
by the People's Assembly. Under the Constitution, the electorate is not 
presented with a choice among competing presidential candidates. In 
October, political activists and opposition political party members 
called for constitutional revisions to change from referendum to 
multiple-candidate presidential elections and term limits. On December 
12, 300 activists from the Kifaya (Enough) movement staged a protest 
against President Mubarak running for a fifth term in office. There was 
little government interference (see Section 2.b.).
    Despite the overall improvement in the 2000 electoral process (as 
compared to the 1995 parliamentary elections), there still were 
problems affecting the fairness of the 2000 parliamentary elections. 
Preceding the elections, the Government arrested thousands of MB 
members on charges of belonging to an illegal organization. Most 
observers believed that the Government was seeking to undermine the 
MB's participation in the People's Assembly and professional syndicate 
elections through intimidation.
    The People's Assembly debated government proposals, and members 
exercised their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy. 
The executive initiated almost all legislation. The Assembly exercised 
limited influence in the areas of security and foreign policy, and 
retained little oversight of the MOI's use of Emergency Law powers. 
Many executive branch initiatives and policies were carried out by 
regulation through ministerial decree without legislative oversight. 
Individual voting records were not published, and citizens had no 
independent method of checking a member's voting record.
    The Shura Council, the upper house of Parliament, has 264 seats. 
Two-thirds of the members were elected and one-third were appointed by 
the President. In 2001, President Mubarak appointed 45 members to the 
Shura Council, including 8 women and 4 Christians.
    In May and June, Shura Council elections resulted in the NDP 
winning 70 of 88 open seats. Independents won 17 seats. One of the 
independents, from Giza, is widely known to be a member of the 
officially banned MB. The opposition Tagammu (Grouping) Party won a 
solitary Shura seat.
    There were 18 recognized opposition parties, not all of which were 
active.
    The Political Parties Committee (PPC) approves applications by 
prospective parties and may withdraw recognition from existing parties. 
The Labor Party, which lost recognition in 2000, remained suspended at 
year's end (see Section 2.a.). During the September National Democratic 
Party Conference, the party leadership announced a plan to seek 
People's Assembly approval in November to relax the political party 
registration process. By year's end, the PPC had approved two new 
parties, including the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party.
    In addition, during the year, a variety of other aspirant political 
parties sought legal recognition from the courts or the PPC. The PPC 
rejected the Wasat (Middle) Party on the grounds that it illegally 
sought to establish a party with an Islamic basis. The PPC rejected the 
Karama (Dignity) Party on the grounds that its platform was not 
sufficiently different from other existing parties. By year's end, the 
International Peace Party and the Nationalist Party had also been 
denied. The Egypt Motherland, the Democratic Wafd, and the Progressive 
Arab parties' applications remained pending.
    On June 2, the Abdeen Appeals Court placed the Ahrar (Liberal) 
Party and its 18 publications under judicial sequestration and 
appointed a custodian to oversee the financial and administrative 
functions of the party. Since 1998, 13 members have competed for the 
chairmanship, with 6 holding general conferences and claiming to have 
been legitimately elected. The PPC did not recognize any of the 
results. An appeal against the sequestration was pending at year's end.
    The law prohibits political parties based on religion, and the MB 
remained an illegal organization; however, MB members openly and 
publicly spoke their views, although they did not explicitly identify 
themselves as members of the organization. They remained subject to 
government pressure (see Section 1.d.). Seventeen candidates affiliated 
with the MB were elected to the People's Assembly as independents in 
2000. One of the 17 was unseated in 2003, when Gamal Heshmat lost a by-
election. There were reports of heavy-handed police interference on 
polling day in favor of his opponent.
    There were 11 women in the 454-seat People's Assembly. Two women 
served among the 32 ministers in the Cabinet. In 2003, the Government 
appointed a female jurist to serve on the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
She became the first female citizen to serve on the bench.
    There were 7 Christians in the 454-seat People's Assembly and 2 
Christians in the 32-member Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Government restrictions on NGO activities, including limits on 
organizations' ability to accept funding, continued to limit reporting 
on human rights abuses. Government officials were selectively 
cooperative and responsive to NGO views. Some human rights activists 
were briefly detained for questioning at international ports of entry 
(see Section 2.d.).
    In 2002, the Government passed a law governing the regulation and 
operation of all NGOs operating in the country. The law and its 
subsequent implementing regulations drew criticism from local NGOs and 
international activists. Some charged that the law and regulations 
placed unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO operations. Of particular 
concern was a new provision in the law that granted the Minister of 
Social Affairs the authority to dissolve an NGO by decree, rather than 
requiring a court order.
    In 2003, the Parliament passed legislation establishing the 
National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), which became operational 
early in the year. The Council is composed of 25 members and headed by 
a chairman and a deputy, who serve 3-year terms. The Council's mandate 
is to receive human rights complaints and request competent government 
authorities to investigate them, to consult with the Government on the 
development of legislation that promotes good human rights practices, 
to increase public awareness on human rights, to issue an annual report 
on human rights in the country, and coordinate and network with other 
entities focused on human rights.
    Observers have complained about the Council's slow start and modest 
results achieved to date. At year's end, the Council had received 
budgetary support from the Government as well as the European Union. 
Reliable reports indicated that the NCHR received over 4,000 
complaints. NCHR reported that it referred an unspecified number of the 
complaints that it deemed credible to relevant authorities, but by 
year's end had received replies on only 50 cases.
    Public visibility of the NCHR's activities was generally low, but 
increased over the course of the year. In October, for example, Council 
Vice Chairman Dr. Kamal Abul Magd, after visiting Tora and Abu Zaabal 
prisons, suggested there had been some improvement in prison 
conditions, but stressed the Council's determination to seek guarantees 
against preventive detention. In December, NCHR publicly announced that 
it would urge the Government, in its annual report to be issued in 
early 2005, to abolish the Emergency Law, on the grounds that ordinary 
constitutional law is sufficient to meet the country's security 
requirements.
    In June 2003, years after it first applied, the EOHR was officially 
registered. HRAAP, another established and credible human rights group, 
also successfully registered. At least three human rights groups 
remained unable to operate during the year due to 2003 government 
decisions to deny their registration for obscure ``security reasons.'' 
The status of some others was pending at year's end (see Section 2.b.).
    In November 2003, the Arab Program for Human Rights Activists and 
the Word Center for Human Rights announced the rejection by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs of the Word Center's application for NGO 
status, citing ``security objections.'' The Ministry also contended 
that the Center is a group based on religion and therefore not eligible 
for NGO status under the NGO Law (Law 84/02). The Word Center 
previously had applied for recognition as a ``social company'' by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Industry. This option, which has been the 
resort of other NGO-like groups denied registration under the NGO law, 
can afford basic legal recognition. The Word Center's ``social 
company'' application was accepted in 1996; and the Center operated 
without restriction. The Word Center has filed suit against the 
Ministry of Social Affairs for recognition as an NGO and its case was 
pending at year's end.
    EOHR and other groups obtained limited cooperation of government 
officials in visiting some prisons in their capacity as legal counsel, 
but not as human rights observers. They received funding from foreign 
human rights organizations.
    During the year, the Government permitted the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies (CIHR) and other human rights organizations, 
including HRAAP, EOHR, and the Arab Center for Independence of the 
Judiciary, to hold and participate in international conferences.
    The Government at times cooperated with international 
organizations; however, according to the delegate to the 2003 session 
of the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the Government had not agreed to 
a requested visit by the UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Torture because of 
an incompatibility of timetables (see Section 1.c.).
    On July 25, inspectors from the Ministry of Health visited the 
premises of the El Nadim Center for the Rehabilitation of the Victims 
of Torture. This inspection visit provoked domestic and international 
concerns that the Government was harassing this human rights 
organization. (The El Nadim Center was not registered as an NGO with 
the Ministry of Social Affairs but was registered as a medical clinic, 
and thus falls under Ministry of Health jurisdiction.) The inspectors 
confiscated equipment and personal papers of doctors and well as 
patients, and soon after the inspection, one volunteer doctor at the 
Center was transferred from his position as the Director of the Airport 
Hospital for Mental Health to a department at the Khanka Hospital. El 
Nadim lodged a formal complaint with the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor, and HRW addressed a letter to President Mubarak requesting 
his immediate intervention to stop the harassment. By late September, 
the Ministry of Health had halted its inquiry, and the Nadim Center was 
proceeding with its work.
Section 5. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
    The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal 
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many 
traditional practices discriminated against women and religious 
minorities.

    Women.--The law does not prohibit spousal abuse; however, 
provisions of law relating to assault in general are applied. Domestic 
violence against women was a significant problem and was reflected in 
press accounts of specific incidents. In 2003, the Center for Egyptian 
Women's Legal Affairs conducted a survey of women, based in part on an 
assessment of crime reports in the vernacular press over a 6-month 
period, which estimated that 67 percent of women in urban areas and 30 
percent in rural areas had been involved in some form of domestic 
violence at least once between 2002 and 2003. Among those who had been 
beaten, less than half had ever sought help. Due to the value attached 
to privacy in the country's traditional society, abuse within the 
family rarely was discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a 
divorce; however, the law requires the plaintiff to produce 
eyewitnesses, a difficult condition to meet. Several NGOs offered 
counseling, legal aid, and other services to women who were victims of 
domestic violence. Activists believed that in general the police and 
the judiciary considered the ``integrity of the family'' more important 
than the well being of the woman. The Ministry of Insurance and Social 
Affairs operated more than 150 family counseling bureaus nationwide, 
which provided legal and medical services.
    The National Council for Women (NCW) proposed and advocated 
policies that promoted women's empowerment and also designed 
development programs that benefit women. The Office of the National 
Ombudsman for Women provided assistance to women facing discrimination 
in employment and housing, domestic violence, sexual assault, and child 
custody disputes.
    The law prohibits non-spousal rape; however, spousal rape is not 
illegal. The Government prosecuted rapists, and punishment for rape 
ranges from 3 years to life imprisonment. Although reliable statistics 
regarding rape were not available, activists believed that it was not 
uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. If a rapist is convicted 
of abducting his victim, he is subject to execution.
    The law does not specifically address ``honor'' crimes (violent 
assaults by a male against a female, usually a family member, with 
intent to kill because of perceived lack of chastity). In practice, the 
courts sentenced perpetrators of such crimes to lesser punishments than 
those convicted in other cases of murder. There were no reliable 
statistics regarding the extent of honor killings; however, it was 
believed that they were not common.
    FGM remained a serious, widespread problem, despite the 
Government's attempts to eliminate the practice and NGO efforts to 
combat it. Traditional and family pressures remained strong. A study 
conducted in 2000 estimated 97 percent of women who have ever been 
married had undergone FGM. The Government supported efforts to educate 
the public about FGM; however, illiteracy impeded some women from 
distinguishing between the deep-rooted tradition of FGM and religious 
practices. Moreover, many citizens believed that FGM was an important 
part of maintaining female chastity, and the practice was supported by 
some Muslim religious authorities and Islamist political activists. FGM 
was equally prevalent among Muslims and Christians.
    Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal but continued to occur, 
particularly in Cairo and Alexandria.
    Sexual harassment is not prohibited specifically by law. There were 
no statistics available regarding its prevalence.
    The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the 
law and many traditional practices discriminated against women. By law, 
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their 
fathers to obtain passports and to travel. Married women do not require 
such permission, but police sometimes did not apply the law 
consistently. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's in court.
    There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as a judge. 
In February, Counselor Tahany al-Gabbani was appointed to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, the first, and only, female citizen to be 
appointed to the bench. At year's end, the Court of Cassation still was 
examining the cases of two female attorneys, Fatma Lashin and Amany 
Talaat, who challenged the Government's refusal to appoint them as 
public prosecutors. As of October, their challenge was still pending.
    On September 5, the Minister of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) for 
the first time appointed a woman to the position of General Manager at 
the Waqf Authority.
    Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally corresponded 
to an individual's religion. Article 20 of the Procedural Personal 
Status Law of 2000 provides for khul' divorce, which allows a Muslim 
woman to obtain a divorce without her husband's consent, provided that 
she is willing to forego all of her financial rights, including 
alimony, dowry, and other benefits. However, in practice, some judges 
have not applied the law accurately or fairly, causing lengthy 
bureaucratic delays for the thousands of women who have filed for khul' 
divorce. Many women have also complained that after being granted 
khul', the required child alimony is not paid.
    The Coptic Orthodox Church permits divorce only in specific 
circumstances, such as adultery or conversion of one spouse to another 
religion.
    Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry 
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim 
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's 
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance 
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the 
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits 
all of his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social 
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance; 
however, in practice this assistance was not always provided.
    Labor laws provide for equal rates of pay for equal work for men 
and women in the public sector. According to government figures from 
2003, women constituted 17 percent of private business owners and 
occupied 25 percent of the managerial positions in the four major 
national banks. Educated women had employment opportunities, but social 
pressure against women pursuing a career was strong. Women's rights 
advocates claimed that Islamist influence inhibited further gains. 
Women's rights advocates also pointed to other discriminatory 
traditional or cultural attitudes and practices, such as FGM and the 
traditional male relative's role in enforcing chastity.
    A number of active women's rights groups worked to reform family 
law, educate women on their legal rights, promote literacy, and combat 
FGM.

    Children.--The Government remained committed to the protection of 
children's welfare; however, in practice, the Government made little 
progress in eliminating FGM, affording rights to children with foreign 
fathers, and helping street children.
    The Government provided public education, which is compulsory for 
the first 9 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The 
Government treated boys and girls equally at all levels of education. 
The Education Minister asserted that 98 percent of citizen children 
were enrolled in compulsory education through grade nine. Approximately 
30 percent of citizen students pursued studies at the post-secondary 
level.
    The Government provided medical care for all children, regardless 
of gender.
    The Child Law provides for privileges, protection, and care for 
children in general. Six of the law's 144 articles set rules protective 
of working children (see Section 6.d.).
    In May 2003, the Suggestions and Complaints Committee of the 
People's Assembly approved a draft law that would allocate special 
holding cells for minors at police stations. The proposal had not been 
adopted by the entire Parliament at year's end.
    Children with foreign fathers were not considered citizens and 
therefore could not attend public school or state universities. They 
were also barred from certain professional schools and could not work 
without meeting foreign residency requirements and obtaining work 
permits. There were an estimated 400,000 such children in the country.
    FGM remained a serious problem and was widely performed (see 
Section 5, Women).
    During the year, the country's National Council of Childhood and 
Motherhood (NCCM), a government organ, developed a national plan to 
increase educational opportunities for girls, to combat the worst forms 
of child labor (in collaboration with the ILO), and to implement a 
reproductive health awareness program for public schools. At year's 
end, implementation was underway.

    Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically prohibit 
trafficking in persons; however, other portions of the criminal code 
may be used to prosecute traffickers. There were anecdotal and press 
reports of trafficking of persons from sub Saharan Africa and Eastern 
Europe through the country to Europe and Israel. There have been press 
reports about foreigners trying to cross over to Israel seeking 
employment there. It is difficult to determine with precision how many 
of the aliens smuggled through the country were actually being 
trafficked and how many were voluntary economic migrants. The 
Government aggressively patrolled its borders to prevent alien 
smuggling, but geography and resource limitations precluded total 
success. Government officials participated in international conferences 
on combating trafficking in persons.

    Persons With Disabilities.--There are no laws specifically 
prohibiting discrimination against persons with physical or mental 
disabilities, but the Government made serious efforts to address their 
rights. It worked closely with U.N. agencies and other international 
aid donors to design job-training programs for persons with 
disabilities. The Government also sought to increase the public's 
awareness of the capabilities of persons with disabilities in 
television programming, the print media, and educational material in 
public schools. There were approximately 5.7 million persons with 
disabilities, of whom 1.5 million were disabled severely.
    The law provides that all businesses must designate 5 percent of 
their jobs for persons with disabilities who are exempt from normal 
literacy requirements. Although there was no legislation mandating 
access to public accommodations and transportation, persons with 
disabilities may ride government-owned mass transit buses free of 
charge, are given priority in obtaining telephones, and receive 
reductions on customs duties for private vehicles. A number of NGOs 
were active in efforts to train and assist persons with disabilities.

    Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination.--In February 2003, a 
court rejected the appeal of foreign national Wissam Toufic Abyad, who 
had been convicted of ``habitual debauchery'' after arranging to meet a 
police informant posing as a homosexual man on an internet site. Abyad, 
serving a 15-month sentence, was unable to get his case heard by the 
Court of Cassation. He was released in May.
    In February 2003, a Court of Appeal in Agouza, Cairo upheld the 3-
year sentences of 11 allegedly homosexual men convicted of ``habitual 
debauchery.'' A twelfth defendant was tried in juvenile court and later 
sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment. Lawyers for the 12 appealed the 
case to the Court of Cassation, but no court hearing date had been set, 
and the 12 remained in prison during the year.
    Individuals suspected of homosexual activity and arrested on 
``debauchery'' charges regularly reported being subjected to 
humiliation and abuse while in custody.
    In March, the HRW Executive Director visited the country to unveil 
the new report ``In a Time of Torture,'' which focused on harassment 
and abuse of alleged homosexuals.
    During the year, there were no reports of wide scale Internet 
entrapment of homosexuals.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--There are no legal obstacles to 
establishing private sector unions, although such unions were uncommon. 
Workers may join trade unions, but were not required to do so. A union 
local or workers' committee may be formed if 50 employees express a 
desire to organize. Most union members, about one-quarter of the labor 
force, were employed by state owned enterprises. Unionization decreased 
in the past several years as a result of early retirement plans in 
public sector enterprises and the privatization of many of these 
enterprises.
    There were 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor 
federation; however, requiring all trade unions to belong to a single 
federation infringes on freedom of association. The ETUF controlled the 
nomination and election procedures for trade union officers and 
permitted public authorities to intervene in union financial 
activities. The Government showed no sign that it intended to accept 
the establishment of more than one federation. ETUF officials had close 
relations with the ruling NDP, and some were members of the People's 
Assembly or the Shura Council. They spoke on behalf of worker concerns, 
and public confrontations between the ETUF and the Government were 
rare.
    Some unions within the ETUF were affiliated with international 
trade union organizations. Others were in the process of becoming 
affiliated. The law does not permit anti-union discrimination. There 
were no reports of attempted discrimination, nor were there reports of 
attempts to enforce this protection.

    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 2003 Labor 
Law (Law 12) calls for the establishment of a labor consultative 
council, including representatives from the Government, employers, and 
workers associations. The council, in working with other labor experts, 
addresses tripartite issues and problems and reviews labor-related 
domestic and international legislation; however, the council did not 
meet during the year. The law provides for collective bargaining, 
allowing for tripartite negotiations to improve labor terms and 
conditions and resolve disputes between workers and employers. 
Collective negotiation may be set in motion by any of the concerned 
parties without the consent of other parties involved with the 
assistance of the concerned administrative authority.
    The Labor Law also established special Pentagonal Committees 
composed of two judges and representatives from the Ministry of 
Manpower and Migration (MOMM), the ETUF, and employers. The Labor Law 
provides these committees with judicial powers to adjudicate labor 
disputes arising from the law's application. Decisions by these 
committees, which are intended to serve in place of the courts of first 
resort, may be appealed through the regular appeals process. During the 
year, the Pentagonal Committees issued more than 200 verdicts in labor 
disputes.
    The MOMM established a unit in 2003 for collective negotiations and 
for monitoring the implementation of collective agreements. The 
Government sets wages, benefits, and job classifications for public 
sector and government employees, and the private sector sets 
compensations for its employees in accordance with the Government's 
laws regarding minimum wages.
    The Labor Law permits strikes, but only after an extended 
negotiation process. There were at least 15 strikes during the year. 
Wildcat strikes are prohibited. Peaceful strikes are allowed, provided 
they are announced in advance and organized by the trade union to 
defend vocational, economic, and social interests. To call a strike, 
the trade union must notify the employer and concerned administrative 
authority at least 10 days in advance of the strike date, giving the 
reason for the strike and the date it would commence. Prior to this 
formal notification, the strike action must be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the ETUF Board of Directors. This advance notification 
requirement effectively eliminates wildcat strikes. Strikes are 
prohibited by law during the validity of collective bargaining 
agreements and during the mediation and arbitration process. Strikes 
are also prohibited in strategic or vital entities in which the 
interruption of work could result in a disturbance of national security 
or basic services. The Labor Law also regulates litigation related to 
collective bargaining and allows collective bargaining in what are 
identified as strategic and vital establishments.
    Firms, apart from large ones in the private sector, generally did 
not adhere to government-mandated standards. Although they are required 
to observe some government practices, such as the minimum wage, social 
security insurance, and official holidays, firms often did not adhere 
to government practice in non-binding matters, including award of the 
annual Labor Day bonus.
    Labor law and practice are the same in the six existing export-
processing zones (EPZs) as in the rest of the country. A Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ) law was issued in 2002 laying the legal foundation 
for the establishment of SEZs that will be export-oriented. According 
to the SEZ law, rules governing labor in the SEZs will be more 
flexible, since the authority regulating the SEZ can tailor contracts 
in accordance with business needs while adhering to the general 
requirements of the labor law. At year's end, the Ministry of 
Investment was proceeding to establish an SEZ in East Port Said.

    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The 2003 Labor Law and the Child 
Law do not specifically prohibit forced and compulsory labor by 
children. Such practices, including by children, were reportedly rare.

    d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--
Local trade unions reported that the Ministry of Labor adequately 
enforced labor laws in state-owned enterprises, but enforcement in the 
private sector, especially in the informal sector, was lax. Employers 
continued to abuse, overwork, and generally endanger many working 
children. Changes in the Child Labor Law have not significantly 
improved conditions due to lax enforcement by the Government. 
Enforcement remained spotty, and in cases where offenders have been 
prosecuted, the fines imposed were often small (e.g., 20 LE, or $3.25) 
and thus had questionable deterrent effect. Regulations proposed in 
2003 under the revised labor law sharply increased the minimum fines in 
child labor cases to LE 500 ($81). The Government has developed 
programs that emphasize prevention and include employer, parent, and 
child counseling.
    The law limits the type and conditions of work that children under 
the age of 18 may perform legally. In nonagricultural work, the minimum 
age for employment is 14 or the age of completing basic education (15), 
whichever is higher. Provincial governors, with the approval of the 
Minister of Education, may authorize seasonal work for children between 
the ages of 12 and 14, provided that duties are not hazardous and do 
not interfere with schooling.
    Pre-employment training for children under the age of 12 is 
prohibited. Children are prohibited from working for more than 6 hours 
per day, and one or more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be 
included. Several other restrictions apply to children: they may not 
work overtime, during their weekly day(s) off, between 7 p.m. and 7 
a.m., or on official holidays. Children are also prohibited from 
working for more than 4 hours continuously.
    Statistical information regarding the number of working children 
was difficult to obtain and often outdated. NGOs estimated that up to 
1.5 million children worked. Government studies indicated that the 
concentration of working children was higher in rural than in urban 
areas. Approximately 78 percent of working children were in the 
agricultural sector. However, children also worked in light industry.

    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--During the year, the minimum 
wage for government and public sector employees was determined by the 
National Council of Wages and differed among sectors. The law 
stipulates that 48 hours is the maximum number of hours that may be 
worked in 1 week. Overtime for hours worked beyond 36 per week is 
payable at the rate of 25 percent extra for daylight hours and 50 
percent extra for nighttime hours. The nationwide minimum wage 
generally was enforced effectively for larger private companies; 
however, smaller firms did not always pay the minimum wage. The minimum 
wage frequently did not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family; however, base pay commonly was supplemented by a 
complex system of fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple 
a worker's take-home pay and provide a decent standard of living.
    The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards, 
which also apply in the EPZs; however, enforcement and inspections were 
uneven. A council for occupational health and safety was established by 
the Labor Law to address health and safety issues nationwide. During 
the year, ETUF called for development of a national health insurance 
program prior to proposed changes in the health insurance law.
    The new labor law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous 
working conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves 
from hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    Starting on June 11, employees at the Ora-Egypt asbestos products 
firm engaged in strike actions. The strikers said that 46 employees had 
suffered from cancer as a result of unsafe working conditions. On 
September 21, the Government closed Ora-Egypt.
    In 2003, the Minister of Manpower said that the total number of 
foreign workers holding work and residence permits was 18,177, not 
including Sudanese, Palestinians, and foreigners married to citizens. 
Unofficial estimates of undocumented workers were as high as 116,000. 
Foreign workers with the required permits enjoyed legal protections.
    There were occasional reports of employer abuse of undocumented 
workers, especially domestic workers. A few employers were prosecuted 
during the year for abuse of domestic workers, but many claims of abuse 
were unsubstantiated because undocumented workers were reluctant to 
make their identities public.

                               __________

                                  IRAN

    The Islamic Republic of Iran\1\ is a constitutional, theocratic 
republic in which Shi'a Muslim clergy dominate the key power 
structures. Article Four of the Constitution states that ``All laws and 
regulations . . . shall be based on Islamic principles.'' Government 
legitimacy is based on the twin pillars of popular sovereignty (Article 
Six) and the rule of the Supreme Jurisconsulate (Article Five). The 
unelected Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamene'i, dominates a tricameral division of power among legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches. Khamene'i directly controls the armed 
forces and exercises indirect control over the internal security 
forces, the judiciary, and other key institutions. The executive branch 
was headed by President Mohammad Khatami, who won a second 4-year term 
in June 2001, with 77 percent of the popular vote in a multiparty 
election. The legislative branch featured a popularly elected 290-seat 
Islamic Consultative Assembly, Majlis, which develops and passes 
legislation, and an unelected 12-member Council of Guardians, which 
reviews all legislation passed by the Majlis for adherence to Islamic 
and constitutional principles and also has the duty of screening Majlis 
candidates for eligibility. Conservative candidates won a majority of 
seats in the February Seventh Majlis election that was widely perceived 
as neither free nor fair, due to the Council of Guardians' exclusion of 
thousands of qualified candidates. The 34-member Expediency Council is 
empowered to resolve legislative impasses between the Council of 
Guardians and the Majlis. The Constitution provides that ``the 
judiciary is an independent power''; however, the judicial branch is 
widely perceived as both corrupt and heavily biased towards 
conservative elements within the society and against reformist forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report 
draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several agencies share responsibility for law enforcement and 
maintenance of order, including the Ministry of Intelligence and 
Security, the Law Enforcement Forces under the Ministry of Interior, 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a military force 
established after the revolution. A paramilitary volunteer force known 
as the Basiji, and various gangs of men known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah 
(Helpers of the Party of God), or ``plain clothes,'' aligned with 
extreme conservative members of the leadership, acted as vigilantes. 
Civilian authorities did not fully maintain effective control of the 
security forces, and there were instances in which elements of the 
security forces acted independently of government authority. The 
regular and the paramilitary security forces both committed numerous, 
serious human rights abuses.
    The mixed economy depends on oil and gas for 80 percent of its 
export earnings. The population was more than 69 million. All large-
scale industry is publicly owned and state-administered. Large 
parastatal charitable foundations (``bonyads''), with strong 
connections to the clerical regime, controlled as much as a third of 
the country's economy and exercised considerable influence. The 
Government heavily subsidized basic foodstuffs and energy costs. 
Government mismanagement and corruption negatively affected economic 
performance. The official unemployment rate was approximately 11 
percent, although other estimates were higher. Estimated inflation was 
15 percent with economic growth approximately 6.5 percent during the 
year.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and it 
continued to commit numerous, serious abuses. The right of citizens to 
change their government was restricted significantly. Continuing 
serious abuses included: summary executions; disappearances; torture 
and other degrading treatment, reportedly including severe punishments 
such as amputations and flogging; poor prison conditions; arbitrary 
arrest and detention; lack of habeas corpus or access to counsel; and 
prolonged and incommunicado detention. Citizens often did not receive 
due process or fair trials. The Government infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights and restricted freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
association, and religion.
    An intense political struggle continued during the early part of 
the year between a broad popular movement favoring greater 
liberalization in government policies, particularly in the area of 
human rights, and certain hard-line elements within the Government and 
society that viewed such reforms as a threat to the survival of the 
Islamic Republic. In many cases, this struggle was played out within 
the Government, with reformists and hard-liners squaring off in 
divisive internal debates. As in the past, reformist members of Majlis 
were harassed, prosecuted, and threatened with jail for statements made 
under parliamentary immunity. In screening for the February Seventh 
Majlis elections, the Guardian Council ruled approximately 2,500 of the 
over 8,000 prospective candidates ineligible to run, including 85 
sitting reformist deputies; this was one factor leading to 
conservatives winning a majority of seats.
    The Government restricted the work of human rights groups. Violence 
and legal and societal discrimination against women were problems. The 
Government discriminated against minorities and severely restricted 
workers' rights, including freedom of association and the right to 
organize and bargain collectively. Child labor persisted. Vigilante 
groups, with strong ties to certain members of the Government, enforced 
their interpretation of appropriate social behavior through 
intimidation and violence. There were reports of trafficking in 
persons.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--There were reports 
of political killings. The Government was responsible for numerous 
killings during the year, including executions following trials that 
lacked due process.
    The law criminalized dissent and applied the death penalty to 
offenses such as ``attempts against the security of the State, outrage 
against high-ranking officials, and insults against the memory of Imam 
Khomeini and against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' 
Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the absence of 
sufficient procedural safeguards.
    Exiles and human rights monitors alleged that many of those 
supposedly executed for criminal offenses in the past, such as 
narcotics trafficking, actually were political dissidents. Supporters 
of outlawed political groups, or in the case of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, 
a terrorist organization, were believed to constitute a number of those 
executed each year.
    In January, security forces killed four persons and injured many 
others when they attacked striking copper factory workers in the 
Khatunabad village near Shahr-i Babak (see Section 6.b.).
    In February, security forces killed seven persons in post-Majlis 
election violence in the towns of Andimeshk and Izeh in Khuzestan 
Province and the town of Firuzabad in the Fars Province.
    In August, Iranian media reported that 16-year-old Ateqeh Rajabi 
was hanged in public for charges reportedly involving her ``acts 
incompatible with chastity.'' Rajabi was not believed to be mentally 
competent; she had no access to a lawyer. Her sentence was reviewed and 
upheld by the Supreme Court. An unnamed man arrested with her was given 
100 lashes and released.
    In July 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi, died 
in custody after being arrested for taking photographs at Evin prison 
in Tehran. After initially claiming that she had died as a result of a 
stroke, the Government subsequently admitted that she died as a result 
of a blow to the head and charged individuals involved in her 
detention. The Government denied Canada's request, based on her son's 
statement, that Kazemi's remains be sent to Canada for further autopsy 
and burial. In July, a court acquitted an Intelligence Ministry 
official accused of her death, and the Government has taken no 
subsequent investigative or legal action to resolve ambiguities 
surrounding her death (see Section 4).
    Two political activists associated with the outlawed Komala party, 
Sassan al-Kanaan and Mohammad Golabi, were executed in February and 
March 2003. Golabi reportedly was tortured while in detention. The 
opposition Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) alleged that 
the Government executed party member Jalil Zewal in December 2003, 
after 9 years in prison during which he reportedly was tortured. KDPI 
member Ramin Sharifi was also executed in December 2003 after his 
arrest in July 2003. KDPI reported that hard-line vigilante groups 
killed at least seven other Kurdish civilians during 2003.
    The 1998 murders of prominent political activists Darioush and 
Parvaneh Forouhar, writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouyandeh, 
and the disappearance of political activist Pirouz Davani continued to 
cause controversy about what is perceived to be the Government's cover-
up of involvement by high-level officials. Prominent investigative 
journalist Akbar Ganji, who was arrested in 2000 and sentenced to 6 
years in prison for his reporting on the case, remained in prison (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). In 2001, the Special Representative for Iran 
of the Commission on Human Rights (UNSR) also reported claims that 
there were more than 80 killings or disappearances over a 10-year 
period as part of a wider campaign to silence dissent. Members of 
religious minority groups, including the Baha'is, evangelical 
Christians, and Sunni clerics were killed in recent years, allegedly by 
government agents or directly at the hands of authorities.

    b. Disappearance.--Little reliable information was available 
regarding the number of disappearances during the year.
    The Government announced that approximately 4,000 persons--both 
protesters and vigilantes--were arrested in connection with pro-reform 
protests in June 2003. As of December, approximately 130 still were 
detained.
    No further information was known regarding the disappearances of 
Baha'i, Kurdish, and Jewish Iranian prisoners cited in previous Human 
Rights Reports dating from as early as the fall of the Shah in 1979.

    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture, as does the 
Law on Respect of Lawful Liberties and Protection of Citizenship Rights 
adopted in May; however, there were numerous credible reports that 
security forces and prison personnel continued to torture detainees and 
prisoners. Some prison facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, were 
notorious for the cruel and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon 
political opponents of the Government. Additionally, in recent years, 
government officials have inflicted severe prisoner abuse and torture 
in a series of ``unofficial'' secret prisons and detention centers 
outside the national prison system. Common methods included prolonged 
solitary confinement with sensory deprivation, beatings, long 
confinement in contorted positions, kicking detainees with military 
boots, hanging detainees by the arms and legs, threats of execution if 
individuals refused to confess, burning with cigarettes, sleep 
deprivation, and severe and repeated beatings with cables or other 
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also 
reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete 
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete 
blindness.
    On February 28, Judiciary Head Ayatollah Shahroudi issued a 
directive protecting the rights of the accused and, among other points, 
instructing police, judicial officials, and security agents to refrain 
from physical abuse when interrogating suspects. On May 2, the Majlis 
passed a law based on this 15-point directive in the form of the Bill 
on Legitimate Liberties and Civil Rights, which the Council of 
Guardians approved shortly thereafter. However, there is much anecdotal 
evidence that this law was ignored routinely in practice.
    In August, credible international and local NGOs reported the case 
of a prisoner in the province of Khuzistan who had to have his hands 
amputated because prison officials had left him hanging by the wrists 
and then forgot about him.
    In August 2003, the Council of Guardians rejected a bill on 
accession to the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Majlis amended the 
bill in late December 2003, reportedly addressing Council of Guardians 
concerns over the monetary costs of joining the convention, but the 
council still rejected the revised bill. The Council of Guardians also 
rejected in mid-2002 a bill passed by the Majlis to end torture and 
forced confessions.
    In July 2002, in an effort to combat ``un-Islamic behavior'' and 
social corruption among the young, the Government formed a new 
``morality'' force, referred to merely as ``special units'' (yegan ha-
ye vizhe), to complement the existing morality police, ``Enjoining the 
Good and Prohibiting the Forbidden'' (Amr be Ma'ruf va Nahi az Monkar). 
The new force was to assist in enforcing the Islamic Republic's strict 
rules of moral behavior. Credible press reports indicated that members 
of this force chased and beat persons in the streets for offenses such 
as listening to music or, in the case of women, wearing makeup or 
clothing regarded as insufficiently modest (see Section 1.f.). While 
not uniformly enforced, in July, morality police made several raids in 
shopping centers and shops in northern Tehran, rounding up young women 
who they determined to be violating the Islamic dress code and 
confiscating articles of clothing considered immodest.
    In February, Mohsen Mofidi reportedly received 80 lashes following 
a 4-month prison sentence having been convicted of consuming alcohol, 
owning a satellite dish, and aiding his sister's ``corruption'' in 
associating with male companions. He died in a hospital in Tehran 
shortly after his release.
    In March 2003, activist Siamak Pourzand was re-imprisoned after his 
provisional release in November 2002. After his arrest in 2001, 
Pourzand was tried in March 2002 behind closed doors and sentenced to 
11 years in prison for ``undermining state security through his links 
with monarchists and counter-revolutionaries.'' Press reports said that 
he had confessed to his crimes at his trial, but his family claimed 
that the confession was extracted under duress. Pourzand suffered 
severe health problems while held incommunicado, reportedly including a 
heart attack, and was allegedly denied proper medical treatment. As of 
December, Siamak Pourzand was on leave from prison for medical 
treatment, his condition a direct result of physical, emotional, and 
mental abuse during 2 years of imprisonment (over 12 months of which 
was in solitary confinement). Despite critical health problems, the 
Government did not allow him to leave the country for treatment.
    In April 2003, Former Deputy Prime Minister and longtime political 
dissident, Abbas Amir-Entezam was re-imprisoned, after his release in 
2002 for medical reasons. Amir-Entezam was reportedly incarcerated for 
calling for a referendum on whether the country should remain under 
clerical rule during a speech at Tehran University. He was reportedly a 
frequent victim of torture in prison resulting in numerous medical 
problems. He reported having been taken on numerous occasions before a 
firing squad (see Section 1.e.). During the year, he was released on 
medical leave until late November, due to the Government's inability to 
treat his medical conditions in prison. As of December, he was 
receiving medical treatment at his home while recovering from back 
surgery, and his medical leave was extended until early January 2005.
    In July 2003, an Iranian-Canadian photographer, Zahra Kazemi, died 
in custody as a result of a blow to the head (see Section 1.a.).
    In November 2003, four men were reportedly sentenced to death by 
stoning for involvement in kidnapping and rape. In December 2002, the 
Government officially suspended the practices of amputation and 
lapidation or stoning--a form of capital punishment for adultery and 
other crimes, although the law has not been rescinded. Amnesty 
International (AI) reported at least nine cases of amputation since 
2002 and four cases of execution of children.
    In mid-September, the Public Relations head of Hamedan Province's 
Department of Prisons announced that the fingers of a robber were cut 
off on the order of the public prosecutor's office. In mid-October, an 
Ahvaz judge upheld the sentence to amputate a young man's right hand, 
with the sentence subsequently implemented. On November 11, in 
Sanandaj, a 14-year-old Kurdish boy died after having received 85 
lashes based on a judge's ruling finding him guilty of breaking his 
fast during the month of Ramadan.
    Prison conditions in the country were poor. Many prisoners were 
held in solitary confinement or denied adequate food or medical care to 
force confessions. After its February 2003 visit, the U.N. Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detentions reported that ``for the first time since 
its establishment, [the Working Group] has been confronted with a 
strategy of widespread use of solitary confinement for its own sake and 
not for traditional disciplinary purposes.'' The Working Group 
described Sector 209 of Evin Prison as a ``prison within a prison,'' 
designed for the ``systematic, large-scale use of absolute solitary 
confinement, frequently for long periods.''
    The 2001 report by the UNSR noted a significant increase in the 
prison population and reports of overcrowding and unrest. In July, the 
UK-based International Center for Prison Studies reported that 133,658 
prisoners occupied facilities constructed to hold a maximum of 65,000 
persons. In November, the Iran Prison Organization reported a prison 
population of 134,103.
    The UNSR reported that much of the prisoner abuse occurred in 
unofficial detention centers run by unofficial intelligence services 
and the military. The UNSR further reported that the unofficial 
detention centers were to be brought under the control of the National 
Prison Organization (NPO) during 2001; however, November 2003 press 
reports indicated that a number of unofficial detention centers 
continued to operate outside NPO control. The U.N. Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention raised this issue with the country's Article 90 
Parliamentary Commission during its February 2003 visit, generating a 
commission inquiry that reportedly confirmed the existence of numerous 
unofficial prisons.
    In a June study, Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented a number of 
unofficial prisons and detention centers such as ``Prison 59'' and 
``Amaken'' an interrogation center where persons are held without 
charge, questioned intensively for prolonged periods, and physically 
abused and tortured during the process.
    The Government generally has only granted prison access to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); however, it did permit 
visits to imprisoned dissidents by U.N. human rights officials during 
2003 (see Section 4). U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
officials visited Evin prison in Tehran--including sector 209, in which 
many political prisoners were believed held--as well as Esfahan and 
Shiraz prisons, the Shiraz military prison, and police stations in each 
city. The Working Group interviewed approximately 140 ``ordinary'' 
prisoners plus 14 out of a requested 45 inmates described as political 
prisoners and prisoners of conscience. The Working Group described the 
authorities' cooperation as ``on the whole positive,'' although it 
noted problems with fulfillment of follow-up requests generated by the 
visit and disappointment over arrests carried out after the Group's 
departure. Following his November 2003 visit to the country, the UNSR 
for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression noted that his delegation met with almost 40 dissidents, 
both in and out of prison.

    d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention.--The Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices remained 
common. In practice, there is no legal time limit for incommunicado 
detention nor any judicial means to determine the legality of 
detention. In the period immediately following detention or arrest, 
many detainees were held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and 
family members. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in 
local Revolutionary Guard offices. There also are numerous detention 
centers not under the control of the NPO, reportedly run by 
``plainclothes'' officers of various security and intelligence 
agencies, elements of the judiciary, and state-sponsored vigilante 
groups.
    The security forces often did not inform family members of a 
prisoner's welfare and location. Authorities often denied visits by 
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed 
prisoners did not always receive notification of the prisoners' deaths. 
Those who received such information reportedly were forced on occasion 
to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
    Security forces often targeted family members of political 
prisoners for harassment. In April, a court sentenced student activist 
Payman Piran, detained since February on charges of acting against 
national security, contacting foreigners, disturbing public opinion, 
and behaving insultingly, to 10 years in prison. In July, security 
forces forcibly evicted retired teacher Mostafa Piran, father of Peyman 
Piran, and his family from their apartment, confiscated their goods, 
and sealed the apartment. They beat Mostafa Piran and then detained him 
in Evin Prison. He was not informed of any charges against him nor 
allowed to see a lawyer. Subsequently, family members who saw him said 
that he had been mistreated during lengthy interrogation sessions and 
badly bruised. Also in July, Simin Mohammadi and her father Mohammad 
Mohammadi, sister and father respectively of jailed student activists 
Manuchehr and Akbar Mohammadi, were arrested, reportedly for ``acts 
against state security.'' Simin was released after posting bail 
following 2 weeks' imprisonment in solitary confinement; her father 
also was released on bail after having had a heart attack in solitary 
confinement.
    According to the media, in November, Mohammad Reza Aghapour, former 
editor-in-chief of the banned magazine, Asan, was arrested upon his 
return from London where he reportedly attended seminars on the 
circumstances of the country's Turkish population. At year's end, there 
was no information on whether Aghapour was imprisoned or if charges 
were brought against him.
    According to the media, in September, authorities arrested and held 
for 11 days Soeed Matalebi, the father of Sinn Motalebi, a political 
opponent of the regime who helped to operate an Internet opposition 
website.
    In January 2003, the Government released Ayatollah Hossein Ali 
Montazeri, amid reports of health problems after 5 years of house 
arrest. Montazeri was formerly the designated successor of the late 
Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, who subsequently became an 
outspoken critic of the Supreme Leader (see Section 2.a.). In recent 
years, the Government has used the practice of house arrest to restrict 
the movements and ability to communicate of senior Shi'a religious 
leaders whose views regarding political and governance issues were at 
variance with the ruling orthodoxy; however, there was no information 
on current practice.
    In July 2003, the press credibly reported that Iranian-American 
academic Dariush Zahedi was detained during a private visit to the 
country and reportedly held in solitary confinement in Evin prison. 
Majlis officials noted that Zahedi was held on suspicion of espionage 
but, after a 40-day investigation, was cleared by the Ministry of 
Intelligence. However, Zahedi remained in detention after the case was 
transferred to the judiciary, reportedly at the intervention of 
Tehran's chief prosecutor. Zahedi was released on approximately 
$250,000 (200 million Tomans) bail in November 2003 and, although 
technically free to leave the country, is still subject to criminal 
prosecution. As of February, Zahedi had left the country; the charges 
against him were still pending.
    In November 2003, security agents briefly arrested two sons of 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the dissident cleric released from 
house arrest in January (see Section 1.d. above). The arrests 
reportedly were in response to the sons' attempts to refurbish a 
building purchased by the family for use as a teaching facility. The 
Qom mosque and Koranic school at which Montazeri formerly taught has 
remained closed since 1997, when comments by the cleric questioning the 
authority of the Supreme Leader sparked attacks on the school and his 
home by Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs.
    In November 2003, student activist Ahmed Batebi met with the UNSR 
for the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, while on medical leave from prison where he is serving a 
15-year sentence for participating in the 1999 student demonstrations. 
He was re-arrested shortly afterward; however, he was temporarily 
released in late April, but he was re-incarcerated and, again, 
temporarily released on May 3. Subsequently, he was returned to prison, 
and his 10-year sentence remained in place.
    AI reported that in October 2003, Arzhang Davoodi was arrested for 
assisting in making a television documentary criticizing the 
authorities. Reportedly, he was kept in solitary confinement for over 3 
months and extensively beaten during the period. According to AI, he 
has not been charged and, although having paid bail in March, has not 
been released.
    In July 2002, the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom 
Movement, the country's oldest opposition party, and sentenced over 30 
of its members to jail terms ranging from 4 months to 10 years on 
charges of trying to overthrow the Islamic system. Other members were 
barred from political activity for up to 10 years and ordered to pay 
fines up to more than approximately $6,000 (currently 48 million 
tomans) (see Sections 2.b. and 3).
    Numerous publishers, editors, and journalists (including those 
working on Internet sites) were either detained, jailed, and fined, or 
they were prohibited from publishing their writings during the year 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Adherents of the Baha'i faith continued to face arbitrary arrest 
and detention. According to Baha'i sources, four Baha'is remained in 
prison for practicing their faith at year's end, one facing a life 
sentence, two facing sentences of 15 years, and the fourth a 4-year 
sentence. A small number of Baha'is were detained at any given time. 
Sources claimed that such arrests were carried out to ``terrorize'' the 
community and to disrupt the lives of its members. Others were 
arrested, charged, and then quickly released. However, the charges 
against them often were not dropped (see Section 2.c.).
    During 2003, the Government continued to exchange with Iraq 
prisoners of war (POWs) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 
1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. In March 2003, the Government said it released 
888 Iraqi POWs in exchange for 351 Iranian prisoners that the 
Government claimed were not POWs, but religious pilgrims, university 
students, tour guides, farmers and villagers from the border regions, 
and border guards). In April and August, the Government claimed that it 
held no more Iraqi POWs.

    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides that the 
judiciary is ``an independent power''; however, in practice the court 
system was subject to government and religious influence. It served as 
the principal vehicle of the Government to restrict freedom and reform 
in the society. U.N. representatives, including the UNSR, the U.N. 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and independent human rights 
organizations noted the absence of procedural safeguards in criminal 
trials. Trials are supposed to be open to the public; however, 
frequently they are held in closed sessions without access to a lawyer; 
the right to appeal often is not honored.
    There are several different court systems. The two most active are 
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter try offenses viewed as 
potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to 
internal or external security, narcotics and economic crimes, and 
official corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged 
transgressions within the clerical establishment, and a military court 
investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security 
duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A 
press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers 
in the media. The Supreme Court has limited review authority.
    After the revolution, the judicial system was revised to conform to 
an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic sources. 
Article 157 provides that the Head of the Judiciary, currently 
Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi, shall be a cleric chosen by the 
Supreme Leader. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General 
also must be clerics. Women are barred from serving as judges.
    Many aspects of the pre-revolutionary judicial system survived in 
the civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right 
to a public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of 
appeal. Panels of judges adjudicate trials. There is no jury system in 
the civil and criminal courts. If post-revolutionary statutes did not 
address a situation, the Government advised judges to give precedence 
to their own knowledge and interpretation of Islamic law.
    In its 2003 report, the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
noted failures of due process in the court system caused by the absence 
of a ``culture of counsel'' and the previous concentration of authority 
in the hands of a judge who prosecuted, investigated, and decides 
cases. The Working Group called for active involvement of counsel in 
cases, from the custody and investigation phase through the trial and 
appeals phases. The Working Group welcomed the December 2002 
reinstatement of prosecution services, after a 7-year suspension, but 
noted that this reform had thus far had been applied unevenly, with the 
judge still having major investigative responsibilities in many 
jurisdictions.
    Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, in which crimes against 
national security and other principal offenses are heard, were 
notorious for their disregard of international standards of fairness. 
Revolutionary Court judges were chosen in part based on their 
ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial detention often was 
prolonged, and defendants lacked access to attorneys. Indictments often 
lacked clarity and included undefined offenses such as ``anti-
revolutionary behavior,'' ``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with 
global arrogance.'' Defendants did not have the right to confront their 
accusers. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes' duration occurred. 
Others were show trials that were intended merely to highlight a 
coerced public confession.
    The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court system continued to be 
a subject of debate. The clerical courts, which investigate offenses 
and crimes committed by clerics and which are overseen directly by the 
Supreme Leader, are not provided for in the Constitution and operated 
outside the domain of the judiciary. In particular, critics alleged 
that the clerical courts were used to prosecute clerics for expressing 
controversial ideas and for participating in activities outside the 
sphere of religion, such as journalism. The recommendations of the U.N. 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention included a call to abolish both 
the Special Clerical Courts and the Revolutionary Courts, which were 
described as ``responsible for many of the cases of arbitrary detention 
for crimes of opinion.''
    The President stated on April 28 that, ``absolutely, we do have 
political prisoners and people who are in prison for their beliefs.'' 
No accurate estimates were available regarding the number of citizens 
imprisoned for their political beliefs. In November 2003, the UNSR for 
the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Expression and 
Opinion estimated the number to be in the hundreds. The Government has 
arrested, convicted, and sentenced persons on questionable criminal 
charges, including drug trafficking, when their actual ``offenses'' 
were political. The Government has charged members of religious 
minorities with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, 
and conducted trials in these cases in the same manner as threats to 
national security.
    In December, a Tehran justice department official alleged that the 
Government tried and sentenced fugitive al-Qaeda members detained in 
the country. The Government did not identify those convicted, the 
verdicts, or their sentences.
    In March 2002, after a trial behind closed doors but with his 
lawyer present, Nasser Zarafshan, the attorney representing the 
families of the victims of the 1998 extrajudicial killings of 
dissidents by intelligence ministry officials, was sentenced to 5 years 
in prison (2 years for disseminating state secrets and 3 years for the 
possession of firearms) and 70 lashes for the possession of alcohol. He 
was charged with leaking confidential information pertaining to the 
trial. HRW reported that he was also charged with ``having weapons and 
alcohol at his law firm.'' Zarafshan was originally arrested in 2000 
but released after a month pending trial. An appeals court upheld his 
conviction in July 2002; he was arrested and taken to Evin Prison in 
August 2002. In November 2003, the Supreme Court reportedly dismissed 
his appeal. According to the NGO PenCanada, in September, a group of 
prisoners in collusion with prison authorities reportedly attempted to 
kill Zarafshan. Opposition websites reported that Zarafshan 
participated in a July hunger strike to protest mistreatment of 
prisoners' families by government officials. Reportedly, since 
September 2003, prison authorities have given Zarafshan only one leave 
of 48 hours.
    Several other human rights lawyers also reportedly were abused, 
among them Mohammad Dadkhah, who participated in the defense of members 
of the Iran Freedom Movement and is a founding member of the Iranian 
Center for Protection of Human Rights, and Abdol Fattah Soltani, who 
was reportedly charged for raising accusations of torture during the 
2002 defense of a number of political prisoners. In 2002, Dadkhah was 
sentenced to 5 months in jail and banned from practicing law for 10 
years; however, in November, he remained free and was practicing law. 
However, in October, the Government refused to issue him a passport. In 
2002, Soltani was sentenced to 4 months in prison and barred from 
practicing law for 5 years. At year's end, he was not in jail but still 
precluded from practicing law. The U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention included among its recommendations the need for guaranteeing 
the immunity of counsel in pleading cases as an essential element of 
the right to due process.
    In November 2002, academic Hashem Aghajari was sentenced to death 
at a closed trial for blaspheming against Islam during a speech in 
Hamedan. In addition to the death sentence, he was sentenced to 74 
lashes, exile to a remote desert location, 8 years in jail, and a ban 
on teaching for 10 years. In February 2003, the Supreme Court revoked 
his death sentence, but the case was sent back to the lower court for 
retrial. In June, the Government announced that the Supreme Court 
overturned his death sentence. As a result of a retrial in July, the 
sentence was reduced to 3 years in prison and 2 years suspended 
sentence in prison, in addition to 5 years ``deprivation of social 
rights.'' Aghajari was released on bail on July 31 and has announced 
that he will challenge the court's decision to bar him from publishing 
articles and speaking in public.
    Former Deputy Prime Minister, Abbas Amir-Entezam, was re-imprisoned 
in April 2003, after his release in 2002 for medical reasons. A 
longtime political dissident, Amir-Entezam has spent much of the past 
24 years in prison. He reportedly was incarcerated for calling for a 
referendum on whether the country should remain under clerical rule 
(see Section 1.c.). During the year, he was freed on medical leave due 
to the Government's inability to treat his medical conditions in 
prison. As of December, he was receiving medical treatment at his home 
recovering from back surgery, and his medical leave was extended until 
early January 2005.
    The trials in 2000 and 2001 of 13 Jewish citizens on charges 
related to espionage for Israel were marked by a lack of due process. 
Ten of the original 13 were sentenced to jail terms ranging from 4 to 
13 years. The last five in prison were released in April 2003 (see 
Section 2.c.).

    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life, 
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as 
``provided by law''; however, the Government infringed on these rights. 
Security forces monitored the social activities of citizens, entered 
homes and offices, monitored telephone conversations, and opened mail 
without court authorization.
    Vigilante violence included attacking young persons considered too 
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes, 
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of 
popular entertainment. Attackers targeted women whose clothing did not 
cover their hair and all parts of their body except the hands and face 
or those who wore makeup or nail polish. In October, in Rasht, Unit 110 
of the Law Enforcement Forces, another police unit charged with 
maintaining Islamic propriety, arrested 8 girls and 12 boys dancing at 
a party. In Shiraz, in late October, over a 2-day period at least 150 
people were arrested. Eyewitnesses said that dozens of individuals, 
mostly youths, were arrested on the streets for their ``un-Islamic 
attire.'' A large number of persons reportedly were arrested for 
``acting as a nuisance.'' A young man was arrested for ``eating in 
public'' in the Islamic holy month of Ramadan according to friends 
accompanying him.
    Authorities entered homes to remove television satellite dishes, or 
to disrupt private gatherings in which unmarried men and women 
socialized or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or other forbidden 
activities were offered or took place. There were also widespread 
reports that the homes and offices of reformist journalists were 
entered, searched, or ransacked by government agents in an attempt to 
intimidate. The government campaign against satellite dishes continued, 
although enforcement appeared to be arbitrary and sporadic, varying 
widely with the political climate and the individuals involved. Press 
reports from late 2003 noted that security authorities restarted 
periodic efforts to remove satellite dishes from Tehran homes, and in 1 
day confiscated 450 dishes in a single neighborhood. Early in the year, 
western media reported that Islamist militia confiscated approximately 
40,000 satellite dishes from 4 factories secretly manufacturing 
satellite equipment in eastern Tehran; however, the vast majority of 
satellite dishes in individual homes continued to operate.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to 
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights''; it makes no 
mention of freedom of speech. In practice, the Government severely 
restricted freedom of speech and of the press. Since the election of 
President Khatami, the independent press, especially newspapers and 
magazines, played an increasingly important role in providing a forum 
for an intense debate regarding reform in the society. However, basic 
legal safeguards for freedom of expression did not exist, and since 
approximately 2000, the independent press has been subjected to 
arbitrary enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably 
the judiciary, which treated such debates as a threat.
    In October, security forces prevented dissident intellectual 
Emaddedin Baghi from leaving the country to accept an award for civil 
courage, informing him he was on a list of those forbidden to leave the 
country (see Section 2.d.). Later that month, a court revoked a 
December 2003 ruling that had suspended a 1-year prison sentence for 
``propagating against the regime,'' giving him 20 days to appeal the 
ruling. At year's end, Baghi was still free; however, he was not 
permitted to leave the country.
    In November, local press reported that after an early October 
trial, a Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced Ebrahim Yazdi, leader of 
the Iranian liberal nationalist Freedom Movement opposition party, to 
an unspecified but long-term imprisonment, based on charges of actions 
against national security, possessing unauthorized weapons, insulting 
the supreme leader and government officials, and propagating against 
the system through actions benefiting opposition groups.
    The Government continued to harass senior Shi'a religious and 
political leaders and their followers who dissent from the ruling 
conservative establishment. In May, the Special Court for the Clergy in 
Qom arrested Hojatoleslam Mujtaba Lotfi, an aide to Ayatollah Hussein 
Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi, for publishing a book that detailed the 
ayatollah's 5 years under house arrest. The book also covered the 
attacks on Montazeri's home and theological school and described the 
various charges and accusations against Ayatollah Montazeri. The court 
confiscated all copies of the book. More generally, there were reports 
that the Government maintained a broad network of student informants in 
Qom's major seminaries, who reported teachings that are counter to 
official government positions.
    According to HRW, following a meeting in November 2003 with the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, a student 
(Ahmed Batebi), who was out of prison on medical leave, was returned to 
prison by government officials (see Section 1.d.).
    In October 2003, media reported that reformist parliamentarian and 
outspoken critic Mohsen Armin was sentenced to 6 months in prison for 
insulting a conservative Majlis member. The judge reportedly also 
stripped Armin of his ``social rights'' for 1 year for not appearing in 
court. Armin ascribed his absence from court to his assumption that he 
held parliamentary immunity. In August, Armin appeared in court in 
response to a complaint relating to speeches he made in 1999-2002 and 
an accusation of spreading lies. At year's end, Armin had not been 
imprisoned.
    In spring 2001, security forces arrested then Majlis member Fatima 
Haqiqatju for inciting public opinion and insulting the judiciary for 
criticizing the arrest of a female journalist and claiming that the 
Government tortured prisoners. She was the first sitting Majlis member 
to face prosecution for statements made under cover of immunity. 
Haqiqatju was sentenced to 17 months in prison, although at year's end, 
she had not been imprisoned for this offense. Separately, in June, the 
public prosecutor summoned her to court and charged her with 
``propaganda against the system,'' ``spreading lies with the intent of 
disturbing public opinion,'' and ``insulting the Council of Guardians, 
the judiciary, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.'' She was 
released on bail, but she was forbidden to leave the country. On 
November 29, Haqiqatju was summoned to a Tehran Penal Court due to a 
complaint by the Public Prosecutor based on her February 23, 2003, 
resignation speech from the Majlis. She was charged with spreading lies 
to disturb public opinion, insulting officials, and propaganda against 
the Government.
    Newspapers and magazines represented a wide variety of political 
and social perspectives, many allied with members of the Government. 
Many subjects were tolerated, including criticism of certain government 
policies. However, the Press Law prohibits the publishing of a broad 
and ill-defined category of subjects, including material ``insulting 
Islam and its sanctities'' or ``promoting subjects that might damage 
the foundation of the Islamic Republic.'' Prohibited topics include 
fault-finding comments regarding the personality and achievements of 
the late Leader of the Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism 
of the Supreme Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or 
rule by a supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain 
Islamic legal principles; publishing sensitive or classified material 
affecting national security; promotion of the views of certain 
dissident clerics, including Ayatollah Montazeri; and advocating rights 
or autonomy for ethnic minorities. Organs of the Government, such as 
the judiciary or the National Security Council, often issued written 
orders to newspapers instructing them to avoid covering controversial 
topics, or directing them as to how to cover these topics.
    The Press Law established the Press Supervisory Board, which is 
responsible for issuing press licenses and for examining complaints 
filed against publications or individual journalists, editors, or 
publishers. In certain cases, the Press Supervisory Board may refer 
complaints to the Press Court for further action, including closure. 
Its hearings were conducted in public with a jury composed of clerics, 
government officials, and editors of government-controlled newspapers. 
The jury was empowered to recommend to the presiding judge the guilt or 
innocence of defendants and the severity of any penalty to be imposed, 
although these recommendations were not legally binding.
    Since 2000, approximately 100 newspapers and magazines have been 
closed for varying lengths of time. In the last few years, some human 
rights groups asserted that the increasingly conservative Press Court 
assumed responsibility for cases before Press Supervisory Board 
consideration, often resulting in harsher judgments. Efforts to amend 
the press laws have not met with success, although in October 2003, 
Parliament passed a law limiting the duration of temporary press 
closures to a maximum of 10 days for newspapers, 4 weeks for weeklies 
or bi-weeklies, 2 months for monthlies, and 3 months for other 
publications. The importance of the legislation was to stop the 
practice of extending ``temporary'' bans indefinitely.
    The Press Law allows government entities to act as complainants 
against newspapers, and often members of the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards Corps, the Intelligence Ministry, the Law Enforcement Forces, 
the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, or other public officials 
lodged criminal complaints against reformist newspapers that led to 
their closures. Offending writers were subjected to lawsuits and fines. 
Suspension from journalistic activities and imprisonment were common 
punishments for guilty verdicts for offenses ranging from 
``fabrication'' to ``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the 
leadership of the Islamic Republic.''
    Freedom of the press continued to deteriorate during the year. Many 
reformist newspapers and magazines were closed, and many of their 
managers were sentenced to jail and, sometimes, lashings.
    In January, legal authorities threatened eight reformist dailies 
for their coverage of the sit-in by reformist deputies in front of the 
Parliament. The weekly Hadith-e Kerman, in Kerman Province, was closed 
in February for coverage in 2003 of serial killings committed by armed 
militia. In February, prior to the Parliament elections, the newspapers 
Sharq and Yas-e Nau were shut for publishing extracts from a letter by 
reformist parliamentarians to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic, Ali Khamenei. The letter blamed Khamenei for the electoral 
``coup d'etat'' and the current political crisis. In July, Jumhuriyat, 
a morning newspaper started by reformist and human rights activist 
Emadeddin Baqi, was closed after publishing only one issue. Also in 
July, the court for offenses committed by government employees and the 
media issued a temporary ban against the Vaqa-yi Itifaqi-yi daily 
newspaper. Complaints against the newspaper included propaganda against 
the state, ``insulting officials,'' and ``publishing lies.'' At year's 
end, the paper remained closed. A handful of pro-reform newspapers 
continued to publish, most with heavy self-censorship. In contrast to 
the past when new reformist newspapers often opened to replace those 
that had been closed, this was no longer the case.
    Dozens of individual editors and journalists have been charged and 
tried by the Press Court in recent years, and several prominent 
journalists were jailed for long periods without trial. Others have 
been sentenced to prison terms or exorbitant fines. As of October, at 
least 14 journalists, editors, and publishers remained in prison, 
according to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), the most prominent being 
Akbar Ganji, sentenced to 6 years in prison in 2000 for his reporting 
on the ``serial murder'' of prominent reformists by elements within the 
Intelligence Ministry. Ganji has been allowed short furloughs from 
prison for treatment of a serious medical condition. Ali Reza Jabari 
was jailed in March 2003 after being sentenced to 4 years of 
imprisonment, 253 lashes, and an approximately $750 (600,000 Tomans) 
fine for ``relations with enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran and 
propaganda against the Government.'' Appeals subsequently reduced his 
term to 2 years, and he was released in October, 4 months before the 
end of his 2-year sentence. Other journalists imprisoned during the 
year included: Iraj Jamshidi, imprisoned without trial and held in 
isolation for long periods; Taghi Rahmani, held in solitary confinement 
for long periods and reportedly sentenced in a separate case to 13 
years in jail; and Reza Alijani and Hoda Saber, both held since June 
2003 and reportedly sentenced in separate cases to 6 and 10 years, 
respectively. In November, the head of Tehran's Islamic Revolution's 
Court Branch 26 ordered Alijani, Saber, and Rahmani released on bail of 
approximately $63,000 (50 million Tomans) each. In October 2003, 
journalist Mohsen Sazgara was released from jail amid rumors of ill 
health, after 4 months in prison on charges of inciting protest.
    In January, freelance journalist Ensafali Hedayat was arrested 
after returning to the country after attending a conference in Germany 
organized by a group advocating a democratic and secular state. He 
reportedly faced charges relating to national security in connection 
with his participation in this conference and with a visit to Turkey in 
2003, as well as defamation charges relating to an article he wrote 
which appeared on a website. Reportedly he was held in solitary 
confinement. In May, the Tabriz Appeals Court confirmed an 18-month 
prison sentence against him; reportedly he planned to appeal. However, 
in early December, according to his lawyer, Hedayat was returned to 
prison and his application to extend his leave from prison denied, due 
to ``political activities'' while on leave.
    In January, a criminal court found Abdul Rasul Vesal, managing 
director of the daily newspaper Iran, guilty of press offenses and 
barred him from working in public service (journalism) for 3 years.
    In May, an Iranian cleric serving as a member of the Press 
Supervisory Council, physically attacked and bit reformist journalist 
Issa Saharkhiz during a council meeting. At year's end, no charges had 
been brought against the cleric.
    In August, a court summoned former Majlis Deputy Mohsen Mirdamadi 
in response to a complaint from an Islamic Revolution Guards Corps 
member concerning published remarks by Mirdamadi that military 
personnel's interference in political affairs weakens the armed forces. 
At year's end, there was no further information on legal action; 
however, he had not been incarcerated.
    In August, dissident intellectual reformist and journalist 
Emaddedin Baqi and attorney Saleh Nikbakht appeared in court because of 
a complaint filed by the Intelligence and Security Ministry, relating 
to Baqi's banned book ``Tragedy of Democracy in Iran.'' Later in 
August, a public court fined Baqi approximately $115 (100 thousand 
Tomans) for insulting the Council of Guardians and other officials.
    In September, government officials arrested Hanif Mazroui, the son 
of a former member of Parliament, Rajabali Mazroui. Mazroui was a 
computer technician who worked for the daily newspaper Vaghayeh 
Etefaghieh, which was shut by the Government. He was freed on November 
11 after paying approximately $19,000 (15 million Tomans) bail.
    On December 27, the press reported that the Revolutionary Court 
sentenced prominent political activist Heshmat Tabarzadi, jailed since 
June 2003, to 16 years in prison.
    On December 25, a Tehran judge ruled, based on a complaint by the 
State-run ``Voice and Vision'' media, that former Tehran Majlis 
Representative Abol Fazl Shakuri Rad must pay approximately $500 
(400,000 Tomans) for comments made while he was a Majlis 
representative, despite constitutional protection according 
representatives the right to ``express their views on all internal and 
external affairs of the country.''
    The Government censored and banned access to Internet sites, many 
of them with political content, such as the Amir Kabir University news 
website. During the year, the Government launched a crackdown on sites 
based in the country, to include ``weblogs.'' Reportedly during the 
year, the Government blocked hundreds of Internet sites. According to 
HRW, since September, more than 20 Internet journalists and civil 
society activists have been arrested and held in a secret detention 
center in Tehran. By year's end, most were released on bail. On 
December 10, in a public letter to President Mohammed Khatami, the 
father of one of those detained, Ali Mazrui, who is also president of 
the Association of Iranian Journalists and a former Majlis member, 
implicated the judiciary in the torture and secret detention of these 
individuals. On December 11, the chief prosecutor of Tehran, Judge 
Saeed Mortazavi, filed charges against Mazrui for libel. On December 
14, four of these ``weblog'' detainees were presented at a televised 
``press conference'' arranged by Judge Mortazavi and denied that they 
had been subjected to solitary confinement, torture, or ill-treatment 
during their earlier detention. However, widespread and credible 
reports indicated that threats and coercions were used to induce their 
statements and, while in secret detention, threats, torture, and 
physical abuse were employed to obtain false confessions and letters of 
repentance from many of those detained.
    On November 1, according to media information, Mahboubeh Abbas-
Gholizadeh, editor of the magazine Farzaneh, was arrested after 
returning from London where she attended the European Social Forum. She 
was released on bail of approximately $38,000 (30 million Tomans) in 
late November.
    On October 28, Fereshteh Ghazi, a journalist addressing women's 
issues for the daily newspaper Etemad, was arrested after being 
summoned to court to answer questions. She was released in mid-December 
after 40 days of detention and paying bail of approximately $62,000 (50 
million Tomans). She was detained on a variety of charges including 
``acting against state security, spreading lies, membership in internal 
opposition groups, and defense of murders in order to stir up public 
opinion against the judiciary.'' For 23 of the 40 days of detention, 
Gazhi was on a hunger strike. According to press accounts, at least 
part of the time she was held in an undisclosed location and was 
repeatedly beaten by her interrogators for refusing to cooperate with 
her interrogators, including refusal to sign a ``confession.'' Her 
interrogators reportedly inflicted multiple, severe injuries, and, upon 
release in mid-December, she was immediately hospitalized.
    On October 18, Javad Gholam Tamayomi, a journalist with the daily 
Mardomsalari was arrested after responding to a summons from the Tehran 
prosecutor's office. On October 10, authorities arrested journalist and 
Internet writer Omid Memarian and detained him on charges of espionage. 
In early December, four of the seven detained ``weblog journalists'' 
were released on bail, with Omid Memarian and Shahram Rafizadeh 
released on bail of approximately $62,000 dollars (50 million Tomans). 
On September 27, Rozbeh Mir Ebrahimi, former political editor of the 
daily Etemad was arrested at his home for contributing to reformist 
Internet websites. On November 26, he was released on a bail of 
approximately $4,000 (3 million Tomans).
    Other weblog journalists detained as part of this repression 
included Shahram Rafizadeh, Babak Ghafouri-Azar, and Mehdi Derayati. 
The judiciary announced that they would be tried for ``acting against 
national security, disturbing the public mind, and insulting 
sanctities.'' On November 11, Mehdi Derayati, Masoud Ghoreishi, and 
Asghar Vatanikhah were released on bail. According to Derayati's 
father, these detainees spent up to 3 months in detention, much of it 
in solitary confinement at an undisclosed location. A number of 
Internet news sites continued to operate from outside the country. 
There is little information on the extent of readership inside the 
country; however, media suggested that there were upwards of 4.8 
million Internet users and as many as 100,000 weblogs.
    In January 2003, the judiciary halted efforts by deputy speaker of 
the Majlis, Mohammad-Reza Khatami, to re-open the banned newspaper 
Norouz under the new name Rouz-e No, by extending the 6-month ban on 
the original publication. Khatami was slated to replace former Norouz 
editor and parliament member Mohsen Mirdamadi, who, despite 
parliamentary immunity, was sentenced in May 2002 to 6 months in jail 
and banned from practicing journalism for 4 years for ``insulting the 
state, publishing lies, and insulting Islamic institutions.'' At year's 
end, there were no reports that Mirdamadi had been imprisoned; however, 
the newspaper has never re-opened.
    In January 2003, the newspaper Hayat-e No was banned and editor 
Alireza Eshraghi arrested after the paper reprinted a 1937 U.S. cartoon 
about President Franklin Roosevelt's battle with the Supreme Court. The 
authorities deemed that the judge portrayed too closely resembled the 
late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Eshraghi was released on bail for 
$31,400 (25 million Tomans) in March 2003, after spending all his jail 
time in solitary confinement in Evin Prison. The daily Hamshahri was 
also temporarily suspended in January 2003 after refusing to print an 
article from the chief of a state-run trade union. Hamshahri was 
apparently shut for 5 days; however, Hayat-e No remained closed at 
year's end.
    In January 2003, the Press Court also closed the reformist daily 
Bahar after the newspaper ran an article about a company whose 
shareholders include former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, former 
judiciary head Ayatollah Yazdi, and Ahmad Jannati, head of the 
Legislative Branch's Guardians Council. Bahar was first closed in 2000 
and had only re-opened in December 2002. The newspaper remained closed 
throughout the year.
    In February 2003, according to AI, Abbas Abdi and Hussein Qazian 
were sentenced to 8 and 9 years, respectively, in the National 
Institute for Research Studies and Opinion Polls case. In April 2003, 
an appeals court reduced the sentences to 4 years and 6 months for 
each. The third defendant in the case, Behrouz Geranpayeh, was 
reportedly released on bail in January 2003, pending a final ruling. 
The case originated in October 2002, when the judicial authorities 
closed the Institute, which had found in a poll commissioned by the 
Majlis that a majority of citizens supported dialogue with the United 
States. The defendants were charged with spying for the United States, 
illegal contacts with foreign embassies, working with anti-regime 
groups, and carrying out research on the order of a foreign polling 
organization. Government intelligence officials publicly stated that 
the accused were not spies. According to press reports, President 
Khatami also rejected the charges, stating that the Intelligence and 
Foreign Ministries had cleared the pollsters' work. Reformist 
parliamentarians were reportedly barred from the court, and the 
defendants were not allowed to see their families or their attorneys. 
At year's end, the defendants remained in jail.
    In May 2003, a government spokesman acknowledged state attempts to 
block access to ``immoral'' websites. The judiciary also announced the 
creation of a special unit to handle Internet-related issues. According 
to press reporting, the judiciary highlighted over 20 subject areas to 
be blocked, including: insulting Islam; opposing the Constitution; 
insulting the Supreme Leader or making false accusations about 
officials; undermining national unity and solidarity; creating 
pessimism among the population regarding the Islamic system; and 
propagating prostitution and drugs.
    In October 2003, RSF reported that the Government closed the 
newspaper Avay-e Kordestan, marking the first time a Kurdish language 
newspaper was banned in the country.
    The Government directly controlled and maintained a monopoly over 
all television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflected 
the Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because 
newspapers and other print media had a limited circulation outside 
large cities, radio and television served as the principal news source 
for many citizens. Satellite dishes that received foreign television 
broadcasts were forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the 
wealthy, owned them. In December 2002, the Majlis passed a bill 
legalizing private ownership of satellite receiving equipment. However, 
the Council of Guardians rejected the legislation in January 2003 on 
constitutional and religious grounds. The Government reportedly acted 
to block foreign satellite transmissions during the year using powerful 
jamming signals (see Section 1.f.).
    The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance was in charge of 
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they did not 
contain offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical 
of the Government were published without reprisal. The Ministry 
inspected foreign printed materials prior to their release on the 
market. In August 2003, author of ``Iran's Women Musicians,'' Toka 
Maleki, its publisher Jaafar Homai, and cultural critic Banafsheh 
Samgis received prison terms for publishing and publicly commenting on 
the book, which was deemed to contain ``lies'' about Islamic history. 
The translator of the book, ``Women behind Veil and Well-Dressed Men,'' 
Maliheh Moghazei and Ministry of Culture and the Islamic Guidance 
Director General Majid Sayyad also received prison terms in connection 
with the book's publication.
    The Government effectively censored domestic films, since it 
remained the main source of production funding. Producers must submit 
scripts and film proposals to government officials in advance of 
funding approval. In April, ``Lizard,'' a film indirectly satirizing 
the clerical class, was released. It was withdrawn from circulation in 
May, and the screenwriter, director, producer, and star were banned 
briefly from travel abroad. Since the release and subsequent banning of 
this film, government restrictions over film have intensified.
    The Government restricted academic freedom. Government informers 
were common on university campuses. Admission to universities was 
politicized; all applicants had to pass ``character tests'' in which 
officials screened out applicants critical of the Government's 
ideology. To obtain tenure, professors had to refrain from criticism of 
the authorities.

    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the 
principles of Islam''; however, in practice the Government restricted 
freedom of assembly and closely monitored gatherings to prevent anti-
government protest. Such gatherings included public entertainment and 
lectures, student gatherings, labor protests, funeral processions, and 
Friday prayer gatherings.
    During a wave of student protests in June 2003, government-
supported vigilantes beat many protestors, and police arrested 
approximately 4,000 persons according to government figures shortly 
after the protests. Although the police arrested both protestors and 
vigilantes, the overwhelming majority of those arrested were 
protestors. Approximately 130 of those arrested during these protests 
were still in detention as of December. The Government banned 
demonstrations planned for July 9 to commemorate the killing of several 
students by security forces in the 1999 demonstrations in both 2003 and 
2004 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.f.). An unknown number of the students 
were still imprisoned, in addition to Ahmed Batebi, Manuchehr 
Mohammadi, Abbas Fakhravar, Akbar Mohammadi, and Mehrdad Lahrasbi. AI 
reported in March that Abbas Fakhravar had been given 19 days leave 
from prison and that prior to temporary release, he had been confined 
in ``Band 325'' military detention center run by the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps and subjected to sensory deprivation. As of 
November, International PEN reported that Fakhravar Fakhravar had been 
returned to Evin Prison.
    In December, according to local media, imprisoned student activist 
Manuchehr Mohamadi was found guilty of disturbing order in prison and 
acting against officials, and fined approximately $375 (300,000 
Tomans), which converted to additional imprisonment.
    Paramilitary organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, a group 
of vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate 
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harassed, beat, and 
intimidated those who demonstrated publicly for reform. Ansar-e 
Hezbollah gangs were used to harass journalists, intimidate dissident 
clerics, and disrupt peaceful gatherings. Ansar-e Hezbollah cells were 
organized throughout the country, and some were reportedly linked to 
individual members of the country's leadership. In the period prior to 
the February Majlis elections, Ansar-e Hezbollah and other government-
supported vigilantes repeatedly attacked political gatherings of 
reformist candidates and vandalized their offices.
    In January, approximately 200 members of the Ansar-e Hezbullah 
vigilante group attacked a political meeting of disqualified 
prospective parliamentary candidates and their supporters in Hamedan. 
The vigilantes entered the meeting hall, heckled the speakers, and 
rushed the speakers' platform. No legal action was taken against the 
vigilantes.
    In May, government security officers reportedly attacked workers 
and their families during a Labor Day march in Saqez; 40 workers, 
including labor leader Mahmoud Salehi, reportedly were arrested (see 
Section 6.b.).
    In June, security forces reportedly arrested more than 100 ethnic 
Azeris for ``spreading secessionist propaganda'' during a holiday 
gathering of thousands of Azeri-Iranians in East Azerbaijan Province.
    In September, approximately 100 vigilantes disrupted a speech by 
prominent Islamic scholar Abdolkarim Soroush at a private home; 
security forces present at the scene failed to stop them. There was no 
subsequent legal action against the vigilantes.
    In June 2003, during a wave of pro-reform protests, members of 
vigilante groups, such as Ansar-e Hezbollah, attacked protestors, 
according to press reports. Ansar-e Hezbollah members reportedly 
stormed a university dormitory in Tehran, destroyed student property, 
and injured more than 50 students. Some vigilantes were reportedly 
included among those arrested by authorities during the clashes. 
Vigilantes who attacked a demonstration in Shiraz reportedly killed a 
protestor. Before being transferred to government custody, vigilantes 
reportedly seized and beat journalist Ensafali Hedayat. Vigilante 
groups were also reported to have attacked protesters during pro-reform 
demonstrations near Tehran University in December 2003.
    In December 2003, vigilantes beat reformist parliamentarian, Mohsen 
Mirdamadi, as he began a speech in Yazd. President Khatami ordered a 
crackdown on vigilantes after the attack; five individuals subsequently 
were arrested. At year's end, there was no further information on the 
status of their detention.
    In November 2002, the Aghajari verdict sparked large and ongoing 
protests at universities throughout the country (see Section 1.e.). 
Students boycotted classes for almost 2 weeks and staged the largest 
pro-reform demonstrations in 3 years, with crowds of up to 5,000 at any 
given location. In late December 2002, two students were given jail 
terms for their protests against the Aghajari sentence. Hojatollah 
Rahimi was sentenced to 2 years in prison and 70 lashes for ``insulting 
religious sanctities and issuing an insulting declaration.'' Co-
defendant Parviz Torkashvand was sentenced to 4 months in jail and 40 
lashes. At year's end, there was no further information on their 
status.
    Government restrictions using Basiji and other forces restored 
quiet for 2 weeks, until a large demonstration occurred at the 
University of Tehran in December 2002, attended by over 2,000 within 
the walls of the campus, and with a larger crowd outside. Law 
enforcement officials and ``plainclothes'' forces wielding batons, 
whips, and belts suppressed the protest. Basiji violently dispersed 
subsequent demonstrations.
    The Constitution provides for the establishment of political 
parties, professional associations, Islamic religious groups, and 
organizations for recognized religious minorities, provided that such 
groups do not violate the principles of ``freedom, sovereignty, and 
national unity,'' or question Islam as the basis of the Islamic 
Republic; however, the Government limited freedom of association, in 
practice.
    In July 2002, the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom 
Movement, the country's oldest opposition party, jailing some members 
and baring others from political activity for up to 10 years (see 
Sections 1.d. and 3).
    In 2001, the Government provisionally closed the 50-year-old Iran 
Freedom Movement political party for ``attempting to overthrow the 
Islamic regime,'' and the Government permanently banned it in 2002. In 
response to the permanent dissolution of the movement, President 
Khatami warned against the banning of political groups, saying that 
suppression did not eliminate ideas; they were simply forced 
underground and continue to grow (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).

    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares that the 
``official religion of Iran is Islam and the doctrine followed is that 
of Ja'fari (Twelver) Shi'ism.'' The Constitution also states that 
``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full respect'' and 
recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews, the country's pre-
Islamic religions, as ``protected'' religious minorities; however, in 
practice, the Government restricted freedom of religion.
    Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution did not 
enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affected the 
approximately 300,000 followers of the Baha'i faith, who were not 
recognized by the Government as a community and were considered to 
belong to an outlawed political organization.
    The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is 
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including 
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the Head of the 
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(Parliament) was composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
    The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) closely monitored 
religious activity. Adherents of recognized religious minorities were 
not required to register individually with the Government. However, 
their community, religious, and cultural organizations, as well as 
schools and public events, were monitored closely. The population was 
approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89 percent were Shi'a and 10 
percent Sunni. Minorities (mostly Turkomen, Arabs, Baluchs, and Kurds) 
lived in the southwest, southeast, and northwest sections of the 
country. Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities 
constituted less than 1 percent of the population.
    Sunni Muslims are the largest religious minority in the country. 
The Constitution provides Sunni Muslims a large degree of religious 
freedom, although, for example, it forbids a Sunni Muslim from becoming 
President. In practice, Sunni Muslims claimed that the Government 
discriminated against Sunnis, although it was hard to distinguish 
whether the cause for discrimination was religious or ethnic, since 
most Sunnis are also ethnic minorities. Sunnis cited the lack of a 
Sunni mosque in the nation's capital, Tehran, despite the presence of 
over a million Sunnis living there, as a prominent example of this 
discrimination. Sunnis also have cited as proof of discrimination the 
lack of Sunni representation in appointed offices in provinces where 
Sunnis form a majority, such as Kordestan Province, and also the 
reported inability of Sunnis to obtain senior governmental positions. 
Sunnis also have charged that the state broadcasting company, Voice and 
Vision, aired programs insulting to Sunnis.
    In April, Sunni Majlis representatives sent a letter to Supreme 
Leader Khameneni, decrying the lack of Sunni presence in the executive 
and judiciary branch of government, especially in higher-ranking 
positions in embassies, universities, and other institutions. They 
called on Khamenei to halt anti-Sunni propaganda in the mass media, 
books, publications, and the state-run media; they also requested 
adherence to the constitutional articles ensuring equal treatment of 
all ethnic groups.
    Members of the country's religious minorities, particularly 
Bahai's, reported imprisonment, harassment, and intimidation based on 
their religious beliefs. All religious minorities suffered varying 
degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the 
areas of employment, education, and housing. The Government generally 
allowed recognized religious minorities to conduct religious education 
of their adherents, although it restricted this right considerably in 
some cases. Religious minorities, by law and practice, are barred from 
election to a representative body, except to the five Majlis seats 
reserved for minorities, and from holding senior government or military 
positions. Members of religious minorities were allowed to vote, but 
they could not run for President. Although the Constitution mandates an 
Islamic Army, members of religious minority communities sometimes 
served in the military.
    The Government allowed recognized religious minorities to establish 
community centers and certain privately financed cultural, social, 
sports, or charitable associations. However, since 1983, the Government 
has denied the Baha'i community the right to assemble officially or to 
maintain administrative institutions.
    The legal system discriminated against religious minorities, 
awarding lower monetary compensation in injury and death lawsuits for 
non-Muslims than for Muslims and imposing heavier punishments on non-
Muslims than on Muslims. However, in January, the Expediency Council 
approved appending a Note to Article 297 of the 1991 Islamic 
Punishments Act, authorizing collection of equal blood money for the 
death of Muslims and non-Muslims.
    Proselytizing of Muslims by non-Muslims is illegal and the 
Government was harsh in its response, in particular against Baha'is and 
evangelical Christians. The Government did not ensure the right of 
citizens to change or recant their religion. Apostasy, specifically 
conversion from Islam, is punishable by death.
    Baha'is were considered apostates because of their claim to a 
religious revelation subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The 
Government defined the Baha'i faith as a political ``sect'' linked to 
the Pahlavi monarchy and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary. 
Historically at risk, Baha'is often have suffered increased levels of 
mistreatment during times of political unrest. There have been reports 
in the past that historic Baha'i shrines were destroyed. Baha'is may 
not teach or practice their faith or maintain links with co-
religionists abroad. The Government continued to imprison and detain 
Baha'is based on their religious beliefs. A 2001 Ministry of Justice 
report indicated that government policy aimed at the eventual 
elimination of the Baha'is as a community.
    In February, two members of the Baha'i faith, Bihnam Mithaqi and 
Kayvan Khalajabadi, were released from prison after serving almost 15 
years on charges related to their religious beliefs. According to a 
Baha'i organization, the only Baha'i still known to be imprisoned in 
the country because of his adherence to the Baha'i faith is Zabihullah 
Mahrami, who was arrested in September 1995 and is serving a life 
sentence.
    In July, for the first time, Baha'i applicants were permitted to 
take part in the nationwide exam for entrance into state-run colleges. 
However, the word ``Islam'' was pre-printed in a slot listing a 
prospective student's religious affiliation. This action precluded 
Baha'i matriculation, since as a matter of faith, Baha'is do not deny 
their faith.
    According to Baha'i sources outside the country, since 2002, 23 
Baha'is from 18 different localities were arbitrarily arrested and 
detained for a short time because of their Baha'i faith. None of these 
persons was in prison at the end of the period covered by this report.
    In 2001, the UNSR estimated the Christian community at 
approximately 300,000. Of these, the majority were ethnic Armenians and 
Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and evangelical churches 
also were active, but they reported restrictions on their activities. 
The authorities became particularly vigilant in recent years in curbing 
proselytizing activities by evangelical Christians. In May and June, 
several Christians in the northern part of the country reportedly were 
arrested, and in September, officials raided the Protestant Assemblies 
of God Church, imprisoning its minister, Hamid Pourmand. Since his 
arrest, Pourmand has been imprisoned at an undisclosed location, and, 
under local law, he can be executed for ``apostasy against Islam.''
    In May, there were reports of the arrest of evangelical Christians 
in the northern part of the country, including a Christian pastor and 
his family in Mazandaran Province. The pastor's family and two other 
church leaders who had been arrested earlier were reportedly released 
on May 30. Although the pastor reportedly was a convert from the Baha'i 
Faith, a number of those arrested in raids on house churches were 
converts from Islam. The pastor and another Christian leader reportedly 
were released from custody in early July.
    Estimates of the size of the Jewish community varied from 20,000 to 
30,000, a substantial reduction from the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 
Jews in the country prior to the 1979 revolution. While Jews were a 
recognized religious minority, allegations of official discrimination 
were frequent. The Government's anti-Israel stance, and the perception 
among many citizens that Jewish citizens supported Zionism and the 
State of Israel, created a threatening atmosphere for the small 
community. Jews limited their contact with and did not openly express 
support for Israel out of fear of reprisal. Jewish leaders reportedly 
were reluctant to draw attention to official mistreatment of their 
community due to fear of government reprisal.
    The Government carefully monitored the statements and views of the 
country's senior Muslim religious leaders. It has restricted the 
movement of several who have been under house arrest for years. All 
ranking clerics were under pressure to ensure that their teachings 
confirm or at least do not contradict government policy and positions.
    For a more detailed discussion, see the 2004 International 
Religious Freedom Report.

    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government placed some restrictions 
on these rights. Citizens may travel within the country and change 
their place of residence without obtaining official permission. The 
Government required exit permits (a validation stamp in the passport) 
for foreign travel for draft-age men and citizens who were politically 
suspect. Some citizens, particularly those whose skills were in short 
supply and who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to 
obtain exit permits. The Government restricted the movement of certain 
religious minorities and several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.c.).
    In October, AI reported that the Government confiscated the 
passport of a senior member of the Society for the Defense of the 
Rights of Prisoners, preventing him from attending human rights 
conferences (see Section 4).
    In May, the Government temporarily prohibited the screenwriter, 
director, producer, and star of the satirical film, ``Lizard,'' from 
leaving the country (see Section 2.a.).
    Citizens returning from abroad sometimes were subjected to searches 
and extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of 
anti-government activities abroad. Recorded and printed material, 
personal correspondence, and photographs were subject to confiscation.
    The Government permitted Jews to travel abroad, but it often denied 
them multiple-exit permits issued to other citizens. Baha'is often 
experienced difficulty in obtaining passports.
    Women must obtain the permission of their husband, father, or 
another male relative to obtain a passport. Married women must receive 
written permission from their husbands before being allowed to leave 
the country.
    The Government did not use forced exile, and no information was 
available regarding whether the law prohibits forced exile; however, 
the Government used internal exile as a punishment. Many dissidents and 
ethnic and religious minorities left and continue to leave the country 
due to a perception of threat from the Government.
    The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government has established a system 
for providing protection to refugees. There were no reports of the 
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution; 
however, there were reports that the Government deported refugees 
deemed ``illegal'' entrants into the country. In times of economic 
uncertainty, the Government increased pressure on refugees to return to 
their home countries. The Government generally cooperated with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and refugee seekers.
    There was no information on the policy of the Government regarding 
temporary protection to individuals who may not qualify as refugees 
under the 1951 Convention or its 1967 Protocol.
    The country hosted a large refugee population, mostly Afghans, as 
well as a significant number of Iraqis. After the September 2001 
terrorist attacks, the Government sealed its border in anticipation of 
a war in Afghanistan and a resulting wave of refugees. The Government 
set up several refugee camps just inside Afghanistan to deal with the 
crisis. In September, UNHCR estimated that approximately 1 million 
refugees from Afghanistan remained in the country, with up to 1 million 
having returned to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 
December 2001. The Government denied UNHCR concerns that it was 
pressing Afghan refugees to leave. Most refugees subsisted on itinerant 
labor. The Government accused many Afghans of involvement in drug 
trafficking.
    The UNHCR estimated that in 2001 there were approximately 200,000 
Iraqi refugees in the country, the majority of whom were Iraqi Kurds, 
but also including Shi'a Arabs. Iraq expelled many of these Iraqi 
refugees at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war because of their 
suspected Iranian origin. In numerous instances, both the Iraqi and 
Iranian Governments disputed their citizenship, rendering many of them 
stateless. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990.
    During 2003, the Government took substantial steps to prepare for 
the possibility of new Iraqi refugees, but significant outflows never 
appeared. In November 2003, the UNHCR initiated a pilot repatriation of 
refugees from the country and had repatriated a few hundred to Iraq by 
early December 2003. According to press reports, refugee officials 
speculated that up to 120,000 of the 200,000 refugees in the country 
may have crossed back into Iraq without formal assistance since April 
2003. As of September, according to the UNHCR, approximately 9,000 
Iraqi refugees in the country had been repatriated into Iraq, as part 
of a UNHCR program.
    Although the Government has claimed to host more than 30,000 
refugees of other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, 
Eritreans, Somalis, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis, it did not provide 
information about them or allow the UNHCR or other organizations access 
to them. There was no further information during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The right of citizens to change their government is restricted 
significantly. The Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is 
elected by the Assembly of Experts and can only be removed by a vote of 
this same Assembly. The Assembly is restricted to clerics, who serve an 
8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a list approved by the 
Government. There is no separation of state and religion, and clerical 
influence pervades the Government, especially in appointed, rather than 
elected, positions. The Government effectively controlled the selection 
of candidates for elections. The Council of Guardians, which reviews 
all laws for consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution, also 
screens candidates for election for ideological, political, and 
religious suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a 
theocratic state; clerics who disagree with government policies or with 
a conservative view of the Islamic state also have been disqualified.
    Regularly scheduled elections are held for the Presidency, the 
Majlis, and the Assembly of Experts.
    Elections that were widely perceived as neither free nor fair were 
held for the 290-seat Majlis in February. The Council of Guardians, 
taking an expansive interpretation of its responsibility to screen 
candidates, barred over a third of the over 8,000 prospective 
candidates, mostly reformists, to include over 85 sitting Majlis 
members seeking re-election. Reasons cited included not showing 
``demonstrated obedience'' to the current system of government. 
Reformers were reduced to a small minority of the Majlis.
    Subsequently, there has been tension between the new Majlis and 
President Khatami's Government. On October 4, the Vice President for 
Majlis and Legal Affairs resigned, stating that he was unable to 
facilitate good relations between the Government and the Majlis.
    Mohammad Khatami, a former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance 
who was impeached in 1992 by the Majlis for ``liberalism'' and 
``negligence,'' was elected President in 1997 and reelected in 2001 
with 77 percent of the vote. The UNSR reported that the Council of 
Guardians significantly limited the number of candidates permitted to 
run in elections and noted that the Interior Minister denounced the 
``unprincipled disqualification'' of candidates.
    Elections were last held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member 
Assembly of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous 
candidates, which led to criticism from many observers that the 
Government improperly predetermined the election results.
    In March, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told reporters 
that, ``any action that weakens the sacred Islamic republican state is 
not permissible.''
    In 1999, elections for nationwide local councils were held for the 
first time since the 1979 revolution. A second round of nationwide 
local council elections was held in February 2003; substantial numbers 
of the pro-Khatami reformist forces elected to these councils in 1999 
were defeated, and candidates aligned with conservative factions were 
elected.
    In July 2002, the Government permanently dissolved the Freedom 
Movement, the country's oldest opposition party, jailing some members, 
fining others and barring them from political activity for up to 10 
years (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    There was widespread public perception of extensive corruption in 
all three branches of government, to include the judiciary (where many 
lawyers have said, ``a judge's verdict is sold by the kilo''). This 
perception augmented by anecdotal information includes extensive 
corruption in the ``bonyards'' (foundations). In October, the NGO 
Transparency International released its annual Corruption Perception 
Index, noted that the country had an extremely low score (2.9 on a 10 
point scale) and commented that, ``corruption robs countries of their 
potential.'' In September 2003, the CEO and other top executives of the 
Norwegian oil company ``Statoil'' were dismissed after revelations of 
bribes paid an Iranian consulting company with direct links to the son 
of former President and current Expediency Council Chairman Ayatollah 
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.
    The country apparently has no laws providing for public access to 
government information.
    Women held 12 out of 290 Majlis seats. There were no female cabinet 
members, although several held high-level positions, such as Vice-
President. A woman served as Presidential Advisor for Women's Affairs, 
and another was head of the Environmental Protection Agency.
    Majlis seats were reserved for elected Christian (three), Jewish 
(one) and Zoroastrian (one) deputies. Religious minorities were barred 
from being elected to any other seats on a representative body and from 
holding senior government or military positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights 
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has 
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a 
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
    In July, the Government granted permission to operate to an 
independent nonpolitical NGO, the Society for the Defense of the Rights 
of Prisoners. It worked to protect detainees and promote prison reform, 
established a small fund to provide free legal advice to prisoners, and 
supported the families of detainees.
    Various professional groups representing writers, journalists, 
photographers, and others attempted to monitor government restrictions 
in their fields, as well as harassment and intimidation against 
individual members of their professions. However, the Government 
severely curtailed their ability to meet, organize, and effect change. 
There were domestic NGOs working in areas such as health and 
population, women and development, youth, environmental protection, 
human rights, and sustainable development. Some reports estimated a few 
thousand local NGOs currently in operation.
    International human rights NGOs such as HRW and AI were not 
permitted to establish offices in or conduct regular investigative 
visits to the country. In June, AI officials, visited the country as 
part of the European Union's (EU's) Human Rights Dialogue, joining 
academics and NGOs to discuss the country's implementation of 
international human rights standards. However, authorities barred HRW 
and AI representatives from attending the EU's late 2002 human rights 
talks in Tehran, despite the EU's invitation. An October 2003 EU-Iran 
human rights dialogue was held in Brussels to facilitate the 
participation of NGO representatives. The Government also opened a 
human rights dialogue with Australia in 2002 and with Switzerland in 
October 2003, however, without tangible progress.
    The ICRC and the UNHCR both operated in the country. However, the 
Government did not allow the UNSR to visit the country from 1997 to 
2001, the last year his mandate to monitor human rights in the country 
was in effect. The Government allowed two visits by U.N. human rights 
representatives during 2003, one by the UNSR for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression and one by 
a U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; there were no comparable 
visits during the year. In December, the Plenary of the U.N. 59th 
General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the country for human 
rights abuses, including public executions, floggings, arbitrary 
sentences, torture, and discrimination against women and minorities.
    The Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995 
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board 
as an observer. In 1996, the Government established a human rights 
committee in the Majlis, the Article 90 Commission, which receives and 
considers complaints regarding violations of constitutional rights; 
however, when the Seventh Majlis formed its new Article 90 Commission, 
the commission announced that it was dropping all cases pending from 
the Sixth Majlis. During the year, the commission took no effective 
action.
    In October, AI reported that the Government confiscated the 
passport of Emaddedin Baqi, a senior member of the Society for the 
Defense of the Rights of Prisoners, preventing him from attending a 
ceremony outside the country where he was to receive an award for civil 
courage (see Section 2.d.). Baqi reportedly also was required to appear 
in court in August relating to complaints associated with his writings 
on human rights issues. At year's end, Baqi was still forbidden to 
leave the country.
    In October 2003, the Article 90 Commission issued a report on the 
death in custody of Iranian-Canadian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi. The 
report identified Tehran's Chief Prosecutor and other members of the 
judiciary as being directly involved in subjecting Kazemi to violent 
interrogations in Evin Prison, and later attempting to cover up the 
cause of her death. The Article 90 Commission findings reportedly 
dismissed allegations of MOIS involvement in Kazemi's death, although 
an MOIS officer was charged with but later acquitted of her murder (see 
Section 1.a.).
    In October 2003, lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in advancing human rights 
both in the country and internationally. Ebadi, who served as one of 
the first female judges in the country before being forced to resign 
after the revolution, has campaigned on behalf of women, children, and 
victims of government repression. She represented the family of Darius 
and Parvaneh Forouhar, killed in 1998, and of a student killed during 
the 1999 student protests, which exposed links between vigilante groups 
and government officials and led to her arrest in 2000. Ebadi is a 
founder of the Center for the Defense of Human Rights, which represents 
defendants in political cases. She also agreed to represent the family 
of Zahra Kazemi during the investigation of her death and subsequent 
trial, and continued to press for justice in the case.
Section 5. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
    In general, the Government did not discriminate on the basis of 
race, disability, language, or social status; however, it discriminated 
on the basis of religion, sex, and ethnicity. The poorest areas of the 
country are those inhabited by ethnic minorities, such as by the 
Baluchis in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, and by Arabs in the 
southwest. Much of the damage suffered by Khuzistan Province during the 
8-year Iran-Iraq war has not been repaired; consequently, the quality 
of life of the largely Arab local population was degraded. Kurds, 
Azeris, and Ahvazi Arabs were not allowed to study their languages.
    In October 2003, lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in advancing human rights 
both in the country and internationally.

    Women.--Although spousal abuse and violence against women occurred, 
statistics were not available. Abuse in the family was considered a 
private matter and seldom was discussed publicly. Rape is illegal, and 
subject to strict penalties, but remained a widespread problem. The 
UNSR published statistics provided by the IHRC indicating that, at the 
end of 2001, an estimated 1,000 of approximately 3,000 active files 
were related to women's issues.
    In July, the Supreme Court voided the death sentence against 
Afsaneh Noroozi and ordered the case re-investigated by the original 
court. Noroozi has been jailed since 1997, having been accused of 
killing a police chief on Kish Island in the southern part of the 
country. Noroozi's lawyers claimed the act was legally permitted 
(``mashru''), as the official had tried to rape her, and the country's 
Islamic penal code allows citizens to take proportionate action to 
defend ``life, honor, chastity, property, or freedom.'' In November 
2003, after lobbying by female Majlis representatives and international 
attention, judiciary head Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahrudi lifted her 
death sentence and returned the case to the Supreme Court. On December 
21, the Kish Island court began a new trial of Nooroozi.
    Prostitution was illegal. Accurate information regarding the extent 
of the problem was not widely available, although the issue received 
greater attention as a result of the public's growing interest in 
social problems. Press reports described prostitution as a widespread 
problem, and government statistics showed the average age of 
prostitutes to be dropping.
    In December, human rights groups reported that ``Leyla M,'' an 18-
year-old with a mental age of 8 years, faced imminent execution for 
``morality-related'' offences arising from her being forced into 
prostitution by her parents as a child. In late November, she was 
sentenced to death by a court in Arak, and the sentence was 
subsequently passed to the Supreme Court for confirmation. According to 
November press reports, social workers tested her mental capacities 
repeatedly, and each time they have found her to have a mental age of 8 
years. However, she has apparently never been examined by the court-
appointed doctors and was sentenced to death solely on the basis of her 
explicit confessions, without consideration of her background or mental 
health.
    Provisions in the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular 
those sections dealing with family and property law, discriminate 
against women. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, the Government 
repealed the Family Protection Law, a hallmark bill adopted in 1967 
that had given women increased rights in the home and workplace, and 
replaced it with a legal system based largely on Shari'a practices. In 
1998, the Majlis passed legislation that mandated segregation of the 
sexes in the provision of medical care. In August 2003, the Council of 
Guardians rejected a bill that would require the country to adopt U.N. 
conventions on eliminating torture and ending discrimination against 
women.
    Although the law permits it, marriage at the minimum age of 9 was 
rare. In mid-2002, authorities approved a law that requires court 
approval for the marriage of girls below the age of 13 and boys younger 
than 15. Although a male can marry at age 15 and above without parental 
consent, the 1991 Civil Law states that a virgin female, even over 18 
years of age, needs the consent of her father or grandfather to wed, 
unless she is willing to go to court to get a ruling allowing her to 
marry without this consent. The country's Islamic law permits a man to 
have up to four wives. The law also allowed for the practice of 
temporary marriages based on a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl 
may become the wife of a married or single Muslim male after a simple 
and brief religious ceremony. The temporary marriage may last any 
length of time. According to Shi'a Islamic law, men may have as many 
temporary wives as they wish. Such wives are not granted rights 
associated with traditional marriage.
    The Penal Code includes provisions for the stoning of women and men 
convicted of adultery, although judges were instructed at the end of 
2002 to cease imposing such sentences (see Section 1.c.). Women may 
receive disproportionate punishment for crimes, including death 
sentences (see Section 1.a.). Women have the right to divorce if their 
husband has signed a contract granting that right or if the husband 
cannot provide for his family, is a drug addict, insane, or impotent. 
However, a husband is not required to cite a reason for divorcing his 
wife. In December 2002, a new law made the adjudication of cases in 
which women demand divorces less arbitrary and less costly.
    A widely used model marriage contract limits privileges accorded to 
men by custom, and traditional interpretations of Islamic law recognize 
a divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples 
acquire during their marriage and to increased alimony. Women who 
remarry are forced to give the child's father custody of children from 
earlier marriages. However, the law granted custody of minor children 
to the mother in certain divorce cases in which the father is proven 
unfit to care for the child. In November 2003, the Government amended 
the existing child custody law, which in the case of divorce gave a 
mother custody of a son up to 2 years of age and a daughter up to age 7 
years, with custody reverting to the father thereafter. The new law 
gives a mother preference in custody for children up to 7 years of age; 
thereafter, the father has custody. After the age of 7 years, in 
disputed cases, custody of the child is to be determined by the court, 
taking into consideration the well being of the child.
    The testimony of a woman is worth half that of a man in court. The 
blood money paid to the family of a female crime victim is half the sum 
paid for a man. A married woman must obtain the written consent of her 
husband before traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Women had access to primary and advanced education. Reportedly 60 
percent of university students were women; however, social and legal 
constraints limited their professional opportunities. Women were 
represented in many fields of the work force, and the Government has 
not prevented women from entering many traditionally male-dominated 
fields; however, their unemployment rate reportedly was significantly 
higher than for men. Women can own property in their own name, own 
businesses, and obtain credit at a bank. Women are barred from seeking 
the presidency and from appointment to the judiciary. The law provides 
maternity, child care, and pension benefits.
    The Government enforced gender segregation in most public spaces 
and prohibited women from mixing openly with unmarried men or men not 
related to them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses 
and enter public buildings, universities, and airports through separate 
entrances. Women were prohibited from attending male sporting events, 
although this restriction did not appear to be enforced universally. 
While the enforcement of conservative Islamic dress codes varied, what 
women wore in public was not entirely a matter of personal choice. The 
authorities sometimes harassed women if their dress or behavior was 
considered inappropriate, and women may be sentenced to flogging or 
imprisonment for such violations (see Section 1.c.). The law prohibits 
the publication of pictures of uncovered women in the print media, 
including pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to 
observe Islamic dress codes at work.

    Children.--There is little current information available to assess 
Government efforts to promote the welfare of children. Except in 
isolated areas of the country, children had access to free education 
through the 12th grade (compulsory to age 11) and to some form of 
health care. Health care generally is regarded as affordable and 
comprehensive with competent physicians.
    In December 2003, the Government enacted the Law on Protection of 
Children and Youth. This law prohibited abuse or harassment of children 
or youth in any manner and outlawed buying, selling, exploiting, or 
employing children to engage in illegal acts such as smuggling.
    There was not enough information available to reflect how the 
Government dealt with child abuse (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).

    Trafficking in Persons.--In August, the Government enacted the Law 
on Combating Human Trafficking, defining and setting punishments for 
trafficking in persons. However, there were widespread reports that 
persons were trafficked to, through, and from the country during the 
year. It was difficult to measure the extent of the Government's 
efforts to curb human trafficking, but national and international press 
reporting indicated that the Government has taken action against 
bandits involved in abducting women and children and pursued agreements 
with neighboring states to curb human trafficking. The Government also 
reportedly has arrested, convicted, and executed numerous human 
trafficking offenders. During the year, police reportedly arrested 
numerous members of prostitution rings and closed brothels.
    In April 2003, a court in Mashhad reportedly sentenced 53 
individuals to 281 years in prison and 222 lashes on charges of 
abduction and slavery for trafficking scores of young girls to 
Pakistan.

    Persons With Disabilities.--In May, the Majlis passed a 
Comprehensive Law on the Rights of the Disabled; however, subsequent 
media reports indicate that there has been no implementing regulation. 
There was no current information available regarding whether the 
Government has legislated or otherwise mandated accessibility for 
persons with disabilities, or whether discrimination against persons 
with disabilities is prohibited; nor is there any information available 
on which government agencies are responsible for protecting the rights 
of persons with disabilities.

    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds continued to suffer 
from government discrimination. Suspicions of Kurdish separatist or 
foreign sympathies have led to sporadic outbreaks of fighting between 
government forces and Kurdish groups. In recent years, greater Kurdish 
cultural expression has been allowed and Kurdish publications and 
broadcasting have expanded. However, there was still no public school 
education in the Kurdish language.
    The KDPI claimed that the Government executed at least three 
Kurdish party members and activists during the year and four during 
2003. According to KDPI, plainclothes vigilantes in five separate 
attacks killed seven more Kurds in 2003 (see Section 1.a.). Other 
activists reportedly were imprisoned.
    Azeris comprise approximately one-quarter of the country's 
population and are well integrated into the Government and society. 
However, Azeris complained of ethnic and linguistic discrimination, 
including banning the Azeri language in schools, harassing Azeri 
activists or organizers, and changing Azeri geographic names. The 
Government traditionally viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, 
particularly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation 
of an independent Azerbaijan. Azeri groups also claimed that there were 
a number of Azeri political prisoners jailed for advocating cultural 
and language rights for Iranian Azerbaijanis. The Government has 
charged several of them with ``revolting against the Islamic state.''
    Foreign representatives of the Ahwazi Arabs of Khuzistan, whose 
numbers could range as high as 4 million or more, claimed that their 
community in the southwest of the country suffered from discrimination, 
including the right to study and speak Arabic. In July 2003, 
authorities reportedly closed two bilingual Arabic/Farsi newspapers and 
imprisoned scores of political activists. They asserted that the 
Government ignored their appeals to de-mine the vast stretches of 
Khuzistan, mined during the Iran-Iraq War. They further stated that 
many Arabs, both Shi'a and Sunni, have been imprisoned and tortured for 
criticizing government policies. According to Ahwazi sources, a 
political activist with the Islamic Wafagh Party, Kazem Mojaddam, was 
sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment in November 2003 after his initial 
arrest in June 2003 on charges of secession and endangering internal 
security.

    Other Societal Abuses and Discrimination.--The law prohibits and 
punishes homosexuality. The punishment of a non-Muslim homosexual is 
harsher if the homosexual's partner is Muslim.
    According to late 2003 estimates by a prominent local physician, 
there are approximately 25,000 to 30,000 HIV positive citizens; a 2001 
estimate suggested an adult prevalence rate of less than 0.1 percent. 
There is a free anonymous testing clinic in Tehran. The Government 
supported the creation of an HIV awareness film to show in schools and 
has not interfered with private HIV-related NGOs. Nevertheless, persons 
infected with HIV were discriminated against in schools and workplaces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code provides workers the 
right to establish unions; however, the Government did not allow 
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the 
Workers' House was the sole authorized national labor organization. It 
served primarily as a conduit for the Government to exert control over 
workers. The leadership of the Workers' House coordinated activities 
with Islamic labor councils, which were made up of representatives of 
the workers and a representative of management in industrial, 
agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35 employees. 
These councils also functioned as instruments of government control, 
although they frequently were able to block layoffs and dismissals.
    The Labor Code allows employers and employees to establish guilds. 
The guilds issued vocational licenses and helped members find jobs. 
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers reportedly were 
common.

    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers did not 
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. The International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) noted that the Labor Code was amended in 2003 to permit 
workers to form and join ``trade unions'' without prior permission if 
registration regulations are observed. The Ministry of Labor must 
register the organization within 30 days.
    In January 2003, the Supreme Council of Labour, composed of 
representatives of Islamic labor councils, employers, and the 
government, exempted workshops of 10 employees or less from labor 
legislation. According to the ICFTU, this decision affected over 
400,000 workshops of the total of 450,000 in the country.
    The law prohibits public sector strikes, and the Government did not 
tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds with its economic and labor 
policies; however, strikes occurred. There are no mechanisms to protect 
workers rights in the public sector, such as mediation or arbitration. 
In addition to strikes, there were also work stoppages and protests by 
oil, textile, electrical manufacturing, and metal workers, as well as 
protests by the unemployed. There were strikes, such as that by copper 
factory workers (see Section 1.a.), and other labor stoppages in 
protest of issues such as nonpayment of salaries.
    In December, textile workers in the city of Sanandaj struck to seek 
the re-hiring of laid off workers, a healthier work environment, 
cancellation of the practice of hiring temporary workers, and revising 
the regulations concerning factories' discipline committees.
    In May, the ICFTU reportedly placed a formal complaint with the 
U.N. International Labor Office regarding the arrest of 40 workers 
during a Labor Day march in Saqez (see Section 2.b.).
    In May 2003, textile workers in Behshar staged a hunger strike to 
protest nonpayment of overdue wages. Teachers staged demonstrations and 
sit-ins in several cities during the year for improved working 
conditions and wage benefits.
    It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in the 
export processing zones (EPZs) differ from the law and practice in the 
rest of the country. According to the ICFTU, labor legislation did not 
apply in the EPZs.

    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code 
provides that the Government may require any person who does not have 
work to take suitable employment; however, this did not appear to be 
enforced regularly. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, this was not enforced adequately, and such labor by 
children was a serious problem (see Section 5).

    d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment.--The 
law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children; however, there 
appears to be a serious problem with child labor (see Section 5). The 
Labor Law prohibits employment of minors less than 15 years of age and 
places restrictions on the employment of minors under age 18; however, 
laws pertaining to child labor were not enforced adequately. The law 
permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some 
small businesses. The law prohibits the employment of women and minors 
in hard labor or night work. Information regarding the extent to which 
these regulations were enforced was not available.

    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the 
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each 
industrial sector and region; however, no information was available 
regarding mechanisms used to set wages. It was not known if the minimum 
wages were adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates 
that the minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses 
of a family and should take inflation into account. However, under poor 
economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work at two or 
three jobs to support their families.
    The Labor Code establishes a maximum 6-day, 48-hour workweek, with 
a weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid 
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
    According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by 
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting 
workplace safety and health. Labor organizations outside the country 
have alleged that hazardous work environments were common in the 
country and have resulted in thousands of worker deaths per year. It 
was not known how well the Ministry's inspectors enforced regulations. 
It was not known whether workers could remove themselves from hazardous 
situations without risking the loss of employment.

                               __________

                                  IRAQ

    Coalition-led forces overthrew the Ba'athist regime of Saddam 
Hussein in April 2003.\1\ As recognized in U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) 1483, 1511, and 1546, an Interim Administration--
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)--administered the country 
until an internationally recognized, representative government was 
established. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), recognized by UNSCR 
1500 as the principal body of the Iraqi interim administration during 
the period of the CPA, adopted the Law for the Administration of the 
State of Iraq for the Transitional Period--the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL)--on March 8, and the new Iraqi Interim 
Government (IIG), consistent with UNSCR 1546, assumed full governmental 
authority on June 28. The TAL set forth a transitional period, to end 
upon the formation of an elected government pursuant to a permanent 
constitution. On August 15-18, the National Conference convened and 
elected a 100-member Interim National Council. Elections for the 
Transitional National Assembly, the country's legislative authority and 
the first step in the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government, 
were scheduled to take place on January 30, 2005.
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    \1\ The 2004 report covers the human rights record of the Interim 
Government from June 28 to December 31, 2004.
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    The TAL established a republican, federal, democratic, and 
pluralistic system with powers shared among the federal and regional 
governments, including 18 governorates, as well as municipalities and 
local administrations. The Kurdistan Regional Government was recognized 
in the TAL as the official government of those territories that were 
administered by the Kurdish Regional Government on March 19, 2003 in 
the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala, and 
Ninewah. Islam is the official religion of the State and, according to 
the TAL, is to be considered a source of legislation. The TAL also 
mandates the separation and independence of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches of the Government. Some aspects of the judicial 
system were dysfunctional and, at times, subject to external influence.
    Domestic security responsibilities are shared within the IIG 
between the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense. As 
set forth in the TAL, certain elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces are 
under the operational control of the Multi National Coalition Force 
(MNF-I) operating in the country under unified command pursuant to 
UNSCR 1546, and some also have domestic security responsibilities. MOI 
forces also partner with MNF-I to ensure a coordinated approach to 
security within the country. The MOI's responsibilities extend only to 
internal security. The MOI commands a number of uniformed forces, 
including the Iraqi Police Service, the Department of Border 
Enforcement, and the Bureau of Dignitary Protection, as well as the MOI 
Intelligence Service. Among its other responsibilities, the MOI also 
regulates private domestic and foreign security companies. While 
civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of security 
forces under their authority, there were instances in which security 
force elements acted without government authority. There were reports 
that members of the MOI's security forces committed numerous, serious 
human rights abuses.
    The country has an estimated population of 25 million, although no 
reliable census has been undertaken for several years. The former 
regime owned all major industries and controlled most of the highly 
centralized economy. The economy is likely to remain heavily dependent 
on revenues from oil exports and international assistance for the 
foreseeable future. Reforms under the CPA introduced many market 
concepts; however, state-owned enterprises still played a significant 
role in the economy. The Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, combined with gross 
mismanagement and corruption, damaged the economy, and the country was 
subject to U.N. sanctions from its 1990 invasion of Kuwait until the 
suspension of sanctions following the fall of the Ba'ath regime. 
Serious security problems significantly slowed reconstruction 
activities. During the year, official estimates of unemployment ranged 
between 20 and 30 percent. Government officials estimated that the rate 
of underemployment was roughly equivalent to joblessness. Anecdotal 
reports suggested that approximately half the working-age population 
was unemployed.
    The Interim Government, reversing a long legacy of serious human 
rights abuses under the previous regime, generally respected human 
rights, but serious problems remained. During the period of the report, 
the Government's human rights performance was handicapped by a serious 
insurgency in which a terrorist campaign of violence impacted every 
aspect of life with executions, kidnappings, torture, and intimidation 
waged against civilians, the Government and Coalition Forces. Although 
this insurgency may have had popular support in some areas, its core 
was former regime elements, foreign and domestic terrorists, and 
organized criminal gangs. On November 7, Prime Minister Iyad Allawi 
declared a 60-day state of emergency limited to Ramadi and Fallujah, in 
accordance with the July 6 IIG ``Order of Safeguarding National 
Security.'' The state of emergency provides broad powers to impose 
curfews, close off entire towns and cities, take command of 
intelligence and security forces, and restrict assembly and movement. 
It remained in effect at year's end.
    With the ongoing insurgency limiting access to information, a 
number of instances in the Report have been difficult to verify. 
However, there were reports of arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, 
impunity, poor prison conditions--particularly in pretrial detention 
facilities--and arbitrary arrest and detention. There remained 
unresolved problems relating to the large number of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs). Corruption at all levels of the Government 
remained a problem. Some aspects of the judicial system were 
dysfunctional, and there were reports that the judiciary was subject to 
external influence. The exercise of labor rights remained limited, 
largely due to violence, unemployment, and maladapted organizational 
structures and laws; however, with international assistance, some 
progress was underway at year's end.
    Civic life and the social fabric remained under intense strain from 
the insurgency, as well as from a continuing shortage of basic services 
and staples. Despite this pressure, the IIG in 6 months set and kept to 
a legal and electoral course based on respect for political rights. 
This included most importantly the right of citizens to change 
peacefully their government through nationwide, free, and fair 
elections. The development of a Human Rights Ministry, the ongoing 
empowerment of women, and the explosive growth of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and civic associations reflected a governmental 
commitment to human rights. The Government's success in building an 
accommodating structure for the exercise of civil liberties, although 
burdened by the heritage of dictatorship and disregard for law, was 
shown clearly in the citizens' embrace of freedoms of speech and press, 
peaceful assembly, and association and religion. While major problems 
still remained, they were of a far different magnitude and nature than 
previously.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.--With the ongoing 
insurgency, there was a climate of extreme violence in which persons 
were killed for political and other reasons. There were occasional 
reports of killings particularly at the local level by the Government 
or its agents, which may have been politically motivated. In early 
December, Basrah police reported that officers in the Internal Affairs 
Unit were involved in the killings of 10 members of the Ba'ath Party. 
Basrah police also reported that the same Internal Affairs Unit 
officers were involved in the killings of a mother and daughter accused 
of engaging in prostitution. The Basrah Chief of Intelligence was 
removed from his position as a result of the accusations; however, he 
retained command of the Internal Affairs Unit. An MOI investigation 
into the Basrah allegations was ongoing at year's end. Other instances 
reflected arbitrary actions by government agents. For example, on 
October 16, Baghdad police arrested, interrogated, and killed 12 
kidnappers of 3 police officers.
    Insurgents killed thousands of citizens (see Section 1.g.). In a 
terrorist campaign of violence and intimidation, they targeted, 
kidnapped and killed foreigners, government officials and workers, 
security forces, members of the armed forces, and civilians suspected 
of collaborating with the Coalition.
    Insurgent and terrorist groups also claimed responsibility for the 
bombings of churches, government facilities, public gathering spots, 
and businesses. These actions resulted in a massive loss of life and 
grave injuries. There were no indications of government involvement in 
these acts.
    Until its fall in 2003, the former regime was responsible for the 
disappearance, murder, and torture of persons suspected of or related 
to persons suspected of oppositionist politics, economic crimes, 
military desertion, and a variety of other activities. The discovery of 
mass graves (considered to be unmarked sites containing at least six 
bodies) provided evidence of the vast dimension of these practices. 
Immediately following the fall of the regime and throughout the 
remainder of 2003, mass graves were reported from sources throughout 
the country. During this reporting period, 189 mass graves were 
confirmed, and investigators continued to review evidence on additional 
mass graves.
    Grid coordinates were obtained on at least 10 mass graves in Al 
Hatra in Ninewah Province. On September 1, authorities began to dig a 
site near Al-Hatra. Two gravesites were excavated; one site contained 
the remains of women and children and the other contained remains of 
men. Approximately 275 bodies--thought to be Kurds who were killed by 
the former regime--were found in each site.
    Sites were discovered in all regions and contained remains of 
members of every major religious and ethnic group in the country, as 
well as of foreign citizens. Graves contained forensic evidence of 
atrocities, including signs of torture, decapitated or mutilated 
corpses, or evidence that some victims were shot in the head at close 
range.
    During the year, the Ministry of Human Rights strengthened efforts 
to help relatives learn the fate of their family members under the 
regime, including those found in mass graves, and created its national 
bureau of missing persons, the National Center for Missing and 
Disappeared Persons.

    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances associated with the Government.
    Due to the ongoing insurgency and the opportunities for common 
crime, as well as politically motivated kidnapping (see Section 1.g.), 
kidnapping and disappearances remained an ongoing problem. Many 
hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals disappeared without a trace. 
The widespread and ongoing nature of these disappearances precluded the 
availability of reliable statistics.