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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA







                             ANNUAL REPORT


                                     


                                  2007

=======================================================================

                       ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2007

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
                           2007 ANNUAL REPORT




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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                                     


                                     


                             ANNUAL REPORT


                                     


                                  2007

=======================================================================

                       ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 10, 2007

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China


         Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov


              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House

                                     Senate

SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
TOM UDALL, New Mexico
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
TIM WALZ, Minnesota
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania

                                     BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-
                                     Chairman
                                     MAX BAUCUS, Montana
                                     CARL LEVIN, Michigan
                                     DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
                                     SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
                                     CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
                                     SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
                                     GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
                                     MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                 PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
                CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
                 HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor

                      Douglas Grob, Staff Director

               Murray Scot Tanner, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Preface..........................................................     1

General Overview.................................................     2

I. Executive Summary and Recommendations.........................     5

    Findings and Recommendations by Substantive Area.............     5
    Political Prisoner Database..................................    31

II. Human Rights.................................................    33

    Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants...................    33
    Worker Rights................................................    56
    Freedom of Expression........................................    73
    Freedom of Religion..........................................    90
    Ethnic Minority Rights.......................................   105
    Population Planning..........................................   108
    Freedom of Residence and Travel..............................   111
    Status of Women..............................................   115
    Human Trafficking............................................   120
    North Korean Refugees in China...............................   124
    Health.......................................................   126
    Environment..................................................   134

III. Development of the Rule of Law..............................   141

    Civil Society................................................   141
    Institutions of Democratic Governance........................   143
    Access to Justice............................................   148
    Commercial Rule of Law.......................................   153
    Impact of Emergencies: Food Safety, Product Quality, and 
      Climate Change.............................................   168

IV. Tibet: Special Focus for 2007................................   182

V. Developments in Hong Kong.....................................   212

VI. Endnotes.....................................................   215
          CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                       2007 ANNUAL REPORT

                                Preface

    As this report goes to press, Beijing is putting the 
finishing touches on preparations for the opening of the 
Chinese Communist Party's 17th Party Congress on October 15, 
2007. The event will mark the completion of Hu Jintao's first 
five-year term as Party General Secretary. China in the last 
year also passed another important marker--the fifth year in 
the implementation of its World Trade Organization (WTO) 
commitments. The Commission passed a marker of its own, having 
issued five previous Annual Reports on human rights and the 
development of the rule of law in China.
    This confluence of five-year markers provides a useful 
opportunity to understand the course of human rights and the 
rule of law in China. Hu Jintao ascended to the Party's top 
leadership post five years ago advocating greater government 
transparency, respect for law, protection of the environment, 
and a more creative response to rising citizen activism. Over 
the last five years, however, a different reality has unfolded. 
China's human rights practices in the last year reflected 
Chinese leaders' intolerance of citizen activism; suppression 
of information on urgent matters of public concern (including 
food safety, public health, and environmental emergencies); the 
instrumental use of law for political purposes; and the 
localization of dispute resolution as a method of insulating 
the central government and Party from the backlash of national 
policy failures. Whether or not the Chinese Communist Party's 
17th Party Congress ultimately will be associated with change 
instead of continuity on these issues remains to be seen.
    The commitments that China made five years ago when 
entering the WTO were not only important to its commercial 
development in the international marketplace, but to the 
development of the rule of law at home. These commitments 
require that China ensure nondiscrimination in the 
administration of trade-related measures and prompt publication 
of all laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and 
administrative rulings relating to trade. The required 
improvements to China's domestic rule of law should have 
assisted Chinese citizens in a wide range of areas from 
property rights, environmental protection, government 
transparency, and access to justice. Unfortunately, China has 
not lived up to its international commitments, and the unfair 
manner in which it competes in the global marketplace is 
causing alarm in the United States and around the world. Its 
instrumental use of legal reform for political purposes 
threatens its domestic rule of law.
    This report summarizes, with the detailed findings of each 
section, previous Commission recommendations in order to 
provide readers a sense of the challenges that remain in 
leveraging improvements in China's human rights and rule of law 
practices. In addition, this report demonstrates the importance 
of the Commission's Political Prisoner Database, a unique and 
powerful resource on which the Commission relies for its 
advocacy and research work, including the preparation of this 
Annual Report.
    The next year will be an important one for China, as the 
2008 Summer Olympic Games place Beijing front and center on the 
world stage. Foreign correspondents and international 
organizations are already concerned that China has not lived up 
to its promises in important areas of human rights. The 
Commission will focus attention on these issues in the coming 
year, both before and after the Olympics.

                            General Overview

    The Commission observed ongoing human rights abuses and 
stalled development of the rule of law in China during 2006-
2007. The Commission also observed increased repression in the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Tibetan autonomous 
areas of China, stepped-up harassment of legal advocates, and 
increased restrictions on Chinese reporters. In addition, 
across the areas the Commission monitors, the following general 
themes emerged: (1) Chinese leaders' increasing intolerance of 
citizen activism and greater suppression of information on 
urgent matters of public concern (including food safety, public 
health, and environmental emergencies); (2) the instrumental 
use of law for political purposes; (3) the localization of 
dispute resolution in order to insulate the center from the 
backlash of national policy failures; and (4) the influence 
that China's linkages with the rest of the world have had on 
some aspects of its domestic rule of law and human rights 
development.


                    intolerance of citizen activism


    Chinese officials have paid particularly close attention in 
the last year to civil society organizations. Central and local 
officials not only tightened existing controls over many 
citizen organizations, but also engaged in selective use of 
rarely enforced laws to provide a legal justification for 
shutting these organizations down. The influential China 
Development Brief was closed down in 2007 after one of its 
editors was accused of violating China's Statistics Law. As a 
vice minister of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration publicly criticized a dangerous algae bloom that 
had fouled China's Lake Tai, Wu Lihong, an environmental 
activist who was among the first to bring the lake's pollution 
problems to the public's attention, languished in prison. 
Official harassment of the family members of human rights 
activists (including Rebiya Kadeer, Gao Zhisheng, Chen 
Guangcheng, and Hua Huiqi) has continued. Chinese citizens who 
have attempted to organize workers outside of the Party-
controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions risk 
imprisonment, and particularly high-profile labor activists 
such as He Chaohui, Yao Fuxin, Wang Sen, and Hu Shigen remained 
in prison in 2007, serving out sentences that ranged from 7 to 
nearly 20 years. China's leaders rely on the disunity of 
workers to drive the economic growth on which the Party has 
staked its claim to supremacy. Notwithstanding the new Labor 
Contract Law's collective contracting provisions (which do not, 
in fact, provide for true collective bargaining, nor do they 
grant workers the right to organize or to select their own 
representatives), the Party views organized labor as it does 
citizen activism on most matters of public concern: as a threat 
to the Party's hold on power.


             instrumental use of law for political purposes


    An increasing number of provisions concerning national 
unity, internal security, social order, and the promotion of a 
``harmonious society'' crept into laws and regulations during 
2006-2007, carving out for public officials an ever-widening 
realm for official discretion. China's laws place a burden of 
undefined risk on citizens. Unbounded legal discretion is 
manifest in many ways, including the deliberate omission of 
fundamental procedural protections (such as access to a lawyer 
or a public trial) for those accused of state security crimes, 
and the use of overbroad terms (such as ``endangering state 
security,'' ``subversion,'' ``splittism,'' and ``disturbance of 
public order,'' or the arbitrary criteria used to distinguish 
between ``normal religious activities'' and illegal religious 
practices). The Commission also noted several cases in the past 
year in which the state criminalized political activists not by 
charging them with state security and disturbance of public 
order crimes, but by indicting them on offenses such as fraud, 
extortion, tax evasion, or illegal border crossing. Most 
Chinese citizens--those who refrain from unapproved political 
and religious activities--enjoyed increased room to maneuver in 
many aspects of daily life. The system provides for an 
increasing number of legal protections across many areas, but 
enforces them selectively. Against persons the Party deems to 
pose a threat to its supremacy, officials wield the legal 
system as a harsh, and deliberately unpredictable, weapon.
    It is now less obvious than before that the rapid pace with 
which China produces new legislation should be seen as a sign 
of progress. China has permitted the efficiency of legislative 
processes to become increasingly divorced from consistent and 
effective implementation. As a result, the distinction between 
the promulgation of law and the making of propaganda has become 
blurred in some instances, placing the credibility of China's 
legal and regulatory reforms at risk.


   insulation of the central leadership from the backlash of policy 
                                failure


    Throughout 2007, China's top leaders increasingly have 
encouraged the resolution of disputes through nonjudicial 
channels at the grassroots level wherever possible, insulating 
the central government from the backlash of national policy 
failures. In a March 29 speech, Supreme People's Court 
President Xiao Yang expressed concern over cases involving 
``hot button problems that can give rise to mass group 
administrative disputes.'' Xiao's call to resolve lawsuits 
involving rural land confiscations and urban home evictions 
through mediation rather than through administrative litigation 
came less than a month after China's passage of its new 
Property Law, one stated goal of which was to provide stronger 
legal protections for property rights holders. Xiao also 
spotlighted cases concerning ``enterprise restructuring, labor 
and social security, and resource and environmental 
protection.'' Party directives and State Council regulations 
concerning the petitioning system (``letters and visits,'' or 
xinfang) and administrative reconsideration system echoed the 
emphasis on dispute resolution through nonjudicial channels, at 
local levels wherever possible. A draft labor dispute 
resolution law, if adopted, would shift the focus of Chinese 
labor law to the nonjudicial, in-house resolution of labor 
disputes. This across-the-board trend appears intended, at 
least in part, to ensure that sensitive disputes do not enter 
legal channels which lead to Beijing.
    Billed as a policy of local empowerment and part of a 
measured long-term strategy to induce grassroots legal 
development, the localization of disputes actually insulates 
the center from the backlash of national policy failures. 
China's leaders remain suspicious of efforts to undo this 
insulation. In February 2007, Luo Gan, a member of the Party 
Politburo Standing Committee, warned legal officials not to be 
swayed by ``enemy forces'' trying to use the legal system to 
Westernize and divide China, and by internal forces that denied 
the Party's leadership on legal matters. He reminded them that 
the ``correct political position'' is to be consistent with the 
Party.


                 rising stakes of legal reform in china


    Among the most important developments of the last year is 
the growing impact outside of China of its domestic problems of 
implementation. China's increased engagement with the world 
economy means that events within China have an increasing 
influence on China's neighbors and trading partners. Weak or 
ineffective implementation of law and policy directly impacted 
China's international relations during 2007. A series of unsafe 
exports underscored the ways a lack of government transparency 
and weak legal institutions can have sudden and serious 
consequences on distant shores. It became more evident than 
ever during 2007 that the rest of the world has a stake in 
improved governance in China.
    Chinese and Western experts have taken note of China's use 
of diplomatic leverage and, in particular, of the way Chinese 
diplomacy in recent years has promoted a notion of national 
sovereignty that supplies China's leaders with a theoretical 
basis and rhetoric with which to resist international calls for 
improvement in its domestic human rights.\1\ Even if they may 
not all fall within the mandated scope of this Commission's 
work as understood in keeping with past precedent, these 
linkages form the backdrop against which some readers are 
likely to engage this report. Policymakers in the United States 
and elsewhere have found China's international actions 
troubling--especially when they have included China's 
opposition to, or withholding of support for, global efforts to 
combat human rights atrocities or humanitarian abuses in other 
parts of the world. China's new-found global reach affords it 
an expanded array of levers through which to reward those 
overseas who support or remain silent on its domestic human 
rights abuses, while punishing those critical of these 
practices. China's role in the UN's new Human Rights Council, 
Uzbekistan's extradition of Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil to 
China rather than allowing him to return home, some of China's 
actions related to Sudan and Darfur, and China's campaign of 
pre-Olympics surveillance and intimidation of nongovernmental 
organization activists overseas may be understood, at least in 
part, in this context.
    Even as the Commission highlights these areas of concern, 
China over the past year has issued a number of laws and 
regulations which have the potential to produce positive 
results if central and local government departments and Party 
officials prove their ability and willingness to implement them 
faithfully. Faced with popular anger over rampant corruption 
and abuse of power, China's procuracy has issued broad-ranging 
provisions, including, among others, July 2006 Provisions on 
the Criteria for Filing Criminal Cases of Dereliction of Duty 
Infringing Upon Rights, which directs procurators to prosecute 
a lengthy list of crimes of official abuse, including cases of 
torture and retaliation against petitioners. China in 2007 
passed a long-awaited Labor Contract Law which, if fully 
implemented, could provide greater regularity and procedural 
protections in hiring, firing, workplace benefits, and safety. 
The Labor Contract Law was passed amid widespread worker anger 
over cases of unpaid wages. In April 2007, the State Council 
issued the Regulation on the Public Disclosure of Government 
Information, dubbed by some observers as China's first national 
``freedom of information'' regulation. In order for this 
regulation to play an effective role, however, the government 
will have to clarify and limit the sphere of information 
considered ``state secrets.'' Finally, in preparation for the 
2008 Olympic Games, Chinese authorities adopted looser 
restrictions on foreign journalists, and issued regulations on 
the protection of the mentally ill, which could represent an 
important first step away from the almost entirely arbitrary 
police detention of the past.

                I. Executive Summary and Recommendations

                               2006-2007

            Findings and Recommendations by Substantive Area

    A summary of findings for 2006-2007 follows below for each 
area that the Commission monitors. The order of topics roughly 
follows that set forth in the Commission's mandate. In each 
area, the Commission has identified a set of specific issues 
that merit attention over the next year, and submits 
recommendations of proposed action to address each set of 
issues to Members of the U.S. Congress and Administration 
officials.


               rights of criminal suspects and defendants


    Chinese prisons in 2007 continue to hold individuals who 
were sentenced for counterrevolutionary and other crimes that 
no longer exist under the current Criminal Law. Shortly 
preceding the annual session of the former UN Human Rights 
Commission in 2005, Chinese central government officials 
pledged to ``provide relief'' to those imprisoned for political 
acts that were no longer crimes under the law. The reality is 
that Chinese citizens remain susceptible to detention and 
incarceration as punishment for political opposition to the 
government, as well as for exercising or advocating human 
rights.
    Chinese law enforcement officers routinely detain 
individuals without formal charge or judicial review. In some 
instances, police hold individuals in custody for a few days 
before ultimately releasing them, without any justification 
other than a general desire to avoid protests and other 
instances of ``social unrest'' that might undermine Party 
governance. Citizens from localities all throughout China 
travel to Beijing to voice their complaints before central 
government offices, often congregating together in 
``petitioners' villages'' on the city's outskirts. NGO and 
media sources have reported that police officers conduct night 
raids of these villages, sending petitioners to a special 
holding location called ``Majialou'' pending their forced 
repatriation home. According to Human Rights Watch, the 
detentions of more than 700 individuals in advance of the 
National People's Congress in March 2007 were ``widely seen as 
a grand rehearsal in public order tactics for two even more 
important upcoming events: the Communist Party's 17th Congress 
in October 2007 and the Olympic Games in 2008.''
    Since releasing China's Third Report on the Implementation 
of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 2000, central 
government leaders have repeatedly emphasized their ongoing 
efforts to pass new laws and administrative regulations 
preventing, punishing, and compensating cases of torture by 
government officials. Despite international safeguards and 
recent domestic reforms designed to help guard against torture 
in China, ``persons acting in an official capacity who torture 
and ill-treat others in violation of the [CAT] generally do so 
with impunity.'' In November 2006, two senior officials from 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate called on local 
procuratorates to strengthen their supervision over criminal 
investigations, and to bring into line police who extract 
confessions through torture or who illegally gather evidence.
    Chinese defendants remain vulnerable to official abuses and 
faced mounting challenges to the defense of their legally 
protected rights during the past two years, as lawyers in 
general were increasingly called upon to contribute to the 
Party's efforts to build a ``harmonious society.'' This new 
role was first clarified in a 2006 guiding opinion by the All 
China Lawyers Association (ACLA), which the Commission analyzed 
as an effort to restrict and punish lawyers who choose to 
handle collective cases without authorization. ACLA's guiding 
opinion effectively calls on China's legal profession to 
function in the interests of the Party and state, a demand that 
conflicts with a lawyer's duty to his or her client in criminal 
cases. It also calls into question ACLA's ability to operate as 
a self-governing professional association that works in the 
interests of Chinese lawyers, without external interference.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge China's leaders in written correspondence 
        and meetings that they ensure the prompt review of 
        cases in which an individual was charged with 
        counterrevolutionary crimes, including the cases of 
        political prisoners such as labor and democracy 
        activist Hu Shigen (originally sentenced to 20 years 
        for helping to establish an unauthorized political 
        party and trade union), and former Tibetan monk Jigme 
        Gyatso (now serving an extended 18-year sentence for 
        printing leaflets, distributing posters, and later 
        shouting pro-Dalai Lama slogans in prison). 
        Commissioners should urge the immediate release of 
        these and other prisoners who continue to be deprived 
        of their liberty for non-existent crimes.
        <bullet> Request in correspondence with the Chinese 
        Embassy that when arranging trips to China, the Embassy 
        should provide information about, and access to, 
        petitioners who travel to Beijing to voice their 
        grievances, to the ``petitioners' villages'' in which 
        many previously congregated, and to the special holding 
        location called ``Majialou'' where many are detained 
        pending forced repatriation home. It is advisable to 
        reiterate the desire to visit these places upon arrival 
        in China. Commissioners should also request in pre-trip 
        correspondence and in communicating with hosts on the 
        ground that there be meetings with officials from the 
        Ministries of Public Security and State Security to 
        discuss their concrete plans for maintaining order in 
        advance of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.
        <bullet> Urge in written correspondence and meetings 
        with China's leaders that they revise the Lawyers Law 
        and Criminal Procedure Law to provide greater rights 
        and protections to lawyers. Support international 
        educational exchanges and training that seek to bring 
        public security, procuratorate, and court officials 
        together with Chinese legal professionals to discuss 
        the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement. 
        Commissioners should also request meetings with 
        officials from the Supreme People's Procuratorate and 
        local procuratorates. Such meetings provide a unique 
        opportunity to inquire about the number of reported 
        cases of ``tortured confession'' and the number of 
        officials actually prosecuted for this crime in recent 
        years.


                             worker rights


    In 2006-2007, several high-profile incidents underscored 
the inhumane conditions and weak protections for workers in 
certain sectors of the Chinese economy. The discovery in 2007 
of a massive network of small-scale brick kilns in Shanxi and 
Hunan provinces employing kidnapped slave labor vividly 
illustrated China's inability to consistently enforce 
internationally recognized worker rights and to guarantee 
workplace safety.
    Against this backdrop, a major legislative development in 
the area of worker rights occurred with passage on June 29, 
2007, of a new Labor Contract Law, set to take effect January 
1, 2008. The law outlines a set of nationwide minimum standards 
for employment contracts. On its face, the law provides for 
collective contracts, but it does not provide for true 
collective bargaining, nor does it grant workers the right to 
organize or the right to select their own representatives. 
Among its stated aims are the promotion of longer-term 
employment relationships, increased leverage for workers vis-a-
vis employers, and an expanded role for the Party-controlled 
All-China Federation of Trade Unions, China's only recognized 
union.
    The law appears to trigger the creation of rights by 
default in certain circumstances. If an employer fails to enter 
into a written labor contract with an employee within one year 
of starting employment, an open-ended employment contract is 
deemed to exist by default. The law increases the range of 
conditions under which severance pay to workers is required, 
but it also specifies severance pay caps for high-wage workers, 
apparently in order not to burden firms that depend on such 
workers.
    A principal cause for concern with the law is uncertainty--
the statutory text leaves much to interpretation and 
clarification during implementation. Even on a point as 
fundamental as its retroactive effect, the law is unclear. 
While the law does not explicitly require employers and 
employees to enter into new contracts when it takes effect on 
January 1, 2008, neither does it say whether it will apply to 
existing employment contracts that do not comply with the new 
law.
    The law requires ``consultation'' between employers and 
trade unions on firm work rules, but says nothing about work 
rules that apply by default during the period of consultation. 
Employers must give the trade union prior notice before 
initiating terminations, but no rules govern the union's 
notification of workers. The law does not specify whether it 
will apply to employees (whether local or expatriate) of 
foreign company representative offices. Because so much has 
been left to be fleshed out through the issuance of 
supplemental regulations and interpretations during 
implementation, the law's full impact will remain unclear for 
some time.
    Promulgation of the new Labor Contract Law does not imply 
that labor disputes are now more likely than before to be 
channeled into China's courts. Current law specifies that labor 
disputes are to be handled by ``mediation, arbitration, and 
trial,'' but a new draft Law on Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration placed before the National People's Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) on August 26, 2007, if passed, would 
change that by encouraging nonjudicial mediation. The draft 
entitles companies to establish labor mediation committees in-
house ``so as to solve disputes at the grassroots level,'' 
according to the Vice Chair of the NPCSC's Legislative Affairs 
Commission.
    Taken as a whole, China's emerging national labor law 
regime, billed as both strengthening worker rights and 
grassroots dispute resolution, appears more intended to make 
sure that disputes do not enter legal channels that lead to 
Beijing. Whether this represents deliberate local empowerment 
as part of a measured long-term strategy to induce grassroots 
legal development, or a strategy of crisis localization and 
insulation from the center, or some combination of both, 
remains an open question.
    The Chinese government has shown a willingness to engage in 
technical exchanges and cooperative activities with the United 
States, and to consider suggestions and recommendations on 
labor law reform from U.S. experts and scholars. Cooperation 
between the two countries is potentially significant with 
respect to China's need for progress in the area of coal mine 
safety and occupational safety. The Chinese government 
participated in a U.S. Department of Labor-supported pilot 
project on enterprise-based dispute resolution programs, 
creating labor relations committees with elected worker 
representatives.
    The Commission notes that two Chinese government agencies, 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) and the State 
Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), have undertaken 
cooperative projects and exchanges with the United States since 
2002. The cooperation between the two countries has focused on 
work safety, labor law reform, legal aid for workers, pension, 
and dispute resolution in the workplace. This year, MOLSS and 
SAWS signed or renewed six Letters of Understanding with the 
U.S. Department of Labor to continue bilateral exchange and 
cooperation.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge in meetings with Chinese officials that 
        China fully implement and strictly enforce its new 
        Labor Contract Law and, in forthcoming implementing 
        regulations and judicial interpretations, that it 
        provide all workers with an effective mechanism for 
        true collective bargaining and free union organizing.
        <bullet> Call upon the Chinese government to make 
        public the results of its investigation on the origins 
        and scale of the recent brick kiln slave labor scandal, 
        including information about the involvement of public 
        officials in protecting those kilns.
        <bullet> Press Chinese officials for answers about 
        working conditions, wage rates, overtime pay, and 
        underage labor at all enterprises throughout China, and 
        press for information on major violations to be 
        published openly.


                         freedom of expression


    Recent international concern over the global health impacts 
of food, drugs, consumer products, disease outbreaks, and 
pollution originating from China underscore the importance of 
the free flow of information in China. Public access to 
government information, at least on paper, has improved, but 
major obstacles to government transparency remain, reflecting 
the Party's overarching concern that it maintain control over 
the flow of information. In April 2007, China passed its first 
national regulation requiring all government agencies to 
release important information to the public in a timely manner, 
but the regulation's impact may be limited by the presence of a 
``state secrets'' exception that gives the government broad 
latitude to withhold information from the public.
    Perhaps the biggest obstacle, however, is the Party and 
government's control over the press, which leads to incomplete 
reporting on issues of public concern and increases 
opportunities for public officials to hide or manipulate 
information when they find it advantageous to do so. In June 
2007, Chinese media initially reported in graphic detail on a 
scandal involving the discovery of more than 1,000 forced 
laborers, including scores of teenagers and the mentally ill, 
working at brick kilns in the provinces of Shanxi and Hunan. 
But authorities later instructed journalists to limit their 
coverage and applaud the Party's rescue efforts, and warned 
parents and lawyers for victims not to speak to the media.
    Developments during 2007 suggest that the prospects for a 
free press in China remain dim. While foreign reporters in 
theory were granted some increased press freedom in accordance 
with promises China made in 2001, as part of its successful bid 
to host the 2008 Olympic Games, China continues to justify 
increased restrictions on domestic media by asserting a public 
interest in preserving order, stability, and control in the 
period around the Party's 17th Congress in October 2007, and by 
alleging corruption among Chinese reporters. Furthermore, 
foreign journalists continue to report harassment by public 
officials in China. Central government officials have urged 
local officials to cooperate more with the media, but this 
development should not be interpreted as a sign of increased 
press freedom or openness.
    The growing availability of the Internet and cell phones in 
China has given citizens unprecedented opportunities to shape 
public opinion and influence policy. In 2007, citizens used the 
Internet and other communication technologies such as cell 
phones with increasing success to raise public awareness, drive 
the reporting agendas of the state-controlled press, and force 
governments to respond to important social problems.
    Their success, however, has not been the result of any 
government policy of liberalization. Instead, the Party has 
responded to this perceived threat to its supremacy over the 
last five years by continuing to adapt regulations and 
technical measures to maintain control over the Internet, 
including requiring Web sites to be licensed, blocking access 
to politically sensitive information on the Internet, and 
detaining citizens who criticize the government online. This 
past year, at least five writers and Internet essayists were 
punished under the Article 105 ``subversion'' clause of the 
Criminal Law for posting their criticism of the government and 
Party on foreign Web sites.
    Finally, the government continues to impose prior 
restraints on publishing, preventing citizens from freely 
expressing ideas and opinions in books and magazines. In 
preparation for the Party's 17th Congress, publication and 
propaganda officials announced a crackdown on ``illegal 
publications'' and banned a number of books.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge Chinese officials at all levels that they 
        must stop blocking foreign news broadcasts and Web 
        sites, such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and 
        the Commission's Web site. Formulate and promote 
        proposals that discourage China's Internet and media 
        censorship and favor online freedom. Chinese officials 
        must be made aware that the United States does not 
        block Chinese government broadcasts, news, or Web 
        sites.
        <bullet> Impress upon Chinese officials that their 
        interpretation of ``state secrets'' under Chinese law 
        does not meet international human rights standards 
        because it gives administrative officials unbounded 
        discretion to withhold information. Chinese officials 
        must be reminded that such discretion, which enables 
        officials to hide information about important events 
        such as health and environmental emergencies, threatens 
        the welfare of not only Chinese citizens but 
        individuals around the world.
        <bullet> Impress upon Chinese officials the urgency of 
        the need for them to live up to their commitment to 
        grant foreign journalists complete freedom to report in 
        China before and during the 2008 Olympic Games. To 
        date, China's fulfillment of this commitment has been 
        incomplete at best. Remind Chinese officials that their 
        continued failure to fulfill this commitment, by 
        allowing harassment and intimidation of foreign 
        journalists and the Chinese citizens they work with and 
        interview, violates both the promise they made in 
        connection with the Olympics and international human 
        rights standards for freedom of expression. Members of 
        the Congress and Administration officials are also 
        urged to press their Chinese counterparts to remove the 
        October 2008 expiration of this commitment and to grant 
        similar protections to domestic journalists, for which 
        this commitment does not apply.
        <bullet> Call on the Chinese government to release 
        political prisoners mentioned in this report who have 
        been punished for peaceful expression, along with other 
        prisoners included in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database. Representative cases include: 
        freelance writer Yang Tongyan, who uses the pen name 
        Yang Tianshui (serving a 12-year sentence for 
        criticizing China's government online and attempting to 
        form a branch of the China Democracy Party); journalist 
        Shi Tao (serving a 10-year sentence for forwarding to 
        an overseas Web site instructions from propaganda 
        officials to the media); and writer Zhang Jianhong 
        (serving a 6-year sentence for criticizing China's 
        government online).


                          freedom of religion


    In both law and practice, China failed in 2007 to provide 
freedom of religion in accordance with international human 
rights standards. China's Constitution, laws, and regulations 
do not guarantee ``freedom of religion'' but only ``freedom of 
religious belief.'' China's laws and regulations protect only 
``normal religious activities'' and do not define this term in 
a manner to provide citizens with meaningful protection for all 
aspects of religious practice.
    Religious communities must register with the government by 
affiliating with one of five recognized religions, and they 
must receive government approval to establish sites of worship. 
The state tightly regulates the publication of religious texts 
and forbids individuals from printing religious materials. 
State-controlled religious associations hinder citizens' 
interaction with foreign co-religionists, including their 
ability to follow foreign religious leaders. The government 
imposes additional restrictions on children's freedom of 
religion. Chinese citizens who practice their faith outside of 
officially sanctioned parameters risk harassment, detention, 
and other abuses. In its 2007 report on religious freedom in 
China, the U.S. Department of State noted past reports of abuse 
and deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in custody.\2\
    Party leaders manipulate religion for political ends. Like 
his predecessor, President Hu Jintao has responded to an 
increase in the number of religious followers through the use 
of legal initiatives to cloak campaigns that tighten control 
over religious communities. Despite official claims in 2004 
that the Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) adopted that 
year represented a ``paradigm shift'' in limiting state 
intervention in citizens' religious practice, it codified at 
the national level ongoing restrictions over officially 
recognized religious communities and discriminatory barriers 
against other groups.
    Government harassment, repression, and persecution of 
religious and spiritual adherents has increased during the 
five-year period covered by this report. In 2004, the 
Commission reported that repression of religious belief and 
practice grew in severity. The Party strengthened its campaign 
against organizations it designated as cults, targeting Falun 
Gong in particular, but also unregistered Buddhist and 
Christian groups, among other unregistered communities. The 
Commission noted a more visible trend in harassment and 
repression of unregistered Protestants for alleged cult 
involvement, starting in mid-2006. The Commission reported an 
increase in harassment against unregistered Catholics starting 
in 2004 and an increase in pressure on registered clerics 
beginning in 2005. The government's crackdown on religious 
activity in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has 
increased in intensity since 2001. New central government legal 
provisions and local measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region 
government intensify an already repressive environment for the 
practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Daoist and Buddhist communities 
have been subject to ongoing efforts to close temples and 
eliminate religious practices deemed superstitious, and have 
also been made subject to tight regulation of temple finances. 
Members of religious and spiritual communities outside the five 
groups recognized by the government continue to operate without 
legal protections and remain at risk of government harassment, 
abuse, and in some cases, persecution.
    Government harassment, repression, and persecution of 
religious and spiritual adherents continued in the past year, 
and worsened for some communities. In the past year, the 
government continued its campaign of persecution against the 
Falun Gong spiritual movement; issued measures that increase 
repression of Tibetan Buddhism; maintained repressive policies 
against Islamic practice in the XUAR; closed unregistered 
Protestant house church gatherings and detained house church 
leaders; continued to dictate the terms upon which Chinese 
Catholics could recognize the authority of Catholic religious 
institutions outside China and continued to detain, sequester, 
and otherwise coerce clergy into complying with official 
policies; and enforced campaigns to close unregistered Buddhist 
and Daoist temples and purge both religions of practices deemed 
as ``feudal superstitions.''
    The government has continued harassment of legal advocates 
who defend religious and spiritual practitioners. Authorities 
also have continued campaigns to restrict ``illegal'' religious 
publications, and continue to imprison religious adherents who 
publish or distribute religious materials without permission.
    Chinese officials have increased oversight of citizens' 
contacts with foreign religious practitioners within China in 
the run-up to the 2008 Olympic Games. In March 2007, Minister 
of Public Security Zhou Yongkang said the government would 
``strike hard'' against hostile forces inside and outside the 
country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a 
``good social environment'' for the Olympics and 17th Communist 
Party Congress.
    The Commission has recommended in the past that the 
President and Congress urge the Chinese government to allow 
visits by the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF) and the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious 
Intolerance. The Commission notes that China has since hosted 
USCIRF, and that discussions about a visit by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance are reportedly in progress. 
It commends the Chinese government for providing access to 
international monitors, but it notes monitors have so far 
encountered some restrictions on their activities within China.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge in direct meetings and written 
        communications with Chinese officials that they 
        guarantee, in both law and practice, freedom of 
        religion to all Chinese citizens, in accordance with 
        Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
        Rights. Stress that this freedom extends to Tibetan 
        Buddhists' right to express devotion to the Dalai Lama; 
        Catholics' right to recognize the religious authority 
        of the Holy See, free from Chinese government 
        interference; Muslims' right to make overseas 
        pilgrimages outside state-controlled channels that 
        dictate Party loyalty; Protestants' right to congregate 
        in house churches; Falun Gong practitioners' right to 
        exercise spiritual beliefs; and all citizens' right to 
        manifest their religious and spiritual beliefs free 
        from government control and threat of harassment and 
        other abuses. Also underscore the importance of 
        protecting children's right to practice religion and 
        receive religious education.
        <bullet> Use talks and written correspondence at all 
        levels to call on the Chinese government to release 
        religious prisoners (including followers of spiritual 
        movements) mentioned in this report, along with other 
        prisoners included in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database. Cases of religious prisoners include 
        Tibetan monk Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life 
        imprisonment for printing leaflets); Bishop Jia Zhiguo 
        (detained repeatedly over the course of decades, and 
        most recently in August 2007, for involvement in the 
        unregistered Catholic Church); Pastor Wang Zaiqing 
        (imprisoned for printing and distributing religious 
        materials); and Li Chang (imprisoned for demonstrating 
        in support of Falun Gong). Spotlight religious 
        prisoners in speeches, on Web sites, and in other 
        forums. Support funding for organizations that promote 
        legal defense efforts for Chinese citizens detained and 
        imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of 
        religion.
        <bullet> Promote opportunities, both in the United 
        States and China, for dialogue between Chinese 
        officials and overseas religious leaders, including 
        members of religious communities not officially 
        recognized within China, to underscore to Chinese 
        officials the importance of religious tolerance. 
        Opportunities for dialogue include exchange programs 
        supported by the U.S. Department of State's 
        International Visitor Leadership Program and programs 
        sponsored by nongovernmental organizations. Urge China 
        to accept training programs that inform public 
        officials of ways to bring China's own laws and 
        policies into compliance with the Chinese government's 
        domestic and international obligations. Urge the 
        Chinese government to continue access to international 
        monitors without imposing restrictions on their ability 
        to fully investigate conditions for religious freedom 
        in China.


                         ethnic minority rights


    The Chinese government recognizes and supports some aspects 
of ethnic minority identity, but represses aspects of ethnic 
minority rights deemed to challenge state authority, especially 
in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region, and Tibet Autonomous Region and other 
Tibetan autonomous areas. Overall conditions vary for members 
of the 55 groups the Chinese government designates as minority 
``nationalities'' or ``ethnicities'' (minzu), but all 
communities face state controls in such spheres as governance, 
language use, culture, and religion. The government provides 
some protections in law and in practice for ethnic minority 
rights, and allows for autonomous governments in regions with 
ethnic minority populations.
    The narrow parameters of the ethnic autonomy system and the 
overriding dominance of the Communist Party, however, prevent 
ethnic minorities from enjoying their rights in line with 
international human rights standards. The central government 
has increased support for development projects in ethnic 
minority regions, but benefits to ethnic minority communities 
have been limited. Although one new development program sets 
concrete targets for improving economic and social conditions 
among ethnic minorities, it couples potentially beneficial 
reforms with measures designed to monitor and report on ethnic 
relations and perceived threats to stability.
    The Chinese government uses counterterrorism and other 
policies as a pretext for suppressing ethnic minorities' 
peaceful aspirations to exercise their rights. The government 
has characterized some expressions of ethnic minority rights as 
separatism or a threat to state security, and levied prison 
sentences on some ethnic minority rights advocates.
    The Chinese government has increased repression in the XUAR 
since 2001, building off campaigns started in the 1990s to 
squelch political viewpoints and expressions of ethnic identity 
deemed threatening to state power. Rights abuses in the region 
are far reaching and target multiple dimensions of Uighur 
identity. In addition to ``strike hard'' measures, officials 
also have enforced ``softer'' policies aimed at diluting 
expressions of Uighur identity. In recent years, local 
governments have intensified measures to reduce education in 
ethnic minority languages and have instituted language 
requirements that disadvantage ethnic minority teachers. 
Authorities in the XUAR continue to imprison Uighurs engaged in 
peaceful expressions of dissent and other nonviolent 
activities.
    Although the Chinese government granted political prisoner 
Rebiya Kadeer early release on medical parole to the United 
States in 2005, it has since launched a campaign of harassment 
and abuse against her family members in the XUAR, in an 
apparent strategy to punish Kadeer for her activism in exile. 
In 2007, a XUAR court sentenced Kadeer's son, Ablikim 
Abdureyim, to nine years in prison for ``instigating and 
engaging in secessionist activities.'' A court imposed a seven-
year prison sentence and fine in 2006 on Kadeer's son, Alim.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Provide support for U.S. organizations that 
        can provide technical assistance to the Chinese 
        government in its efforts to draft and revise 
        legislation on ethnic minority rights. Such 
        organizations might include groups already engaged in 
        legal reform projects in China. A new Chinese 
        government program for ethnic minority development, 
        issued in 2007, promotes drafting legislation to 
        protect some aspects of ethnic minority rights, 
        providing one possible opportunity for increased 
        engagement in this area.
        <bullet> Urge the Chinese government to end the 
        practice of repressing the constitutionally protected 
        right to the freedom of speech by ethnic minorities in 
        China, such as Tibetans, Uighurs, and Mongols, and of 
        punishing or imprisoning individuals of such ethnic 
        minority groups by characterizing peaceful expression 
        and nonviolent action as ``splitting the country'' or 
        ``endangering state security.'' Urge China's National 
        People's Congress and State Council to clarify within 
        their laws and regulations on state security the 
        distinction between violent terrorist behavior, and 
        nonviolent policy research and advocacy of ideas aimed 
        at expanding ethnic autonomy and rights, and provide 
        explicit legal protection for such research and 
        advocacy. Support funding for organizations that can 
        assist China in such legislative projects. Support 
        funding for organizations that promote human rights in 
        the XUAR. Because of restrictions on civil society 
        groups within the region, recipients of such funding 
        should include organizations that carry out their work 
        outside the region.
        <bullet> In talks and written correspondence, call on 
        China to release Chinese citizens imprisoned for 
        advocating ethnic minority rights, including prisoners 
        mentioned in this report and included in the 
        Commission's Political Prisoner Database. Such 
        prisoners include Uighur writer Nurmemet Yasin (serving 
        a 10-year sentence for writing a short story about a 
        caged pigeon); Mongol bookstore owner Hada (serving a 
        15-year sentence for peacefully advocating for ethnic 
        minority rights); and Tibetan schoolteacher Drolma Kyab 
        (serving a sentence of 10 years and 6 months for 
        authoring unpublished manuscripts on subjects such as 
        Tibetan history and People's Liberation Army forces in 
        Tibetan areas).
        <bullet> Express concern about the continued abuse and 
        imprisonment of Rebiya Kadeer's family members in the 
        XUAR, and call for the release of all political 
        prisoners in the region. Couple efforts to promote 
        Uighur rights within China with measures to protect 
        Uighur culture in diaspora. In particular, in light of 
        recent measures that reduce Uighur language instruction 
        within the XUAR, encourage and provide financial 
        support for organizations and projects that seek to 
        preserve Uighur language and literature in diaspora. 
        Such funding targets could include community language 
        schools that promote training in the Uighur language, 
        especially among Uighur children; literary journals 
        that publish works in Uighur; and library programs to 
        collect Uighur books published inside and outside China 
        and catalogue them by their Uighur-language titles, 
        rather than by the Mandarin-Chinese titles imposed on 
        Uighur books published within China.


                          population planning


    China continues to implement population planning policies 
that violate international human rights standards. These 
policies impose government control over women's reproductive 
lives, result in punitive actions against citizens not in 
compliance with the population planning policies, and engender 
additional abuses by officials who implement the policies at 
local levels. In 2007, the Party and government leadership 
reaffirmed its commitment to its population planning policies, 
and continues to implement such actions as charging large 
``social compensation fees'' to families that bear children 
``out of plan.''
    Violent abuses continue to be widespread, particularly when 
local officials--whose promotions and incomes are connected to 
performance on these policies--come under pressure from higher 
level officials for failing to meet family planning targets. In 
the spring of 2007, local officials in the Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region sparked large-scale protests and riots in 
response to violent and heavy-handed tactics that they used to 
enforce population planning policies, an incident which 
underscored the continued tendency of citizens to resist such 
abuses. Throughout 2006-2007, public officials continued to 
suppress citizen activists who used legal measures to spotlight 
or fight illegal and coercive population planning enforcement.
    The government has taken limited steps to address social 
problems exacerbated by population planning policies, such as 
imbalanced sex ratios and decreasing social support for China's 
aging population. In 2006, the government announced that the 
following year it would extend across China a pilot project to 
provide financial support to rural parents with only one child 
or two girls, once the parents have reached 60 years of age. At 
the same time, according to some observers, imbalanced sex 
ratios and a resulting shortage of marriage partners have 
already contributed to, or will exacerbate in the future, the 
problem of human trafficking. Sex ratios stand at roughly 118 
male births to 100 female births, with higher rates in some 
parts of the country and for second births. Demographers and 
population experts consider a normal male-female birth ratio to 
be between 103 to 107:100.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge Chinese officials promptly to release 
        Chen Guangcheng, imprisoned in Linyi city, Shandong 
        province, after exposing forced sterilizations, forced 
        abortions, beatings, and other abuses carried out by 
        Linyi population planning officials. Yinan county and 
        Linyi public security, procuratorate, and court 
        officials convicted and imprisoned Mr. Chen through a 
        process that deprived him of many of the procedural 
        protections afforded to him under Chinese law.
        <bullet> Impress upon China's leaders the importance of 
        promoting legal aid and training programs that help 
        citizens pursue compensation and other remedies against 
        the state for injury suffered as a result of official 
        abuse related to China's population planning policies. 
        Provisions in China's Law on State Compensation provide 
        for such remedies for citizens subject to abuse and 
        personal injury by administrative officials, including 
        population planning officials. Provide funding and 
        support for the development of programs and 
        international cooperation in this area.
        <bullet> Urge the Chinese government to dismantle its 
        system of population controls, while funding programs 
        that inform Chinese officials of the importance of 
        respecting citizens' diverse beliefs.


                    freedom of residence and travel


    The Chinese government still restricts freedom of residence 
through the household registration (hukou) system it first 
enacted in the 1950s. This system limits the right of Chinese 
citizens to determine their permanent place of residence. 
Regulations and policies that condition legal rights and access 
to social services on residency status have resulted in 
discrimination against rural hukou holders who migrate for work 
to urban areas. The hukou system exacerbates barriers that 
migrant workers and their families face in areas such as 
employment, healthcare, property rights, legal compensation, 
and schooling. The government's restrictions on residence, and 
discrimination in equal treatment, contravene international 
human rights standards.
    Under President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, the 
government has attempted to adapt this system to challenges 
created by the massive job-seeking migrant population spawned 
by economic reforms. In 2007, the Ministry of Public Security 
formulated a series of proposals to submit to the State Council 
for approval. Major reforms in the proposal include improving 
the temporary residence permit system, improving the ability of 
migrants' spouses and parents to transfer hukou to urban areas, 
and using the existence of a fixed and legal place of residence 
as the primary basis for obtaining registration in a city of 
residence. Uneven implementation of hukou reform at the local 
level has dulled the impact of national calls for change.
    The Chinese government continues to enforce restrictions on 
citizens' right to travel, in violation of international human 
rights standards. The Chinese government uses restrictions on 
international travel to punish activists and control religious 
communities. In addition, Western academics, NGOs, and even 
Commission staff and Members have been restricted in their 
ability to travel to China. The Passport Law, effective January 
2007, articulates some beneficial features for passport 
applicants, but permits officials to refuse a passport where 
``the competent organs of the State Council believe that [the 
applicant's] leaving China will do harm to the state security 
or result in serious losses to the benefits of the state.'' In 
August, Shanghai authorities denied the passport applications 
of rights defense lawyer and former political prisoner Zheng 
Enchong and his spouse, Jiang Meili. The same month, 
authorities in Beijing prevented Yuan Weijing, spouse of 
imprisoned rights activist Chen Guangcheng, from traveling 
overseas to accept an award on behalf of her husband. House 
church leader Zhang Rongliang, who resorted to obtaining 
illegal travel documents after the government refused to issue 
him a passport, was sentenced to seven and one half years' 
imprisonment in 2006 on charges of illegally crossing the 
border and fraudulently obtaining a passport. Also in 2006, 
authorities detained two leaders of the unregistered Wenzhou 
diocese, Peter Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang (who is also 
known by the name Jiang Sunian), after they returned from a 
pilgrimage to Rome. Authorities later handed down prison 
sentences of 9 and 11 months, respectively, alleging they had 
falsified passports and charging them with illegal exit from 
the country.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Raise the issue of restrictions on travel, and 
        the cases of Zhang Rongliang, Zheng Enchong, Jiang 
        Meili, and Yuan Weijing (mentioned above) in all levels 
        of talks with Chinese officials. Such dialogue might be 
        integrated into broader discussions on the promotion of 
        citizen activism and of religious freedom.
        <bullet> Urge the Chinese government to undertake the 
        following measures, in line with recommendations the 
        Commission made to the Chinese government in its 2005 
        Issue Paper titled ``China's Household Registration 
        System:'' eliminate hukou restrictions that contravene 
        domestic and international law and institute measures 
        to equalize citizens' ability to change their 
        residence; eliminate outstanding rules that link hukou 
        status to access to public services like healthcare and 
        education; support private efforts to provide social 
        services to migrants; and engage in international 
        dialogue on migration and hukou reform to develop 
        effective models for China's reform efforts.
        <bullet> Provide funding for organizations that can 
        lend legal training and support for the reform efforts 
        outlined above.


                            status of women


    Discrimination against women remains widespread in Chinese 
society, as equal access to justice has been slow to develop, 
and coercive population planning policies remain in place in 
violation of internationally recognized human rights. There is 
a lack of awareness among Chinese women of legal options when 
their rights are violated, in spite of efforts by Chinese 
officials and women's organizations to build protections for 
women into law. This is especially true of migrant women, women 
in impoverished rural areas, and women who are members of 
ethnic minorities. Moreover, a lack of reliable, publicly 
available statistical information and other data that are 
disaggregated by sex and region hinder efforts by Chinese 
women's rights activists and women's organizations to more 
accurately assess the current problems women face and 
accurately gauge how effectively laws and Party and government 
policies are being implemented.
    Within the past year, provincial and municipal governments 
continued to pass regulations to strengthen the implementation 
of the Law on the Protection of Women's Rights and Interests 
(LPWRI), which the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee amended in August 2005. The LPWRI prohibited sexual 
harassment and domestic violence, and required government 
entities at all levels to give women assistance to assert their 
rights in court. In addition, the Ministry of Public Security 
and All-China Women's Federation, among others, issued 
guidelines in 2007 that will legally obligate police officers 
to respond immediately to domestic violence calls and to assist 
domestic violence survivors, or face punishment.
    Women's organizations have been particularly active in the 
last few years, although these groups advocate on behalf of 
women's rights within the confines of government and Party 
policy. In the past year, these women's organizations, lawyers 
associations, and universities organized seminars and workshops 
to raise awareness of women's issues among lawyers, judges, 
public officials, and academics.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> In talks and in correspondence at all levels 
        call on Chinese officials to encourage further creation 
        of comprehensive social services for women, including 
        literacy programs that focus on combating illiteracy 
        among women, longer-term options for sheltering 
        domestic violence survivors, and psychological 
        counseling and suicide prevention programs, especially 
        in rural areas. Urge Chinese counterparts to support 
        initiatives that help raise public awareness of women's 
        issues and rights, especially as they affect migrant 
        women, women from rural communities, and ethnic 
        minority women.
        <bullet> Fund nongovernmental organizations that 
        provide training to independent Chinese organizations 
        that train legal officials and social service providers 
        in women's issues and rights, and that strengthen 
        collection and publication of data on issues affecting 
        women.
        <bullet> Encourage bilateral education and exchange 
        programs, such as exchanges between sister-city police 
        officers, judges, and other social service providers 
        that work on cases of domestic violence and other 
        issues affecting women.


                           human trafficking


    The National People's Congress Standing Committee revised 
the Law on the Protection of Minors on December 29, 2006, which 
took effect on June 1, 2007. Article 41 of the revised law 
contains new provisions that prohibit the trafficking, 
kidnapping, and maltreatment, including sexual exploitation, of 
minors. In July 2007, the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) 
and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) held the first 
National Anti-Trafficking Children's Forum, in which an MPS 
spokesperson noted the increase in the number of cases of 
forced labor trafficking and trafficking for commercial sexual 
exploitation, and an annual decrease in the number of cases 
that the MPS handled that relate to the trafficking of women 
and children for marriage and adoption. According to the MPS 
spokesperson, ``In trafficking and abduction aspects, China's 
legal protection is underdeveloped, and it needs to be further 
strengthened.'' Domestic rather than cross-border trafficking 
remains the most significant part of the problem in China. 
Women and children, who make up most cases, are trafficked from 
poorer provinces to more prosperous provinces. Metrics used to 
assess the extent of the problem in cross-border contexts may 
not adequately capture the full extent of human trafficking in 
China.

                            Recommendations

    To address this issue, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Under the Trafficking Victims Protection 
        Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-164), 
        authorize and appropriate funding to staff the Office 
        to Monitor and Combat Trafficking within the U.S. 
        Department of State with additional personnel who 
        possess appropriate expertise in China's unique 
        situation, in which the majority of trafficking in 
        persons remains domestic. Strengthen bilateral 
        exchanges, such as the China-U.S. Global Issues Forum, 
        and fund programs through the Department of State and 
        other U.S. government agencies that promote 
        international cooperation and address incidences of 
        domestic and cross-border trafficking of persons in 
        China, as provided for under the 2005 Act. Fund public 
        education and exchange programs in China, such as the 
        training of judges and court personnel, and assistance 
        in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers, as 
        provided for under the 2005 Act.
        <bullet> Urge the Chinese government to ratify the 
        Trafficking in Persons Protocol under the UN Convention 
        Against Transnational Organized Crime, and to adopt and 
        implement its anti-trafficking National Plan of Action. 
        Use meetings with Chinese officials to encourage the 
        implementation of best practices in investigation and 
        prosecution, such as more comprehensive victim 
        rehabilitation services and greater cross-
        jurisdictional cooperation among legal and 
        administrative departments to combat forced labor 
        trafficking and to share information about victims and 
        prosecution efforts, including systematic 
        identification of Chinese citizens that distinguishes 
        victims of international trafficking from those who 
        traveled abroad illegally. Urge Chinese officials to 
        use the media to raise citizen awareness of issues 
        related to human trafficking, such as the role that 
        corruption plays in facilitating trafficking, efforts 
        by law enforcement officials to prosecute trafficking 
        cases, how courts handle trafficking and forced labor 
        cases, and the plight of trafficking victims and 
        survivors.
        <bullet> It has been reported that the severe imbalance 
        in the male-female sex ratio created by China's 
        population planning policies has the potential to 
        severely exacerbate the trafficking of women from 
        countries such as Laos, Vietnam, and North Korea, and 
        the internal trafficking of Chinese women, for sale as 
        brides. Members of the Congress and Administration 
        officials are encouraged to fund needed research on 
        this extremely serious set of problems, especially as 
        they pertain to the trafficking of women and children 
        for marriage, adoption, and commercial sexual 
        exploitation.


                     north korean refugees in china


    The Chinese government forcibly repatriates North Korean 
refugees found on Chinese soil. Because China does not classify 
North Korean migrants as refugees, the Chinese government 
denies the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) access to 
this vulnerable population. North Korean refugees deported from 
China to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea face 
punishment ranging from detention in labor camps to long 
imprisonment to execution. Women are among the most vulnerable 
of the North Korean refugees in China, at risk of exploitation 
and abuse at the hands of human traffickers. The Commission 
notes numerous reports by international humanitarian workers in 
the region that during the past one to two years, the Chinese 
government has intensified its efforts to forcibly repatriate 
North Korean refugees, in part as a security preparation for 
the 2008 Olympic Games.

                            Recommendations

    To address this issue, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Use meetings and communications with Chinese 
        officials to urge them to honor their obligations under 
        the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
        Refugees and its 1967 Protocol by halting the forced 
        repatriation of refugees, and terminating the practice 
        of automatically classifying all undocumented North 
        Korean border crossers as illegal economic migrants.
        <bullet> Press these officials to allow the UNHCR 
        unfettered access to this vulnerable refugee 
        population. Encourage them, as part of China's ongoing 
        effort to draft national refugee regulations, to 
        include provisions that establish formal and 
        transparent procedures for the review of North Korean 
        claims to refugee status.


                                 health


    During 2007, healthcare system reform focused on systems to 
reduce risks and irregularities in healthcare delivery. In July 
2007, Premier Wen Jiabao announced plans to provide a national 
health insurance plan for all urban residents, including 
children, the elderly, and the uninsured, with the aim of 
increasing the number of insured urban residents by 200 
million. The central government has selected 79 cities to 
launch pilot programs by the end of September 2007.
    While central government officials have emphasized the 
importance of combating HIV/AIDS, implementation remains highly 
problematic. A government advisor on AIDS policy has expressed 
concern that China's efforts to combat the disease have stalled 
and that funding, which in 2006 was 3 billion yuan (US$388 
million), remains inadequate. At the local level, an 
overburdened, underfunded healthcare system makes it difficult 
for governments to provide the necessary prevention and 
treatment programs. It is not uncommon for persons living with 
HIV/AIDS and their advocates to report harassment by local 
officials. In 2007, the government announced plans to spend 960 
million yuan (US$127 million) on pharmaceuticals, education, 
and efforts to reach out to the nation's homosexual community. 
The Commission will monitor the implementation and results of 
these plans in the coming months.
    Discrimination against carriers of the hepatitis B virus 
(HBV) remains widespread. Employer screening for HBV remains 
common, especially in cities. Roughly half of a general 
population sample surveyed said that they were not willing to 
work with an HBV carrier, and over half said that they would 
not hire one. State control of information relating to 
infectious diseases hampers effective public health policy and 
management. Regulations categorize as ``state secrets'' 
information on large-scale epidemics. A new Beijing municipal 
regulation contains procedural protections for mentally ill 
patients hospitalized involuntarily, but concerns about forced 
commitment of the mentally ill in the period leading up to the 
2008 Olympic Games remain.

                             Recommendation

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Call for an end to the harassment of HIV/AIDS 
        activists listed in the Commission's Political Prisoner 
        Database, such as Gao Yaojie, Wan Yanhai, and Hu Jia. 
        Call on China to ease restrictions on civil society 
        groups and provide more support to organizations that 
        address HIV/AIDS issues. Encourage Chinese officials to 
        make prevention and sensitivity training a requirement 
        for local officials. Encourage Chinese officials to 
        focus attention on the effective implementation of 
        prohibitions on discrimination against persons living 
        with HIV/AIDS and HBV in hiring and in the workplace. 
        Urge public officials to develop and fund training 
        programs to raise awareness among social service 
        providers, public officials, and educators of HBV and 
        other infectious disease-related discrimination in the 
        workplace, schools, and other community organizations.


                              environment


    China's leaders acknowledge the severity of their country's 
environmental problems, and the Chinese government has taken 
steps to curb pollution and environmental degradation. For 
example, the central government has developed an expansive 
framework of environmental laws and regulations to combat 
environmental problems. Nonetheless, effective implementation 
remains systemically hampered by noncompliance at the local 
level and administrative structures that prioritize the 
suppression of ``social unrest'' and the generation of revenue 
over environmental protection.
    Just as China's environmental policies have not kept pace 
with the country's severe environmental degradation, neither 
have they kept pace with citizens' aspirations for a vigorous 
expression of concern over environmental health and human 
rights. During 2007, China's citizens confronted environmental 
public policy with an increasing propensity not only to voice 
intense dismay with government and industry, but also to turn 
to petitions and mass protests, and to some extent the courts, 
in order to pressure public officials for greater environmental 
accountability, enforcement, and protection.
    Rural residents and middle-class urban residents have 
increased their participation in environmental activism in the 
last two to three years. Official responses to environment-
related citizen activism have included crackdowns on the free 
flow of information, and the suppression of citizen complaints 
and protest. In part because these crackdowns and suppressions 
target potential social allies instead of engaging them, 
further environmental degradation may impel China's leaders to 
acknowledge that these strategies can diminish their capacity 
to exercise effective environmental leadership over the long 
run.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Impress upon Chinese officials the urgency 
        with which they must combat the lure of revenue 
        generation over environmental protection, especially at 
        the local level, by urging China to endorse an 
        incentives system for local-level officials to adhere 
        to and enforce environmental laws and regulations. 
        Emphasize in speeches, on Member Web sites, and in 
        other fora the importance of effective local-level 
        implementation of environmental protection measures in 
        China.
        <bullet> Request meetings with officials from China's 
        State Environmental Protection Administration, 
        provincial environmental protection bureaus, and 
        experts from government, academic, and nongovernmental 
        environmental think tanks when arranging travel to 
        China. Endorse the efforts of officials who seek to 
        implement sound environmental policy by advocating for 
        improved disclosure and dissemination of pollution 
        data. Support programs that provide training for 
        Chinese officials in the conduct of environmental 
        impact hearings open to the public. Support training 
        programs in China aimed at increasing the integrity and 
        precision of environmental data collection methods, and 
        improving administration of public information 
        disclosure and dissemination concerning environmental 
        hazards and emergencies. Encourage constituents with 
        expertise and experience in successful public-private 
        environmental partnerships to build relationships with 
        provincial and city-level counterparts in China.
        <bullet> Call attention to China's practice of 
        censoring and penalizing citizens who request access 
        to, and disseminate, information relating to 
        environmental hazards and emergencies. Call on Chinese 
        officials to release and end harassment of 
        environmental activists mentioned in this report, such 
        as Wu Lihong and Tan Kai, and other environmental 
        activists included in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database.


                             civil society


    Chinese officials have expressed particular concern in the 
last year over the influence that civil society organizations 
have on the course of political development in China. Central 
and local officials not only tightened existing controls over 
many of these organizations, but also engaged in the selective 
use of laws to provide a legal pretext for shutting them down. 
In a widely publicized example, the influential nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) publication, China Development Brief, was 
closed down in 2007 in part because it was accused of violating 
China's Statistics Law.
    In March, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that 
revisions to the key 1998 regulations on managing social 
organizations were under consideration. The revisions 
reportedly would for the first time permit international 
organizations operating in China to register with the 
government. At the same time, however, they would also retain 
one of the government's key mechanisms for political control 
over civil society organizations--the requirement that each 
organization obtain the formal sponsorship of a Party or 
government organization.
    The government recently has initiated potentially 
beneficial reforms affecting two types of civil society 
organizations: rural farmers' cooperatives and charitable 
groups. The Chinese government has created space for NGO 
participation in delivering certain services, such as poverty 
relief.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Use contacts with Chinese officials to call 
        for concrete measures that can help ease conditions for 
        civil society, including removal of the legal 
        requirement that all civil society organizations obtain 
        a Party or government sponsor organization and the 
        easing of restrictions on contact between Chinese and 
        foreign NGOs.
        <bullet> In talks and written correspondence at all 
        levels, call on the Chinese government to release 
        Chinese citizens imprisoned for forming and 
        participating in independent civil society 
        organizations, including prisoners mentioned in this 
        report and included in the Commission's Political 
        Prisoner Database. Such prisoners include Yang Tongyan 
        (also known as Yang Tianshui, sentenced to 12 years in 
        prison on subversion charges, for criticizing the 
        government online and attempting to form a branch of 
        the China Democracy Party).


                           access to justice


    The Party continues to use the courts and the legal system 
instrumentally to further its political objectives. In January 
2007, the Supreme People's Court issued several opinions 
calling on courts to insist on the Party's leadership. These 
opinions outlined in detail how lower courts should handle 
cases in order to promote the Party's ``harmonious society.'' 
In February 2007, Luo Gan, a member of the Party Politburo 
Standing Committee, warned legal officials not to be swayed by 
``enemy forces'' trying to use the legal system to Westernize 
and divide China, and internal forces that denied the Party's 
leadership on legal matters.
    In March 2007, the President of China's Supreme People's 
Court urged local judicial officials to make greater use of 
mediation and other alternative methods of dispute resolution 
in dealing with cases that touch on issues that could spark 
public protest. ``(R)ural land seizures, urban home evictions 
and demolitions, enterprise restructuring, labor and social 
security, and resource and environmental protection'' cases 
were among the issues singled out. Courts have been urged to 
increase the proportion of cases handled through mediation. 
Officials continued to implement the State Council's January 
2005 regulation on the proper handling of citizen petitions, 
which forces dispute resolution at local levels, implicitly 
making it more difficult for citizens to take appeals to 
provincial and central levels.
    In early 2006, the All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) 
issued a ``guiding opinion'' restricting the ability of lawyers 
to handle cases involving representative or joint litigation by 
10 or more litigants, or cases involving both litigation and 
non-litigation efforts. The guiding opinion further instructed 
law firms to assign only ``politically qualified'' lawyers to 
conduct the initial intake of these cases, and lawyers handling 
collective cases to attempt to mitigate conflict and propose 
mediation as the method for conflict resolution. Renowned 
lawyer Zhang Sizhi, former ACLA president, criticized the 
guiding opinion as retrogressive and warned that it would set 
the country's legal profession back several decades to the 
1980s.

                             Recommendation

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge China to examine and take steps to ensure 
        that the finality of the formal judicial process is not 
        undermined by alternative channels for dispute 
        resolution. Use meetings with Chinese officials to 
        inquire about China's steps to reform its judicial 
        personnel and budgetary systems, in order to make local 
        courts and judges less beholden to local Communist 
        Party committees and governments.


                 institutions of democratic governance


    The Ministry of Civil Affairs reported in July 2007 that 
villages in all of China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions 
had held at least two rounds of elections since 1998, when the 
Organic Law of the Village Committees took effect. In 2006-
2007, official Chinese reports suggested that ``corrupt'' and 
``illegal'' election practices, including ``vote-rigging'' and 
``rampant'' bribery, remain widespread, and that there is 
reason to infer they are getting worse, despite numerous Party 
and government directives calling for a cleanup.
    In 2006-2007, citizens took to the streets in some areas to 
protest vote-rigging and other electoral abuses. International 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) monitors, who have been 
involved in promoting and monitoring these village elections 
since their inception, have reported that in the past two 
years, Chinese officials in many localities have increasingly 
resisted permitting either Chinese or foreign observers to 
monitor the quality, procedural integrity, and fairness of 
village elections. The powers of village committees and their 
elected leaders by law are highly circumscribed by appointed 
village Party secretaries.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Call on Chinese officials to make elections 
        more transparent by directing each province and 
        locality to openly publish on Web sites and other media 
        outlets detailed electoral information on all village 
        committee and residents committee elections, including 
        advance information on candidate nomination meetings, 
        candidate names, election dates and locations, plus the 
        total number and percentage of the vote each candidate 
        received.
        <bullet> Strongly urge Chinese officials to revive and 
        expand engagement with international NGOs specializing 
        in election monitoring.


                         commercial rule of law


    Deficiencies in legal institutions and systems of policy 
implementation have prompted a number of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) challenges, including challenges to China's 
intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement regime and its 
provision of subsidies to domestic industry in direct 
contravention of its WTO obligations. China has shown little 
progress in correcting deficiencies that have prompted these 
cases and continues to engage in practices that deviate from 
WTO national treatment principles.
    China's long-protected banking and oil sectors were opened 
in accordance with WTO commitments that came due on December 
11, 2006. The opening of oil markets ends a longstanding state 
monopoly, but concerns about national treatment remain. New 
measures establish licensing schemes that may maintain some 
barriers to entry by new market participants without further 
regulatory loosening or relaxation of licensing requirements.
    New banking sector regulations impose stringent compliance 
and risk management duties on both corporate Boards of 
Directors and Boards of Supervisors. It is unclear how the 
rules will be implemented and enforced with respect to 
institutions, such as many foreign banks, that do not have both 
a Board of Directors and a Board of Supervisors. A new Anti-
Money Laundering Law, as well as new Bankruptcy, Anti-Monopoly, 
and Enterprise Tax Laws will have broad impact in and beyond 
the banking sector.
    In the area of transparency, developments include China's 
solicitation of comments on landmark legislation and 
regulations that came into effect in 2007 (including the new 
Labor Contract Law and Tax Law Implementation Regulations). 
Comment procedures afford interested parties some limited 
opportunities to offer input during legislative and regulatory 
development. The State Council's issuance of a landmark 
Regulation on the Public Disclosure of Government Information 
in April 2007, to take effect in May 2008, is potentially 
significant. Also potentially significant is the issuance by 
the Supreme People's Court (SPC) and Supreme People's 
Procuratorate (SPP) of measures concerning the publication of 
judicial decisions and other documents.
    The SPC issued an interpretation in 2007 concerning China's 
Law Against Unfair Competition, an important development for 
judicial reform generally speaking, with possible implications 
for IPR. China ratified World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright and WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaties in June 2007. The SPC and SPP jointly 
issued an interpretation in April 2007 to clarify the 
application of several criminal law provisions in IPR cases. 
Thresholds for applying Criminal Law provisions in IPR cases 
contained in the interpretation, though higher than before, 
still permit some commercial-scale infringement to elude 
criminal sanctions.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Urge Chinese officials to close the remaining 
        loopholes contained in its April 2007 SPC-SPP joint 
        interpretation on criminal sanctions and thresholds in 
        IPR cases.
        <bullet> As a general matter, express concern to 
        Chinese counterparts about China's implementation of 
        new laws and regulations. While some new laws and 
        regulations may be welcome, they should not be seen as 
        a sign of progress unless coupled with consistent, 
        transparent, and effective implementation that meets 
        international standards. Failure to do so risks 
        reducing even good law with the best intentions to mere 
        propaganda, and diminishes the credibility of China's 
        commitment to reform and the integrity of China's legal 
        and regulatory institutions.


                         impact of emergencies


    The context of China's domestic rule of law development 
changed during 2006-2007, with a sharp rise in domestic and 
international concerns over food safety, product quality, and 
climate change. These concerns, and China's response to them, 
will both shape and be shaped by China's rule of law reforms. 
Because their impact on the course of rule of law in China is 
expected to be large, these developments are covered in added 
detail in the main body of this report.

                    Food Safety and Product Quality

    The central government has taken steps to address recent 
concerns, but inadequate and inconsistent implementation, 
corruption, and the lack of regulatory incentives hinder 
effective regulation. The lack of strong national consumer 
laws, consumer associations, and other civil society groups, 
and public officials' ongoing harassment of individuals who 
report issues relating to consumer safety, represent additional 
challenges in ensuring consumer safety.
    The State Council publicly released its national 11th Five-
Year Plan on Food and Drug Safety (2006-2010) on June 5, 2007. 
The plan calls for the implementation of strict controls to 
prevent farmers and producers from overusing pesticides and 
additives, to publish online lists of blacklisted food 
exporters and restrict their ability to export, to strengthen 
investigations of major food safety incidents, to upgrade 
standards, and to severely punish offenders. In addition, the 
General Administration on Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine announced plans to implement the first national 
recall system by the end of 2007.

                             Recommendation

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Use meetings and written communications with 
        Chinese officials to underscore how strongly American 
        consumers desire that China reform and strengthen its 
        enforcement system for drug, food, and consumer product 
        safety. Stress the indispensability of organized 
        citizen involvement in making drug and product safety 
        effective, and continue developing and funding Sino-
        U.S. exchanges aimed at strengthening quality and 
        safety programs. Emphasize the importance of the free 
        flow of information and citizen participation in an 
        effective response to emergencies. Urge an end to the 
        suppression of information during emergencies, and to 
        the practice of penalizing those who wish to access 
        information. Take additional, concrete steps, which 
        might include adding product safety criteria to local 
        officials' performance evaluations, enhancing the 
        capacity and independence of enforcement personnel, and 
        including enhanced whistleblower protection in new 
        legislation and legislation currently under revision.

                             Climate Change

    Government publications in 2007 indicate central government 
concern with the issue of climate change, but the effectiveness 
of central government policies to address climate change 
remains to be seen. China issued its first National Assessment 
Report on Climate Change in December 2006, and a five-year 
General Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Pollutant 
Discharge Reduction on June 4, 2007. The latter establishes 
regional climate change administrations for coordinating 
interagency work on climate change, energy efficiency, and 
renewable energy. The Chinese government does not appear likely 
to accept a mandatory reduction in its greenhouse gas 
emissions.

                             Recommendation

    To address this issue, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Use contacts with Chinese officials to 
        continue promoting new areas of cooperation and new 
        opportunities for pollution-control and environmental 
        protection technology transfer, and the promotion of 
        renewable energy use. Continue developing and funding 
        educational exchanges with China regarding 
        environmental governance and climate change.


                                 tibet


    No progress in the dialogue between China and the Dalai 
Lama or his representatives is evident. After the Dalai Lama's 
Special Envoy returned to India after the sixth round of 
dialogue, he issued the briefest and least optimistic statement 
to date. Chinese officials showed no sign that they recognize 
the potential benefits of inviting the Dalai Lama to visit 
China so that they can meet with him directly.
    Chinese government enforcement of Party policy on religion 
resulted in an increased level of repression of the freedom of 
religion for Tibetan Buddhists during the past year. The 
Communist Party intensified its long-running anti-Dalai Lama 
campaign. Tibetan Buddhism in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) 
is coming under increased pressure as recent legal measures 
expand and deepen government control over Buddhist monasteries, 
nunneries, monks, nuns, and reincarnated lamas. The Chinese 
government issued legal measures that, if fully implemented, 
will establish government control over the process of 
identifying and educating reincarnated Tibetan Buddhist 
teachers throughout China.
    Chinese authorities continue to detain and imprison 
Tibetans for peaceful expression and nonviolent action, 
charging them with crimes such as ``splittism,'' and claiming 
that their behavior ``endangers state security.'' The 
Commission's Political Prisoner Database listed 100 known cases 
of current Tibetan political detention or imprisonment as of 
September 2007, a figure that is likely to be lower than the 
actual number of Tibetan political prisoners. Based on sentence 
information available for 64 of the current prisoners, the 
average sentence length is 11 years and 2 months. Tibetan 
Buddhist monks and nuns make up a separate set of 64 of the 
known currently detained or imprisoned Tibetan political 
prisoners as of September 2007, according to data available in 
the Commission's Political Prisoner Database. Based on data 
available for 42 currently imprisoned Tibetan monks and nuns, 
their average sentence length is 10 years and 4 months. (It is 
a coincidence that the number of monks and nuns, and the number 
of prisoners for whom the Commission has sentence information 
available, are both 64).
    In its first year of operation, the Qinghai-Tibet railway 
carried 1.5 million passengers into the TAR, of whom hundreds 
of thousands are likely to be ethnic Han and other non-Tibetans 
seeking jobs and economic opportunities. The government is 
establishing greater control over the Tibetan rural population 
by implementing programs that will bring to an end the 
traditional lifestyle of the Tibetan nomadic herder by settling 
them in fixed communities, and reconstructing or relocating 
farm villages.

                            Recommendations

    To address these issues, Members of the Congress and 
Administration officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Continue to convey to the Chinese government 
        the importance and urgency of moving forward in 
        dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. 
        The most effective way for the dialogue to move forward 
        is for Chinese government officials to invite the Dalai 
        Lama to visit China and meet with him face-to-face so 
        that the Chinese and Tibetans can begin to overcome 
        obstacles to progress in the dialogue, and seek an 
        understanding that will contribute to the protection 
        and preservation of the Tibetan culture and heritage, 
        and improve China's stability, prosperity, and harmony.
        <bullet> Convey to the Chinese government the 
        importance of respecting the Tibetan people's right to 
        freedom of religion, and of not using the law as an 
        instrument to deprive Tibetans and other Chinese 
        citizens of that right. Freedom of religion includes 
        the right of Tibetan Buddhists to identify and educate 
        their religious teachers in a manner consistent with 
        their preferences and traditions, without regulation 
        and supervision by the Chinese government. Continue to 
        urge the Chinese government to allow international 
        observers to visit Gedun Choekyi Nyima, the Panchen 
        Lama as recognized by the Dalai Lama, and his parents.
        <bullet> Increase funding for U.S. nongovernmental 
        organizations to develop programs that can assist 
        Tibetans to increase their capacity to protect and 
        develop their culture, language, and heritage; that can 
        help to improve education, economic, and health 
        conditions of ethnic Tibetans living in Tibetan areas 
        of China; and that create sustainable benefits without 
        encouraging an influx of non-Tibetans into these areas. 
        Such assistance to Tibetans is of increased importance 
        following the start of operation of the Qinghai-Tibet 
        railway.
        <bullet> Raise in meetings and correspondence with 
        Chinese officials the cases of Tibetans who are 
        imprisoned as punishment for the peaceful exercise of 
        human rights. Representative cases include: monk 
        Choeying Khedrub (sentenced to life imprisonment for 
        printing leaflets); and reincarnated lama Bangri 
        Chogtrul (serving a sentence of 18 years commuted from 
        life imprisonment for ``inciting splittism'').

    The Commission's Executive Branch members have participated 
in and supported the work of the Commission, including the 
preparation of this report. The views and recommendations 
expressed in this report, however, do not necessarily reflect 
the views of individual Executive Branch members or the 
Administration.
    This report was adopted by a vote of 20 to 1.<dagger>

                      Political Prisoner Database


                    a powerful resource for advocacy


    Most of the Annual Report's sections provide information 
about Chinese political and religious prisoners\3\ in the 
context of specific human rights and rule of law abuses, and as 
the result of the Chinese Communist Party and government's 
application of policies and laws. The Commission relies on the 
Political Prisoner Database (PPD) for its own advocacy and 
research work, including the preparation of the Annual Report, 
and routinely uses the database to prepare summaries of 
information about political and religious prisoners for Members 
of Congress and senior Administration officials.
    The Commission invites the public to read about issue-
specific Chinese political imprisonment in sections of this 
Annual Report, and to access and make use of the PPD at http://
ppd.cecc.gov. 
    The PPD has served, since its launch in November 2004, as a 
unique and powerful resource for governments, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), educational institutions, and individuals 
who research political and religious imprisonment in China, or 
that advocate on behalf of such prisoners. The most important 
feature of the PPD is that it is structured as a genuine 
database and uses a powerful query engine. Though completely 
Web-based, it is not an archive that uses a simple or advanced 
search tool, nor is it a library of Web pages and files. The 
PPD received approximately 28,000 online requests for prisoner 
information during the 12-month period ending July 31, 2007. 
About one-quarter of the requests for prisoner information 
originated from government Internet domains (.gov).


                          political prisoners


    The PPD seeks to provide users with prisoner information 
that is reliable and up-to-date. Commission staff members work 
to maintain and update political prisoner records based on 
their areas of expertise. Staff seek to provide objective 
analysis of information about individual prisoners, and about 
events and trends that drive political and religious 
imprisonment in China.
    The PPD contained approximately 4,060 individual case 
records of political imprisonment in China as of September 
2007. The Dui Hua Foundation, based in San Francisco, and the 
Tibet Information Network, based in London, shared their 
extensive experience and data on political and religious 
prisoners in China with the Commission to help establish the 
database.\4\ The Dui Hua Foundation continues to do so. The 
Commission also relies on its own staff research for prisoner 
information, as well as on information provided by NGOs and 
other groups that specialize in promoting human rights and 
opposing political and religious imprisonment.


                          database technology


    The PPD aims to provide a technology with sufficient power 
to cope with the scope and complexity of political imprisonment 
in China. Upgrades to the database should be in operation 
before publication of the Commission's 2008 Annual Report, and 
will increase the number of types of information available and 
allow the PPD to function in an interactive manner with other 
Commission resources and reports. The upgrade will leverage the 
capacity of these Commission resources to support research, 
reporting, and advocacy by the U.S. Congress and 
Administration, and by the public, on behalf of political and 
religious prisoners in China.

     Providing Information to Users While Respecting Their Privacy

    The design of the PPD allows anyone with Internet access to 
query the database and download prisoner data without providing 
personal information to the Commission, and without the PPD 
downloading any software or Web cookies to a user's computer. 
Users have the option to create a user account, which allows 
them to save, edit, and reuse queries, but the PPD does not 
require a user to provide any personal information to set up 
such an account. The PPD does not download software or a Web 
cookie to a user's computer as the result of setting up such an 
account. Saved queries are not stored on a user's computer. A 
user-specified ID (which can be a nickname) and password are 
the only information required to set up a user account.

               Powerful Queries Provide Useful Responses

    Each prisoner's record describes the type of human rights 
violation by Chinese authorities that led to his or her 
detention. These include violations of the right to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of religion, freedom of association, and free 
expression, including the freedom to advocate peaceful social 
or political change and to criticize government policy or 
government officials. Since inception, the PPD has allowed 
users to conduct queries on 19 categories of prisoner 
information. Users may search for prisoners by name, using 
either the Latin alphabet or Chinese characters. Users may 
construct queries to include one or more types of data, 
including personal information (ethnic group, sex, age, 
occupation, religion), or information about imprisonment 
(current status of detention, place of detention, prison name, 
length of sentence, legal process).
    Many records contain a short summary of the case that 
includes basic details about the political or religious 
imprisonment and the legal process leading to imprisonment. 
Users may download and save the results of queries as Adobe 
Acrobat files or Microsoft Excel spreadsheets.

               Upgrading the Database To Leverage Impact

    The Commission expects to begin work to upgrade the PPD 
soon after publication of the 2007 Annual Report. When 
completed, the upgrade will approximately double the number of 
types of information available, making it possible for users to 
query for and retrieve information such as the names and 
locations of the courts that convicted political and religious 
prisoners, and the dates of key events in the legal process 
such as sentencing and decision upon appeal. The upgrade will 
double the length of the short summary about a prisoner. Users 
will be able to download PPD information more easily, whether 
for a single prisoner record, a group of records that satisfies 
a user's query, or all of the records available in the 
database.
    The upgrade will also enable the PPD to provide Web links 
in a record's short summary that can open reports, articles, 
and texts of laws that are available on the Commission's Web 
site or on other Web sites. In the same way, Web links in 
Commission reports and articles will be able to open a 
prisoner's PPD record. The Commission intends that streamlining 
and enhancing a user's browsing and research experience will 
leverage the impact of Commission resources and contribute in a 
tangible manner to a user's research and advocacy efforts on 
behalf of political and religious prisoners in China.

                            Recommendations

    When composing correspondence advocating on behalf of a 
political or religious prisoner, or preparing for official 
travel to China, Members of the Congress and Administration 
officials are encouraged to:

        <bullet> Check the database (http://ppd.cecc.gov) for 
        reliable, up-to-date information on one prisoner, or on 
        groups of prisoners.
        <bullet> Check a prisoner's database record for 
        available information on the public and state security 
        issues, laws, and legal processes that may apply to the 
        prisoner's case.
        <bullet> Advise official and private delegations 
        traveling to China to present Chinese officials with 
        lists of political and religious prisoners compiled 
        from database records.
        <bullet> Urge U.S. state and local officials and 
        private citizens involved in sister-state and sister-
        city relationships with China to explore the database, 
        and to build new advocacy efforts for the release of 
        political and religious prisoners in China.

                            II. Human Rights

               Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants


                              introduction


    Since 2001, the Commission has been monitoring the 
development of human rights and the rule of law in China. The 
Commission's legislative mandate calls for scrutiny of Chinese 
government actions that either comply with or violate the 
fundamental human rights enjoyed by all individuals, including 
those individuals accused of a crime under China's domestic 
laws. The mandate calls specifically for the monitoring of 
criminal defendants' rights, 
including the right to be tried in one's own presence; to 
defend oneself in person or through legal assistance; to be 
informed of the 
opportunity for trial and criminal defense; to receive legal 
aid services where necessary; to be afforded a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal; to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty; and to be tried 
without undue delay.\1\ In addition, the mandate requires that 
the Commission focus continuing attention on those individuals 
believed to be imprisoned, detained, placed under house arrest, 
tortured, or otherwise persecuted by Chinese government 
officials in retaliation for the mere pursuit of their 
rights.\2\
    The Commission's annual report recommendations over the 
past five years have focused on the gap between mere legal 
ideals and actual law enforcement practice. In 2002, 2004, and 
2006, the Commission underscored the continuing need to help 
fund and strengthen the work of criminal defense lawyers in 
China. In 2003, and again in 2006, the Commission emphasized 
that the detention and imprisonment of activists and rights 
defenders only serve to undermine the legitimacy of China's 
developing legal system. It thus called for the need to press 
for release of targeted individuals. Between 2002 and 2004, the 
Commission underscored the significance of multilateral and 
diplomatic efforts in encouraging the Chinese government to 
grant unconditional visits to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.\3\ Based on 
the findings of those UN bodies, the Commission focused in 2006 
on the urgency of reforming China's administrative detention 
system, abolishing forced labor practices, and 
ensuring that the procuracy exercise greater oversight over 
police abuses.
    Domestic and international developments in 2006 have helped 
to highlight the Chinese leadership's desire to increase 
China's profile among the international community of rule of 
law nations. China was elected to serve for a three-year term 
on the newly established UN Human Rights Council, noting in its 
application that it had acceded to 22 international human 
rights accords, including 5 of the 7 core conventions.\4\ The 
Chinese government promised that it would amend its Criminal, 
Civil, and Administrative Procedure Laws, as well as reform its 
judiciary, in preparation for ratification of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.\5\ In addition, Chinese 
citizens were appointed to lead international bodies such as 
the International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 
and the World Health Organization.\6\
    While the Commission recognizes the progress that China has 
made in bringing its own practices into compliance with 
international standards, it also notes that significant gaps 
remain within Chinese laws and regulations, and between law on 
the books and law in action. The ideals embodied in recent 
legal and regulatory reforms are positive first steps, but 
nonetheless incomplete, and have not necessarily translated 
into the everyday practice of local law enforcement officers. 
For example, international human rights standards require that 
due process of law be accorded to all criminal suspects and 
defendants, and that they be free from torture, arbitrary 
detention, and prosecution on the basis of their political 
opinions or exercise of human rights.\7\ Nonetheless, China's 
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure Law, and accompanying 
regulations leave too much room for discretion and abuse. As a 
result, NGO and media reports indicate that criminal defense 
efforts have been hampered, numerous Chinese citizens continue 
to be arbitrarily detained and convicted, and torture remains 
widespread.
    The Commission's findings in this section have been placed 
in the context of five years of monitoring and reporting on 
criminal justice reform, and take into account some of the 
systemic problems that have persisted throughout China during 
that timeframe. In many areas of criminal procedure, reforms 
that were initiated several years ago have stalled in the past 
year, and failed to achieve the goals of better protecting 
human rights and guarding against official abuse. The problems 
that persist, and the reforms designed to confront those 
problems, are analyzed in greater detail throughout the 
remainder of this section. The first part of the section 
discusses continuing abuses of criminal law and procedure, 
while the second part turns to institutional failings that make 
these abuses possible.


          law in action: abuses of criminal law and procedure


                          Arbitrary Detention

    The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) 
defines the deprivation of personal liberty to be ``arbitrary'' 
if it meets one of the following criteria:

        <bullet>  there is clearly no legal basis for the 
        deprivation of liberty;
        <bullet>  an individual is deprived of his liberty 
        because he has exercised rights and freedoms guaranteed 
        under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
        or International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
        (ICCPR); or
        <bullet>  non-compliance with the standards for a fair 
        trial set out in the UDHR and other relevant 
        international instruments is sufficiently grave to make 
        the detention arbitrary.\8\

    The ICCPR provides that the deprivation of an individual's 
liberty is permissible only ``on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedure as are established by law,'' and that an 
individual must be promptly informed of the reasons for his 
detention and any charges against him.\9\
    Arbitrary detention in China takes several different forms, 
including detention and incarceration for the peaceful 
expression of civil and political rights, detention and 
incarceration in circumvention of criminal procedure 
protections, and illegal extended detention in violation of 
China's own Criminal Procedure Law.
Political Crimes
    China's Criminal Law was revised by the National People's 
Congress in 1997 to eliminate mention of the socialist 
revolution and counterrevolutionary crimes, but to otherwise 
preserve the political and economic orientation of the Chinese 
criminal justice system:

        The aim of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of 
        China is to use criminal punishments to fight against 
        all criminal acts in order to safeguard security of the 
        State, to defend the State power of the people's 
        democratic dictatorship and the socialist system, to 
        protect property owned by the State, and property 
        collectively owned by the working people and property 
        privately owned by citizens, to protect citizens' 
        rights of the person and their democratic and other 
        rights, to maintain public and economic order, and to 
        ensure the smooth progress of socialist 
        construction.\10\

    Nonetheless, Chinese prisons continue to hold individuals 
who were sentenced for counterrevolutionary and other crimes 
that no longer exist under the current Criminal Law.\11\ 
Shortly preceding the annual session of the UN Human Rights 
Commission in 2005,\12\ Chinese central government officials 
pledged to ``provide relief'' to those imprisoned for political 
acts that were no longer crimes under the law.\13\ The U.S. 
State Department reported that in 2006, despite the urging of 
foreign governments, the Chinese government had yet to conduct 
a national review of such cases and continued to hold 
approximately 500 individuals in prison for 
counterrevolutionary crimes alone.\14\
    Developments over the last year have breathed new life into 
this issue. The Dui Hua Foundation, which researches and seeks 
to curb political imprisonment, recently confirmed that on 
November 11, 2007, Chinese authorities will release one of the 
last known prisoners serving a sentence for the former crime of 
``hooliganism.'' \15\ Authorities originally detained Li 
Weihong, a manufacturing worker in Changsha city, Hunan 
province, in April 1989 for helping to organize protests that 
subsequently turned 
violent. In February 2006, authorities released journalist Yu 
Dongyue, who was detained for throwing paint during the 
Tiananmen democracy protests of 1989 and later convicted of 
``counterrevolutionary propaganda'' and ``counterrevolutionary 
sabotage and incitement.'' \16\ Numerous others remain in 
prison for counterrevolutionary crimes, including: Hu Shigen, 
who helped to establish the China Free Trade Union Preparatory 
Committee and China Freedom and Democracy Party, and was later 
convicted of ``organizing and leading a counterrevolutionary 
group'' and ``engaging in counterrevolutionary propaganda and 
incitement'' \17\ [see Section II--Worker Rights for additional 
information about his case]; and former Tibetan monk Jigme 
Gyatso, who was detained for distributing pro-independence 
leaflets and putting up posters and later convicted of 
``forming a counterrevolutionary organization'' \18\ [see 
Section IV--Tibet for additional information about his case].
    The Chinese central government officially maintains that 
there are no ``political prisoners'' in China, but ample 
evidence suggests that the Criminal Law is routinely abused to 
target and imprison individuals for their political opinions or 
the exercise of their fundamental human rights. China's 
official position on this issue has remained the same since 
1991, when the State Council Information Office issued its 
first white paper on human rights: ``In China, ideas alone, in 
the absence of action which violates the criminal law, do not 
constitute a crime; nobody will be sentenced to punishment 
merely because he holds dissenting political views.'' \19\ 
However, since 2002, the Commission has reported on the 
repeated 
harassment, detention, and imprisonment of political 
dissidents, journalists, writers, lawyers, human rights 
defenders, Protestants, Catholics, Falun Gong practitioners, 
Tibetans, and Uighurs, among other groups. Many of these 
individuals continue to serve long prison or reeducation 
through labor sentences as a result of their peaceful exercise 
of fundamental rights guaranteed under China's Constitution, 
the UDHR, and the ICCPR.\20\
    The ability of local law enforcement officers to target and 
punish these individuals is made possible, in large part, by 
the existence of vague criminal and administrative provisions, 
which allow for the punishment of activists for crimes of 
``disturbing public order'' and ``endangering state security.'' 
\21\ Over the past five years, the Commission has reported on 
numerous instances in which these two categories of crimes have 
been used to charge and convict individuals for their politics, 
beliefs, and affiliations.\22\ After a 2004 visit to China, the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) recommended 
that the Chinese government define these crimes in precise 
terms and create exceptions under the Criminal Law for peaceful 
activity in the exercise of fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the UDHR.\23\ In his March 2006 report to the UN, Special 
Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak noted that to date, 
UNWGAD's recommendation has not been implemented.\24\ He 
further concluded: ``The vague definition of these crimes 
leaves their application open to abuse particularly of the 
rights to freedom of religion, speech, and assembly.'' \25\ In 
its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission echoed these 
international calls for greater clarity in the definition of 
such crimes under Chinese law. No progress has been made on 
this front.
    The reality is that Chinese citizens remain susceptible to 
detention and incarceration as punishment for political 
opposition to the government, as well as for exercising or 
advocating human rights. China's leaders say that they are 
committed to building a fair and just society based on the rule 
of law, with adequate guarantee of civil and political rights. 
In order to demonstrate true commitment to these claims, 
China's leaders need to ensure the prompt review of cases in 
which an individual was charged with counterrevolutionary 
crimes. They have already set a precedent for doing so, by 
resolving and releasing one of the last known prisoners serving 
a sentence for hooliganism, another crime eliminated by the 
1997 revision to the Criminal Law. Logical next steps would 
include taking prompt action to clarify the Criminal Law's 
vague definitions of crimes that ``disturb public order'' or 
``endanger state security,'' and providing for the parole or 
immediate release of all political prisoners.
Detention Outside the Criminal Process
    Chinese law enforcement officers routinely detain 
individuals without formal charge or judicial review, in 
contravention of international human rights standards and 
Chinese law. Both the UDHR and ICCPR provide that everyone is 
entitled to a ``fair and public hearing'' by an ``independent 
and impartial tribunal,'' and that the accused shall enjoy 
``the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law.'' \26\ These guarantees have been 
incorporated into China's Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and 
related regulations. Nevertheless, public and state security 
officials regularly authorize mass security sweeps and take 
advantage of law 
enforcement tools that include incommunicado detention, 
surveillance, house arrest, and administrative detention 
measures such as reeducation through labor, to harass and 
control Chinese citizens.
    In some instances, police hold individuals in custody for a 
few days before ultimately releasing them, without any 
justification other than a general desire to avoid protests and 
other instances of social unrest that might undermine Party 
governance. The CPL permits detention without arrest or charge, 
but generally requires notification of family members or the 
detainee's workplace within 24 hours of custody.\27\ Public 
security officials have been known to conduct mass security 
sweeps during politically sensitive periods in China, including 
the approach of significant public anniversaries, the annual 
sessions of Party or central government officials, and the 
duration of visits by foreign dignitaries.\28\ Citizens from 
localities throughout China travel to Beijing to voice their 
complaints before central government offices, often 
congregating together in ``petitioners' villages'' on the 
city's outskirts. [See Section III--Access to Justice for a 
discussion of petitioning]. NGO and media sources have reported 
that police officers conduct night raids of these villages, 
sending petitioners to a special holding location called 
``Majialou'' pending their forced repatriation home.\29\ In 
2006, a senior official from the Ministry of Public Security 
justified such security sweeps on the basis of the government's 
need to ``manage public order'' and to ``reduce some of the 
factors threatening social stability.'' \30\
    In March 2007, officials launched ``the largest `clean-up' 
operation by the police in recent years'' and detained over 700 
individuals.\31\ According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the 
detentions of more than 700 individuals in advance of this 
year's session of the National People's Congress were ``widely 
seen as a grand rehearsal in public order tactics for two even 
more important upcoming events: the Communist Party's 17th 
Congress in October 2007 and the Olympics Games in 2008.'' On 
August 30, officials posted notice of imminent plans to 
demolish an area bordering the southern railway station in 
Beijing, where an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 petitioners 
congregate.\32\ The notice provides a three-week deadline for 
relocation and attributes the timing of the demolition to 
planned road construction, but HRW asserts that it may also be 
the result of the ``clean-up'' in advance of the Party 
Congress.\33\
    In other instances, Chinese law enforcement officers have 
relied on measures such as surveillance and house arrest\34\ to 
punish and control political activists, despite the lack of any 
legal basis for such deprivations of liberty. Brad Adams, 
Director of HRW's Asia Division, has commented that house 
arrest is becoming ``the weapon of choice for the authorities 
in silencing and repressing civil rights activists.'' \35\ He 
added, ``It is imposed at the entire discretion of the police 
and takes place outside of any legal procedure--you can't get 
more arbitrary than that.'' The case of Chen Guangcheng, a 
legal advocate who exposed and challenged the abuses of local 
population planning officials in Linyi city, Shandong province, 
provides one concrete example to support HRW's analysis. Public 
security officials at the county level placed Chen under house 
arrest in September 2005, one year before authorities 
ultimately charged and convicted him.\36\ A network of Chinese 
human rights activists and groups worked with Chen's defense 
lawyers to submit information about his case to the UNWGAD, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and 
Lawyers, and the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Human Rights Defenders.\37\ Around the time of 
Chen's retrial on November 27, 2006, the same public security 
officials issued a formal decision to place Chen's wife, Yuan 
Weijing, under house arrest from November 28, 2006 until May 
27, 2007.\38\ Despite the expiration date made explicit in this 
order, security officers reportedly obstructed Yuan's attempts 
to meet with U.S. Embassy officials in July 2007 and prevented 
her from exiting the country in August to receive an award on 
behalf of her husband.\39\
    In cases where there is insufficient evidence to proceed 
with formal prosecution,\40\ or it is expedient for the local 
government to keep watch over an activist for up to several 
years,\41\ public security officials have taken advantage of 
their power to punish Chinese citizens through administrative 
sanction. Chinese law allows for punishment that includes 
``administrative,'' rather than criminal, detention of 
individuals who have been accused of ``public security'' 
offenses such as public order disturbances, traffic offenses, 
prostitution, and other ``minor crimes'' under the Criminal 
Law.\42\ Pursuant to the Public Security Administration 
Punishment Law (PSAPL), effective March 1, 2006, public 
security officials can impose sanctions ranging from a warning 
or fine, to a maximum of 20 days in administrative 
detention.\43\ A total of 165 offenses, including ``taking on 
the name of religion or qigong to carry out activities 
disturbing public order,'' \44\ are subject to sanctions under 
the PSAPL. In November 2006, three house church Christians in 
Wendeng city, Shandong province, succeeded in forcing the local 
public security bureau (PSB) to rescind its decision to hold 
them in administrative detention for 10 days for allegedly 
committing this particular offense under the PSAPL.\45\ Their 
success was attributable to the PSB's willingness to reach an 
out-of-court settlement and therefore avoid the issue of 
whether the detention had violated their constitutional and 
legal rights.\46\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion--
Religious Freedom for China's Protestants for a more detailed 
analysis of efforts to defend religious rights.] Li Baiguang, 
who represented the three, agreed to drop the administrative 
complaint that he had filed on October 12 against the PSB in 
exchange for its promise to rescind the decision.\47\
    China's system of ``reeducation through labor'' (RTL) has 
long drawn fire from various members of the international 
community as the most egregious abuse of administrative 
detention measures. Under the RTL system, public security 
officials can investigate a case and propose that an individual 
be confined to a RTL center for up to three years, with the 
possibility of a one-year extension.\48\ The list of offenses 
subject to RTL is broad and vaguely defined,\49\ lending itself 
to abuse by public security officials in order to silence 
Chinese citizens who attempt to express their political 
opinions or assert their fundamental rights.\50\ Moreover, the 
RTL administrative committees that are responsible for making 
the final decision consist of representatives from each of the 
local public security, civil affairs, and labor bureaus,\51\ 
but in practice, are dominated by public security 
officials.\52\ Despite being harsher than some criminal 
punishments,\53\ a RTL decision is typically imposed in the 
absence of judicial review by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.\54\ The Chinese government has argued that 
administrative detention decisions are subject to judicial 
review under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), but the 
UNWGAD found ALL review ``of very little value'' and maintained 
that ``no real judicial control has been created over the 
procedure to commit someone to [reeducation] through labor.'' 
\55\ In practice, the decision to confine someone to a RTL 
center is rarely successfully challenged.\56\ Between 1999 and 
2002, the number of individuals held in RTL centers was 
estimated to range from 260,000 to 300,000.\57\ According to 
the U.S. State Department, official statistics released in 2005 
reflect the rapid growth of these numbers over the past few 
years, to a new total of approximately 500,000.\58\
    Chinese authorities use RTL and other forms of 
administrative detention to circumvent the criminal process in 
a manner which disregards the procedural protections guaranteed 
under domestic and international law.\59\ China's Legislation 
Law requires that all deprivations of personal liberty be 
authorized by national law, and not just by administrative 
regulation.\60\ Under the criminal justice system, a Chinese 
citizen cannot be found guilty of any crime, even a ``minor 
crime,'' without being judged guilty by a people's court.\61\ 
The Constitution makes explicit the inviolable nature of a 
person's liberty and further dictates:

        No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or 
        by decision of a people's procuratorate or by decision 
        of a people's court, and arrests must be made by a 
        public security organ. Unlawful deprivation or 
        restriction of citizens' freedom of person by detention 
        or other means is prohibited. . . .\62\

    While the Chinese government consistently emphasizes the 
beneficial ``reeducation'' function of administrative detention 
measures,\63\ Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
found after visiting China that ``some of these measures of 
[reeducation] through coercion, humiliation and punishment aim 
at altering the personality of detainees up to the point of 
even breaking their will.'' \64\ In his March 2006 report, 
Nowak concluded that RTL and other forms of administrative 
detention ``go beyond legitimate rehabilitation measures 
provided for in [A]rticle 10 of the ICCPR.'' \65\ During the 
seven years between visiting China in 1997 and again in 2004, 
the UNWGAD found that the Chinese government had made no 
significant progress in reforming the administrative 
detention system to ensure judicial review and to conform to 
international law.\66\
    Domestic pressure has been building to reform the RTL 
system,\67\ but efforts have focused on better codification, 
rather than outright elimination, of the practice. Since March 
2005, the National People's Congress (NPC) has been considering 
a new Law on the Correction of Unlawful Acts that would 
reportedly enhance the rights of RTL detainees by setting a 
maximum sentence of 18 months, and by permitting detainees to 
hire a lawyer, request a hearing, and appeal decisions imposed 
by public security officials in RTL cases.\68\ The draft law 
does not currently provide the accused with an opportunity to 
dispute accusations of guilt before an independent adjudicatory 
body.\69\ According to one drafter, the Ministry of Public 
Security and the Supreme People's Court continue to disagree 
about whether courts should get involved in the decision making 
process prior to administrative enforcement of a RTL 
decision.\70\ In an attempt to enhance the transparency of the 
process,\71\ Chongqing municipality recently issued Interim 
Provisions on Legal Representation in RTL Cases, which went 
into effect on April 1, 2007, and provide that a suspect may 
retain a lawyer to contest the legality of the process, access 
the files relevant to his case, and present proof of his 
innocence.\72\ The Interim Provisions mirror some of the 
criminal procedure protections contained in the CPL,\73\ and 
could potentially be incorporated into the draft law now 
pending before the NPC.\74\ While greater access to legal 
representation is a positive sign, some in China maintain that 
the RTL system as a whole still contradicts provisions in the 
Chinese Constitution, CPL, and ICCPR.\75\
Illegal Extended Detention in the Criminal Process
    In cases that enter the formal criminal process in China, 
public security, procuratorate, and court (collectively 
referred to as gongjianfa) officials continue to illegally 
detain Chinese citizens for long periods of time before 
determining the outcome of their cases. The National People's 
Congress (NPC) revised the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) in 1996 
to impose fixed deadlines for the resolution of each stage of 
the criminal process.\76\ In 2003, the Supreme People's Court 
(SPC) took the lead by additionally issuing a notice to set 
time limits for the resolution of cases of extended detention 
in violation of the CPL.\77\ The Supreme People's Procuratorate 
(SPP) soon followed by passing regulations to prohibit the 
abuse of legal procedures in order to disguise extended 
detention.\78\ The SPC and SPP then worked together with the 
Ministry of Public Security (MPS) to issue a joint Notice on 
the Strict Enforcement of the Criminal Procedure Law, and on 
the Conscientious Correction and Prevention of Extended 
Detention.\79\ The launch of such a major public campaign to 
eliminate illegal extended detention tacitly signaled 
acknowledgment by the central government of law enforcement 
abuses throughout the country.
    Extended detention contravenes international standards for 
the prompt judicial review of a criminal detention or arrest. 
The ICCPR provides that ``[a]nyone arrested or detained on a 
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power,'' 
and that ``[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, 
in order that the court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the 
detention is not lawful.'' \80\ In December 2004, the UNWGAD 
found that the CPL and related regulations on pretrial 
detention fail to meet these basic standards because: (1) 
Chinese suspects continue to be held for too long without 
judicial review; (2) procurators, who review arrest decisions, 
only examine case files and do not hold hearings; and (3) a 
procurator cannot be considered an independent adjudicator 
under applicable international standards.\81\
    International scrutiny of this problem over the last few 
years has led to a dramatic decrease in the number of extended 
detention cases reported by the Chinese government. In 1998, 
Chinese procuratorates identified and called for the resolution 
of extended detention cases involving 70,992 individuals.\82\ A 
white paper on the status of human rights in 2003 noted that 
extended detention cases involving 25,736 individuals had been 
resolved that year, accounting for a nationwide effort that was 
``the most extensive in scope, the biggest in scale and the 
largest in number of people 
involved in the nation's judicial experience.'' \83\ By 2004, 
central government officials reported that there were no cases 
of extended detention among public security bureaus or 
procuratorates, and that Chinese courts had cleared extended 
detention cases involving just 2,432 individuals.\84\ In 
January 2006, the Chinese government told Manfred Nowak, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture, that serious cases of extended 
detention lasting more than three years had been eliminated, 
and that the number of individuals held beyond time limits was 
at an all-time low.\85\ This claim was repeated again in March 
2007, when the SPP identified in its work report to the NPC an 
all-time low of just 233 individuals cleared from extended 
detention.\86\
    The continued decrease in cases of extended detention 
depends heavily on continued central government efforts to 
increase transparency and hold local law enforcement officials 
strictly accountable to the CPL. In May 2006, the SPP 
explicitly acknowledged that illegal extended detentions remain 
problematic, and that Chinese authorities misuse provisions in 
the CPL to disguise this problem.\87\ Several months later, SPC 
President Xiao Yang echoed this acknowledgement and stated in 
an interview with the People's Daily that ``delayed justice is 
a form of injustice.'' \88\ In March 2007, the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) commented 
on the significance of oversight mechanisms in helping to 
tackle the problem of extended detention.\89\ SPP spokesman 
Dong Jianming has attributed the decrease in cases of extended 
detention to the NPCSC's push--and the resulting joint effort 
among gongjianfa officials nationwide.\90\ Gongjianfa officials 
have continued to work together to finalize new regulations 
seeking to further address the problem.\91\ In addition, 
China's unique system of ordinary citizens who function as 
``people's supervisors'' 
expanded its oversight powers in the last year, to guard 
against illegal extended detentions by all three 
institutions.\92\ This move holds great potential for enhanced 
public supervision of law enforcement agencies during the 
criminal process.

                      Torture and Abuse in Custody

    Although illegal in China, torture and abuse by law 
enforcement officers remain widespread.\93\ In March 2006, 
Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, reported that 
Falun Gong practitioners make up the overwhelming majority of 
victims of alleged torture, and that other targeted groups 
include Uighurs, Tibetans, human rights defenders, and 
political activists.\94\ Over three-quarters of all alleged 
acts of torture take place in venues where public security 
officials have chosen to confine criminal suspects.\95\ Forty-
seven percent of alleged perpetrators are police or other 
public 
security officials, while 53 percent are either staff members 
at correctional facilities or fellow prisoners acting at the 
instigation or acquiescence of staff members.\96\ Forms of 
torture and abuse cited in Nowak's report include beating, 
electric shock, painful shackling of the limbs, denial of 
medical treatment and medication, and hard labor.\97\
    Chinese media reports in 2005 about the wrongful conviction 
of She Xianglin, and in 2006 about the wrongful detentions and 
torture of four teenagers in Chaohu city, Anhui province, help 
to shed light on numerous institutional and legal factors that 
are to blame for the continuing problem of torture in 
China.\98\ In both cases, authorities relied heavily on 
confessions obtained during interrogation as evidence of 
alleged crimes. She Xianglin, who was originally convicted of 
murder after the disappearance of his wife in 1994, was 
ultimately released in April 2005 after 11 years in prison and 
his wife's unexpected return to their village in Hubei 
province.\99\ The Chaohu teenagers, who ranged in age from 16 
to 18, were released in January 2006 after more than three 
months in police custody and further investigative efforts 
leading to the arrests of four other suspects.\100\ Both cases 
reflect a number of institutional hurdles at the heart of the 
torture issue, including pressure on public security bureaus to 
meet quotas for cracking down on crime, inadequate training and 
investigative tools, and the lack of independence and oversight 
exercised by the procuracy and judiciary.\101\ They also 
spotlight continuing legal challenges, including a strong 
presumption of guilt in criminal cases, the abuse of 
administrative detention measures, the absence of lawyers at 
interrogations, the lack of a rule requiring the exclusion of 
illegally acquired evidence, failure by procuratorates to 
prosecute torture cases, and inadequate complaint mechanisms.
    Since releasing China's Third Report on the Implementation 
of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 2000,\102\ central 
government leaders have repeatedly emphasized their ongoing 
efforts to pass new laws and administrative regulations 
preventing, punishing, and compensating cases of torture by law 
enforcement 
officers.\103\ For example, China's Criminal Law provides for 
the punishment of judicial officers who coerce confessions 
under torture or acquire evidence through the use of force, and 
also imposes liability in particularly ``serious'' cases where 
police or other corrections officers have beaten or otherwise 
mistreated prisoners.\104\ In 2003, the Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) issued a new regulation to also prohibit the use 
of torture as an investigative tool in administrative 
cases.\105\ The following year, the Party,\106\ MPS,\107\ and 
Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP)\108\ each passed 
regulations to provide for Party or administrative sanction 
(including demerits, demotions, and dismissals) of officials 
who employ torture as an investigative tool to coerce 
confessions. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) issued similar 
regulations in 2006 to provide for both administrative sanction 
and criminal investigation of prison and reeducation through 
labor (RTL) police who beat, or instigate others to beat, 
detainees.\109\ SPP regulations that went into effect on July 
26, 2006, provide detailed criteria for the criminal 
prosecution of police who abuse their power to hold individuals 
in custody beyond legal limits, coerce confessions under 
torture, acquire evidence through the use of force, mistreat 
prisoners, or retaliate against those who petition to, or file 
complaints against, the government.\110\
    Despite international safeguards and recent domestic 
reforms designed to help guard against torture in China, one 
China scholar has noted that ``persons acting in an official 
capacity who torture and ill-treat others in violation of the 
[CAT] generally do so with impunity.'' \111\ Two months after 
Xinhua and Southern Metropolitan Daily reports revealed the 
extent to which the Chaohu teenagers had been tortured while in 
custody,\112\ two senior SPP officials called on local 
procuratorates to strengthen their supervision over criminal 
investigations, and to bring into line police who extract 
confessions through torture or who illegally gather evidence. 
Deputy Procurator-General Wang Zhenchuan acknowledged that 
almost all wrongful convictions in China involve police abuses 
during the investigative stage,\113\ and Chen Lianfu, head of 
the SPP office that investigates official misconduct and rights 
infringement, reported that systemic reforms still had to be 
implemented.\114\ Neither provided statistics to detail the 
number of officials who had been prosecuted for torture in 
recent years, but SPP work reports submitted to the National 
People's Congress indicate that the number of officials 
investigated for civil rights abuses, including torture, 
totaled 1,983 in 2001, 1,408 in 2003, and 1,595 in 2004.\115\ 
This number dropped to 930 in 2006, the same year that the SPP 
released its regulations on filing rights abuse cases for 
prosecution.\116\ It is difficult to analyze how many Chinese 
officials go unpunished in any given year, particularly when 
the central government does not recognize the competence of the 
Committee against Torture to investigate allegations of 
systematic torture.\117\ According to Nowak, SPP figures ``are 
clearly the tip of the iceberg in a country the size of China 
and demonstrate that most victims and their families are 
reluctant to file complaints for fear of reprisal or lack of 
confidence that their complaints will be addressed 
effectively.'' \118\
    Law enforcement practices in China further provide for 
official impunity by failing to adequately criminalize non-
state actors who commit torture and abuse at the behest of 
state actors. Nowak pointed out that this omission is one 
reason that the Chinese 
definition of torture fails to correspond fully to the 
international standard as outlined in Article 1 of the 
CAT.\119\ The MOJ's 2006 regulations are illustrative of this 
point, and punish only prison and RTL police for beating, or 
instigating others to beat, detainees. They do not take into 
account the existing practice of ``fanren guanli fanren,'' 
whereby ``cell bosses'' take part in correctional facility 
administration by helping officials control and punish 
recalcitrants.\120\ Human Rights in China has noted that 
inmates who are assigned to supervise others ``are widely known 
in the system as `second-rank cadres,' or `the second 
government,' indicating their power in the system.'' \121\ 
Imprisoned legal advocate Chen Guangcheng told his wife that on 
June 16, 2007, six other inmates at Linyi Prison pushed him to 
the floor, and hit and kicked him hard, at the instigation of 
prison guards after he refused to have his head shaved.\122\ 
There is no indication that any prison guards have been 
investigated as a result of this incident. In June 2005, when 
fellow detainees beat to death a 15-year-old at the instigation 
of a detention center superintendent in Jingdezhen city, 
Jiangxi province, the local procuratorate indicted the 
superintendent only for ``abuse of power to accept bribes.'' 
\123\ A September 2004 article on the Web site of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference disclosed that 
between 2003 and 2004, over 20 ``prison bosses'' had been 
investigated in Guangshan county, Henan province, alone. The 
article called for elimination of the practice of ``fanren 
guanli fanren.'' \124\


         law on the books: judicial institutions and challenges


             Social Unrest and Coercive Use of Police Power

    The Chinese government maintains a vast network of people's 
police, who are employed in state security bureaus, public 
security bureaus, prisons, reeducation through labor centers, 
procuratorates, and courts throughout the nation. Public 
security bureaus (PSBs) divide their police into separate 
categories of ``administrative personnel'' responsible for 
public security, transportation, residence and migration, 
border defense, customs and immigration, fire prevention, and 
management of information and Internet safety, and ``criminal 
personnel'' responsible for investigation of crimes. In 
addition, local PSBs employ personnel responsible for domestic 
security and protection (guobao), which sometimes has been used 
to justify the targeting and harassment of democracy activists, 
Falun Gong practitioners, and other dissidents.\125\ Official 
statistics recently disclosed that there were over 490,000 PSB 
police employed as police station personnel, 130,000 as 
community police officers, and 150,000 as criminal 
investigators as of early 2006.\126\
    Communist Party leaders have leaned heavily on the powers 
of the police in order to quell social unrest during the past 
few years, but earlier this year, top Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) officials acknowledged the risks inherent in 
such a tactic. The MPS reported a rise in ``mass incidents,'' 
defined to include public demonstrations, protests, and riots 
over unresolved claims,\127\ from 58,000 in 2003 to 74,000 in 
2004.\128\ This figure dropped to about 27,500 in 2005, and 
23,000 in 2006, \129\ accompanied by an MPS denial of the 
existence of any inherent conflict between police and 
civilians.\130\ Notwithstanding the decrease in numbers and the 
accompanying MPS statement, there have been news reports of 
increasingly violent clashes between police and protesting 
villagers all over China. In December 2005, public security 
officials in Shanwei city, Guangdong province, brought in 
forces from the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP) to 
handle a protest by local villagers.\131\ The PAP opened fire 
onto the crowd, and some estimates placed the resulting death 
count at up to 20 villagers. At a national public security 
meeting convened in April 2007 in Xi'an city, Shaanxi province, 
Vice Minister of Public Security Liu Jinguo emphasized the need 
to avoid police mishandling of demonstrations and protests, and 
warned that such mishandling could ``aggravate the conflict and 
worsen the situation.'' \132\
    A number of Chinese lawyers and former law enforcement 
officers agree that no inherent conflict exists between police 
and civilians, but they also warn that abuse of the coercive 
power of the 
police may create new tensions. One commentator, who formerly 
taught at a public security vocational school in Zhejiang 
province, attributed clashes between police and civilians to 
the fact that ``Chinese police are policemen for the Party, not 
for the state.'' \133\ Another commentator, who served for 18 
years as a former police officer in Jiangsu province, added 
that in carrying out their law enforcement duties, the police 
do not carry out the laws of the state: ``They carry out the 
law neither pursuant to the Police Law, nor pursuant to various 
[other] laws, but instead pursuant to the will of senior Party 
officials.'' \134\ He added that the ability of PSB police to 
simultaneously carry out both police and ``non-police'' 
(namely, administrative) functions has contributed to their 
loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
    Party and central government statements confirm that 
Chinese police forces are in fact required to assist in the 
advancement of Party priorities. A 2003 resolution passed by 
the Communist Party Central Committee (CPCC) establishes that 
``public security work must proceed under the Party's absolute 
leadership.'' \135\ At its sixth plenum in October 2006, the 
CPCC issued a communique to announce that ``the [Communist 
Party of China]'s role as the core leadership must be brought 
fully into play to build a harmonious socialist society.'' 
\136\ At the same plenum, the CPCC also passed a resolution 
calling on police and armed forces to further strengthen public 
security, state security, and national defense construction, in 
furtherance of a ``harmonious society.'' \137\ The resolution 
specifically called on the MPS to reform community police 
affairs so that a ``frontline platform'' could be created to 
service the masses and safeguard stability. Later that month, 
Xinhua identified construction of this ``frontline platform'' 
as a significant part of Public Security Minister Zhou 
Yongkang's 2006 plan to reorganize public 
security agencies and send more police forces out into local 
communities and villages.\138\ At a press conference in 
November, the MPS reported that it had issued a new Resolution 
on Implementing a Strategy for Community and Village Police 
Affairs, and had already set up more than 30,000 new police 
stations and dispatched more than 70,000 police officers to 
watch over villages nationwide.\139\ One senior official 
defined the new strategy for community and village police 
affairs to be one that would allow public security agencies to 
``deeply integrate'' into local communities, families, and 
schools, and ``merge into one with the people,'' \140\ in the 
name of safeguarding public security and order, as mandated by 
the Party.
    Last year's implementation of the Public Security 
Administration Punishment Law (PSAPL)\141\ helps expand the 
legal authority of PSB police to almost every realm of civilian 
life, creating new cause for concern about police abuses and 
domination over the general populace. [See Section II--Freedom 
of Expression for additional discussion of abuse of the PSAPL 
to exercise control over the sharing of information.] One month 
after the law went into effect, police reportedly filed over 
35,000 cases, leading to the investigations of over 40,000 
individuals, warnings or fines issued to over 16,000, and 
administrative detention of over 7,000 in Beijing alone.\142\ 
In a July 2006 article that asks ``Why Some Police Resemble 
Crime Bosses,'' a China Youth Daily journalist comments: ``If 
detention and other criminal investigation measures are used in 
the administration of public security cases, while public 
security aspects of the [police] power are brought into 
criminal investigations, then objectively, this creates a self-
perception among some police that they are boss.'' \143\ The 
article asserts that there is a certain pervasiveness to abuse 
of power by the police, and that it can best be blamed on their 
unchecked legal authority. In March 2007, a Shenzhen delegate 
to the National People's Congress proposed revising the PSAPL 
to further expand the authority of the police to detain 
individuals for disruption of city management.\144\ Under his 
proposal, individuals would be at the mercy of the police for 
such minor offenses as running an unlicensed business or health 
clinic. Within months, the China Media Project, based across 
the border from Shenzhen in Hong Kong, questioned whether 
Chinese police aren't already ``over-reaching'' in their 
application of the PSAPL.\145\
    Supervision over China's police forces has not improved in 
the last year, particularly when taking into account the 
concerns previously expressed by this Commission. The 
Commission noted in last year's annual report: ``The government 
does not encourage external supervision over police affairs or 
prosecution of police abuses by the procuratorate, as mandated 
by law.'' \146\ While the MPS continues to disclose the number 
of police officers who have been disciplined or even dismissed 
for improprieties, their sanctions are still decided and 
administered internally, by Party or MPS superiors.\147\ One 
prominent Beijing law professor argues that the increasingly 
vicious nature of the police is attributable to this lack of 
meaningful constraints either externally or internally.\148\ In 
February 2006, the Procuratorial Daily published an article 
that recognized the lack of power exercised by lawyers and 
courts during the investigative stage of the criminal process, 
and highlighted the urgency of greater procuratorate 
supervision as the only means for reining in the police.\149\

            Access to Counsel and Right to Present a Defense

    Most Chinese defendants go through the criminal process and 
are tried without assistance from an attorney, despite 
guarantees under Article 14(3)(d) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).\150\ In 2006, domestic 
media sources reported the continuing growth of China's legal 
profession to over 150,000 attorneys and 12,000 law firms 
nationwide.\151\ The Chinese government requires that public 
security bureaus and procuratorates notify all criminal 
defendants of their right to apply for legal aid,\152\ and also 
mandates that all practicing attorneys undertake the duty of 
legal aid.\153\ Nonetheless, the number of criminal cases 
handled per lawyer in a city like Beijing, one of China's most 
legally advanced locales, fell from 2.64 in 1994 to 0.78 in 
2004.\154\ The Commission noted in 2003 and 2004 that only one 
in three criminal defendants have access to legal counsel. This 
number fell to about 30 percent in 2005 and 2006, and has 
continued to drop.\155\ China's legal system therefore makes 
possible, but does not guarantee, the fundamental right to 
legal assistance in defending oneself against the state.\156\
    The ability to present a defense is further limited in 
China because of constraints on the role that criminal defense 
lawyers may play. Lawyers have long complained about the 
``three difficulties'' that they face in criminal defense work: 
(1) the difficulty in obtaining permission to meet with a 
client, (2) the difficulty in accessing and reviewing the 
prosecution's evidence, and (3) the difficulty in gathering 
evidence in support of the defense. The Commission has reported 
on multiple cases in which law enforcement officers abused 
their discretion to deny a defendant access to his lawyer, 
noting in particular abuse of the ``state secrets'' 
exception.\157\ [See Section II--Freedom of Expression for more 
information on abuse of ``state secrets'' law.] U.S. permanent 
resident Yang Jianli,\158\ democracy activist Xu Wanping,\159\ 
and freelance writer Yang Tongyan\160\ (who uses the pen name 
Yang Tianshui) were all denied access to their defense lawyers 
on the grounds that their cases involved state secrets. In 
addition, Chinese law authorizes law enforcement officials to 
obtain evidence from concerned parties, but provides that 
evidence involving state secrets ``shall be kept 
confidential.'' \161\ This effectively shields public security 
and procuratorate authorities from having to turn over to the 
defense any evidence they deem to be classified. In 2004, the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention identified China's use 
of the ``state secrets'' exception as one area of particular 
concern.\162\ In April 2007, the All China Lawyers Association 
(ACLA) released its first draft proposal for a new revision of 
the Criminal Procedure Law, and took special note in its 
executive summary of the need to eliminate these ``three 
difficulties'' in criminal defense work.\163\
    Chinese defendants remain vulnerable to official abuses and 
faced mounting challenges to the defense of their legally 
protected rights during the past two years, as lawyers in 
general were increasingly called upon to contribute to the 
Party's efforts to build a ``harmonious society.'' This new 
role was first clarified in ACLA's 2006 guiding opinion, which 
the Commission analyzed as an effort to restrict and punish 
lawyers who choose to handle collective cases without 
authorization.\164\ In its December 2006 report on the effects 
of this guiding opinion, Human Rights Watch (HRW) asserted that 
the opinion ``fundamentally harm[s] the entire profession by 
limiting its independence and legitimizing the interference of 
local governments in professional processes.'' \165\ HRW 
further noted, ``It is not the role of lawyers to protect 
social and political stability,'' but that instead, ``[t]heir 
duty is to represent their clients in an ethical and 
professional manner.'' \166\ ACLA's guiding opinion effectively 
calls on China's legal profession to function in the interests 
of the Party and state, a demand that conflicts with a lawyer's 
duty to his client in criminal cases. The opinion calls into 
question ACLA's ability to operate as a self-governing 
professional association that works in the interests of Chinese 
lawyers, without external interference. In the wake of its 
issuance, a group of Beijing law professors and practicing 
lawyers held a seminar to voice their concerns. Renowned lawyer 
Zhang Sizhi, former ACLA president, criticized the guiding 
opinion as retrogressive and warned that it would set the 
country's legal profession back several decades to the 
1980s.\167\
    The foregoing problems are made worse by the fact that it 
is increasingly dangerous for Chinese defense lawyers to carry 
out their work, especially in high-profile or politically 
sensitive cases. Law enforcement officials sometimes resort to 
intimidating lawyers who defend these cases, charging or 
threatening to charge them with crimes such as ``evidence 
fabrication'' under Article 306 of the Criminal Law.\168\ 
Despite official recognition of the chilling effect that such 
tactics have had on criminal defense work,\169\ as well as 
indications that Article 306 would be repealed,\170\ this 
problem persists and has become more damaging to China's legal 
system in the face of unchecked police power.\171\
    In May 2007, the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders 
(CRD) published a report on ``The Perils of Defending Rights'' 
and included information on 20 ``endangered defense lawyers.'' 
\172\ This list included all of the defense lawyers that the 
Commission reported on in 2006.\173\ The Hong Kong-based China 
Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group issued an open letter to 
President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, dated June 22, 
2007, to demand an end to the crackdown on defense lawyers and 
human rights activists.\174\ The letter points to the ongoing 
harassment, targeting, and criminal cases of Gao Zhisheng, Chen 
Guangcheng, Yang Maodong (who uses the pen name Guo Feixiong), 
and Zheng Enchong as representative of that crackdown. In the 
weeks preceding publication of this report, authorities stepped 
up their campaign against those lawyers not already in official 
custody. Gao, who has been living on the outside since his 
three-year prison sentence was suspended in December 2006 for a 
period of five years,\175\ went missing immediately after an 
open letter that he sent to the U.S. Congress was made public 
at a Capitol Hill press conference on September 20, 2007.\176\ 
Zheng, who was released from prison in June 2006 and had his 
political rights reinstated in June 2007,\177\ was taken into 
custody for interrogation as recently as September 29, 2007, 
for his potential involvement in sending an open letter to the 
United Nations.\178\ Chen Guangcheng remains in prison, serving 
out his sentence of four years and three months for destruction 
of property and gathering crowds to disturb traffic order. As 
of the date of this report, Yang Maodong has been in detention 
for one year without any resolution to his criminal case.


------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Continued Crackdown on Rights Defenders
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights defines a ``human rights
 defender'' as someone who acts on behalf of individuals or groups to
 promote and protect civil and political rights, and to promote,
 protect, and realize economic, social, and cultural rights. This
 definition includes those who focus on good governance and advocate
 peacefully for an end to government abuses of power.
In 2006-2007, local government officials in China continued to target
 for repression human rights defenders and others who turned to the law
 to defend their constitutionally protected rights. Harassment of the
 following high-profile lawyers and legal advocates intensified:

Chen Guangcheng
Current location: Linyi Prison.
Current status: Serving a sentence of four years and three months in
 prison for ``intentional destruction of property'' and ``gathering
 people to disturb traffic order.'' Reportedly beaten in June 2007 by
 fellow inmates, at the behest of prison guards.
Profession and/or activity: Drew international attention in 2005 to
 population planning abuses in Linyi city, Shandong province. Issued a
 report that documented the extensive use of violence by local officials
 in order to implement population planning policies, and assisted in a
 lawsuit that sought to challenge those abuses.
Associations:
  <bullet> Yuan Weijing (Chen's wife and the mother of their two small
   children): Under house arrest from November 28, 2006 to May 27, 2007.
   Prevented from meeting with U.S. Embassy officials in July, and from
   leaving the country to receive an award on her husband's behalf in
   August.
  <bullet> Hu Jia, Zeng Jinyan (activist couple who have befriended and
   spoken out on behalf of Chen and his wife): Prevented from leaving
   the country for travels in May 2007. Reportedly under house arrest,
   under suspicion of endangering state security.

Gao Zhisheng
Current location: Unknown.
Current status: Released from official custody on December 22, 2006 to
 serve a three-year prison sentence, suspended for five years, for the
 crime of ``inciting subversion of state power.'' Went missing
 immediately after his open letter to the U.S. Congress was made public
 at a press conference on Capitol Hill on September 20, 2007.
Profession and/or activity: Founder of the Beijing Shengzhi Law Firm and
 criminal defense lawyer who has represented numerous activists,
 religious leaders, and writers. Law firm was shut down in November
 2005, several weeks after he issued an open letter to President Hu
 Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to expose reports of widespread torture
 against Falun Gong practitioners.
Associations:
  Geng He (Gao's wife and the mother of their two children): Under
   constant police surveillance since August 2006, and reportedly beaten
   by plainclothes police officers in late-November.
   Li Heping (Gao's friend and fellow Beijing lawyer and rights
   defender): Reportedly beaten on September 29, 2007 and told to leave
   Beijing immediately. Returned home to discover that some of his legal
   files and his license to practice law were missing.
  Guo Feixiong (Gao's colleague at the Beijing Shengzhi Law Firm): See
   below.

Yang Maodong (pen name: Guo Feixiong)
Current location: Guangzhou No. 3 Detention Center.
Current status: In official custody since September 14, 2006,
 transferred back and forth between Shenyang city, in Liaoning province,
 and Guangzhou city, in Guangdong province. Reportedly tortured while in
 detention in Shenyang. Ultimately put on trial on July 9, 2007 for
 ``illegal operation of a business,'' in connection with a book that he
 edited about a political scandal in Shenyang. Still awaiting final
 judgment on his case.
Profession and/or activity: Previously detained for three months in late
 2005, after he advised villagers in Taishi, Guangdong, on their recall
 campaign against an allegedly corrupt village committee head.

Zheng Enchong
Current location: Shanghai.
Current status: Released from Tilanqiao Prison in Shanghai municipality
 on June 5, 2006, upon expiration of a three-year prison sentence for
 ``illegally providing state secrets to entities outside of China.''
 Passport application denied; prevented from visiting Hong Kong in
 August 2007. Taken into custody for interrogation as recently as
 September 29, 2007, for alleged involvement in putting together an open
 letter to the United Nations.
Profession and/or activity: Criminal defense lawyer whose license to
 practice law was revoked in 2001, after he advised more than 500
 households displaced by Shanghai's urban redevelopment projects.
Associations:
  Guo Guoting (one of Zheng's criminal defense lawyers): License to
   practice law revoked in early 2005. Placed under house arrest for
   ``adopting positions and making statements contrary to the law and
   the Constitution.'' Ultimately forced into exile.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Fairness of Criminal Trials

    Over the past few years, Chinese courts have maintained a 
consistent conviction rate above 99 percent,\179\ due in part 
to the lack of fairness of criminal trials and the routine 
failure to comply with standards set forth under Article 14(1) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR).\180\ China's criminal justice system is strongly 
biased toward a presumption of guilt, particularly in cases 
that are high-profile or politically sensitive.\181\ Trial 
courts are required by law to conduct their proceedings in 
public, but can also resort to the ``state secrets'' exception 
and conduct politically charged trials as they see fit,\182\ 
behind closed doors and thus shielded from public scrutiny. 
Court officials have in the past also denied requests by U.S. 
embassy and consular officers to attend the criminal trials of 
certain political, legal, and religious activists, including 
the August 2003 trial of U.S. permanent resident Yang Jianli 
and the November 2005 trial of Protestant house church leader 
Cai Zhuohua. Yang was released on April 27, 2007, after serving 
a five-year prison sentence for alleged espionage and illegal 
border crossing.\183\ Cai was released on September 10, 2007, 
upon the completion of his three-year prison sentence for 
printing and giving away Bibles and other religious literature 
without government permission.\184\ In June 2007, the Supreme 
People's Court (SPC) issued several opinions aimed at improving 
trial adjudication throughout China, and called on local courts 
to carry out trial proceedings lawfully, promptly, and 
transparently.\185\ Nonetheless, the opinions keep intact the 
``state secrets'' exception.
    Chinese courts rely heavily on the defendant's confession 
and on pretrial witness statements to judge guilt or innocence, 
even though provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 
explicitly prohibit this.\186\ In 2005 and 2006, the Commission 
reported on several wrongful convictions that had been decided 
on the basis of confessions and pretrial statements only, and 
were later reversed.\187\ In the wake of She Xianglin's 
wrongful conviction, a Xinhua article provided the following 
quote from his lawyer: ``Throughout the case, with the 
exception of She Xianglin's own confession, there was neither 
any evidence nor witnesses to prove that [Mr.] She had killed 
someone.'' \188\ Illegally obtained evidence, such as a 
confession coerced under torture, is not currently excludable 
under the CPL, and about 95 percent of witnesses fail to 
appear in court to corroborate their pretrial statements. In 
the executive summary to its draft proposal for a new CPL, the 
All China Lawyers Association (ACLA) emphasized the adversarial 
nature of the criminal justice system, and urged a greater 
balance between what the prosecution and defense are allowed to 
present as evidence in support of their case.\189\ ACLA's 
proposal insists that the CPL be revised to clarify the 
procedures for excluding illegally obtained evidence. In 
addition, it urges that courts be granted the legal authority 
to subpoena witnesses, noting that without this authority, a 
criminal defendant is deprived of his ability to confront 
witnesses and therefore present a proper defense.
    The SPC made criminal justice reform one of its top 
priorities for the 2004 to 2008 period, but court reforms must 
proceed in the larger context of a biased judiciary in China. 
The SPC's most recent five-year court reform program provides 
that greater procedural protections be afforded to criminal 
defendants facing the death penalty, and that officials reject 
the use of illegally obtained evidence and adopt the principle 
of a presumption of innocence.\190\ The program also addresses 
some of the institutional problems facing the judiciary 
generally, but it does not change basic Party control over the 
courts. In fact, the program makes clear that courts are also 
expected to strive toward the Party's ultimate goal of building 
a ``harmonious society.'' Numerous structural constraints and 
internal practices therefore continue to limit the independence 
of Chinese courts and judges. In the Xinhua article on She 
Xianglin's case, one judge commented that the court 
responsibility system for wrongly decided cases, which has been 
used to discipline judges for cases overturned or altered on 
appeal, in fact increases the pressure felt by judges and 
causes them to decide cases in a way that takes into account 
various external factors.\191\ Moreover, senior court officials 
and Party political-legal committees continue to influence 
judicial decisionmaking, particularly in sensitive or important 
criminal cases.\192\ At present, the Chinese judiciary is 
therefore restricted in its ability to function as a 
transparent, impartial, and independent part of the legal 
system, and therefore, as a body capable of ensuring the full 
protection of defendants' rights.

     Death Penalty Review and Regulations Against Organ Harvesting

    Chinese criminal law includes 68 capital offenses, over 
half of which are nonviolent crimes such as tax evasion, 
bribery, and embezzlement.\193\ In recent years, China's 
central government leadership has adopted an ``execute fewer, 
execute cautiously'' policy, but the government publishes no 
official statistics on the number of executions and reportedly 
considers this figure a state secret.\194\ Some Chinese sources 
estimate that the annual number of executions in China ranges 
from 8,000 to 10,000.\195\ The Dui Hua Foundation, which 
researches and seeks to curb political imprisonment, estimates 
that China executed about 100,000 individuals during the past 
decade, accounting for more than 95 percent of all executions 
worldwide.\196\ According to Dui Hua, since the late 1990s 
there has been a significant rise in the executions of those 
found guilty of membership in ``splittist, terrorist 
organizations'' in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.\197\ 
In addition, since the 1980s, numerous credible foreign media 
sources have reported on the practice of state-sanctioned 
removal and sale of the internal organs of executed 
prisoners.\198\ One Chinese magazine disclosed in late-2005 
that over 95 percent of organs transplanted in China comes from 
executed prisoners, and cited to Vice Minister of Health Huang 
Jiefu as the first official to publicly acknowledge that the 
majority of those organs originate from such prisoners.\199\
    The leaders of China's highest court have reasserted their 
legal authority to review all death penalty cases in an effort 
to limit the use of death sentences, and to prevent 
miscarriages of justice that undermine China's criminal justice 
system. Xinhua reported earlier this year: ``On Jan. 1, 2007, 
the Supreme People's Court (SPC) retrieved the right to review 
all death penalty decisions made by lower courts, ending its 
24-year absence in approving China's execution verdicts.'' 
\200\ Since January, SPC officials have heralded death penalty 
reform as a success, citing to the fact that the number of 
death penalty sentences imposed in 2006 reached a decade-long 
record low,\201\ and that during the first five months of 2007, 
the number of death sentences imposed by courts in Beijing 
dropped 10 percent from the same period last year.\202\ In 
early September, the China Daily reported that the downward 
trend had continued, and quoted one SPC vice president as 
saying that ``[the SPC] is handing down a very small number of 
death sentences for economic crimes now, just a few a year. And 
much fewer for crimes of bribery.'' \203\ A week later, 
domestic news media reported that the SPC had issued a new 
decision on adjudication of criminal cases, which called for 
``strict control and cautious application of the death 
penalty'' \204\ (code words for the government's continuing 
promise to limit the use of death penalty to only the most 
serious criminal cases).
    The SPC first began considering death penalty reform in 
1996, when the Criminal Procedure Law was revised, but pressure 
to accelerate reforms increased only after 2000, in response to 
domestic media coverage about a number of wrongful convictions 
that had led to unjustified executions.\205\ For example: In 
early 2005, a rape and murder suspect arrested by police 
confessed that he had committed the crime that had resulted in 
the 1995 execution of Hebei farmer Nie Shubin.\206\ In January 
2007, the Hunan provincial high court acknowledged that the 
1999 execution of local farmer Teng Xingshan was for the 
alleged murder of a woman who was in fact still alive.\207\ 
Over the past few years, the SPC has convened a number of 
seminars and training sessions to help lower-level courts draw 
lessons from judgments made in error.\208\ Last year, the 
Commission reported that the Chinese judiciary made reform of 
the death penalty review process a top priority in 2006, 
introducing new appellate court procedures for hearing death 
penalty cases.\209\ At the same time, the Commission also 
noticed that the SPC had not yet issued a judicial 
interpretation to help settle unresolved issues in the death 
penalty review process and further clarify its own procedures.
    SPC reform efforts during the past year have helped to 
clarify a new review process by which errors will better be 
detected, but reforms do not address continuing concerns about 
the use of illegally obtained evidence or the lack of judicial 
independence generally.\210\ The SPC's five-year court reform 
program effectively creates a three-step process in death 
penalty cases that is not available in ordinary criminal 
cases.\211\ Beginning in 2006, provincial-level high courts are 
to focus solely on appeals from lower-level courts.\212\ As of 
January 1, 2007, pursuant to an amendment to the Organic Law of 
the People's Courts, death penalty sentences are then submitted 
to the SPC for review and approval.\213\ This extra step is 
designed to provide an extra guarantee of impartiality, but an 
SPC decision issued in December 2006 indicates that death 
sentences subject to immediate execution (sometimes imposed 
because the case has been accelerated due to intense external 
pressures) still remain within the jurisdiction of provincial-
level high courts only.\214\ The SPC has more recently taken 
the lead in issuing, together with the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of 
Justice, a joint opinion on the entire process for handling 
death penalty cases.\215\ While this may be a positive step 
toward providing greater clarity and transparency throughout 
the criminal process, the joint opinion still does not provide 
for the excludability of illegally obtained evidence and 
repeats the standard practice that such evidence cannot form 
the basis for a verdict.\216\ Furthermore, the joint opinion 
emphasizes the relevance and ultimate decisionmaking power of 
adjudication committees at the trial and appellate court 
levels, and provides for 
active participation by the procuratorate, but not by defense 
counsel, throughout all stages of the case.\217\
    Interestingly, the new joint opinion also grants a criminal 
defendant the opportunity to meet with his family prior to 
execution,\218\ and prohibits ``humiliation'' of a corpse,\219\ 
provisions that hint at the need for greater respect for the 
sanctity of the deceased. In 2006, reports from overseas 
medical and legal experts condemned the government's continuing 
practice of harvesting organs from executed prisoners without 
their consent.\220\ In January 2007, David Kilgour, a member of 
the Canadian parliament, and David Matas, a Canadian lawyer, 
released a revised version of their 2006 report and explained 
that the revised report ``presents, we believe, an even more 
compelling case for our conclusions than the first version 
did.'' \221\
    Although Vice Minister Huang Jiefu and spokesmen for both 
the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have 
said that organ transplants are strictly regulated, and that 
donations must be accompanied by the written consent of the 
donor or donor's family members,\222\ 1984 provisions governing 
the use of corpses or organs from executed prisoners say that a 
corpse or organ belonging to an executed prisoner may also be 
used if no one has retrieved the prisoner's corpse for 
burial.\223\ According to Caijing Magazine, ``in several cases, 
local courts have sold organs from prisoners' cadavers without 
informing their families.'' \224\ In March 2007, the State 
Council passed new Regulations on Human Organ Transplants that 
prohibit the purchase and sale of human organs and explain what 
type of consent is needed for the donation of organs.\225\ The 
new regulations specifically omit any mention of the use of 
executed prisoners' organs and leave intact the 1984 
provisions. After several years of discussions between the 
World Medical Association andthe Chinese Medical Association, 
Chinese medical authorities agreed in theory at an October 5, 
2007, meeting in Copenhagen that they would not transplant 
organs from prisoners or others in official custody, except 
into members of the prisoner's immediate family.\226\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Significant Death Penalty Procedural Reforms (in chronological order,
                           since October 2005)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second Five-Year Reform Program for the People's Courts (2004-2008)
 [Renmin fayuan di er ge wu nian gaige gangyao (2004-2008)]
  <bullet> Issued on October 26, 2005 by the Supreme People's Court.
  <bullet> Establishes criminal law reform, including reform of the
   death penalty review process, as one of the top priorities for
   judicial authorities during the 2004-2008 period.

Circular on Further Improving Court Hearing Work in Death Penalty Appeal
 Cases [Guanyu jinyibu zuo hao sixing ershen anjian kaiting shenli
 gongzuo de tongzhi]
  <bullet> Issued on December 7, 2005 by the Supreme People's Court.
  <bullet> Calls on provincial-level high courts to act as appellate
   bodies in death penalty cases, and establishes guidelines for how
   they should change their current practices.

Trial Provisions on Several Issues Regarding Court Hearing Procedures in
 Death Penalty Appeal Cases [Guanyu sixing di er shen anjian kaiting
 shenli chengxu ruogan wenti de guiding]
  <bullet> Jointly issued on September 21, 2006 by the Supreme People's
   Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate.
  <bullet> Establishes concrete guidelines for the handling of death
   penalty appeals by procuratorates and provincial-level high courts.

Decision on Amending the ``Organic Law of the People's Courts'' [Guanyu
 xiugai ``Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo renmin fayuan zuzhifa'' de jueding]
  <bullet> Passed on October 31, 2006 by the National People's Congress
   Standing Committee.
  <bullet> Codifies into law the requirement that all death penalty
   sentences must be reviewed and approved by the Supreme People's
   Court.

Decision on Issues Relating to Consolidated Review of Death Penalty
 Cases [Guanyu tongyi xingshi sixing anjian hezhun quan youguan wenti de
 jueding]
  <bullet> Issued on December 28, 2006 by the Supreme People's Court.
  <bullet> Provides guidance on which death penalty cases will continue
   to be reviewed by provincial-level high courts, and which cases
   should be submitted to the Supreme People's Court for review.

Provisions on Some Issues Regarding Review of Death Penalty Cases
 [Guanyu fuhe sixing anjian ruogan wenti de guiding]
  <bullet> Issued on January 22, 2007 by the Supreme People's Court.
  <bullet> Provides guidance to all courts on when and how to review and
   approve a death sentence.

Decision on Further Strengthening Criminal Adjudication Work [Guanyu
 jinyibu jiaqiang xingshi shenpan gongzuo de jueding]
  <bullet> Issued in September 2007 by the Supreme People's Court.
  <bullet> Retains the death penalty, but calls for limiting its use to
   only the most serious criminal cases.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             Worker Rights


                              INTRODUCTION

    The Chinese government does not fully respect 
internationally recognized worker rights. Chinese citizens are 
not guaranteed either in law or in practice full worker rights 
in accordance with international standards. In the five-year 
period the Commission has reported on worker rights in China, 
the government has made progress in enacting more legal 
protections for workers, but has continued to deny workers the 
fundamental right to organize into independent unions and 
strike to achieve meaningful change. In addition to these 
restrictions, factors such as poor implementation of labor 
protections on the books and collusion between local officials 
and employers create obstacles for workers who attempt to 
protect their rights. Although market liberalizations have 
brought Chinese citizens more freedom to choose their 
employment, along with prosperity and better jobs for some 
workers, social and economic changes also have engendered 
abuses from forced labor and child labor to flagrant violations 
of health and safety standards, wage arrearages, and loss of 
job benefits. Residency restrictions present hardships for 
workers who migrate for jobs in urban areas. In addition, tight 
controls over civil society organizations hinder the ability of 
citizen groups to champion for worker rights.
    In the last five years, local and central governments have 
enacted a series of rules, regulations, and laws on labor, but 
have not created the administrative structure to ensure 
adequate enforcement. A new Labor Contract Law, passed in June 
2007 and to take effect in January 2008, attempts to codify a 
series of protections for worker rights but does not include 
adequate provisions to guarantee equal bargaining power between 
workers and employers, and entrenches the role of China's only 
legal union, the Communist Party-controlled All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in contract negotiations.\1\ 
The law's imprecision leaves interpretation and clarification 
to the discretion of implementing officials, further limiting 
the impact of potentially beneficial provisions within the law. 
As the number of labor disputes rise,\2\ the government may aim 
for the law to remedy this source of perceived social unrest, 
but systemic weaknesses in implementing the law challenge the 
law's capacity to protect workers and reduce conflict.
    In 2006-2007, several high profile incidents underscored 
the 
inhumane conditions and weak protections under which many 
Chinese work. The discovery in 2007 that a massive network of 
small-scale brick kilns in Shanxi and Hunan provinces were 
employing forced labor evidenced China's weakness in 
effectively enforcing even its own labor and workplace safety 
laws. The discovery and admission that child labor was being 
used in the manufacturing of Olympic souvenirs further 
illustrated the state's failure to enforce worker rights.
    China's labor practices contravene its obligations as a 
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to respect 
a basic set of internationally recognized labor rights for 
workers, including freedom of association and the ``effective 
recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.\3\ China 
is also a permanent member of the ILO's governing body.\4\ The 
ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to respect, to 
promote and to realize'' these fundamental rights based on 
``the very fact of [ILO] membership.'' \5\ The ILO's eight core 
conventions articulate the scope of worker rights and 
principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is 
committed to respect the fundamental right or principle 
addressed in each core convention, even if that member state 
has not ratified the convention. China has ratified four of the 
eight ILO core conventions, including two core conventions on 
the abolition of child labor (No. 138 and No. 182) and two on 
non-discrimination in employment and occupation (No. 100 and 
No. 111).\6\ The ILO has reported that the Chinese government 
is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced labor 
(No. 29 and No. 105).\7\ Chinese labor law generally 
incorporates the basic obligations of the ILO's eight core 
conventions, with the exception of the provisions relating to 
the freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining,\8\ but many of these obligations remain unrealized 
in practice.
    The Chinese government is a state party to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), which guarantees the right of workers to strike, the 
right of workers to organize independent unions, the right of 
trade unions to function freely, the right of trade unions to 
establish national federations or confederations, and the right 
of the latter to form or join international trade union 
organizations.\9\ In ratifying the ICESCR, the Chinese 
government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which 
guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The 
government asserts that application of the article should be 
consistent with Chinese law, which does not allow for the 
creation of independent trade unions.\10\ The Chinese 
government is a signatory to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to 
freedom of association, ``including the right to form and join 
trade unions[.]'' \11\
    Workers in China have no choice as to their representation 
in the workplace. The ACFTU is China's only official trade 
union and is required by the Trade Union Law to ``uphold the 
leadership of the Communist Party.'' \12\ While the ACFTU has 
made progress in unionizing more workplaces in China, and has 
promoted pro-worker programs where they do not conflict with 
Party policy, the basic structure of the union system in China 
is at odds with meaningful representation of workers' rights 
and interests. Surveys of local ACFTU branches have indicated 
that a majority of union leaders hold concurrent positions 
within Party committees, government, or enterprise. Union 
leaders have represented enterprises, rather than workers, in 
labor dispute arbitration.\13\
    Workers who try to establish independent associations or 
organize demonstrations risk arrest and imprisonment. 
Independent labor organizers continue to serve long jail terms. 
For example, He Chaohui, a former railway worker at the 
Chenzhou Railway 
Bureau and vice-chairperson of the Hunan Workers Autonomous 
Federation during the May 1989 pro-democracy movement, has 
faced multiple detentions, including a current nine-year 
sentence, since taking part in labor strikes and 
demonstrations, and giving information on the protests to 
overseas human rights groups. 
Another long-term prisoner, Hu Shigen (Hu Shenglun), received a 
20-year sentence in 1994 for ``organizing and leading a 
counterrevolutionary group'' and ``engaging in 
counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement'' after helping 
to establish the China Freedom and Democracy Party and the 
China Free Trade Union Preparatory Committee.\14\

                           LABOR CONTRACT LAW

                                Overview

    The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
(NPC) passed a new Labor Contract Law in June 2007, after 
considering multiple draft versions and soliciting public 
comments on the law.\15\ In addition to seeking public 
comments, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security also sought 
technical assistance from U.S. experts in drafting the law. In 
2005 and 2006, a U.S. Department of Labor-funded technical 
cooperation project sponsored a series of workshops and a study 
tour for Chinese officials who requested to be briefed on U.S. 
best practices in employment relationships, termination of 
contracts, part-time employment, regulation of labor 
recruitment, U.S. Wage and Hour regulations, the means of 
protecting worker rights, the means of enhancing compliance, 
and training for investigation.\16\
    The new law, effective January 2008, governs the 
contractual relationship between workers and employers from 
enterprises, individual economic organizations, and private 
non-enterprise units.\17\ The law expands requirements in 
China's 1994 Labor Law that mandate the signing of labor 
contracts.\18\ It requires workers and employers to establish a 
written contract in order to begin a labor relation\19\ and 
creates the presumption of an open-ended contract if the 
parties have not concluded a written contract within one year 
from the start of employment.\20\ The law also includes 
provisions that allow certain workers with existing fixed-term 
contracts to transition to open-ended employment.\21\ The law 
mandates that contracts specify matters including working 
hours, compensation, social insurance, and protections against 
occupational hazards. In addition, the employer and worker may 
add contractual provisions for probationary periods, training, 
supplementary benefits, and insurance.\22\ The basic provisions 
on establishing contracts accompany a series of other 
stipulations within the law that attempt to regularize the 
status of workers employed through staffing agencies; 
strengthen protections in the event of job dismissals; and 
establish a framework for penalizing non-compliance with the 
law.\23\
    Despite strengthening formal legal protections for workers, 
the ultimate extent of the law's effectiveness, especially 
without an independent union system to monitor enforcement, 
remains untested until the law takes effect. China's track 
record for implementing existing labor protections is poor at 
best. One government official has described weak implementation 
as the root cause of China's labor problems.\24\ A series of 
surveys on the enforcement of existing requirements to sign 
labor contracts found that many enterprises fail to use 
contracts, and that workers lacked knowledge of their right to 
sign a contract.\25\ Even if the Labor Contract Law promotes 
the creation of more formal contracts, however, the benefits of 
such a development may have limited impact without adequate 
measures to ensure that employers adhere to the terms of the 
contracts.\26\
    Ambiguities in the law amplify the challenges of 
implementation. While the law does not explicitly require 
employers and employees to enter into new contracts on January 
1, 2008, neither does it say whether it will apply to existing 
employment contracts that do not comply with the new law.\27\ 
The law requires workplaces that receive workers through 
staffing agencies to provide ``benefits suited for the job'' 
but does not elaborate on this provision.\28\ The law allows 
employers to cover their costs for employees' ``professional 
technical training'' by requiring employees first to agree to a 
set service period in exchange, but it provides no definition 
of ``professional technical training'' or a method of valuing 
service.\29\ Finally, the law does not specify whether it will 
apply to employees (whether local or expatriate) of foreign 
company representative offices. Because the law leaves many 
details to be fleshed out through the issuance of supplemental 
regulations and interpretations during implementation, its full 
impact will remain unclear for some time. In the interim, media 
reports indicate that some employers are dismissing workers now 
in order to avoid increased safeguards against terminations 
once the law enters into force.\30\

                          Non-Standard Workers

    The new law attempts to address a gap in legal protection 
for workers employed through staffing agencies, who have 
labored without explicit legal guidelines governing various 
aspects of their relationships with both staffing agencies and 
worksites that hire through the agencies. The Labor Contract 
Law provides that staffing firms fulfill the same function as 
other employers under the law by signing contracts with workers 
that detail the terms of employment. Compliance with the law 
requires staffing firms to agree to fixed-term contracts of at 
least two years and to pay each worker on a monthly basis 
including for periods where the worker has not been dispatched 
to an outside employer.\31\ Compliance also requires workplaces 
that receive workers through staffing agencies to provide the 
same wages as directly hired employees.\32\ The law also 
stipulates that these workplaces provide overtime, benefits, 
and incremental wage increases, though the law lacks details on 
these requirements.\33\ In addition, workers may join a union 
affiliated with either the staffing firm or the workplace to 
which they are dispatched.\34\ Finally, the law mandates that 
neither staffing firms nor workplaces that receive workers may 
levy placement fees from workers, nor can the staffing firm 
keep part of the worker's wages.\35\ The provisions expand on 
more limited stipulations for staffing firms specified in the 
law's draft form.\36\
    The Labor Contract Law attempts to extend a modest new 
protection for part-time employees by mandating that these 
workers (defined as those who work no more than 4 hours a day 
or 24 hours a week) not receive less than the local minimum 
hourly wage.\37\ Under the 1994 Labor Law, part-time employees 
had no such 
protection, and in 2007, news sources in China reported that 
fast food restaurants in Guangzhou paid part-timers 40 percent 
less than the minimum wage.\38\ In addition, the law mandates 
that part-time employees be paid no later than every 15 
days.\39\ However, the Labor Contract Law does not require 
employers to sign written contracts with part-time workers, and 
allows employers to terminate part-time workers without notice 
or termination compensation.\40\ The law's prospects for 
improving conditions for non-standard workers, therefore, are 
diminished not only by problems with implementation, but also 
by certain weaknesses in the law itself.

                              Terminations

    The Labor Contract Law stipulates a series of guidelines 
governing workforce reductions. Where employers reduce their 
workforce by 20 or more employees--a reduction from the 50 or 
more workers earlier specified in the drafting process\41\--or 
if they terminate employment for fewer than 20 workers but by 
an amount that comprises 10 percent or more of the workforce, 
the union or all employees must receive 30 days' advance 
notice. In addition, in order to comply with the law, the 
employer must explain the staff reduction and ``listen to the 
opinions of the trade union or the employees.'' \42\ Such 
provisions reinforce the tendency that runs throughout the new 
law requiring notification to workers and the union, rather 
than negotiations, over major issues such as mass layoffs. In 
the event of layoffs, the law stipulates giving priority to 
retaining workers with open-ended contracts or long periods of 
employment under fixed-term contracts, as well as workers who 
are the sole wage earner in the family and must support 
children or elderly family members.\43\ The law also forbids 
laying off several categories of workers, including workers 
near retirement, pregnant and postpartum workers, and workers 
who have sustained on-the-job injuries or occupational 
diseases, or are in the process of having such a disease 
diagnosed.\44\ Where employers end a contract unilaterally, 
they must notify the union and allow the union to intervene 
where the termination violates the law or contractual 
terms.\45\
    The law also specifies conditions under which employers 
must give severance pay to employees. Severance provisions 
apply to categories of workers including those laid off and 
workers who terminate their contracts because of illegal 
practices on the part of the employer.\46\ The law specifies a 
formula for determining severance based on one month of wages 
for each year worked; workers employed for fewer than six 
months receive half of the monthly wage.\47\ It also specifies 
severance pay caps for high-wage workers.\48\

               Enforcement Mechanisms and Legal Liability

    The Labor Contract Law includes a series of provisions to 
monitor enforcement of the law and penalize non-compliance. It 
assigns local labor officials at the county level and above 
with responsibility for overseeing implementation, including 
the enforcement of specific contractual terms.\49\ The law also 
empowers authorities from other offices, such as construction 
and health officials, to monitor aspects of the law within the 
scope of their jurisdiction.\50\ A report from the State 
Council Research Office issued in 2006 noted, however, a 
``serious shortage'' of supervisors to enforce implementation 
of labor laws, drawing into question the effectiveness of 
provisions in the Labor Contract Law.\51\
    Workers who allege an infringement of their rights may 
appeal to government authorities to address the matter, apply 
for arbitration, or initiate a lawsuit.\52\ A section on legal 
liability requires employers who fail to sign a contract after 
one month of employing a worker to pay double wages.\53\ It 
also articulates a series of other remedies for workers and 
stipulates additional penalties for employers, staffing firms, 
and labor officials who violate the law.\54\ One provision 
holds workers responsible for damages where they cause loss to 
an employer for ending a labor contract in violation of the law 
or breaching confidentiality and competition agreements.\55\

                         Collective Bargaining

    The Labor Contract Law includes six articles that specify 
guidelines for negotiating ``collective contracts,'' \56\ but 
it does not provide for collective bargaining. Collective 
contracting provisions have appeared in Chinese law for many 
years.\57\ The limited scope of the collective contracting 
process in the new law, including the lack of independent union 
participation, however, prevents it from translating into a 
meaningful mechanism for collective bargaining. Some leading 
Chinese experts argue that the meaning of the phrase 
``collective agreements'' is rendered meaningless due to the 
ACFTU's historic record of never having negotiated genuine 
collective bargaining agreements.\58\ Many provisions in the 
Labor Contract Law appear to be based on the presumption that 
workers will negotiate individual contracts. The final draft of 
the Labor Contract Law includes a provision that permits 
workers representatives to negotiate collective contracts where 
no ACFTU branch exists in the workplace, but such negotiations 
are ``under the guidance of the ACFTU at the next higher 
level.'' \59\ As three labor experts have noted, however, ``the 
idea of [ACFTU officials] representing and protecting the 
legitimate rights and interests of their members in opposition 
to those of the employer is something unfamiliar, if not 
totally alien.'' \60\ To date, the terms of collective 
contracts have been limited. One study of collective contracts 
observed that a typical contract lacks ``detailed specification 
of the terms and conditions of labour, and often does not 
include reference to many of the benefits that are in fact 
provided by the enterprise.'' \61\ In addition, workers' input 
in the process is limited, and employers have concluded 
collective contracts through model agreements rather than 
through a process of negotiation with employees.\62\ At the 
same time, use of the mechanism is widespread. According to the 
ACFTU, as of September 2006, 862,000 collective contracts 
covering 110 million workers had been signed, representing a 
14.3 percent 
increase since 2005 in the number of contracts signed and an 
8.3 percent increase in number of workers covered.\63\

                             Labor Disputes

    The Labor Contract Law includes default provisions designed 
to function in the event of dispute over contractual terms. 
Workers and employers may renegotiate a contract in the event 
specific terms are not clearly specified in a contract, and 
where negotiations fail, the terms of the collective contract 
or ``pertinent regulations of the state'' apply.\64\ The law 
also provides for the role of a labor arbitration board or 
people's court in the event the validity of a contract is 
disputed.\65\ In addition, the labor union may apply for 
arbitration or initiate a lawsuit in the event of dispute over 
a collective contract.\66\ Individual workers may do the same 
where their rights have been violated, and the law mandates 
that the labor union supply ``support and help'' in such 
cases.\67\ The union's divided loyalties in practice, however, 
call into questions the efficacy of these provisions. In 
addition, the high cost of arbitration fees has the practical 
effect of discouraging workers from pursuing this avenue of 
dispute resolution.\68\ Moreover, the law does not specify 
whether workers must first enter mediation before pursuing 
arbitration or legal suits, the first stage of labor dispute 
resolution listed in the 1994 Labor Law.\69\ Unlike the 1994 
Labor Law, it does not specify that workers must first exhaust 
arbitration options 
before pursuing a legal suit.\70\
    In addition, broader legislative developments may 
ultimately deny workers a full range of options for resolving 
labor disputes. A new draft Law on Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration placed before the NPC Standing Committee on August 
26, 2007, if passed, would limit the role of courts in labor 
dispute resolution. According to a vice-chair of the 
Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee, 
as cited in a Xinhua article, ``The draft bill is for 
strengthening mediation and improving arbitration so as to help 
fairly solve labor disputes without going to court and thus 
safeguard employee's legitimate rights and promote social 
harmony'' [emphasis added].\71\ The draft allows companies to 
establish labor mediation committees in-house ``so as to solve 
disputes at [the] grassroots level,'' according to the Xinhua 
article, and specifies that the mediation committees may 
consist only of management and employees.\72\ Taken as a whole, 
China's emerging national labor law regime, billed as both 
strengthening worker rights and grassroots dispute resolution, 
appears equally intended to make sure that disputes do not 
enter legal channels that lead to the central government. 
Whether this represents deliberate local empowerment as part of 
a measured long-term strategy to induce grassroots legal 
development, a strategy of crisis localization and insulation 
for the center, or some combination, remains an open question.

            Criticism and Support for the Labor Contract Law

    Observers have been divided in their evaluations of the 
Labor Contract Law. While noting limitations for enforcing 
workers rights in practice, some worker rights organizations 
have expressed support for the law's role in strengthening 
protections for workers. For example, the China Labour 
Bulletin, directed by Hong Kong labor activist Han Dongfang, 
describes the new law as ``a laudable attempt to protect the 
rights of individual workers'' in its weekly publication but 
contends that workers need freedom to join unions, not just the 
ACFTU, and to freely elect their own representatives who would 
have the power to negotiate with management for collective 
bargaining agreements. It also expressed concerns about 
protections in earlier drafts omitted from the final 
version.\73\
    Businesses and business associations have had mixed 
reactions to the new law. Some multi-national companies raised 
objections to the law during the drafting process because of 
provisions perceived as impediments to employers, and analysts 
have drawn attention to new requirements and extra costs the 
law may impose on foreign firms.\74\
    U.S. and European multi-national companies and their 
representative associations commented upon or urged revisions 
to the law after publication of a draft version in spring 2006 
and continuing through the next year.\75\ The American Chamber 
of Commerce in the People's Republic of China ``called several 
meetings of its members and formed a team to carefully study 
and discuss the draft'' and prepared a set of comments as part 
of the NPC's formal public process of soliciting opinions.\76\ 
Some foreign corporations and their associations endorsed 
revisions that would weaken some of the formal protections 
written into draft versions of the law, according to business 
association, media, and other sources.\77\ Among the aspects of 
the drafts that concerned these companies were clauses on 
hiring and termination procedures, layoffs, employee 
probationary periods, the status of temporary workers, the 
power of the official trade union, severance pay provisions, 
and employee training repayment.\78\ The U.S.-China Business 
Council contended that limitations on the use of temporary 
employees would prove ``prohibitively expensive'' for 
businesses. \79\ NGO sources report that some business 
organizations threatened to withdraw manufacturing from 
China.\80\
    In its comments on the draft law publicized in March 2006, 
the American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of 
China cautioned against ``impos[ing] additional and unrealistic 
obligations on employers'' against the backdrop of poor 
implementation of existing labor laws, stating that the law 
instead ``should leave enough latitude for local governments to 
make rules according to local needs.'' \81\ The European 
Chamber of Commerce expressed support for the final version of 
the law, after initial criticism, and urged the Chinese 
government to focus on adequate implementation of the law.\82\
    In answer to earlier complaints by foreign investors that 
the new law would have a detrimental effect on foreign 
investment, the director of the law department of the ACFTU 
stated that the Labor Contract Law ``not only protects workers' 
interests and rights, but also equally protects employers.'' 
\83\ According to one Chinese government official, ``If there 
were some bias, it would be in favor of foreign investors 
because local governments have great tolerance for them in 
order to attract and retain investment.'' \84\

                     OTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

    In August 2007, the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress adopted an Employment Promotion Law, 
effective January 1, 2008, that stipulates measures relating to 
the promotion of employment growth and equal access to 
employment.\85\ In addition to containing provisions aimed at 
prohibiting discrimination based on factors including 
ethnicity, race, sex, and religious belief,\86\ the law 
addresses the equal right to work for women and ethnic 
minorities;\87\ specifies disabled people's right to work;\88\ 
stipulates that rural workers' access to work should ``be equal 
to'' urban workers;\89\ and forbids employers from refusing to 
hire carriers of infectious diseases.\90\ The law also allows 
workers to initiate lawsuits in the event of 
discrimination.\91\ A survey publicized in June 2007 found 
widespread discrimination among job-seekers, especially 
physically disabled people, HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B carriers, 
and migrant workers. Women reported discrimination related to 
their entitlement to maternity benefits.\92\ [See Section II-- 
Status of Women for more information.]
    If properly implemented, the law may offer support for 
legal 
advocates pursuing employment discrimination cases, but other 
aspects of the law raise potential difficulties. One article 
assigns the state to spur workers to develop a ``proper'' 
mentality in job selections.\93\ Another provision carves out a 
role for Party-controlled 
organizations like the Communist Youth League to aid in 
implementation of the law, which may dampen the role of civil 
society groups that promote implementation in ways that 
challenge Party policy.\94\ Potentially beneficial safeguards 
also face barriers due to a lack of clearly defined terms. A 
provision to promote the employment of workers with 
``employment hardship,'' for example, defines this category of 
workers in general terms but leaves precise details to local 
authorities, introducing the possibility of uneven protections 
that reduce the law's overall impact.\95\ In addition, the law 
specifies the establishment of an unemployment insurance 
system, but provides no extensive details on 
implementation.\96\

                     CONDITIONS FOR CHINESE WORKERS

                                 Wages

    The 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers, 
and assigns local governments to set wage standards for each 
region.\97\ The new Labor Contract Law improves formal 
monitoring requirements to verify workers receive minimum 
wages. Article 74 requires local labor bureaus to monitor labor 
practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards. 
Article 85 imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates 
below minimum wage. In addition, Article 72 guarantees minimum 
hourly wages for part-time workers.\98\
    The government reported progress in 2006 in establishing 
hourly minimum wage standards in most of its provinces. 
According to a report from the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (MOLSS) released in October 2006, 29 of China's 31 
provincial-level areas had established hourly minimum wage 
standards, compared to 23 provinces in 2005. In addition, the 
report found that all 31 provincial-level areas maintained 
monthly minimum wage standards. The 
report shows greater local government compliance in 2006 than 
in 2005 with requirements to review monthly minimum wage 
standards every two years.\99\ Local government discretion to 
set minimum wages has resulted in wide variances across 
provinces.\100\ In 2006, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions reportedly urged provincial-level governments to 
increase minimum wages.\101\
    Illegal labor practices have undermined minimum wage 
guarantees. In an investigation of working conditions for 
migrant workers in China, Amnesty International noted that 
``wages of internal 
migrant workers are effectively reduced by management through 
inadequate pay for compulsory overtime, fines, unpaid wages, 
and other methods.'' \102\ The investigation found that some 
factories' fines for tardiness--calculated for each minute a 
worker is late--could constitute a major reduction in a 
worker's daily salary.\103\ (See the discussions on ``wage 
arrearages'' and ``working hours,'' below, for additional 
information.)
    China's leaders have expressed concerns over the growing 
income gap between rural and urban workers, and between earners 
at the top of the income ladder and those at the bottom. In 
July 2006, the government announced it would institute reforms 
aimed at cutting the wealth gap to promote a ``harmonious'' 
society and ``improve the socialist market economy,'' with 
focus on increasing the middle class and improving wages of 
low-level government employees.\104\ Party officials and 
commentators have not yet settled on a firm opinion of the 
wealth gap problem. In November 2006, Ministry of Finance 
official Wang Bao'an outlined a new wage plan aimed at limiting 
the rate of wage increases at the high end of the scale; 
standardizing income subsidies; stabilizing the wages of 
middle-income earners; and raising the income of low-wage 
earners.\105\ A commentary reprinted in the China Economic 
Daily, however, argued that ``the existence of a high-income 
group is inevitable in a market economy,'' and argued against 
``robbing the rich to give to the poor.'' \106\ Government 
official Qiu Xiaoping, of the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, agreed that the government should not intervene in 
setting wages in a socialist market economy where a ``salary is 
the market price of labor.'' \107\

                            Wage Arrearages

    Wage arrearages remains a serious problem, especially for 
migrant workers. In June 2006, the Ministry of Communications, 
which oversees China's transportation sector, issued a circular 
ordering provincial-level departments to finish resolving 
migrant workers' claims for unpaid wages from work on 
transportation projects by the end of 2006. The Ministry 
circular responds to a 2004 State Council decree to resolve all 
migrant worker wage arrears that have resulted from unpaid debt 
on government projects.\108\ Government efforts have helped 
lower the amount of outstanding unpaid wages, but progress in 
this area remains limited. Employers in the construction sector 
still owe workers a reported 10 billion yuan (US$1.2 
billion).\109\ An inspection in Gansu province found that 
companies owed 130 million yuan (US$16.6 million) in back wages 
to 130,000 migrant workers, mainly in the construction and 
restaurant industries.\110\
    Some local governments have issued legal guidance and taken 
other steps to address wage arrearages. Trial legal measures 
implemented in Qinghai province in 2006 require construction 
companies to set aside and deposit wage funds before projects 
begin, to ensure that workers will be paid when the project is 
completed. The measures punish enterprises that fail to deposit 
sufficient funds, that do not make their deposits in a timely 
manner, or that provide false contract information, and allow 
authorities to bar non-compliant firms from participating in 
the construction market.\111\ In Guangdong province, 
authorities had barred 30 enterprises for failing to pay 
employee wages as of June 2006. Though the government had given 
the companies previous warnings and implemented other punitive 
measures, the companies failed to remedy an outstanding debt of 
over 20 million yuan (US$2.5 million) to over 8,000 
workers.\112\
    Subcontracting practices within industry exacerbate the 
problem of wage arrearages. When investors and developers 
default on their payments to construction companies, workers at 
the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack the means to 
recover wages from the original defaulters. Subcontractors, 
including companies that operate illegally, neglect their own 
duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any direct 
avenue to demand their salaries. In some cases, subcontractors 
will pay partial wages to force workers to stay on site to 
finish construction projects.\113\
    Wage arrearages have resulted in protests and 
demonstrations by workers, and some Chinese employers have 
responding by hiring thugs or gangsters to drive off the 
protesters. In July 2007, a group of armed gangsters beat up 
300 migrant workers who had gone on strike in Guangdong 
province to collect four months of back pay. The subcontractor 
construction company claimed that it could not pay the workers 
because it had not been paid by the contractor.\114\
    Workers who try to take legal measures to recover lost 
wages face prohibitive expenses and limited possibilities of 
recovering wages, even where adjudicators decide in their 
favor.\115\ Despite these obstacles, there has been a steady 
increase in the number of workers who turn to labor arbitration 
to settle their disputes with employers.\116\ In addition to 
wage arrearages, sources of disputes have included illegal and 
improperly compensated overtime and failure to adhere to labor 
contracts.\117\

                             Working Hours

    China's labor law mandates a maximum 8-hour work day and 
44-hour average work week, but compliance with these standards 
is weak.\118\ One specialist in China's compliance practices 
has estimated that work weeks above 80 hours are common in the 
apparel industry and other export sectors.\119\ A study of 
migrant workers in southern China found that workers were 
subject to forced overtime to upwards of 16 hours a day. The 
report noted that employers dodged paying overtime rates by 
compensating workers on a piece-rate basis with quotas high 
enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime wages. Workers who 
failed to comply with overtime requirements or who were late 
faced fines.\120\
    Suppliers in China avoid exposing themselves to claims of 
requiring illegal, long hours by hiring firms that help them 
set up double booking systems designed to deceive foreign 
importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations. A 
detailed account of the practice found that these firms not 
only help suppliers set up fake books for audit, but also coach 
managers and employees on answers to give the auditors. One 
specialist has estimated that only 5 percent of Chinese 
suppliers comply with overtime regulations, and 20 percent 
adhere to wage regulations.\121\

                                Benefits

    The routine denial of legally guaranteed job benefits to 
workers by some employers is a serious problem in China. Gaps 
in social security and labor insurance coverage remain 
widespread. Though the government has reported that 100 million 
workers had unemployment insurance as of November 2006, this 
figure accounted for only one-seventh of the total 760 million 
workers in the country.\122\ An International Labor 
Organization study found that enterprises dodge requirements to 
provide contributions for old-age insurance by misreporting the 
number of employees and wages, as well as by keeping workers in 
irregular employment positions.\123\ In addition to failing to 
secure social security safeguards, employers also have denied 
workers benefits ranging from paid vacations to sick 
leave.\124\ Workers have described being fined for taking sick 
days.\125\
    Women workers face additional obstacles, as employers 
withhold maternity leave and related benefits.\126\ A 2006 
survey of women migrant workers conducted by the All-China 
Women's Federation found that only 6.7 percent of surveyed 
workers had maternity insurance. Of the 36.4 percent who 
reported that they were allowed to take maternity leave, 64.5 
percent said this leave was unpaid.\127\ The survey also found 
that only 23.8 percent have medical insurance and 19.1 percent 
have occupational insurance.\128\ [See Section II--Status of 
Women for more information.]
    Systemic failings of local governance exacerbate 
shortcomings in the provision of social security benefits, as 
local governments bear responsibility for providing coverage 
for retirement, illness or injury, occupational injuries, 
joblessness, and childbirth.\129\ After local mismanagement of 
the pension system in Shanghai, central government departments 
issued a series of legal guidance in 2006 to increase oversight 
of fund management.\130\ Li Jinhua, auditor-general of the 
National Audit Office, pledged in 2007 to stop the misuse of 
pension funds and said local governments would be held 
responsible for repaying misused funds out of their own 
budgets.\131\ Despite these measures, fundamental flaws within 
the system persist. As one overseas media source observed, 
``The party has talked for decades about building a social 
safety net, yet as the working population ages the government 
isn't investing nearly enough to head off looming crises in 
health care, education, and pensions.'' \132\ Chinese officials 
reported in 2006 that only 6 percent of the population 
benefited from the existing social insurance system and pledged 
to enlarge participation by 2020.\133\
    In 2006, the government announced it would take 
``compulsory measures'' to promote employer participation in 
on-the-job injury insurance for migrant workers, expanding 
coverage to over 140 million people by the year 2010. By the 
end of July 2006, 18.71 million migrant workers nationwide were 
covered by the insurance, while 87 million workers overall had 
such insurance as of April 2006.\134\

                             WORKER SAFETY

    Over the last year, the Chinese government enhanced its 
efforts to enforce work safety laws by conducting national 
inspections, promoting accident prevention through safety 
campaigns, enforcing the closure of small, illegal mines, and 
actively seeking international cooperation. According to latest 
statistics provided by the Chinese government, mine fatalities 
decreased by 20.1 percent in 2006 compared to 2005; fatalities 
during the first eight months of 2007 also decreased by 15.7 
percent compared to 2006, according to latest statistics 
provided by the government.\135\

              Industrial Accidents and Occupational Health

    Industrial injuries and deaths remain widespread in China, 
despite reported decreases in the number of workplace deaths 
and accidents.\136\ In February 2006, the State Administration 
for Workplace Safety (SAWS) closed nearly 36,000 businesses 
that had failed to obtain safety licenses by the end of 
2005.\137\ The government amended the Criminal Law in June 2006 
to broaden punishments for work safety violations. The 
amendments included new penalties for ``responsible'' personnel 
who hinder rescue efforts by covering up or failing to report 
accidents, though the amendments do not clarify how 
responsibility for reporting such incidents is determined.\138\ 
In August 2006, the government pledged over US$50 billion to 
lower workplace accidents.\139\
    China has high rates of occupational disease and injuries. 
As of 2006, official statistics indicated that 440,000 workers 
suffered from the respiratory condition pneumonoconiosis, as a 
result of exposure to toxic particles. Unofficial estimates 
place the number as high as 5 million.\140\ In 2006, government 
officials estimated the total number of workers with 
occupational illnesses may be as high as 700 million.\141\ 
Workers have reported that workplaces fail to educate them on 
occupational hazards or provide adequate safety equipment.\142\

                          Coal Mine Accidents

    China's coal mining sector continues to have high accident 
and death rates, and without independent worker organizations, 
coal miners are limited in their ability to promote safer 
working conditions. Though government statistics indicate a 
decline in deaths in coal mine disasters, official statistics 
are unreliable, and the reported death rate remains high 
nonetheless. In 2006, officials indicated that 4,746 workers 
died in coal mine accidents, representing a decline of 20 
percent from 2005.\143\ Unofficial estimates have placed the 
number as high as 20,000, not including the number of workers 
who die from mining-related diseases.\144\ The central 
government issued a series of legal guidance in 2006 aimed at 
addressing coal mine safety. Interim provisions issued in 
November 2006, for example, stipulate penalties for failing to 
correct hidden dangers that result in an accident; concealing, 
misreporting, or providing a delayed report of an accident; and 
allowing mines with 
revoked licenses to continue operations.\145\
    Despite measures to penalize violations of coal mine 
safety, punishment of coal mine officials is limited in 
practice. In a Supreme People's Procuratorate investigation of 
officials charged for their involvement in mining disasters, 
95.6 percent were not given any punishment or were given 
suspended sentences.\146\ In one case, where 56 miners died in 
a flood at a coal mine in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region, public outrage resulted in a retrial of the township 
chief, whose sentence was increased from one year to 12.\147\ 
Officials and mine operators have thwarted efforts to 
reconstruct evidence from coal mine disasters. After a series 
of accidents in April 2007, China's chief safety officer, SAWS 
head Li Yizhong, commented that mine operators ``sabotaged the 
(accident) scenes, destroyed incriminating evidence and removed 
the bodies.'' \148\
    China's coal is the source of its huge economic growth rate 
and some of its worst corruption.\149\ Weak central government 
control over local governments has forced central authorities 
to postpone closing many small mines until 2010. These mines 
are the most dangerous ones, but are highly lucrative for local 
owners. Mine owners raise production levels above the legal 
limit, and if accidents happen, bribe local officials to ignore 
their practices. Overseas media reported that mine owners have 
sent corpses to other provinces to avoid requirements to report 
accidents with more than three deaths.\150\

                            MIGRANT WORKERS

    Chinese migrants face numerous obstacles in the protection 
of their labor rights, and employers have exploited migrant 
workers' uprooted status to deny them fair working conditions. 
A report from the State Council Research Office found that 
wages for migrant workers are ``universally low;'' workplaces 
lack ``the most basic labor protection[s];'' migrant workers 
``engage in overly intensive labor for excessively long 
hours,'' without a guaranteed right to rest; and migrant 
workers are ``unable to obtain employment rights and public 
employment services'' on a par with permanent urban 
residents.\151\ Migrant workers are reportedly denied a total 
of 100 billion yuan in back pay, with 94 percent of migrant 
workers in the construction sector not paid on time.\152\ The 
central government has enacted a series of decrees to ease 
restrictions for 
migrant workers, but the measures lack sufficient legal force 
and sustainability at the local government level to ensure 
consistent implementation. [See Section II--Freedom of 
Residency and Travel for more information about migrant 
workers.]
    Thirty-one Chinese city governments agreed to a plan in 
2007 to set up a network of legal aid centers among the cities 
to improve legal access for migrant workers and ensure 
accountability among legal aid providers. Called the Chongqing 
Pact, the agreement obliges legal aid centers in the network to 
help migrant workers with issues such as labor disputes and 
work-related injuries, regardless of a worker's residency 
status. It also requires legal aid centers in a migrant 
worker's original place of residency to assist in the 
process.\153\ The program may be designed in part to avoid the 
demonstrations, and sometimes violence, that break out when 
workers are not paid.
    Chinese officials reported in June 2007 on a draft plan to 
change its pension system to address migrant workers' needs. 
Under the proposed plan, those with steady employment would 
join current pension schemes, and those without a permanent 
place of employment would enter a new program designed 
specifically for that population. Under the proposed system, 
employers and employees would make mandatory contributions to 
the fund that would be shifted to accounts in the migrants' 
home towns but that would 
retain portability as migrants change jobs and relocate.\154\ A 
2006 investigation on old-age pensions by the International 
Labor Organization identified an existing lack of portability 
of pension funds as one of the ``major barriers'' to coverage 
for migrants.\155\

                              CHILD LABOR

    Child labor remains a persistent problem within China, 
despite legal measures to prohibit the practice. As a member of 
the International Labor Organization (ILO), China has ratified 
the two core conventions on the elimination of child 
labor.\156\ China's Labor Law and related legislation prohibit 
the employment of minors under 16,\157\ and national legal 
provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines 
for employing children.\158\ Under the Criminal Law, employers 
and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for 
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme 
danger.\159\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have 
dulled the effects of these legal measures, though the overall 
extent of child labor in China is unclear due to the government 
categorizing data on the matter as ``highly secret.'' \160\ A 
report on child labor in China found that child laborers 
generally work in low-skill service sectors as well as small 
workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe 
manufacturing enterprises.\161\ It noted that many under-age 
laborers are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15 
years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the 
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\162\ 
Children in detention facilities also have been subjected to 
forced labor.\163\
    Events from the past year underscore the government's 
inability to prevent child labor. Underage workers were among 
the forced laborers found working in brick kiln mines in 2007, 
highlighting the existence of what the ILO terms the ``worst 
forms of child labor.'' \164\ [See the subsection on ``Forced 
Labor,'' below, for more information on forced labor in brick 
kilns.] A company that produces Olympics-related products 
admitted in 2007 that children as young as 12 years old had 
worked in the factory.\165\
    Although the Chinese government has condemned the use of 
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat 
it,\166\ it continues to actively endorse other forms of child 
labor under the guise of work-study activities. Under work-
study programs implemented in various parts of China, children 
as young as elementary school students pick crops and engage in 
other physical labor. In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), for example, some 800,000 students began their 2006 
academic year by picking cotton in school-organized work-study 
programs, while elementary school students in some parts of the 
XUAR were forced to pick hops. The XUAR government issued legal 
guidance that year to outline the contours of this labor 
system, stating that priority should be placed on using labor 
revenue to buy accident insurance for students and liability 
insurance for schools. Reports from the region indicated that 
in recent years students had been made to work in 12-hour 
shifts and suffered injuries from dangerous working conditions 
and sexual abuse from adult laborers. [See Section II--Ethnic 
Minority Rights for more information on conditions in the 
XUAR.] Also in 2006, over 10,000 students in the fourth grade 
and higher in a city in Gansu province were made to harvest 
corn.\167\
    Central government legislation allows this form of child 
labor. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that 
``education practice labor'' and vocational skills training 
labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational 
institutes do not constitute the use of child labor when such 
activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the 
students.\168\ The Education Law supports schools that 
establish work-study and other programs, provided that the 
programs do not negatively affect normal studies.\169\ A 
nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and 
secondary school students outlines the general terms of such 
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals, 
contribute to production outputs, and generate resources for 
improving schools.\170\ These provisions contravene China's 
obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting 
child labor.\171\ In 2006, the ILO's Committee of Experts on 
the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations 
``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under 
18 years performing forced labour not only in the framework of 
re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular 
work programmes at school.'' \172\
    Beyond the parameters of government-approved work study 
programs, some teachers have used their position of authority 
to induce students into exploitative working conditions in 
factories far from home. In 2006, for example, a teacher in 
Henan province recruited 84 female students from her school to 
work in a can factory in Zhejiang province. Students labored 
under exploitative conditions until some escaped. Authorities 
rescued the remaining students.\173\ The same year, teachers at 
a school in Shaanxi province arranged for approximately 600 
students, including under-age minors, to do ``work-study'' in 
an electronics factory in Guangdong province, where students 
were reported to work up to 14 hours a day without full 
wages.\174\

                              FORCED LABOR

    In May and June 2007, Chinese media and Internet activists 
uncovered a massive network of forced labor in brick kilns in 
Shanxi and Henan provinces. Reports indicated that people 
forced to work in the kilns included children and mentally 
challenged adults kidnapped by human traffickers and sold to 
the kilns, where they were beaten, denied food, and forced to 
work up to 20 hours per day. In other cases, workers were lured 
to the kilns through promises of high salaries.\175\ One father 
described his son's condition when he found him:

        My son was totally dumb, not even knowing how to cry, 
        or to scream or to call out ``father''[ . . .] He was 
        in rags and had wounds all over his body. Within three 
        months he had lost over [22 pounds].\176\

    Chinese officials announced in August 2007 that a 
nationwide campaign led to the rescue of 1,340 enslaved 
workers,\177\ but government reports of the size and scope of 
the problem appeared to conflict with accounts by citizens. 
Parents from Henan province, for example, said that up to 1,000 
children were forced into labor in Shanxi province, but Shanxi 
provincial vice-governor Xue Yanzhong said that authorities had 
inspected 4,861 brick kilns in the province and identified only 
15 child workers. According to Xue, only 17 of the brick kilns 
inspected used forced labor.\178\
    The reports of forced labor reveal a longstanding 
phenomenon, according to an editorial in the Chinese newspaper 
Southern Weekly:

        The dirty slave trade has been thriving for a long time 
        but the local government didn't take any action. It's 
        become an actual accomplice. The scandal is so massive 
        and catastrophic that it poses a serious threat to 
        public security.\179\

    According to a deputy director from the Ministry of Public 
Security, official knowledge of the forced labor system goes 
back as far as 2004. At that time, police discovered child 
labor being used in brick kilns in Henan province after a 
parent asked for help in finding his child. The deputy director 
considered the problem ``solved . . . under the instructions of 
our leaders.'' A kiln contractor reported that many kiln 
operators received advance notice of the 
inspections from local police and hid enslaved laborers during 
inspections. Kilns were only closed if they had no business 
licenses or did not adhere to safety and environmental 
standards, not because they were using forced labor.\180\
    By the middle of July 2007, 29 mine supervisors and owners 
received prison sentences for their involvement in forced 
labor. Of those convicted, a foreman who beat a mentally 
disabled worker to death was given the death penalty. The owner 
of this kiln, a son of a local Communist Party official, 
received a sentence of nine years. Other defendants were given 
prison terms from two years to life in prison.\181\ Critics 
have complained that these few convicted criminals were being 
used to deflect attention from the involvement of Party 
officials.\182\ By August, no senior officials had been 
punished and only 95 low ranking officials had been 
reprimanded.\183\ [For information regarding Chinese officials' 
disclosure of information on the forced labor scandal see 
Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
    In June, the All-China Lawyers Association asked the 
National People's Congress Standing Committee to introduce new 
legislation making slavery a criminal charge. The Association 
noted that current law applies only to legally recognized 
employers and does not apply to individuals or illegal 
workplaces.\184\

                    U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL COOPERATION

    The U.S. Department of Labor and two Chinese government 
agencies continued to conduct cooperative activities during 
2007 on wage and hour laws, occupational safety and health, 
mine safety, and pension oversight. The two countries renewed 
Letters of Understanding related to these areas and pledged to 
continue the 
cooperative activities for four more years. In addition, two 
new cooperative agreements were signed in the areas of 
unemployment insurance program administration and labor 
statistics.\185\

                         Freedom of Expression


                              INTRODUCTION

    The Commission's previous recommendations addressed three 
areas where China's citizens do not enjoy the right to free 
expression. First, the Commission has noted that restrictions 
on the free flow of information threaten the well-being of 
Chinese citizens and, increasingly, citizens around the world. 
In its 2003 Annual Report, the Commission noted that China's 
news media restrictions prevented citizens from being fully 
informed during the 2003 SARS crisis. After China began 
considering a proposal in 2006 to further limit media coverage 
during public emergencies, the Commission recommended in its 
2006 Annual Report that the President and Congress urge China's 
leaders to recognize the importance of complete transparency in 
the administration of public health, and the importance of an 
unimpeded press in providing critical information to the public 
in a timely manner. Recent international concern over the 
global health impacts of food, drugs, consumer products, 
disease outbreaks, and pollution originating from China 
underscore the importance of the free flow of information.
    Over the last five years, public access to government 
information, at least on paper, has improved, but major 
obstacles to government transparency remain, reflecting the 
Communist Party's overarching concern that it maintain control 
over the flow of information. In 2007, the government passed 
China's first national ``freedom of information'' regulation, 
but it remains subject to a ``state secrets'' 
exception that gives the government broad latitude to withhold 
information. The Party and government continue to maintain 
tight control over the press, and the prospects for a free 
press remain dim. While foreign reporters in theory were 
granted some increased press freedom in accordance with 
promises China made in 2001 as part of its successful bid to 
host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, China continues to use 
upcoming important events such as the Party's 17th Congress in 
October 2007, and corruption among Chinese reporters, as a 
pretext for increased restrictions on domestic media. The lack 
of a free press to monitor the government leaves citizens 
poorly informed about major problems and unable to fully 
investigate the root causes of such problems and the extent to 
which the Party or the government should be held accountable.
    Second, previous Commission reports highlighted China's 
pervasive censorship of the Internet and other electronic 
media. In its Annual Reports from 2002 to 2006, the Commission 
recommended that the President and Congress urge the Chinese 
government to stop blocking access to foreign news broadcasts 
and Web sites, and allow its citizens freer access to 
information on the Internet, particularly information 
concerning the rights of Chinese citizens to free speech and a 
free press. The Commission has also recommended that the 
President and Congress urge China to cease detaining 
journalists and writers, many of whom are punished for posting 
essays critical of the Chinese government on the Internet.
    Over the last five years, the Party and government have 
continued to emphasize management and control over the 
Internet. They have done so by requiring Web sites to be 
licensed, blocking access to politically sensitive information 
on the Internet, and detaining citizens who criticize the 
government online. In 2007, Hu Jintao called for ``purifying'' 
the Internet, saying ``the stability of the state'' depended on 
the Party taking full advantage of and successfully controlling 
the Internet. The Internet poses a daunting challenge for the 
Party. In 2007, citizen activists used the Internet and cell 
phones to raise public awareness about cases involving slave 
labor and the construction of a hazardous chemical plant, 
driving the reporting agendas of the state-controlled press and 
forcing the government to address these problems. Their 
success, however, reflects the creativity of China's citizenry 
in evading censors and the difficulty in trying to monitor 
China's growing online environment, rather than any government 
policy of liberalization. Furthermore, journalists and writers 
who criticize the government online continue to face 
imprisonment for such crimes as ``inciting subversion.''
    Third, the Commission's previous reports have noted China's 
prior restraints on publishing, which prevent citizens from 
freely expressing ideas and opinions. In its Annual Reports 
from 2003 to 2006, the Commission recommended that the 
President and Congress urge the Chinese government to eliminate 
prior restraints on publishing. Over the last five years, 
public officials in China have maintained prior restraints on 
publishing and continue to ban and confiscate books and 
magazines that do not conform to the Party's political 
requirements. This past year, publication and propaganda 
officials stepped up their efforts to clean up the publishing 
industry in preparation for the Party's 17th Congress to be 
held in October 2007.

                        FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

         Improvements and Obstacles to Government Transparency

    The Commission notes that over the last five years, the 
Chinese government has made progress in increasing public 
access to government sources of information. The Communist 
Party and State Council have directed all levels of government 
to increase transparency.\1\ In its 2003 Annual Report, the 
Commission noted that most provinces and major cities had set 
up detailed government Web sites.\2\ By March 2007, 86 percent 
of all government agencies had official Web sites.\3\ Many of 
the Web sites provide detailed and substantive information.\4\ 
In addition, by the end of 2006, most central government 
institutions and all provinces, autonomous regions, centrally 
administered municipalities, and top-level courts had 
established public spokesperson systems.\5\
    Over the last five years, the government has also sought to 
improve its ability to respond to public emergencies and make 
information available to the public more quickly. The 
government's slow response to the SARS disease outbreak in 2003 
and to the Songhua River chemical spill in 2005 led to passage 
of measures to prevent provincial and local officials from 
covering up such incidents.\6\ The Regulation on the Handling 
of Public Health Emergencies, for example, requires provincial 
governments to report a public health emergency to central 
officials within one hour and requires central officials, or 
provincial governments who have received approval from central 
officials, to release information in a timely manner.\7\ 
However, as the Commission noted in its 2003 and 2006 Annual 
Reports, these reforms were not intended to relax the 
government's control over the media or the free flow of 
information to the general public.\8\ Rather, the goal was to 
increase the flow of information to central authorities in 
Beijing, control how the press reported on the matter, and 
prevent private citizens from publishing opinions regarding the 
government's handling of the crisis.
    In April 2007, the State Council issued the Regulation on 
the Public Disclosure of Government Information (Public 
Disclosure Regulation), the first national ``freedom of 
information'' regulation requiring all government agencies to 
release important information to the public in a timely 
manner.\9\ The new regulation, which takes effect on May 1, 
2008, requires government agencies to timely disclose vital 
information regarding the government's handling of issues that 
have been at the forefront of controversy in recent years, such 
as food, drug, and product safety, public health emergencies, 
environmental protection, land expropriation, the sale of 
state-owned property, and population planning.\10\ The 
regulation also provides citizens, legal persons, and other 
organizations with the right to request information from a 
government agency and to file an administrative lawsuit to 
appeal an agency's decision not to provide information.\11\ The 
State Environmental Protection Administration subsequently 
issued implementing measures in April mandating public 
disclosure of information on China's environment.\12\ [See 
Section II--Environment.]
    The impact of these freedom of information regulations is 
limited, however, by the presence of a ``state secrets'' 
exception that gives the government broad latitude to withhold 
information from the public.\13\ This policy reflects the 
continuing perception by the Party that relinquishing too much 
control over the flow of information will cause ``social 
instability'' and challenge the Party's supremacy. Chinese laws 
and regulations provide lists of what may be deemed a state 
secret, but these lists are broad and vague, encompassing 
essentially all matters of public concern.\14\ For example, 
information about China's environmental pollution that would 
``reflect negatively on China's foreign affairs work'' is 
considered a state secret.\15\ Legal scholars in China have 
noted that the inclusion of a ``state secrets'' exception in 
the Public Disclosure Regulation gives officials too much 
discretion to withhold information.\16\ In addition, the Public 
Disclosure Regulation's heavy penalties for officials who fail 
to protect state secrets may encourage even less 
transparency.\17\ Moreover, citizens and journalists have 
encountered resistance from local officials when requesting 
information under similar administrative rules already in place 
in some Chinese cities. In June 2006, a Shanghai journalist 
sued the Shanghai Municipal Planning Bureau under a similar 
freedom of information regulation, but lost the case and was 
fired from his job as a result.\18\ Some legal experts in China 
have also questioned whether provisions in such regulations, 
granting citizens the right to request information, would apply 
to citizens acting in their role as journalists, an 
interpretation that would severely limit the law's impact.\19\
    The National People's Congress recently issued the 
Emergency Response Law, which requires people's governments to 
publicly disclose accurate and timely information regarding 
emergencies.\20\ The law was issued in August 2007 and will 
take effect on November 1, 2007. The Commission noted in its 
2006 Annual Report that a draft of this law contained a 
provision that would have imposed a heavy fine on domestic or 
foreign media who reported on a public emergency without 
government approval.\21\ The Commission noted that the 
provision would have impeded the efficiency of the Global 
Public Health Intelligence Network, an electronic surveillance 
system used by the World Health Organization to monitor the 
Internet for reports of communicable diseases and communicable 
disease syndromes. In a positive step, the provision was 
removed from the final version of the law.\22\ The law, 
however, now contains a provision prohibiting the fabrication 
and spread of ``false information.'' \23\ Media who violate 
this provision may be shut down.\24\ This provision could have 
a chilling effect on journalists who worry that the government 
retains too much discretion to determine whether information is 
false or not.\25\ In January 2006, for example, public 
officials sentenced journalist Li Changqing to three years in 
prison for violating a Criminal Law provision that prohibits 
the ``intentional dissemination of terrorist information that 
is knowingly fabricated to disturb public order,'' even though 
Li's reporting on a dengue fever outbreak turned out to be 
materially similar to the government's own accounts.\26\
    Public officials have punished citizens for sharing second-
hand information over the Internet or cell phones, threatening 
the free flow of information and forcing citizens to wait for 
the government's official version of the ``truth'' before 
discussing important public events. Commentators in China have 
expressed concern over the government's liberal application of 
Article 25 of the Public Security Administration Punishment 
Law, which provides for the detention of citizens who spread 
rumors with the intent to disturb public order.\27\ [See 
Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants for more 
information about this law.] For example, in July 2007, 
officials in Jinan city, Shandong province, detained a resident 
for noting in an online discussion that she had heard that 
citizens had perished in heavy flooding that hit the city.\28\
    The Supreme People's Court (SPC) has continued its campaign 
to increase public access to court proceedings. As the 
Commission noted in its 2003 Annual Report, the SPC has taken 
steps to improve the quality and availability of judicial 
decisions.\29\ In June 2007, the SPC issued several opinions 
calling on courts to provide public access to all stages of the 
trial process,\30\ and to make more judgments available in 
publications and over the Internet.\31\ The opinions, however, 
contain the ``state secrets'' exception, which courts have 
commonly used to conduct politically charged trials behind 
closed doors.\32\ [See Section II--Rights of Criminal Suspects 
and Defendants for more information about these opinions.] In 
addition, court officials concerned about media threats to 
judicial independence have sought to limit media reporting of 
court activities. In September 2006, top officials at the SPC 
announced a policy prohibiting news media from interviewing 
judges or court officials without government permission and 
directing the media not to issue commentary on pending court 
cases.\33\

                             NO FREE PRESS

    China's restrictions on the press violate the right to 
freedom of expression as provided for under international human 
rights standards and China's Constitution. Both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights\34\ 
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights\35\ 
(UDHR) guarantee the freedom to seek, receive, and impart 
information, through any media, regardless of frontiers. 
Article 35 of China's Constitution provides China's citizens 
freedom of speech and the press.\36\ While this freedom is not 
absolute, the ICCPR and UDHR provide that restrictions may be 
imposed only to protect the following interests: national 
security or public order, public health or morals, or the 
rights or reputations of others. Furthermore, the restriction 
must be prescribed by law and must not exceed the scope 
necessary to protect a compelling interest.\37\ China restricts 
the press for political and ideological reasons. Restrictions 
such as directives from propaganda officials are not prescribed 
by law because they are issued by a Communist Party entity, 
rather than one of the parties authorized to pass legislation 
under China's Legislation Law.

                Party and Government Control Over Media

    China's media could play an important role in helping 
inform the public about important events but, as noted above, 
recent laws and regulations dealing with government disclosure 
and public emergencies limit this potential. A more fundamental 
limitation, however, is the Party's continued control over all 
media in China, 
either directly or through its control over the government 
agencies that regulate China's media. The Party exercises 
direct control over the media through the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD). The CPD issues directives informing 
publishers and editors what stories can and cannot be covered. 
It works together with lower-level propaganda departments to 
deliver these directives to all media and to appoint media 
managers to monitor each publication.\38\ The CPD also requires 
editors and publishers to attend 
indoctrination sessions. In addition, government agencies 
heavily regulate the media. News publishers must be licensed by 
the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and 
have a government sponsor.\39\ GAPP requires all journalists to 
be licensed.\40\ The State Administration of Radio, Film, and 
Television (SARFT) controls the content of radio, television, 
satellite, and Internet broadcasts.
    Major media, such as the People's Daily and Xinhua, remain 
closely affiliated with a Party or government entity.\41\ 
Central Party and government officials use journalists to 
gather information so that they can monitor provincial and 
local officials, under a policy called ``public opinion 
supervision.'' \42\ Stories they deem too critical or 
politically sensitive to be published in the media are instead 
forwarded as intelligence reports to relevant officials through 
classified channels.\43\ Commercialization of the industry in 
the 1990s and the ``public opinion supervision'' policy has led 
to the development of media with a reputation for more hard-
hitting journalism, including Southern Metropolitan Daily and 
Caijing.\44\ Yet, even these more independent media remain 
subject to control by propaganda officials and have been 
singled out for punishment in the past.\45\

                  Roles the Media Is Expected to Play

    The media in China is expected to act as the Party's 
mouthpiece.\46\ Just before becoming President and Party 
General Secretary, Hu Jintao, in 2002, reiterated this 
longstanding policy, which has remained firmly in place during 
Hu's first five years in power.\47\ For example, the Party's 
Central Committee issued a resolution at the end of its sixth 
plenum meeting in October 2006, calling on the news media to 
promote Hu's ``harmonious society'' policy.\48\ To create a 
``positive public opinion atmosphere'' for the Party's 17th 
Congress in October 2007, propaganda officials issued 
guidelines restricting media coverage of 20 topics, including 
the 50th anniversary of the anti-Rightist campaign, judicial 
corruption, and campaigns by legal rights defenders.\49\ SARFT 
ordered television stations to air only ``ethically inspired TV 
series'' during prime time in the months leading up to the 
Party Congress.\50\
    The Party also expects the media to paint central Party and 

government officials in a positive light. While media may 
report critically on the activities of provincial and local 
officials, their criticisms must remain at that level and may 
not threaten Party supremacy. The media must emphasize efforts 
by central Party and government officials to remedy the 
situation. For example, after news media and Internet activists 
exposed the widespread use of forced labor in brick kilns in 
May and June 2007, authorities chided local officials for 
trying to hide information from the media, but then instructed 
journalists to limit their coverage and to applaud the rescue 
efforts of central Party and government officials.\51\
    Media that disobey propaganda directives or publish content 

unacceptable to censors continue to risk being disciplined or 
censored by the Party. In November 2006, the CPD ordered senior 
executives at the Beijing-based weekly magazine, Lifeweek, to 
engage in self-criticism and required its journalists to 
undergo political training after the magazine violated a Party 
directive not to highlight politically sensitive events.\52\ 
Staff at a newspaper in Sichuan province were suspended for 
inadvertently running an 
advertisement that included a veiled reference to the Chinese 
government's June 4, 1989 crackdown on the Tiananmen Square 
democracy protests.\53\ In March 2007, Caijing was reportedly 
ordered to withdraw an issue containing an article about a 
contentious draft of the Property Law then under 
consideration.\54\

                Consequences of the Lack of a Free Press

    Over the last five years, events such as the SARS crisis in 
2003 and more recent government scandals show that the Party's 
control over the press denies citizens critical information at 
important times. Chinese citizens and citizens around the world 
cannot effectively monitor the Chinese government because they 
remain dependent on the willingness of one unsupervised source, 
the Party, to provide accurate, timely, and unbiased 
information. Some recent examples include:

        <bullet>  Even after measures implemented following the 
        SARS crisis in 2003 discouraged local officials from 
        hiding information, local officials in the provinces of 
        Jilin and Heilongjiang delayed notifying relevant 
        officials and the general public about a chemical plant 
        explosion in 2005 that released chemicals into the 
        Songhua River, the main water source for the 
        Heilongjiang capital of Harbin.\55\ They imposed a two-
        week press blackout, and the incident led to panic 
        among citizens and a diplomatic incident with Russia.
        <bullet>  When the top Party official in Shanghai was 
        forced to step down in September 2006 amid allegations 
        that he had mismanaged the city's nine billion yuan 
        (US$1.2 billion) pension fund,\56\ propaganda officials 
        ordered local media to publish only official news 
        reports from Xinhua.\57\ During this time, Shanghai's 
        municipal government reportedly did not hold a press 
        conference for almost four months.\58\
        <bullet>  In May 2007, international and Hong Kong 
        officials complained that Chinese officials were tight-
        lipped about a rumored epidemic affecting pigs in a 
        province near Hong Kong, and about contaminated pet 
        food that had reportedly caused large numbers of cats 
        and dogs in the United States to become ill.\59\ 
        China's media had reportedly issued few reports on the 
        incidents.\60\
        <bullet>  In July 2007, the Financial Times reported 
        that officials at the State Environmental Protection 
        Administration and Ministry of Health asked the World 
        Bank to remove from a joint report the figure of 
        750,000 premature deaths every year in China, caused 
        mainly by air pollution.\61\ Officials reportedly said 
        the information was ``too sensitive'' and could cause 
        ``social unrest.'' \62\ A foreign ministry official 
        denied the charge that any information had been 
        censored.\63\
        <bullet>  In July 2007, propaganda officials ordered 
        restrictions on food safety reports after a Beijing 
        reporter issued a false news report alleging that food 
        vendors were filling steamed buns with pieces of 
        cardboard.\64\

                   Limited Prospects for a Free Press

    Central government officials have urged local officials to 
cooperate more with the media, but this development should not 
be interpreted as a shift in government policy to allow for a 
freer press.\65\ For example, in July 2007, a State Council 
Information Office official criticized local officials for 
blocking media coverage of the forced labor scandal at brick 
factories in central China.\66\ This criticism is consistent 
with the central government's ``public opinion supervision'' 
policy of relying on journalists to gather information so that 
they can monitor provincial and local officials. The central 
government's support of this policy has, however, given 
commentators in China justification for calling for broader 
press freedom, 
although they have been careful to do so in the context of 
local initiatives to restrict press freedom and to fashion 
arguments consistent with ``public opinion supervision.'' \67\ 
For example, a deputy editor at Southern Weekend argued in an 
editorial that the purpose of news is not to serve as a 
propaganda tool, and that the central government's ``public 
opinion supervision'' policy is intended for the press to be a 
check on public power.\68\ The editorial was in response to the 
Anhui provincial government's issuance in October 2006 of rules 
requiring journalists to write a minimum number of ``positive'' 
stories about Anhui in order to receive a promotion.\69\
    The Chinese government also allowed foreign journalists 
greater freedom in 2007. To fulfill China's commitment to give 
journalists ``complete freedom'' to report on China when it bid 
for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in 2001,\70\ Premier Wen 
Jiabao signed into law new regulations in December 2006, which 
eliminate the requirement that foreign journalists must obtain 
government permission before conducting interviews.\71\ The new 
rules, which went into effect on January 1, 2007 and expire on 
October 17, 2008,\72\ have had mixed results. The Foreign 
Correspondents Club of China, an association of Beijing-based 
foreign journalists, and Human Rights Watch both issued reports 
noting that while some journalists have said that China's 
reporting environment has improved, harassment, intimidation, 
and detention of foreign journalists and the Chinese citizens 
they interact with remains commonplace.\73\ Problems have 
included intimidation of citizens who speak to foreign 
journalists,\74\ harassment of journalists in politically 
sensitive areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region,\75\ 
harassment of citizens who work with foreign journalists,\76\ 
and the refusal of local officials to recognize that the new 
rules extend to non-Olympics related coverage.\77\ It remains 
to be seen whether the rules will be extended beyond the 
Olympics and what effect they will have on domestic 
journalists. For a more detailed and updated analysis on the 
impact of these regulations on freedom of expression in China, 
see the Commission's Web site at www.cecc.gov. 
    One obstacle to press freedom in China is that the state's 
control over the media contributes to corruption in the media. 
According to David Bandurski, a research associate at the China 
Media Project at the University of Hong Kong: ``Media 
corruption is facilitated by the quasi-official status of 
reporters, who are seen by many Chinese as government 
functionaries with special authority. This combination of power 
and profit motive is a key ingredient in many extortion 
attempts.'' \78\ In May 2007, the People's Daily reported that 
a person who had posed as a reporter and top editor at the 
paper had collected 3.79 million yuan (US$500,000) in bribes 
before being caught and sentenced to life in prison.\79\ 
Problems of journalists asking for bribes in return for not 
publishing negative news or writing a positive story are 
reportedly widespread.\80\
    This corruption has provided the state with a pretext to 
restrict China's media even more.\81\ In March 2007, for 
example, the GAPP issued a notice requiring media to take 
greater measures to purge their local offices of unlicensed 
journalists after one was beaten to death by the owner of an 
illegal coal mine who thought the journalist was seeking a 
bribe.\82\ Later in 2007, a Beijing journalist falsified a 
report on food vendors filling steamed buns with cardboard. 
Amid rising international concern over China's food exports, 
China responded with a crackdown on false news and illegal 
publications, including ``illegal political newspapers and 
magazines that fabricate political rumors.'' \83\

                          INTERNET CENSORSHIP

                        China's Internet Policy

    Since the Internet first became popular in the late 1990s, 
China's policy has emphasized management and control over this 
medium. In a January 2007 speech to Politburo officials, 
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Jintao called for 
``purifying'' the Internet environment, saying that ``the 
stability of the state'' depended on the Party taking full 
advantage of and successfully controlling the Internet.\84\ 
China has controlled the Internet through licensing 
requirements for Web sites, shutting down and blocking access 
to Web sites that post political content, and detaining 
citizens who criticize the government online or post 
politically sensitive content. Its efforts have been relatively 
successful. Despite heavy censorship, many citizens consider 
the Internet in China to be quite free, with unprecedented 
access to information about sports, entertainment, and 
business, and in some cases, political content that China fails 
to block. According to a recent survey, more than 80 percent of 
Internet users in China are satisfied with the diversity of 
content.\85\
    Far from simply limiting online information that runs 
counter to the Party's ideology, the Party has sought to use 
the Internet to bolster its monopoly on political power and to 
drive China's economy. According to the World Bank, information 
and communication technologies have led China's economic 
ascent, growing two to three times faster than China's overall 
GDP over the last 10 years.\86\ Internet use has skyrocketed 
from 59 million users in 2002 to 162 million in June 2007.\87\ 
According to Tim Wu, an expert on China and a professor at 
Columbia Law School, ``the Chinese government has seen the 
Internet as an enormous opportunity at igniting public opinion 
in its favor.'' \88\ During his January 2007 speech to 
Politburo officials, President Hu emphasized the central role 
the Internet plays in the Party's efforts to shape public 
opinion.\89\ China views the Internet as a battleground for 
public opinion that is currently monopolized by the West,\90\ 
and has sought to overcome this perceived monopoly by 
increasing Chinese sources for online information. The fact 
that it is easy to communicate with large numbers of people 
over the Internet, and that users rely heavily on the Internet 
for news and information, make the Internet a powerful platform 
for promoting the Party's ideology and policies.

                    Measures To Control the Internet

    China's measures to control the Internet do not conform to 
international standards for freedom of expression. Under the 
ICCPR and UDHR, such restrictions may be imposed only if they 
are provided by law and are necessary to protect national 
security or public order, public health or morals, or the 
rights or reputations of others.\91\ In some cases, China has 
imposed restrictions to address issues of public concern, such 
as privacy protection, false advertisements, spam, online 
pornography, and youth addiction to the Internet.\92\ But 
public officials in China also prohibit citizens from 
accessing or posting online content if they find such content 
to be politically unacceptable without any formal determination 
of necessity based on ICCPR and UDHR standards.

Licensing System

    As noted in the Commission's 2006 Annual Report, the 
government requires all Web sites in China to be either 
licensed by, or registered with, the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII).\93\ Web sites that fail to register or obtain a 
license may be shut down and their operators fined.\94\ 
Authorities appear to be shutting down more Web sites in 
preparation for the 17th Party Congress, many for being 
unregistered.\95\ Anyone wishing to post or transmit news 
reports or commentary relating to politics and economics, or 
military, foreign, and public affairs, must also have a 
government license.\96\ According to the OpenNet Initiative, 
``In large measure, the registration regulation is designed to 
induce Web site owners to forego potentially sensitive or 
prohibited content, such as political criticism, by linking 
their identities to that content. The regulation operates 
through a chilling effect.'' \97\ China continues to draft 
regulations to bring new forms of online media into the 
registration system. In April 2007, for example, Xinhua 
reported that the General Administration of Press and 
Publication (GAPP) had drafted the Regulation on the 
Supervision of Internet Publishing, which would require online 
magazines to be examined and approved by GAPP prior to 
publication.\98\

Monitoring, Blocking Access, and Filtering Content

    China has continued to block access to foreign Web sites, 
which it is able to do because it controls access at the 
gateway connection between China and the global Internet.\99\ 
Over the past five years, the Commission has noted that at 
various times China has blocked the Web sites of AltaVista, 
Google, and foreign news providers such as the Voice of 
America, Radio Free Asia, and the BBC, and human rights 
advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Human Rights in 
China, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to Protect 
Journalists. The Commission has noted in its recommendations on 
the Internet that China's censorship system prevents its 
citizens from accessing information about their rights and 
China's violations of them. Since May 2005, the Chinese 
government has prevented its citizens from accessing the 
Commission's Web site. In June 2007, China reportedly unblocked 
access to the English Wikipedia Web site after it had been 
blocked for most of the last 18 months, but the version of 
Wikipedia designed for Chinese users remained blocked. Bloggers 
reported that certain pages on the English site remained 
blocked as well, such as those relating to Tibet or Tiananmen 
Square.\100\ In July, Yahoo!'s photo sharing Web site, Flickr, 
reported that China had blocked its site, after ruling out the 
possibility of a technical problem.\101\
    China employs a large number of public security officials 
to monitor the Internet and is improving its monitoring 
capabilities as Internet usage grows. In April 2007, Xinhua 
reported that by the end of June, all major portals and online 
forums would be monitored by ``virtual cops'' of the Ministry 
of Public Security.\102\ In May, the MII announced that by 
October the ministry would complete a database of registered 
Web sites that would make it easier for law enforcement 
officials to keep track of the rapidly growing number of Web 
sites.\103\ Xinhua reported that more than 2,000 Web sites are 
registered each day.\104\
    China compels Internet companies to assist in censorship by 
requiring them to filter search results and to monitor the 
Internet activities of its customers to ensure that ``harmful 
information'' does not come online. Chinese search engines such 
as Baidu, and the China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, 
and Google filter search results, including those relating to 
the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and human rights.\105\ 
Providers of Internet access and services must monitor 
customers' online activity, maintain records of such activity, 
provide such information to officials as part of a ``legal 
investigation,'' and remove any ``harmful'' information.\106\ 
In February 2007, Radio Free Asia reported that Sohu.com, a 
major Chinese Internet portal, had shut down two of the blogs 
of Pu Zhiqiang, a prominent lawyer who has promoted citizens' 
legal rights.\107\ Internet cafes, where many Chinese access 
the Internet, are also required to record the identities of 
their customers, monitor their online activity, and maintain 
records of both for not less than 60 days.\108\
    Internet companies have also repeatedly pledged publicly to 
support China's censorship policies over the last five years, 
although they have shown a willingness to resist some 
proposals. This past year, the Internet Society of China (ISC), 
a think tank affiliated with the MII, sought to implement a 
policy requiring all bloggers to register under their real 
names. Real name systems may be useful for encouraging civil 
discourse and accountability, but in the context of China's 
tightly censored Internet it threatens what has become a haven 
for expression, as bloggers had come to rely on a veneer of 
anonymity\109\ that had emboldened many to publicly express 
opinions they otherwise would not have. Real name systems that 
have already been implemented have reportedly led to dramatic 
drops in participation.\110\ In May 2007, the ISC decided 
against making the proposal mandatory following industry 
resistance.\111\ Instead, major Internet companies such as Sina 
Corporation, NetEase.com, Inc., TOM Online, Inc., Yahoo! China, 
which Yahoo! retains a minority stake in but reportedly does 
not have day-to-day operational control over,\112\ and MSN's 
China service, signed a self-discipline pledge in August to 
encourage Internet users to use their real name when posting 
blogs or essays online.\113\ Yahoo! and MSN, however, both 
indicated that there were no current plans to require customers 
to use their real names to register for blogging services.\114\

Imprisoning Online Critics

    Over the last five years, public officials in China have 
frequently used Article 105 of the Criminal Law to detain 
citizens for criticizing the government and the Party online, 
especially on Web sites outside of China.\115\ Article 105 
outlaws ``subversion'' or ``incitement of subversion.'' The UN 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has criticized China's use 
of such ``vague, imprecise, and sweeping'' provisions to punish 
peaceful expression of rights guaranteed in the UDHR and 
ICCPR.\116\
    Over the past year, public officials in China have punished 
numerous online critics in the run-up to the 17th Party 
Congress and the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.

        <bullet>  In October 2006, a court in Hebei province 
        sentenced Internet essayist Guo Qizhen to four years in 
        prison for inciting subversion in connection with 30 
        essays he posted on a U.S.-based Web site.\117\
        <bullet>  In October 2006, a court in Shandong province 
        sentenced Internet essayist Li Jianping to two years in 
        prison for inciting subversion in connection with 
        essays he posted on foreign Web sites.\118\
        <bullet>  In March 2007, a court in Zhejiang province 
        sentenced writer Zhang Jianhong (whose pen name is Li 
        Hong) to six years in prison for inciting subversion by 
        ``slandering'' the government and China's social system 
        in 60 essays he posted on foreign Web sites.\119\
        <bullet>  In April 2007, a Zhejiang court sentenced 
        painter and writer Yan Zhengxue to three years in 
        prison for inciting subversion by ``attacking the 
        Party's leaders'' on foreign Web sites.\120\
        <bullet>  In August 2007, a Zhejiang court sentenced 
        writer Chen Shuqing to four years in prison for 
        inciting subversion after he criticized the government 
        online.\121\

    The above individuals in Zhejiang were reportedly members 
of the China Democracy Party (CDP) or charged with being a CDP 
member,\122\ and joined other reported CDP members in Zhejiang 
who were punished this past year, including Chi Jianwei and Lu 
Gengsong. Chi was sentenced to three years in prison in March 
for ``using a cult to undermine implementation of the law'' 
\123\ and Lu was detained in August on charges of inciting 
subversion.\124\ [See Section III--Civil Society for more 
information on the CDP.] 
Authorities also refused to renew the license of Li Jianqiang, 
the lawyer who represented Chen, Zhang, Yan, and Guo.\125\ Li 
has represented numerous writers and activists, including 
freelance writer Yang Tongyan (whose pen name is Yang 
Tianshui), sentenced in May 2006 to 12 years in prison on 
``subversion'' charges for criticizing the government online 
and attempting to form a branch of the CDP.\126\
    Public officials in China have also used Article 105 to 
punish citizens who criticize China's human rights record in 
the context of the 2008 Olympic Games. In August 2007, public 
security officials in Jiamusi city, Heilongjiang province, 
arrested Yang Chunlin and charged him with inciting subversion 
after he organized an open letter titled ``We Want Human 
Rights, Not the Olympics,'' and gathered more than 10,000 
signatures from farmers who had reportedly lost their 
land.\127\
    Additional information on these cases and others is 
available on the Commission's Political Prisoner Database [See 
Section I--Political Prisoner Database].
    Both the UDHR and ICCPR allow for restrictions on free 
speech only to the extent necessary to protect national 
security. Available opinions from these cases, however, provide 
no examples of any subversive language and make no attempt to 
show that the actions in question caused or were likely to 
cause a threat to China's national security.\128\ Moreover, the 
courts did not place any constitutional limitations on the 
authority of the government to criminalize certain types of 
speech, or balance the need to protect national security with 
the right to freedom of expression. Chinese officials have also 
begun to punish citizens for simply looking up and viewing Web 
sites deemed to be reactionary or a threat to its power. Zhang 
Jianping was barred from using the Internet for six months 
after he allegedly accessed the Web site for the Epoch Times, a 
New York-based newspaper linked to Falun Gong and known for its 
critical coverage of China.\129\

                         Challenges to Control

    The Internet presents a daunting challenge for the Party. 
Its decentralized nature and the ability to send information to 
large numbers of people quickly makes it increasingly difficult 
to control.\130\ This challenge is expected to increase over 
time as more people use the Internet and rely on it for 
information. With a penetration rate of only 12.3 percent of 
China's population, below the world average of 17.6 percent, 
there is plenty of room to grow.\131\ The average number of 
hours per week spent online rose from 11.5 in 2002 to 18.6 in 
June 2007. Almost all Internet users in China look to the 
Internet first for information and more than three-fourths said 
that they first found out about a major news event from the 
Internet.
    Commentators have noted recently that the Internet and 
blogs in particular are becoming a powerful vehicle for 
citizens to provide one another information that contrasts with 
information in the state-controlled press and Party propaganda. 
The number of blogs, personalized Web pages that citizens use 
to provide running commentary on all kinds of topics, has grown 
to an estimated 20 million in China.\132\ Xiao Qiang, Director 
of the China Internet Project at the University of California 
at Berkeley, testified at the Commission's hearing in September 
2006 that ``[o]nline discussions of current events, especially 
through Internet bulletin board systems (BBS) and Weblogs, or 
`blogs,' are having real agenda-setting power.'' According to 
Ashley Esarey, a Middlebury College professor and expert on 
China's media controls, China's blogs exhibit much higher 
freedom and pluralism than the state-controlled press.\133\ The 
Internet has provided a platform for ``citizen journalists'' 
who operate largely outside of the censorship system for 
traditional media\134\ and citizens are using less regulated 
blogs to break news stories. ``[E]very blogger is a potential 
source of news. The Internet has the power to take any local 
news story and make it national news overnight,'' said Li 
Datong, the ousted former editor of Freezing Point, a weekly 
published by the China Youth Daily, who now writes for the 
current affairs Web site openDemocracy.\135\
    Other information sharing technologies, especially cell 
phones, are posing similar challenges to China's information 
control. Cell phone use is ubiquitous in China and popular 
among broad segments of the population. By July 2007, cell 
phone usage had grown to 500 million, almost 40 percent of the 
population.\136\ Rural residents made up nearly half of China 
Mobile's 53 million new cell phone subscribers in 2006.\137\ 
While cell phones are a less conducive platform for exchanging 
large amounts of information, in China they are a popular tool 
for sending short text messages. Chinese of all ages use the 
``text messaging'' function much more often than in the United 
States, where it has remained largely the province of the 
young.\138\ China also employs censorship technology to filter 
out politically sensitive text messages.\139\
    Citizens have been using the Internet and cell phones with 
increasing success to shape and even drive the reporting 
agendas of mainstream news outlets, and to force governments to 
address problems. Censors have not been able to stop an initial 
tide of information and instead have been left to contain the 
situation after the fact. Several high-profile instances over 
the last year include:

        <bullet>  Officials in the southeastern port city of 
        Xiamen, home to more than 2 million people, planned to 
        build a 300-acre, 10.5 billion yuan (US$1.4 billion) 
        hazardous chemical plant in a heavily populated 
        neighborhood.\140\ In March 2007, central government 
        officials criticized the project's safety,\141\ but 
        officials in Xiamen kept local residents in the dark 
        about the concerns and made sure local media touted the 
        project's economic benefits.\142\ A local resident who 
        became aware of the concerns began to use his blog to 
        organize opposition to the plant, telling readers the 
        plant would hurt the local property market and tourism 
        industry.\143\ Word quickly spread over the Internet. 
        Meanwhile, residents began to circulate cell phone text 
        messages comparing the plant to an ``atomic bomb.'' 
        \144\ Xinhua 
        reported that citizens sent nearly one million text 
        messages opposing the project, leading local officials 
        to suspend construction in May 2007.\145\ Despite local 
        officials' efforts to censor the Internet and cell 
        phones, area residents used both to organize and 
        document protest marches in early June that attracted 
        thousands.\146\
        <bullet>  The Internet also helped bring nationwide and 
        international attention to the kidnapping of migrant 
        workers forced into labor in brick factories in central 
        China. In early June 2007, the relative of a rescued 
        child posted a plea on the Internet on behalf of 
        hundreds of parents still looking for missing 
        children.\147\ The post was rejected by a Xinhua forum 
        for containing ``sensitive content,'' but was 
        successfully posted on 
        another forum. Her original post and a re-posting were 
        each viewed hundreds of thousands of times. Following 
        the postings, China's traditional media outlets gave 
        the story extensive coverage, exposing in graphic 
        detail the large numbers of migrant workers, including 
        many children and mentally ill, who were forced under 
        heavy guard to work for no pay and little food.\148\ In 
        response, the government launched raids involving a 
        reported 35,000 policemen, ordered media to highlight 
        the Party's rescue efforts, sought to discredit the 
        Internet activist who helped uncover the scandal, and 
        warned parents and lawyers for victims not to speak to 
        journalists.\149\ [See Section II--Worker Rights for 
        more information on the labor issues relating to this 
        case.]
        <bullet>  In March 2007, Chinese bloggers made a 
        national news sensation of a couple in Chongqing city 
        in western China who resisted pressure to sell their 
        home to developers, leaving their house protruding in 
        the air like a nail after the land around it had been 
        excavated.\150\ Bloggers posted photos of the ``awesome 
        nail house'' and traveled to the scene to conduct their 
        own reporting of the story, which hit the headlines 
        shortly after the landmark Property Law had been 
        passed.\151\

    While these technological tools have offered citizens new 
opportunities to express themselves and to elude censors, they 
have not 
increased citizens' freedom of expression per se, as the 
Chinese government has consistently responded to these 
outpourings of discontent with increased restrictions. 
Officials imposed restrictions on media coverage, blocked 
access to or removed offending blogs and cell phone text 
messages, and in some cases warned citizens not to speak with 
the media.\152\ After the Xiamen chemical plant protests, for 
example, local officials drafted legislation that would 
prohibit area Internet users from commenting on blogs and 
discussion forums anonymously and require local Internet 
service providers to improve their capability to filter out 
``harmful and unhealthy'' information.\153\

                 FREEDOM TO PUBLISH IDEAS AND OPINIONS

                  Government Policy Toward Publishing

    The Chinese government's licensing scheme for print 
media\154\ that has remained in place over the last five years 
does not conform to international standards for freedom of the 
press.\155\ An individual who wishes to publish a book, 
newspaper, or magazine may not do so on their own, but must do 
so through a publisher that has been licensed by the General 
Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP).\156\ The GAPP 
requires that to obtain a license, publishers must have a 
government sponsor and meet minimum financial 
requirements.\157\ Every book, newspaper, and magazine must 
have a unique serial number, and the GAPP maintains exclusive 
control over the distribution of these numbers.\158\ GAPP 
officials have explicitly linked the allotment of book numbers 
to the political orientation of publishers.\159\
    While not speaking specifically about this licensing 
scheme, Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged in March that 
government agencies with too much licensing authority, and 
little restraint or oversight, had bred corruption among 
officials.\160\ In July, popular writer Wang Shuo accused 
television censors of abusing their authority and collecting 
bribes in exchange for a television show's approval, a 
situation that one official acknowledged, but denied being 
widespread.\161\ Concern over corruption has not stopped 
officials from continuing to expand their licensing authority 
over free expression. In April 2007, the Ministry of Culture 
announced that it would begin to require actors, singers, 
directors, and other artists to receive certification in order 
to be hired.\162\
    Publishers and writers must serve the Communist Party's 
interests. Long Xinmin said in October 2006 while he was 
director of GAPP that press and publishing departments must 
``insist on the unwavering guiding position'' of Marxism and 
the Party.\163\ In November, President Hu Jintao told writers 
that the Party hoped that ``each would make their own 
contribution to building a harmonious society.'' \164\ In March 
2007, Long Xinmin said that press and publishing industries 
must ``firmly grasp the correct guidance of public opinion and 
create a good public opinion environment'' for the Party's 17th 
Congress and ``harmonious society'' policy.\165\

             Banning and Confiscating Illegal Publications

    The government continues to target publications that 
contain 
political and religious information and opinions with which the 
government disagrees or for simply not having a license to 
publish. Between 2002 and 2006, public security officials in 
China confiscated 590 million ``illegal publications.'' \166\ 
Many of the publications are targeted for violating 
intellectual property rights or containing pornographic 
content, but in 2004, for example, public officials confiscated 
hundreds of thousands of copies of publications solely 
because of their political content. In 2005, officials seized 
996,000 copies of ``illegal political publications.'' During a 
two-month period in 2006, officials seized 303,000 copies of 
``illegal publications'' deemed to have harmed social 
stability, endangered state security, or incited ethnic 
separatism.\167\ During that same period, officials confiscated 
616,000 unauthorized newspapers and periodicals.\168\ In 
February 2007, a GAPP official explained that a crackdown on 
``illegal political publications,'' including those that 
``attacked the Party's leaders,'' ``slandered the socialist 
system,'' or concerned Falun Gong, would be a major focus of 
the ongoing Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal 
Publications campaign in preparation for the Party's 17th 
Congress.\169\ [See Section II--Freedom of Religion--Religious 
Speech for more information on restrictions on religious 
publications.] In the first three months of 2007 alone, 
authorities confiscated 357,000 copies of publications deemed 
to have harmed social stability, endangered state security, or 
incited ethnic separatism.\170\
    China's onerous licensing requirements encourage citizens 
to publish illegally, eroding the rule of law, and subjecting 
them to the risk that they will be caught and their publication 
shut down. One editor of a college magazine in China said in 
June 2007 that he had set up his own campus magazine because he 
had been disappointed with other magazines in China, which he 
described as ``homogeneous, very contrived, and lacking in 
energetic content.'' \171\ A professor commenting on the 
publications, however, said that without a publication number 
the students were engaged in illegal publishing. The professor 
said the licensing system was intended to ensure that 
publications were not ``abused by certain groups.'' \172\

                         Censoring Publications

    Authors who have published through a licensed publisher 
still risk being censored. Propaganda officials decide what to 
censor behind closed doors, making verification difficult and a 
legal challenge impossible. The Hong Kong-based South China 
Morning Post reported that at a meeting in January 2007, GAPP 
said it had banned eight books because propaganda officials 
determined they had ``overstepped the line.'' \173\ The books 
dealt with topics such as China's media, SARS, the Cultural 
Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, and democracy. Officials 
reportedly criticized one of the books for ``romanticizing'' 
Japan's occupation of China in the 1930s and 1940s and others 
for revealing state secrets.\174\
    In response to media attempts to confirm the ban, GAPP 
officials denied its existence.\175\ Publishers, however, 
confirmed the ban.\176\ As punishment, authorities reportedly 
required the editors at one publisher to write self-criticisms 
and forego bonuses, and reduced the publisher's allotment of 
book numbers by 20 percent. Zhang Yihe, the daughter of a 
prominent rightist figure from the 1950s and whose book on the 
repression faced by classical opera stars in 1960s China was 
banned, sought to have a Chinese court overturn the action, but 
two courts in Beijing refused to accept her application.\177\

                Preventing Writers From Traveling Freely

    Chinese officials have also punished critics by restricting 
their travel. In February 2007, local police officials 
prevented 20 writers from attending an International PEN 
conference in Hong Kong by refusing to approve their travel 
documents or warning them not to go.\178\ The writers included 
Zhang Yihe and Zan Aizong, a journalist who was detained in 
2006 after he posted reports on 
foreign Web sites about detentions of Protestants protesting 
the destruction of a church in Zhejiang province.

                    POLITICAL PRISONER DEVELOPMENTS

    The case of Shi Tao, a Chinese journalist currently serving 
a 10-year sentence for ``illegally providing state secrets to a 
foreign organization,'' \179\ gained greater attention outside 
of China in 2007, as new information about his case became 
public. In 2004, Shi Tao reportedly e-mailed notes to a New 
York-based democracy Web site that were from a propaganda 
document restricting media coverage during the 15th anniversary 
of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy protests. Shi Tao's conviction 
in 2005 was based in part on information provided by Yahoo! 
China, then under the control of Yahoo!.\180\ In July 2007, the 
Dui Hua Foundation and Boxun released a copy of the request 
Chinese police made to Yahoo! China seeking information about 
Shi Tao's e-mail account. The release of the request brought to 
light new information about the basis of the request as 
communicated to Yahoo! China because it indicates that the 
request related specifically to a suspected ``illegal provision 
of state secrets'' case.\181\ In addition, Shi Tao's case 
remains significant because he exposed China's censorship of 
its media. As the global impact of events within China has 
grown, China's censorship of the media has become more 
important because the rest of the world relies on China's media 
to better understand such events. The Commission will continue 
to monitor and note future actions by Chinese officials to 
punish citizens for exposing censorship of China's media, in 
violation of these citizens' internationally protected right to 
freedom of expression.
    Another journalist, Zhao Yan, completed his three-year 
sentence for fraud and was released in September 2007.\182\ 
Authorities originally arrested Zhao, a Chinese researcher for 
the New York Times (NYT), for providing state secrets to 
foreigners.\183\ Sources said the ``state secret'' was 
information that former President and Communist Party General 
Secretary Jiang Zemin had offered to resign as Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission. Jiang's resignation was later 
reported in the official press. In August 2006, an intermediate 
court in Beijing sentenced Zhao to three years in prison on an 
unrelated fraud charge dating from 2001, but acquitted him of 
disclosing state secrets. Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese 
law and advisor to the NYT on Zhao's case, testified at a 
Commission hearing in September 2006 that Zhao was ``sentenced 
to three years in prison after another trial that can only be 
regarded as a farce, and after highly illegal--according to 
Chinese law--pre-trial detention, interrogation, et cetera.''
    In a positive sign, one journalist was released early while 
another received a sentence reduction. Local officials released 
former Xinhua journalist Gao Qinrong from a prison in Shanxi 
province in December 2006, 4 years before his 12-year sentence 
was to expire.\184\ Gao was sentenced in 1999 after he exposed 
corruption at an irrigation project in Yuncheng district, 
Shanxi province, that implicated top provincial officials. Xu 
Zerong received a nine-month sentence reduction on an unknown 
date and is due for release in September 2012.\185\ Xu, a 
senior research fellow at the Guangdong Academy of Social 
Sciences in Guangzhou city and head of an independent 
publishing company in Hong Kong, was sentenced to 13 years in 
prison in 2001 for revealing state secrets by copying and 
sending historical material dating from the 1950s about the 
Korean War to researchers overseas, and illegally operating a 
business by selling books and periodicals without officially 
issued book numbers.
    Additional information on these cases and others is 
available on the Commission's Political Prisoner Database [see 
Section I--Political Prisoner Database].

                          Freedom of Religion


                              INTRODUCTION

    Government harassment, repression, and persecution of 
religious and spiritual adherents has increased during the 
five-year period covered by this report. In 2004, the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported that 
repression of religious belief and practice grew in severity. 
The Communist Party strengthened its campaign against 
organizations it designated as cults, targeting Falun Gong in 
particular, but also unregistered Buddhist and Christian 
groups, among other unregistered communities.\1\ The Commission 
noted a more visible trend in harassment and repression of 
unregistered Protestants for alleged cult involvement starting 
in mid-2006.\2\ The Commission reported an increase in 
harassment against unregistered Catholics starting in 2004 and 
an increase in pressure on registered clerics beginning in 
2005.\3\ The government's crackdown on religious activity in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has increased in 
intensity since 2001.\4\ New central government legal 
provisions and local measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region 
government intensify an already repressive environment for the 
practice of Tibetan Buddhism.\5\ Daoist and Buddhist 
communities have been subject to ongoing efforts to close 
temples and eliminate religious practices deemed superstitious, 
as well as made subject to tight regulation of temple 
finances.\6\ Members of religious and spiritual communities 
outside the five groups recognized by the government continue 
to operate without legal protections and remain at risk of 
government harassment, abuse, and in some cases, persecution. 
China has remained a ``Country of Particular Concern'' because 
of its restrictions on religion since the U.S. Department of 
State first gave it this designation in 1999.\7\
    The Chinese government's failure to protect religion and 
its imposition of limits on religion violate international 
human rights standards. The Chinese Constitution, laws, and 
regulations guarantee only ``freedom of religious belief'' 
(zongjiao xinyang ziyou), but they do not guarantee ``freedom 
of religion.'' \8\ As defined by international human rights 
standards, ``freedom of religion'' encompasses not only the 
freedom to hold beliefs but also the freedom to manifest 
them.\9\ Chinese laws and regulations protect only ``normal 
religious activities.'' They do not define this term in a 
manner to provide citizens with meaningful protection for all 
aspects of religious practice.\10\ Religious communities must 
register with the government by affiliating with one of the 
five recognized religions and they must receive government 
approval to establish sites of worship.\11\ The state tightly 
regulates the publication of religious texts and forbids 
individuals from printing religious materials.\12\ State-
controlled religious associations hinder citizens' interaction 
with foreign co-religionists, including their ability to follow 
foreign religious leaders.\13\ The government imposes 
additional restrictions on children's freedom of religion.\14\ 
Chinese citizens who practice their faith outside of officially 
sanctioned parameters risk harassment, detention, and other 
abuses. In 2006, a top religious official in China claimed that 
no religious adherents were punished because of their faith, 
but the Chinese government continues to use a variety of 
methods within and outside its legal system--including 
selective application of criminal penalties--to punish and 
imprison citizens who practice religion in a manner authorities 
deem illegitimate.\15\
    As recognized in international human rights standards,\16\ 
including those in treaties China has signed or ratified,\17\ 
freedom of religion ``is far-reaching and profound.'' \18\ It 
includes the freedom to manifest one's beliefs alone or in 
community with others; the freedom to believe in and practice 
the religion of one's choice, without discrimination; the 
freedom to build places of worship; the freedom to print and 
distribute religious texts; the freedom to recognize religious 
leaders regardless of those leaders' nationality; and the 
freedom of children to practice a religion.\19\
    The Chinese government has failed to guarantee these 
freedoms to its citizens both in law and in practice.
    Party leaders manipulate religion for political ends. Like 
his predecessor, President and Party General Secretary Hu 
Jintao has responded to an increase in the number of religious 
followers through the use of legal initiatives to cloak 
campaigns that tighten control over religious communities.\20\ 
Despite official claims in 2004 that the Regulation on 
Religious Affairs adopted that year represented a ``paradigm 
shift'' in limiting state intervention in citizens' religious 
practice,\21\ it codified at the national level ongoing 
restrictions over officially recognized religious communities 
and discriminatory barriers against other groups. In the area 
of religion, the Party has used legal means as a tool for 
exerting tight control over all aspects of citizens' religious 
practice. Beyond overt measures of control, internal public 
security handbooks call for undercover teams to monitor the 
activities of religious communities.\22\ In an essay on 
maintaining stability in western China, one public security 
analyst called for security officials to gather information on 
religious communities by cultivating ``secret . . . `friends' 
'' from within such communities.\23\
    In recent years, top officials publicly have stated that 
religion may play a positive role in society,\24\ but have 
maneuvered this sentiment to meet Party goals. In its campaign 
to promote a ``harmonious society,'' the Party has emphasized 
``bringing into play the positive role of religion'' through 
greater control of internal religious doctrine.\25\ In July 
2006, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for 
Religious Affairs, said the government would 
direct religious leaders to provide correct interpretations of 
religious tenets to ``convey positive and beneficial contents 
to worshippers and direct them to practice faiths rightly.'' 
\26\ The announcement builds on earlier policies to manipulate 
doctrine to suit Party policy. For example, the national 
Islamic Association has continued a program to compile sermons 
that reflect the ``correct and authoritative'' view of 
religious doctrine in line with Party policy, making imams' 
confirmation contingent on knowledge of the sermons. The 
official Protestant church continues to promote ``theological 
construction,'' a guiding ideology designed to minimize aspects 
of Christianity deemed incompatible with socialism.\27\ The 
government and Party continue to propagate atheism among 
Chinese citizens. In an August 2006 article, Ye Xiaowen called 
for strengthening propaganda and education on atheism.\28\
    Despite controls over religion, unofficial estimates 
indicate that the number of religious and spiritual adherents 
in China continues to grow. In 2007, Chinese media reported on 
a poll by Chinese scholars that found China has approximately 
300 million religious adherents, a figure three times as high 
as official figures.\29\ The growth of religion in Chinese 
society presents potential challenges to government authority, 
and government concerns over the rise of religion intersect 
with broader apprehensions about perceived social instability 
and ethnic unrest. A summary of religious work issued in 2005 
listed ``stability'' as the ``number one responsibility.'' \30\ 
As long as the government views religion as a potential 
flashpoint for conflict or challenge to Party authority, it is 
unlikely to ease restrictions on religious communities. Broader 
political liberalizations that address how China's own 
restrictive policies exacerbate instability, however, could 
bring improvements in the area of religious freedom, but a 
review of events from the past five years indicates a trend in 
the opposite direction.

                        Legislative Developments

    The central government has taken more steps to codify state 
and Party policy on religion in recent years, particularly 
through the 2004 national Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) 
and subsequent provincial regulations. Though the regulations 
guarantee some legal protections to registered religious 
communities, they also condition many religious activities on 
government oversight and approval. Codification of government 
procedures lends more transparency and predictability about 
government actions, but as legal controls over the internal 
activities of religious communities, the regulations reflect 
rule by law rather than rule of law.
    Implementation of the RRA has been uneven, resulting in a 
confusing legal terrain for citizens who aim to understand the 
applicability of legal protections and restrictions imposed by 
the regulation. Though the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs (SARA) and local governments have reported training 
local officials in the RRA,\31\ the complete scope of the 
training and indicators for measuring its progress are unclear. 
The central government has not issued general implementing 
guidelines, but has promulgated a limited number of legal 
measures that expand on specific provisions within the RRA. The 
new measures clarify some ambiguous provisions in the RRA, but 
generally articulate more rigid controls.\32\ Although SARA 
also has promoted a handbook that provides a more detailed 
explanation of each article of the RRA, the book does not 
appear to be widely distributed in training classes.\33\
    The national government has not publicized a clear plan of 
action for ensuring local regulations on religion are 
consistent with national requirements, and inconsistencies 
among regulations persist. Most of the provincial-level 
regulations issued after the RRA entered into force promote 
consistency with the RRA by aligning many key provisions to 
national requirements, but at least one province initially 
retained provisions that conflicted with those in the RRA.\34\ 
Other provinces have yet to amend their regulations, leaving 
intact provisions that conflict with the RRA and, in some 
cases, impose harsher restrictions.\35\
    Though the new provincial regulations have promoted 
uniformity with national regulations, they also contain 
provisions that differ from each other and from the national 
RRA. A new comprehensive regulation from Hunan province, for 
example, is the first comprehensive provincial-level regulation 
on religion to provide limited recognition for venues for folk 
beliefs.\36\ Measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region provide 
detailed stipulations for the designation and supervision of 
reincarnated Buddhist lamas.\37\ Some 
provincial-level regulations recognize only Buddhism, 
Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Others are 
silent on this issue.\38\

           Recognized and Unrecognized Religious Communities

    The central government has not made progress in extending 
its limited legal protections for religion to all Chinese 
citizens. The Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) did not 
explicitly codify Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and 
Protestantism as China's only recognized religious communities, 
but the government perpetuates a regulatory system that 
recognizes only these communities, with limited exceptions.\39\ 
Although recognized groups receive limited guarantees to 
practice ``normal religious activities,'' they must submit to 
state-defined interpretations of their faith as well as ongoing 
state control over internal affairs. The RRA and subsequent 
regulations continue to subject recognized communities to 
onerous registration and reporting requirements.\40\
    Party-sponsored religious associations,\41\ with which 
religious communities must affiliate, remain the state's main 
vehicle for ensuring religious practice conforms to Party goals 
and for denying religious communities doctrinal 
independence.\42\ The associations vet religious leaders for 
political reliability, and religious leaders who express 
sensitive political views have faced dismissal from their 
posts. For example, in 2006, the national Buddhist Association, 
in coordination with government officials, expelled a Buddhist 
monk from a temple in Jiangxi province after the monk led 
religious activities to commemorate victims of the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown and took measures to address corruption 
among government officials and the Buddhist Association.\43\ 
Authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have 
enforced an ongoing campaign to monitor imams and decertify 
religious leaders deemed unreliable.\44\
    Unregistered religious and spiritual communities continue 
to practice their faith under the risk of harassment, 
detention, and other abuses. Differences in legislation and 
regional variations in the implementation of religious policy 
have allowed a limited number of unrecognized groups to operate 
openly.\45\ Without the clear guarantee that all citizens have 
a right to openly practice their religion, however, all 
unregistered communities remain vulnerable to official abuses 
and restrictions on their freedom. Religious and spiritual 
communities defined as ``cults'' remain subject to persecution. 
In 2004, the Party increased its campaign against organizations 
it designated as cults, targeting Falun Gong practitioners as 
well as unregistered communities including Buddhist and 
Christian groups.\46\ In July 2007, the central government 
instructed officials to ``strike hard against illegal religions 
and cult activities'' as part of a campaign to address 
perceived instability in rural areas.\47\ The promulgation of 
the RRA may increase pressures on unregistered groups. A 
district in Shanghai, for example, has set targets for carrying 
out work to eliminate ``abnormal religious activity'' in 
accordance with the RRA.\48\

 Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Co-religionists 
                                 Abroad

    The Chinese government restricts Chinese citizens' freedom 
to interact with foreign citizens in China and with citizens 
abroad as part of its policy to promote self-management and 
independence from foreign religious institutions.\49\ Chinese 
officials have increased oversight of citizens' contacts with 
foreign religious practitioners within China in the run-up to 
the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games. In March 2007, Minister 
of Public Security Zhou Yongkang said the government would 
``strike hard'' against hostile forces inside and outside the 
country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a 
``good social environment'' for the Olympics and 17th Party 
Congress.\50\ In 2006, local officials expelled a registered 
church leader in Shanxi province after his church invited an 
American missionary to the church.\51\ According to the 
nongovernmental organization China Aid Association, authorities 
implemented a campaign in 2007 to expel foreigners thought to 
be engaged in Christian missionary activities.\52\ National 
rules governing the religious activities of foreigners forbid 
them from ``cultivating followers from among Chinese 
citizens,'' distributing ``religious propaganda materials,'' 
and carrying out other missionary activities.\53\

                Freedom of Religion for Chinese Children

    The Chinese government failed to secure the rights of 
children to practice religion in its recent codification of 
religious policy. Although a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
official stated in 2005 that no laws restrict minors from 
holding religious beliefs and that parents may give their 
children a religious education,\54\ recent legislation has not 
articulated a guarantee of these rights. Regulations from some 
provinces penalize acts such as ``instigating'' minors to 
believe in religion or accepting them into a religion.\55\ In 
practice, children in some parts of China participate in 
religious activities at registered and unregistered venues,\56\ 
but in other areas, they have been restricted from 
participating in religious services.\57\
    Ambiguities in the law and variations in implementation 
have created space for children in some parts of China to 
receive a religious education. Some Muslim communities outside 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have established schools 
to provide secular and religious education to children.\58\ In 
some ethnic minority communities, children receive education at 
Buddhist temples.\59\
    Some recent government campaigns against religion have 
targeted children. In 2004, authorities launched campaigns to 
educate children against the evils of government-designated 
cults and to encourage children to expose family members 
engaged in ``illegal religious activities.'' \60\ In 2006, Ye 
Xiaowen called for strengthening education in atheism 
especially among children.\61\

           Social Welfare Activities by Religious Communities

    The government accommodates, and in some cases, sponsors, 
the social welfare activities of recognized religious 
communities where such activities meet Party goals. Article 34 
of the Regulation on Religious Affairs allows registered 
religious communities to organize such undertakings.\62\ In 
some cases, government offices and Party-led religious 
associations initiate and control the scope of social welfare 
activities.\63\ In other cases, religious civil society 
organizations organize their work under other auspices or are 
able to operate without registering with the government.\64\
    Government support for religious charity work is part of a 
broader policy allowing civil society organizations to provide 
welfare services in certain areas. [See Section III--Civil 
Society for more information.] The government also has 
permitted some international 
religious organizations to engage in charity work within 
China.\65\ In recent years, however, the government has 
increased pressures on civil society organizations.\66\ 
Religiously affiliated civil society groups in tightly 
controlled regions such as the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region (XUAR) face additional restrictions. For example, local 
authorities in the XUAR have banned meshrep, Islam-centered 
groups that have sought to address social problems.\67\

                RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISTS

                                Overview

    The Chinese government creates a repressive environment for 
the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Two new sets of legal 
measures increase legal bases for repression. Tibetan Buddhist 
monks and nuns remain subject to expulsions from religious 
institutions and imprisonment for refusing to accept government 
policy on issues such as the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama as a 
religious leader, and the identity of the Panchen Lama. For a 
detailed overview of 
current conditions for Tibetan Buddhists in China, see Section 
IV--Tibet.

                RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA'S CATHOLICS

                              Overview\68\

    The Chinese government continues to deny Chinese Catholics 
the freedom to recognize the authority of overseas Catholic 
institutions in a manner of their choosing. Authorities blocked 
Web sites in 2007 to prevent Catholic practitioners from 
viewing an open letter from Pope Benedict XVI urging 
reconciliation between registered and unregistered communities 
in China. Government harassment against Catholic communities 
has escalated since 2004. The government continues to detain 
unregistered bishops and coerce registered bishops to exercise 
their faith according to Party-dictated terms. The return of 
property owned by the Catholic Church in the 1950s and 1960s 
remains a contentious issue. Officials and unidentified 
assailants have beaten people protesting slated demolitions of 
church property.

                Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses

    Both unregistered Catholics and registered clergy remain 
subject to government harassment, and in some cases, detention. 
The Commission noted an increase in reported detentions of 
unregistered Catholics in 2005, after the Regulation on 
Religious Affairs entered into force.\69\ In June 2007, the 
public security bureau detained Jia Zhiguo, underground bishop 
of the Diocese of Zhending, in Hebei province, for 17 days.\70\ 
Authorities detained him again in August as he prepared to lead 
meetings to discuss a letter Pope Benedict XVI issued to 
Chinese Catholics in June.\71\ Jia previously spent more than 
20 years in prison.\72\ In 2006, the government increased 
pressure on registered bishops and priests to coerce them to 
participate in bishop consecrations without papal approval. 
Authorities detained, sequestered, threatened, or otherwise 
exerted pressure on registered Catholic clerics to obtain 
compliance.\73\ Authorities have pressured both unregistered 
clergy and lay practitioners to join registered churches or 
face repercussions such as restricting children's access to 
school, job dismissal, fines, and detention.\74\

Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious Property

    The return of religious property remains a contentious 
issue. In recent years, some registered Catholic groups have 
called on the government to give back church property 
confiscated in the 1950s and 1960s, and in separate incidents, 
officials or unidentified assailants have beaten people 
protesting the slated demolition of such property. For example, 
in 2005, government officials assaulted a group of Catholic 
nuns in a village near the city of Xi'an, in Shaanxi province, 
after the nuns had attempted to prevent the 
authorities from erecting a new building on property that the 
government confiscated from their religious order during the 
1950s. According to overseas sources, the nuns were not 
injured, and the construction work was halted after the 
assault. In another incident in 2005, unidentified assailants 
beat a group of Catholic nuns in Xi'an after the nuns had 
organized a sit-in to prevent the demolition of a school 
formerly belonging to their religious order. In a separate 
incident, unidentified assailants beat a group of Catholic 
priests in Tianjin who had occupied a building formerly 
belonging to their Shanxi dioceses and demanded its return. At 
issue in all three cases was the refusal of local authorities 
to abide by government instructions mandating the return of 
such property.\75\

                        China-Holy See Relations

    The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) 
does not recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint 
bishops and has continued to appoint bishops based on its own 
procedures, in some cases coercing clerics to participate in 
consecration ceremonies. While in recent years authorities had 
tolerated discreet involvement by the Holy See in the selection 
of some bishops, in 2006 the CPA moved to appoint more bishops 
without Holy See approval. For example, in November 2006, the 
CPA appointed Wang Renlei as auxiliary bishop of the Xuzhou 
diocese, Jiangsu province, without Holy See approval, and 
authorities reportedly detained two bishops to force their 
participation in the ordination ceremony.\76\
    In September 2007, the CPA ordained Paul Xiao Zejiang as 
coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese. Though the CPA elected 
him according to its own practices, the Holy See expressed 
approval of his election to bishop.\77\ The same month, the CPA 
ordained Li Shan as bishop of Beijing according to its own 
practices. The Holy See expressed approval for the 
ordination.\78\
    The ordinations follow a June 2007 open letter from Pope 
Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, urging 
reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic 
communities in China and stating that ``the Catholic Church 
which is in China does not have a mission to change the 
structure or administration of the State.'' \79\ After the 
letter was published on the Vatican Web site, Chinese 
authorities blocked Internet access and ordered Catholic Web 
sites within China to remove the letter.\80\ An overseas news 
agency reported that local authorities have since detained at 
least 11 unregistered church priests in an effort to assert 
official authority in the aftermath of the letter's 
publication.\81\
    Government apprehension about Chinese Catholics' 
relationship with foreign religious communities and 
institutions also manifested itself in 2007 in the Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). In July, the XUAR government 
announced it would strengthen oversight of Catholic and 
Protestant communities to prevent foreign infiltration, a call 
reiterated in August by local authorities in the XUAR's Changji 
Hui Autonomous Prefecture.\82\
    The government has penalized members of the unregistered 
Catholic community for their overseas travel. In 2006, 
authorities detained two leaders of the unregistered Wenzhou 
diocese, Peter Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang, after they 
returned from a pilgrimage to Rome. Six months after their 
detention, Shao and Jiang received prison sentences of 9 and 11 
months, respectively, after authorities accused them of 
falsifying their passports and charged them with illegally 
exiting the country.\83\

                 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA'S MUSLIMS

                              Overview\84\

    The government strictly controls the practice of Islam, and 
religious repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), especially among the Uighur ethnic group, remains 
severe. In recent years the government has increased control 
over Muslim pilgrimages and continued an ongoing project to 
author sermons that reflect Party values. New confirmation 
rules for religious leaders require knowledge of the sermons. 
Authorities reportedly have tried to restrict the number of 
Muslim students who study religion overseas. Within the XUAR, 
the government restricts access to mosques, imprisons citizens 
for religious activity determined to be ``extremist,'' has 
detained people for possession of unauthorized texts, and most 
recently has confiscated Muslims' passports. The XUAR 
government maintains the harshest legal restrictions in China 
on children's right to practice religion. Religious repression 
in the XUAR accompanies a broader crackdown in the region aimed 
at diluting expressions of Uighur identity. [See Section II--
Ethnic Minority Rights for more information on conditions in 
the XUAR.]

                Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses

    Authorities in the XUAR have intensified their crackdown on 
religion since 2001. Official records have indicated an 
increase in Uighurs in the XUAR sent to prison or reeducation 
through labor centers because of religious activity since the 
mid-1990s.\85\ XUAR residents reported to overseas human rights 
organizations that police monitoring for illegal activity, 
including systematic door-to-door searches within neighborhoods 
and villages, has increased in recent years.\86\
    In recent years, authorities have detained people for 
having 
unauthorized religious texts. In 2005, authorities in the XUAR 
detained a religion instructor and her students, accusing the 
teacher of ``illegally possessing religious materials and 
subversive historical information.'' \87\ XUAR officials also 
detained a group of people for possessing an unauthorized 
religious book.\88\

     Access to Religious Sites and Closures of Religious Structures

    The government continues to enforce tight restrictions on 
XUAR residents' ability to enter mosques. Overseas media has 
reported on restrictions on mosque entry enforced against 
minors under 18, local government employees, state employees 
and retirees, and women, among other groups. Authorities 
reportedly monitor attendance at mosques and levy fines when 
people violate the bans.\89\
    Authorities in the XUAR continue to enforce earlier 
policies to demolish ``illegal'' religious sites, and they have 
increased oversight since 2001.\90\ Authorities reportedly have 
not allowed Uighurs in the XUAR to build new mosques since 
1999.\91\

        Restrictions on the Freedom To Make Overseas Pilgrimages

    The central government has increased its control over 
Muslims' overseas pilgrimages in recent years, and public 
officials in the XUAR have followed suit with further 
restrictions. The 2004 
national Regulation on Religious Affairs charged the Islamic 
Association of China (IAC) with responsibility for organizing 
Chinese Muslims' overseas pilgrimages, and stipulated 
punishments for the unauthorized organization of such 
trips.\92\ In 2006, the IAC established an office to manage 
pilgrimages to Mecca.\93\ It also signed an agreement with the 
Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage allowing Chinese Muslim pilgrims 
to receive Hajj visas only at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing and 
restricting visas to pilgrims in official Chinese government-
sponsored travel groups. The government announced its agreement 
with Saudi Arabia after a group of Muslims from the XUAR 
attempted to obtain Saudi visas via a third country. In 
addition, the IAC issued a circular in 2006 that regulates 
secondary pilgrimages (umrah) to Mecca outside the yearly 
Hajj.\94\ Some citizens who have tried to take trips outside 
official channels reportedly have done so to avoid requirements 
to demonstrate political reliability to the government and to 
save money, among other factors.\95\ Authorities also 
reportedly have tried to restrict Muslims' opportunities to 
study religion overseas.\96\
    Local officials in the XUAR have used pilgrimage policy to 
further religious repression in that region. In June 2007, 
after XUAR Party Secretary Wang Lequan announced that the 
government would further increase its oversight of pilgrimages 
in the region, overseas media reported that local authorities 
implemented a policy to confiscate passports from Muslims, and 
Uighurs in particular.\97\ In July, the XUAR government 
announced that the public security bureau would strengthen 
passport controls as part of its campaign to curb unauthorized 
pilgrimages.\98\

                         Religious Publications

    The government continues to exert tight control over the 
publications of religious materials in the XUAR. In 2007, 
authorities in the XUAR city of Urumqi reported destroying over 
25,000 ``illegal'' religious books.\99\ During a month-long 
campaign in 2006 aimed at rooting out ``political and religious 
illegal publications,'' XUAR authorities reported confiscating 
publications about Islam with ``unhealthy content.'' \100\ In 
2005, official news media reported that XUAR authorities had 
confiscated 9,860 illegal publications involving religion, 
``feudal superstitions,'' or Falun Gong.\101\

                                Children

    Restrictions on children's right to practice religion are 
harsher in the XUAR than elsewhere in China. Legal measures 
from the XUAR, unseen elsewhere in China, forbid parents and 
guardians from allowing minors to engage in religious 
activity.\102\ Local governments throughout the XUAR continued 
restrictions on children's right to practice a religion during 
2006. They enforced measures during Ramadan to prevent students 
from fasting and participating in other religious activities. 
Authorities also directed such measures at college students who 
are legal adults under Chinese law.\103\ Also in 2006, a county 
government in the XUAR began a campaign aimed at monitoring and 
reforming the children of religious figures, alongside other 
students including truants and children of those 
released from administrative detention.\104\

               RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA'S PROTESTANTS

                             Overview\105\

    The government and Party control the activities of its 
official Protestant church, and the government continues to 
target unregistered Protestant groups for harassment, 
detention, and other forms of abuse. The targeting of 
Protestant groups deemed to be cults intensified in 2004 and 
again in 2006. Authorities continue to close house churches and 
confiscate property. The government has included in this 
crackdown groups with ties to foreign co-religionists. 
Religious adherents serving prison sentences include clergy who 
printed and distributed religious texts without government 
permission. Members of unregistered house churches have made 
some advances in challenging government actions, but harassment 
and abuses continue.

                Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses

    Authorities continue to target some unregistered Protestant 
communities for harassment, detention, and other abuses. A July 
2007 report from a district within Shanghai called on 
authorities to strengthen control over grassroots religious 
activity and singled out private Protestant gatherings for 
monitoring and regulation.\106\ The China Aid Association 
(CAA), a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization that monitors 
religious freedom in China, recorded 600 detentions of 
unregistered Protestants in China during 2006. It noted that 
the figure represents a decline from over 2,000 detentions 
recorded in 2005, but attributed the decrease to a new strategy 
of targeting church leaders over practitioners and 
interrogating practitioners on the spot rather than formally 
arresting them.\107\ The CAA found that 18 people were 
sentenced to more than a year of imprisonment in 2006.\108\ In 
2007, seven police officers attacked and wounded Beijing house 
church pastor and farmer advocate Hua Huiqi and his 76-year-old 
mother Shuang Shuying.\109\ Officials charged Hua, who had been 
previously detained by local officials, with obstruction of 
justice and sentenced him to six months in prison. Shuang was 
charged with willfully damaging property and 
sentenced to two years in prison. An overseas report in August 
2007 indicated that police were using Shuang's imprisonment as 
leverage to pressure Hua to become a police informant. In 
September, authorities reportedly denied Shuang medical parole 
despite her poor health.\110\ In October, CAA reported that 
authorities placed Hua under house arrest on October 1 and 
informed him that his mother's imprisonment was intended to 
pressure Hua to stop his activism. CAA reported Shuang had been 
beaten in prison.\111\ Gong Shengliang, founder of the South 
China Church, continues to serve a life sentence for alleged 
assault and rape, and is reported to be in poor health.\112\ 
Authorities released Liu Fenggang from prison in February 2007 
after he served a three-year sentence for reporting on the 
government demolition of house churches.\113\ CAA reported that 
authorities later placed him under house arrest, starting on 
October 1, 2007.\114\

Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious Property

    The government states there are no registration 
requirements for religious gatherings within the home,\115\ but 
public officials continue to target unregistered Protestant 
churches for closure and demolition. For example, in July 2007, 
CAA reported that three underground church buildings in 
Wenzhou, Zhejiang province faced imminent demolition by local 
government authorities. The government accused the believers of 
subscribing to an ``evil cult'' and threatened to arrest them 
if they impeded the demolition.\116\ In 2006, a court case 
against religious adherents who had protested the demolition of 
a church building in the Xiaoshan district of Hangzhou, 
Zhejiang province, concluded with the sentencing of eight house 
church leaders for ``inciting violence to resist the law.'' 
\117\ According to the CAA, closures of house churches 
increased between 2005 and 2006.\118\
    The government also exerts control over the property of 
registered Protestant churches. In 2006, approximately 300 
members of a registered Protestant church in Gansu province 
engaged in a peaceful demonstration to demand the return of 
property that had been confiscated by the government in 
1966.\119\

                            Religious Speech

    Chinese authorities continue to punish citizens who publish 
religious materials without permission, including Protestant 
religious leaders who have printed and given away Bibles. In 
separate incidents in 2005 and 2006, pastors Cai Zhuohua and 
Wang Zaiqing received prison sentences of three and two years, 
respectively, after each printed and distributed religious 
materials without government permission. In each case, the 
sentencing court found that the preparation and distribution of 
the materials constituted the ``illegal operation of a 
business,'' a crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Law.\120\ 
Authorities released Cai from prison upon completion of his 
three-year prison sentence on September 10, 2007.\121\ The 
government has also detained people for publicizing abuses 
against house church members. In 2006, Chinese authorities 
detained a documentary filmmaker who was making a film about 
house churches and detained a journalist after he posted 
reports publicizing protests about a church demolition.\122\

                     Challenging Government Actions

    Some members of unregistered churches have used the legal 
system to challenge government actions. In August 2006, a court 
in Henan province rescinded a decision to subject a house 
church pastor to one year of reeducation through labor for 
participating in a house church gathering authorities deemed 
illegal. In November 2006, a group in Shandong province that 
previously had been placed in administrative detention for 
their attendance at a house church service reached a settlement 
with the Public Security Bureau to rescind the administrative 
detention decision against them. [See Section II--Rights of 
Criminal Suspects and Defendants for more information.] In 
neither case did the rescission include recognition of 
practitioners' right to assemble for worship outside of 
registered venues for religious activity.\123\ Not all 
challenges to government actions have been successful. In 2007, 
local governments in Henan province and the Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region rejected unregistered church leaders' 
applications for administrative review of their 
detentions.\124\ In addition, rights defenders who have 
advocated on behalf of house church members and other groups 
have faced repercussions.\125\
    Outside of legal channels, international pressure has 
resulted in advances for some house churches. CAA reported that 
international pressure facilitated the release of 33 arrested 
house church leaders and 3 South Korean church leaders who had 
been detained after officials raided a house church study group 
in Henan province in 2007.\126\ Two days after two house church 
pastors appealed for administrative reconsideration regarding a 
2007 raid on their churches, local officials in Jiangsu 
province returned confiscated property, citing concerns about 
negative international repercussions.\127\

 Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Co-religionists 
                                 Abroad

    Authorities have promoted official exchanges with overseas 
Protestant churches, including Chinese participation in a 2005 
World Council of Churches conference,\128\ but have restricted 
citizens from participating in programs outside these official 
channels. For example, authorities prevented house church 
members and legal advocates Fan Yafeng, Gao Zhisheng, and Teng 
Biao from attending a Washington, DC-based forum on religious 
freedom in 2005.\129\
    In July, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
government announced it would strengthen oversight of 
Protestant and Catholic communities to prevent foreign 
infiltration in the names of these religions.\130\ The 
announcement followed church service raids in the XUAR during 
2006 and 2007, including those with foreign worshippers and 
pastors.\131\ According to CAA, more than 60 of over 100 
missionaries expelled from China between April and June 2007 
came from the XUAR.\132\
    The government has punished some house church members for 
traveling overseas. Unregistered Protestant church leader Zhang 
Rongliang, who resorted to obtaining illegal travel documents 
after the government refused to issue him a passport, was 
sentenced to seven and a half years' imprisonment in 2006 on 
charges of illegally crossing the border and fraudulently 
obtaining a passport.\133\ Also in 2006, authorities placed 
house church historian and former political prisoner Zhang 
Yinan and his family under surveillance after he applied for a 
passport to attend a religious function in the United 
States.\134\

                  GOVERNMENT PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG

    The government has continued its campaign of persecution 
against Falun Gong practitioners, which it began in 1999. In 
its 2007 report on religious freedom in China, the U.S. 
Department of State noted past reports of deaths and abuse of 
Falun Gong practitioners in custody.\135\ Government officials 
have used both the Criminal Law and administrative punishment 
regulations as legal pretexts for penalizing Falun Gong 
activities.\136\ Citizens sentenced to prison terms under the 
Criminal Law include Falun Gong practitioners who demonstrated 
in support of Falun Gong in 1999, as well as practitioners who 
prepared leaflets about Falun Gong, including Wang Xin, Li 
Chang, Wang Zhiwen, and Ji Liewu.\137\ Authorities released Yao 
Jie in 2006 after sentencing her in 1999 to seven years' 
imprisonment for crimes related to organizing and using a cult 
and for illegal acquisition of state secrets. The charges stem 
from accusations that she organized an April 1999 rally of 
Falun Gong practitioners outside the central government's 
leadership compound.\138\
    Falun Gong practitioners and rights defenders who advocate 
on their behalf, as well as on behalf of other communities, 
including house church members, face serious obstacles in 
challenging government abuses. In 2006, authorities intensified 
a campaign of harassment against lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who has 
represented 
numerous activists, religious leaders, and writers, after he 
publicized widespread torture against Falun Gong practitioners. 
A 
Beijing court convicted him in 2006 to a three-year sentence, 
suspended for five years, for ``inciting subversion of state 
power.'' \139\ Gao went missing immediately after an open 
letter that he sent to the U.S. Congress was made public at a 
Capitol Hill press conference on September 20, 2007. 
Authorities also have harassed members of his family.\140\ [For 
additional information, see Section II--Rights of Criminal 
Suspects and Defendants.] Overseas organizations reported that 
on September 29, 2007, unidentified assailants beat rights 
defense lawyer Li Heping, who had advocated on behalf of Falun 
Gong practitioners and house church members, among others.\141\
    In 2006, courts in Shandong province rejected appeals from 
Liu Ruping and his lawyer that challenged Liu's sentence of 15 
months of reeducation through labor for posting Falun Gong 
notices.\142\
    In 2007, the government used possession of Falun Gong 
materials as a pretext for squelching a political activist. In 
March, a court in Zhejiang province gave a three-year sentence 
to Chi Jianwei, a member of the Zhejiang branch of the China 
Democracy Party, for ``using a cult to undermine implementation 
of the law'' after authorities found Falun Gong materials in 
his home.\143\

                OTHER RELIGIOUS AND SPRITUAL COMMUNITIES

    Local governments continue to shut down unauthorized 
Buddhist and Daoist temples. Towns and cities reported in 2006 
on campaigns to address the presence of illegal temples through 
measures that included closure and demolition.\144\ Some local 
governments have targeted temples that include practices deemed 
as superstitious beliefs.\145\ Other temples have registered 
and submitted to official control. At a forum evaluating 
implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs in 2007, 
the president of the Daoist Association of China noted that the 
regulation has led to the registration of previously 
unregistered Daoist temples.\146\
    The government has supported some official interactions 
between domestic and foreign Buddhist communities,\147\ but 
also limited some foreign involvement. In 2004, authorities 
closed a Buddhist temple renovated by an American Buddhist 
association and 
detained the temple's designated leader.\148\
    Chinese religious adherents with ties to foreign religious 
communities not recognized within China have had leeway to 
practice their religion in some cases. The U.S. Department of 
State reported in 2006 that some Chinese citizens who joined 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) while 
living abroad met for 
worship in a Beijing location that Chinese authorities 
permitted 
expatriate LDS members to use.\149\ The central government 
continues to deny formal recognition to the LDS church as a 
domestic religious community, however, as it does other 
religious communities outside the five recognized groups, 
including Christian denominations that maintain a distinct 
identity outside the Chinese government-defined Protestant and 
Catholic churches. A few local governments provide legal 
recognition to Orthodox Christian communities, but the central 
government has not recognized Orthodoxy as a religion.\150\ In 
recent years, officials have met with representatives of the 
Russian Orthodox Church to discuss China's Orthodox 
communities.\151\
    Central and local authorities have drawn some aspects of 
folk 
beliefs into official purview. Since at least 2004, the State 
Administration for Religious Affairs has operated an office 
that undertakes research and policy positions on folk beliefs 
and religious communities outside the five recognized 
groups,\152\ but the government has neither extended formal 
legal recognition to any of these groups nor altered its system 
whereby religious communities must receive government 
recognition to operate. In 2006, Hunan province issued the 
first provincial-level regulation on religious affairs to 
provide for the registration of venues for folk beliefs.\153\ 
The Hunan provincial government's decision to channel folk 
religions into the government system of religious regulation 
provides some limited legal protections, but also may subject 
more aspects of folk practice to government control. To date, 
no other provincial regulation has regulated folk beliefs,\154\ 
but a central government official has indicated that the 
government is studying the Hunan model and may formulate 
national legal guidance on the regulation of folk belief 
venues.\155\ Authorities continue, however, to express concern 
over components within recognized religions deemed as folk 
beliefs, and view some aspects of folk practice as 
superstitions subject to official censure, and in some cases, 
legal penalties.\156\

                         Ethnic Minority Rights


                              INTRODUCTION

    The Chinese government recognizes and supports some aspects 
of ethnic minority identity, but represses aspects of ethnic 
minority rights deemed to challenge state authority, especially 
in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region (IMAR), and Tibet Autonomous Region and other 
Tibetan autonomous areas. Overall conditions vary for members 
of the 55 groups the Chinese government designates as minority 
``nationalities'' or ``ethnicities'' (minzu),\1\ but all 
communities face state controls in such spheres as governance, 
language use, culture, and 
religion. In recent years, the state has further refined its 
legal and economic systems for ethnic minorities, whom official 
statistics place at almost 8.5 percent of China's total 
population.\2\ The government provides some protections in law 
and in practice for ethnic minority rights and allows for 
autonomous governments in regions with ethnic minority 
populations.\3\ The narrow parameters of the ethnic autonomy 
system and the overriding dominance of the Communist Party, 
however, prevent ethnic minorities from enjoying their rights 
in line with international human rights standards.\4\ [See 
Section IV--Tibet for more information on conditions in 
Tibetan areas of China.]
    The government has taken steps to refine the legal 
framework for ethnic minority autonomy, but it has retained the 
fundamental features of the system that deny ethnic minorities 
meaningful control over their own affairs. In 2005, the State 
Council issued legal provisions\5\ for implementing the 1984 
Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), which defines the 
framework for autonomous governments. Though the 2005 
provisions include measures beneficial in areas such as local 
economic development, monitoring implementation of regional 
ethnic autonomy legislation, and protection of cultural 
heritage,\6\ some provisions weaken ethnic minority rights. For 
example, the provisions bolster measures to promote migration 
to ethnic minority areas and reduce support for ethnic minority 
language education.\7\ In addition, the basic legal structure 
whereby higher organs of government can reject proposed 
legislation persists.\8\ [See Section IV--Tibet for a 
discussion of the REAL as 
implemented in Tibetan areas of China.] In 2006, the National 
People's Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) launched a program 
to examine implementation of the REAL in regions throughout 
China and reported positively on its investigation.\9\ An NPCSC 
investigation team that went to the IMAR, for example, 
described the ethnic autonomy system as a success in that 
region.\10\ The conclusion conflicts with other reports that 
authorities there have taken measures that undermine meaningful 
autonomy. In recent years authorities in the IMAR have closed 
Mongolian Web sites,\11\ placed on trial Mongolian medicine 
practitioners Naguunbilig and Daguulaa,\12\ and denied a Mongol 
rights advocate's passport application on the grounds of 
``possible harm to state security and national interests.'' 
\13\ Ethnic Mongol bookstore owner Hada continues to serve a 
15-year prison sentence for the crimes of ``splittism'' and 
``espionage,'' after he organized peaceful protests for ethnic 
minority rights.\14\ Although the IMAR government issued new 
legal measures in 2005 to promote ethnic minority language use 
in schooling, jobs, and broadcasting, its effectiveness remains 
unclear.\15\
    The central government has increased support for 
development projects in ethnic minority regions, with mixed 
results. Aid projects, including the Great Western Development 
program launched in 2000, have increased migration, strained 
local resources, and furthered uneven allocation of resources 
that favors Han Chinese.\16\ In 2007, the central government 
issued a separate five-year development program for ethnic 
minorities and ethnic minority regions.\17\ The program sets 
concrete targets for improving economic and social conditions 
among ethnic minorities, who make up almost half of the Chinese 
population living in extreme poverty,\18\ and calls for 
improved efforts to draft regional ethnic autonomy 
legislation.\19\ The program couples such potentially 
beneficial reforms, however, with measures designed to monitor 
and report on ethnic relations and perceived threats to 
stability.\20\

         RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE XINJIANG UIGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION

    The Chinese government has increased repression in the 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2001, building 
off campaigns started in the 1990s to squelch political 
viewpoints and expressions of ethnic identity deemed 
threatening to state power.\21\ The government targets in 
particular the region's ethnic Uighur population, within which 
it alleges the presence of separatist activity. Since the mid-
1990s, the government has carried out ``strike hard'' anti-
crime campaigns that have addressed targets including the 
government-designated ``three forces'' of terrorism, 
separatism, and religious extremism.\22\ In 2007, XUAR 
Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan called on the XUAR 
government to make stability the ``overriding'' concern in the 
region and to continue to ``strike hard'' against the ``three 
forces.'' \23\ The statement followed a January 5 raid at a 
location in the XUAR that Chinese officials described as a 
terrorist training base.\24\ Authorities provided limited 
information to back up the claim, drawing doubt from outside 
observers.\25\ Broader Chinese government reporting on 
terrorist threats remains questionable in light of government 
actions that conflate the peaceful exercise of rights with 
terrorist or separatist activity.\26\ In July 2007, a 
publication under the national Ministry of Public Security 
called for ``greatly'' strengthening intelligence gathering in 
the region to address perceived sources of 
instability, including ``antagonistic forces within and outside 
the border.'' \27\ In August, Wang Lequan called for ongoing 
measures to fight separatism. He urged vigilance against 
``western hostile forces'' led by the United States that he 
said have used the guise of human rights and ethnic and 
religious issues in plots aimed at overthrowing Communist Party 
leadership.\28\
    Rights abuses in the region are far reaching and target 
multiple dimensions of Uighur identity. Repression of Islam, 
the predominant religion practiced by Uighurs and many other 
ethnic minority groups in the XUAR, remains severe. [See 
Section II--Freedom of Religion for more information.] ``Strike 
hard'' campaigns have resulted in high rates of incarceration 
among Uighurs for state security crimes, including sentences 
stemming from religious activity.\29\ Official records have 
indicated an increase in Uighurs in the XUAR sent to prison or 
reeducation through labor centers because of religious activity 
since the mid-1990s.\30\ Ministry of Justice figures from 2001 
indicated that Uighurs incarcerated for ``state security 
crimes'' made up over 9 percent of those serving prison 
sentences.\31\ XUAR residents reported to overseas human rights 
organizations that police monitoring for illegal activity, 
including systematic door-to-door searches within neighborhoods 
and villages, has increased in recent years.\32\
    In addition to ``strike hard'' measures, officials also 
have enforced ``softer'' policies aimed at diluting expressions 
of Uighur identity. In recent years local governments have 
intensified measures to reduce education in ethnic minority 
languages\33\ and have instituted language requirements that 
disadvantage ethnic minority teachers.\34\ Broader 
discriminatory hiring practices, including in the government 
sector, also hinder ethnic minorities' job prospects. In 2006, 
for example, during job recruiting in the XUAR, the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (bingtuan) reserved 
approximately 800 of 840 civil servant job openings for Han 
Chinese, leaving 38 positions for members of specified ethnic 
minority groups.\35\ The government provides incentives for 
migration to the region from elsewhere in China, in the name of 
recruiting talent and promoting stability.\36\ Measures to 
address high population growth have targeted impoverished 
ethnic minorities within the region.\37\ At the same time the 
government promotes migration to the XUAR to address perceived 
labor shortages, it also supports programs to send young ethnic 
minorities to work in factories in other parts of China.\38\ In 
2007, overseas media reported on abuses in such a government-
sponsored labor program that sent Uighur women to a factory in 
Shandong province under false pretenses and compelled them to 
work without regular wages.\39\ Central and local authorities 
also have promoted abusive labor practices within the region to 
fulfill state development goals. To meet harvesting demands in 
the XUAR's cotton industry, authorities have compelled children 
in the region to pick crops.\40\ The government issued legal 
guidance in 2006 on supporting the child labor force.\41\
    Authorities in the XUAR continue to imprison Uighurs 
engaged in peaceful expressions of dissent and other non-
violent activities. Such political prisoners include Tohti 
Tunyaz, who received an 11-year prison sentence in 1999 after 
conducting historical research on the XUAR; Abduhelil Zunun, 
who received a 20-year sentence in 2001 after translating the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights into the Uighur language; 
Abdulghani Memetemin, who received a 9-year prison sentence in 
2003 after sending information on human rights abuses to a 
foreign NGO; Nurmemet Yasin, who received a 10-year prison 
sentence in 2005 after writing a short story authorities deemed 
a criticism of government policy in the XUAR; and Korash 
Huseyin, who received a 3-year prison sentence in 2005 after 
publishing Yasin's work of literature.\42\
    Although the Chinese government granted political prisoner 
Rebiya Kadeer early release on medical parole to the United 
States in 2005, it has since launched a campaign of harassment 
and abuse against her family members in the XUAR in an apparent 
strategy to punish Kadeer for her activism in exile.\43\ In 
2007, a XUAR court sentenced Kadeer's son Ablikim Abdureyim to 
nine years in prison for ``instigating and engaging in 
secessionist activities.'' \44\ A court imposed a seven-year 
prison sentence and fine in 2006 on Kadeer's son Alim, and 
imposed a fine on her son Kahar, for tax evasion.\45\ In 2005 
and 2006, authorities also placed other family members under 
surveillance and house arrest\46\ and held two of Kadeer's 
former business associates in detention without charges for 
seven months.\47\
    The Chinese government's increasing cooperation with 
Central Asian neighbors has placed Uighur activists outside of 
China at risk of extradition. In 2006, Uzbek authorities 
extradited Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil from Uzbekistan to 
China, where he received a life sentence in 2007 for 
``terrorist activities'' and ``plotting to split the country.'' 
A former Chinese citizen originally from the XUAR, Celil had 
gained political asylum in Canada in 2001. Chinese authorities 
do not recognize Celil's Canadian citizenship and have 
denied Celil access to Canadian consular officials.\48\

                          Population Planning


                              INTRODUCTION

    During the past five years, the Chinese government has 
maintained population planning policies that violate 
international human rights standards. As this Commission noted 
in 2006, ``The Chinese government strictly controls the 
reproductive lives of Chinese women. Since the early 1980s, the 
government's population planning policy has limited most women 
in urban areas to bearing one child, while permitting many 
women in rural China to bear a second child if their first 
child is female. Officials have coerced compliance with the 
policy through a system marked by pervasive propaganda, 
mandatory monitoring of women's reproductive cycles, mandatory 
contraception, mandatory birth permits, coercive fines for 
failure to comply, and, in some cases, forced sterilization and 
abortion. The Chinese government's population planning laws and 
regulations contravene international human rights standards by 
limiting the number of children that women may bear, by 
coercing compliance with population targets through heavy 
fines, and by discriminating against `out-of-plan' children.'' 
\1\
    As this Commission reported in 2005 and 2006, China's 
population planning policies in both their nature and 
implementation constitute human rights violations according to 
international standards. During 2007, human rights abuses 
related to China's population planning policies clearly were 
not limited to physically coerced abortions. Local officials 
have violated Chinese law by punishing citizens, such as 
imprisoned legal advocate Chen Guangcheng, who have drawn 
attention to population planning abuses by government 
officials. Moreover, as described below, population planning 
policies have exacerbated imbalanced sex ratios--a male to 
female ratio of 118:100, according to the U.S. Department of 
State, but reportedly higher in some localities and for second 
births.

                    OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

    China's population planning policies exert government 
control over women's reproductive lives, impose punitive 
measures against citizens not in compliance with the population 
planning policies, and engender additional abuses by officials 
who implement the policies at local levels. The government 
states that population planning policies have prevented more 
than 300 million births since implementation, and it justifies 
continuing the policies to maintain controls over population 
growth.\2\ In 2002, when the Chinese government codified its 
population planning policies into national law, an official 
stated that China ``does not yet possess the conditions for a 
relaxation of [the] birth policy, but there is also no need to 
tighten it.'' \3\ A decision issued by the Communist Party 
Central Committee and State Council in December 2006 promoted 
the continuation of basic national policies on population 
planning.\4\ In July 2007, the head of the Population and 
Family Planning Commission reiterated that the policies would 
remain in place.\5\
    China's population planning policies deny Chinese women 
control over their reproductive lives. The Population and 
Family Planning Law and related local regulations permit women 
to bear one child, with limited exceptions.\6\ Women who bear 
``out-of-plan'' children face, along with their family members, 
harsh economic penalties in the form of ``social compensation 
fees'' that can range to multiples of a locality's yearly 
average income.\7\ Authorities also subject citizens who 
violate population planning rules to demotions or loss of jobs 
and other punitive measures.\8\ Authorities have used legal 
action and coercive measures to collect money from poor 
citizens who cannot afford to pay the fees.\9\ The fees 
entrench the disparity between rich and poor, as wealthier 
citizens have come to view paying the fees as a way to buy out 
of population planning restrictions.\10\ Public officials also 
have been able to flaunt restrictions. Official Chinese media 
reported in 2007 that the Hunan province family planning 
commission found that from 2000 to 2005, nearly 2,000 officials 
in the province had violated the Population and Family Planning 
Law.\11\ In September 2007, the government and Party announced 
new measures to monitor public officials' 
adherence to population planning policies and deny promotions 
to officials who violate them.\12\ In recent years, the 
government has introduced more programs to reward citizens' 
compliance with family planning policies, but it has retained 
punitive measures.\13\ In May 2007, the national Population and 
Family Planning Commission adopted a plan to ``rectify'' out-
of-plan births in urban parts of China.\14\ Controls imposed on 
Chinese women and their families, and additional abuses 
engendered by the system, from forced abortion to 
discriminatory policies against ``out-of-plan'' children, 
violate standards in the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,\15\ Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,\16\ and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,\17\ the terms of which 
China is bound to uphold as a state party to these treaties.
    Abuses in the enforcement of population planning policies 
have further eroded citizens' rights. Although the Population 
and Family Planning Law provides for punishment of officials 
who violate citizens' rights in promoting compliance,\18\ 
reports from recent years indicate that abuses continue. Media 
reports in 2005 publicized abuses in Linyi, Shandong province, 
where officials enforced compliance through forced 
sterilizations, forced abortions, beatings, and other 
abuses.\19\ Citizens who challenge government offenses continue 
to face harsh repercussions. After legal advocate Chen 
Guangcheng exposed abuses in Linyi, authorities launched a 
campaign of harassment against him that culminated in a four-
year, three-month prison sentence imposed in 2006 and affirmed 
by a higher court in 2007.\20\ [See also Section II--Rights of 
Criminal Suspects and Defendants for more information.] 
Structural incentives for local officials to coerce compliance 
exacerbate the potential for abuses. In spring 2007, local 
officials in Bobai county, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
(GZAR), initiated a wide-scale campaign to control birthrates 
after the GZAR government reprimanded officials for failing to 
meet population targets. Officials reportedly required all 
women to submit to examinations and subjected women to fines, 
forced sterilization, and forced abortions. Authorities looted 
homes and seized possessions of citizens who did not pay the 
fines.\21\ In May, Bobai residents rioted in protest of 
government abuses. Residents of Rong county, also in the GZAR, 
protested population planning policies later the same 
month.\22\ In one potentially positive development, an 
intermediate court in Hebei province agreed in 2007 to hear a 
couple's lawsuit against a local family planning commission for 
a forced abortion seven years ago, reportedly the first time a 
court has taken an appeal in this type of case.\23\
    The government has taken limited steps to address social 
problems exacerbated by population planning policies, such as 
unbalanced sex ratios\24\ and decreasing social support for 
China's aging population. In 2006, the government announced 
that the following year it would extend across China a pilot 
project to provide financial support to rural parents with only 
one child or two girls, once the parents have reached 60 years 
of age.\25\ The Communist Party Central Committee and State 
Council decision issued in 2006 describes the unbalanced sex 
ratio as ``inevitably influencing social stability,'' advocates 
steps to address discrimination against girls and women, and 
promotes measures to stop sex-selective abortion.\26\ Sex 
ratios stand at roughly 118 male births to 100 female births, 
with higher rates in some parts of the country and for second 
births. Demographers and population experts consider a normal 
male-female birth ratio to be between 103 to 107:100.\27\
    In 2006, the National People's Congress Standing Committee 
considered, but decided not to pass, a proposed amendment to 
the Criminal Law that would have criminalized sex-selective 
abortion.\28\ Local governments have instituted prohibitions 
against fetal sex-determination and sex-selective abortion. For 
example, in 2006, Henan province passed a regulation imposing 
financial penalties on these acts where they take place outside 
of limited approved parameters.\29\
    At the same time the government has taken some steps to 
deal with the sex imbalance and discriminatory attitudes toward 
girls, some provincial governments have enforced policies that 
institutionalize biases against girls by permitting families to 
have a 
second child where the first child is a girl.\30\ According to 
some observers, imbalanced sex ratios and a resulting shortage 
of marriage partners have already contributed to, or will 
exacerbate in the future, the problem of human trafficking.\31\ 
[See Section II--Human Trafficking, and Section II--North 
Korean Refugees in China.]
    Within individual provincial-level jurisdictions, a range 
of factors beyond birth rates affect local population growth. 
Internal migration has contributed to demographic shifts within 
ethnic minority autonomous regions, among other areas. In 2006, 
authorities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 
acknowledged that floating and migrant populations would 
continue to contribute to the region's high rate of population 
growth, but also announced the government would carry out its 
population planning policies by continuing measures to control 
birth rates. A series of articles from official media 
specifically indicated that the XUAR government would target 
impoverished ethnic minority areas as the focus of these 
measures.\32\ [See Section II--Ethnic Minority Rights, and 
Section IV--Tibet, for more information on population issues in 
ethnic minority areas.]
    During 2008, the Commission will continue to monitor and 
report on violations of international human rights standards in 
China related to forced abortions, social compensation fees, 
licensing for births, control of women's reproductive cycles, 
and all other issues.

                    Freedom of Residence and Travel


                          FREEDOM OF RESIDENCE

    The Chinese government continues to enforce the household 
registration (hukou) system it first established in the 1950s. 
This system limits the right of Chinese citizens to determine 
their permanent place of residence. Regulations and policies 
that condition legal rights and access to social services on 
residency status have resulted in discrimination against rural 
hukou holders who migrate for work to urban areas. The hukou 
system exacerbates barriers that migrant workers and their 
families face in areas such as employment, healthcare, property 
rights, legal compensation, and schooling. [See Section II--
Worker Rights for more information.] Central and local 
government reforms from the past five years have mitigated some 
obstacles to equal treatment, but provisions that allow people 
to change hukou status have included criteria that advantage 
those with greater economic and educational resources or with 
family connections to urban hukou holders.\1\ The government's 
restrictions on residence and discrimination in equal treatment 
contravene international human rights standards,\2\ including 
those in treaties China has signed or ratified.\3\ In May 2005, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
expressed ``deep concern'' over the discrimination resulting 
from ``inter alia, the restrictive national household 
registration system (hukou) which continues to be in place 
despite official announcements regarding reforms.'' \4\
    Recent reforms have addressed some of the burdens migrants 
face. In 2001, the State Council expanded an earlier program to 
allow rural migrants who meet set requirements to migrate to 
small towns and cities and obtain hukou there, while keeping 
rural land rights.\5\ In 2003, the State Council abolished 
``Measures for the Custody and Repatriation of Vagrant Beggars 
in Cities'' that allowed the police to detain, at will, people 
without identification, residence, or work permits.\6\ The same 
year, the State Council issued a national legal aid regulation 
that does not condition legal aid on residence status.\7\
    Central government directives promulgated in 2003 and 
beyond also have called for reform, though many have had 
limited formal legal force and limited impact.

        <bullet> In 2003, the State Council issued a directive 
        acknowledging migrants' right to work in cities, 
        forbidding discriminatory policies, and calling for 
        improved services for migrants and their families.\8\
        <bullet> Also in 2003, the State Council issued legal 
        guidance ordering urban governments to take 
        responsibility for educating migrant children.\9\
        <bullet> A 2004 State Council directive called for an 
        end to discriminatory work restrictions against 
        migrants.\10\
        <bullet> The Ministry of Labor and Social Services 
        (MOLSS) issued a labor handbook the following year 
        stating that the MOLSS will not require migrants to 
        obtain a work registration card in their place of 
        origin before seeking jobs in urban areas.\11\
        <bullet> A joint opinion on the promotion of a ``new 
        socialist countryside'' issued in 2005 by the Communist 
        Party Central Committee and the State Council called 
        for reforms to the hukou system, including a 
        reiteration of prior reform measures that stalled at 
        the local level.\12\
        <bullet> In 2006, the State Council issued an opinion 
        addressing various issues affecting migrant workers and 
        calling for measures to ease, under certain conditions, 
        migrants' ability to settle in urban areas.\13\
        <bullet> 2006 revisions to the compulsory education law 
        codify a guarantee of equal educational opportunities 
        for children outside the jurisdiction of their hukou 
        registry.\14\
        <bullet> During the 10th session of the National 
        People's Congress (NPC) in March 2007, Chinese 
        legislators approved a resolution creating a delegate 
        quota in the NPC reserved for migrant workers.\15\
        <bullet> In 2007, the Ministry of Public Security 
        formulated a series of proposals to submit to the State 
        Council for approval.\16\ Major reforms in the proposal 
        include improving the temporary residence permit 
        system, improving the ability of migrants' spouses and 
        parents to transfer hukou to urban areas, and using the 
        existence of a fixed and legal place of residence as 
        the primary basis for obtaining registration in a city 
        of residence.\17\

    Uneven implementation of hukou reform at the local level 
has dulled the impact of national calls for change. Fiscal 
burdens placed on local governments have served as 
disincentives for implementing reforms. Fears of population 
pressures and citizen activism, in addition to discriminatory 
attitudes against migrants, also have fueled resistance from 
local governments.\18\ Since 2001, many provinces and large 
cities have implemented measures that allow migrants to obtain 
an urban hukou, but they generally give preference to wealthier 
and more educated migrants by conditioning change in status on 
meeting requirements such as having ``a stable place of 
residence'' and a ``stable source of income,'' as defined in 
local provisions.\19\ New reforms instituted in Chengdu in 2006 
allow some migrants to obtain a hukou where they rent housing 
in the city and reside in it for over a year, but the reforms 
also impose conditions that disadvantage poorer migrants.\20\ 
Other policies also are detrimental to broader reforms of the 
hukou system. In 2005, authorities in Shenzhen implemented 
tighter restrictions against migrants by suspending the 
processing of hukou applications for migrants' dependents. 
Authorities also said they would limit the growth of private 
schools for migrant children and require migrant parents to pay 
additional fees to enroll their children in public schools.\21\ 
In 2006, Shenyang municipal authorities reversed 2003 
relaxations on hukou requirements when they reinstituted 
temporary residence requirements for migrants.\22\
    Some local government measures have been beneficial to 
improving conditions for migrants. After the State Council 
called in 2004 for abolishing employment restrictions for 
migrants, the Beijing municipal government followed suit with 
local reforms in 2005 that eliminated restrictions on migrant 
workers holding certain occupations.\23\ In 2005, Henan 
provincial authorities reported that they would institute 
measures to increase migrant workers' access to healthcare 
while in urban areas.\24\ In 2006, authorities in a district 
within the city of Xi'an reported instituting measures granting 
all residents equal access to social services.\25\ Some local 
governments have removed discriminatory compensation levels for 
rural migrants. In October 2006, the Chongqing High People's 
Court issued an opinion stipulating that rural migrants who 
have resided in Chongqing for over a year and have an 
``appropriate source of 
income'' are entitled to the same compensation as urban hukou 
holders in traffic accident cases.\26\ The Supreme People's 
Court is currently contemplating a new judicial interpretation 
on the role of hukou status in determining death compensation 
rates.\27\
    Central and local governments have accompanied measures to 
address discrimination against migrants with calls to 
strengthen supervision over migrant populations, reflecting 
concerns over 
perceived social unrest. The 2003 directive articulating broad 
protections for migrant workers also supports measures to 
increase control over them, including through ``social order 
management responsibility systems.'' \28\ Although a government 
official called in 2005 for transforming management techniques 
from methods of control to methods of service,\29\ authorities 
have continued to enact measures to exert government control. A 
circular from Henan province issued in 2006 called for 
monitoring migrants by keeping files on their rental 
housing.\30\

                           FREEDOM OF TRAVEL

    The Chinese government continues to enforce restrictions on 
citizens' right to travel, in violation of international human 
rights standards.\31\ The Law on Passports, effective January 
2007, articulates some beneficial features for passport 
applicants, but gives officials the discretion to refuse a 
passport where ``[t]he competent organs of the State Council 
believe that [the applicant's] leaving China will do harm to 
the state security or result in serious losses to the benefits 
of the state.'' \32\ Authorities restrict travel to penalize 
citizens who express views they deem objectionable. The Chinese 
government initially failed to approve democracy activist Yang 
Jianli's passport application,\33\ which he submitted after his 
release from prison in April 2007.\34\ In August, however, 
authorities 
allowed Yang to travel to the United States. Authorities had 
detained Yang in 2002 when he crossed into China on another 
person's passport. Authorities had earlier refused to renew his 
passport and had barred him and other activists from entering 
the country.\35\ Chinese officials have prevented other 
activists from traveling abroad, including rights defender Tang 
Jingling, whose passport was confiscated by Guangdong border 
authorities in September 2006 as he was en route to New York. 
Tang brought an administrative lawsuit against the government 
in December 2006.\36\ In February 2007, the government 
prevented a group of writers from participating in a conference 
in Hong Kong by denying visas to some writers, warning others 
not to attend, and directly preventing some from passing 
through border controls into Hong Kong.\37\ [See Section II--
Freedom of Expression for more information.] In June 2007, 
authorities intercepted human rights defenders Yao Lifa and 
Zeng Jinyan at the airport and prevented them from traveling to 
an overseas human rights conference.\38\ In July, 
authorities rejected Mongol rights advocate Gao Yulian's 
passport application on the grounds of ``possible harm to state 
security and national interests.'' \39\ In August, Shanghai 
authorities denied the passport applications of rights defense 
lawyer and former political prisoner Zheng Enchong and his 
spouse Jiang Meili.\40\ The same month, authorities in Beijing 
prevented Yuan Weijing, spouse of imprisoned rights activist 
Chen Guangcheng, from traveling overseas to accept an award for 
her husband.\41\ In 2007, authorities also denied passport 
applications from the family members of defense lawyer Gao 
Zhisheng.\42\
    The government also uses travel restrictions to control 
religious citizens' overseas travel and to punish religious 
adherents deemed to act outside approved parameters. [See 
Section II--Freedom of Religion for more information.] The 
central government has increased control over Muslims' ability 
to undertake overseas religious pilgrimages, especially since 
2004. In June 2007, overseas media reported that authorities in 
the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) implemented a 
policy to confiscate passports from Muslims, and Uighurs in 
particular, in a reported effort to enforce restrictions on 
overseas pilgrimages.\43\ In July, the XUAR government 
announced the public security bureau would strengthen passport 
controls as part of its campaign to curb unauthorized 
pilgrimages.\44\ House church leader Zhang Rongliang, who 
resorted to obtaining illegal travel documents after the 
government refused to issue him a passport, was sentenced to 
seven and one-half years' imprisonment in 2006 on charges of 
illegally crossing the border and fraudulently obtaining a 
passport.\45\ Also in 2006, authorities detained two leaders of 
the unregistered Wenzhou diocese, Peter Shao Zhumin and Paul 
Jiang Surang, after they returned from a pilgrimage to Rome. 
Six months after their detention, Shao and Jiang received 
prison sentences of 9 and 11 months, respectively, after 
authorities accused them of falsifying their passports and 
charged them with illegal exit from the country.\46\ 
Authorities placed house church historian and former political 
prisoner Zhang Yinan and his family under surveillance in 2006 
after he tried to apply for a passport to attend a religious 
function in the United States.\47\

                            Status of Women


                              INTRODUCTION

    The Commission has noted in the past that the Chinese 
government has been more vigorous in publicizing and condemning 
abuse against women than in other areas concerning human 
rights.\1\ In 2003, 2004, and 2006, the Commission observed 
that, while China had built an expansive legal framework to 
protect women's rights and interests, loopholes and inadequate 
implementation remained that left women vulnerable to 
widespread abuse, discrimination, and harassment at home and in 
the workplace.\2\ The Commission noted in 2004-2006 that 
China's economic reforms have increased opportunities for women 
to build their own businesses, but these reforms still leave 
many women, when compared to men, with fewer employment 
opportunities, less earning power, less access to education, 
especially in rural areas, and increasing risks from HIV/
AIDS.\3\ In its 2004-2006 Annual Reports, the Commission also 
noted the existence of women's organizations that advocate on 
behalf of women's rights within the confines of government and 
Communist Party policy.\4\ In its 2005 Annual Report, the 
Commission observed that China's Constitution and laws provide 
for the equal rights of women, but, as noted in 2006, vague 
language and inadequate implementation continue to hinder the 
effectiveness of legal protections written in the Constitution 
and national laws.\5\

                         LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS

    The Chinese Constitution and laws provide for the equal 
rights of women.\6\ In addition, the Program for the 
Development of Chinese Women seeks to increase women's 
development by 2010 in areas of the economy, decisionmaking and 
management, education, health, law, and the environment.\7\ 
CECC Annual Reports dating from 2003 have noted that the number 
of laws and regulations promoting the equal rights of women has 
expanded, with a noticeable difference after 2004.
    In August 2005, the National People's Congress (NPC) 
Standing Committee passed an amendment to the Law on the 
Protection of Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI), which 
prohibit sexual harassment and domestic violence, and require 
government entities at all levels to give women assistance to 
assert their rights in court.\8\ At least nine provincial and 
municipal governments have passed regulations to strengthen the 
implementation of the LPWRI.\9\ For example, Shanghai's 
regulations, passed in April 2007, explicitly prohibit five 
types of sexual harassment, namely verbal, written, pictorial, 
electronic transmission of information such as text messaging, 
and physical sexual harassment.\10\ The 2002-2004 Annual 
Reports noted that although there was initially no specific law 
on sexual harassment, people began to file sexual harassment 
cases in court and several women won lawsuits against their 
employers, in part due to greater economic openness and 
government and women's organizations' efforts to build 
awareness.\11\ In addition, at least 15 provincial and 
municipal governments have detailed domestic violence 
regulations, and the Ministry of Public Security and the All-
China Women's Federation (ACWF), among others, issued 
guidelines in 2007 that will legally obligate police officers 
to respond immediately to domestic violence calls and to assist 
domestic violence victims, or face punishment.\12\
    Previous annual reports have noted that the lack of a 
national definition on key terms, such as discrimination 
against women and sexual harassment, hinder effective 
implementation of the amended LPWRI and other policy 
instruments.\13\ In addition, even though the amended Marriage 
Law of 2001 and the amended LPWRI prohibit domestic violence, 
``domestic violence'' is not defined, and case rulings in 
domestic violence cases are inconsistent due to the lack of 
clear standards in laws and judicial explanations.\14\ Other 
hurdles in accessing justice include domestic violence victims 
bearing the burden in bringing complaints, lack of detailed 
provisions on how to implement policy measures, and limited 
public understanding and awareness, among other factors.\15\ 
Recent surveys show that domestic violence and sexual 
harassment remain widespread. For example, 30 percent of 
Chinese families experience 
domestic violence, and 74.8 percent of female migrant workers 
engaged in the service industry in Changsha city report 
experiencing some form of verbal or physical sexual 
harassment.\16\

                           GENDER DISPARITIES

                                Economy

    China's transition to a market economy has had 
contradictory 
influences on the social status of women, who contribute to 
over 40 percent of China's gross domestic product, offering 
them both ``greater freedom and mobility,'' and ``greater 
threats . . . at home and in the workplace.'' \17\ The 
Commission's 2003 Annual Report notes that women workers face 
particular hardships in finding a job, as they are often the 
first to be fired and the last to be hired, and there exists 
weak labor protection measures, inadequate maternity insurance, 
unequal compensation and benefits when compared to men for 
equal work, and fewer opportunities for advancement, among 
other factors.\18\ There are also concerns that women's 
participation in the economy is unevenly distributed between 
rural and urban areas, and that the market transition has 
increased fees in rural areas, impoverishing some families and 
harming girls' access to education.\19\ Young women are 
increasingly migrating to urban areas to find work, leaving 
them vulnerable to trafficking, forced labor, and other 
abuses.\20\
    At the same time, some women are succeeding as 
entrepreneurs in China, in certain measures even in comparison 
to men.\21\ For 
example, most of these women entrepreneurs work in small and 
medium-sized companies, accounting for 20 percent of the total 
number of entrepreneurs in China. Among them, 60 percent have 
become successful in the past decade and 95 percent of the 
companies that they run have been very successful. These 
companies have created more job opportunities for women as 
well, since 60 percent of the staff tends to be women.\22\ [See 
Section II--Worker Rights.]

                     Decisionmaking and Management

    Women account for 40 percent of government positions, yet 
this number may be misleading as very few hold positions with 
decisionmaking power. For example, the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs estimates that less than 1 percent of village 
committees and village-level Communist Party Committees in 
China's 653,000 administrative villages were headed by women in 
2004. In March 2007, the NPC announced that female 
representatives should account for at least 22 percent of the 
seats in the 11th NPC, with representatives to be elected by 
the end of January 2008, and at least 30 
percent of civil servant posts must be held by women.\23\ 
Various provincial and municipal governments have also 
announced gender quotas for positions in their local 
governments and local people's congresses.\24\

                          HIV/AIDS and Health

    Chinese health statistics over the past five years continue 
to reflect women's disadvantaged status, and also reflect 
central and local governments' slow pace in effectively 
addressing health issues that are known to disparately impact 
women, especially women in rural areas. The Commission's 2005 
Annual Report noted that women make up an increasingly larger 
percentage of newly reported HIV/AIDS cases, an observation 
confirmed by official Chinese government news media.\25\ This 
trend has continued in the 2006-2007 reporting period,\26\ 
although the government has taken some steps to increase HIV/
AIDS awareness among women used in prostitution.\27\ Although 
the Commission's 2003 Annual Report observed that China had not 
taken the necessary initiatives to increase awareness among 
this group, these recent steps suggest a possible positive 
development if they are implemented effectively.\28\
    China is the only country in the world where the rate of 
suicide is higher among women than among men.\29\ According to 
the editor of China Women's News, 157,000 women commit suicide 
each year in China, 25 percent more than men. In rural areas, 
the instance of suicide among women is three to four times 
higher than the instance among men, and three to five times 
higher than the instance among women who live in urban areas. 
Domestic violence is the main cause of suicide among women in 
rural areas.\30\ While there has been a decline in maternal 
mortality rates since 1991, there is a widening gap between 
urban and rural areas, with women in rural areas experiencing 
significantly higher mortality rates when compared with 
maternal mortality rates in urban areas and the national 
average.\31\ Moreover, rural women's rates of illnesses are 5 
percent higher when compared with rural men's rates of 
illnesses, most likely as a result of long working hours, poor 
nutrition and care after childbirth, and the collapse of the 
rural cooperative medical system.\32\ [See Section II--Health.]

             Access to Education, Especially in Rural Areas

    Women continue to have less access to education in rural 
areas and lower educational levels when compared to men, 
although women's organizations and the government have 
initiated programs in recent years to reverse this trend by 
providing economic incentives to send girls to school or 
seeking to change traditional rural attitudes that give 
preference to the education of sons. Despite 99 percent 
enrollment rates for girls and boys, only 43 percent of girls 
in rural areas, as compared with 61 percent of boys, complete 
education higher than junior middle school.\33\ Furthermore, 
the National Bureau of Statistics released statistical data in 
2006 showing that more than 70 percent of those who are 
illiterate and 15 years of age and older are women, a figure 
that has increased since 2001.\34\ In an attempt to address 
these issues in part, government and government-affiliated 
organizations have organized local-level ``Spring Bud'' 
programs that aim to help girls stay in school around the 
country.\35\

    Rural Land Reallocation and the Rights of ``Married-Out Women''

    ``Married-out women'' in rural areas continue to experience 
violation of their land and property rights, although judges 
have recently ruled in favor of women in certain types of 
lawsuits, and some provinces are issuing regulations that seek 
to strengthen implementation of existing legal protections. 
Village committees, when determining who should be eligible to 
receive shares of collectively owned land assets, may order 
decisions that legitimize discrimination against ``married-out 
women.'' ``Married-out women'' include women who have either 
married men from other villages, but whose household 
registration (hukou) remains in their birthplace, whose hukou 
is transferred from one place back to their birthplace, or 
whose hukou is transferred to their husbands' village.
    These women are especially vulnerable to violation of their 
rights, including rights to use land, to receive compensation 
for the land, to use the land for residential purposes, and to 
have access to collective welfare resources.\36\ Legal 
protections in the form of the PRC Law on Land Contract in 
Rural Areas, the Marriage Law, and other laws, guarantee women 
the same land rights as men. Judges have ruled in favor of 
women in four lawsuits concerning land rights since August 
2005, and there have been reports of other successful cases 
within the last two years.\37\ Most of these women who have won 
lawsuits, however, have been those who still live in their 
villages after marrying men from other villages.\38\
    There are still tremendous difficulties for ``married-out 
women'' to use legal channels to seek redress for violations of 
their rights. For example, lawyers have noted that the LPWRI 
and relevant regulations in Guangdong province guarantee the 
property rights of women, but they lack detailed articles that 
could be used to protect these rights.\39\ In addition, each 
village also has its own set of laws, which according to the 
PRC Organic Law of Village Committees (Organic Law) should not 
contravene national laws and regulations.\40\ Yet the Organic 
Law does not indicate how to prevent or resolve this 
disconnect, with the consequence that some villages uphold 
their own laws even when they are in conflict with the LPWRI 
and other laws.\41\ In May 2007, Guangdong province passed 
regulations to strengthen its implementation of the LPWRI, with 
the rule that neither organizations, such as the village 
committee, nor individuals can prevent or force rural women to 
change their hukou as a result of marriage, divorce, or 
widowhood.\42\ In addition, the regulations state that village 
rules, laws, and resolutions concerning land rights must not 
violate women's rights on the basis of marriage, divorce, or 
widowhood.\43\

                         WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

    Women's organizations have been particularly active in the 
last few years, although these groups advocate on behalf of 
women's rights within the confines of government and Communist 
Party policy. The All-China Women's Federation (ACWF), a 
Communist Party-led mass organization, plays a supporting role 
in the formation of some of these organizations while others 
operate more independently and sometimes with unregistered 
status.\44\ There were 2,000 active organizations by 1989, and 
the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 helped to launch 
other women's organizations, such as the Center for Women's Law 
Studies and Legal Services of Peking University and the Maple 
Women's Psychological Counseling Center. In addition, several 
women leaders jointly founded the advocacy project Women's 
Watch--China in April 2005.
    Within the last year, the China Women's University 
established a legal center for women and children, and there 
have been various seminars and workshops sponsored by 
universities, lawyers' associations, and local women's 
federations to raise awareness of women's issues among lawyers, 
judges, public officials, and academics.\45\ The ACWF works 
with the Chinese government to support women's rights, 
implement programs for disadvantaged women, and provide a 
limited measure of legal counseling and training for women.\46\ 
As a Party organization, however, the ACWF does not promote 
women's interests when such interests conflict with Party 
policies that limit women's rights. For example, in 2005, an 
ACWF representative in Yunnan province refused to allow a 
leading women's rights activist to represent over 500 women in 
Yunnan in seeking redress for lost land, on the grounds that 
such interference could ``influence stability.'' \47\ In 
addition, the ACWF has been silent about the abuses of Chinese 
government population planning policies and remains complicit 
in the coercive enforcement of birth limits.\48\

           NON-DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKPLACE

    Women account for 60 percent of total rural laborers, and 
by the end of 2004, there were 337 million women working in 
cities and rural areas, which accounted for 44.8 percent of the 
total workforce, roughly women's proportion of China's general 
population.\49\ Women still face tremendous challenges in the 
workplace, and women migrant workers face particular hardship. 
For example, more than 70 percent of women in a 2007 survey 
reported worrying about losing their jobs after becoming 
pregnant, and there have been numerous cases of women dismissed 
after they became pregnant.\50\ In addition, a 2006 survey of 
women migrant workers 
conducted by the ACWF found that only 6.7 percent of surveyed 
workers had maternity insurance. Of the 36.4 percent who 
reported that they were allowed to take maternity leave, 64.5 
percent said this leave was unpaid.\51\ Some local governments 
have established programs to provide loans, training, and legal 
aid for woman workers.\52\ For example, the legal aid center in 
Jinan city provides legal services for migrant women 
workers.\53\ The ACWF also has programs such as the Two Million 
Project, launched in 2003, which aims to train 2 million laid-
off women so that they can find reemployment.\54\ [See Section 
II--Worker Rights.]

                 CONTINUING CHALLENGES IN THE WORKPLACE

    The Chinese government has passed a substantial body of 
protective legislation, particularly in the area of labor laws 
and regulations. For example, the 1978 Temporary Measures on 
Providing for Old, Weak, Sick, and Handicapped Cadres 
(Temporary Measures) require women to retire at 55, and men at 
60.\55\ Chinese academics and government officials have noted 
that the Temporary Measures discriminate against women.\56\ In 
addition, requirements for employment based on height, weight, 
gender, age, and beauty are not uncommon. In 2006, a 
transportation company based in Hubei province issued rules 
stipulating that female attendants must stay within certain 
height and weight requirements, and that attendants whose 
weight exceeded 60 kilograms (132 pounds) would be laid 
off.\57\ Despite some legal protections, both urban and rural 
women in China continue to have limited earning power when 
compared to men, and women lag behind men in finding employment 
in higher-wage urban areas.\58\

                           Human Trafficking


                              INTRODUCTION

    The Chinese government has taken some steps to establish a 
national-level anti-trafficking coordinating mechanism, to 
increase public awareness, to expand the availability of some 
social services for victims of trafficking, and to improve 
international cooperation. The Chinese government reports that 
efforts have led to a decline in some forms of trafficking, but 
also notes that there has been an increase in other forms of 
trafficking that have not received as much attention, such as 
using trafficking victims to perform forced labor or engage in 
commercial sex. Within the past five years, for example, there 
has been a rise in cross-border trafficking cases, with 
internal and international traffickers increasingly working 
together. The U.S. State Department also notes that the Chinese 
government ``continued to treat North Korean victims of 
trafficking as economic migrants, routinely deporting them back 
to horrendous conditions in North Korea.'' \1\

                     DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST YEAR

    The National People's Congress Standing Committee revised 
the PRC Law on the Protection of Minors on December 29, 2006, 
which became effective June 1, 2007, to explicitly prohibit the 
trafficking of minors.\2\ Article 41 of the revised law 
contains new provisions that prohibit the trafficking, 
kidnapping, and maltreatment, including sexual exploitation, of 
minors, although these terms are not 
defined.\3\ In July 2007, the All-China Women's Federation 
(ACWF) and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) held the first 
National Anti-Trafficking Children's Forum, in which an MPS 
spokesperson noted the increase in the number of cases of 
forced labor trafficking and trafficking for commercial sexual 
exploitation, and an annual decrease in the number of cases 
handled by the MPS that relate to the trafficking of women and 
children for marriage and adoption.\4\
    Official Chinese case statistics suggest, however, that 
China is either not publishing accurate data on the incidence 
of human trafficking, uses non-standard categories for these 
crimes, or has low prosecution rates in these cases. In 2005, 
the MPS reported that Chinese police departments nationwide 
opened 2,884 cases of ``abducting women and children,'' of 
which they reported ``investigating and handling'' just over 
2,400 cases. In 2006, the total number of cases investigated 
and resolved was just over 2,100. Police press reports portray 
the trends as evidence that such abduction cases have declined 
in society since the 1980s and 1990s, and as proof of the 
``obvious effectiveness'' of their policies.\5\ By contrast, 
the U.S. State Department's 2007 Trafficking in Persons Report 
notes that ``an estimated minimum of 10,000 to 20,000 victims'' 
are trafficked internally each year.\6\ The ACWF-MPS forum also 
touched on legal protections for trafficking victims. According 
to the MPS spokesperson, ``In trafficking and abduction 
aspects, China's legal protection is underdeveloped, and it 
needs to be further strengthened.'' \7\ The forum noted, for 
example, that China's Criminal Law provides punishment for the 
trafficking of women and children, but neglects minors over 14 
and male adults, who are often targeted for forced labor.\8\

                     TRENDS IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS

    China's Ministry of Public Security reports that efforts to 
combat human trafficking have led to a decline in some forms of 
trafficking, but that there has also been an increase in other 
forms of trafficking that have not received as much attention, 
such as using trafficking victims to perform forced labor.\9\ 
As the U.S. State Department reports in its annual review of 
global human trafficking, China ``is a source, transit, and 
destination country'' for human trafficking.\10\ Domestic 
trafficking continues to comprise the majority of trafficking 
cases in China. Women and children, who make up 90 percent of 
the cases, are trafficked from poorer provinces to more 
prosperous provinces on the east coast.\11\ Some experts note 
that the Chinese government's attention to human trafficking 
for commercial sexual exploitation appears to be uneven, with 
far greater concern shown towards the internal trafficking of 
Chinese girls and women and little concern over foreign girls 
and women who are trafficked into China or who enter China 
voluntarily but are subsequently trafficked. Many of these 
women are from Vietnam, North Korea, and Mongolia, among other 
countries, and are treated as immigration violators who are 
detained and subsequently repatriated.\12\
    There have also been increases in the number of cross-
border trafficking cases and, especially between 2004 and 2006, 
an increase in the number of infant trafficking cases.\13\ The 
rising number of infant trafficking cases in China reflects 
many factors, such as China's population planning policies, 
economic disparity, and a lack of awareness among the general 
public [see Section II--Population Planning]. Most of the 
infants who have been rescued were male, but the increased 
demand for children has reportedly driven traffickers to 
traffic females as well.\14\ Some of the cases involved social 
service organizations buying infants that had been abducted, 
and selling them to adoptive families at marked-up prices, as 
well as traffickers buying infants from private medical clinics 
and other social service organizations and selling them to 
buyers elsewhere.\15\ In 2007, the U.S. State Department placed 
China on its Tier Two Watch List for the third consecutive year 
due to the Chinese government's failure to show evidence of 
efforts to improve comprehensive victim protection services and 
to address trafficking of persons for forced labor.\16\

                   INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND OBLIGATIONS

    The Chinese government ratified the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime on September 23, 2003, but still 
has not ratified its protocol that addresses trafficking in 
persons. The protocol represents the first global legally 
binding definition of trafficking in persons and aims to 
support international cooperation in investigating and 
prosecuting cases and in protecting and assisting victims of 
trafficking.\17\ In addition, China has ratified the Convention 
to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which further legally 
bind the Chinese government to suppress and prevent the 
abduction and trafficking of women and children.\18\

      DOMESTIC EFFORTS TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND CHALLENGES

    Central and local governments have taken steps to combat 
trafficking within the past five years, but these initiatives 
remain inadequate to effectively address the root causes of 
human trafficking and forms of trafficking such as forced 
labor. For example, Article 39 of the Law on the Protection of 
Women's Rights and Interests (LPWRI), which was amended in 
2005, expanded the number of organizations responsible for 
preventing trafficking in women and rehabilitating victims, 
including local women's federations and local public security, 
labor, social security, and health bureaus.\19\ The central 
government announced in 2007 that it will establish a national-
level anti-trafficking coordinating mechanism that aims to 
strengthen interagency cooperation, as at least seven agencies 
currently have regulatory responsibilities to combat 
trafficking.\20\
    The 2003 and 2004 Commission Annual Reports noted that the 
central government initiated several short-term ``Strike Hard'' 
campaigns to punish traffickers and rescue victims.\21\ But 
these campaigns have not proven to be effective instruments 
that address the causes of trafficking, nor do they introduce 
administrative and legal mechanisms to combat future 
trafficking operations. ``Strike Hard'' campaigns have also 
been characterized by extensive violations of criminal 
procedure rights.\22\ Some provincial and municipal governments 
have localized efforts to combat trafficking by creating short-
term rehabilitation centers, and increasing public awareness 
efforts that inform people of their legal protections and 
resource options.\23\ For example, Sichuan provincial public 
security officials have created informational fliers, public 
service announcements, and pamphlets that explain legal 
protections, resources, and hotline numbers that are aimed at 
migrant workers and other workers who are most at risk.\24\ In 
addition, within the past year, Yunnan provincial authorities 
held a media outreach seminar to raise awareness among 
journalists of anti-trafficking strategies, victim protection, 
and relevant legislation.\25\
    These preliminary steps are positive, but local governments 
need to expand them to include more comprehensive victim 
rehabilitation services such as psychological counseling and 
long-term care. While there are currently legal prohibitions 
against some types of human trafficking, these protections do 
not prohibit forms of trafficking such as debt bondage or 
commercial sexual exploitation that involves coercion or 
fraud.\26\ Another hurdle is the difficulty central government 
officials face in compelling local law enforcement officials to 
aggressively pursue cases that cross jurisdictional boundaries, 
especially as more trafficking cases take place across 
provincial and national borders.\27\ For example, U.S. experts 
have noted that ``local Party dominance over law enforcement 
creates powerful 
incentives for local police departments to neglect their 
responsibilities to share crime-related data and intelligence 
with other jurisdictions.'' \28\

                       INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

    Central and local governments have increased cooperation 
with other countries to investigate and prosecute trafficking 
cases involving women and children. In particular, the Chinese 
government has discussed trafficking in persons with the United 
States as part of the bilateral China-U.S. Global Issues Forum, 
and has worked to improve its cross-border prosecution efforts 
with such countries as Vietnam.\29\ China is also actively 
cooperating with international organizations such as the 
International Labor Organization, the International 
Organization for Migration, and the United Nations Interagency 
Project on Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
on programs to prevent and combat human trafficking.\30\ The 
Chinese government has prepared a National Plan of Action to 
address the trafficking of women and children, which it still 
has not adopted.\31\ A September 4, 2007, China Daily article 
noted that the government hopes to adopt the national action 
plan by the end of 2007.\32\

                     North Korean Refugees in China

    In 2006-2007, China continued to fail in its obligations to 
the thousands of North Korean refugees who crossed its 
northeastern border to escape North Korea's chronic food 
shortages and political oppression. While an accurate estimate 
of the size of this underground population is probably not 
possible, in recent years the U.S. State Department and several 
NGOs have estimated that 20,000 to 50,000 North Koreans 
currently are hiding in northeastern China. Chinese civilian, 
law enforcement and military experts speaking in 2005-2006 
typically cited an estimate of 30,000 to 50,000.\1\ An October 
2006 report by the International Crisis Group surveyed the 
opinions of many NGO experts and reached an estimate that the 
total number of North Korean refugees residing on Chinese soil 
is approximately 100,000.\2\ As noted by the State Department's 
2007 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, these refugees, many 
of whom are women, are unable to work legally in China. Thus, 
many of them are highly vulnerable to being kidnapped by 
traffickers:

        The illegal status of North Koreans in the People's 
        Republic of China (P.R.C.) and other Southeast Asian 
        countries increases their vulnerability to trafficking 
        schemes and sexual and physical abuse. In the most 
        common form of trafficking, North Korean women and 
        children who voluntarily cross the border into P.R.C. 
        are picked up by trafficking rings and sold as brides 
        to P.R.C. nationals, usually of Korean ethnicity, or 
        placed in forced labor. In a less common form of 
        trafficking, North Korean women and girls are lured out 
        of North Korea by the promise of food, jobs, and 
        freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, 
        or exploitative labor arrangements once in P.R.C.\3\

    The U.S. State Department reports that during 2006 
``several thousand North Koreans were reportedly detained and 
forcibly returned to North Korea.'' \4\ To encourage these 
repatriation efforts, central government authorities assign 
local public security bureaus in northeastern China a target 
number of North Koreans that they must detain in order to 
receive favorable work evaluations.\5\ To persuade civilians in 
these areas not to assist the refugees, the government also 
provides financial rewards to citizens who reveal the 
locations of refugees.\6\ By employing these incentive and 
punishment systems on citizens to turn these refugees in, China 
deliberately undermines its own international legal obligations 
to 
refrain from repatriating North Koreans and further deters its 
citizens from supplying humanitarian assistance. In the past 
several years, the government has reportedly built new 
detention centers along the Chinese-Mongolian border and the 
Chinese-North Korean border in order to accommodate more North 
Koreans before it repatriates them.\7\
    By returning these refugees to the DPRK , China is in 
contravention of its obligations under the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its 
1967 Protocol (Protocol). Under the 1951 Convention and its 
Protocol, no contracting state may ``expel or return 
(`refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.'' 
\8\
    The Chinese government classifies all North Koreans who 
enter China without documents as illegal economic migrants 
without making any effort to determine whether or not they are 
refugees, and claims that it must return them to the DPRK. In a 
June 19, 2007, press conference Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
press spokesperson Qin Gang repeated China's longstanding 
insistence that these migrants ``came to China for economic 
reasons and they are not `refugees' at all.'' \9\ In addition, 
the Chinese government bases its policy of repatriating North 
Koreans on a 1961 treaty with the DPRK and a series of 
protocols on border management signed by the two countries in 
1986 and 1998.\10\ But China is also obligated under Article 3 
of the Convention Against Torture not to forcibly return any 
person to another state where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he or she would be in danger of torture.\11\ 
Under the general international legal principle of non-
derogation, China's bilateral commitments with the DPRK should 
not supersede China's international obligations under the 1951 
Convention, its Protocol, and the Convention Against 
Torture.\12\
    Moreover, the treatment these refugees receive upon their 
repatriation to the DPRK provides more than ample evidence that 
they satisfy the definition of refugees under international 
law. The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as someone who, 
``owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country.'' \13\ In a 2005 
report, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in North 
Korea noted that even North Koreans who have crossed into China 
for reasons of livelihood are nevertheless ``refugees sur 
place,'' a designation for those who ``did not leave their 
country of origin for fear of persecution, but who fear 
persecution upon return.'' \14\
    The DPRK government imprisons, tortures, and executes 
repatriated North Koreans, and has increased the punishment for 
border crossers since late 2004. Article 233 of the amended 
North Korean Penal Code provides for up to two years' 
imprisonment for citizens who leave the DPRK without 
permission, and Article 62 provides for no less than five 
years' imprisonment for defectors, and life imprisonment or 
execution for defectors deemed to have committed ``an extremely 
grave offense.'' \15\ According to international NGOs, North 
Koreans are considered to have committed a more serious 
offense, and are punished more harshly, if they have converted 
to Christianity or have met with Christian missionaries, South 
Koreans, or other foreigners while in China.\16\ In late 2004, 
the North Korean government changed its policy toward 
repatriated border crossers to increase prison sentences from 
several months to several years and to detain them in regular 
prisons, which have harsher regimes, rather than labor 
camps.\17\ Defector testimonies document cases of beatings, 
forced labor, lack of food and medicine, degrading treatment, 
torture, and execution.\18\ Pregnant female defectors have 
reportedly been subjected to forced abortions under poor 
medical care. According to a South Korean Bar Association 
study, defectors have also reported witnessing North Korean 
authorities carry out forced abortions.\19\
    The Chinese government blanketly asserts that North Korean 
migrants are not refugees, and does not permit individual 
petitions for asylum. The government also denies the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations the 
access needed to evaluate their claims. Chinese guards posted 
outside the UNHCR office and foreign embassies in Beijing block 
access to North Koreans who seek to present refugee 
petitions.\20\ The government's failure to allow for a process 
in order to evaluate whether individual North Koreans have 
reason to fear persecution upon return to the DPRK contravenes 
its obligations under the 1951 Convention and its Protocol, as 
identified by the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North 
Korea: ``Implicit in the Convention--the strict Article 33 
prohibition read together with the multi-pronged Article 1 
refugee definition--is a requirement that states take 
appropriate steps to determine whether an individual is a 
refugee before sending him or her back to possible 
persecution.'' \21\ This refusal of access by the UNHCR also 
contravenes Article 35 of the 1951 Convention.\22\
    The government fines and imprisons Chinese citizens and 
international humanitarian workers who assist North Korean 
refugees, and these penalties have recently been increased. In 
2006, Chinese authorities sentenced Hong Jin-hee, Kim Hong-
kyun, and Lee Soo-cheol, three South Korean citizens and former 
North Korean defectors, to seven, five, and two years' 
imprisonment, respectively, for assisting North Koreans in 
China to seek asylum in a third country. Chinese authorities 
detained Kim and Lee in Beijing in October 2004, and Hong in 
Shenyang in November 2004, and have held the three without 
trial until their sentencing in 2006.\23\ In November 2006, 
authorities in Yantai city, Shandong province, released on 
parole Choi Yong-hoon, a South Korean citizen imprisoned for 
assisting North Koreans in China to seek asylum in South Korea, 
after Choi served 3 years and 11 months of his 5-year 
sentence.\24\
    The Chinese government is reportedly in the final stages of 
drafting a Regulation on the Administration of Refugees.\25\ A 
June 2007 report in the official People's Daily said that ``the 
government draft national refugee regulation [is] now in its 
final phase,'' but that ``[i]t is unclear when the draft will 
be submitted to the State Council for final review and 
approval.'' The report also mentions the UNHCR role in 
``helping . . . [to] draft'' the regulation.\26\ In March 2006, 
the UNHCR said that his office would be involved in insuring 
that the regulation is in compliance with international 
law.\27\ The drafting process for these regulations provides 
Chinese officials with an opportunity to carry out a long 
overdue reassessment of their refugee policies to make them 
accessible and transparent, providing every refugee with a 
chance for a legal hearing and an appeal if necessary.

                                 Health


                             MENTAL HEALTH

    In December 2006, the Beijing Municipal People's Congress 
issued a new Regulation on Mental Health. On its face, the new 
regulation prohibits local police from arbitrarily detaining 
the city's mentally ill as Beijing prepares to host the 2008 
Summer Olympic Games.\1\ Under the new regulation, which went 
into effect in March 2007, public security officials may remove 
a mentally ill person to a mental health center only if that 
person ``harms or poses a serious threat to public safety, a 
person's life, or property.'' \2\ The precise meaning of these 
words and how they are to be interpreted remain unclear.
    The new regulation requires that at least two mental health 

doctors make determinations of medical necessity for 
involuntary hospital admission. It also provides for review of 
involuntary admission by a review body. On these points the 
regulation is not dissimilar from the UN Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care.\3\ However, while the UN 
Principles provide that the review body complete its review 
``as soon as possible'' and ``in accordance with expeditious 
procedures,'' the Beijing regulation requires that the review 
be completed ``within three months''--a period of time that 
could accomplish the purpose of removing persons from the 
streets for the duration of the 2008 Olympic Games (August 8-
24, 2008) or longer, without violating the letter of the 
law.\4\

                                HIV/AIDS

    Many international experts concur that over the past five 
years, the Chinese central government's policies to combat the 
spread of HIV/AIDS have, in general, progressively 
strengthened. On this issue of importance to China's leaders, 
however, the government's worries about uncontrolled citizen 
activism and foreign-affiliated nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) have limited their policies potential effectiveness. 
During its best periods, the government has developed a set of 
policies and laws and committed funding, and in limited but 
important ways engaged international groups and its own NGO 
community. China's HIV/AIDS policy has also demonstrated 
unusual openness to working with marginalized communities such 
as migrant workers, the homosexual community, women and men 
used in prostitution, and drug users. Due to these efforts and 
the increase in the use of anti-retroviral drugs, the death 
rate has reportedly decreased in recent years.\5\
    China recorded its first AIDS case in 1989,\6\ and by mid-
2002, official Chinese government and UN figures estimated that 
between 1 million to 1.5 million people were infected with 
HIV.\7\ Recent UN figures estimate there are about 650,000 
people living with HIV in China today, but experts believe this 
estimate to be low on account of changes in estimation 
methodology and procedures.\8\ While China is a country with a 
low prevalence of the disease nationwide, health experts say 
the disease is moving into the general population, with most 
new infections being spread sexually, followed by drug use.\9\ 
China reported 18,543 new cases of HIV in the first six months 
of 2007, which is approximately the number of cases for all of 
2006.\10\ Health officials calculate that there were on average 
200 new cases of HIV/AIDS infection in China each day in 
2005.\11\
    In 2007, China announced plans to spend 960 million yuan 
(US$127 million) on anti-retroviral drugs, expand public 
education, and conduct outreach to China's marginalized 
homosexual community.\12\ The government also expanded policies 
to further incorporate foreign governments, international 
companies, grassroots 
organizations, and trade unions in its efforts to combat HIV/
AIDS. In January 2007, the government, along with the 
International Labor Organization and the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions, initiated a program that made HIV/AIDS 
education available in the workplace.\13\ Privately owned 
Chinese firms are also gradually becoming involved in these 
efforts, often at the request of their foreign business 
affiliates.\14\ In addition, the U.S. Department of Labor 
initiated a $3.5 million grant to support a program that 
focused on migrant workers.\15\
    Nonetheless, while national officials have emphasized the 
importance of combating HIV/AIDS, it is local implementation 
that determines whether national-level commitment and policy 
action produce outcomes of consequence on the ground. 
Implementation remains highly problematic. Fear of the disease 
has led some local officials to harass persons with HIV/AIDS 
and their advocates.\16\ Henan province, where a large number 
of villagers contracted HIV through unsanitary blood collection 
practices in the late 1980s and early 1990s, provides a 
particularly stark example:

        <bullet> In June 2003, public security officials, aided 
        by local residents, raided Xiongqiao village, an ``AIDS 
        village'' in Henan, and destroyed property, assaulted 
        residents, and arrested 13 villagers. Villagers had 
        appealed to local officials to receive previously 
        promised government assistance for AIDS patients.\17\
        <bullet> In May 2004, several people living with HIV/
        AIDS in Henan were detained for more than a week, 
        apparently for seeking 
        assistance from provincial officials to compel local 
        officials to provide promised assistance.\18\
        <bullet> In 2005, a U.S. NGO reported the violent 
        closure of a privately run orphanage for children with 
        AIDS in Henan, and another U.S. group noted that local 
        officials in Henan have organized militias to prevent 
        journalists and NGO observers from visiting AIDS 
        patients.\19\
        <bullet> In November 2005, public security officials 
        detained activist Hu Jia, co-founder of two HIV/AIDS 
        advocacy groups, when he attempted to deliver a 
        petition on behalf of more than 50 AIDS patients to 
        Vice Premier Wu Yi at a November 2005 AIDS 
        conference in Henan. Citing government pressure, Hu 
        subsequently resigned in February 2006 from one of the 
        groups, Loving Source, and is currently under 
        residential surveillance.\20\
        <bullet> In November 2006, public officials detained 
        HIV/AIDS advocacy group leader Wan Yanhai, forcing him 
        to cancel a conference on AIDS, blood-transfusion 
        safety, and legal human rights.\21\
        <bullet> In February 2007, public security officials in 
        Zhengzhou city, Henan, placed AIDS activist and doctor 
        Gao Yaojie under surveillance at her home in an attempt 
        to prevent her from traveling to the United States to 
        accept a human rights award.\22\ Central government 
        officials intervened, and Gao was subsequently granted 
        permission to travel to the United States to receive 
        the 2007 Vital Voices Global Women's Leadership Award 
        for Human Rights on March 14.\23\

    The depth of the crisis is only magnified by official 
corruption. In July 2007, the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
announced the removal of a director of a Guangdong province 
blood center as a result of his involvement in illegal blood 
sales and noted that six other people had received sentences of 
between 6 and 18 months for helping individuals repeatedly sell 
their blood using fake identity cards.\24\ In the hopes of 
reducing illegal blood trade activity, the MOH has announced 
that blood collection centers are required by the end of 
October 2007 to set up equipment to videotape plasma 
collections.\25\
    A government advisor on AIDS policy has expressed concern 
that China's efforts to combat the disease have stalled and 
that funding, which in 2006 was 3 billion yuan (US$388 
million), remains inadequate.\26\ The government's commitment 
to provide care to specific subpopulations, such as children 
orphaned as a result of AIDS and ethnic minorities infected 
with HIV, appears to be wavering.\27\ Sensitive issues, such as 
compensation for rural residents in central provinces who 
contracted HIV from the sale of blood, have hindered broader 
efforts to combat HIV/AIDS.\28\
    At the local level, an overburdened, underfunded healthcare 
system makes it difficult for governments to provide the 
necessary prevention and treatment programs. Many programs lack 
sufficient numbers of qualified doctors to properly administer 
anti-retroviral drugs and to help patients maintain needed 
treatment, with the result that many patients simply drop out 
of the programs. Public education and awareness efforts have 
not fully succeeded: 66 percent of China's population 
reportedly continues to be unaware of how to protect themselves 
against HIV.\29\ AIDS patients have also been discriminated 
against and denied treatment at hospitals.\30\

         WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HEPATITIS B CARRIERS

    China has a high rate of hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection, 
with 120 million carriers of the virus, who make up 
approximately 30 percent of the 400 million HBV carriers in the 
world.\31\ Only 70 percent of China's population has been 
vaccinated for the disease. In an attempt to reduce hepatitis B 
infection, the Ministry of Health (MOH) issued the 2006-2010 
National Plan on Hepatitis B Prevention and Control, with the 
top priority of strengthening vaccination programs, especially 
among young children. The goal is to lower the infection rate 
to 1 percent among those five years old and younger, and to 
less than 7 percent nationwide by 2010.\32\
    Until 2004, there were no national laws protecting HBV 
carriers from discrimination in the workplace, and some central 
and local governments prohibited the hiring of people with 
certain varieties of the disease.\33\ In April 2003, when 
university student Zhou Yichao was denied a public service job 
because he was an HBV carrier, he stabbed two officials in 
Zhejiang province, killing one. Zhou was later sentenced to 
death on murder charges.\34\ This incident helped to spark 
discussion over the treatment of HBV carriers. In November 
2003, HBV carrier Zhang Xianzhu of Anhui province successfully 
sued a government personnel office, complaining that his job 
application had been unjustly rejected. A court held in April 
2004 that the personnel office applied the regulation 
incorrectly, but did not invalidate the regulation itself, and 
also denied Zhang's request to be reconsidered for the civil 
service position, noting that the recruitment season had 
already ended.\35\ This was the first partially successful 
administrative lawsuit regarding discrimination against HBV 
carriers in the workplace.
    In 2004, the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing 
Committee amended the Law on the Prevention and Control of 
Infectious Diseases to prohibit discrimination against persons 
with 
infectious diseases, persons carrying a pathogen of an 
infectious disease, and persons suspected of having an 
infectious disease.\36\ In January 2005, the Ministry of 
Personnel and the MOH revised 
national standards to allow HBV carriers who do not exhibit 
symptoms of the disease to apply for employment with the 
government.\37\
    Yet discrimination against HBV carriers remains widespread. 
Even though experts and Chinese officials have publicly stated 
that hepatitis B is not infectious in most work and school 
situations, many people believe that it is and refuse to hire 
HBV carriers or interact with them on those grounds.\38\ A 2005 
China Foundation for Hepatitis Prevention and Control survey, 
covering 583 hepatitis B patients in 18 provinces, found not 
only that a majority of Chinese physicians do not have adequate 
knowledge of hepatitis B or of ways to prevent and treat the 
disease, but also that 52 percent of the respondents had faced 
discrimination in employment and education.\39\ In November 
2005, two universities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR) suspended 156 students, diagnosed as hepatitis B 
positive in their matriculation medical examinations, from 
their studies for a year.\40\ Students formed an action group 
and distributed fliers to protest this decision, and one 
student filed the first hepatitis B discrimination lawsuit in 
the XUAR against her university, Xinjiang Agricultural 
University.\41\ The student eventually withdrew her case as 
university authorities allowed her to resume her studies amid 
widespread media coverage, and support from NGOs and concerned 
individuals.\42\ As of December 2006, the other students were 
reportedly still not able to return to school.\43\
    In September 2006, Urumqi municipal education officials in 
the XUAR expelled 19 high school students who had tested 
positive for hepatitis B.\44\ After first attempting to 
petition local government bureaus, seven families later filed a 
lawsuit against the municipal education bureau, with the hope 
that the students would be allowed to continue their 
education.\45\ The Urumqi Tianshan District People's Court 
postponed the hearing date on several occasions until it 
announced on November 20 that the families had withdrawn their 
case. The families' lawyer and a NGO that works on hepatitis B 
issues believe that the case was dropped due to pressure from 
local officials and employers.\46\ In addition, public security 
officials forced Snow Lotus, an unregistered NGO based in the 
XUAR, to close in October and discontinue its work for 
reportedly drafting open letters on behalf of the students and 
breaking the story to the media.\47\ [See Section III--Civil 
Society for more information on this case.] Local education 
officials maintain that the students were expelled in order to 
protect other pupils, yet central officials and experts have 
condemned the expulsion.\48\ According to Mao Qun'an, a MOH 
representative, ``This is prejudice. All these students can go 
to school unless they are sick enough to be hospitalized.'' 
\49\
    Most recently, a 2007 survey on health discrimination in 
the workplace found that 49 percent of respondents would be 
unwilling to work with HBV carriers, and 55 percent noted that 
they would not hire HBV carriers.\50\ Employer screening for 
HBV remains common, especially in cities.\51\ A Chinese job 
applicant filed a lawsuit against Nokia in March 2007, alleging 
that its China branch denied him employment after he underwent 
a company medical examination and was found to be a HBV 
carrier.\52\ The applicant is claiming 500,000 yuan (US$66,613) 
in emotional damages in what is reportedly the first hepatitis 
B discrimination case against a foreign multinational company 
in China.\53\ The Dongguan People's Court accepted the case in 
May, and court proceedings began on August 15 and concluded 
with a decision by the judge to select a retrial date.\54\ At 
press time, the court has yet to publicly issue a decision or a 
retrial date. In some online forums, there is active discussion 
of this case, as well as other cases of discrimination against 
HBV carriers.\55\
    In May 2007, the MOH and the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security issued a non-legally binding opinion to protect the 
employment rights of HBV carriers, including a prohibition 
against mandatory HBV screening for job applicants, except for 
those positions that were previously designated as forbidden 
for HBV carriers.\56\ On August 30, 2007, the NPC Standing 
Committee adopted the Employment Promotion Law, which 
stipulates provisions that could benefit HBV carriers seeking 
employment.\57\ For example, Article 30 of the new law 
prohibits employers from refusing to hire applicants on the 
grounds that they carry infectious diseases, except for those 
industries barred to formally certified infectious disease 
carriers because of the possibility that they might spread the 
disease, and Article 62 allows workers to file a lawsuit 
against employers who violate provisions of the new law and 
discriminate against employees.\58\ Without the concurrent 
creation of effective programs to raise public awareness of how 
the disease is spread, incentives for local implementation, and 
a clear and comprehensive definition of discrimination,\59\ the 
impact of these regulatory measures remains to be seen.\60\

      STATE CONTROL OF INFORMATION RELATING TO SARS AND AVIAN FLU

    In July 2007, military officials denied Dr. Jiang Yanyong 
permission to travel to the United States to receive a human 
rights award. Dr. Jiang had previously informed foreign media 
of government attempts to cover up the SARS outbreak in 
2003.\61\ In addition, Chinese laws still require journalists 
to get advance approval before publishing public health 
information about broad categories of diseases classified as 
``state secrets.''
    Chinese public health officials sought to improve their 
ability to prevent and control the spread of avian flu by 
improving the flow of information between lower officials and 
higher officials following the mishandling of the SARS epidemic 
in 2003. The State Council issued regulations in November 2005 
requiring provincial governments to report ``major'' animal 
epidemics to the State Council within four hours of discovering 
them, and county and city governments to report cases to 
provincial authorities within two hours. Officials who are 
found negligent in reporting outbreaks face removal from office 
and potential prosecution.\62\
    Such laws allow for improved internal channels of 
information but do not necessarily guarantee free flow of 
information to the public. The Law on the Protection of State 
Secrets and implementing regulations in the area of public 
health continue to serve as a hindrance to the free flow of 
information on public health matters. For example, the 
Regulation on State Secrets and the Specific Scope of Each 
Level of Secrets in Public Health Work, issued in 1996, 
categorize as state secrets information on large-scale 
epidemics of viral hepatitis and other diseases that has not 
been authorized for public disclosure by the government.\63\ A 
new national Regulation on the Public Disclosure of Government 
Information, issued in April 2007, contains provisions that 
require agencies to disclose information on public health 
supervision and sudden emergencies, but these ``state secret'' 
exceptions remain in place.\64\ [See Section II--Freedom of 
Expression.]

                        HEALTHCARE SYSTEM REFORM

    During the 1980s, the government abolished its previous 
rural healthcare system, which was based on village clinics 
staffed by ``barefoot doctors'' and financed by cooperative 
insurance.\65\ The government did not replace the previous 
system with a new rural cooperative medical system until 
2003.\66\ From 1977 to 2002, the number of doctors in rural 
China decreased from 1.8 million to 800,000, and the number of 
rural healthcare workers decreased from 3.4 million to 
800,000.\67\ Eighty percent of medical resources are now 
concentrated in cities.\68\ The rural-urban disparity is also 
apparent in mortality statistics. Residents of large cities in 
China live 12 years longer than rural residents, and the infant 
mortality rate in some rural areas is nine times higher than in 
large cities.\69\

                            Urban Healthcare

    The government established a public health insurance 
program for employed urban residents in 1998, and by the end of 
2006, 
approximately 160 million out of the country's 500 million 
urban residents received coverage.\70\ In July 2007, Premier 
Wen Jiabao announced plans to establish a national health 
insurance program to cover all urban residents, including 
children, the elderly, and the uninsured, over the next three 
years. The central government has selected 79 cities to launch 
pilot programs by the end of September 2007.\71\ In order to 
improve community-level medical services in urban areas, large 
city hospitals will provide facility and staff support to 
community health clinics, and a data-sharing system will be 
established.\72\

                            Rural Healthcare

    Under China's Rural Cooperative Medical System (RCMS), a 
farmer and each family member that participates in the system 
pays an average premium of 10 yuan (US$1.25) each year into a 
personal medical care account, with governments at all levels 
subsidizing an additional 40 yuan (US$5) on average.\73\ 
Participants may have up to 65 percent of their healthcare 
costs reimbursed, but are required to first pay such costs out 
of pocket.\74\ The scope of the RCMS's coverage, and government 
spending on healthcare, has increased in recent years. The 
government reported that the number of counties covered by the 
RCMS increased from 687 pilot counties in 2005 to 1,451 
counties (50.7 percent of China's rural areas) at the end of 
2006.\75\ Prior to implementation of the RCMS, the percentage 
of rural residents with health insurance coverage reportedly 
reached a low of 7 percent in 2002.\76\ After the RCMS was 
introduced in 2003, the government reported that coverage had 
increased to 51 percent by February 2007.\77\ The amount of 
money the central government has announced it plans to spend on 
rural healthcare also increased from 2.073 billion yuan (US$252 
million) in 2004 to 5.8 billion yuan (US$750 million) in 2006, 
and reportedly to 10.1 billion yuan (US$1.33 billion) in 
2007.\78\ Since the establishment of the RCMS, some areas have 
reported increases in the number of hospitalized patients and 
in the amount of revenue for local clinics.\79\

                       Rising Cost of Healthcare

    Some senior Chinese officials and scholars have questioned 
the fairness and efficiency of the medical and healthcare 
system. The poorest residents in rural areas frequently do not 
enroll in the cooperatives because they cannot afford the 
required fee. As many as 50 percent of farmers who fall ill do 
not seek healthcare for economic reasons, and half of all 
children who die in rural areas had not received medical 
treatment.\80\ For rural participants especially, the 
reimbursement level remains inadequate. The average 
reimbursement rate is 27.5 percent, determined in part by the 
specific disease and the local government's budget.\81\ Many 
counties and townships do not have the financial resources to 
supply their portion of the fund. In addition, rural clinics 
are poorly funded and lack adequate medical personnel and 
equipment.\82\
    High medical costs have become the top concern of Chinese 
citizens, according to a 2006 Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences survey on ``Problems that Affect Social Harmony and 
Stability,'' with medical expenses comprising 11.8 percent of 
an average family's total annual spending.\83\ There has also 
been an increase in violent attacks on doctors and hospital 
personnel as citizens protest rising costs, medical errors, and 
declining professional ethics.\84\ In 2006, hospitals reported 
9,831 cases of violence, more than 200 million yuan (US$25.6 
million) in damages to hospital facilities, and 5,519 medical 
personnel injuries, an increase from 5,093 cases of violence, 
67 million yuan (US$8.8 million) in damages, and 2,600 medical 
personnel injuries in 2002.\85\
    To address some of these issues, the Ministry of Health 
relocated approximately 5,500 doctors and nurses from urban 
areas to rural areas in 2007 to treat rural patients and train 
local medical personnel.\86\ In addition, the central 
government has set a goal of renovating 22,000 village clinics, 
1,300 county-level general hospitals, 400 county-level 
traditional or ethnic minority hospitals, and 950 county-level 
maternity and childcare institutes by 2010, and has pledged 
more than 20 billion yuan (US$2.5 billion) for the task.\87\

                              Environment


                              INTRODUCTION

    China's leaders acknowledge the severity of their country's 

environmental problems, and the Chinese government has taken 
steps to curb pollution and environmental degradation. For 
example, the central government has developed an expansive 
framework of environmental laws and regulations to combat 
environmental problems. Nonetheless, effective implementation 
remains systemically hampered by noncompliance at the local 
level and administrative structures that prioritize the 
containment of ``social unrest'' and the generation of revenue 
over environmental protection.
    Just as China's environmental policies have not kept pace 
with the country's severe environmental degradation, neither 
have they kept pace with citizens' aspirations for, and 
increasingly vigorous expression of concern over, environmental 
health and human rights. During 2007, China's citizens 
confronted environmental public policy with an increasing 
propensity, not only to voice intense dismay with government 
and industry, but also to turn to petitions and mass protests, 
and to some extent to the courts, in order to pressure public 
officials for greater environmental accountability, 
enforcement, and protection.
    Participation in environmental protests has risen in the 
last two years, particularly among middle-class urban 
residents. Their participation is significant because, until 
recently, public protest related to environmental issues was 
concentrated in rural areas and thought to be a more remote 
concern for urban elites. Official responses to environment-
related activism have included crackdowns on the free flow of 
information, and the suppression of citizen protest. In part 
because these strategies target potential allies instead of 
engaging them, further environmental degradation may require 
China's leaders to confront the ways these strategies diminish 
their capacity to exercise effective environmental leadership 
over the long run.

    ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PUBLIC FRUSTRATION WITH OFFICIAL 
                               RESPONSES

    Rapid economic growth without effective environmental 
safeguards has led to severe environmental degradation, with 
water, air, soil, and other forms of pollution threatening 
public health and quality of life. Poor soil and water 
conservation practices and government inattention to polluting 
industries exacerbate these problems. Many Chinese citizens 
suffer from respiratory diseases, and the State Environmental 
Protection Administration (SEPA) estimated that there are 
approximately 358,000 premature deaths each year due to air 
pollution.\1\ Acid rain affects about one-third of the 
country.\2\ Deforestation and erosion leading to loss of arable 
land, landslides, and sedimentation of waterways are 
widespread.\3\ Water pollution and poor conservation practices 
have led to water shortages in many areas, leaving millions in 
urban areas, and one-third of the rural population without 
access to clean drinking water.\4\
    The Chinese government acknowledges the severity of China's 
environmental problems. The State Council's White Paper on 
``Environmental Protection (1996-2005),'' issued in June 2006, 
notes that ``the contradiction between economic growth and 
environmental protection is particularly prominent'' as the 
``relative shortage of resources, a fragile ecological 
environment, and insufficient environmental capacity are 
becoming critical problems hindering China's development.'' \5\ 
Senior government officials also acknowledge the public protest 
that severe environmental degradation could prompt.\6\ A U.S. 
expert has observed that environmental degradation and 
pollution ``constrain economic growth, contribute to large-
scale migration, harm public health, and engender social 
unrest.'' \7\ According to official Chinese estimates, 
environmental degradation and pollution cost China an estimated 
8 to 12 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP), and the 
number of mass protests over pollution has increased by 29 
percent per year in recent years.\8\
    China has taken steps to curb pollution and environmental 
degradation. In both its 10th (2001-2005) and 11th (2006-2010) 
Five-Year Plans, the government formulated or revised 
environmental protection laws, administrative regulations, and 
standards, and has worked to strengthen enforcement of anti-
pollution rules.\9\ In addition, SEPA and the Ministry of 
Health (MOH) are working together to facilitate the sharing of 
information resources, and to develop a national action plan 
and implementation measures on environmental health.\10\ As 
described below, for some incidents that have captured public 
attention, central and local governments have imposed 
administrative penalties on polluters and public officials 
responsible for enforcement failures.
    Nonetheless, although the central government has issued 
numerous environmental laws and programs, effective 
implementation has been beset by problems that are fundamental 
and widespread. Local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) 
depend on local governments for resources and funding, and 
submit to political control by local Party Committees. In part 
because local governments (and some officials) derive income 
from local enterprises, some local EPBs receive pressure to 
engage in weak or selective enforcement. Even without such 
pressure, officials in underfunded EPBs have incentives to 
permit polluting enterprises to continue operating in order to 
preserve revenue used to finance their bureau's operating 
deficits. Shortages of well-trained environmental personnel, 
loopholes in the law, and weak interagency coordination 
contribute to an incentive structure that favors economic 
growth over the rigorous implementation and enforcement of 
environmental protection measures.\11\
    China's serious air, water, and soil pollution problems 
have emerged in recent years as one of the country's most 
rapidly growing sources of citizen activism. For example, 
SEPA's Minister Zhou Shengxian stated in July 2007 that the 
number of citizen petitions received by SEPA in the first five 
months of 2007 grew by 8 percent over the same period in 2006. 
Moreover, the number of pollution-related ``mass incidents'' 
(China's official term for protests) 
increased during a year when officials claimed that overall 
mass incidents decreased significantly.\12\ These numbers 
reflect, in part, Chinese citizens' willingness, prompted by 
rapidly rising frustration with the government's failure to 
rein in environmental degradation, to stand up for the 
environment, and for their rights.\13\
    In its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission reported that 
central government officials delayed some of the proposed 
hydroelectric dams on the Nujiang (Nu River) in response to 
environmental concerns from civil society groups.\14\ As of 
February 2007, some villagers have already been resettled in 
advance of the Liuku dam, one of four approved dams, and there 
have been concerns over inadequate relocation compensation.\15\ 
Local residents around the site of the proposed Lushui dam, 
which has not been approved, have observed laborers engaging in 
survey work on the dam. Other villagers have limited knowledge 
of the proposed dams being built in their vicinity.\16\ This 
continued lack of transparency limits public involvement and 
violates the government's own environmental protection laws and 
policies.\17\
    In a nationwide campaign that inspected 720,000 enterprises 
in 2006, the government reported that 3,176 polluting 
enterprises had been closed, and SEPA reported 161 pollution 
accidents in 2006.\18\ Administrative litigation and 
administrative reconsideration remain avenues for environmental 
dispute resolution and private enforcement, but attention in 
2006-2007 turned to a rise in the form of ``high-impact'' 
litigation, particularly in cases involving compensation for 
the health impacts of environmental pollution. Although the 
government prevails in the majority of cases, experts have 
noted that high-impact cases often prompt an official response, 
typically in the form of new administrative rules and Party 
directives, even when plaintiffs lose.\19\
    Promotion of rural officials for a long time has been tied 
to their record of containing social protest. For example, 
``(L)ocal officials will only be promoted to more senior 
positions if they can minimize social unrest in the 
countryside,'' according to a senior Party official.\20\ These 
officials choose either to confront the underlying 
environmental problem or to suppress activists.\21\ Previously, 
experts have noted that rural residents tended more frequently 
than urban residents to engage in ``large-scale'' protests over 
environmental issues.\22\ Events in 2007, however, suggest that 
this impression may now be outdated, as the urban middle class' 
supposed preference for non-confrontational approaches gave way 
to a rise in urban environmental activism. Mass protests in 
Xiamen over the construction of a chemical plant in June 2007 
and protests shortly thereafter in Beijing over the building of 
a garbage incineration power project signal some of the first 
large-scale protests in urban areas by middle-class citizens 
over environmental pollution. These protests are significant 
because they suggest that middle-class urban residents regard 
alternative methods for pollution prevention and health 
preservation as inadequate.
    Chinese citizens concerned with environmental issues are 
increasingly organized. There are now an estimated 4,000 
registered and unregistered environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) nationwide.\23\ In recent years, these 
NGOs have broadened their focus beyond initial efforts at 
public education and awareness to assisting pollution victims 
in pursuing redress through the legal system, and mobilizing 
public participation in and support for environmental 
protection.\24\ SEPA has sought public support for and 
participation in environmental protection work and has, to a 
limited extent, encouraged and supported environmental NGO 
activism. In 2005, SEPA held a public hearing to encourage 
citizen 
interest and NGO activism,\25\ and in February 2006, it 
released two provisional measures on public participation in 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures. These 
measures are the first to contain specific arrangements and 
procedures for public involvement in environmental issues.\26\ 
Since the release of the provisional measures, approximately 43 
projects with a value of 160 billion yuan (US$20.5 billion) in 
investments have been halted for violating EIA procedures.\27\
    In an effort to increase transparency, SEPA issued a 
regulation in April 2007 on environmental information 
disclosure, coinciding with the State Council's issuance of the 
Regulation on the Public Disclosure of Government Information. 
[See Section II--Freedom of Expression.] The SEPA regulation 
lists 17 categories of government information that should be 
made public either through government Web sites, local 
newspapers, or upon request. Firms may voluntarily disclosure 
information in nine categories and are obligated to disclose 
information when they violate standards or cause an 
accident.\28\
    In spite of this apparent support for limited citizen 
activism by SEPA, official efforts to increase control over 
environmental civil society groups during the past two years 
have had a chilling effect on citizen activism. During 2006-
2007, the Commission has observed numerous official actions to 
repress citizen activism and organizers that work on 
environmental or environmental health issues:

        <bullet> Fu Xiancai, who has protested forced 
        resettlement of citizens during the construction of the 
        Three Gorges Dam project, gave an interview with a 
        German television station in May 2006. A public 
        security official interrogated Fu about the interview 
        in June 2006, and shortly thereafter an unidentified 
        assailant attacked Fu. The attack left Fu paralyzed 
        from the shoulders down.\29\ The official investigation 
        into the assault concluded in August 2006 that Fu's 
        injuries were self-inflicted.\30\
        <bullet> Environmental activist Tan Kai was detained in 
        October 2005 for his involvement in the environmental 
        group ``Green Watch'' and was tried in May 2006 on 
        charges of illegally obtaining state secrets. In August 
        2006, Tan was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and 
        was reportedly released in April 2007.\31\
        <bullet> After activist Sun Xiaodi was awarded the 
        Nuclear-Free Future Award in December 2006, officials 
        have intensified their harassment efforts. Sun has 
        spent more than a decade petitioning central 
        authorities over radioactive contamination from the No. 
        792 Uranium Mine in the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous 
        Prefecture in Gansu province. Sun has protested illegal 
        mining allegedly carried out by local officials that 
        has resulted in an unusually high rate of cancer and 
        other health problems for residents in the area. In 
        February 2007, Sun traveled to Beijing to seek further 
        medical consultation and treatment of a tumor in his 
        abdominal cavity.\32\ In July 2007, the State 
        Security Bureau in Beijing reportedly ordered Sun to 
        leave Beijing.\33\


------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Case: Human Rights Abuses and Intolerance of Environmental Activism
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Background
Wu Lihong, a 39-year old sound-proofing equipment salesman turned
 environmental activist, has spent the past 17 years documenting the
 pollution in Taihu (Lake Tai) in his hometown of Yixing city, Zhoutie
 township, Jiangsu province, in the hopes of pressuring local officials
 and factories to stop the pollution and clean up the lake.\34\ Wu
 notes, ``My wish is that the lake will return to the lake of my
 childhood, when the water was safe and we could go swimming in it
 without fear.'' \35\ Wu collects physical evidence of pollution in Lake
 Tai, such as bottles of dirty water illegally discharged from chemical
 enterprises around the area and the local officials whose complicity
 exacerbate the situation, and submits this evidence to provincial- and
 central-level officials through the xinfang (petitioning) system.\36\
In interviews with foreign media in 2006 and early 2007, Wu remarked
 that ``It is shameful that we can't drink from the lake. The chemical
 factories and local government officials should be blamed. I want them
 to admit their responsibility so we will have clean drinking water
 again. . . . The corruption is severe. Some local officials are only
 after profits so they will do anything to protect their interests, even
 if it means flouting environmental standards and allowing polluting
 factories to operate.'' \37\ His strategy of bypassing local officials
 and filing petitions with provincial- and central-level officials
 seemed to have worked in part: more than 200 polluting factories have
 been closed since the mid-1990s. Local officials, such as the director
 of Yixing's EPB, give a different assessment, ``He is only interested
 in filing reports to officials above us. If you want me to commend him
 . . . sorry, I can only say I will not do that.'' \38\
Due to his environmental advocacy efforts, local government officials
 have repeatedly harassed Wu and his family members, even though a panel
 of judges from the People's Political Consultative Conference and the
 National People's Congress named him one of China's top 10
 environmentalists in November 2005.\39\ According to foreign media
 interviews with him and his wife, Xu Jiehua, Wu lost his job after his
 manager was warned by local officials to fire him and in 2003, he was
 beaten on three occasions by local thugs. In addition, his daughter
 reportedly received threats over the phone from anonymous callers, and
 his wife lost her job in 1998, after the chemical factory where she was
 employed closed in response to one of his reports.\40\
Official Mistreatment in 2007
April 13, 2007: Shortly before Wu planned to provide central officials
 in Beijing with new evidence against local officials, Yixing public
 security officials detained Wu, accusing him of blackmail and
 extortion.\41\ Officials at the Yixing Detention Center restricted his
 ability to see his lawyer or family, and his lawyer reported evidence
 of torture when she met with him a month later.\42\
May to June 2007: Outbreaks of green-blue algae in Lake Tai left
 millions of residents in a rush to purchase bottled water. The central
 government's main news agency, Xinhua, largely attributed the outbreaks
 to pollution.\43\ In June, Premier Wen Jiabao ordered a formal
 investigation into the algae growth, noting that despite numerous
 attempts to improve the quality of the water, ``the problem has never
 been tackled at the root.'' \44\ State-controlled media and experts
 criticized local officials for blaming the problem on natural
 conditions, such as a warm climate, and for not taking effective steps
 to control pollution in Lake Tai.\45\
June 2007: The Yixing People's Court charged Wu with blackmail and
 allegedly extorting 55,000 yuan (US$6,875) from enterprises in exchange
 for not exposing them as polluters.\46\ Wu's original trial date was
 scheduled for June 12, but was postponed to allow a medical
 investigation of his wounds in response to a complaint filed by his
 lawyer.\47\
August 10, 2007: The Yixing People's Court sentenced Wu to three years'
 imprisonment for fraud and extortion, and ruled that there was no
 evidence of torture.\48\ Wu was also fined 3,000 yuan (approximately
 US$400) and ordered to return the money he allegedly extorted from
 enterprises.\49\ Xu Jiehua has taken on her husband's cause by suing
 SEPA for naming Yixing a model city. The Yixing People's Court
 reportedly refused to consider the case.\50\
A System of Policy Implementation That Relies on the Abuse of Rights
Even though national leaders have publicly called on China's citizens to
 report misbehavior by members of the Communist Party, Wu Lihong's
 detention and imprisonment underscore the problem that activists are
 not afforded adequate whistleblower protections, but instead are
 singled out for harassment, and left vulnerable to revenge by the
 officials whose malfeasances they bring to light.\51\ Effective
 implementation of China's announced commitment to environmental
 protection requires information, private initiative, and citizen
 leadership.\52\ Wu's imprisonment illustrates the extent to which
 China's leaders have structured political and legal affairs in ways
 that impose risks on citizen activists.
According to Xinhua, the central government demanded that officials
 close several hundred factories near Lake Tai in June 2007. Officials
 also required 20,000 chemical plants in the Lake Tai area to meet
 tougher standards for sulfur dioxide emissions and water pollution.
 Plants that fail to meet the new standards by the June 2008 deadline
 risk suspension or closure. In addition, cities around Lake Tai must
 establish sewage treatment plants and can no longer discharge untreated
 sewage into the lake and rivers in the area. Existing plants must
 install nitrogen and phosphorus removal facilities before the deadline.
 In July 2007, senior provincial officials in Jiangsu instructed local
 officials to make combating pollution in Lake Tai a priority, even if
 it meant a 15 percent decrease in the province's GDP.\53\ At the time
 of this writing, Wu Lihong remains in prison.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

      CHALLENGES OF BUILDING BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND OVERCOMING 
                             OBSTRUCTIONISM

    Local EPBs are frequently unable or unwilling to carry out 
many of the numerous environmental laws and regulations passed 
by the central government. Strengthening local level EPB 
funding and enforcement capacity has been a significant 
challenge. Some local EPB offices rely upon income from fines 
to fund operating budget deficits, which in turn provides 
incentives for lax enforcement of environmental measures.\54\
    China continues to delay publication of its 2005 Green GDP 
report due to bureaucratic wrangling and pressure from local 
governments. The report has already been drafted but has now 
been ``indefinitely postponed.'' The report's release would 
have symbolized growing environmental transparency as it would 
have provided the public and Chinese and international NGOs 
more 
detailed information than the first Green GDP report in 2004. 
The 2004 report sparked controversy by estimating that China's 
economic losses from environmental degradation amounted to 
511.8 billion yuan (US$67.7 billion), or approximately 3.1 
percent of China's entire GDP.\55\ Local governments reportedly 
opposed the 
report's publication because it contained detailed data on 
environmental performance and conditions broken down by 
province.\56\ SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics also 
reportedly disagreed over what information to include and how 
to disseminate that information.\57\
    The Chinese government reportedly pressured the World Bank 
to remove material from a joint report, including the figure 
that some 750,000 people die prematurely in China each year due 
to air and water pollution.\58\ China's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has denied this charge.\59\ Several news accounts 
reported, however, that the Chinese government impugned the 
report's methodology, calling it ``not very reliable,'' and 
voiced concern that it might spark citizen protest if 
released.\60\ SEPA's Vice Minister Zhou Jian noted that ``It's 
a very complex issue to analyze the impact of pollution on 
human health. Without a common scientific methodology in the 
world, any survey on environment and health is not 
persuasive.'' \61\
    In 2007, China finally issued punishments to those found 
responsible for the November 2005 Songhua River benzene spill 
that threatened the Chinese city of Harbin and the Russian city 
of Khabarovsk. As the Commission noted in its 2006 Annual 
Report, the coverup of the Songhua spill demonstrated a lack of 
transparency which, in turn, hampered the government's ability 
to respond to the environmental disaster. In its aftermath, 
despite steps to improve local reporting to higher authorities, 
the central government did not address the larger issue of 
government control over the news media [see Section II--Freedom 
of Expression]. In 
November 2006, the State Council supported administrative 
punishments and Party disciplinary punishments, but no criminal 
prosecutions, for 14 state-owned company and local government 
officials involved in the Songhua incident.\62\ SEPA imposed 
the maximum fine on the state-owned Jilin Petrochemical Company 
as administrative punishment for its role in the incident.\63\ 
Some Chinese experts assert that SEPA's maximum fines are still 
too low to act as an effective deterrent.\64\ A recent draft 
revision of the Water Pollution and Control Law may strengthen 
and increase punishments for unlawful conduct.\65\

                  III. Development of the Rule of Law


                             Civil Society

    Under Hu Jintao, the Chinese government has strengthened 
policies that restrict the growth of an independent civil 
society in an effort to guard against perceived challenges to 
state authority and sources of social unrest. In the past five 
years, and particularly since 2005, the government has enforced 
tighter controls over civil society organizations and has 
articulated increasing concern over ``foreign infiltration'' of 
these groups. Although the government increasingly has 
acknowledged the contributions of civil society networks\1\ and 
eased some formal legal requirements governing the operation of 
certain civil society groups, these developments have not 
translated into greater freedom of association for Chinese 
citizens.
    The government maintains tight legal controls over the 
operation of civil society organizations, though it has taken 
modest steps in recent years to loosen some formal legal 
strictures. Under the 1998 Regulation on the Management of the 
Registration of Social Organizations (Social Organizations 
Regulation), groups must register with a civil affairs office 
after securing sponsorship from a government or Party 
organization.\2\ These restrictive registration requirements 
violate the right to freedom of association as defined by 
international human rights standards.\3\ Stringent registration 
requirements lead some organizations to register as commercial 
organizations, undertaking related fiscal requirements, and 
others to operate without formal legal recognition.\4\
    In March 2007, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) 
announced that revisions to the Social Organizations Regulation 
had been completed and submitted to the State Council for 
approval. The revised regulations would allow, for the first 
time, international organizations that operate in China to 
register with the government.\5\ Although officials have 
proposed changing the sponsorship requirement for domestic 
organizations,\6\ the revised regulations retain this 
provision,\7\ and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
that register with the government also would be required to 
have an approved sponsor organization.\8\ The 2004 Regulation 
on the Management of Foundations (Foundations Regulation) also 
retained sponsorship requirements but liberalized some controls 
that are still in place for the registration of other social 
organizations. The Foundations Regulation lacks a prohibition 
on the registration of more than one organization addressing 
the same topic within the same administrative region, and it 
permits foreign foundations to register.\9\
    Despite various restrictions, citizens have been active in 
forming civil society organizations. Citizens have formed 
organizations to address such issues as HIV/AIDS, women's 
rights, worker rights, religious charity work, and the 
environment. [For more information on citizen organizations in 
each of these areas, see Section II--Health, Status of Women, 
Worker Rights, Freedom of Religion, and Environment.] Ministry 
of Civil Affairs statistics from 1999 to 2006 indicate an 
increase in the number of registered social organizations 
starting in 2002. The statistics indicate a total of 354,000 
registered civil society organizations in 2006.\10\ Estimates 
of the total number of organizations, including unregistered 
groups, have ranged as high as eight million.\11\
    Government officials often have tolerated the operation of 
unregistered groups, but lack of legal status makes the 
organizations vulnerable especially where they challenge 
government actions or raise issues deemed politically 
sensitive.\12\ In November 2006, Shenzhen officials shut down 
12 grassroots labor rights organizations that were working 
together to overturn a regulation 
concerning labor arbitration fees.\13\ Chinese authorities also 
have monitored the activities of health activist groups, 
especially HIV/AIDS awareness organizations. In October 2006, 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region officials shut down the 
Xinjiang Snow Lotus AIDS organization after the group 
publicized the expulsion of 19 middle school students diagnosed 
as hepatitis B carriers.\14\ In addition, some citizens who try 
to establish organizations in politically sensitive areas have 
faced imprisonment. This past year, authorities detained or 
gave prison sentences to a number of citizens in Zhejiang 
province who were reportedly members of the China 
Democracy Party (CDP),\15\ including Zhang Jianhong\16\ 
(inciting subversion), Chen Shuqing\17\ (inciting subversion), 
Lu Gengsong\18\ (inciting subversion), and Chi Jianwei\19\ 
(using a cult to undermine implementation of the law).\20\ In 
addition, in May 2006, a court sentenced Yang Tongyan (whose 
pen name is Yang Tianshui) to 12 years in prison, also on 
subversion charges, for criticizing the government online and 
attempting to form a branch of the CDP.\21\
    Chinese officials have expressed particular concern in the 
last year over the influence that civil society organizations 
have on the course of political development in China. Central 
and local officials not only tightened existing controls over 
many of these organizations, but also engaged in selective use 
of laws to provide a legal pretext for shutting them down. The 
government set up a task force in 2005 to strengthen monitoring 
of NGOs.\22\ A 2005 academic article in a publication linked to 
the State Council called for preventing ``[W]estern countries 
from carrying out infiltration and sabotage of China through 
political NGOs,'' expressing a sentiment about Western NGOs 
echoed elsewhere among officials.\23\ Since 2005, the 
government has been auditing the funding sources of domestic 
NGOs and investigating their personnel. Targeted groups include 
those receiving funding from foreign sources and those with 
influence among migrant workers.\24\ International NGOs have 
reported that Chinese partners have been pressured by the 
government to withdraw from cooperative projects.\25\ In 2007, 
the government closed the foreign NGO publication China 
Development Brief, which had reported on civil society 
developments in China and was preparing to transition to 
Chinese leadership. Authorities cited the 1983 Statistics Law 
to accuse the publication's English-language editor of 
conducting ``unauthorized surveys.'' \26\
    The government recently has initiated potentially 
beneficial reforms to two particular types of civil society 
organizations: rural farmers' cooperatives and charitable 
groups. The new Law on Professional Farmers' Cooperatives, 
effective July 2007, clarifies the previously ambiguous legal 
status of these organizations, which number over 150,000 and 
claim some 35 million members.\27\ The law mandates 
registration with industry and commerce departments and does 
not require the cooperatives to secure sponsorship 
organizations.\28\ If implemented fully, the law will improve 
cooperatives' access to financial resources.\29\ The MOCA has 
been 
preparing a draft charity law, which aims to define charitable 
activities and standardize the operation of charitable 
organizations.\30\ The Ministry of Finance and the State 
Administration of Taxation announced a new tax policy in 
January 2007 that expands the scope of permitted tax deductions 
for charitable giving.\31\
    The Chinese government has created space for NGO 
participation in delivering certain services, such as poverty 
relief, where such activities do not run afoul of government 
and Party policy. In January 2007, the State Council's Leading 
Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development Office in 
conjunction with local officials in Jiangxi province initiated 
the second phase of a two-year pilot 
poverty alleviation project that marks the first time the 
Chinese central government officially has outsourced large-
scale poverty alleviation projects to NGOs.\32\ In Shanghai, 
municipal and district government officials have begun to 
coordinate with NGOs to provide various social services.\33\ 
Authorities also have accommodated the social welfare programs 
of religion-based NGOs where they suit Party goals. [See 
Section II--Freedom of Religion for more information.]

                 Institutions of Democratic Governance

    With more than 70 million members in more than 3.5 million 
grassroots organizations nationwide, the Communist Party of 
China exercises control over government and society through 
networks of Party committees. Party committees are set up at 
all levels in government, legislative, judicial, and security 
organs; major social groups (including unions); enterprises; 
and the People's Liberation Army. Party secretaries chairing 
Party committees simultaneously hold corresponding government 
positions, retaining final decisionmaking authority on most 
issues. Except for a very small number of non-communist 
officials in symbolic positions, most leadership positions in 
China are held by Communist Party members.
    Chinese citizens are formally permitted to directly elect 
just three types of governing institutions, all of which are at 
the local level: villagers committees in rural areas, residents 
committees in urban areas, and local legislatures, called 
People's Congresses, at the township and county levels. But the 
Party maintains control over these elections by controlling the 
lists of candidates, the identity of the electorate, voting 
procedures, ratification and announcement of election results, 
and many other key aspects of the process. China's National 
People's Congress and provincial and municipal people's 
congresses are indirectly elected by legislatures one level 
down.
    The fact that China is a one-party system does not prevent 
Party leaders from disagreeing over many major issues, and 
central Party leaders often face persistent, tacit resistance 
to their policies from ministries and local governments. At the 
same time, some Western analysts believe that under Jiang Zemin 
and Hu Jintao, a common fear that divisive leadership struggles 
could encourage mass uprisings similar to 1989 has increased 
the pressure on Party leaders to avoid the bitter factional 
battles of the past. This relative unity among the leaders, in 
particular their opposition to Western democratization, and has 
become a major obstacle to more open discussions of fundamental 
political reform.\1\
    As the Commission noted in its 2006 Annual Report, 
``China's authoritarian one-party system does not comply with 
international human rights standards contained in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Article 25 of the ICCPR 
requires that citizens be allowed to ``take part in the conduct 
of political affairs'' and ``to vote and to be elected at 
genuine periodic elections.'' Under General Comment 25 to the 
ICCPR, this language requires that:

        <bullet> The right of persons to stand for election 
        should not be limited unreasonably by requiring 
        candidates to be members of parties or of specific 
        parties;
        <bullet> Party membership should not be a condition of 
        eligibility to vote;
        <bullet> It is implicit in Article 25 that [elected] 
        representatives do in fact exercise governmental power 
        and that they are accountable through the electoral 
        process for their exercise of that power;
        <bullet> An independent electoral authority should be 
        established to supervise the electoral process and to 
        ensure that it is conducted fairly, impartially, and in 
        accordance with established laws which are compatible 
        with the ICCPR;
        <bullet> Freedom of expression, assembly, and 
        association are essential conditions for the effective 
        exercise of the right to vote and must be fully 
        protected.'' \2\

               VILLAGE AND RESIDENTS COMMITTEE ELECTIONS

    In 2006-2007, China continued gradual expansion of its 
long-running experiment in local-level citizen participation in 
village and urban neighborhood affairs. These local-level rural 
and urban elections have encouraged greater citizen 
participation in local administration, and sometimes result in 
rejections of specific local Party leaders. Although election 
results provide Party officials with information about popular 
attitudes, elections do not represent Communist Party 
acceptance of directly elected or representative government.
    In a September 5, 2006 interview, Premier Wen Jiabao 
rejected further electoral reforms at the township and county 
levels in the countryside, stating:

        [C]onditions are not yet ripe for conducting direct 
        election at a higher level of government . . . 
        Democracy and direct election, in particular, should 
        develop in an orderly way in keeping with the 
        particular condition of a country . . . We are 
        confident that when the people are capable of running a 
        village through direct election, they will later be 
        able to run a township, then a county and a province, 
        true to the principle that our country is run by the 
        people.\3\

    The Ministry of Civil Affairs reported in July 2007 that 
villages in all of China's 31 provincial-level jurisdictions 
had held at least two rounds of elections since 1998, when the 
Organic Law of Village Committees took effect.\4\ More than 500 
million voters in over 624,000 villages have taken part in some 
form of village committee election since election experiments 
began in 1988, and the Ministry claims an average voter turnout 
rate of 80 percent.\5\
    During the 2006-2007 election cycle, the poor 
administration of elections prompted citizens to take to the 
street to protest vote-rigging and other electoral abuses.\6\ 
Despite numerous Party and government directives calling for a 
clean-up, official Chinese reports suggest that ``corrupt'' and 
``illegal'' election practices, including ``vote-rigging'' and 
``rampant'' bribery, remain widespread, and there is reason to 
infer they are getting worse. A senior Ministry of Civil 
Affairs official, speaking in July 2007, reported that ``clan 
forces and gangsters are gaining ground in some elections'' and 
noted cases of ``beating and intimidation of candidates.'' The 
same official criticized the lack of a clear definition of 
``election bribery'' as a major source of abuses.\7\ Official 
Chinese sources have recently suggested that the influence some 
village committee officials have over sales of local land 
rights and mineral resources, coupled with China's long-running 
land and resource price boom, have probably made the incentives 
for electoral corruption even worse.\8\
    In late 2006, for example, two candidates in the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region spent the combined equivalent of 
US$82,500 entertaining voters to win a village committee 
chief's post that only paid about 10,000 yuan per year (around 
US$1,265), according to a Party-owned news magazine. Some 
candidates view election bribes as a business expense.\9\ The 
official China Daily reported in February 2007 that the Central 
Organization Department issued a directive calling for ``severe 
punishment'' of those who commit election-related 
irregularities. But the same report indicates that 
nationwide authorities had prosecuted only 192 officials for 
vote-buying and electoral fraud during the most recent round of 
village elections over the last year.\10\
    Under Hu Jintao, Party officials have been directed to 
strengthen their control over village committees and elections. 
Scholar Li Lianjiang notes that the powers of these village 
committees and their elected leaders have always been ``highly 
constrained because appointed village party secretaries remain 
by law the `leadership core' of the village.'' This has left 
the village committee heads as ``only a lieutenant to the 
village party secretary'' who is actually selected by Party 
officials in the village or township.\11\ Moreover, the 
fairness, competitiveness and openness of these elections have 
always varied significantly from region to region. Since 2005 
and continuing through the past year, Party leaders in many 
areas have endorsed having village Party leaders take ``joint 
membership'' and ``concurrent leadership'' of village 
committees,\12\ a change that would exacerbate some of the 
foregoing problems.
    International nongovernmental organization monitors, who 
have been involved since the inception in promoting and 
monitoring these village elections, have reported that in the 
past two years Chinese officials in many localities have 
increasingly resisted permitting either Chinese or foreign 
observers to monitor the quality, procedural integrity, and 
fairness of village elections. The exclusion of these monitors 
removes a major disincentive for local officials to commit the 
types of irregularities that are already widespread.\13\
    Grassroots citizen participation in cities is even more 
limited. Since 1999, many cities have experimented with using 
elections, rather than direct Party committee appointment, to 
select members of urban residents committees or community 
residents committees, the lowest level of state power in 
China's cities.\14\ Although the percentage of community 
residents committees chosen through election appears to be 
significantly lower than the percentage of village committees 
that are elected, their share is rising. Shenzhen officials, 
for example, announced in July 2007 that they would increase 
the proportion of elected residents committees from 47 
percent to 70 percent during their next term of office.\15\ 
Although initially most of these committees did not control any 
goods or service of value, in the past year, some have asserted 
their influence as forums for debating and approving deals 
offered by city officials in return for eviction and demolition 
of homes in areas slated for renewal.\16\

                INTERFERING WITH INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

    In addition to interfering with citizens' right to vote, 
local 
authorities continued to interfere with citizens' right to 
stand for election during the 2006-2007 cycle of township and 
county local people's congress (LPC) elections. Official 
statistics noted that 900 million county election voters and 
600 million township election voters were scheduled to elect 
more than 2 million LPC deputies during the July 1, 2006, to 
December 31, 2007, election period.\17\ Beijing lawyer and 
rights defender Teng Biao reported in late 2006 that more than 
20 non-Party, independent LPC candidates were attempting to run 
for election in Beijing alone, but that the Party continued to 
select the vast majority of candidates.\18\ Teng ultimately 
announced his decision to boycott the elections due to Party 
control over the election process and government harassment of 
independent candidates.\19\
    Local authorities reportedly have harassed and taken into 
custody independent candidates and supporters who threaten 
Party control over the electoral process and candidates. In 
some instances, these candidates continue to play an active 
role, despite having been targeted for harassment during 
previous election cycles.\20\ For example, in November 2006, on 
the eve of the current cycle of LPC elections in Qianjiang 
city, Hubei province, public security officials took democracy 
activist Yao Lifa into custody as he was on his way to campaign 
for votes.\21\ Yao had previously been taken into custody in 
July 2006, when he attempted to meet with five other 
independent LPC candidates to discuss their election campaigns, 
and was beaten by unidentified assailants several times in 2005 
while educating villagers on the election process. Lu Banglie, 
an activist running for reelection in Zhijiang city, Hubei, was 
similarly beaten in 2003 for attempting to recall an allegedly 
corrupt leader in his village, again in 2005 for his role in 
another village's recall campaign, and twice during his own 
campaign for reelection in the 2006-2007 election cycle.\22\ 
The former president of Human Rights in China argued in a 
September 2006 article published by the organization that 
although many independent candidates may not be elected in the 
current election cycle, they play a significant role in serving 
as forerunners for civil rights in Chinese society.\23\

                       PARTY LEADERSHIP SELECTION

    Since the late 1990s, the Party has also continued to 
experiment with allowing limited citizen participation in the 
selection of local Party leaders, particularly at the village 
level. Most of these reported experiments involve local Party 
officials allowing non-party member citizens to help nominate 
candidates for Party offices at the village and sometimes the 
township levels, usually followed by an election in which only 
Party members may participate.\24\ Party scholars report that 
in the past three years these experiments continued in some 
areas, but their scale is far narrower than that of either the 
village committee elections or the urban community residents 
committees.\25\ Local Party officials have been urged to 
combine the selection of Party committee leaders with that of 
village elections to try to ensure that Party members dominate 
both organs. But they are also urged to use popular opinion to 
weed out the most unpopular Party officials during the 
process.\26\ In a recent major speech discussing political 
reform and the Party, Hu Jintao endorsed both expanded popular 
participation in government and greater democracy within the 
Party, but did not specifically endorse further expanding these 
experiments in allowing the public to help choose local Party 
leaders.\27\
    During 2006-2007 Hu Jintao continued to voice support for 
experiments in expanded ``inner-Party democracy,'' or 
consultation by Party leaders with lower-level Party 
officials.\28\ The Party's Central Organization Department 
reports that between 2003 and 2006, about 15,000 Party members 
were promoted to leadership positions as a result of elections 
within the Party. Of these, about 3,800 were chosen to county-
level positions (an average of a little over one for each of 
China's counties) and just over 390 were at prefectural-level 
positions. The Party's Central Organization Department 
estimates that about 100,000 Party posts at various levels were 
filled by elections within the Party during 2006-2007.\29\ With 
more than 70 million Party members in more than 3.5 million 
grassroots organizations nationwide, this represents a small 
experiment confined to lower levels.\30\ However, elections for 
delegates to the 17th Party Congress have reportedly been more 
competitive than those for the 16th Congress in 2002, with the 
number of candidates exceeding the number of delegate slots by 
an average of 15 percent across provinces.\31\
    Recent discussion within the Party indicates that efforts 
to make Party affairs more democratic have faced resistance. A 
January 2007 article in the Central Party School's journal 
Study Times stressed that Party elections can only strengthen 
the Party if they are truly ``democratic,'' and ``impartial.'' 
Zhang Xiaoyan endorsed several specific procedural steps to 
perfect Party elections, including opening up the nominating 
process to additional Party members, and having more multi-
candidate elections, including elections with multiple serious 
candidates, well known to the local membership.\32\ Official 
press sources have carried numerous reports of extreme 
corruption in Party leadership selection processes, and even 
reports of violence in Party elections. In a February 2007 
report, the official China Daily stated that ``the buying and 
selling of party and government posts is rampant in China's 
countryside.'' \33\ In June 2007, Chinese police reported they 
were searching for a former village Party leader in Hebei 
province believed to have murdered two new Party committee 
members after losing his seat to them in an election.\34\

                   LOOKING TO THE 17TH PARTY CONGRESS

    The Commission will monitor closely and assess the policies 
on political reform that are widely anticipated to emerge at 
the 17th Party Congress, and notes that the Party Congress may 
constitute Hu Jintao's last real chance to advance a sustained 
program of political reform in what is expected to be his final 
five-year term. As the Party Congress approaches, Party leaders 
have been engaging in public and internal discussions over the 
relative value of ``inner-Party democracy'' versus a more 
``consultative democracy'' that would offer greater 
participation to the Chinese public and to members of its eight 
legally recognized non-Communist parties. An August 2007 
article in the Party-managed national magazine Outlook 
(Liaowang) reported that the consensus among official policy 
analysts was that ``after the 17th Party Congress, China's 
socialist democratic political reforms will move faster.'' \35\ 
But a June 25, 2007, speech by Hu Jintao was more guarded. 
Although he called for ``political structure reform'' and 
greater ``democracy within the Party,'' he also continued to 
endorse ``democratic centralism,'' long the watchword for 
obedience to high-level Party leaders. As for greater 
participation for the Chinese people as a whole, Hu endorsed 
taking ``active but prudent'' steps in this direction, and 
expanding the ``orderly political participation of our 
citizens.'' \36\

                           Access to Justice


                              INTRODUCTION

    Since the early 1950s, the Chinese system has had, at least 
on paper, several formal legal institutions and informal, 
nonjudicial systems through which citizens could seek justice, 
appeal government actions, and exercise oversight of officials. 
The oldest and most widely used of these systems allows 
citizens to present their grievances to Party and government 
offices charged specifically with receiving ``letters and 
visits'' (xinfang). In 2006-2007, Chinese leaders continued 
efforts begun in 2005 to restructure and formalize the xinfang 
system in a manner that they asserted would make it more 
responsive, accessible, and fair. Since the 1989 passage of the 
Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), citizens have also been 
permitted to sue administrative organs of the government 
through the courts. Other dispute resolution institutions 
include local mediation committees, labor arbitration 
committees, and administrative reconsideration organs.
    Petitions and citizen administrative suits rose sharply in 
number during the 1990s and early 2000s. Some citizens who 
avail themselves of these institutions have been successful. 
But for many, the last or only resort is public protest, which 
officials typically are quick to stifle. Surveys reveal that 
many citizens believe it is only the threat of protest that can 
help them get the attention of officials and kick-start formal 
institutions.

        INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PETITIONS (``LETTERS AND VISITS'')

    By far the most commonly used institution through which 
citizens may seek redress involves filing petitions through the 
``Letters and Visits Offices'' available in nearly all county-
level and higher government offices and in many government and 
judicial departments. Official statistics in recent years 
indicate that government departments nationwide receive more 
than 10 to 13 million such petitions annually, compared with 
between 90,000 and 100,000 administrative lawsuits that China's 
courts have accepted annually in the past five years.\1\ 
``Petitions,'' however, are not lawsuits, and their handling is 
governed by State Council and other government regulations that 
leave citizens with no legal leverage to compel offices to 
respond. Citizen-petitioners more often than not find that 
institutions to which xinfang offices refer their petitions for 
actual resolution of grievances ultimately decline to handle 
complaints. The government forbids petitioners to seek 
``strength in numbers'' by presenting petitions to xinfang 
offices in groups of more than five, although many citizens 
ignore this rule and try to pressure officials by petitioning 
in groups. Although regulations require offices to which 
petitions are referred by the xinfang office to respond within 
a specified period of time, they frequently stall indefinitely. 
As the Commission's 2004 Annual Report noted, ``the 
overwhelming majority of individual petitioners . . . find 
themselves lost in a Kafkaesque shuffle from bureau to bureau 
and city to city, facing years of red tape without any real 
resolution to their problems.'' \2\
    In 2006-2007, Chinese officials continued to implement the 
State Council's January 2005 regulation on the proper handling 
of petitions in a manner aimed to prevent citizens from taking 
appeals to Beijing and provincial capitals. The 2005 Regulation 
on Letters and Visits instead forces citizens to turn to lower-
level xinfang offices to resolve their disputes. The regulation 
does permit citizens who are dissatisfied with the outcome of 
the local petition process to then submit their petition to 
officials at the next level up in the administrative structure 
(for example, allowing a town dweller to submit at the county 
level) and, in some cases, two levels up (the city level). 
However, xinfang offices at higher levels are ordered not to 
accept petitions submitted from more than two levels down the 
administrative structure. Under the regulation, government 
offices were required to establish ``responsibility systems'' 
for handing citizen petitions, which link the performance 
assessments of public officials to their success in resolving 
complaints at their level. The regulation strictly forbids 
petitioners from physically organizing groups outside xinfang 
offices, or from taking other actions to pressure or threaten 
xinfang handlers.\3\
    Since at least 2002, central government officials have 
maintained confidential rankings of which provinces have the 
highest number of petitioners who travel to Beijing or their 
own provincial capitals, and have encouraged provincial Party 
and security officials to compete to ``improve'' (that is, to 
lower) their national ranking. Since at least 2005, Beijing has 
rewarded local officials with ``outstanding records'' of 
handling petitioners locally, while punishing those whose 
disgruntled residents took their cases to Beijing or provincial 
capitals more frequently. Local officials continue to dispatch 
security officials to stop petitioners en route to Beijing, or 
to detain them in the capital and forcibly return them to their 
places of residence.\4\
    In 2006, Chinese officials continued to declare success in 
their efforts to reduce the number of citizen petitions, 
claiming a nationwide decrease of more than 15 percent compared 
to 2005. Based on official statistics, the total number of 
petitions in 2005 was 12.7 million, down from 13.7 million in 
2004.\5\ These figures suggest that the total number of 
petitions for 2006 was less than 10.8 million. The official 
Xinhua news agency has attributed the decline to several 
successful policies, including giving local governments 
numerical targets for lowering petitions, fining or punishing 
local officials with negative performance appraisals if they 
missed their targets, and ordering local police officials to 
meet with, and listen to, petitioners.\6\
    These statistics notwithstanding, throughout 2007, central 
government authorities continued to issue directives suggesting 
that they do not yet regard local officials' handing of 
petitions as satisfactory. In May, a directive on petitions 
from the Supreme People's Procuratorate acknowledged that many 
``major, complicated, or unclear'' petition cases were not 
being handled adequately, and offered citizens the possibility 
of holding an open hearing in the event that cases could not 
otherwise be resolved.\7\ In June, the Party and State Council 
leadership issued another directive suggesting that local 
authorities were still not handling petition cases in a 
satisfactory manner or devoting appropriate resources to keep 
petitioners contained within their local areas. The directive 
called on the top local Party leaders in each area to take 
personal charge and responsibility for handling petitions, to 
provide improved budgets and personnel to petition offices, and 
to resolve citizen complaints while keeping them at the local 
level.\8\ The directive also indicated that the government 
plans to open a national center to maintain information on 
petitioning and help address citizen grievances. The center's 
exact role and functions remained unclear, especially in light 
of the national leadership's directive to keep petition cases 
away from Beijing.\9\
    Major policy documents and regulations issued in 2005-2007 
insist that local authorities should make every effort to 
properly investigate and resolve citizen petitions, and demand 
that officials not employ harsh or coercive tactics except in 
the event that petitioners break the law. Nevertheless, in 
2006-2007, widespread 
reports continued to indicate that many local officials remain 
unwilling or unable to deal with citizen complaints 
effectively, and still resort to coercive tactics to try to 
cover up cases and prevent petitioners from taking cases to 
provincial capitals or to Beijing. Officials in Hubei, for 
example, kept a disabled local resident, Ma Wenjun, under 24-
hour guard by a rotating a group of 13 security officials and 
threatened to cut off his basic living allowance if he 
continued his attempt to take his petition to higher-level 
authorities.\10\ In February 2007, a leading expert on protests 
and petitions from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the 
nation's premier social science research institution, conducted 
a survey on the implementation of the 2005 regulation among 
1,200 petitioners in Beijing to present their grievances to the 
central government. Of those surveyed, 71 percent indicated 
that they had suffered greater retaliation or intimidation as a 
result of their petitioning at the hands of authorities from 
their home region in the past year. Only five percent felt that 
their local officials had taken their grievances more 
seriously.\11\
    Although China's Constitution and Criminal Law in principle 
provide ample protection from this sort of official retaliation 
against citizen petitioners, official press sources note that 
these protections often go unenforced. Article 41 of the 
Constitution grants citizens the right ``to criticize and make 
suggestions to any state organ or functionary.'' The 
Constitution also asserts that ``[N]o one may suppress such 
complaints, charges or exposures, or retaliate against the 
citizen making them.'' Article 254 of the Criminal Law provides 
for imprisonment of any state functionary who abuses his power 
and ``retaliates against or frames up complainants, 
petitioners, critics or persons who report against him.'' But 
legal analysts have criticized many local procurators for 
failing to deal with officials who abuse their power to 
retaliate against petitioners and other citizen critics.\12\ In 
January 2006, the Supreme People's Procuratorate attempted to 
pressure local procurators to file such cases by issuing 
Interpretation Number 2 (2006), which requires procurators to 
file charges in cases in which state personnel retaliate 
against or frame up petitioners, complainants and critics.\13\

                        ADMINISTRATIVE LAWSUITS

    Under the 1989 Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), 
citizens may file administrative lawsuits through local courts. 
A 2004 Chinese Academy of Social Science survey of 632 
petitioners who had taken their cases to Beijing revealed that 
nearly two-thirds (401) had initially submitted their cases to 
local courts. But 43 percent of these reported that the courts 
had declined to hear their cases at all, which spurred them to 
petition administrative officials.\14\ The number of first-
instance administrative suits accepted by courts nationwide, 
which soared from 13,006 cases to 100,921 cases in the 12 years 
after the ALL was passed, tapered off between 2002 and 2005 
(the most recent year for which data is available), fluctuating 
between about 80,000 and 96,000 cases annually.
    The President of China's Supreme People's Court, Chief 
Justice Xiao Yang, urged local judicial officials in March 2007 
to make greater use of mediation and other alternative methods 
of dispute resolution in dealing with cases that touch on 
issues that could spark public protest. Cases involving rural 
land seizures, urban home evictions and demolitions, enterprise 
restructuring, labor and social security, resource disputes and 
environmental protection cases were among issues Xiao singled 
out.\15\
    In June, the State Council issued new regulations to 
clarify the procedures that citizens and officials must follow 
when seeking redress under China's 1999 Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, under which more than 80,000 
administrative disputes per year are resolved, according to 
government statistics. The regulations obligate administrative 
departments to accept for reconsideration applications that 
meet the law's guidelines. The regulations also strengthen the 
authority of higher-level departments to compel lower-level 
departments to accept applications that they previously 
rejected. The regulations also require administrative 
departments to inform citizens of their right to apply for 
reconsideration if the department makes an administrative 
decision that adversely affects the citizen's interests.\16\
    In March, the Supreme People's Court announced the 
nationwide expansion of what it deemed to be a successful pilot 
program aimed at ensuring ``objectivity'' in administrative 
suits, in part by circumventing local Party and government 
control of administrative courts. Under the program, 
administrative suits would not be tried in the plaintiff's home 
jurisdiction, but either in a higher-level court or in a court 
outside of the plaintiff's home area. The SPC reports that in 
areas where tests were conducted, such changes of venue 
resulted in judgments against the defendants--usually a public 
official or agency--about two and one-half times more often 
than when such cases are handled by the plaintiff's local 
court.\17\ As promising as these statistics may be, if the 
improvement in the plaintiff's prospects for winning a case 
against an official depends on moving the case away from the 
official's local judiciary, it underscores the central 
government's failure to overcome local Party and government 
dominance of court procedures and verdicts.
    Throughout 2006-2007, the Party leadership's political 
selectivity and ambivalence toward permitting citizens to use 
the courts and legal system to seek redress continued to be 
manifested in the comments of senior officials. In March 2007, 
for example, Party Politburo Standing Committee member Luo Gan, 
who heads the Party's Central Political-Legal Committee (which 
oversees legal and internal security policies), told a meeting 
of administrative law experts that China's system of 
administrative lawsuits was ``one of the most effective and 
direct legal systems to safeguard the public's rights and 
interests,'' and called for the building of a ``fair, 
effective, and authoritative system to try lawsuits against 
government bodies to guarantee social justice.'' \18\
    Yet during the preceding year, the Party and government 
repeatedly pressured lawyers to refrain from taking politically 
sensitive cases. In early 2006, the All China Lawyers 
Association (ACLA) issued a ``guiding opinion'' restricting the 
ability of lawyers to handle cases involving representative or 
joint litigation by 10 or more litigants, or cases involving 
both litigation and non-litigation efforts. The guiding opinion 
further instructed law firms to assign only ``politically 
qualified'' lawyers to conduct the initial intake of these 
cases, and lawyers handling collective cases to attempt to 
mitigate conflict and propose mediation as the method for 
conflict resolution. Former ACLA president Zhang Sizhi 
criticized the guiding opinion as retrogressive and warned that 
it would set the country's legal profession back several 
decades to the 1980s. In speeches to Party judicial and 
internal security officials, Luo Gan has reaffirmed the 
responsibility of such Party members to defend the Party's 
interests and its leadership over society. He has also attacked 
lawyers who take on politically sensitive suits, calling for 
``forceful measures . . . against those who carry out sabotage 
under the pretext of rights protection . . . so as to protect 
national security and the political stability of society.'' 
\19\

                         Commercial Rule of Law


                              INTRODUCTION

    China has passed the five-year mark in the implementation 
of its World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments. These 
commitments are outlined under both the WTO agreements and 
China's accession documents,\1\ and require that the Chinese 
government ensure nondiscrimination in the administration of 
trade-related measures, as well as prompt publication of all 
laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative 
rulings relating to trade. Over the past year, concerns have 
persisted that China continues to deviate from WTO norms in 
both law and practice.
    Concerns regarding China's uneven implementation of its WTO 
commitments pursuant to its obligations as a member of the WTO 
have led to multiple WTO challenges against China during 
2007.\2\ Weaknesses in China's legal institutions and systems 
of policy implementation detailed by the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) earlier this year formed the basis of the 
United States' August 13, 2007 request that the WTO establish a 
dispute settlement panel, in the U.S. case challenging 
deficiencies in China's intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection and enforcement regime.\3\ The WTO granted the U.S. 
request and established a panel in September 2007. On August 
31, 2007, the WTO also granted a U.S. request to form a panel 
to review Chinese export and import-substitution subsidies 
prohibited by WTO rules.\4\ The United States and Mexico allege 
that China's revised income tax law and related tax refunds, 
exemptions, and reductions constitute an export subsidy.\5\
    The timely resolution of many of these disputes remains a 
focus of concern and effort. Throughout 2007, the ways in which 
``China's laws, policies, and practices deviate from the WTO's 
national treatment principle'' \6\ remained at center stage. 
The U.S.-China Business Council and other business interests 
kept a coordinated 
spotlight on China's inadequate protection of IPR, its 
insufficiently transparent legal and regulatory processes, and 
its opaque development of technical and product standards that 
inadequately address quality issues and tend to favor local 
companies.\7\ China's long-protected banking and oil sectors 
were opened in accordance with WTO commitments that came due on 
December 11, 2006, but concerns remain.
    In the area of transparency, important developments during 
the Commission's 2006-2007 reporting cycle included China's 
solicitation of comments during legislative and regulatory 
development (including on the new Labor Contract Law and Tax 
Law Implementation Regulations). Comment procedures afford 
interested parties some limited opportunities to offer input 
prior to implementation. Among those who submitted comments on 
the draft Labor Contract Law were U.S. business groups. Some 
comments endorsed revisions that would weaken some of the 
formal protections written into draft versions of the law, 
according to business association, media, and other sources.\8\ 
Among the aspects of the drafts that concerned these companies 
were clauses on hiring and termination procedures, layoffs, 
employee probationary periods, the status of temporary workers, 
the power of the official trade union, severance pay 
provisions, and employee training repayment.\9\ The State 
Council's issuance of a new Regulation on the Public Disclosure 
of Government Information in April 2007, to take effect in May 
2008, is 
potentially significant, and the Commission will monitor its 
implementation going forward. Also potentially significant is 
the issuance by the Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's 
Procuratorate's of measures concerning the publication of 
judicial decisions and other documents. The Commission also 
will be monitoring developments in this area closely. [See 
Section II--Freedom of Expression.]

                  PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

    For several years the Commission has noted the widespread 
counterfeiting and piracy of intellectual property in 
China.\10\ The Commission's 2004 Annual Report concluded that 
``only rhetorical progress has been made toward reducing the 
extremely high level of intellectual property infringement in 
China in the past year and the situation continues to severely 
injure U.S. intellectual property industries.'' \11\ In its 
2006 Annual Report, the Commission characterized IPR 
infringement in China as ``rampant.'' Placing China on its top-
ranked ``Priority Watch'' list, the USTR noted in early 2007 
that ``[a]lthough this year's Special 301 Report shows positive 
progress in many countries, rampant counterfeiting and piracy 
problems have continued to plague China and Russia, indicating 
a need for stronger IPR regimes.'' \12\
    Reasons for China's weak enforcement of IPR protections 
include what some analysts regard as deliberate ``free-riding'' 
on the international system--China's resistance to introducing 
criminal penalties sufficient to deter infringement, and the 
high thresholds that Chinese laws and regulations use to 
determine the existence of infringement, for example. Reasons 
also include structural and local factors that call for 
consistent, long-term policy solutions--weak, politicized legal 
institutions, for example, and the presence of Party, 
government, and military interests that have incentives to 
resist the closure of commercial producers of infringing 
products because they generate revenues and contribute to local 
economies.\13\
    From July through October 2006, central government 
officials launched a highly publicized ``100 Day Anti-Piracy 
Campaign'' sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry 
of Public Security, and eight other central government 
departments.\14\ Chinese authorities reported seizing more than 
58 million illegal publications and four pirated DVD production 
lines, investigating more than 10,000 cases of IPR 
infringement, and sentencing at least two individuals to life 
imprisonment.\15\
    The campaign targeted not only IPR infringing publications, 
but also material published without government permission, and 
material containing prohibited political content. Authorities 
reported confiscating some 616,000 unauthorized newspapers and 
periodicals, according