[DOCID: f:er033.104]
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104th Congress                                             Exec. Report
                                 SENATE

 2d Session                                                      104-33
_______________________________________________________________________


 
                    THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

                                _______
                                

               September 11, 1996.--Ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________


   Mr. Helms, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted the 
                               following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                      MAJORITY and MINORITY VIEWS

                   [To accompany Treaty Doc. 103-21]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, opened for signature and signed by the United 
States at Paris on January 13, 1993, including the following 
documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Annex on 
Chemicals; the Annex on Implementation and Verification; and 
the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information, having 
considered the same, reports favorably thereon and recommends 
that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification 
thereof subject to 7 conditions and 11 declarations as set 
forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of 
ratification.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
  I. Purpose..........................................................2
 II. Treaty Terms.....................................................2
III. Treaty Obligations...............................................7
 IV. Background......................................................12
  V. Committee Action................................................17
 VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................19
VII. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................32
VIII.Majority Views.................................................162

 IX. Minority Views.................................................241

                               I. Purpose

    The purpose of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (The Chemical Weapons 
Convention or ``CWC'') is to create a global ban on the use, 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or transfer 
of chemical weapons. The Convention seeks to reinforce the 
international norm against the use of chemical weapons by 
reaffirming and building upon the principles, objectives, and 
obligations assumed under two other international agreements: 
(1) the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of 
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare; and (2) the 1972 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, or the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
    The United States has been engaged in negotiations for the 
elimination of weapons for chemical and biological warfare for 
more than 70 years. The Geneva Protocol and the BWC are the two 
basic treaties now in force. Most countries, including the 
United States, are parties to both. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 
prohibits the use in war by a Party against another Party of 
chemical and biological weapons, but places no restriction on 
production or possession of such weapons. In addition, 
reservations attached to the Protocol by many countries, 
including the United States, preserve the right to use chemical 
weapons in retaliation. The Biological Weapons Convention, on 
the other hand, outlaws the development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of biological and toxin 
weapons and provides for their destruction. (Toxins are 
considered both chemical and biological weapons in that they 
are biologically derived but act in a chemical manner. Thus, 
toxins are also covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention.) 
However, the BWC does not contain verification provisions. The 
administration is currently working with other nations to 
expand the BWC drawing upon the verification regime contained 
in the CWC.
    As noted, the CWC goes beyond both the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
and the BWC by prohibiting any use of chemical weapons in war--
including retaliatory use--as well as military preparations for 
the use of chemical weapons, and by establishing a verification 
regime to monitor compliance with the Convention. The CWC 
requires member states to declare all of their existing 
chemical weapons and chemical weapons storage and production 
facilities, requires their indigenous commercial chemical 
industries to declare their production activities and to allow 
an international inspectorate to examine those declarations and 
to have access to both military and commercial facilities, and 
to completely eliminate all of their chemical weapons within 10 
years of the Convention's entry into force. The goals of the 
CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons, to 
reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any 
future use of these weapons.

                            II. Treaty Terms

    The Chemical Weapons Convention consists of the main Treaty 
text and three annexes, together with two documents, formally 
transmitted to the Senate by the President on November 23, 
1993, for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification. The 
CWC is a treaty with a preamble and 24 Articles with an 
unlimited duration, and three annexes as follows:
          the Annex on Chemicals;
          the Annex on Implementation and Verification (the 
        ``Verification Annex''); and
          the Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
        Information (the ``Confidentiality Annex'').
    The President also transmitted documents associated with, 
but not integral parts of, the Annexes or the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. These documents embody legally binding commitments 
regarding the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and 
on privileges, immunities, practical arrangements, and 
commitments undertaken with respect to the hosting of the 
Preparatory Commission. These documents are relevant to the 
consideration of the CWC by the Senate. No new U.S. security 
assurances or guarantees are associated with any of these 
documents.

                           a. the treaty text

    Article I contains the principal obligations undertaken by 
countries that become parties to the Convention. Parties are 
prohibited from:
          (a) Developing, producing, otherwise acquiring, 
        stockpiling or retaining chemical weapons or 
        transferring them, directly or indirectly, to anyone;
          (b) Using chemical weapons under any circumstances, 
        including retaliatory use;
          (c) Engaging in any military preparations to use 
        chemical weapons or assisting, encouraging, or inducing 
        anyone to engage in any activity prohibited by the CWC; 
        and
          (d) Using riot control agents as a ``method of 
        warfare.''
    Article II provides the definitions used in the Articles 
and Annexes and the criteria used to determine what is included 
within the scope of the Convention's controls. The definition 
of ``chemical weapons'' is specifically broad to encompass all 
known, unknown and future toxic chemicals, so that novel, as 
well as traditional chemical agents, will be prohibited in 
types and quantities that cannot be justified for permitted 
purposes. Article II also defines what is meant by the phrase 
``purposes not prohibited under this Convention.'' (Additional 
definitions are found in paragraph 1 of Article X, Part I of 
the Verification Annex, and paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the 
Verification Annex.)
    Article III requires all States Parties to declare whether 
or not they possess chemical weapons, including old and/or 
abandoned chemical weapons, chemical weapons production 
facilities and facilities or establishments that have been 
designed, constructed or used primarily for chemical weapons 
since January 1, 1946. States Parties are also required to 
report any chemical weapons on its territory that are owned and 
possessed by another State and located in any place under the 
jurisdiction or control of another State. Article III also 
requires States to declare any shipments, direct or indirect, 
of any chemical weapons, or chemical weapons production 
equipment, to or from its territory since January 1, 1946.
    Article IV describes the obligations of States Parties 
regarding destruction of chemical weapons, including the scope 
of the obligation, verification procedures, destruction, 
reporting of destruction activities, safety and environmental 
standards for destruction, bilateral and multilateral 
verification arrangements and costs of verification and 
destruction. Article IV also specifies that duplication of 
bilateral verification activities should be avoided, provided 
that the bilateral efforts are consistent with the Convention's 
provisions and that the States Parties involved keep the 
Organization fully informed of their verification activities. 
This provision was added to limit the duplicative cost of 
verification in instances in which States are already planning 
bilateral destruction and verification activities, namely 
between the United States and the Russian Federation.
    Article V describes the obligation by States Parties to 
destroy chemical weapons production facilities. This article 
specifies that each State Party immediately cease all 
production of chemical weapons and that all chemical weapon 
production facilities must be closed within 90 days of the 
Convention's entry into force for a State Party. Each State 
Party is responsible for the destruction of all chemical 
weapons production facilities on its territory or any other 
place under its jurisdiction or control, regardless of 
ownership. As with Article IV, this article specifies that 
duplication of verification efforts of bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements should be avoided as long as those 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements are consistent with the 
Convention's requirements.
    Article VI describes activities that are not prohibited 
under the Convention. It establishes an international 
verification regime for States Parties' chemical industries in 
order to allow legitimate commercial chemical production while 
guarding against clandestine chemical weapon production. 
Article VI also states that the Technical Secretariat shall 
avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's chemical 
activities while conducting verification activities. Further, 
the article applies the prohibition on hampering a State 
Party's economic or technological development in Article XI 
specifically to chemical industry verification.
    Article VII requires States Parties to develop implementing 
legislation. This is to make sure that private individuals and 
nongovernmental organizations anywhere on a State Party's 
territory or under its jurisdiction are prohibited from the 
same activities as the State Party. Article VII requires each 
State Party to establish or designate a National Authority to 
be the national focal point for liaison with the Organization 
and other States Parties. Article VII also requires each State 
Party to treat all information and data received from the 
Organization as confidential to protect information gathered 
during inspections from being used for purposes not related to 
the Convention, such as for commercial advantage.
    Article VIII establishes the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Conference of the States 
Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, 
and details the general provisions regarding the Organization. 
This article also sets forth the rules for financing the 
Organization.
    Article IX gives States Parties the right to request 
challenge inspections. However, Article IX also declares that 
States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every 
effort to clarify and resolve any compliance issues before 
requesting an inspection. The State Party receiving the request 
is required to provide sufficient information to clarify the 
concern to the requesting State Party as soon as possible, but 
in any case within 10 days of receiving the request. Article IX 
also requires an inspected State Party to make every reasonable 
effort to allow the inspection team to fulfill its mandate, 
while giving the inspected party the right to prevent 
disclosure of confidential information and data not related to 
the Convention. Article IX also gives the Executive Council the 
power, in limited circumstances, to cancel an inspection if it 
considers the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive, or 
clearly beyond the scope of the Convention.
    Article X establishes procedures for assistance to States 
Parties that are attacked or threatened with the attack by 
chemical weapons. ``Assistance'' is defined as the coordination 
and delivery to the threatened State Party of protection 
against chemical weapons, including detection equipment, 
protective equipment, decontamination equipment, medical 
antidotes and advice on any of these measures. Article X also 
gives States Parties the right to chemical weapons defenses, as 
long as they are for purposes not prohibited under the 
Convention. States Parties can choose the type of assistance 
they wish to provide.
    Article XI seeks to balance free trade in legitimate 
chemicals with preventing the proliferation of chemical 
weapons. This article sets the broad principle that the 
Convention should not be implemented in a manner that hampers 
the economic and technological development of States Parties or 
international cooperation in chemical activities for purposes 
not prohibited under the Convention.
    Article XII sets forth general measures that may be taken 
to address noncompliance. These measures include the 
possibility of restricting or suspending a State Party's rights 
and privileges, recommending sanctions, or bringing the issue 
before the United Nations.
    Article XIII states that nothing in the Convention shall 
limit or detract from any obligations assumed by a State under 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 or the Biological Weapons 
Convention.
    Article XIV sets general mechanisms for settling disputes 
between States Parties or between the States Parties and the 
Organization.
    Article XV provides two methods for modifying the 
Convention: a formal amendment process and a ``simplified'' 
procedure for making minor administrative or technical changes 
which is listed to most provisions of the Annexes. The former 
requires ratification by States Parties without dissent and the 
latter requires neither ratification nor consensus.
    Article XVI states that the Convention shall be of 
unlimited duration and sets forth the conditions for 
withdrawal.
    Article XVII states that the Annexes form an integral part 
of the Convention and that any reference to the Convention 
includes the Annexes. The purpose of this article is to make 
clear that the Annexes have the same legal status as the 
Articles to the Convention.
    Article XVIII states that the Convention shall be open for 
signature for all States before its entry into force in order 
to allow for universal acceptance of the Convention.
    Article XIX states that the Convention shall be subject to 
ratification by States Signatories according to their 
respective constitutional processes.
    Article XX states that any State which does not sign the 
Convention prior to its entry into force may sign it at any 
time thereafter.
    Article XXI sets the date for the Convention's entry into 
force. This article specifies that the Convention shall enter 
into force 180 days after the date of the deposit of the 65th 
instrument of ratification, but not earlier than 2 years after 
its opening for signature. Article XXI also specifies that the 
States who sign the Convention after its entry into force, it 
shall enter into force for that State on the 30th day following 
the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or 
accession.
    Article XXII states that the Articles of the Convention 
shall not be subject to reservations by States Parties and that 
any reservations to the Annexes must be compatible with the 
object and purpose of the Convention.
    Article XXIII designates the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations as the depositary for the Convention and sets 
forth the responsibilities of the depositary.
    Article XXIV states that the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian, and Spanish texts of the Convention are all 
equally authentic and shall be deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.

                    B. INTEGRAL ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS

    The Treaty includes other documents which the President and 
the Secretary indicated are ``integral'' parts of the Treaty, 
and are submitted for consideration as legally binding parts of 
the Treaty.
    The Annex on Chemicals sets forth the criteria by which 
toxic chemicals and precursors are to be evaluated for 
inclusion in the schedules and the three Schedules of chemicals 
and chemical families themselves. The first part is designed so 
that new or currently unknown chemicals that meet the criteria 
may be proposed for addition to the Schedules in the future. 
The annex states that these Schedules do not constitute a 
definitive definition of chemical weapons. Schedule 1 is a list 
of chemicals that have actually been developed, produced, 
stockpiled or used as chemical weapons, chemicals that are 
immediate precursors to such chemical weapons and all other 
chemicals that are a high risk for use as chemical weapon 
precursors and have not significant civilian use. Schedule 2 
lists toxic chemicals and their immediate precursors that are 
produced, typically in small quantities, for peaceful purposes 
by industry, but which still pose a significant risk to the 
objectives of the Convention because of their potential to be 
used as chemical weapons. Schedule 3 lists chemicals that are 
usually produced in large commercial quantities but which 
either have been used in the past for chemical weapons or pose 
a risk to the objectives of the Convention because of their 
toxicity or importance as precursors to Schedule 1 or 2 
chemicals.
    The Annex on Implementation and Verification details how 
the inspections are to be conducted by stating the guidelines 
to be used in the declaration, monitoring, and inspection 
provisions of the Convention. This annex includes definitions; 
general rules of verification; general provisions for 
verification measures for chemical weapons, chemical weapons 
production facilities, and permitted Schedule 1 production; 
specific provisions for destruction and verification of 
destruction of chemical weapons; specific provisions for 
destruction or conversion, and verification of destruction or 
conversion, or chemical weapons production facilities; specific 
provisions regarding permitted production and use of Schedule 1 
chemicals; specific provisions for declaration and verification 
of Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals and related facilities; 
specific provisions for declaration and anticipated 
verification of other chemical production facilities; 
procedures for challenge inspections; and procedures for 
investigations of alleged use on chemical weapons.
    The Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information 
obliges the Organization, the inspectors and the inspection 
observers not to reveal information gathered in the course of 
an inspection that is not relevant to a violation of the 
Convention.

                        c. associated documents

    Associated with the CWC are two separate document and three 
annexes to the documents. The Resolution Establishing the 
Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons was adopted by the conference on 
Disarmament at Geneva on September 3, 1992. The Resolution 
approves the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission. The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission (and its Three Annexes) sets forth the details on 
arranging the Preparatory Commission.

                        III. Treaty Obligations

                        destruction obligations

    The Convention obligates each State Party to destroy all of 
its chemical weapons, and chemical weapons it abandoned on the 
territory of another State Party, and all of its chemical 
weapons production facilities. The CWC outlines a destruction 
schedule in specified categories of chemical weapons and 
requires completion of the destruction process by 10 years 
after the Convention's entry-into-force (EIF). The Convention 
does allow flexibility in the destruction process, permitting 
extension of the 10-year timeframe for up to 5 years.
    The CWC identifies two special categories of chemical 
weapons--namely old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical 
weapons. All chemical weapons produced before 1925 may be 
destroyed or otherwise disposed of as ``toxic waste.'' In the 
case of ``old chemical weapons,'' the Executive Council of the 
international organization created to implement the CWC can 
modify time-limits and order of destruction for chemical 
weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated 
to such an extent that they are no longer usable as chemical 
weapons.
    With regard to ``abandoned chemical weapons,'' the 
abandoning State Party is required to provide all necessary 
financial, technical, expert, facility and other resources to 
ensure appropriate destruction or disposal. The 10-year 
destruction time-line applies, through the Executive Council 
may approve the modification or suspension of the time-limits 
and/or order of destruction.
    All chemical weapons that do not fall into these categories 
will be subject to the full verification and destruction 
regimes of the CWC. Chemical weapons are broadly defined by 
Article II the CWC to be:
          (a) Toxic chemicals--any chemical which through 
        chemical action on life processes can case death, 
        temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or 
        animals--and their precursors, except when used for:
                  (i) Industrial, agricultural, research, 
                medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful 
                purposes;
                  (ii) Purposes directly related to protection 
                against toxic chemicals and to protection 
                against chemical weapons;
                  (iii) Military purposes not connected with 
                the use of chemical weapons and not dependent 
                on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals 
                as a method of warfare; and
                  (iv) Law enforcement, including some domestic 
                riot control purposes.
          (b) Munitions and devices specifically designed to 
        release toxic chemicals; and
          (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
        directly in connection with the employment of those 
        munitions or devices.
    The CWC also requires the destruction of chemical weapons 
production facilities within 10 years of EIF. However, chemical 
weapons production facilities may be converted temporarily for 
use as destruction facilities. In addition, States Parties may 
request approval from the Conference to convert chemical 
weapons production facilities to purposes not prohibited under 
the Convention. Approval is contingent on the State Party's 
acceptance of conditions specified in the CWC which, inter 
alia, preclude the use of a converted facility to produce, 
process, or consume Schedule 1 or 2 chemicals (with some 
exceptions), require the declaration of activities, provide for 
international monitoring of such activities, and set parameters 
for the conduct of such activities (e.g., very limited 
production of Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes, 
very limited Schedule 1 production capacity, and the use of 
only two Schedule 1 production facilities for protective 
purposes).
    The CWC defines chemical weapons production facilities as 
any equipment, or any building housing such equipment, that was 
designed, constructed or used at any time since January 1, 
1946:
          (a) As part of the stage in the production of 
        chemicals where the material flows would contain, when 
        the equipment is in operation:
                  (i) Any Schedule 1 chemical; or
                  (ii) Any other chemical that has no use, 
                above 1 metric ton per year, for purposes not 
                prohibited under the Convention, but can be 
                used for chemical weapons purposes; or
          (b) For filling chemical weapons, devices, or bulk 
        storage containers. This includes the filling of 
        chemicals into containers that form part of assembled 
        binary munitions/devices or into chemical submunitions 
        that form part of assembled unitary munitions/devices, 
        and the loading of the containers and chemical 
        submunitions into the respective munitions and devices.
    The CWC specifically excludes from the definition of 
``chemical weapons production facilities:'' (1) any facility 
having a productive capacity of less than 1 metric ton; (2) any 
facility in which a scheduled chemical is or was produced as an 
avoidable by-product of activities for nonprohibited purposes 
(provided that the chemical does not exceed 3% of the total 
production at that facility and that the facility is subject to 
CWC data declarations and inspection); or (3) the single small-
scale facility permitted for the production of chemicals listed 
in Schedule 1 for nonprohibited purposes.
    The Committee notes that regardless of whether any or all 
specialized production equipment has been removed, prior to 
entry into force of the Treaty, from a facility previously used 
at anytime since January 1, 1946, for chemical weapons 
production, such a facility must be declared pursuant to 
Article III of the Treaty and Part V of the Verification Annex.

                         financial obligations

    Article VIII of the CWC specifies that the costs of the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
that will be established to implement the CWC be paid in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments 
adjusted to take into account differences in membership between 
the U.N. and the OPCW. According to Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher's April 19, 1996, responses to questions asked by 
the Chairman, the United States is expected to pay 24.96 
percent of the OPCWs operating costs. The next five highest 
contributors after the United States are expected to be Japan 
(13.92 percent), Germany (8.93 percent), France (6.31 percent), 
Russia (5.67 percent), and the United Kingdom (5.26 percent).
    Each State Party must also pay for the costs of destruction 
of its chemical weapons and for verification of the chemical 
weapons storage and destruction process. However, the CWC also 
allows for the conclusion of bilateral verification 
arrangements under which the parties involved assume the 
bilateral costs, and other members are apportioned percentages 
of the cost of monitoring the bilateral agreement by the 
international inspectorate. The United States proposed the 
bilateral verification provision based on a desire for direct 
involvement in monitoring the Russian chemical weapons 
destruction effort, the pre-existence of the 1990 U.S.-Russian 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), and a mutual desire with 
the Russian Federation to minimize costs where possible.

           Obligations to Provide assistance under article X

    The CWC obligates each State Party to provide either 
monetary contributions to the Voluntary Fund of the OPCW, 
contribute protective equipment to an OPCW stockpile, or to 
identify assistance that will be provided upon demand or in 
response to an appeal by the OPCW.
    The PrepCom agreed in 1993 that the Voluntary Fund would 
comprise monetary contributions from States Parties as well as 
from nongovernmental organizations, institutions, private 
parties, and individuals. Conditions on the use of these funds 
would need to be consistent with the aims and purpose of the 
Convention and approved by the Executive Council. The Voluntary 
Fund is to be used for the creation, maintenance and periodic 
replenishment of a stockpile of equipment for emergency 
assistance.
    In the case of an emergency request, each State Party has 
the right to request and receive assistance, in general, if:
          (1) chemical weapons have been used against it;
          (2) riot control agents have been used against it as 
        a ``method of warfare;'' or
          (3) it is threatened by the actions or activities of 
        any State that are prohibited under Article I.
    The CWC defines assistance as ``the co-ordination and 
delivery to States Parties of protection against chemical 
weapons.'' Types of assistance are further defined inter alia 
as detection equipment, alarm systems, protective equipment, 
medical antidotes and treatments, decontamination equipment and 
decontaminants, and advice on protective measures. The CWC 
outlines procedures for requesting assistance and the ways in 
which the OPCW should respond.
    The Committee understands that, as a matter of practice, 
any request for assistance will be submitted to the Director-
General who will then bring it to the attention of the 
Executive Council and all States Parties. States Parties that 
are so committed should be in a position to provide voluntary 
emergency assistance within 12 hours of the receipt of such a 
request. After the Director-General has initiated an 
investigation, the Executive Council will meet and decide if 
supplementary assistance should be provided. In cases where the 
investigation is not finished, but it is obvious that chemical 
weapons have been used, the Director-General may provide 
emergency assistance by using the Voluntary Fund. Under such 
circumstances, protective equipment from the OPCW's stockpile 
can be dispatched and equipment from other donor States Parties 
can be used.
    Finally, Article X mandates that each State Party submit 
annual information on its national chemical weapons defense 
programs ``for purposes of increasing the transparency of 
national programs related to protective purposes * * *.'' The 
extent to which countries may be required to divulge 
information about their defensive chemical programs is unclear, 
and some on the Committee find this ambiguity troubling.
    The Expert Group has discussed lists of categories of 
information to be provided by States Parties on national 
programs related to protective purposes. At this stage, the 
Preparatory Commission for the OPCW conceptualizes mandatory 
data to include information on the existence and general 
elements of a national program, information on the training of 
specialists in chemical weapons protection, and information on 
protection units. However, final agreement has not been reached 
on the extent of information to be provided.

      creation and funding of the organizational bodies of the cwc

    The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory Commission for 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 
and the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory Commission 
both were adopted by acclamation by Signatory States on January 
13, 1993. Together they provide the basis for the Preparatory 
Commission for the OPCW--the organization responsible for 
preparing the necessary procedures for implementing the 
Convention and for laying the groundwork for the international 
organization created by the Convention.
    The OPCW will consist of the following: the Conference of 
the States Parties, the overall governing body made up of all 
States Parties; a 41-member Executive Council; and the 
Technical Secretariat, which will be the international body 
responsible for actually conducting the verification 
activities, including the on-site inspections.

                   creation of the national authority

    In ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, a country 
agrees to the basic provisions of the Convention in Article I, 
and to implement those obligations by taking the necessary 
national legal and administrative measures required by Article 
VII. States Parties must provide the declarations and 
information required under Articles I, IV, V and VI and this 
information will be subject to the verification provisions of 
these articles using the machinery of Article VIII. The State 
Party also agrees to accept challenge inspection under Article 
IX if the need arises.
    While States Parties are required to take measures to 
adhere to the Convention, Article VII is generally worded, 
leaving it to individual States Parties to determine who they 
will implement the provisions of the Convention and comply with 
their obligations.
    The primary function of the National Authority under the 
Convention is to establish a system to meet the CWC's 
obligations, and in so doing to minimize the disclosure of 
confidential business information in the process of providing 
information to the OPCW. Compliance with the CWC entails data-
reporting on scheduled chemicals, some unscheduled discrete 
organic chemicals including ``PSF'' chemicals and on research 
activities under the Convention. The National Authority will be 
responsible for three different types of data reporting: (a) 
the initial declarations of the State Party after entry into 
force of the Convention, (b) annual data reporting and (c) 
reporting on anticipated activities and changes in activities 
reported previously. Such data must be retrievable, authorized, 
and assessable at the National Authority level, and will 
contain information on chemical trade (both export and import) 
for chemical listed under the Schedules.
    More specifically, a U.S. National Authority would be 
required to:
          (1) assess U.S. producers of chemicals of concern 
        under the Convention;
          (2) process data declarations by firms under Articles 
        III, IV, V and VI;
          (3) process annual declarations under Articles IV, V 
        and VI;
          (4) escort OPCW inspection teams under Articles IV, 
        V, VI, IX and X;
          (5) accredit OPCW Inspectors;
          (6) develop Facility Agreements;
          (7) oversee closure and destruction activities 
        relating to chemical weapons and chemical weapons 
        production facilities;
          (8) coordinate the provision of national assistance 
        under Article X;
          (9) analyze chemical export and import activities;
          (10) review national regulations in international 
        trade in chemicals; and
          (11) manage issues relating to old and abandoned 
        chemical weapons.
    Beyond this, the National Authority will be called upon to 
represent the United States at the Conference of States 
Parties, the Executive Council, and to undertake other 
activities. Thus the National Authority must have both a 
domestic and an international focus.

                             IV. Background

    In 1925, at the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of 
the International Traffic in Arms, the United States proposed a 
prohibition on the export of gases for use in war; France 
broadened the proposal to include a ban on the use of poisonous 
gas in war. At the suggestion of Poland, the proposed 
prohibition was further extended to include bacteriological 
weapons. The result was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which 
prohibits the use in war--though not internally, as in the 
instance of Iraqi gassing of Kurds--of chemical and biological 
weapons, but not the production or stockpiling of such weapons. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations favorably reported the 
treaty in 1926, but the Senate did not act on it in that 
period.
    In the post-World War II period, there were a number of 
discussions of the possibility of multilateral chemical and 
biological weapons bans, but no significant progress was made 
until the late 1960's. In 1969, President Nixon announced that 
he would resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate. He 
reaffirmed U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical 
weapons, as well as incapacitating chemicals.
    In 1970, the President resubmitted the protocol with a 
reservation that the United States could retaliate with 
chemical weapons. He also declared that the protocol would not 
apply to the use in war of riot-control agents and herbicides. 
The Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the narrow 
coverage and deferred action. 1971, the Soviets accepted the 
U.S. view that a ban on biological weapons presented less 
intractable problems and should not be held up awaiting 
agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical 
weapons ban. As a result, the Biological Weapons Convention was 
negotiated quickly, opened for signature and submitted to the 
Senate in 1972. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred 
action pending resolution of the U.S. commitment under the 
Geneva Protocol.
    In 1974, the Ford administration reopened the issue, and 
the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
indicated that the President, while reaffirming the scope of 
the protocol, was prepared ``to renounce as a matter of 
national policy: (1) first use of herbicides in war except use, 
under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control 
of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around 
their immediate defensive perimeters; and (2) first use of 
riot-control agents in war except in defensive military modes 
to save lives * * *.'' Moreover, Dr. Ikle, testified, ``The 
President, under an earlier directive still in force, must 
approve in advance any use of riot-control agents and chemical 
herbicides in war.'' With that and related understandings, the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously 2 days 
later to report the Convention and the protocol favorably. Four 
days later, the Senate approved the protocol and the Convention 
unanimously.

                          recent developments

    In recent years, the issue of chemical weapons 
proliferation has gained more immediacy as a result of a number 
of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use. In the 
mid 1960's, Egypt was accused of using chemical weapons with 
Soviet help in the Yemeni civil war. North Vietnam was accused 
of using chemical weapons and toxins in Laos and Cambodia. The 
Ethiopian government was suspected of using chemicals against 
rebels in 1980. The United States has also charged that the 
Soviet Union used chemical weapons and toxins in Afghanistan.
    However, the event which provoked the sharpest response 
from the U.S. Congress was Iraq's repeated use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, prompting Iranian retaliation 
with chemical weapons and use of poison gas against its own 
Kurdish citizens in 1988. Congress responded by passing the 
Pell-Helms Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Welfare 
Elimination Act, which imposed sanctions on nations using 
chemical weapons and against companies aiding the chemical 
weapons programs in certain countries. President Bush vetoed 
the legislation in 1990, however, because it did not allow a 
Presidential waiver of sanctions. The Bush administration 
subsequently established controls and sanctions by Executive 
order, but with complete leeway on waivers of penalties. The 
legislation was passed again by Congress and became law in 
1991.
    Additionally, progress was made during the 1980's in 
achieving international cooperation on nonproliferation issues. 
In 1984, Vice President Bush introduced at the Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty calling for a 
comprehensive ban with extensive verification procedures. In 
the following years, a number of key issues were resolved, and 
an early agreement in principle on the basic approach a ban 
would take emerged. The Reagan administration had favored very 
strict ``anytime, anywhere'' verification regime which the 
Soviet Union ultimately accepted. While some argued that this 
may constitute an unacceptable level of intrusiveness, further 
negotiation to reach of common ground resulted in a 
modification of the earlier approach and resulted in the 
``managed access'' system of inspections.
    In June 1990 Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a 
bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production of 
Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral 
Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons. This agreement:
          Banned the production of chemical weapons agents;
          Required reduction in chemical weapons stocks to 
        5,000 tons by 2002, necessitating cuts of 83% in U.S. 
        stocks and 90% in Russian stocks;
          Provided for on-site inspections of storage, 
        destruction and production facilities, combined with 
        data declarations.
    In March 1993, the United States and Russian delegations 
agreed ad referendum on detailed implementing procedures and 
updated provisions to finalize the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement. Russia has yet to formally agree to these detailed 
procedures and provisions, however, citing problems with the 
provisions on conversion of former chemical weapons facilities 
to peaceful uses and with the costs of stockpile destruction.
    On the multilateral front, the late 1980's saw a slowdown 
in progress on an international chemical weapons agreement, as 
states debated the extensive verification procedures proposed 
by the United States. Also, many nations opposed a U.S.-Soviet 
formulation whereby those two countries could keep 500 tons of 
chemical weapons for at least another 8 years, pending an 
assessment of participation in the Convention.
    The experience of the Gulf War, in which the United States 
faced the possibility of chemical weapons attack, apparently 
precipitated a change in the Bush administration's thinking in 
the matter. The administration decided that the need for a 
chemical weapons ban outweighed the need to maintain a chemical 
retaliatory capability. Thus, the United States decided that in 
the context of a multilateral convention, it would be willing 
to abide by a total chemical weapons ban even if other 
countries maintained chemical weapons stockpiles and programs.
    This led to accelerated progress in multilateral talks. The 
result was the opening for signature on January 13, 1993, of 
The Convention on the Prohibition of Development Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention Ratifications: 62 as of 
                                 9/6/96

Afghanistan
Albania--Ratified 5/11/94
Algeria--Ratified 8/14/95
Argentina--Ratified 10/2/95
Armenia--Ratified 1/27/95
Australia--Ratified 5/6/94
Austria--Ratified 8/17/95
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus--Ratified 7/11/96
Belgium
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil--Ratified 3/13/96
Brunei Darussalem
Bulgaria--Ratified 8/10/94
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada--Ratified 9/26/95
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Chile--Ratified 7/11/96
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands--Ratified 7/15/94
Costa Rica--Ratified 5/31/96
Cote d'Ivoire--Ratified 12/15/95
Croatia--Ratified 5/23/95
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic--Ratified 3/6/96
Denmark--Ratified 7/13/95
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador--Ratified 9/6/95
El Salvador--Ratified 10/30/95
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia--Ratified 5/24/96
Fiji--Ratified 1/20/93
Finland--Ratified 2/7/95
France--Ratified 3/2/95
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia--Ratified 11/27/95
Germany--Ratified 8/12/94
Ghana
Greece--Ratified 12/22/94
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India--Ratified 9/3/96
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland--Ratified 6/24/96
Israel
Italy--Ratified 12/8/95
Japan--Ratified 9/15/95
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia--Ratified 7/23/96
Lesotho--Ratified 12/7/94
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives--Ratified 5/31/94
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius--Ratified 2/9/93
Mexico--Ratified 8/29/94
Micronesia
Moldova--Ratified 7/8/96
Monaco--Ratified 6/1/95
Mongolia--Ratified 1/17/95
Morocco--Ratified 12/28/95
Myanmar
Namibia--Ratified 11/27/95
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands--Ratified 6/30/95
New Zealand--Ratified 7/15/96
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway--Ratified 4/7/94
Oman--Ratified 2/8/95
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea--Ratified 4/17/96
Paraguay--Ratified 23/1/94
Peru--Ratified 7/20/95
Philippines
Poland--Ratified 8/23/95
Portugal
Qatar
Romania--Ratified 2/15/95
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
  the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Saudi Arabia--Ratified 8/9/96
Senegal
Seyechelles--Ratified 4/7/93
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic--Ratified 10/27/95
Slovenia
South Africa--Ratified 9/13/95
South Korea
Spain--Ratified 8/3/94
Sri Lanka--Ratified 8/19/94
Swaziland
Sweden--Ratified 6/17/93
Switzerland--Ratified 3/10/95
Tajikistan--Ratified 1/11/95
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan--Ratified 9/29/94
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom--Ratified 5/13/96
United States
Uruguay--Ratified 10/6/94
Uzbekistan--Ratified 7/23/96
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

    Total=160 Members.
    Last updated: July 24, 1996.

                          V. Committee Action

    Senator Pell chaired the first hearing on the Chemical 
Weapons Convention on March 22, 1994, when the Committee heard 
from the Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State and 
the Honorable John D. Holum, Director of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Additionally, Mr. Holum was 
heard in closed session in the afternoon of March 22.
    A second hearing was held on April 13, 1994. Witnesses 
included the Honorable Stephen J. Ledogar, U.S. Representative 
to the Conference on Disarmament; Sherry S. Mannix, Chairman, 
Interagency Chemical Weapons Ratification Task Force and Former 
Senior ACDA Representative to the U.S. Delegation to the 
Conference on Disarmament; and Bernard L. Seward, Jr., Attorney 
Advisor, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Former 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. Conference on Disarmament.
    A third hearing was held on May 13, 1994, with witnesses 
from the Department of Defense. Witnesses included the 
Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary for 
Policy; Major General David W. McIlvoy, USAF, Deputy Director 
for International Negotiations, Directorate for Strategic Plans 
and Policy (J-5), Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Dr. Harold P. 
Smith, Jr., Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic 
Energy, Department of Defense.
    On May 17, 1994, the Committee met briefly in open session 
and moved to closed session with representatives of the 
Intelligence Community. Witnesses included Major General 
(retired) John Landry, USA, National Intelligence Officer for 
General Forces, National Intelligence Council; John Lauder, 
Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff for the Director of 
Central Intelligence; and Donald Mahley, Acting Assistant 
Director, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency.
    On June 9, 1994, the Committee heard from several outside 
experts. Witnesses included Will B. Carpenter, Chemical 
Industry Consultant, Salt Lake City, Utah; Amoretta Hoeber, 
Former Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Arlington, Virginia; 
Dr. Matthew Meselson, Department of Biochemistry and Molecular 
Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; the 
Honorable Michael Moodie, President, Chemical and Biological 
Arms Control Institute, Alexandria, Virginia; the Honorable 
Ronald F. Lehman, Former Director, United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, Livermore, California; Frank Gaffney, 
Jr., Director, Center for Security Policy, Washington, D.C.; 
the Honorable Kathleen Bailey, Former Assistant Director, 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Livermore, 
California; and Amy Smithson, Director, Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, 
Washington, D.C.
    On June 16, 1994, the Committee met in closed session to 
hear Intelligence Community witnesses.
    On June 23, 1994, the Committee met in open session with 
General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; the Honorable John D. Holum, Director, United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Honorable R. James 
Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence.
    On March 13, 1996, the Committee held the first in the 
final round of hearings. Witnesses include: Ms. Amoretta 
Hoeber, President of AMH Consulting; Mr. Baker Spring, a Senior 
Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation; The Honorable 
Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms 
Control Institute; Dr. J.D. Crouch, professor of Defense and 
Strategic Studies at Southwest Missouri State.
    The Committee's eighth hearing was held on March 21, 1996. 
Witnesses included: Dr. Brad Roberts, Defense Institute of 
Analysis; Frederick Webber, President and CEO, Chemical 
Manufacturers Association; The Honorable Kathleen Bailey, 
Senior Fellow on the Staff of the Director at Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory; Douglas J. Feith, Senior 
Founding Partner of Feith and Zell, P.C.
    On March 26, 1996, the Committee met in closed session to 
hear Intelligence Community witnesses.
    The final hearing was held on March 28, 1996. Witnesses 
included: The Honorable Warren Christopher, Secretary of State; 
The Honorable William Perry, Secretary of Defense; Lt. General 
Wesley Clark, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy in the 
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
    On April 25, 1996, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
met for a business meeting, where among other things, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention was on the agenda. The Chairman, 
under an agreement reached during the State Department 
Reorganization debate, introduced a resolution of ratification 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention. A substitute offered by 
Senator Lugar, Senator Pell, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Biden, 
Senator Dodd, and Senator Kerry was agreed to by a vote of 12 
to 6. Senator Lugar, Senator Kassebaum, Senator Snowe, Senator 
Thomas, Senator Pell, Senator Biden, Senator Sarbanes, Senator 
Dodd, Senator Kerry, Senator Robb, Senator Feingold, and 
Senator Feinstein voted in favor of the substitute. Chairman 
Helms, Senator Brown, Senator Coverdell, Senator Thompson, 
Senator Grams, and Senator Ashcroft voted against the 
substitute. On the question of reporting the Chemical Weapons 
Convention to the full Senate, the committee voted in favor, by 
a vote of 13 to 5. Senator Lugar, Senator Kassebaum, Senator 
Snowe, Senator Thompson, Senator Thomas, Senator Pell, Senator 
Biden, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Dodd, Senator Kerry, Senator 
Robb, Senator Feingold, and Senator Feinstein voted in favor of 
reporting the Convention to the full Senate. Chairman Helms, 
Senator Brown, Senator Coverdell, Senator Grams, and Senator 
Ashcroft voted against the Convention's report to the full 
Senate.
    The substitute resolution of ratification adopted was the 
result of a bi-partisan effort to report a resolution of 
ratification to the full Senate which if approved by a two-
thirds majority would allow U.S. instruments of ratification to 
be deposited and U.S. participation in the Convention. The 
substitute received the support of the Administration. The 
resolution of ratification was submitted to the Senate on April 
30, 1996, pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement entered 
into on December 7, 1995.

                     VI. Resolution of Ratification

                     1. Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein), That (a) the Senate advise and consent to the 
ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature and 
signed by the United States at Paris on January 13, 1993, 
including the following annexes and associated documents, all 
such documents being integral parts of and collectively 
referred to in this resolution as the ``Convention'' (contained 
in Treaty Document 103-21), subject to the conditions of 
subsection (b) and the declarations of subsection (c):
           (1) The Annex on Chemicals.
          (2) The Annex on Implementation and Verification 
        (also known as the ``Verification Annex'').
          (3) The Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
        Information (also known as the ``Confidentiality 
        Annex'').
          (4) The Resolution Establishing the Preparatory 
        Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of 
        Chemical Weapons.
          (5) The Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
        Commission.
    (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
the ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:
          (1) Amendment conferences.--The United States will be 
        present and participate fully in all Amendment 
        Conferences and will cast its vote, either 
        affirmatively or negatively, on all proposed amendments 
        made at such conferences, to ensure that--
                  (A) the United States has an opportunity to 
                consider any and all amendments in accordance 
                with its Constitutional processes; and
                  (B) no amendment to the Convention enters 
                into force without the approval of the United 
                States.
          (2) Presidential certification on data 
        declarations.--(A) Not later than 10 days after the 
        Convention enters into force, or not later than 10 days 
        after the deposit of the Russian instrument of 
        ratification of the Convention, whichever is later, the 
        President shall either--
                  (i) certify to the Senate that Russia has 
                complied satisfactorily with the data 
                declaration requirements of the Wyoming 
                Memorandum of Understanding; or
                  (ii) submit to the Senate a report on 
                apparent discrepancies in Russia's data under 
                the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the 
                results of any bilateral discussions regarding 
                those discrepancies.
          (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
        ``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the 
        Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of 
        the United States of America and the Government of the 
        Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a 
        Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange 
        Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons, signed at 
        Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
          (3) Presidential certification on the bilateral 
        destruction agreement.--Before the deposit of the 
        United States instrument of ratification of the 
        Convention, the President shall certify in writing to 
        the Senate that--
                  (A) a United States-Russian agreement on 
                implementation of the Bilateral Destruction 
                Agreement has been or will shortly be 
                concluded, and that the verification procedures 
                under that agreement will meet or exceed those 
                mandated by the Convention, or
                  (B) the Technical Secretariat of the 
                Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
                Weapons will be prepared, when the Convention 
                enters into force, to submit a plan for meeting 
                the Organization's full monitoring 
                responsibilities that will include United 
                States and Russian facilities as well as those 
                of other parties to the Convention.
          (4) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that 
        a party to the Convention is in violation of the 
        Convention and that the actions of such party threaten 
        the national security interests of the United States, 
        the President shall--
                  (A) consult with, and promptly submit a 
                report to, the Senate detailing the effect of 
                such actions on the Convention;
                  (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the 
                highest diplomatic level with the Organization 
                for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (in 
                this resolution referred to as the 
                ``Organization'') and the noncompliant party 
                with the objective of bringing the noncompliant 
                party into compliance;
                  (C) in the event that a party to the 
                Convention is determined not to be in 
                compliance with the Convention, request 
                consultations with the Organization on whether 
                to--
                          (i) restrict or suspend the 
                        noncompliant party's rights and 
                        privileges under the Convention until 
                        the party complies with its 
                        obligations;
                          (ii) recommend collective measures in 
                        conformity with international law; or
                          (iii) bring the issue to the 
                        attention of the United Nations General 
                        Assembly and Security Council; and
                  (D) in the event that noncompliance 
                continues, determine whether or not continued 
                adherence to the Convention is in the national 
                security interests of the United States and so 
                inform the Senate.
          (5) Financing implementation.--The United States 
        understands that in order to ensure the commitment of 
        Russia to destroy its chemical stockpiles, in the event 
        that Russia ratifies the Convention, Russia must 
        maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
        implementation of the Convention. The costs of 
        implementing the Convention should be borne by all 
        parties to the Convention. The deposit of the United 
        States instrument of ratification of the Convention 
        shall not be contingent upon the United States 
        providing financial guarantees to pay for 
        implementation of commitments by Russia or any other 
        party to the Convention.
          (6) Implementation arrangements.--If the Convention 
        does not enter into force or if the Convention comes 
        into force with the United States having ratified the 
        Convention but with Russia having taken no action to 
        ratify or accede to the Convention, then the President 
        shall, if he plans to implement reductions of United 
        States chemical forces as a matter of national policy 
        or in a manner consistent with the Convention--
                  (A) consult with the Senate regarding the 
                effect of such reductions on the national 
                security of the United States; and
                  (B) take no action to reduce the United 
                States chemical stockpile at a pace faster than 
                that currently planned and consistent with the 
                Convention until the President submits to the 
                Senate his determination that such reductions 
                are in the national security interests of the 
                United States.
          (7) Presidential certification and report on national 
        technical means.--Not later than 90 days after the 
        deposit of the United States instrument of ratification 
        of the Convention, the President shall certify that the 
        United States National Technical Means and the 
        provisions of the Convention on verification of 
        compliance, when viewed together, are sufficient to 
        ensure effective verification of compliance with the 
        provisions of the Convention. This certification shall 
        be accompanied by a report, which may be supplemented 
        by a classified annex, indicating how the United States 
        National Technical Means, including collection, 
        processing and analytic resources, will be marshalled, 
        together with the Convention's verification provisions, 
        to ensure effective verification of compliance. Such 
        certification and report shall be submitted to the 
        Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on 
        Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and 
        the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
    (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
ratification of the Convention is subject to the following 
declarations, which express the intent of the Senate:
          (1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
        applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally 
        based principles of treaty interpretation set forth in 
        Condition (1) of the Resolution of Ratification with 
        respect to the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate on 
        May 27, 1988. For purposes of this declaration, the 
        term ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the 
        United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
        Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their 
        Intermediate-Range and Shorter Range Missiles, together 
        with the related memorandum of understanding and 
        protocols, approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
          (2) Further arms reduction obligations.--The Senate 
        declares its intention to consider for approval 
        international agreements that would obligate the United 
        States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments 
        of the United States in a militarily significant manner 
        only pursuant to the treaty power set forth in Article 
        II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
          (3) Retaliatory policy.--The Senate declares that the 
        United States should strongly reiterate its retaliatory 
        policy that the use of chemical weapons against United 
        States military forces or civilians would result in an 
        overwhelming and devastating response, which may 
        include the whole range of available weaponry.
          (4) Chemical defense program.--The Senate declares 
        that ratification of the Convention will not obviate 
        the need for a robust, adequately funded chemical 
        defense program, together with improved national 
        intelligence capabilities in the nonproliferation area, 
        maintenance of an effective deterrent through capable 
        conventional forces, trade-enabling export controls, 
        and other capabilities. In giving its advice and 
        consent to ratification of the Convention, the Senate 
        does so with full appreciation that the entry into 
        force of the Convention enhances the responsibility of 
        the Senate to ensure that the United States continues 
        an effective and adequately funded chemical defense 
        program. The Senate futher declares that the United 
        States should continue to develop theater missile 
        defense to intercept ballistic missiles that might 
        carry chemical weapons and should enhance defenses of 
        the United States Armed Forces against the use of 
        chemical weapons in the field.
          (5) Enforcement policy.--The Senate urges the 
        President to pursue compliance questions under the 
        Convention vigorously and to seek international 
        sanctions if a party to the Convention does not comply 
        with the Convention, including the ``obligation to make 
        every reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance 
        with this Convention'', pursuant to paragraph 11 of 
        Article IX. It should not be necessary to prove the 
        noncompliance of a party to the Convention before the 
        United States raises issues bilaterally or in 
        appropriate international fora and takes appropriate 
        actions.
          (6) Approval of inspectors.--The Senate expects that 
        the United States will exercise its right to reject a 
        proposed inspector or inspection assistant when the 
        facts indicate that this person is likely to seek 
        information to which the inspection team is not 
        entitled or to mishandle information that the team 
        obtains.
          (7) Assistance to Russia.--The Senate declares that, 
        if the United States provides limited financial 
        assistance for the destruction of Russian chemical 
        weapons, the United States should, in exchange for such 
        assistance, require Russia to destroy its chemical 
        weapons stocks at a proportional rate to the 
        destruction of United States chemical weapons stocks 
        and to take the action before the Convention deadline. 
        In addition, the Senate urges the President to request 
        Russia to allow inspections of former military 
        facilities that have been converted to commercial 
        production, given the possibility that these plants 
        could one day be reconverted to military use, and that 
        any United States assistance for the destruction of the 
        Russian chemical stockpile be apportioned according to 
        Russia's openness to these broad based inspections.
          (8) Expanding chemical arsenals in countries not 
        party to the chemical weapons convention.--It is the 
        sense of the Senate that, if during the time the 
        Convention remains in force the President determines 
        that there has been an expansion of the chemical 
        weapons arsenals of any country not a party to the 
        Convention so as to jeopardize the supreme national 
        interests of the United States, then the President 
        should consult on an urgent basis with the Senate to 
        determine whether adherence to the Convention remains 
        in the national interest of the United States.
          (9) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear pattern of 
        Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and 
        continued cases of noncompliance by Russia, the Senate 
        declares the following:
                  (A) The Convention is in the interest of the 
                United States only if both the United States 
                and Russia, among others, are in strict 
                compliance with the terms of the Convention as 
                submitted to the Senate for its advice and 
                consent to ratification, such compliance being 
                measured by performance and not by efforts, 
                intentions, or commitments to comply.
                  (B)(i) Given its concern about compliance 
                issues, the Senate expects the President to 
                offer regular briefings, but not less than 
                several times a year, to the Committees on 
                Foreign Relations and Armed Services and the 
                Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate 
                on compliance issues related to the Convention. 
                Such briefings shall include a description of 
                all United States efforts in diplomatic 
                channels and bilateral as well as the 
                Multilateral Organization fora to resolve the 
                compliance issues and shall include, but not 
                necessarily be limited to a description of--
                          (I) any compliance issues, other than 
                        those requiring challenge inspections, 
                        that the United States plans to raise 
                        with the Organization; and
                          (II) any compliance issues raised at 
                        the Organization, within 30 days.
                  (ii) Any Presidential determination that 
                Russia is in noncompliance with the Convention 
                shall be transmitted to the committees 
                specified in clause (i) within 30 days of such 
                a determination, together with a written 
                report, including an unclassified summary, 
                explaining why it is in the national security 
                interests of the United States to continue as a 
                party to the Convention.
          (10) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--
        The Senate declares that after the Senate gives its 
        advice and consent to ratification of the Convention, 
        any agreement or understanding which in any material 
        way modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States and 
        Russian obligations, or those of any country, under the 
        Convention, including the time frame for implementation 
        of the Convention, should be submitted to the Senate 
        for its advice and consent to ratification.
          (11) Riot control agents.--(A) The Senate, 
        recognizing that the Convention's prohibition on the 
        use of riot control agents as a ``method of warfare'' 
        precludes the use of such agents against combatants, 
        including use for humanitarian purposes where 
        combatants and noncombatants intermingled, urges the 
        President--
                  (i) to give high priority to continuing 
                efforts to develop effective nonchemical, 
                nonlethal alternatives to riot control agents 
                for use in situations where combatants and 
                noncombatants are intermingled; and
                  (ii) to ensure that the United States 
                actively participates with other parties to the 
                Convention in any reassessment of the 
                appropriateness of the prohibition as it might 
                apply to such situations as the rescue of 
                downed air crews and passengers and escaping 
                prisoners or in situations in which civilians 
                are being used to mask or screen attacks.
          (B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term ``riot 
        control agents'' is used within the meaning of Article 
        II (4) of the Convention.

            2. Description of the Resolution of Ratification

    Article XXII states that the Articles of the Convention are 
not subject to reservations. The Committee has expressed the 
view that the President's agreement to such a prohibition 
cannot constrain the Senate's constitutional right and 
obligation to give its advice and consent to a treaty subject 
to any reservation it might determine is required by the 
national interest. This principle must apply even if the Senate 
agrees to treaties when no reservations are necessary.
    The Annexes of the Convention are subject to reservations, 
as long as they are not incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention. The Administration has informed the 
Senate that Article XXII represents a compromise between 
countries that wanted no reservations and the United States, 
which wanted to preserve the rights of the executive and 
legislative branches to make reservations. This compromise 
reflects the position of most countries that the basic 
requirements of the Convention, which are found in the 
Articles, should not be subject to reservations. The Annexes, 
however, contain detailed implementation measures which may not 
be suitable or necessary for all countries. Reservations to the 
Annexes, therefore, should be allowed, unless they contradict 
the object and purpose of the Convention.
    Although the Senate may accede to the President's request 
not to make its advice and consent to this Convention subject 
to a reservation, the Senate is still in a position to give its 
declarations or provisions as it might deem necessary, short of 
a reservation that would be deemed a change in specific U.S. 
obligations.
    The first condition of the substitute resolution of 
ratification responds to paragraph 3 of Article XV of the 
Convention. It states that ``3. Amendments shall enter into 
force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit of the 
instruments of ratification or acceptance by all the States 
parties referred to under subparagraph (b) below: (a) When 
adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive vote of a 
majority of all States Parties with no State Party casting a 
negative vote; and (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States 
parties casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.''
    Pursuant to this provision, if the United States were to 
abstain, or simply not to vote, when a matter was decided in 
the Amendment Conference, it could be possible for an amendment 
to be adopted without being submitted to the Senate for advice 
and consent--or, indeed, over the objection of the Senate. By 
contrast, a U.S. vote in favor of an amendment would make U.S. 
ratification a precondition to entry into force--and a U.S. 
vote against an amendment would defeat the proposal before any 
States Parties could ratify it.
    The Executive Branch provided the Senate with the following 
assurance:

          On this point, it should be stressed that the United 
        States will be present at all Amendment Conferences and 
        will cast its vote, either positive or negative, on all 
        proposed amendments made at such conferences, thus 
        ensuring the opportunity for the Senate to consider any 
        amendment approved by the Amendment Conference.

    The Executive Branch's assurance is intended to remove any 
concern regarding the constitutional role of the Senate. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations would make the Senate's consent 
to ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention conditioned 
upon a binding obligation upon the President to abide by this 
commitment.
    Condition 2. In the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) of September 23, 1989, the Soviet Union and the United 
States agreed to ``conduct a bilateral verification experiment 
and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical 
weapons.'' This agreement was to be carried out in two phases. 
In Phase I, the sides agreed to ``exchange general data on 
their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of 
visits to relevant facilities.'' In Phase II, the sides agreed 
to ``exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspections to 
verify the accuracy of those data.'' The overall intent of the 
Wyoming MOU was ``to facilitate the process of negotiation, 
signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively 
verifiable and truly global convention on the prohibition and 
destruction of chemical weapons.''
    Pursuant to the Wyoming MOU, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed on June 1, 1990, an ``Agreement on 
Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on 
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning 
Chemical Weapons'' (known as the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement or BDA).
    When the Wyoming MOU and the BDA were signed, there was 
still a Soviet Union. There was little expectation that a 
Chemical Weapons Convention could be negotiated in the near 
term. Today, there is no Soviet Union but there is a Chemical 
Weapons Convention. To the extent, however, that Russia impedes 
the implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement or submits questionable data 
declarations, her good faith must be questioned.
    Data Declarations under the Wyoming MOU. Phase I of the 
Wyoming MOU appears to have been carried out as planned. The 
Phase II data exchange, which should have occurred in the 
spring of 1992, did not take place until fully 2 years later, 
pursuant to implementing procedures that were agreed in Moscow 
on January 14, 1994. A review of the Russia's Wyoming MOU Phase 
I and Phase II data declarations suggests significant 
shortcomings in those declarations. Those shortcomings account 
for the Committee's concern over Russia's failure to comply 
fully with the data declaration provisions of the Wyoming MOU 
and its implementing procedures.
    Moreover, the failure to implement all the on-site 
inspections originally agreed to in the Wyoming MOU is another 
cause of concern. The inspections under Phase II of the MOU are 
no longer likely to make a significant contribution to 
compliance monitoring or verification. Rather, as pared down in 
1993 and in the final implementing procedures, they will 
continue the confidence-building process and help the two sides 
prepare for later inspections under the Bilateral Destruction 
Agreement and/or the Chemical Weapons Convention. But the 
Russian refusal to permit a full suite of technical inspection 
equipment, even after most inspections and all challenge 
inspections or nondeclared sites were eliminated, suggests the 
Russians may have something to hide.
    The Committee believes that the President must make full 
Russian implementation of the Wyoming MOU and the Bilateral 
Destruction Agreement an issue of high priority in U.S.- 
Russian relations and must raise the matter personally at the 
highest levels. Therefore, the committee has added a condition 
to the resolution of ratification of the CWC requiring the 
President, 10 days after the CWC enters into force or 10 days 
after the Russian Federation deposits instruments of 
ratification of the CWC, whichever is later, either (A) to 
certify to the Senate that the Russian Federation has complied 
satisfactorily with the data declaration requirements of the 
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding; or (B) to submit to the 
Senate a report on apparent discrepancies in the Russian 
Federation's Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding data and the 
results of any bilateral discussions regarding those 
discrepancies.
    Condition 3. The Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA) of 
1990 calls for the immediate cessation of CW production, for 
the destruction by December 31, 2002, of all U.S. and Russian 
chemical weapons except for up to 5,000 metric tons, and, if 
the CWC should enter into force, for destruction of all but 500 
metric tons within 8 years of that date--reflecting the U.S. 
negotiating position as of 1990. The BDA also mandates annual 
updates to the 1989 Wyoming MOU data exchange.
    At the time the BDA was signed, there was no exception that 
in just over 2 years the Chemical Weapons Convention would be 
initialed. The BDA was intended to set a good example for the 
rest of the world, to move the CWC negotiations along, and to 
mesh with a CWC that had not yet been completed. To deal with a 
future CWC, the Parties adopted Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of 
the BDA that reads:

          After the multilateral convention enters into force, 
        the provisions of the multilateral convention shall 
        take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement 
        (the BDA) in cases of compatible obligations therein. 
        Otherwise, the provisions of the (BDA) Agreement shall 
        supplement the provisions of the multilateral 
        convention in its operation between the Parties. After 
        the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to 
        this (BDA) Agreement shall consult with each other in 
        order to resolve any questions concerning the 
        relationship of this (BDA) Agreement to the 
        multilateral convention.

    However, Russia has yet to agree to a date for further 
bilateral negotiations on BDA implementation. Given the passage 
of more than 3 years since Russia and the United States reached 
agreement ad referendum on BDA implementation, and given the 
fact that the BDA mandates extensive on-site inspection by U.S. 
personnel, there is a real risk that the BDA will never enter 
into force, notwithstanding Russia's economic incentive to 
accept bilateral verification.
    In the absence of agreement on BDA implementation, 
verification of Russian compliance would likely be based upon a 
smaller number of inspections than originally anticipated, that 
the inspections of Russian sites would be conducted by the OPCW 
inspectorate rather than by U.S. personnel, and there would be 
no guaranteed U.S. access to the detailed inspection data. On 
the other hand, the OPCW is unlikely to exempt Russia from the 
requirements set forth in the CWC's provisions.
    OPCW budget planning has proceeded on the assumption that 
the United States and the Russian Federation would handle the 
bulk of the monitoring of each other's CWC facilities. If the 
BDA should not come into force by the time the CWC comes into 
force, then the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW might not be 
able to field enough international inspectors to handle this 
significant task. At minimum, OPCW planning assumptions may 
need to be revised so that the organization can prepare for the 
possible need to monitor U.S. and Russian CW facilities.
    Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC, barring the deposit of 
the instruments of ratification until the President certifies 
to Congress either (A) that the U.S.-Russian agreement on 
implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement has been 
or will shortly be achieved, and that the agreed verification 
procedures will meet or exceed those mandated by the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; or (B) that the Technical Secretariat of 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will 
be prepared, when the Convention enters into force, to submit a 
plan for meeting the organization's full monitoring 
responsibilities that will include U.S. and Russian facilities 
as well as those of other States Parties.
    Condition 4. The enforcement of arms control agreements 
serves two basic functions: it is essential to the correction 
of violations, be they inadvertent or intentional; and it can 
serve to deter potential violators, by establishing a real 
penalty for noncompliance. The penalty for noncompliance may be 
tangible or largely political--i.e., public exposure of the 
violator. But without some penalty, deterrence is minimal and 
enforcement can at best correct those violations that the 
international community happens to discover. Without the will 
to enforce an agreement in the face of violations, moreover, an 
agreement can gradually or precipitously lose its force.
    The basic enforcement powers of the OPCW are set forth in 
Article XII of the Convention. But collective measures in 
defense of the CWC will likely require both firm OPCW 
leadership and strong support from the major powers. 
Specifically, it is hard to imagine any such collective 
measures being adopted unless the United States asserts itself 
to build the necessary consensus for such action.
    The Committee believes that the deterrent effect of the CWC 
is extremely difficult to predict. Countries that are uncertain 
about the value of chemical weapons may well be both reassured 
by wide ratification of the CWC and loath to risk discovery of 
a CW posture that they see as providing only marginal gain. 
Given the nature and secrecy of many of the states of greatest 
concern, however, the CWC may not deter those most committed to 
having an offensive CW capability, although it will likely be 
more effective in deterring the actual use of chemical weapons.
    The Committee also believes that a strong U.S. commitment 
to the enforcement of the CWC will be essential to the 
effectiveness of the Convention. It may, in fact, be possible 
to achieve a measure of both enforcement and deterrence, but 
only if the United States is prepared to make compliance with 
the CWC a major element of its foreign policy stance toward 
each State Party to the Convention.
    Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC that establishes the 
framework by which the President may seek to bring a 
noncompliant Party into compliance and, failing that, the 
President's actions with respect to determining whether 
continued adherence to the CWC remains in the national security 
interests of the United States.
    Condition 5. There is inevitably a tension between the 
desire to maintain the best possible monitoring and 
verification capabilities and the need to limit expenditures 
and enforce budget discipline on international organizations to 
which the United States contributes. The OPCW has not been 
immune to this cost-benefit dilemma. Questions have been raised 
regarding the OPCW budget, and these are legitimate in light of 
the U.S. agreement to cover 25% of that budget.
    By the same token, the Executive Branch believes that there 
are major economic incentives for the Russians to implement the 
Bilateral Destruction Agreement, since the United States would 
contribute funds for CW destruction under that agreement. 
Indeed, various Russian officials have argued that the rest of 
the world should share in the cost of Russian CW destruction, 
as they will share in the security benefits which flow from 
such destruction.
    The United States has agreed to provide assistance to the 
Russian chemical weapons destruction program, including the 
provision of a U.S. contractor to aid in the development of a 
comprehensive destruction plan and the equipping of a central 
analytical laboratory for monitoring to ensure safe destruction 
activities. Moreover, the Russian government has asked that 
additional support focus on efforts to develop one or two 
nerve-agent destruction facilities.
    Notwithstanding such limited U.S. assistance and the 
Committee view that the BDA may never enter into force, despite 
Russia's economic incentive to accept bilateral verification, 
the Committee believes that in order to ensure Russian 
commitment to destruction of its chemical stockpiles, Russia 
must maintain a substantial stake in financing the 
implementation of the CWC and share a substantial portion--if 
not all--of the burden of Russian implementation of the CWC. 
Therefore, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC that the deposit of the 
instruments of ratification of the CWC shall not be contingent 
upon the United States providing financial guarantees to pay 
for implementation of commitments by Russia and other States 
Parties under the Convention.
    Condition 6. This instructs the President that if the CWC 
does not come into force or it comes into force with the U.S. 
having ratified the Treaty but Russia having taken no action, 
and the President plans to implement U.S. chemical reductions 
anyway, he must consult with the Senate. He can take no action 
to reduce the U.S. stockpile at a pace faster than currently 
planned and consistent with the CWC until he submits to the 
Senate his determination that such reductions are in the 
national security interests of the United States. This 
provision allows the Administration to meet its CW destruction 
obligation in full consultation with the Senate.
    Condition 7. The United States will rely upon a combination 
of capabilities--including imagery, signals intelligence, human 
intelligence, open-source information, and the verification 
provisions of the CWC. Monitoring the CWC will be a difficult 
task and the Intelligence Community has poor confidence in its 
ability to monitor the most stressing aspects of the CWC for 
three primary reasons:
          the large number of sites worldwide involved in 
        chemical production subject to the Convention;
          most of the products and production facilities 
        subject to the agreement are dual-use, with legitimate 
        commercial applications; and
          most activity prohibited by the CWC is easily 
        concluded or disguised.
    Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community has testified that 
the CWC is a net plus in its efforts to assess and warn of 
potential chemical warfare threats to the United States and 
that the accumulation of data provided by the OPCW over the 
years will assist in its monitoring tasks.
    The Committee shares the view with the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency that the verification provisions of the CWC, 
in combination with national intelligence means are 
insufficient to detect, with a high degree of confidence, all 
activities prohibited under the Convention. Nonetheless, the 
larger and more systematic the violations, the higher the 
possibility that, over time, evidence of these would surface. 
The existence of a program with the scope and size of the 
former Soviet Union's would be difficult to completely conceal 
under the Convention. Thus, the Committee does not believe that 
a single-all-encompassing judgment can be made regarding the 
verifiability of the CWC or U.S. capability to monitor 
compliance with the Convention. In some areas, our confidence 
will be significantly higher than others. However, the 
Committee accepts the Intelligence Community's pessimistic 
assessment of U.S. capability to detect and identify a 
sophisticated and determined violation of the Convention, 
especially on a small scale.
    For that reason, the Committee has added a condition to the 
resolution of ratification of the CWC requiring the president, 
within 90 days of depositing the instruments of ratification, 
to certify that a combination of U.S. National Technical Means 
and the verification provisions of the Convention itself are 
sufficient to ensure effective verification of compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty. That certification shall be 
accompanied by a report indicating how U.S. National Technical 
Means, including collection, processing. and analytical 
resources, will be marshaled in combination with the 
Convention's verification provisions.
    Declaration 1 is an affirmation of Condition 1 of the INF 
Treaty Resolution of Ratification.
    Declaration 2 is a statement of the intention of the Senate 
to continue to reduce the Armed Forces or armaments of the 
United States in a manner pursuant to the Constitution.
    Declaration 3 states the U.S. Senate's policy to respond to 
chemical weapons use on U.S. troops or civilians with an 
overwhelming and devastating response, which may include the 
whole range of available weaponry.
    Declaration 4 states the Senate's view that the U.S. must 
continue to field a robust, adequately funded chemical defense 
program, combined with improved national intelligence 
capabilities. The Senate states the United States should 
continue to develop missile theater defense.
    Declaration 5 urges the President to seek sanctions 
bilaterally or in appropriate international fora if a state 
party does not abide by the Convention.
    Declaration 6 states the Senate's expectation that the U.S. 
will exercise its right to reject a proposed inspector or 
inspection assistant when there is an indication that the 
person is seeking information the inspection team is not 
entitled or to mishandle information that the team obtains.
    Declaration 7 states that if the U.S. provides assistance 
to Russia for chemical weapon destruction the U.S. should, in 
exchange for such assistance, require Russia to destroy stocks 
at a proportional rate to U.S. destruction, and before the CWC 
deadline. The Senate also urges the U.S. to require inspections 
of former Russian military facilities that have been converted 
to commercial production, given the possibility that these 
plants could be reconverted, and U.S. assistance should be 
apportioned to Russia's openness to these broad-based 
inspections.
    Declaration 8 states that if the President at any time 
while the CWC is in force determines the supreme national 
interests of the United States are in jeopardy due to an 
expansion of the chemical weapons arsenals of any country not 
party to the CWC, the President should consult with the Senate 
to determine whether adherence to the CWC remains in the 
national security interests of the United States.
    Declaration 9 states that the CWC is in the interest of the 
United States only if both the United States and Russia, among 
others, are in strict compliance. The Senate expects Russia, 
among others, to be in strict compliance with the CWC. The 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are 
to be offered regular briefings on compliance issues including: 
challenge inspections, compliance issues raised at the OPCW 
within 30 days, and any Presidential determination that Russia 
is in noncompliance.
    Declaration 10 states that any agreement or understanding 
to the CWC which modifies, amends, or reinterprets U.S., 
Russian, or any other state's obligations should be submitted 
to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
    Declaration 11 urges the President to give high priority to 
continuing efforts to develop effective non-chemical, non-
lethal alternatives to riot control agents. The Senate urges 
the President to ensure that the United States actively 
participates with other Parties to the Convention in any 
reassessment of the appropriateness of the prohibition as it 
might apply to such situation as the rescue of downed air crews 
and passengers and escaping prisoners or in situations in which 
civilians are being used to mask or screen attacks.

 VII. Article-by-Article Analysis of the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
                        and on Their Destruction

                        table of contents

                                                                   Page
Preamble.........................................................    36

                             Articles

   I. General Obligations............................................37
  II. Definitions and Criteria.......................................37
 III. Declarations...................................................39
  IV. Chemical Weapons...............................................41
   V. Chemical Weapons Production Facilities.........................43
  VI. Activities not Prohibited Under this Convention................46
 VII. National Implementation Measures...............................47
VIII. The Organization...............................................48
  IX. Consultations, Cooperation and Fact-Finding....................56
   X. Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Weapons.............60
  XI. Economic and Technological Development.........................62
 XII. Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, 
      including Sanctions............................................62
XIII. Relation to Other International Agreements.....................63
 XIV. Settlement of Disputes.........................................63
  XV. Amendments.....................................................64
 XVI. Duration and Withdrawal........................................65
XVII. Status of the Annexes..........................................66
XVIII.Signature......................................................66

 XIX. Ratification...................................................66
  XX. Accession......................................................66
 XXI. Entry into Force...............................................66
XXII. Reservations...................................................66
XXIII.Depositary.....................................................66

XXIV.  Authenic Texts................................................67

                        Annex on chemicals

A. Guidelines for schedules of chemicals:
    Guidelines for Schedule 1....................................    67
    Guidelines for Schedule 2....................................    67
    Guidelines for Schedule 3....................................    67
B. Schedules of chemicals:
    Guidelines for Schedule 1....................................    68
    Guidelines for Schedule 2....................................    69
    Guidelines for Schedule 3....................................    69

     Annex on implementation and verification (``verification 
                             annex'')

Part I: Definitions..............................................    70
Part II: General rules of verification:
     A. Designation of inspectors and inspection assistants......    73
     B. Privileges and immunities................................    74
     C. Standing arrangements:
        Points of entry..........................................    76
        Arrangements for use of non-scheduled aircraft...........    77
        Administrative arrangements..............................    78
        Approved equipment.......................................    78
    D. Pre-inspection activities:
        Notification.............................................    79
        Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
          Host State and transfer to the inspection site.........    79
        Pre-inspection briefing..................................    80
    E. Conduct of inspections:
        General rules............................................    80
        Safety...................................................    80
        Communications...........................................    81
        Inspection team and inspected State Party rights.........    81
        Collection, handling and analysis of samples.............    82
        Extension of inspection duration.........................    83
        Debriefing...............................................    83
    F. Departure.................................................    83
    G. Reports...................................................    83
    H. Application of general provisions.........................    84
Part III: General provisions for verification measures pursuant 
  to articles IV, V and VI, paragraph 3:
    A. Initial inspections and facility agreements...............    84
    B. Standing arrangements.....................................    85
    C. Pre-inspection activities.................................    86
Part IV (A): Destruction of chemical weapons and its verification 
  pursuant to article IV:
    A. Declarations:
        Chemical Weapons.........................................    86
        Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to Article III, 
          paragraph 1 (a) (iii)..................................    88
        Declarations of past transfers and receipts..............    88
        Submission of the general plan for destruction of 
          chemical weapons.......................................    88
    B. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage 
      facility preparation.......................................    89
    C. Destruction:
        Principles and methods for destruction of chemical 
          weapons................................................    89
        Order of destruction.....................................    89
        Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines.......    91
        Extension of the deadline for completion of destruction..    92
        Detailed annual plans for destruction....................    92
        Annual reports on destruction............................    94
    D. Verification:
        Verification of declarations of chemical weapons through 
          on-site inspection.....................................    94
        Systematic verification of storage facilities............    94
        Inspection and visits....................................    95
        Systematic verification of the destruction of chemical 
          weapons................................................    96
        Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons 
          destruction facilities.................................    98
        Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical 
          weapons destruction facilities.........................    98
Part IV (B): Old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons:
    A. General...................................................    99
    B. Regime for old chemical weapons...........................    99
    C. Regime for abandoned chemical weapons.....................   100
Part V: Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities and 
  its verification pursuant to article V:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities...   102
        Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities 
          pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(c) (iii)..........   103
        Declarations of past transfers and receipts..............   104
        Submission of general plans for destruction..............   104
        Submission of annual plans for destruction and annual 
          reports on destruction.................................   104
    B. Destruction:
        General principles for destruction of chemical weapons 
          production facilities..................................   105
        Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons 
          production facility....................................   105
        Technical maintenance of chemical weapons production 
          facilities prior to their destruction..................   106
        Principles and methods for temporary conversion of 
          chemical weapons production facilities into chemical 
          weapons destruction facilities.........................   106
        Principles and methods related to destruction of a 
          chemical weapons production facility...................   107
        Order of destruction.....................................   107
        Detailed plans for destruction...........................   108
        Review of detailed plans.................................   109
    C. Verification:
        Verification of declarations of chemical weapons 
          production facilities through on-site inspection.......   110
        Systematic verification of chemical weapons production 
          facilities and cessation of their activities...........   111
        Verification of destruction of chemical weapons 
          production facilities..................................   112
        Verification of temporary conversion of a chemical 
          weapons production facility into a chemical weapons 
          destruction facility...................................   112
    D. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to 
      purposes not prohibited under this convention:
        Procedures for requesting conversion.....................   113
        Actions pending a decision...............................   114
        Conditions for conversion................................   115
        Decision by the Executive Council and the Conference.....   115
        Detailed plans for conversion............................   116
        Review of detailed plans.................................   116
Part VI: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 1 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. General provisions........................................   118
    B. Transfers.................................................   118
    C. Production:
        General principles for production........................   118
        Single small-scale facility..............................   119
        Other facilities.........................................   119
    D. Declarations:
        Single small-scale facility..............................   119
        Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11.....   120
    E. Verification:
        Single small-scale facility..............................   121
        Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11.....   122
Part VII: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 2 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of aggregate national data..................   123
        Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or 
          consuming Schedule 2 Chemicals.........................   123
        Declarations on past production of Schedule 2 chemicals 
          for chemical weapons purposes..........................   125
        Information to States Parties............................   125
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   125
        Inspection aims..........................................   126
        Initial inspections......................................   126
        Inspections..............................................   126
        Inspection procedures....................................   127
        Notification of inspection...............................   128
    C. Transfers to States not party to this convention..........   128
Part VIII: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for schedule 3 chemicals and 
  facilities related to such chemicals:
    A. Declarations:
        Declarations of aggregate national data..................   128
        Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 
          chemicals..............................................   129
        Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chemicals 
          for chemical weapons purposes..........................   130
        Information to States Parties............................   130
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   130
        Inspection aims..........................................   131
        Inspection procedures....................................   131
        Notification of inspection...............................   132
    C. Transfers to States not party to this convention:.........   132
Part IX: Activities not prohibited under this convention in 
  accordance with article VI: Regime for other chemical 
  production facilities:
    A. Declarations:
        List of other chemical production facilities.............   132
         Information to States Parties...........................   132
        Assistance by the Technical Secretariat..................   133
    B. Verification:
        General..................................................   134
        Inspection aims..........................................   134
        Inspection procedures....................................   134
        Notification of inspection...............................   135
    C. Implementation and review of section B:
        Implementation...........................................   135
        Review...................................................   135
Part X: Challenge inspections pursuant to article IX:
    A. Designation and selection of inspectors and inspection 
      assistants.................................................   136
    B. Pre-inspection activities:
        Notification.............................................   136
        Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
          the Host State.........................................   137
        Alternative determination of final perimeter.............   138
        Verification of location.................................   139
        Securing the site, exit monitoring.......................   139
        Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan..............   140
        Perimeter activities.....................................   141
    C. Conduct of inspections:
        General rules............................................   141
        Managed access...........................................   142
        Observer.................................................   143
        Duration of inspection...................................   144
    D. Post-inspection activities:
        Departure................................................   144
        Reports..................................................   144
Part XI: Investigation in cases of alleged use of chemical 
  weapons:
    A. General...................................................   145
    B. Pre-inspection activities:
        Request for an investigation.............................   145
        Notification.............................................   145
        Assignment of inspection team............................   146
        Dispatch of inspection team..............................   146
        Briefings................................................   146
    C. Conduct of inspections:
        Access...................................................   146
        Sampling.................................................   147
        Extension of inspection site.............................   147
        Extension of inspection duration.........................   147
        Interviews...............................................   147
    D. Reports:
        Procedures...............................................   148
        Contents.................................................   148
    E. States not party to this convention.......................   148

       Annex on the protection of confidential information

A. General principles for the handling of confidential 
  information....................................................   148
B. Employment and conduct of personnel in the technical 
  secretariat....................................................   150
C. Measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent 
  disclosure of confidential data in the course of on-site 
  verification activities........................................   151
D. Procedures in case of breaches or alleged breaches of 
  confidentiality................................................   152

          Other documents associated with the convention

Resolution establishing the preparatory commission for the 
  organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons...........   152
Text on the establishment of a preparatory commission:
    Annex 1: Privileges, immunities and practical arrangements in 
      connection with the hosting of the Preparatory Commission..   157
    Annex 2: Privileges, immunities, and practical arrangements 
      to be laid down in the Headquarters Agreement..............   157
    Annex 3: Information submitted and commitments undertaken by 
      the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague...............
        Privileges and Immunities................................   158
        Building and Equipment...................................   159
        Laboratory/training......................................   160
        Social Security..........................................   161
        Employment...............................................   161
        General conditions relating to the Netherlands bid.......   161

                                Preamble

    The States Parties to this Convention,
    Determined to act with a view to achieving effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control, including the prohibition 
and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,
    Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
    Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles 
and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use 
in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 
1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925),
    Recognizing that this Convention reaffirms principles and 
objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol 
of 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed 
at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,
    Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,
    Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude 
completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, 
through the implementation of the provisions of this 
Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under 
the Geneva Protocol of 1925,
    Recognizing the prohibition, embodied in the pertinent 
agreements and relevant principles of international law, of the 
use of herbicides as a method of warfare,
    Considering that achievements in the field of chemistry 
should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,
    Desiring to promote free trade in chemicals as well as 
international cooperation and exchange of scientific and 
technical information in the field of chemical activities for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention in order to 
enhance the economic and technological development of all 
States Parties,
    Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of 
the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, 
retention, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their 
destruction, represent a necessary step towards the achievement 
of these common objectives,
    Have agreed as follows:

                               Article I

                          general obligations

    1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never 
under any circumstances:
          (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile 
        or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or 
        indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;
          (b) To use chemical weapons;
          (c) To engage in any military preparations to use 
        chemical weapons;
          (d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, 
        anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
        Party under this Convention.
    2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons 
it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under 
its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions 
of this Convention.
    3. Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical 
weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, 
in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
    4. Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical 
weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
    5. Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control 
agents as a method of warfare.

                               Article II

                        definitions and criteria

    For the purposes of this Convention:
    1. ``Chemical Weapons'' means the following, together or 
separately:
          (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except 
        where intended for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention, as long as the types and quantities are 
        consistent with such purposes;
          (b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to 
        cause death or other harm through the toxic properties 
        of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), 
        which would be released as a result of the employment 
        of such munitions and devices;
          (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use 
        directly in connection with the employment of munitions 
        and devices specified in subparagraph (b).
    2. ``Toxic Chemical'' means: Any chemical which through its 
chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This 
includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of 
their method of production, and regardless of whether they are 
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.
    (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, toxic 
chemicals which have been identified for the application of 
verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the 
Annex on Chemicals.)
    3. ``Precursor'' means: Any chemical reactant which takes 
part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a 
toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or 
multicomponent chemical system.
    (For the purpose of implementing this Convention, 
precursors which have been identified for the application of 
verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the 
Annex on Chemicals.)
    4. ``Key Component of Binary or Multicomponent Chemical 
Systems'' (hereinafter referred to as ``key component'') means: 
The precursor which plays the most important role in 
determining the toxic properties of the final product and 
reacts rapidly with other chemicals in the binary or 
multicomponent system.
    5. ``Old Chemical Weapons'' means:
          (a) Chemical weapons which were produced before 1925; 
        or
          (b) Chemical weapons produced in the period between 
        1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent 
        that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.
    6. ``Abandoned Chemical Weapons'' means: Chemical weapons, 
including old chemical weapons, abandoned by a State after 1 
January 1925 on the territory of another State without the 
consent of the latter.
    7. ``Riot Control Agent'' means: Any chemical not listed in 
a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory 
irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within 
a short time following termination of exposure.
    8. ``Chemical Weapons Production Facility'':
          (a) Means any equipment, as well as any building 
        housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed 
        or used at any time since 1 January 1946:
                  (i) As part of the stage in the production of 
                chemicals (``final technological stage'') where 
                the material flows would contain, when the 
                equipment is in operation:
                          (1) Any chemical listed in Schedule 1 
                        in the Annex on Chemicals; or
                          (2) Any other chemical that has no 
                        use, above 1 tonne per year on the 
                        territory of a State Party or in any 
                        other place under the jurisdiction or 
                        control of a State Party, for purposes 
                        not prohibited under this Convention, 
                        but can be used for chemical weapons 
                        purposes; or
                  (ii) For filling chemical weapons, including, 
                inter alia, the filling of chemicals listed in 
                Schedule 1 into munitions, devices or bulk 
                storage containers; the filling of chemicals 
                into containers that form part of assembled 
                binary munitions and devices or into chemical 
                submunitions that form part of assembled 
                unitary munitions and devices, and the loading 
                of the containers and chemical submunitions 
                into the respective munitions and devices;
          (b) Does not mean:
                  (i) Any facility having a production capacity 
                for synthesis of chemicals specified in 
                subparagraph (a) (i) that is less than 1 tonne;
                  (ii) Any facility in which a chemical 
                specified in subparagraph (a) (i) is or was 
                produced as an unavoidable by-product of 
                activities for purposes not prohibited under 
                this Convention, provided that the chemical 
                does not exceed 3 per cent of the total product 
                and that the facility is subject to declaration 
                and inspection under the Annex on 
                Implementation and Verification (hereinafter 
                referred to as ``Verification Annex''); or
                  (iii) The single small-scale facility for 
                production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 
                for purposes not prohibited under this 
                Convention as referred to in Part VI of the 
                Verification Annex.
    9. ``Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention'' means:
          (a) Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
          (b) Protective purposes, namely those purposes 
        directly related to protection against toxic chemicals 
        and to protection against chemical weapons;
          (c) Military purposes not connected with the use of 
        chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the 
        toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;
          (d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control 
        purposes.
    10. ``Production Capacity'' means: The annual quantitative 
potential for manufacturing a specific chemical based on the 
technological process actually used or, if the process is not 
yet operational, planned to be used at the relevant facility. 
It shall be deemed to be equal to the nameplate capacity or, if 
the nameplate capacity is not available, to the design 
capacity. The nameplate capacity is the product output under 
conditions optimized for maximum quantity for the production 
facility, as demonstrated by one or more test-runs. The design 
capacity is the corresponding theoretically calculated product 
output.
    11. ``Organization'' means the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons established pursuant to Article 
VIII of this Convention.
    12. For the purposes of Article VI:
          (a) ``Production'' of a chemical means its formation 
        through chemical reaction;
          (b) ``Processing'' of a chemical means a physical 
        process, such as formulation, extraction and 
        purification, in which a chemical is not converted into 
        another chemical;
          (c) ``Consumption'' of a chemical means its 
        conversion into another chemical via a chemical 
        reaction.

                              Article III

                              DECLARATIONS

    1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, the following declarations, in which it shall:
          (a) With respect to chemical weapons:
                  (i) Declare whether it owns or possesses any 
                chemical weapons, or whether there are any 
                chemical weapons located in any place under its 
                jurisdiction or control;
                  (ii) Specify the precise location, aggregate 
                quantity and detailed inventory of chemical 
                weapons it owns or possesses, or that are 
                located in any place under its jurisdiction or 
                control, in accordance with Part IV (A), 
                paragraphs 1 to 3, of the Verification Annex, 
                except for those chemical weapons referred to 
                in sub-subparagraph (iii);
                  (iii) Report any chemical weapons on its 
                territory that are owned and possessed by 
                another State and located in any place under 
                the jurisdiction or control of another State, 
                in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 4, of 
                the Verification Annex;
                  (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or 
                received, directly or indirectly, any chemical 
                weapons since 1 January 1946 and specify the 
                transfer or receipt of such weapons, in 
                accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 5, of 
                the Verification Annex;
                  (v) Provide its general plan for destruction 
                of chemical weapons that it owns or possesses, 
                or that are located in any place under its 
                jurisdiction or control, in accordance with 
                Part IV (A), paragraph 6, of the Verification 
                Annex;
    (b) With respect to old chemical weapons and abandoned 
chemical weapons:
          (i) Declare whether it has on its territory old 
        chemical weapons and provide all available information 
        in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 3, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (ii) Declare whether there are abandoned chemical 
        weapons on its territory and provide all available 
        information in accordance with Part IV (B), paragraph 
        8, of the Verification Annex;
          (iii) Declare whether it has abandoned chemical 
        weapons on the territory of other States and provide 
        all available information in accordance with Part IV 
        (B), paragraph 10, of the Verification Annex;
    (c) With respect to chemical weapons production facilities:
          (i) Declare whether it has or has had any chemical 
        weapons production facility under its ownership or 
        possession, or that is or has been located in any place 
        under its jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 
        January 1946;
          (ii) Specify any chemical weapons production facility 
        it has or has had under its ownership or possession or 
        that is or has been located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control at any time since 1 January 
        1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 1, of the 
        Verification Annex, except for those facilities 
        referred to in sub-subparagraph (iii);
          (iii) Report any chemical weapons production facility 
        on its territory that another State has or has had 
        under its ownership and possession and that is or has 
        been located in any place under the jurisdiction or 
        control of another State at any time since 1 January 
        1946, in accordance with Part V, paragraph 2, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (iv) Declare whether it has transferred or received, 
        directly or indirectly, any equipment for the 
        production of chemical weapons since 1 January 1946 and 
        specify the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in 
        accordance with Part V, paragraphs 3 to 5, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (v) Provide its general plan for destruction of any 
        chemical weapons production facility it owns or 
        possesses, or that is located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 6, of the Verification Annex;
          (vi) Specify actions to be taken for closure of any 
        chemical weapons production facility it owns or 
        possesses, or that is located in any place under its 
        jurisdiction or control, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 1 (i), of the Verification Annex;
          (vii) Provide its general plan for any temporary 
        conversion of any chemical weapons production facility 
        it owns or possesses, or that is located in any place 
        under its jurisdiction or control, into a chemical 
        weapons destruction facility, in accordance with Part 
        V, paragraph 7, of the Verification Annex;
    (d) With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise 
location, nature and general scope of activities of any 
facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, and 
that has been designed, constructed or used since 1 January 
1946 primarily for development of chemical weapons. Such 
declaration shall include, inter alia, laboratories and test 
and evaluation sites;
    (e) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the 
chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts 
Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it 
holds for riot control purposes. This declaration shall be 
updated not later than 30 days after any change becomes 
effective.
    2. The provisions of this Article and the relevant 
provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at 
the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons 
buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain 
buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

                               Article IV

                            CHEMICAL WEAPONS

    1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed 
procedures for its implementation shall apply to all chemical 
weapons owned or possessed by a State Party, or that are 
located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, except 
old chemical weapons and abandoned chemical weapons to which 
Part IV (B) of the Verification Annex applies.
    2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this 
Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.
    3. All locations at which chemical weapons specified in 
paragraph 1 are stored or destroyed shall be subject to 
systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with Part IV 
(A) of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall, immediately after the 
declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (a), has been 
submitted, provide access to chemical weapons specified in 
paragraph 1 for the purpose of systematic verification of the 
declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State 
Party shall not remove any of these chemical weapons, except to 
a chemical weapons destruction facility. It shall provide 
access to such chemical weapons, for the purpose of systematic 
on-site verification.
    5. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical 
weapons destruction facilities and their storage areas, that it 
owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control, for the purpose of systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    6. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons 
specified in paragraph 1 pursuant to the Verification Annex and 
in accordance with the agreed rate and sequence of destruction 
(hereinafter referred to as ``order of destruction''). Such 
destruction shall begin not later than two years after this 
Convention enters into force for it and shall finish not later 
than 10 years after entry into force of this Convention. A 
State Party is not precluded from destroying such chemical 
weapons at a faster rate.
    7. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Submit detailed plans for the destruction of 
        chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 not later 
        than 60 days before each annual destruction period 
        begins, in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 29, 
        of the Verification Annex; the detailed plans shall 
        encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next 
        annual destruction period;
          (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the 
        implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical 
        weapons specified in paragraph 1, not later than 60 
        days after the end of each annual destruction period; 
        and
          (c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the 
        destruction process has been completed, that all 
        chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 have been 
        destroyed.
    8. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after 
the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 6, it 
shall destroy chemical weapons specified in paragraph 1 as soon 
as possible. The order of destruction and procedures for 
stringent verification for such a State Party shall be 
determined by the Executive Council.
    9. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after 
the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, 
secured and destroyed in accordance with Part IV (A) of the 
Verification Annex.
    10. Each State Party, during transportation, sampling, 
storage and destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the 
highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to 
protecting the environment. Each State Party shall transport, 
sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in accordance with 
its national standards for safety and emissions.
    11. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical 
weapons that are owned or possessed by another State, or that 
are located in any place under the jurisdiction or control of 
another State, shall make the fullest efforts to ensure that 
these chemical weapons are removed from its territory not later 
than one year after this Convention enters into force for it. 
If they are not removed within one year, the State Party may 
request the Organization and other States Parties to provide 
assistance in the destruction of these chemical weapons.
    12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with other 
States Parties that request information or assistance on a 
bilateral basis or through the Technical Secretariat regarding 
methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction 
of chemical weapons.
    13. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to 
this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex, the 
Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
verification of chemical weapons storage and their destruction 
among States Parties.
    To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit 
verification to measures complementary to those undertaken 
pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it 
considers that:
          (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are 
        consistent with the verification provisions of this 
        Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification Annex;
          (b) Implementation of such an agreement provides for 
        sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant 
        provisions of this Convention; and
          (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral 
        agreement keep the Organization fully informed about 
        their verification activities.
    14. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to 
paragraph 13, the Organization shall have the right to monitor 
the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
    15. Nothing in paragraphs 13 and 14 shall affect the 
obligation of a State Party to provide declarations pursuant to 
Article III, this Article and Part IV (A) of the Verification 
Annex.
    16. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of 
chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet 
the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these 
chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides 
otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit 
verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 
13, the costs of complementary verification and monitoring by 
the Organization shall be paid in accordance with the United 
Nations scale of assessment, as specified in Article VIII, 
paragraph 7.
    17. The provisions of this Article and the relevant 
provisions of Part IV of the Verification Annex shall not, at 
the discretion of a State Party, apply to chemical weapons 
buried on its territory before 1 January 1977 and which remain 
buried, or which had been dumped at sea before 1 January 1985.

                               Article V

                 CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

    1. The provisions of this Article and the detailed 
procedures for its implementation shall apply to any and all 
chemical weapons production facilities owned or possessed by a 
State Party, or that are located in any place under its 
jurisdiction or control.
    2. Detailed procedures for the implementation of this 
Article are set forth in the Verification Annex.
    3. All chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
paragraph 1 shall be subject to systematic verification through 
on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in 
accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall cease immediately all activity at 
chemical weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 
1, except activity required for closure.
    5. No State Party shall construct any new chemical weapons 
production facilities or modify any existing facilities for the 
purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other 
activity prohibited under this Convention.
    6. Each State Party shall, immediately after the 
declaration under Article III, paragraph 1 (c), has been 
submitted, provide access to chemical weapons production 
facilities specified in paragraph 1, for the purpose of 
systematic verification of the declaration through on-site 
inspection.
    7. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Close, not later than 90 days after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, all chemical 
        weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, 
        in accordance with Part V of the Verification Annex, 
        and give notice thereof; and
          (b) Provide access to chemical weapons production 
        facilities specified in paragraph 1, subsequent to 
        closure, for the purpose of systematic verification 
        through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site 
        instruments in order to ensure that the facility 
        remains closed and is subsequently destroyed.
    8. Each State Party shall destroy all chemical weapons 
production facilities specified in paragraph 1 and related 
facilities and equipment, pursuant to the Verification Annex 
and in accordance with an agreed rate and sequence of 
destruction (hereinafter referred to as ``order of 
destruction''). Such destruction shall begin not later than one 
year after this Convention enters into force for it, and shall 
finish not later than 10 years after entry into force of this 
Convention. A State Party is not precluded from destroying such 
facilities at a faster rate.
    9. Each State Party shall:
          (a) Submit detailed plans for destruction of chemical 
        weapons production facilities specified in paragraph 1, 
        not later than 180 days before the destruction of each 
        facility begins;
          (b) Submit declarations annually regarding the 
        implementation of its plans for the destruction of all 
        chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
        paragraph 1, not later than 90 days after the end of 
        each annual destruction period; and
          (c) Certify, not later than 30 days after the 
        destruction process has been completed, that all 
        chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
        paragraph 1 have been destroyed.
    10. If a State ratifies or accedes to this Convention after 
the 10-year period for destruction set forth in paragraph 8, it 
shall destroy chemical weapons production facilities specified 
in paragraph 1 as soon as possible. The order of destruction 
and procedures for stringent verification for such a State 
Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.
    11. Each State Party, during the destruction of chemical 
weapons production facilities, shall assign the highest 
priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment. Each State Party shall destroy chemical weapons 
production facilities in accordance with its national standards 
for safety and emissions.
    12. Chemical weapons production facilities specified in 
paragraph 1 may be temporarily converted for destruction of 
chemical weapons in accordance with Part V, paragraphs 18 to 
25, of the Verification Annex. Such a converted facility must 
be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction 
of chemical weapons but, in any case, not later than 10 years 
after entry into force of this Convention.
    13. A State Party may request, in exceptional cases of 
compelling need, permission to use a chemical weapons 
production facility specified in paragraph 1 for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention. Upon the recommendation of 
the Executive Council, the Conference of the States Parties 
shall decide whether or not to approve the request and shall 
establish the conditions upon which approval is contingent in 
accordance with Part V, Section D, of the Verification Annex.
    14. The chemical weapons production facility shall be 
converted in such a manner that the converted facility is not 
more capable of being reconverted into a chemical weapons 
production facility than any other facility used for 
industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
other peaceful purposes not involving chemicals listed in 
Schedule 1.
    15. All converted facilities shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments in accordance with Part V, Section D, of the 
Verification Annex.
    16. In carrying out verification activities pursuant to 
this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex, the 
Organization shall consider measures to avoid unnecessary 
duplication of bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
verification of chemical weapons production facilities and 
their destruction among States Parties.
    To this end, the Executive Council shall decide to limit 
the verification to measures complementary to those undertaken 
pursuant to such a bilateral or multilateral agreement, if it 
considers that:
          (a) Verification provisions of such an agreement are 
        consistent with the verification provisions of this 
        Article and Part V of the Verification Annex;
          (b) Implementation of the agreement provides for 
        sufficient assurance of compliance with the relevant 
        provisions of this Convention; and
          (c) Parties to the bilateral or multilateral 
        agreement keep the Organization fully informed about 
        their verification activities.
    17. If the Executive Council takes a decision pursuant to 
paragraph 16, the Organization shall have the right to monitor 
the implementation of the bilateral or multilateral agreement.
    18. Nothing in paragraphs 16 and 17 shall affect the 
obligation of a State Party to make declarations pursuant to 
Article III, this Article and Part V of the Verification Annex.
    19. Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of 
chemical weapons production facilities it is obliged to 
destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification under 
this Article unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If 
the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of 
the Organization pursuant to paragraph 16, the costs of 
complementary verification and monitoring by the Organization 
shall be paid in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessment, as specified in Article VIII, paragraph 7.

                              Articles VI

            ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION

    1. Each State Party has the right, subject to the 
provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise 
acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their 
precursors for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
    2. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to 
ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only 
developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, 
or used within its territory or in any other place under its 
jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. To this end, and in order to verify that activities 
are in accordance with obligations under this Convention, each 
State Party shall subject toxic chemicals and their precursors 
listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex on Chemicals, 
facilities related to such chemicals, and other facilities as 
specified in the Verification Annex, that are located on its 
territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or 
control, to verification measures as provided in the 
Verification Annex.
    3. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 1 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 1 
chemicals'') to the prohibitions on production, acquisition, 
retention, transfer and use as specified in Part VI of the 
Verification Annex. It shall subject Schedule 1 chemicals and 
facilities specified in Part VI of the Verification Annex to 
systematic verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with that 
Part of the Verification Annex.
    4. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 2 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 2 
chemicals'') and facilities specified in Part VII of the 
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification 
in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
    5. Each State Party shall subject chemicals listed in 
Schedule 3 (hereinafter referred to as ``Schedule 3 
chemicals'') and facilities specified in Part VIII of the 
Verification Annex to data monitoring and on-site verification 
in accordance with that Part of the Verification Annex.
    6. Each State Party shall subject facilities specified in 
Part IX of the Verification Annex to data monitoring and 
eventual on-site verification in accordance with that Part of 
the Verification Annex unless decided otherwise by the 
Conference of the States Parties pursuant to Part IX, paragraph 
22, of the Verification Annex.
    7. Not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
force for it, each State Party shall make an initial 
declaration on relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance 
with the Verification Annex.
    8. Each State Party shall make annual declarations 
regarding the relevant chemicals and facilities in accordance 
with the Verification Annex.
    9. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State 
Party shall grant to the inspectors access to facilities as 
required in the Verification Annex.
    10. In conducting verification activities, the Technical 
Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's 
chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention and, in particular, abide by the provisions set 
forth in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential 
Information (hereinafter referred to as ``Confidentiality 
Annex'').
    11. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in 
a manner which avoids hampering the economic or technological 
development of States Parties, and international cooperation in 
the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited 
under this Convention including the international exchange of 
scientific and technical information and chemicals and 
equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals 
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

                              Article VII

                    NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

General undertakings

    1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to 
implement its obligations under this Convention. In particular, 
it shall:
          (a) Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on 
        its territory or in any other place under its 
        jurisdiction as recognized by international law from 
        undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party 
        under this Convention, including enacting penal 
        legislation with respect to such activity;
          (b) Not permit in any place under its control any 
        activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
        Convention; and
          (c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under 
        subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State 
        Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by 
        natural persons, possessing its nationality, in 
        conformity with international law.
    2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States 
Parties and afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to 
facilitate the implementation of the obligations under 
paragraph 1.
    3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its 
obligations under this Convention, shall assign the highest 
priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other 
States Parties in this regard.

Relations between the State party and the organization

    4. In order to fulfil its obligations under this 
Convention, each State Party shall designate or establish a 
National Authority to serve as the national focal point for 
effective liaison with the Organization and other States 
Parties. Each State Party shall notify the Organization of its 
National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into 
force for it.
    5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the 
legislative and administrative measures taken to implement this 
Convention.
    6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford 
special handling to information and data that it receives in 
confidence from the Organization in connection with the 
implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such 
information and data exclusively in connection with its rights 
and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with 
the provisions set forth in the Confidentiality Annex.
    7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the 
Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in 
particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.

                              Article VIII

                            the organization

A. General provisions

    1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to 
achieve the object and purpose of this Convention, to ensure 
the implementation of its provisions, including those for 
international verification of compliance with it, and to 
provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States 
Parties.
    2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members 
of the Organization. A State Party shall not be deprived of its 
membership in the Organization.
    3. The seat of the Headquarters of the Organization shall 
be The Hague, Kingdom of the Netherlands.
    4. There are hereby established as the organs of the 
Organization: the Conference of the States Parties, the 
Executive Council, and the Technical Secretariat.
    5. The Organization shall conduct its verification 
activities provided for under this Convention in the least 
intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and 
efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request 
only the information and data necessary to fulfil its 
responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every 
precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on 
civil and military activities and facilities coming to its 
knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in 
particular, shall abide by the provisions set forth in the 
Confidentiality Annex.
    6. In undertaking its verification activities the 
Organization shall consider measures to make use of advances in 
science and technology.
    7. The costs of the Organization's activities shall be paid 
by States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale 
of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in 
membership between the United Nations and this Organization, 
and subject to the provisions of Articles IV and V. Financial 
contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission 
shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their 
contributions to the regular budget. The budget of the 
Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating 
to administrative and other costs, and one relating to 
verification costs.
    8. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the 
payment of its financial contribution to the Organization shall 
have no vote in the Organization if the amount of its arrears 
equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it 
for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States 
Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it 
is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions 
beyond the control of the member.

B. The Conference of the States Parties

            Composition, procedures and decision-making
    9. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter 
referred to as ``the Conference'') shall be composed of all 
members of this Organization. Each member shall have one 
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by 
alternates and advisers.
    10. The first session of the Conference shall be convened 
by the depositary not later than 30 days after the entry into 
force of this Convention.
    11. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which 
shall be held annually unless it decides otherwise.
    12. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
          (a) When decided by the Conference;
          (b) When requested by the Executive Council;
          (c) When requested by any member and supported by one 
        third of the members; or
          (d) In accordance with paragraph 22 to undertake 
        reviews of the operation of this Convention.
    Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session 
shall be convened not later than 30 days after receipt of the 
request by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, 
unless specified otherwise in the request.
    13. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an 
Amendment Conference in accordance with Article XV, paragraph 
2.
    14. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat 
of the Organization unless the Conference decides otherwise.
    15. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At 
the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its 
Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall 
hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected 
at the next regular session.
    16. A majority of the members of the Organization shall 
constitute a quorum for the Conference.
    17. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in 
the Conference.
    18. The Conference shall take decisions on questions of 
procedure by a simple majority of the members present and 
voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as 
far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable 
when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairman shall defer 
any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall 
make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and 
shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. 
If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the 
Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of 
members present and voting unless specified otherwise in this 
Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a 
matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference 
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
            Powers and functions
    19. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the 
Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or 
issues within the scope of this Convention, including those 
relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council 
and the Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and 
take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related to 
this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its 
attention by the Executive Council.
    20. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of this 
Convention, and act in order to promote its object and purpose. 
The Conference shall review compliance with this Convention. It 
shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and 
the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in 
accordance with this Convention to either of them in the 
exercise of their functions.
    21. The Conference shall:
          (a) Consider and adopt at its regular sessions the 
        report, programme and budget of the Organization, 
        submitted by the Executive Council, as well as consider 
        other reports;
          (b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to 
        be paid by States Parties in accordance with paragraph 
        7;
          (c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;
          (d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical 
        Secretariat (hereinafter referred to as ``the Director-
        General'');
          (e) Approve the rules of procedure of the Executive 
        Council submitted by the latter;
          (f) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds 
        necessary for the exercise of its functions in 
        accordance with this Convention;
          (g) Foster international cooperation for peaceful 
        purposes in the field of chemical activities;
          (h) Review scientific and technological developments 
        that could affect the operation of this Convention and, 
        in this context, direct the Director-General to 
        establish a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in 
        the performance of his functions, to render specialized 
        advice in areas of science and technology relevant to 
        this Convention, to the Conference, the Executive 
        Council or States Parties. The Scientific Advisory 
        Board shall be composed of independent experts 
        appointed in accordance with terms of reference adopted 
        by the Conference;
          (i) Consider and approve at its first session any 
        draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed 
        by the Preparatory Commission;
          (j) Establish at its first session the voluntary fund 
        for assistance in accordance with Article X;
          (k) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance 
        with this Convention and to redress and remedy any 
        situation which contravenes the provisions of this 
        Convention, in accordance with Article XII.
    22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the 
expiry of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into 
force of this Convention, and at such other times within that 
time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions 
to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such 
reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and 
technological developments. At intervals of five years 
thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of 
the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.

C. The Executive Council

            Composition, procedure and decision-making
    23. The Executive Council shall consist of 41 members. Each 
State Party shall have the right, in accordance with the 
principle of rotation, to serve on the Executive Council. The 
members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the 
Conference for a term of two years. In order to ensure the 
effective functioning of this Convention, due regard being 
specially paid to equitable geographical distribution, to the 
importance of chemical industry, as well as to political and 
security interests, the Executive Council shall be composed as 
follows:
          (a) Nine States Parties from Africa to be designated 
        by States Parties located in this region. As a basis 
        for this designation it is understood that, out of 
        these nine States Parties, three members shall, as a 
        rule, be the States Parties with the most significant 
        national chemical industry in the region as determined 
        by internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating 
        these three members;
          (b) Nine States Parties from Asia to be designated by 
        States Parties located in this region. As a basis for 
        this designation it is understood that, out of these 
        nine States Parties, four members shall, as a rule, be 
        the States Parties with the most significant national 
        chemical industry in the region as determined by 
        internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating 
        these four members;
          (c) Five States Parties from Eastern Europe to be 
        designated by States Parties located in this region. As 
        a basis for this designation it is understood that, out 
        of these five States Parties, one member shall, as a 
        rule, be the State Party with the most significant 
        national chemical industry in the region as determined 
        by internationally reported and published data; in 
        addition, the regional group shall agree also to take 
        into account other regional factors in designating this 
        one member;
          (d) Seven States Parties from Latin America and the 
        Caribbean to be designated by States Parties located in 
        this region. As a basis for this designation it is 
        understood that, out of these seven States Parties, 
        three members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties 
        with the most significant national chemical industry in 
        the region as determined by internationally reported 
        and published data; in addition, the regional group 
        shall agree also to take into account other regional 
        factors in designating these three members;
          (e) Ten States Parties from among Western European 
        and other States to be designated by States Parties 
        located in this region. As a basis for this designation 
        it is understood that, out of these 10 States Parties, 
        5 members shall, as a rule, be the States Parties with 
        the most significant national chemical industry in the 
        region as determined by internationally reported and 
        published data; in addition, the regional group shall 
        agree also to take into account other regional factors 
        in designating these five members;
          (f) One further State Party to be designated 
        consecutively by States Parties located in the regions 
        of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. As a basis 
        for this designation it is understood that this State 
        Party shall be a rotating member from these regions.
    24. For the first election of the Executive Council 20 
members shall be elected for a term of one year, due regard 
being paid to the established numerical proportions as 
described in paragraph 23.
    25. After the full implementation of Articles IV and V the 
Conference may, upon the request of a majority of the members 
of the Executive Council, review the composition of the 
Executive Council taking into account developments related to 
the principles specified in paragraph 23 that are governing its 
composition.
    26. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of 
procedure and submit them to the Conference for approval.
    27. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from 
among its members.
    28. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. 
Between regular sessions it shall meet as often as may be 
required for the fulfillment of its powers and functions.
    29. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one 
vote. Unless otherwise specified in this Convention, the 
Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of substance 
by a two-thirds majority of all its members. The Executive 
Council shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a 
simple majority of all its members. When the issue arises as to 
whether the question is one of substance or not, that question 
shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise 
decided by the Executive Council by the majority required for 
decisions on matters of substance.
            Powers and functions
    30. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of 
the Organization. It shall be responsible to the Conference. 
The Executive Council shall carry out the powers and functions 
entrusted to it under this Convention, as well as those 
functions delegated to it by the Conference. In so doing, it 
shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and 
guidelines of the Conference and assure their proper and 
continuous implementation.
    31. The Executive Council shall promote the effective 
implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention. It 
shall supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat, 
cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party and 
facilitate consultations and cooperation among States Parties 
at their request.
    32. The Executive Council shall:
          (a) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft 
        programme and budget of the Organization;
          (b) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft 
        report of the Organization on the implementation of 
        this Convention, the report on the performance of its 
        own activities and such special reports as it deems 
        necessary or which the Conference may request;
          (c) Make arrangements for the sessions of the 
        Conference including the preparation of the draft 
        agenda.
    33. The Executive Council may request the convening of a 
special session of the Conference.
    34. The Executive Council shall:
          (a) Conclude agreements or arrangements with States 
        and international organizations on behalf of the 
        Organization, subject to prior approval by the 
        Conference;
          (b) Conclude agreements with States Parties on behalf 
        of the Organization in connection with Article X and 
        supervise the voluntary fund referred to in Article X;
          (c) Approve agreements or arrangements relating to 
        the implementation of verification activities, 
        negotiated by the Technical Secretariat with States 
        Parties.
    35. The Executive Council shall consider any issue or 
matter within its competence affecting this Convention and its 
implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and 
cases of non-compliance, and, as appropriate, inform States 
Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the 
Conference.
    36. In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding 
compliance and cases of non-compliance, including, inter alia, 
abuse of the rights provided for under this Convention, the 
Executive Council shall consult with the States Parties 
involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take 
measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To 
the extent that the Executive Council considers further action 
to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the 
following measures:
          (a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter;
          (b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the 
        Conference;
          (c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding 
        measures to redress the situation and to ensure 
        compliance.
    The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity 
and urgency, bring the issue or matter, including relevant 
information and conclusions, directly to the attention of the 
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security 
Council. It shall at the same time inform all States Parties of 
this step.

D. The Technical Secretariat

    37. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference 
and the Executive Council in the performance of their 
functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the 
verification measures provided for in this Convention. It shall 
carry out the other functions entrusted to it under this 
Convention as well as those functions delegated to it by the 
Conference and the Executive Council.
    38. The Technical Secretariat shall:
          (a) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the 
        draft programme and budget of the Organization;
          (b) Prepare and submit to the Executive Council the 
        draft report of the Organization on the implementation 
        of this Convention and such other reports as the 
        Conference or the Executive Council may request;
          (c) Provide administrative and technical support to 
        the Conference, the Executive Council and subsidiary 
        organs;
          (d) Address and receive communications on behalf of 
        the Organization to and from States Parties on matters 
        pertaining to the implementation of this Convention;
          (e) Provide technical assistance and technical 
        evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of 
        the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation 
        of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals.
    39. The Technical Secretariat shall:
          (a) Negotiate agreements or arrangements relating to 
        the implementation of verification activities with 
        States Parties, subject to approval by the Executive 
        Council;
          (b) Not later than 180 days after entry into force of 
        this Convention, coordinate the establishment and 
        maintenance of permanent stockpiles of emergency and 
        humanitarian assistance by States Parties in accordance 
        with Article X, paragraphs 7 (b) and (c). The Technical 
        Secretariat may inspect the items maintained for 
        serviceability. Lists of items to be stockpiled shall 
        be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant 
        to paragraph 21 (i) above;
          (c) Administer the voluntary fund referred to in 
        Article X, compile declarations made by the States 
        Parties and register, when requested, bilateral 
        agreements concluded between States Parties or between 
        a State Party and the Organization for the purposes of 
        Article X.
    40. The Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive 
Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the 
discharge of its functions, including doubts, ambiguities or 
uncertainties about compliance with this Convention that have 
come to its notice in the performance of its verification 
activities and that it has been unable to resolve or clarify 
through its consultations with the State Party concerned.
    41. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-
General, who shall be its head and chief administrative 
officer, inspectors and such scientific, technical and other 
personnel as may be required.
    42. The Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical 
Secretariat and shall act under the supervision of the 
Director-General.
    43. The Director-General shall be appointed by the 
Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for 
a term of four years, renewable for one further term, but not 
thereafter.
    44. The Director-General shall be responsible to the 
Conference and the Executive Council for the appointment of the 
staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical 
Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of 
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service 
shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States 
Parties shall serve as the Director-General, as inspectors or 
as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due 
regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff 
on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall 
be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a 
minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the 
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
    45. The Director-General shall be responsible for the 
organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board 
referred to in paragraph 21 (h). The Director-General shall, in 
consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the 
Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual 
capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the 
basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields 
relevant to the implementation of this Convention. The 
Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with 
members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of 
scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific 
issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists 
of experts to the Director-General.
    46. In the performance of their duties, the Director-
General, the inspectors and the other members of the staff 
shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or 
from any other source external to the Organization. They shall 
refrain from any action that might reflect on their positions 
as international officers responsible only to the Conference 
and the Executive Council.
    47. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively 
international character of the responsibilities of the 
Director-General, the inspectors and the other members of the 
staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their 
responsibilities.

E. Privileges and Immunities

    48. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in 
any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a State 
Party such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as 
are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
    49. Delegates of States Parties, together with their 
alternates and advisers, representatives appointed to the 
Executive Council together with their alternates and advisers, 
the Director-General and the staff of the Organization shall 
enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the 
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the 
Organization.
    50. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred 
to in this Article shall be defined in agreements between the 
Organization and the States Parties as well as in an agreement 
between the Organization and the State in which the 
headquarters of the Organization is seated. These agreements 
shall be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
paragraph 21 (i).
    51. Notwithstanding paragraphs 48 and 49, the privileges 
and immunities enjoyed by the Director-General and the staff of 
the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification 
activities shall be those set forth in Part II, Section B, of 
the Verification Annex.

                               ARTICLE IX

              CONSULTATIONS, COOPERATION AND FACT-FINDING

    1. States Parties shall consult and cooperate, directly 
among themselves, or through the Organization or other 
appropriate international procedures, including procedures 
within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance 
with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to 
the object and purpose, or the implementation of the 
provisions, of this Convention.
    2. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to 
request a challenge inspection, States Parties should, whenever 
possible, first make every effort to clarify and resolve, 
through exchange of information and consultations among 
themselves, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance 
with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a 
related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A State Party 
which receives a request from another State Party for 
clarification of any matter which the requesting State Party 
believes causes such a doubt or concern shall provide the 
requesting State Party as soon as possible, but in any case not 
later than 10 days after the request, with information 
sufficient to answer the doubt or concern raised along with an 
explanation of how the information provided resolves the 
matter. Nothing in this Convention shall affect the right of 
any two or more States Parties to arrange by mutual consent for 
inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify 
and resolve any matter which may cause doubt about compliance 
or gives rise to a concern about a related matter which may be 
considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any State Party under other 
provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

    3. A State Party shall have the right to request the 
Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which 
may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to a concern 
about the possible non-compliance of another State Party with 
this Convention. The Executive Council shall provide 
appropriate information in its possession relevant to such a 
concern.
    4. A State Party shall have the right to request the 
Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State 
Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or 
which gives rise to a concern about its possible non-compliance 
with this Convention. In such a case, the following shall 
apply:
          (a) The Executive Council shall forward the request 
        for clarification to the State Party concerned through 
        the Director-General not later than 24 hours after its 
        receipt;
          (b) The requested State Party shall provide the 
        clarification to the Executive Council as soon as 
        possible, but in any case not later than 10 days after 
        the receipt of the request;
          (c) The Executive Council shall take note of the 
        clarification and forward it to the requesting State 
        Party not later than 24 hours after its receipt;
          (d) If the requesting State Party deems the 
        clarification to be inadequate, it shall have the right 
        to request the Executive Council to obtain from the 
        requested State Party further clarification;
          (e) For the purpose of obtaining further 
        clarification requested under subparagraph (d), the 
        Executive Council may call on the Director-General to 
        establish a group of experts from the Technical 
        Secretariat, or if appropriate staff are not available 
        in the Technical Secretariat, from elsewhere, to 
        examine all available information and data relevant to 
        the situation causing the concern. The group of experts 
        shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council 
        on its findings;
          (f) If the requesting State Party considers the 
        clarification obtained under subparagraphs (d) and (e) 
        to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to 
        request a special session of the Executive Council in 
        which States Parties involved that are not members of 
        the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. 
        In such a special session, the Executive Council shall 
        consider the matter and may recommend any measure it 
        deems appropriate to resolve the situation.
    5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the 
Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been 
considered ambiguous or has given rise to a concern about its 
possible non-compliance with this Convention. The Executive 
Council shall respond by providing such assistance as 
appropriate.
    6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties 
about any request for clarification provided in this Article.
    7. If the doubt or concern of a State Party about a 
possible non-compliance has not been resolved within 60 days 
after the submission of the request for clarification to the 
Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent 
consideration, notwithstanding its right to request a challenge 
inspection, it may request a special session of the Conference 
in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 12 (c). At such a 
special session, the Conference shall consider the matter and 
may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to resolve the 
situation.

Procedures for challenge inspections

    8. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site 
challenge inspection of any facility or location in the 
territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or 
control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of 
clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-
compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have 
this inspection conducted anywhere without delay by an 
inspection team designated by the Director-General and in 
accordance with the Verification Annex.
    9. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the 
inspection request within the scope of this Convention and to 
provide in the inspection request all appropriate information 
on the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible 
non-compliance with this Convention as specified in the 
Verification Annex. Each State Party shall refrain from 
unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. 
The challenge inspection shall be carried out for the sole 
purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-
compliance.
    10. For the purpose of verifying compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention, each State Party shall permit 
the Technical Secretariat to conduct the on-site challenge 
inspection pursuant to paragraph 8.
    11. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a 
facility or location, and in accordance with the procedures 
provided for in the Verification Annex, the inspected State 
Party shall have:
          (a) The right and the obligation to make every 
        reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with 
        this Convention and, to this end, to enable the 
        inspection team to fulfil its mandate;
          (b) The obligation to provide access within the 
        requested site for the sole purpose of establishing 
        facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
        compliance; and
          (c) The right to take measures to protect sensitive 
        installations, and to prevent disclosure of 
        confidential information and data, not related to this 
        Convention.
    12. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
          (a) The requesting State Party may, subject to the 
        agreement of the inspected State Party, send a 
        representative who may be a national either of the 
        requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to 
        observe the conduct of the challenge inspection.
          (b) The inspected State Party shall then grant access 
        to the observer in accordance with the Verification 
        Annex.
          (c) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, 
        accept the proposed observer, but if the inspected 
        State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be 
        recorded in the final report.
    13. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection 
request for an on-site challenge inspection to the Executive 
Council and at the same time to the Director-General for 
immediate processing.
    14. The Director-General shall immediately ascertain that 
the inspection request meets the requirements specified in Part 
X, paragraph 4, of the Verification Annex, and, if necessary, 
assist the requesting State Party in filing the inspection 
request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the 
requirements, preparations for the challenge inspection shall 
begin.
    15. The Director-General shall transmit the inspection 
request to the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry.
    16. After having received the inspection request, the 
Executive Council shall take cognizance of the Director-
General's actions on the request and shall keep the case under 
its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, 
its deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.
    17. The Executive Council may, not later than 12 hours 
after having received the inspection request, decide by a 
three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out 
the challenge inspection, if it considers the inspection 
request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope of 
this Convention as described in paragraph 8. Neither the 
requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in 
such a decision. If the Executive Council decides against the 
challenge inspection, preparations shall be stopped, no further 
action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States 
Parties concerned shall be informed accordingly.
    18. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate 
for the conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection 
mandate shall be the inspection request referred to in 
paragraphs 8 and 9 put into operational terms, and shall 
conform with the inspection request.
    19. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in 
accordance with Part X or, in the case of alleged use, in 
accordance with Part XI of the Verification Annex. The 
inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting 
the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner 
possible, consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of its mission.
    20. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection 
team throughout the challenge inspection and facilitate its 
task. If the inspected State Party proposes, pursuant to Part 
X, Section C, of the Verification Annex, arrangements to 
demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to 
full and comprehensive access, it shall make every reasonable 
effort, through consultations with the inspection team, to 
reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts 
with the aim of demonstrating its compliance.
    21. The final report shall contain the factual findings as 
well as an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and 
nature of access and cooperation granted for the satisfactory 
implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-
General shall promptly transmit the final report of the 
inspection team to the requesting State Party, to the inspected 
State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States 
Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly 
to the Executive Council the assessments of the requesting and 
of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of other 
States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General 
for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties.
    22. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its 
powers and functions, review the final report of the inspection 
team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as 
to:
          (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred;
          (b) Whether the request had been within the scope of 
        this Convention; and
          (c) Whether the right to request a challenge 
        inspection had been abused.
    23. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in 
keeping with its powers and functions, that further action may 
be necessary with regard to paragraph 22, it shall take the 
appropriate measures to redress the situation and to ensure 
compliance with this Convention, including specific 
recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the 
Executive Council shall examine whether the requesting State 
Party should bear any of the financial implications of the 
challenge inspection.
    24. The requesting State Party and the inspected State 
Party shall have the right to participate in the review 
process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties 
and the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the 
process.
    25. If the Executive Council has made specific 
recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall 
consider action in accordance with Article XII.

                               Article X

           assistance and protection against chemical weapons

    1. For the purposes of this Article, ``Assistance'' means 
the coordination and delivery to States Parties of protection 
against chemical weapons, including, inter alia, the following: 
detection equipment and alarm systems; protective equipment; 
decontamination equipment and decontaminants; medical antidotes 
and treatments; and advice on any of these protective measures.
    2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as 
impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research into, 
develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection 
against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited under 
this Convention.
    3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate, and shall 
have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange 
of equipment, material and scientific and technological 
information concerning means of protection against chemical 
weapons.
    4. For the purposes of increasing the transparency of 
national programmes related to protective purposes, each State 
Party shall provide annually to the Technical Secretariat 
information on its programme, in accordance with procedures to 
be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    5. The Technical Secretariat shall establish, not later 
than 180 days after entry into force of this Convention and 
maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data 
bank containing freely available information concerning various 
means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such 
information as may be provided by States Parties.
    The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources 
available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide 
expert advice and assist the State Party in identifying how its 
programmes for the development and improvement of a protective 
capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented.
    6. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as 
impeding the right of States Parties to request and provide 
assistance bilaterally and to conclude individual agreements 
with other States Parties concerning the emergency procurement 
of assistance.
    7. Each State Party undertakes to provide assistance 
through the Organization and to this end to elect to take one 
or more of the following measures:
          (a) To contribute to the voluntary fund for 
        assistance to be established by the Conference at its 
        first session;
          (b) To conclude, if possible not later than 180 days 
        after this Convention enters into force for it, 
        agreements with the Organization concerning the 
        procurement, upon demand, of assistance;
          (c) To declare, not later than 180 days after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, the kind of 
        assistance it might provide in response to an appeal by 
        the Organization. If, however, a State Party 
        subsequently is unable to provide the assistance 
        envisaged in its declaration, it is still under the 
        obligation to provide assistance in accordance with 
        this paragraph.
    8. Each State Party has the right to request and, subject 
to the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11, to 
receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of 
use of chemical weapons if it considers that:
          (a) Chemical weapons have been used against it;
          (b) Riot control agents have been used against it as 
        a method of warfare; or
          (c) It is threatened by actions or activities of any 
        State that are prohibited for States Parties by Article 
        I.
    9. The request, substantiated by relevant information, 
shall be submitted to the Director-General, who shall transmit 
it immediately to the Executive Council and to all States 
Parties. The Director-General shall immediately forward the 
request to States Parties which have volunteered, in accordance 
with paragraphs 7 (b) and (c), to dispatch emergency assistance 
in case of use of chemical weapons or use of riot control 
agents as a method of warfare, or humanitarian assistance in 
case of serious threat of use of chemical weapons or serious 
threat of use of riot control agents as a method of warfare to 
the State Party concerned not later than 12 hours after receipt 
of the request. The Director-General shall initiate, not later 
than 24 hours after receipt of the request, an investigation in 
order to provide foundation for further action. He shall 
complete the investigation within 72 hours and forward a report 
to the Executive Council. If additional time is required for 
completion of the investigation, an interim report shall be 
submitted within the same time-frame. The additional time 
required for investigation shall not exceed 72 hours. It may, 
however, be further extended by similar periods. Reports at the 
end of each additional period shall be submitted to the 
Executive Council. The investigation shall, as appropriate and 
in conformity with the request and the information accompanying 
the request, establish relevant facts related to the request as 
well as the type and scope of supplementary assistance and 
protection needed.
    10. The Executive Council shall meet not later than 24 
hours after receiving an investigation report to consider the 
situation and shall take a decision by simple majority within 
the following 24 hours on whether to instruct the Technical 
Secretariat to provide supplementary assistance. The Technical 
Secretariat shall immediately transmit to all States Parties 
and relevant international organizations the investigation 
report and the decision taken by the Executive Council. When so 
decided by the Executive Council, the Director-General shall 
provide assistance immediately. For this purpose, the Director-
General may cooperate with the requesting State Party, other 
States Parties and relevant international organizations. The 
States Parties shall make the fullest possible efforts to 
provide assistance.
    11. If the information available from the ongoing 
investigation or other reliable sources would give sufficient 
proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and 
immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General shall 
notify all States Parties and shall take emergency measures of 
assistance, using the resources the Conference has placed at 
his disposal for such contingencies. The Director-General shall 
keep the Executive Council informed of actions undertaken 
pursuant to this paragraph.

                               Article XI

                 economic and technological development

    1. The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented 
in a manner which avoids hampering the economic or 
technological development of States Parties, and international 
cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes 
not prohibited under this Convention including the 
international exchange of scientific and technical information 
and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or 
use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.
    2. Subject to the provisions of this Convention and without 
prejudice to the principles and applicable rules of 
international law, the States Parties shall:
          (a) Have the right, individually or collectively, to 
        conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, 
        retain, transfer, and use chemicals;
          (b) Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to 
        participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
        chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical 
        information relating to the development and application 
        of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention;
          (c) Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, 
        including those in any international agreements, 
        incompatible with the obligations undertaken under this 
        Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and 
        the development and promotion of scientific and 
        technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for 
        industrial, agricultural, research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;
          (d) Not use this Convention as grounds for applying 
        any measures other than those provided for, or 
        permitted, under this Convention nor use any other 
        international agreement for pursuing an objective 
        inconsistent with this Convention;
          (e) Undertake to review their existing national 
        regulations in the field of trade in chemicals in order 
        to render them consistent with the object and purpose 
        of this Convention.

                              Article XII

  measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including 
                               sanctions

    1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set 
forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with this 
Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which 
contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering 
action pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take 
into account all information and recommendations on the issues 
submitted by the Executive Council.
    2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the 
Executive Council to take measures to redress a situation 
raising problems with regard to its compliance, and where the 
State Party fails to fulfill the request within the specified 
time, the Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation 
of the Executive Council, restrict or suspend the State Party's 
rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes 
the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this 
Convention.
    3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose 
of this Convention may result from activities prohibited under 
this Convention, in particular by Article I, the Conference may 
recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity 
with international law.
    4. The Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, 
bring the issue, including relevant information and 
conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General 
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.

                              Article XIII

               relation to other international agreements

    Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any 
way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any 
State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 
1925, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed 
at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

                              Article XIV

                         settlement of disputes

    1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or 
the interpretation of this Convention shall be settled in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention and 
in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
    2. When a dispute arises between two or more States 
Parties, or between one or more States Parties and the 
Organization, relating to the interpretation or application of 
this Convention, the parties concerned shall consult together 
with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties' choice, 
including recourse to appropriate organs of this Convention 
and, by mutual consent, referral to the International Court of 
Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court. The States 
Parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed of 
actions being taken.
    3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement 
of a dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including 
offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties to a 
dispute to start the settlement process of their choice and 
recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
    4. The Conference shall consider questions related to 
disputes raised by States Parties or brought to its attention 
by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as it finds 
necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to 
the settlement of these disputes in conformity with Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (f).
    5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately 
empowered, subject to authorization from the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, to request the International Court of 
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question 
arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. 
An agreement between the Organization and the United Nations 
shall be concluded for this purpose in accordance with Article 
VIII, paragraph 34 (a).
    6. This Article is without prejudice to Article IX or to 
the provisions on measures to redress a situation and to ensure 
compliance, including sanctions.

                               Article XV

                               amendments

    1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Convention. Any State Party may also propose changes, as 
specified in paragraph 4, to the Annexes of this Convention. 
Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the procedures in 
paragraphs 2 and 3. Proposals for changes, as specified in 
paragraph 4, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 5.
    2. The text of a proposed amendment shall be submitted to 
the Director-General for circulation to all States Parties and 
to the Depositary. The proposed amendment shall be considered 
only by an Amendment Conference. Such an Amendment Conference 
shall be convened if one third or more of the States Parties 
notify the Director-General not later than 30 days after its 
circulation that they support further consideration of the 
proposal. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately 
following a regular session of the Conference unless the 
requesting States Parties ask for an earlier meeting. In no 
case shall an Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days 
after the circulation of the proposed amendment.
    3. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 
30 days after deposit of the instruments of ratification or 
acceptance by all the States Parties referred to under 
subparagraph (b) below:
          (a) When adopted by the Amendment Conference by a 
        positive vote of a majority of all States Parties with 
        no State Party casting a negative vote; and
          (b) Ratified or accepted by all those States Parties 
        casting a positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
    4. In order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness 
of this Convention, provisions in the Annexes shall be subject 
to changes in accordance with paragraph 5, if proposed changes 
are related only to matters of an administrative or technical 
nature. All changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in 
accordance with paragraph 5. Sections A and C of the 
Confidentiality Annex, Part X of the Verification Annex, and 
those definitions in Part I of the Verification Annex which 
relate exclusively to challenge inspections, shall not be 
subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 5.
    5. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 4 shall be 
made in accordance with the following procedures:
          (a) The text of the proposed changes shall be 
        transmitted together with the necessary information to 
        the Director-General. Additional information for the 
        evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State 
        Party and the Director-General. The Director-General 
        shall promptly communicate any such proposals and 
        information to all States Parties, the Executive 
        Council and the Depositary;
          (b) Not later than 60 days after its receipt, the 
        Director-General shall evaluate the proposal to 
        determine all its possible consequences for the 
        provisions of this Convention and its implementation 
        and shall communicate any such information to all 
        States Parties and the Executive Council;
          (c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal 
        in the light of all information available to it, 
        including whether the proposal fulfils the requirements 
        of paragraph 4. Not later than 90 days after its 
        receipt, the Executive Council shall notify its 
        recommendation, with appropriate explanations, to all 
        States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall 
        acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
          (d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States 
        Parties that the proposal be adopted, it shall be 
        considered approved if no State Party objects to it 
        within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If 
        the Executive Council recommends that the proposal be 
        rejected, it shall be considered rejected if no State 
        Party objects to the rejection within 90 days after 
        receipt of the recommendation;
          (e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does 
        not meet with the acceptance required under 
        subparagraph (d), a decision on the proposal, including 
        whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 4, 
        shall be taken as a matter of substance by the 
        Conference at its next session;
          (f) The Director-General shall notify all States 
        Parties and the Depositary of any decision under this 
        paragraph;
          (g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter 
        into force for all States Parties 180 days after the 
        date of notification by the Director-General of their 
        approval unless another time period is recommended by 
        the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.

                              Article XVI

                        duration and withdrawal

    1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
    2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention if 
it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-
matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal 90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the 
Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations 
Security Council. Such notice shall include a statement of the 
extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its 
supreme interests.
    3. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention 
shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue 
fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of 
international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

                              Article XVII

                         status of the annexes

    The Annexes form an integral part of this Convention. Any 
reference to this Convention includes the Annexes.

                             Article XVIII

                               signature

    This Convention shall be open for signature for all States 
before its entry into force.

                              Article XIX

                              ratification

    This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States 
Signatories according to their respective constitutional 
processes.

                               Article XX

                               accession

    Any State which does not sign this Convention before its 
entry into force may accede to it at any time thereafter.

                              Article XXI

                            entry into force

    1. This Convention shall enter into force 180 days after 
the date of the deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, 
but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for 
signature.
    2. For States whose instruments of ratification or 
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of 
this Convention, it shall enter into force on the 30th day 
following the date of deposit of their instrument of 
ratification or accession.

                              Article XXII

                              reservations

    The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to 
reservations. The Annexes of this Convention shall not be 
subject to reservations incompatible with its object and 
purpose.

                             Article XXIII

                               depositary

    The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby 
designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall, 
inter alia:
          (a) Promptly inform all signatory and acceding States 
        of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
        each instrument of ratification or accession and the 
        date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of 
        the receipt of other notices;
          (b) Transmit duly certified copies of this Convention 
        to the Governments of all signatory and acceding 
        States; and
          (c) Register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 
        of the Charter of the United Nations.

                              Article XXIV

                            authentic texts

    This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall 
be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
    In Witness Whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized 
to that effect, have signed this Convention.
    Done at Paris on the thirteenth day of January, one 
thousand nine hundred and ninety-three.

                           ANNEX ON CHEMICALS

                A. GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULES ON CHEMICALS

Guidelines for schedule 1

    1. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor should be 
included in Schedule 1:
          (a) It has been developed, produced, stockpiled or 
        used as a chemical weapon as defined in Article II;
          (b) It poses otherwise a high risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention by virtue of its high 
        potential for use in activities prohibited under this 
        Convention because one or more of the following 
        conditions are met:
                  (i) It possesses a chemical structure closely 
                related to that of other toxic chemicals listed 
                in Schedule 1, and has, or can be expected to 
                have, comparable properties;
                  (ii) It possesses such lethal or 
                incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
                properties that would enable it to be used as a 
                chemical weapon;
                  (iii) It may be used as a precursor in the 
                final single technological stage of production 
                of a toxic chemical listed in Schedule 1, 
                regardless of whether this stage takes place in 
                facilities, in munitions or elsewhere;
          (c) It has little or no use for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention.

Guidelines for schedule 2

    2. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical not listed in Schedule 1 
or a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical or to a chemical listed 
in Schedule 2, part A, should be included in Schedule 2:
          (a) It poses a significant risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention because it possesses such 
        lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
        properties that could enable it to be used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (b) It may be used as a precursor in one of the 
        chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of a 
        chemical listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2, part A;
          (c) It poses a significant risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention by virtue of its importance 
        in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1 or 
        Schedule 2, part A;
          (d) It is not produced in large commercial quantities 
        for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

Guidelines for schedule 3

    3. The following criteria shall be taken into account in 
considering whether a toxic chemical or precursor, not listed 
in other Schedules, should be included in Schedule 3:
          (a) It has been produced, stockpiled or used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (b) It poses otherwise a risk to the object and 
        purpose of this Convention because it possesses such 
        lethal or incapacitating toxicity as well as other 
        properties that might enable it to be used as a 
        chemical weapon;
          (c) It poses a risk to the object and purpose of this 
        Convention by virtue of its importance in the 
        production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 
        1 or Schedule 2, part B;
          (d) It may be produced in large commercial quantities 
        for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.

                       B. SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

    The following Schedules list toxic chemicals and their 
precursors. For the purpose of implementing this Convention, 
these Schedules identify chemicals for the application of 
verification measures according to the provisions of the 
Verification Annex. Pursuant to Article II, subparagraph 1 (a), 
these Schedules do not constitute a definition of chemical 
weapons.
    (Whenever reference is made to groups of dialkylated 
chemicals, followed by a list of alkyl groups in parentheses, 
all chemicals possible by all possible combinations of alkyl 
groups listed in the parentheses are considered as listed in 
the respective Schedule as long as they are not explicitly 
exempted. A chemical marked ``*'' on Schedule 2, part A, is 
subject to special thresholds for declaration and verification, 
as specified in Part VII of the Verification Annex.)

                               Schedule 1

                                                   (CAS registry number)
A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) O-Alkyl (<C><INF>10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates:
        e.g. Sarin: O-Isopropyl 
          methylphosphonofluoridate.....................      (107-44-8)
        Soman: O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate....       (96-64-0)
    (2) O-Alkyl (>C<INF>10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphoramidocyanidates:
        e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl 
          phosphoramidocyanidate........................       (77-81-6)
    (3) O-Alkyl (H or >C<INF>10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and 
      corresponding alkylated or protonated salts:
        e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl 
          methyl phosphonothiolate......................    (50782-69-9)
    (4) Sulfur mustards:
        2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide................     (2625-76-5)
        Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide..........      (505-60-2)
        Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane...................    (63869-13-6)
        Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane.     (3563-36-8)
        1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane............    (63905-10-2)
        1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane.............   (142868-93-7)
        1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane............   (142868-94-8)
        Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether...............    (63918-90-1)
         O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether....    (63918-89-8)
    (5) Lewisites:
        Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine.........      (541-25-3)
         Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine.....    (40334-69-8)
         Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine..........    (40334-70-1)
    (6) Nitrogen mustards:
        HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine...............      (538-07-8)
        HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine..............       (51-75-2)
        HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine...................      (555-77-1)
    (7) Saxitoxin.......................................    (35523-89-8)
    (8) Ricin...........................................     (9009-86-3)
B. Precursors:
    (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphonyldifluorides:
        e.g. DF: Methylphosphonyldifluoride.............      (676-99-3)
    (10) O-Alkyl (H or >C<INF>10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-
      dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl 
      (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and 
      corresponding alkylated or protonated salts:
        e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl 
          methylphosphonite.............................    (57856-11-8)
    (11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl 
      methylphosphonochloridate.........................     (1445-76-7)
    (12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl 
      methylphosphonochloridate.........................     (7040-57-5)

                               Schedule 2

A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] 
      phosphorothiolate and corresponding alkylated or 
      protonated salts..................................       (78-53-5)
    (2)PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-
      1-propene.........................................      (382-21-8)
    (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (*)...............     (6581-06-2)
B. Precursors:
    (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in Schedule 
      1, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded 
      one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group 
      but not further carbon atoms:
        e.g. Methylphosphonyl dichloride................      (676-97-1)
        Dimethyl methylphosphonate......................      (756-79-6)
        Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl 
          ethylphosphonothiolothionate..................      (944-22-9)
    (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) 
      phosphoramidic dihalides:
    (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, 
      Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates:
    (7) Arsenic trichloride.............................     (7784-34-1)
    (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid...............       (76-93-7)
    (9) Quinuclidine-3-ol...............................     (1619-34-7)
    (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-
      2-chlorides and corresponding protonated salts:
    (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-
      2-ols and corresponding protonated salts:
        Exemptions: N,N-Dimethylaminoethanol and 
          corresponding protonated salts................      (108-01-0)
        N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and corresponding 
          protonated salts..............................      (100-37-8)
    (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-
      2-thiols and corresponding protonated salts:
    (13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulfide.......      (111-48-8)
    (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-Dimethylbutane-2-ol.....      (464-07-3)

                               Schedule 3

A. Toxic chemicals:
    (1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride...................       (75-44-5)
    (2) Cyanogen chloride...............................      (506-77-4)
    (3) Hydrogen cyanide................................       (74-90-8)
    (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane.............       (76-06-2)
B. Precursors:
    (5) Phosphorus oxychloride..........................    (10025-87-3)
    (6) Phosphorus trichloride..........................     (7719-12-2)
    (7) Phosphorus pentachloride........................    (10026-13-8)
    (8) Trimethyl phosphite.............................      (121-45-9)
    (9) Triethyl phosphite..............................      (122-52-1)
    (10) Dimethyl phosphite.............................      (868-85-9)
    (11) Diethyl phosphite..............................      (762-04-9)
    (12) Sulfur monochloride............................    (10025-67-9)
    (13) Sulfur dichloride..............................    (10545-99-0)
    (14) Thionyl chloride...............................     (7719-09-7)
    (15) Ethyldiethanolamine............................      (139-87-7)
    (16) Methyldiethanolamine...........................      (105-59-9)
    (17) Triethanolamine................................      (102-71-6)

                ANNEX ON IMPLEMENTATION AND VERIFICATION

                        (``VERIFICATION ANNEX'')

                                 Part I

                              DEFINITIONS

    1. ``Approved Equipment'' means the devices and instruments 
necessary for the performance of the inspection team's duties 
that have been certified by the Technical Secretariat in 
accordance with regulations prepared by the Technical 
Secretariat pursuant to Part II, paragraph 27 of this Annex. 
Such equipment may also refer to the administrative supplies or 
recording materials that would be used by the inspection team.
    2. ``Building'' as referred to in the definition of 
chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises 
specialized buildings and standard buildings.
          (a) ``Specialized Building'' means:
                  (i) Any building, including underground 
                structures, containing specialized equipment in 
                a production or filling configuration;
                  (ii) Any building, including underground 
                structures, which has distinctive features 
                which distinguish it from buildings normally 
                used for chemical production or filling 
                activities not prohibited under this 
                Convention.
          (b) ``Standard Building'' means any building, 
        including underground structures, constructed to 
        prevailing industry standards for facilities not 
        producing any chemical specified in Article II, 
        paragraph 8 (a) (i), or corrosive chemicals.
    3. ``Challenge Inspection'' means the inspection of any 
facility or location in the territory or in any other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party requested by 
another State Party pursuant to Article IX, paragraphs 8 to 25.
    4. ``Discrete Organic Chemical'' means any chemical 
belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all 
compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal 
carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural 
formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry 
number, if assigned.
    5. ``Equipment'' as referred to in the definition of 
chemical weapons production facility in Article II comprises 
specialized equipment and standard equipment.
          (a) ``Specialized Equipment'' means:
                  (i) The main production train, including any 
                reactor or equipment for product synthesis, 
                separation or purification, any equipment used 
                directly for heat transfer in the final 
                technological stage, such as in reactors or in 
                product separation, as well as any other 
                equipment which has been in contact with any 
                chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 8 
                (a) (i), or would be in contact with such a 
                chemical if the facility were operated;
                  (ii) Any chemical weapon filling machines;
                  (iii) Any other equipment specially designed, 
                built or installed for the operation of the 
                facility as a chemical weapons production 
                facility, as distinct from a facility 
                constructed according to prevailing commercial 
                industry standards for facilities not producing 
                any chemical specified in Article II, paragraph 
                8(a)(i), or corrosive chemicals, such as: 
                equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other 
                special corrosion-resistant material; special 
                equipment for waste control, waste treatment, 
                air filtering, or solvent recovery; special 
                containment enclosures and safety shields; non-
                standard laboratory equipment used to analyze 
                toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; 
                custom-designed process control panels; or 
                dedicated spares for specialized equipment.
          (b) ``Standard Equipment'' means:
                  (i) Production equipment which is generally 
                used in the chemical industry and is not 
                included in the types of specialized equipment;
                  (ii) Other equipment commonly used in the 
                chemical industry, such as: fire-fighting 
                equipment; guard and security/safety 
                surveillance equipment; medical facilities, 
                laboratory facilities; or communications 
                equipment.
    6. ``Facility'' in the context of Article VI means any of 
the industrial sites as defined below (``plant site'', 
``plant'' and ``unit'').
          (a) ``Plant Site'' (Works, Factory) means the local 
        integration of one or more plants, with any 
        intermediate administrative levels, which are under one 
        operational control, and includes common 
        infrastructure, such as:
                  (i) Administration and other offices;
                  (ii) Repair and maintenance shops;
                  (iii) Medical center;
                  (iv) Utilities;
                  (v) Central analytical laboratory;
                  (vi) Research and development laboratories;
                  (vii) Central effluent and waste treatment 
                area; and
                  (viii) Warehouse storage.
          (b) ``Plant'' (Production facility, Workshop) means a 
        relatively self-contained area, structure or building 
        containing one or more units with auxiliary and 
        associated infrastructure, such as:
                  (i) Small administrative section;
                  (ii) Storage/handling areas for feedstock and 
                products;
                  (iii) Effluent/waste handling/treatment area;
                  (iv) Control/analytical laboratory;
                  (v) First aid service/related medical 
                section; and
                  (vi) Records associated with the movement 
                into, around and from the site, of declared 
                chemicals and their feedstock or product 
                chemicals formed from them, as appropriate.
          (c) ``Unit'' (Production unit, Process unit) means 
        the combination of those items of equipment, including 
        vessels and vessel set up, necessary for the 
        production, processing or consumption of a chemical.
    7. ``Facility Agreement'' means an agreement or arrangement 
between a State Party and the Organization relating to a 
specific facility subject to on-site verification pursuant to 
Articles IV, V and VI.
    8. ``Host State'' means the State on whose territory lie 
facilities or areas of another State, Party to this Convention, 
which are subject to inspection under this Convention.
    9. ``In-Country Escort'' means individuals specified by the 
inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, 
if they so wish, to accompany and assist the inspection team 
during the in-country period.
    10. ``In-Country Period'' means the period from the arrival 
of the inspection team at a point of entry until its departure 
from the State at a point of entry.
    11. ``Initial Inspection'' means the first on-site 
inspection of facilities to verify declarations submitted 
pursuant to Articles III, IV, V and VI and this Annex.
    12. ``Inspected State Party'' means the State Party on 
whose territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or 
control an inspection pursuant to this Convention takes place, 
or the State Party whose facility or area on the territory of a 
Host State is subject to such an inspection; it does not, 
however, include the State Party specified in Part II, 
paragraph 21 of this Annex.
    13. ``Inspection Assistant'' means an individual designated 
by the Technical Secretariat as set forth in Part II, Section 
A, of this Annex to assist inspectors in an inspection or 
visit, such as medical, security and administrative personnel 
and interpreters.
    14. ``Inspection Mandate'' means the instructions issued by 
the Director-General to the inspection team for the conduct of 
a particular inspection.
    15. ``Inspection Manual'' means the compilation of 
additional procedures for the conduct of inspections developed 
by the Technical Secretariat.
    16. ``Inspection Site'' means any facility or area at which 
an inspection is carried out and which is specifically defined 
in the respective facility agreement or inspection request or 
mandate or inspection request as expanded by the alternative or 
final perimeter.
    17. ``Inspection Team'' means the group of inspectors and 
inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General to 
conduct a particular inspection.
    18. ``Inspector'' means an individual designated by the 
Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth 
in Part II, Section A, of this Annex, to carry out an 
inspection or visit in accordance with this Convention.
    19. ``Model Agreement'' means a document specifying the 
general form and content for an agreement concluded between a 
State Party and the Organization for fulfilling the 
verification provisions specified in this Annex.
    20. ``Observer'' means a representative of a requesting 
State Party or a third State Party to observe a challenge 
inspection.
    21. ``Perimeter'' in case of challenge inspection means the 
external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either 
geographic coordinates or description on a map.
          (a) ``Requested Perimeter'' means the inspection site 
        perimeter as specified in conformity with Part X, 
        paragraph 8, of this Annex;
          (b) ``Alternative Perimeter'' means the inspection 
        site perimeter as specified, alternatively to the 
        requested perimeter, by the inspected State Party; it 
        shall conform to the requirements specified in Part X, 
        paragraph 17, of this Annex;
          (c) ``Final Perimeter'' means the final inspection 
        site perimeter as agreed in negotiations between the 
        inspection team and the inspected State Party, in 
        accordance with Part X, paragraphs 16 to 21, of this 
        Annex;
          (d) ``Declared Perimeter'' means the external 
        boundary of the facility declared pursuant to Articles 
        III, IV, V and VI.
    22. ``Period of Inspection'', for the purposes of Article 
IX, means the period of time from provision of access to the 
inspection team to the inspection site until its departure from 
the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings 
before and after the verification activities.
    23. ``Period of Inspection'', for the purposes of Articles 
IV, V and VI, means the period of time from arrival of the 
inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from 
the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings 
before and after the verification activities.
    24. ``Point of Entry''/''Point of Exit'' means a location 
designated for the in-country arrival of inspection teams for 
inspections pursuant to this Convention or for their departure 
after completion of their mission.
    25. ``Requesting State Party'' means a State Party which 
has requested a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX.
    26. ``Tonne'' means metric ton, i.e. 1,000 kg.

                                Part II

                     general rules of verification

A. Designation of inspectors and inspection assistants

    1. Not later than 30 days after entry into force of this 
Convention the Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in 
writing, to all States Parties the names, nationalities and 
ranks of the inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for 
designation, as well as a description of their qualifications 
and professional experiences.
    2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt 
of the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed 
for designation communicated to it. The State Party shall 
inform the Technical Secretariat in writing of its acceptance 
of each inspector and inspection assistant, not later than 30 
days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list. Any 
inspector and inspection assistant included in this list shall 
be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later than 
30 days after acknowledgement of receipt of the list, declares 
its non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the 
reason for the objection.
    In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or 
inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in 
verification activities on the territory or in any other place 
under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party which has 
declared its non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall, 
as necessary, submit further proposals in addition to the 
original list.
    3. Verification activities under this Convention shall only 
be performed by designated inspectors and inspection 
assistants.
    4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5, a State Party 
has the right at any time to object to an inspector or 
inspection assistant who has already been designated. It shall 
notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing 
and may include the reason for the objection. Such objection 
shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical 
Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform 
the State Party concerned of the withdrawal of the designation 
of the inspector or inspection assistant.
    5. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection 
shall not seek to have removed from the inspection team for 
that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection 
assistants named in the inspection team list.
    6. The number of inspectors or inspection assistants 
accepted by and designated to a State Party must be sufficient 
to allow for availability and rotation of appropriate numbers 
of inspectors and inspection assistants.
    7. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-
acceptance of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants 
impedes the designation of a sufficient number of inspectors or 
inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective 
fulfillment of the tasks of the Technical Secretariat, the 
Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive 
Council.
    8. Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of 
inspectors and inspection assistants are necessary or 
requested, replacement inspectors and inspection assistants 
shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with 
respect to the initial list.
    9. The members of the inspection team carrying out an 
inspection of a facility of a State Party located on the 
territory of another State Party shall be designated in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in this Annex as 
applied both to the inspected State Party and the Host State 
Party.

B. Privileges and immunities

    10. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
acknowledgement of receipt of the list of inspectors and 
inspection assistants or of changes thereto, provide multiple 
entry/exit and/or transit visas and other such documents to 
enable each inspector or inspection assistant to enter and to 
remain on the territory of that State Party for the purpose of 
carrying out inspection activities. These documents shall be 
valid for at least two years after their provision to the 
Technical Secretariat.
    11. To exercise their functions effectively, inspectors and 
inspection assistants shall be accorded privileges and 
immunities as set forth in subparagraphs (a) to (i). Privileges 
and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection 
team for the sake of this Convention and not for the personal 
benefit of the individuals themselves. Such privileges and 
immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period 
between arrival on and departure from the territory of the 
inspected State Party or Host State, and thereafter with 
respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their 
official functions.
          (a) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents 
        pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on 
        Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.
          (b) The living quarters and office premises occupied 
        by the inspection team carrying out inspection 
        activities pursuant to this Convention shall be 
        accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to 
        the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 
        30, paragraph 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
        Relations.
          (c) The papers and correspondence, including records, 
        of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability 
        accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic 
        agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 2, of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The 
        inspection team shall have the right to use codes for 
        their communications with the Technical Secretariat.
          (d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members 
        of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to 
        provisions contained in this Convention and exempt from 
        all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be 
        transported in accordance with relevant regulations.
          (e) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the immunities accorded to diplomatic agents 
        pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
          (f) The members of the inspection team carrying out 
        prescribed activities pursuant to this Convention shall 
        be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded 
        to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the 
        Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
          (g) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected 
        State Party or Host State Party, without payment of any 
        customs duties or related charges, articles for 
        personal use, with the exception of articles the import 
        or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled 
        by quarantine regulations.
          (h) The members of the inspection team shall be 
        accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as 
        are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments 
        on temporary official missions.
          (i) The members of the inspection team shall not 
        engage in any professional or commercial activity for 
        personal profit on the territory of the inspected State 
        Party or the Host State.
    12. When transiting the territory of non-inspected States 
Parties, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded 
the privileges and immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents 
pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including 
records, and samples and approved equipment, carried by them, 
shall be accorded the privileges and immunities set forth in 
paragraph 11 (c) and (d).
    13. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities 
the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect 
the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party or Host 
State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection 
mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of that State. If the inspected State Party or Host 
State Party considers that there has been an abuse of 
privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, 
consultations shall be held between the State Party and the 
Director-General to determine whether such an abuse has 
occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such 
an abuse.
    14. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the 
inspection team may be waived by the Director-General in those 
cases when the Director-General is of the opinion that immunity 
would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived 
without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of 
this Convention. Waiver must always be express.
    15. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and 
immunities accorded to inspectors pursuant to this section, 
except for those accorded pursuant to paragraph 11 (d).

C. Standing arrangements

            Points of entry
    16. Each State Party shall designate the points of entry 
and shall supply the required information to the Technical 
Secretariat not later than 30 days after this Convention enters 
into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the 
inspection team can reach any inspection site from at least one 
point of entry within 12 hours. Locations of points of entry 
shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical 
Secretariat.
    17. Each State Party may change the points of entry by 
giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. 
Changes shall become effective 30 days after the Technical 
Secretariat receives such notification to allow appropriate 
notification to all States Parties.
    18. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are 
insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of 
inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by 
a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, 
it shall enter into consultations with the State Party 
concerned to resolve the problem.
    19. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected 
State Party are located on the territory of a Host State Party 
or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities 
or areas subject to inspection requires transit through the 
territory of another State Party, the inspected State Party 
shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning 
such inspections in accordance with this Annex. The Host State 
Party shall facilitate the inspection of those facilities or 
areas and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the 
inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and 
effective manner. States Parties through whose territory 
transit is required to inspect facilities or areas of an 
inspected State Party shall facilitate such transit.
    20. In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected 
State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party 
to this Convention, the inspected State Party shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those 
facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the 
provisions of this Annex. A State Party that has one or more 
facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to 
this Convention shall take all necessary measures to ensure 
acceptance by the Host State of inspectors and inspection 
assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected 
State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate 
that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.
    21. In cases where the facilities or areas sought to be 
inspected are located on the territory of a State Party, but in 
a place under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party 
to this Convention, the State Party shall take all necessary 
measures as would be required of an inspected State Party and a 
Host State Party to ensure that inspections of such facilities 
or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions 
of this Annex. If the State Party is unable to ensure access to 
those facilities or areas, it shall demonstrate that it took 
all necessary measures to ensure access. This paragraph shall 
not apply where the facilities or areas sought to be inspected 
are those of the State Party.
            Arrangements for use of nonscheduled aircraft
    22. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other 
inspections where timely travel is not feasible using scheduled 
commercial transport, an inspection team may need to utilize 
aircraft owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of 
the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled 
aircraft transporting inspection teams and equipment necessary 
for inspection into and out of the territory in which an 
inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the 
designated point of entry shall be along established 
international airways that are agreed upon between the States 
Parties and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such 
diplomatic clearance.
    23. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical 
Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a 
flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft's 
flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of 
the State in which the inspection site is located to the point 
of entry, not less than six hours before the scheduled 
departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed 
in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its 
owned or chartered flights, the Technical Secretariat shall 
include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing 
diplomatic clearance number and the appropriate notation 
identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft.
    24. Not less than three hours before the scheduled 
departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior 
to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection 
is to take place, the inspected State Party or Host State Party 
shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with 
paragraph 23 is approved so that the inspection team may arrive 
at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.
    25. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, 
security protection, servicing and fuel as required by the 
Technical Secretariat for the aircraft of the inspection team 
at the point of entry when such aircraft is owned or chartered 
by the Technical Secretariat. Such aircraft shall not be liable 
for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The 
Technical Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, 
security protection and servicing.
            Administrative arrangements
    26. The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for 
the amenities necessary for the inspection team such as 
communication means, interpretation services to the extent 
necessary for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, 
transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. 
In this regard, the inspected State Party shall be reimbursed 
by the Organization for such costs incurred by the inspection 
team.
            Approved equipment
    27. Subject to paragraph 29, there shall be no restriction 
by the inspected State Party on the inspection team bringing 
onto the inspection site such equipment, approved in accordance 
with paragraph 28, which the Technical Secretariat has 
determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection 
requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall prepare and, as 
appropriate, update a list of approved equipment, which may be 
needed for the purposes described above, and regulations 
governing such equipment which shall be in accordance with this 
Annex. In establishing the list of approved equipment and these 
regulations, the Technical Secretariat shall ensure that safety 
considerations for all the types of facilities at which such 
equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. A 
list of approved equipment shall be considered and approved by 
the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    28. The equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical 
Secretariat and be designated, calibrated and approved by the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall, to the 
extent possible, select that equipment which is specifically 
designed for the specific kind of inspection required. 
Designated and approved equipment shall be specifically 
protected against unauthorized alteration.
    29. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without 
prejudice to the prescribed time-frames, to inspect the 
equipment in the presence of inspection team members at the 
point of entry, i.e., to check the identity of the equipment 
brought in or removed from the territory of the inspected State 
Party or the Host State. To facilitate such identification, the 
Technical Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to 
authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment. The 
inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the 
satisfaction of the inspected State Party that the equipment 
meets the description of the approved equipment for the 
particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may 
exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment 
without the above-mentioned authentication documents and 
devices. Procedures for the inspection of equipment shall be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    30. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary 
to use equipment available on site not belonging to the 
Technical Secretariat and requests the inspected State Party to 
enable the team to use such equipment, the inspected State 
Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can.

D. Preinspection activities

            Notification
    31. The Director-General shall notify the State Party 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry and within the prescribed time-frames, where 
specified, of its intention to carry out an inspection.
    32. Notifications made by the Director-General shall 
include the following information:
          (a) The type of inspection;
          (b) The point of entry;
          (c) The date and estimated time of arrival at the 
        point of entry;
          (d) The means of arrival at the point of entry;
          (e) The site to be inspected;
          (f) The names of inspectors and inspection 
        assistants;
          (g) If appropriate, aircraft clearance for special 
        flights.
    33. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge the receipt 
of a notification by the Technical Secretariat of an intention 
to conduct an inspection, not later than one hour after receipt 
of such notification.
    34. In the case of an inspection of a facility of a State 
Party located on the territory of another State Party, both 
States Parties shall be simultaneously notified in accordance 
with paragraphs 31 and 32.
            Entry into the territory of the inspected State party or 
                    host State and transfer to the inspection site
    35. The inspected State Party or Host State Party which has 
been notified of the arrival of an inspection team, shall 
ensure its immediate entry into the territory and shall through 
an in-country escort or by other means do everything in its 
power to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its 
equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the 
inspection site(s) and to a point of exit.
    36. The inspected State Party or Host State Party shall, as 
necessary, assist the inspection team in reaching the 
inspection site not later than 12 hours after the arrival at 
the point of entry.
            Pre-inspection briefing
    37. Upon arrival at the inspection site and before the 
commencement of the inspection, the inspection team shall be 
briefed by facility representatives, with the aid of maps and 
other documentation as appropriate, on the facility, the 
activities carried out there, safety measures and 
administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the 
inspection. The time spent for the briefing shall be limited to 
the minimum necessary and in any event not exceed three hours.

E. Conduct of Inspections

            General rules
    38. The members of the inspection team shall discharge 
their functions in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention, as well as rules established by the Director-
General and facility agreements concluded between States 
Parties and the Organization.
    39. The inspection team shall strictly observe the 
inspection mandate issued by the Director-General. It shall 
refrain from activities going beyond this mandate.
    40. The activities of the inspection team shall be so 
arranged as to ensure the timely and effective discharge of its 
functions and the least possible inconvenience to the inspected 
State Party or Host State and disturbance to the facility or 
area inspected. The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily 
hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid 
affecting its safety. In particular, the inspection team shall 
not operate any facility. If inspectors consider that, to 
fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried 
out in a facility, they shall request the designated 
representative of the inspected facility to have them 
performed. The representative shall carry out the request to 
the extent possible.
    41. In the performance of their duties on the territory of 
an inspected State Party or Host State, the members of the 
inspection team shall, if the inspected State Party so 
requests, be accompanied by representatives of the inspected 
State Party, but the inspection team must not thereby be 
delayed or otherwise hindered in the exercise of its functions.
    42. Detailed procedures for the conduct of inspections 
shall be developed for inclusion in the inspection manual by 
the Technical Secretariat, taking into account guidelines to be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
            Safety
    43. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and 
inspection assistants shall observe safety regulations 
established at the inspection site, including those for the 
protection of controlled environments within a facility and for 
personal safety. In order to implement these requirements, 
appropriate detailed procedures shall be considered and 
approved by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (i).
            Communications
    44. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-
country period to communicate with the Headquarters of the 
Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own, 
duly certified, approved equipment and may request that the 
inspected State Party or Host State Party provide them with 
access to other telecommunications. The inspection team shall 
have the right to use its own two-way system of radio 
communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and 
other members of the inspection team.
            Inspection team and inspected State party rights
    45. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the 
relevant Articles and Annexes of this Convention as well as 
with facility agreements and procedures set forth in the 
inspection manual, have the right to unimpeded access to the 
inspection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by 
the inspectors.
    46. Inspectors shall have the right to interview any 
facility personnel in the presence of representatives of the 
inspected State Party with the purpose of establishing relevant 
facts. Inspectors shall only request information and data which 
are necessary for the conduct of the inspection, and the 
inspected State Party shall furnish such information upon 
request. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those 
questions are deemed not relevant to the inspection. If the 
head of the inspection team objects and states their relevance, 
the questions shall be provided in writing to the inspected 
State Party for reply. The inspection team may note any refusal 
to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and 
any explanations given, in that part of the inspection report 
that deals with the cooperation of the inspected State Party.
    47. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect 
documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of 
their mission.
    48. Inspectors shall have the right to have photographs 
taken at their request by representatives of the inspected 
State Party or of the inspected facility. The capability to 
take instant development photographic prints shall be 
available. The inspection team shall determine whether 
photographs conform to those requested and, if not, repeat 
photographs shall be taken. The inspection team and the 
inspected State Party shall each retain one copy of every 
photograph.
    49. The representatives of the inspected State Party shall 
have the right to observe all verification activities carried 
out by the inspection team.
    50. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its 
request, of the information and data gathered about its 
facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.
    51. Inspectors shall have the right to request 
clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during 
an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the 
representative of the inspected State Party. The representative 
of the inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, 
during the inspection, with such clarification as may be 
necessary to remove the ambiguity. If questions relating to an 
object or a building located within the inspection site are not 
resolved, the object or building shall, if requested, be 
photographed for the purpose of clarifying its nature and 
function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the 
inspection, the inspectors shall notify the Technical 
Secretariat immediately. The inspectors shall include in the 
inspection report any such unresolved question, relevant 
clarifications, and a copy of any photographs taken.
            Collection, handling and analysis of samples
    52. Representatives of the inspected State Party or of the 
inspected facility shall take samples at the request of the 
inspection team in the presence of inspectors. If so agreed in 
advance with the representatives of the inspected State Party 
or of the inspected facility, the inspection team may take 
samples itself.
    53. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be 
performed on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to 
perform on-site analysis of samples using approved equipment 
brought by it. At the request of the inspection team, the 
inspected State Party shall, in accordance with agreed 
procedures, provide assistance for the analysis of samples on-
site. Alternatively, the inspection team may request that 
appropriate analysis on-site be performed in its presence.
    54. The inspected State Party has the right to retain 
portions of all samples taken or take duplicate samples and be 
present when samples are analyzed on-site.
    55. The inspection team shall, if it deems it necessary, 
transfer samples for analysis off-site at laboratories 
designated by the Organization.
    56. The Director-General shall have the primary 
responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of 
samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples 
transferred for analysis off-site is protected. The Director-
General shall do so in accordance with procedures, to be 
considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
VIII, paragraph 21 (i), for inclusion in the inspection manual. 
He shall:
          (a) Establish a stringent regime governing the 
        collection, handling, transport and analysis of 
        samples;
           (b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform 
        different types of analysis;
          (c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and 
        procedures at these designated laboratories, mobile 
        analytical equipment and procedures, and monitor 
        quality control and overall standards in relation to 
        the certification of these laboratories, mobile 
        equipment and procedures; and
          (d) Select from among the designated laboratories 
        those which shall perform analytical or other functions 
        in relation to specific investigations.
    57. When off-site analysis is to be performed, samples 
shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The 
Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing 
of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the 
Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions 
thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat.
    58. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of 
the laboratory analysis of samples relevant to compliance with 
this Convention and include them in the final inspection 
report. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the report 
detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology 
employed by the designated laboratories.
            Extension of inspection duration
    59. Periods of inspection may be extended by agreement with 
the representative of the inspected State Party.
            Debriefing
    60. Upon completion of an inspection the inspection team 
shall meet with representatives of the inspected State Party 
and the personnel responsible for the inspection site to review 
the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify 
any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide to the 
representatives of the inspected State Party its preliminary 
findings in written form according to a standardized format, 
together with a list of any samples and copies of written 
information and data gathered and other material to be taken 
off-site. The document shall be signed by the head of the 
inspection team. In order to indicate that he has taken notice 
of the contents of the document, the representative of the 
inspected State Party shall countersign the document. This 
meeting shall be completed not later than 24 hours after the 
completion of the inspection.

F. Departure

    61. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the 
inspection team shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory 
of the inspected State Party or the Host State.

G. Reports

    62. Not later than 10 days after the inspection, the 
inspectors shall prepare a factual, final report on the 
activities conducted by them and on their findings. It shall 
only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention, 
as provided for under the inspection mandate. The report shall 
also provide information as to the manner in which the State 
Party inspected cooperated with the inspection team. Differing 
observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report. 
The report shall be kept confidential.
    63. The final report shall immediately be submitted to the 
inspected State Party. Any written comments, which the 
inspected State Party may immediately make on its findings 
shall be annexed to it. The final report together with annexed 
comments made by the inspected State Party shall be submitted 
to the Director-General not later than 30 days after the 
inspection.
    64. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should 
cooperation between the National Authority and the inspectors 
not measure up to the standards required, the Director-General 
shall approach the State Party for clarification.
    65. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts 
established are of a nature to suggest that obligations 
undertaken under this Convention have not been met, the 
Director-General shall inform the Executive Council without 
delay.

H. Application of general provisions

    66. The provisions of this Part shall apply to all 
inspections conducted pursuant to this Convention, except where 
the provisions of this Part differ from the provisions set 
forth for specific types of inspections in Parts III to XI of 
this Annex, in which case the latter provisions shall take 
precedence.

                                Part III

GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV, V 
                          AND VI, PARAGRAPH 3

A. Initial inspections and facility agreements

    1. Each declared facility subject to on-site inspection 
pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, paragraph 3, shall receive 
an initial inspection promptly after the facility is declared. 
The purpose of this inspection of the facility shall be to 
verify information provided and to obtain any additional 
information needed for planning future verification activities 
at the facility, including on-site inspections and continuous 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and to work on the 
facility agreements.
    2. States Parties shall ensure that the verification of 
declarations and the initiation of the systematic verification 
measures can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at 
all facilities within the established time-frames after this 
Convention enters into force for them.
    3. Each State Party shall conclude a facility agreement 
with the Organization for each facility declared and subject to 
on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V, and VI, 
paragraph 3.
    4. Facility agreements shall be completed not later than 
180 days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party or after the facility has been declared for the first 
time, except for a chemical weapons destruction facility to 
which paragraphs 5 to 7 shall apply.
    5. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility 
that begins operations more than one year after this Convention 
enters into force for the State Party, the facility agreement 
shall be completed not less than 180 days before the facility 
begins operation.
    6. In the case of a chemical weapons destruction facility 
that is in operation when this Convention enters into force for 
the State Party, or begins operation not later than one year 
thereafter, the facility agreement shall be completed not later 
than 210 days after this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party, except that the Executive Council may decide that 
transitional verification arrangements, approved in accordance 
with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this Annex and including a 
transitional facility agreement, provisions for verification 
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site 
instruments, and the time-frame for application of the 
arrangements, are sufficient.
    7. In the case of a facility, referred to in paragraph 6, 
that will cease operations not later than two years after this 
Convention enters into force for the State Party, the Executive 
Council may decide that transitional verification arrangements, 
approved in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 51, of this 
Annex and including a transitional facility agreement, 
provisions for verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for 
application of the arrangements, are sufficient.
    8. Facility agreements shall be based on models for such 
agreements and provide for detailed arrangements which shall 
govern inspections at each facility. The model agreements shall 
include provisions to take into account future technological 
developments and shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    9. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a 
sealed container for photographs, plans and other information 
that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent 
inspections.

B. Standing arrangements

    10. Where applicable, the Technical Secretariat shall have 
the right to have continuous monitoring instruments and systems 
and seals installed and to use them, in conformity with the 
relevant provisions in this Convention and the facility 
agreements between States Parties and the Organization.
    11. The inspected State Party shall, in accordance with 
agreed procedures, have the right to inspect any instrument 
used or installed by the inspection team and to have it tested 
in the presence of representatives of the inspected State 
Party. The inspection team shall have the right to use the 
instruments that were installed by the inspected State Party 
for its own monitoring of the technological process of the 
destruction of chemical weapons. To this end, the inspection 
team shall have the right to inspect those instruments that it 
intends to use for purposes of verification of the destruction 
of chemical weapons and to have them tested in its presence.
    12. The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary 
preparation and support for the establishment of continuous 
monitoring instruments and systems.
    13. In order to implement paragraphs 11 and 12, appropriate 
detailed procedures shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    14. The inspected State Party shall immediately notify the 
Technical Secretariat if an event occurs or may occur at a 
facility where monitoring instruments are installed, which may 
have an impact on the monitoring system. The inspected State 
Party shall coordinate subsequent actions with the Technical 
Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the 
monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if 
necessary, as soon as possible.
    15. The inspection team shall verify during each inspection 
that the monitoring system functions correctly and that 
emplaced seals have not been tampered with. In addition, visits 
to service the monitoring system may be required to perform any 
necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust 
the coverage of the monitoring system as required.
    16. If the monitoring system indicates any anomaly, the 
Technical Secretariat shall immediately take action to 
determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or 
activities at the facility. If, after this examination, the 
problem remains unresolved, the Technical Secretariat shall 
immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through 
immediate on-site inspection of, or visit to, the facility if 
necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such 
problem immediately after its detection to the inspected State 
Party which shall assist in its resolution.

C. Pre-inspection activities

    17. The inspected State Party shall, except as specified in 
paragraph 18, be notified of inspections not less than 24 hours 
in advance of the planned arrival of the inspection team at the 
point of entry.
    18. The inspected State Party shall be notified of initial 
inspections not less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated 
time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

                              Part IV (A)

   destruction of chemical weapons and its verification pursuant to 
                               article iv

A. Declarations

            Chemical weapons
    1. The declaration of chemical weapons by a State Party 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (ii), shall include 
the following:
          (a) The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared;
          (b) The precise location of each chemical weapons 
        storage facility, expressed by:
                  (i) Name;
                  (ii) Geographical coordinates; and
                  (iii) A detailed site diagram, including a 
                boundary map and the location of bunkers/
                storage areas within the facility.
          (c) The detailed inventory for each chemical weapons 
        storage facility including:
                  (i) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in 
                accordance with Article II;
                  (ii) Unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, 
                devices and equipment defined as chemical 
                weapons;
                  (iii) Equipment specially designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of 
                munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment 
                specified in sub-subparagraph (ii);
                  (iv) Chemicals specifically designed for use 
                directly in connection with the employment of 
                munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment 
                specified in sub-subparagraph (ii).
    2. For the declaration of chemicals referred to in 
paragraph 1 (c) (i) the following shall apply:
          (a) Chemicals shall be declared in accordance with 
        the Schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals;
          (b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the 
        Annex on Chemicals the information required for 
        possible assignment of the chemical to the appropriate 
        Schedule shall be provided, including the toxicity of 
        the pure compound. For a precursor, the toxicity and 
        identity of the principal final reaction product(s) 
        shall be provided;
          (c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in 
        accordance with current International Union of Pure and 
        Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, structural 
        formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, 
        if assigned. For a precursor, the toxicity and identity 
        of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be 
        provided;
          (d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more 
        chemicals, each chemical shall be identified and the 
        percentage of each shall be provided, and the mixture 
        shall be declared under the category of the most toxic 
        chemical. If a component of a binary chemical weapon 
        consists of a mixture of two or more chemicals, each 
        chemical shall be identified and the percentage of each 
        provided;
          (e) Binary chemical weapons shall be declared under 
        the relevant end product within the framework of the 
        categories of chemical weapons referred to in paragraph 
        16. The following supplementary information shall be 
        provided for each type of binary chemical munition/
        device:
                  (i) The chemical name of the toxic end-
                product;
                  (ii) The chemical composition and quantity of 
                each component;
                  (iii) The actual weight ratio between the 
                components;
                  (iv) Which component is considered the key 
                component;
                  (v) The projected quantity of the toxic end-
                product calculated on a stoichiometric basis 
                from the key component, assuming 100 per cent 
                yield. A declared quantity (in tonnes) of the 
                key component intended for a specific toxic 
                end-product shall be considered equivalent to 
                the quantity (in tonnes) of this toxic end-
                product calculated on a stoichiometric basis 
                assuming 100 per cent yield.
          (f) For multicomponent chemical weapons, the 
        declaration shall be analogous to that envisaged for 
        binary chemical weapons;
          (g) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. 
        munitions, sub-munitions, devices, equipment or bulk 
        containers and other containers shall be declared. For 
        each form of storage the following shall be listed:
                  (i) Type;
                  (ii) Size or calibre;
                  (iii) Number of items; and
                  (iv) Nominal weight of chemical fill per 
                item.
          (h) For each chemical the total weight present at the 
        storage facility shall be declared;
          (i) In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk, the 
        percentage purity shall be declared, if known.
    3. For each type of unfilled munitions, sub-munitions, 
devices or equipment, referred to in paragraph 1 (c) (ii), the 
information shall include:
          (a) The number of items;
          (b) The nominal fill volume per item;
          (c) The intended chemical fill.
            Declarations of chemical weapons pursuant to article III, 
                    paragraph 1 (a) (iii)
    4. The declaration of chemical weapons pursuant to Article 
III, paragraph 1 (a) (iii), shall contain all information 
specified in paragraphs 1 to 3 above. It is the responsibility 
of the State Party on whose territory the chemical weapons are 
located to make appropriate arrangements with the other State 
to ensure that the declarations are made. If the State Party on 
whose territory the chemical weapons are located is not able to 
fulfil its obligations under this paragraph, it shall state the 
reasons therefor.
            Declarations of past transfers and receipts
    5. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical 
weapons since 1 January 1946 shall declare these transfers or 
receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (iv), 
provided the amount transferred or received exceeded 1 tonne 
per chemical per year in bulk and/or munition form. This 
declaration shall be made according to the inventory format 
specified in paragraphs 1 and 2. This declaration shall also 
indicate the supplier and recipient countries, the dates of the 
transfers or receipts and, as precisely as possible, the 
current location of the transferred items. When not all the 
specified information is available for transfers or receipts of 
chemical weapons for the period between 1 January 1946 and 1 
January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever 
information is still available to it and provide an explanation 
as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.
            Submission of the general plan for destruction of chemical 
                    weapons
    6. The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons 
submitted pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), shall 
provide an overview of the entire national chemical weapons 
destruction programme of the State Party and information on the 
efforts of the State Party to fulfil the destruction 
requirements contained in this Convention. The plan shall 
specify:
          (a) A general schedule for destruction, giving types 
        and approximate quantities of chemical weapons planned 
        to be destroyed in each annual destruction period for 
        each existing chemical weapons destruction facility 
        and, if possible, for each planned chemical weapons 
        destruction facility;
          (b) The number of chemical weapons destruction 
        facilities existing or planned to be operated over the 
        destruction period;
          (c) For each existing or planned chemical weapons 
        destruction facility:
                  (i) Name and location; and
                  (ii) The types and approximate quantities of 
                chemical weapons, and the type (for example, 
                nerve agent or blister agent) and approximate 
                quantity of chemical fill, to be destroyed;
          (d) The plans and programmes for training personnel 
        for the operation of destruction facilities;
          (e) The national standards for safety and emissions 
        that the destruction facilities must satisfy;
          (f) Information on the development of new methods for 
        destruction of chemical weapons and on the improvement 
        of existing methods;
          (g) The cost estimates for destroying the chemical 
        weapons; and
          (h) Any issues which could adversely impact on the 
        national destruction programme.
            B. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage 
                    facility preparation
    7. Not later than when submitting its declaration of 
chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it 
considers appropriate to secure its storage facilities and 
shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons out of the 
facilities, except their removal for destruction.
    8. A State Party shall ensure that chemical weapons at its 
storage facilities are configured to allow ready access for 
verification in accordance with paragraphs 37 to 49.
    9. While a storage facility remains closed for any movement 
of chemical weapons out of the facility other than their 
removal for destruction, a State Party may continue at the 
facility standard maintenance activities, including standard 
maintenance of chemical weapons; safety monitoring and physical 
security activities; and preparation of chemical weapons for 
destruction.
    10. Maintenance activities of chemical weapons shall not 
include:
          (a) Replacement of agent or of munition bodies;
          (b) Modification of the original characteristics of 
        munitions, or parts or components thereof.
    11. All maintenance activities shall be subject to 
monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.

C. Destruction

            Principles and methods for destruction of chemical weapons
    12. ``Destruction of chemical weapons'' means a process by 
which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible 
way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, 
and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other 
devices unusable as such.
    13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy 
chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not 
be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit 
burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically 
designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.
    14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons 
destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner 
to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the 
destruction process can be verified under the provisions of 
this Convention.
            Order of destruction
    15. The order of destruction of chemical weapons is based 
on the obligations specified in Article I and the other 
Articles, including obligations regarding systematic on-site 
verification. It takes into account interests of States Parties 
for undiminished security during the destruction period; 
confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; 
gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying 
chemical weapons; and applicability irrespective of the actual 
composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the 
destruction of the chemical weapons. The order of destruction 
is based on the principle of levelling out.
    16. For the purpose of destruction, chemical weapons 
declared by each State Party shall be divided into three 
categories:
          Category 1: Chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule 
        1 chemicals and their parts and components;
          Category 2: Chemical weapons on the basis of all 
        other chemicals and their parts and components;
          Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and 
        equipment specifically designed for use directly in 
        connection with employment of chemical weapons.
    17. A State Party shall start:
          (a) The destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons 
        not later than two years after this Convention enters 
        into force for it, and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than 10 years after entry into force of this 
        Convention. A State Party shall destroy chemical 
        weapons in accordance with the following destruction 
        deadlines:
                  (i) Phase 1: Not later than two years after 
                entry into force of this Convention, testing of 
                its first destruction facility shall be 
                completed. Not less than 1 per cent of the 
                Category 1 chemical weapons shall be destroyed 
                not later than three years after the entry into 
                force of this Convention;
                  (ii) Phase 2: Not less than 20 per cent of 
                the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be 
                destroyed not later than five years after the 
                entry into force of this Convention;
                  (iii) Phase 3: Not less than 45 per cent of 
                the Category 1 chemical weapons shall be 
                destroyed not later than seven years after the 
                entry into force of this Convention;
                  (iv) Phase 4: All Category 1 chemical weapons 
                shall be destroyed not later than 10 years 
                after the entry into force of this Convention.
          (b) The destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons 
        not later than one year after this Convention enters 
        into force for it and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than five years after the entry into force of 
        this Convention. Category 2 chemical weapons shall be 
        destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the 
        destruction period. The comparison factor for such 
        weapons is the weight of the chemicals within Category 
        2; and
          (c) The destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons 
        not later than one year after this Convention enters 
        into force for it, and shall complete the destruction 
        not later than five years after the entry into force of 
        this Convention. Category 3 chemical weapons shall be 
        destroyed in equal annual increments throughout the 
        destruction period. The comparison factor for unfilled 
        munitions and devices is expressed in nominal fill 
        volume (m\3\) and for equipment in number of items.
    18. For the destruction of binary chemical weapons the 
following shall apply:
          (a) For the purposes of the order of destruction, a 
        declared quantity (in tonnes) of the key component 
        intended for a specific toxic end-product shall be 
        considered equivalent to the quantity (in tonnes) of 
        this toxic end-product calculated on a stoichiometric 
        basis assuming 100 per cent yield.
          (b) A requirement to destroy a given quantity of the 
        key component shall entail a requirement to destroy a 
        corresponding quantity of the other component, 
        calculated from the actual weight ratio of the 
        components in the relevant type of binary chemical 
        munition/device.
          (c) If more of the other component is declared than 
        is needed, based on the actual weight ratio between 
        components, the excess shall be destroyed over the 
        first two years after destruction operations begin.
          (d) At the end of each subsequent operational year a 
        State Party may retain an amount of the other declared 
        component that is determined on the basis of the actual 
        weight ratio of the components in the relevant type of 
        binary chemical munition/device.
    19. For multicomponent chemical weapons the order of 
destruction shall be analogous to that envisaged for binary 
chemical weapons.
            Modification of intermediate destruction deadlines
    20. The Executive Council shall review the general plans 
for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to 
Article III, paragraph 1 (a) (v), and in accordance with 
paragraph 6, inter alia, to assess their conformity with the 
order of destruction set forth in paragraphs 15 to 19. The 
Executive Council shall consult with any State Party whose plan 
does not conform, with the objective of bringing the plan into 
conformity.
    21. If a State Party, due to exceptional circumstances 
beyond its control, believes that it cannot achieve the level 
of destruction specified for Phase 1, Phase 2 or Phase 3 of the 
order of destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons, it may 
propose changes in those levels. Such a proposal must be made 
not later than 120 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention and shall contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for the proposal.
    22. Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to 
ensure destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons in accordance 
with the destruction deadlines set forth in paragraph 17 (a) as 
changed pursuant to paragraph 21. However, if a State Party 
believes that it will be unable to ensure the destruction of 
the percentage of Category 1 chemical weapons required by an 
intermediate destruction deadline, it may request the Executive 
Council to recommend to the Conference to grant an extension of 
its obligation to meet that deadline. Such a request must be 
made not less than 180 days before the intermediate destruction 
deadline and shall contain a detailed explanation of the 
reasons for the request and the plans of the State Party for 
ensuring that it will be able to fulfil its obligation to meet 
the next intermediate destruction deadline.
    23. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall still 
be under the obligation to meet the cumulative destruction 
requirements set forth for the next destruction deadline. 
Extensions granted pursuant to this Section shall not, in any 
way, modify the obligation of the State Party to destroy all 
Category 1 chemical weapons not later than 10 years after the 
entry into force of this Convention.
            Extension of the deadline for completion of destruction
    24. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to 
ensure the destruction of all Category 1 chemical weapons not 
later than 10 years after the entry into force of this 
Convention, it may submit a request to the Executive Council 
for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction 
of such chemical weapons. Such a request must be made not later 
than nine years after the entry into force of this Convention.
    25. The request shall contain:
          (a) The duration of the proposed extension;
          (b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the 
        proposed extension; and
          (c) A detailed plan for destruction during the 
        proposed extension and the remaining portion of the 
        original 10-year period for destruction.
    26. A decision on the request shall be taken by the 
Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the 
Executive Council. Any extension shall be the minimum 
necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party 
to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended 
beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. 
The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of 
the extension, including the specific verification measures 
deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the 
State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. 
Costs of verification during the extension period shall be 
allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16.
    27. If an extension is granted, the State Party shall take 
appropriate measures to meet all subsequent deadlines.
    28. The State Party shall continue to submit detailed 
annual plans for destruction in accordance with paragraph 29 
and annual reports on the destruction of Category 1 chemical 
weapons in accordance with paragraph 36, until all Category 1 
chemical weapons are destroyed. In addition, not later than at 
the end of each 90 days of the extension period, the State 
Party shall report to the Executive Council on its destruction 
activity. The Executive Council shall review progress towards 
completion of destruction and take the necessary measures to 
document this progress. All information concerning the 
destruction activities during the extension period shall be 
provided by the Executive Council to States Parties, upon 
request.
            Detailed annual plans for destruction
    29. The detailed annual plans for destruction shall be 
submitted to the Technical Secretariat not less than 60 days 
before each annual destruction period begins pursuant to 
Article IV, paragraph 7 (a), and shall specify:
          (a) The quantity of each specific type of chemical 
        weapon to be destroyed at each destruction facility and 
        the inclusive dates when the destruction of each 
        specific type of chemical weapon will be accomplished;
          (b) The detailed site diagram for each chemical 
        weapons destruction facility and any changes to 
        previously submitted diagrams; and
          (c) The detailed schedule of activities for each 
        chemical weapons destruction facility for the upcoming 
        year, identifying time required for design, 
        construction or modification of the facility, 
        installation of equipment, equipment check-out and 
        operator training, destruction operations for each 
        specific type of chemical weapon, and scheduled periods 
        of inactivity.
    30. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical 
weapons destruction facilities, detailed facility information 
to assist the Technical Secretariat in developing preliminary 
inspection procedures for use at the facility.
    31. The detailed facility information for each destruction 
facility shall include the following information:
          (a) Name, address and location;
          (b) Detailed, annotated facility drawings;
          (c) Facility design drawings, process drawings, and 
        piping and instrumentation design drawings;
          (d) Detailed technical descriptions, including design 
        drawings and instrument specifications, for the 
        equipment required for: removing the chemical fill from 
        the munitions, devices, and containers; temporarily 
        storing the drained chemical fill; destroying the 
        chemical agent; and destroying the munitions, devices, 
        and containers;
          (e) Detailed technical descriptions of the 
        destruction process, including material flow rates, 
        temperatures and pressures, and designed destruction 
        efficiency;
          (f) Design capacity for each specific type of 
        chemical weapon;
          (g) A detailed description of the products of 
        destruction and the method of their ultimate disposal;
          (h) A detailed technical description of measures to 
        facilitate inspections in accordance with this 
        Convention;
          (i) A detailed description of any temporary holding 
        area at the destruction facility that will be used to 
        provide chemical weapons directly to the destruction 
        facility, including site and facility drawings and 
        information on the storage capacity for each specific 
        type of chemical weapon to be destroyed at the 
        facility;
          (j) A detailed description of the safety and medical 
        measures in force at the facility;
          (k) A detailed description of the living quarters and 
        working premises for the inspectors; and
          (l) Suggested measures for international 
        verification.
    32. A State Party shall provide, for each of its chemical 
weapons destruction facilities, the plant operations manuals, 
the safety and medical plans, the laboratory operations and 
quality assurance and control manuals, and the environmental 
permits that have been obtained, except that this shall not 
include material previously provided.
    33. A State Party shall promptly notify the Technical 
Secretariat of any developments that could affect inspection 
activities at its destruction facilities.
    34. Deadlines for submission of the information specified 
in paragraphs 30 to 32 shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    35. After a review of the detailed facility information for 
each destruction facility, the Technical Secretariat, if the 
need arises, shall enter into consultation with the State Party 
concerned in order to ensure that its chemical weapons 
destruction facilities are designed to assure the destruction 
of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how 
verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the 
application of verification measures is consistent with proper 
facility operation, and that the facility operation allows 
appropriate verification.
            Annual reports on destruction
    36. Information regarding the implementation of plans for 
destruction of chemical weapons shall be submitted to the 
Technical Secretariat pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), 
not later than 60 days after the end of each annual destruction 
period and shall specify the actual amounts of chemical weapons 
which were destroyed during the previous year at each 
destruction facility. If appropriate, reasons for not meeting 
destruction goals should be stated.

D. Verification

            Verification of declarations of chemical weapons through 
                    on-site inspection
    37. The purpose of the verification of declarations of 
chemical weapons shall be to confirm through on-site inspection 
the accuracy of the relevant declarations made pursuant to 
Article III.
    38. The inspectors shall conduct this verification promptly 
after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia, 
verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number 
of munitions, devices and other equipment.
    39. The inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed 
seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to 
facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at 
each storage facility.
    40. As the inventory progresses, inspectors shall install 
such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if 
any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the 
storage facility during the inventory. After completion of the 
inventory, such seals will be removed unless otherwise agreed.
            Systematic verification of storage facilities
    41. The purpose of the systematic verification of storage 
facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of 
chemical weapons from such facilities takes place.
    42. The systematic verification shall be initiated as soon 
as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is 
submitted and shall continue until all chemical weapons have 
been removed from the storage facility. It shall in accordance 
with the facility agreement, combine on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments.
    43. When all chemical weapons have been removed from the 
storage facility, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the 
declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this 
confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the 
systematic verification of the storage facility and shall 
promptly remove any monitoring instruments installed by the 
inspectors.
            Inspections and visits
    44. The particular storage facility to be inspected shall 
be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to 
preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be 
inspected. The guidelines for determining the frequency of 
systematic on-site inspections shall be elaborated by the 
Technical Secretariat, taking into account the recommendations 
to be considered and approved by the Conference pursuant to 
Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    45. The Technical Secretariat shall notify the inspected 
State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage 
facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection 
team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In 
cases of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this 
period may be shortened. The Technical Secretariat shall 
specify the purpose of the inspection or visit.
    46. The inspected State Party shall make any necessary 
preparations for the arrival of the inspectors and shall ensure 
their expeditious transportation from their point of entry to 
the storage facility. The facility agreement will specify 
administrative arrangements for inspectors.
    47. The inspected State Party shall provide the inspection 
team upon its arrival at the chemical weapons storage facility 
to carry out an inspection, with the following data on the 
facility:
          (a) The number of storage buildings and storage 
        locations;
          (b) For each storage building and storage location, 
        the type and the identification number or designation, 
        shown on the site diagram; and
          (c) For each storage building and storage location at 
        the facility, the number of items of each specific type 
        of chemical weapon, and, for containers that are not 
        part of binary munitions, the actual quantity of 
        chemical fill in each container.
    48. In carrying out an inventory, within the time 
available, inspectors shall have the right:
          (a) To use any of the following inspection 
        techniques:
                  (i) inventory all the chemical weapons stored 
                at the facility;
                  (ii) inventory all the chemical weapons 
                stored in specific buildings or locations at 
                the facility, as chosen by the inspectors; or
                  (iii) inventory all the chemical weapons of 
                one or more specific types stored at the 
                facility, as chosen by the inspectors; and
          (b) To check all items inventoried against agreed 
        records.
    49. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility 
agreements:
          (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage 
        facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk 
        containers, or other containers therein. While 
        conducting their activity, inspectors shall comply with 
        the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be 
        inspected will be chosen by the inspectors; and
          (b) Have the right, during the first and any 
        subsequent inspection of each chemical weapons storage 
        facility, to designate munitions, devices, and 
        containers from which samples are to be taken, and to 
        affix to such munitions, devices, and containers a 
        unique tag that will indicate an attempt to remove or 
        alter the tag. A sample shall be taken from a tagged 
        item at a chemical weapons storage facility or a 
        chemical weapons destruction facility as soon as it is 
        practically possible in accordance with the 
        corresponding destruction programmes, and, in any case, 
        not later than by the end of the destruction 
        operations.
            Systematic verification of the destruction of chemical 
                    weapons
    50. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical 
weapons shall be:
          (a) To confirm the identity and quantity of the 
        chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed; and
          (b) To confirm that these stocks have been destroyed.
    51. Chemical weapons destruction operations during the 
first 390 days after the entry into force of this Convention 
shall be governed by transitional verification arrangements. 
Such arrangements, including a transitional facility agreement, 
provisions for verification through on-site inspection and 
monitoring with on-site instruments, and the time-frame for 
application of the arrangements, shall be agreed between the 
Organization and the inspected State Party. These arrangements 
shall be approved by the Executive Council not later than 60 
days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party, taking into account the recommendations of the Technical 
Secretariat, which shall be based on an evaluation of the 
detailed facility information provided in accordance with 
paragraph 31 and a visit to the facility. The Executive Council 
shall, at its first session, establish the guidelines for such 
transitional verification arrangements, based on 
recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). The transitional 
verification arrangements shall be designed to verify, 
throughout the entire transitional period, the destruction of 
chemical weapons in accordance with the purposes set forth in 
paragraph 50, and to avoid hampering ongoing destruction 
operations.
    52. The provisions of paragraphs 53 to 61 shall apply to 
chemical weapons destruction operations that are to begin not 
earlier than 390 days after the entry into force of this 
Convention.
    53. On the basis of this Convention and the detailed 
destruction facility information, and as the case may be, on 
experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat 
shall prepare a draft plan for inspecting the destruction of 
chemical weapons at each destruction facility. The plan shall 
be completed and provided to the inspected State Party for 
comment not less than 270 days before the facility begins 
destruction operations pursuant to this Convention. Any 
differences between the Technical Secretariat and the inspected 
State Party should be resolved through consultations. Any 
unresolved matter shall be forwarded to the Executive Council 
for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full 
implementation of this Convention.
    54. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
visit to each chemical weapons destruction facility of the 
inspected State Party not less than 240 days before each 
facility begins destruction operations pursuant to this 
Convention, to allow it to familiarize itself with the facility 
and assess the adequacy of the inspection plan.
    55. In the case of an existing facility where chemical 
weapons destruction operations have already been initiated, the 
inspected State Party shall not be required to decontaminate 
the facility before the Technical Secretariat conducts an 
initial visit. The duration of the visit shall not exceed five 
days and the number of visiting personnel shall not exceed 15.
    56. The agreed detailed plans for verification, with an 
appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, shall 
be forwarded to the Executive Council for review. The Executive 
Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, 
consistent with verification objectives and obligations under 
this Convention. It should also confirm that verification 
schemes for destruction are consistent with verification aims 
and are efficient and practical. This review should be 
completed not less than 180 days before the destruction period 
begins.
    57. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy 
of the plan for verification. If there are no objections by any 
member of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into 
action.
    58. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
shall enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they 
shall be referred to the Conference.
    59. The detailed facility agreements for chemical weapons 
destruction facilities shall specify, taking into account the 
specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its 
mode of operation:
          (a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures; and
          (b) Provisions for verification through continuous 
        monitoring with on-site instruments and physical 
        presence of inspectors.
    60. Inspectors shall be granted access to each chemical 
weapons destruction facility not less than 60 days before the 
commencement of the destruction, pursuant to this Convention, 
at the facility. Such access shall be for the purpose of 
supervising the installation of the inspection equipment, 
inspecting this equipment and testing its operation, as well as 
for the purpose of carrying out a final engineering review of 
the facility. In the case of an existing facility where 
chemical weapons destruction operations have already been 
initiated, destruction operations shall be stopped for the 
minimum amount of time required, not to exceed 60 days, for 
installation and testing of the inspection equipment. Depending 
on the results of the testing and review, the State Party and 
the Technical Secretariat may agree on additions or changes to 
the detailed facility agreement for the facility.
    61. The inspected State Party shall notify, in writing, the 
inspection team leader at a chemical weapons destruction 
facility not less than four hours before the departure of each 
shipment of chemical weapons from a chemical weapons storage 
facility to that destruction facility. This notification shall 
specify the name of the storage facility, the estimated times 
of departure and arrival, the specific types and quantities of 
chemical weapons being transported, whether any tagged items 
are being moved, and the method of transportation. This 
notification may include notification of more than one 
shipment. The inspection team leader shall be promptly 
notified, in writing, of any changes in this information.
            Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons 
                    destruction facilities
    62. The inspectors shall verify the arrival of the chemical 
weapons at the destruction facility and the storing of these 
chemical weapons. The inspectors shall verify the inventory of 
each shipment, using agreed procedures consistent with facility 
safety regulations, prior to the destruction of the chemical 
weapons. They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, 
markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an 
accurate inventory of the chemical weapons prior to 
destruction.
    63. As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at 
chemical weapons storage facilities located at chemical weapons 
destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be 
subject to systematic verification in conformity with the 
relevant facility agreements.
    64. At the end of an active destruction phase, inspectors 
shall make an inventory of the chemical weapons, that have been 
removed from the storage facility, to be destroyed. They shall 
verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons 
remaining, employing inventory control procedures as referred 
to in paragraph 62.
            Systematic on-site verification measures at chemical 
                    weapons destruction facilities
    65. The inspectors shall be granted access to conduct their 
activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and 
the chemical weapons storage facilities located at such 
facilities during the entire active phase of destruction.
    66. At each chemical weapons destruction facility, to 
provide assurance that no chemical weapons are diverted and 
that the destruction process has been completed, inspectors 
shall have the right to verify through their physical presence 
and monitoring with on-site instruments:
          (a) The receipt of chemical weapons at the facility;
          (b) The temporary holding area for chemical weapons 
        and the specific type and quantity of chemical weapons 
        stored in that area;
          (c) The specific type and quantity of chemical 
        weapons being destroyed;
          (d) The process of destruction;
          (e) The end-product of destruction;
          (f) The mutilation of metal parts; and
          (g) The integrity of the destruction process and of 
        the facility as a whole.
    67. Inspectors shall have the right to tag, for sampling, 
munitions, devices, or containers located in the temporary 
holding areas at the chemical weapons destruction facilities.
    68. To the extent that it meets inspection requirements, 
information from routine facility operations, with appropriate 
data authentication, shall be used for inspection purposes.
    69. After the completion of each period of destruction, the 
Technical Secretariat shall confirm the declaration of the 
State Party, reporting the completion of destruction of the 
designated quantity of chemical weapons.
    70. Inspectors shall, in accordance with facility 
agreements:
          (a) Have unimpeded access to all parts of the 
        chemical weapons destruction facilities and the 
        chemical weapons storage facilities located at such 
        facilities, including any munitions, devices, bulk 
        containers, or other containers, therein. The items to 
        be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors in 
        accordance with the verification plan that has been 
        agreed to by the inspected State Party and approved by 
        the Executive Council;
          (b) Monitor the systematic on-site analysis of 
        samples during the destruction process; and
          (c) Receive, if necessary, samples taken at their 
        request from any devices, bulk containers and other 
        containers at the destruction facility or the storage 
        facility thereat.

                              Part IV (B)

          OLD CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. General

    1. Old chemical weapons shall be destroyed as provided for 
in Section B.
    2. Abandoned chemical weapons, including those which also 
meet the definition of Article II, paragraph 5 (b), shall be 
destroyed as provided for in Section C.

B. Regime for old chemical weapons

    3. A State Party which has on its territory old chemical 
weapons as defined in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), shall, not 
later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant 
information, including, to the extent possible, the location, 
type, quantity and the present condition of these old chemical 
weapons.
    In the case of old chemical weapons as defined in Article 
II, paragraph 5 (b), the State Party shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat a declaration pursuant to Article III, 
paragraph 1 (b) (i), including, to the extent possible, the 
information specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 1 to 3, of 
this Annex.
    4. A State Party which discovers old chemical weapons after 
this Convention enters into force for it shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat the information specified in paragraph 3 
not later than 180 days after the discovery of the old chemical 
weapons.
    5. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in 
order to verify the information submitted pursuant to 
paragraphs 3 and 4 and in particular to determine whether the 
chemical weapons meet the definition of old chemical weapons as 
specified in Article II, paragraph 5. Guidelines to determine 
the usability of chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 
1946 shall be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. A State Party shall treat old chemical weapons that have 
been confirmed by the Technical Secretariat as meeting the 
definition in Article II, paragraph 5 (a), as toxic waste. It 
shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the steps being taken 
to destroy or otherwise dispose of such old chemical weapons as 
toxic waste in accordance with its national legislation.
    7. Subject to paragraphs 3 to 5, a State Party shall 
destroy old chemical weapons that have been confirmed by the 
Technical Secretariat as meeting the definition in Article II, 
paragraph 5 (b), in accordance with Article IV and Part IV (A) 
of this Annex. Upon request of a State Party, the Executive 
Council may, however, modify the provisions on time-limit and 
order of destruction of these old chemical weapons, if it 
determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object 
and purpose of this Convention. The request shall contain 
specific proposals for modification of the provisions and a 
detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed 
modification.

C. Regime for abandoned chemical weapons

    8. A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned 
chemical weapons (hereinafter referred to as the ``Territorial 
State Party'') shall, not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical 
Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the 
abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to 
the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the 
present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as 
information on the abandonment.
    9. A State Party which discovers abandoned chemical weapons 
after this Convention enters into force for it shall, not later 
than 180 days after the discovery, submit to the Technical 
Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the 
discovered abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall 
include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity 
and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as 
well as information on the abandonment.
    10. A State Party which has abandoned chemical weapons on 
the territory of another State Party (hereinafter referred to 
as the ``Abandoning State Party'') shall, not later than 30 
days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to 
the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information 
concerning the abandoned chemical weapons. This information 
shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, 
quantity as well as information on the abandonment, and the 
condition of the abandoned chemical weapons.
    11. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection, and any further inspections as may be necessary, in 
order to verify all available relevant information submitted 
pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 10 and determine whether systematic 
verification in accordance with Part IV (A), paragraphs 41 to 
43, of this Annex is required. It shall, if necessary, verify 
the origin of the abandoned chemical weapons and establish 
evidence concerning the abandonment and the identity of the 
Abandoning State.
    12. The report of the Technical Secretariat shall be 
submitted to the Executive Council, the Territorial State 
Party, and to the Abandoning State Party or the State Party 
declared by the Territorial State Party or identified by the 
Technical Secretariat as having abandoned the chemical weapons. 
If one of the States Parties directly concerned is not 
satisfied with the report it shall have the right to settle the 
matter in accordance with provisions of this Convention or 
bring the issue to the Executive Council with a view to 
settling the matter expeditiously.
    13. Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3, the Territorial 
State Party shall have the right to request the State Party 
which has been established as the Abandoning State Party 
pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 12 to enter into consultations for 
the purpose of destroying the abandoned chemical weapons in 
cooperation with the Territorial State Party. It shall 
immediately inform the Technical Secretariat of this request.
    14. Consultations between the Territorial State Party and 
the Abandoning State Party with a view to establishing a 
mutually agreed plan for destruction shall begin not later than 
30 days after the Technical Secretariat has been informed of 
the request referred to in paragraph 13. The mutually agreed 
plan for destruction shall be transmitted to the Technical 
Secretariat not later than 180 days after the Technical 
Secretariat has been informed of the request referred to in 
paragraph 13. Upon the request of the Abandoning State Party 
and the Territorial State Party, the Executive Council may 
extend the time-limit for transmission of the mutually agreed 
plan for destruction.
    15. For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical 
weapons, the Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary 
financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other 
resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide 
appropriate cooperation.
    16. If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not 
a State Party, the Territorial State Party, in order to ensure 
the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons, may 
request the Organization and other States Parties to provide 
assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical 
weapons.
    17. Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16, Article IV and Part IV 
(A) of this Annex shall also apply to the destruction of 
abandoned chemical weapons. In the case of abandoned chemical 
weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical weapons 
in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the 
request of the Territorial State Party, individually or 
together with the Abandoning State Party, may modify or in 
exceptional cases suspend the application of provisions on 
destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. In the case 
of abandoned chemical weapons which do not meet the definition 
of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the 
Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State 
Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State 
Party, may in exceptional circumstances modify the provisions 
on the time-limit and the order of destruction, if it 
determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object 
and purpose of this Convention. Any request as referred to in 
this paragraph shall contain specific proposals for 
modification of the provisions and a detailed explanation of 
the reasons for the proposed modification.
    18. States Parties may conclude between themselves 
agreements or arrangements concerning the destruction of 
abandoned chemical weapons. The Executive Council may, upon 
request of the Territorial State Party, individually or 
together with the Abandoning State Party, decide that selected 
provisions of such agreements or arrangements take precedence 
over provisions of this Section, if it determines that the 
agreement or arrangement ensures the destruction of the 
abandoned chemical weapons in accordance with paragraph 17.

                                 Part V

     DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND ITS 
                   VERIFICATION PURSUANT TO ARTICLE V

A. Declarations

            Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities
    1. The declaration of chemical weapons production 
facilities by a State Party pursuant to Article III, paragraph 
1 (c) (ii), shall contain for each facility:
          (a) The name of the facility, the names of the 
        owners, and the names of the companies or enterprises 
        operating the facility since 1 January 1946;
          (b) The precise location of the facility, including 
        the address, location of the complex, location of the 
        facility within the complex including the specific 
        building and structure number, if any;
          (c) A statement whether it is a facility for the 
        manufacture of chemicals that are defined as chemical 
        weapons or whether it is a facility for the filling of 
        chemical weapons, or both;
          (d) The date when the construction of the facility 
        was completed and the periods during which any 
        modifications to the facility were made, including the 
        installation of new or modified equipment, that 
        significantly changed the production process 
        characteristics of the facility;
          (e) Information on the chemicals defined as chemical 
        weapons that were manufactured at the facility; the 
        munitions, devices, and containers that were filled at 
        the facility; and the dates of the beginning and 
        cessation of such manufacture or filling:
                  (i) For chemicals defined as chemical weapons 
                that were manufactured at the facility, such 
                information shall be expressed in terms of the 
                specific types of chemicals manufactured, 
                indicating the chemical name in accordance with 
                the current International Union of Pure and 
                Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) nomenclature, 
                structural formula, and the Chemical Abstracts 
                Service registry number, if assigned, and in 
                terms of the amount of each chemical expressed 
                by weight of chemical in tonnes;
                  (ii) For munitions, devices and containers 
                that were filled at the facility, such 
                information shall be expressed in terms of the 
                specific type of chemical weapons filled and 
                the weight of the chemical fill per unit;
          (f) The production capacity of the chemical weapons 
        production facility:
                  (i) For a facility where chemical weapons 
                were manufactured, production capacity shall be 
                expressed in terms of the annual quantitative 
                potential for manufacturing a specific 
                substance on the basis of the technological 
                process actually used or, in the case of 
                processes not actually used, planned to be used 
                at the facility;
                  (ii) For a facility where chemical weapons 
                were filled, production capacity shall be 
                expressed in terms of the quantity of chemical 
                that the facility can fill into each specific 
                type of chemical weapon a year;
          (g) For each chemical weapons production facility 
        that has not been destroyed, a description of the 
        facility, including:
                  (i) A site diagram;
                  (ii) A process flow diagram of the facility; 
                and
                  (iii) An inventory of buildings at the 
                facility, and specialized equipment at the 
                facility and of any spare parts for such 
                equipment;
          (h) The present status of the facility, stating:
                  (i) The date when chemical weapons were last 
                produced at the facility;
                  (ii) Whether the facility has been destroyed, 
                including the date and manner of its 
                destruction; and
                  (iii) Whether the facility has been used or 
                modified before entry into force of this 
                Convention for an activity not related to the 
                production of chemical weapons, and if so, 
                information on what modifications have been 
                made, the date such non-chemical weapons 
                related activity began and the nature of such 
                activity, indicating, if applicable, the kind 
                of product;
          (i) A specification of the measures that have been 
        taken by the State Party for closure of, and a 
        description of the measures that have been or will be 
        taken by the State Party to inactivate the facility;
          (j) A description of the normal pattern of activity 
        for safety and security at the inactivated facility; 
        and
          (k) A statement as to whether the facility will be 
        converted for the destruction of chemical weapons and, 
        if so, the dates for such conversions.
            Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities 
                    pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii)
    2. The declaration of chemical weapons production 
facilities pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), 
shall contain all information specified in paragraph 1 above. 
It is the responsibility of the State Party on whose territory 
the facility is or has been located to make appropriate 
arrangements with the other State to ensure that the 
declarations are made. If the State Party on whose territory 
the facility is or has been located is not able to fulfil this 
obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.
            Declarations of past transfers and receipts
    3. A State Party that has transferred or received chemical 
weapons production equipment since 1 January 1946 shall declare 
these transfers and receipts pursuant to Article III, paragraph 
1 (c) (iv), and in accordance with paragraph 5 below. When not 
all the specified information is available for transfer and 
receipt of such equipment for the period between 1 January 1946 
and 1 January 1970, the State Party shall declare whatever 
information is still available to it and provide an explanation 
as to why it cannot submit a full declaration.
    4. Chemical weapons production equipment referred to in 
paragraph 3 means:
          (a) Specialized equipment;
          (b) Equipment for the production of equipment 
        specifically designed for use directly in connection 
        with chemical weapons employment; and
          (c) Equipment designed or used exclusively for 
        producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions.
    5. The declaration concerning transfer and receipt of 
chemical weapons production equipment shall specify:
          (a) Who received/transferred the chemical weapons 
        production equipment;
          (b) The identity of such equipment;
          (c) The date of transfer or receipt;
          (d) Whether the equipment was destroyed, if known; 
        and
          (e) Current disposition, if known.
            Submission of general plans for destruction
    6. For each chemical weapons production facility, a State 
Party shall supply the following information:
          (a) Envisaged time-frame for measures to be taken; 
        and
          (b) Methods of destruction.
    7. For each chemical weapons production facility that a 
State Party intends to convert temporarily into a chemical 
weapons destruction facility, the State Party shall supply the 
following information:
          (a) Envisaged time-frame for conversion into a 
        destruction facility;
          (b) Envisaged time-frame for utilizing the facility 
        as a chemical weapons destruction facility;
          (c) Description of the new facility;
          (d) Method of destruction of special equipment;
          (e) Time-frame for destruction of the converted 
        facility after it has been utilized to destroy chemical 
        weapons; and
          (f) Method of destruction of the converted facility.
            Submission of annual plans for destruction and annual 
                    reports on destruction
    8. The State Party shall submit an annual plan for 
destruction not less than 90 days before the beginning of the 
coming destruction year. The annual plan shall specify:
          (a) Capacity to be destroyed;
          (b) Name and location of the facilities where 
        destruction will take place;
          (c) List of buildings and equipment that will be 
        destroyed at each facility; and
          (d) Planned method(s) of destruction.
    9. A State Party shall submit an annual report on 
destruction not later than 90 days after the end of the 
previous destruction year. The annual report shall specify:
          (a) Capacity destroyed;
          (b) Name and location of each facility where 
        destruction took place;
          (c) List of buildings and equipment that were 
        destroyed at each facility;
          (d) Methods of destruction.
    10. For a chemical weapons production facility declared 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1 (c) (iii), it is the 
responsibility of the State Party on whose territory the 
facility is or has been located to make appropriate 
arrangements to ensure that the declarations specified in 
paragraphs 6 to 9 above are made. If the State Party on whose 
territory the facility is or has been located is not able to 
fulfil this obligation, it shall state the reasons therefor.

B. Destruction

            General principles for destruction of chemical weapons 
                    production facilities
    11. Each State Party shall decide on methods to be applied 
for the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, 
according to the principles laid down in Article V and in this 
Part.
            Principles and methods for closure of a chemical weapons 
                    production facility
    12. The purpose of the closure of a chemical weapons 
production facility is to render it inactive.
    13. Agreed measures for closure shall be taken by a State 
Party with due regard to the specific characteristics of each 
facility. Such measures shall include, inter alia:
          (a) Prohibition of occupation of the specialized 
        buildings and standard buildings of the facility except 
        for agreed activities;
          (b) Disconnection of equipment directly related to 
        the production of chemical weapons, including, inter 
        alia, process control equipment and utilities;
          (c) Decommissioning of protective installations and 
        equipment used exclusively for the safety of operations 
        of the chemical weapons production facility;
          (d) Installation of blind flanges and other devices 
        to prevent the addition of chemicals to, or the removal 
        of chemicals from, any specialized process equipment 
        for synthesis, separation or purification of chemicals 
        defined as a chemical weapon, any storage tank, or any 
        machine for filling chemical weapons, the heating, 
        cooling, or supply of electrical or other forms of 
        power to such equipment, storage tanks, or machines; 
        and
          (e) Interruption of rail, road and other access 
        routes for heavy transport to the chemical weapons 
        production facility except those required for agreed 
        activities.
    14. While the chemical weapons production facility remains 
closed, a State Party may continue safety and physical security 
activities at the facility.
            Technical maintenance of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities prior to their destruction
    15. A State Party may carry out standard maintenance 
activities at chemical weapons production facilities only for 
safety reasons, including visual inspection, preventive 
maintenance, and routine repairs.
    16. All planned maintenance activities shall be specified 
in the general and detailed plans for destruction. Maintenance 
activities shall not include:
          (a) Replacement of any process equipment;
          (b) Modification of the characteristics of the 
        chemical process equipment;
          (c) Production of chemicals of any type.
    17. All maintenance activities shall be subject to 
monitoring by the Technical Secretariat.
            Principles and methods for temporary conversion of chemical 
                    weapons production facilities into chemical weapons 
                    destruction facilities
    18. Measures pertaining to the temporary conversion of 
chemical weapons production facilities into chemical weapons 
destruction facilities shall ensure that the regime for the 
temporarily converted facilities is at least as stringent as 
the regime for chemical weapons production facilities that have 
not been converted.
    19. Chemical weapons production facilities converted into 
chemical weapons destruction facilities before entry into force 
of this Convention shall be declared under the category of 
chemical weapons production facilities.
    They shall be subject to an initial visit by inspectors, 
who shall confirm the correctness of the information about 
these facilities. Verification that the conversion of these 
facilities was performed in such a manner as to render them 
inoperable as chemical weapons production facilities shall also 
be required, and shall fall within the framework of measures 
provided for the facilities that are to be rendered inoperable 
not later than 90 days after entry into force of this 
Convention.
    20. A State Party that intends to carry out a conversion of 
chemical weapons production facilities shall submit to the 
Technical Secretariat, not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it, or not later than 30 days 
after a decision has been taken for temporary conversion, a 
general facility conversion plan, and subsequently shall submit 
annual plans.
    21. Should a State Party have the need to convert to a 
chemical weapons destruction facility an additional chemical 
weapons production facility that had been closed after this 
Convention entered into force for it, it shall inform the 
Technical Secretariat thereof not less than 150 days before 
conversion. The Technical Secretariat, in conjunction with the 
State Party, shall make sure that the necessary measures are 
taken to render that facility, after its conversion, inoperable 
as a chemical weapons production facility.
    22. A facility converted for the destruction of chemical 
weapons shall not be more fit for resuming chemical weapons 
production than a chemical weapons production facility which 
has been closed and is under maintenance. Its reactivation 
shall require no less time than that required for a chemical 
weapons production facility that has been closed and is under 
maintenance.
    23. Converted chemical weapons production facilities shall 
be destroyed not later than 10 years after entry into force of 
this Convention.
    24. Any measures for the conversion of any given chemical 
weapons production facility shall be facility-specific and 
shall depend upon its individual characteristics.
    25. The set of measures carried out for the purpose of 
converting a chemical weapons production facility into a 
chemical weapons destruction facility shall not be less than 
that which is provided for the disabling of other chemical 
weapons production facilities to be carried out not later than 
90 days after this Convention enters into force for the State 
Party.
            Principles and methods related to destruction of a chemical 
                    weapons production facility
    26. A State Party shall destroy equipment and buildings 
covered by the definition of a chemical weapons production 
facility as follows:
          (a) All specialized equipment and standard equipment 
        shall be physically destroyed;
          (b) All specialized buildings and standard buildings 
        shall be physically destroyed.
    27. A State Party shall destroy facilities for producing 
unfilled chemical munitions and equipment for chemical weapons 
employment as follows:
           (a) Facilities used exclusively for production of 
        non-chemical parts for chemical munitions or equipment 
        specifically designed for use directly in connection 
        with chemical weapons employment, shall be declared and 
        destroyed. The destruction process and its verification 
        shall be conducted according to the provisions of 
        Article V and this Part of this Annex that govern 
        destruction of chemical weapons production facilities;
          (b) All equipment designed or used exclusively for 
        producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions 
        shall be physically destroyed. Such equipment, which 
        includes specially designed molds and metal-forming 
        dies, may be brought to a special location for 
        destruction;
          (c) All buildings and standard equipment used for 
        such production activities shall be destroyed or 
        converted for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention, with confirmation, as necessary, through 
        consultations and inspections as provided for under 
        Article IX;
          (d) Activities for purposes not prohibited under this 
        Convention may continue while destruction or conversion 
        proceeds.
            Order of destruction
    28. The order of destruction of chemical weapons production 
facilities is based on the obligations specified in Article I 
and the other Articles of this Convention, including 
obligations regarding systematic on-site verification. It takes 
into account interests of States Parties for undiminished 
security during the destruction period; confidence-building in 
the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of 
experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons 
production facilities; and applicability irrespective of the 
actual characteristics of the facilities and the methods chosen 
for their destruction. The order of destruction is based on the 
principle of levelling out.
    29. A State Party shall, for each destruction period, 
determine which chemical weapons production facilities are to 
be destroyed and carry out the destruction in such a way that 
not more than what is specified in paragraphs 30 and 31 remains 
at the end of each destruction period. A State Party is not 
precluded from destroying its facilities at a faster pace.
    30. The following provisions shall apply to chemical 
weapons production facilities that produce Schedule 1 
chemicals:
          (a) A State Party shall start the destruction of such 
        facilities not later than one year after this 
        Convention enters into force for it, and shall complete 
        it not later than 10 years after entry into force of 
        this Convention. For a State which is a Party at the 
        entry into force of this Convention, this overall 
        period shall be divided into three separate destruction 
        periods, namely, years 2-5, years 6-8, and years 9-10. 
        For States which become a Party after entry into force 
        of this Convention, the destruction periods shall be 
        adapted, taking into account paragraphs 28 and 29;
          (b) Production capacity shall be used as the 
        comparison factor for such facilities. It shall be 
        expressed in agent tonnes, taking into account the 
        rules specified for binary chemical weapons;
          (c) Appropriate agreed levels of production capacity 
        shall be established for the end of the eighth year 
        after entry into force of this Convention. Production 
        capacity that exceeds the relevant level shall be 
        destroyed in equal increments during the first two 
        destruction periods;
          (d) A requirement to destroy a given amount of 
        capacity shall entail a requirement to destroy any 
        other chemical weapons production facility that 
        supplied the Schedule 1 facility or filled the Schedule 
        1 chemical produced there into munitions or devices; 
        and
          (e) Chemical weapons production facilities that have 
        been converted temporarily for destruction of chemical 
        weapons shall continue to be subject to the obligation 
        to destroy capacity according to the provisions of this 
        paragraph.
    31. A State Party shall start the destruction of chemical 
weapons production facilities not covered in paragraph 30 not 
later than one year after this Convention enters into force for 
it, and complete it not later than five years after entry into 
force of this Convention.
            Detailed plans for destruction
    32. Not less than 180 days before the destruction of a 
chemical weapons production facility starts, a State Party 
shall provide to the Technical Secretariat the detailed plans 
for destruction of the facility, including proposed measures 
for verification of destruction referred to in paragraph 33 
(f), with respect to, inter alia:
          (a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the 
        facility to be destroyed; and
          (b) Procedures for verification of measures to be 
        applied to each item on the declared inventory.
    33. The detailed plans for destruction of each chemical 
weapons production facility shall contain:
          (a) Detailed time schedule of the destruction 
        process;
          (b) Layout of the facility;
          (c) Process flow diagram;
          (d) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and 
        other items to be destroyed;
          (e) Measures to be applied to each item on the 
        inventory;
          (f) Proposed measures for verification;
          (g) Security/safety measures to be observed during 
        the destruction of the facility; and
          (h) Working and living conditions to be provided for 
        inspectors.
    34. If a State Party intends to convert temporarily a 
chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons 
destruction facility, it shall notify the Technical Secretariat 
not less than 150 days before undertaking any conversion 
activities. The notification shall:
          (a) Specify the name, address, and location of the 
        facility;
          (b) Provide a site diagram indicating all structures 
        and areas that will be involved in the destruction of 
        chemical weapons and also identify all structures of 
        the chemical weapons production facility that are to be 
        temporarily converted;
          (c) Specify the types of chemical weapons, and the 
        type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed;
          (d) Specify the destruction method;
          (e) Provide a process flow diagram, indicating which 
        portions of the production process and specialized 
        equipment will be converted for the destruction of 
        chemical weapons;
          (f) Specify the seals and inspection equipment 
        potentially affected by the conversion, if applicable; 
        and
          (g) Provide a schedule identifying: The time 
        allocated to design, temporary conversion of the 
        facility, installation of equipment, equipment check-
        out, destruction operations, and closure.
    35. In relation to the destruction of a facility that was 
temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons, 
information shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 32 
and 33.
            Review of detailed plans
    36. On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and 
proposed measures for verification submitted by the State 
Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the 
destruction of the facility, consulting closely with the State 
Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and 
the State Party concerning appropriate measures should be 
resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be 
forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with 
a view to facilitating the full implementation of this 
Convention.
    37. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this 
Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for destruction and 
verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council 
and the State Party. This agreement should be completed, not 
less than 60 days before the planned initiation of destruction.
    38. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy 
of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there 
are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the 
plan shall be put into action.
    39. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
shall enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they 
shall be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any 
differences over methods of destruction shall not delay the 
execution of other parts of the destruction plan that are 
acceptable.
    40. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council 
on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification 
plan cannot be put into action, verification of destruction 
shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site 
instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
    41. Destruction and verification shall proceed according to 
the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere 
with the destruction process and shall be conducted through the 
presence of inspectors on-site to witness the destruction.
    42. If required verification or destruction actions are not 
taken as planned, all States Parties shall be so informed.

C. Verification

            Verification of declarations of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities through on-site inspection
    43. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct an initial 
inspection of each chemical weapons production facility in the 
period between 90 and 120 days after this Convention enters 
into force for the State Party.
    44. The purposes of the initial inspection shall be:
          (a) To confirm that the production of chemical 
        weapons has ceased and that the facility has been 
        inactivated in accordance with this Convention;
          (b) To permit the Technical Secretariat to 
        familiarize itself with the measures that have been 
        taken to cease production of chemical weapons at the 
        facility;
          (c) To permit the inspectors to install temporary 
        seals;
          (d) To permit the inspectors to confirm the inventory 
        of buildings and specialized equipment;
          (e) To obtain information necessary for planning 
        inspection activities at the facility, including use of 
        tamper-indicating seals and other agreed equipment, 
        which shall be installed pursuant to the detailed 
        facility agreement for the facility; and
          (f) To conduct preliminary discussions regarding a 
        detailed agreement on inspection procedures at the 
        facility.
    45. Inspectors shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, 
markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an 
accurate inventory of the declared items at each chemical 
weapons production facility.
    46. Inspectors shall install such agreed devices as may be 
necessary to indicate if any resumption of production of 
chemical weapons occurs or if any declared item is removed. 
They shall take the necessary precaution not to hinder closure 
activities by the inspected State Party. Inspectors may return 
to maintain and verify the integrity of the devices.
    47. If, on the basis of the initial inspection, the 
Director-General believes that additional measures are 
necessary to inactivate the facility in accordance with this 
Convention, the Director-General may request, not later than 
135 days after this Convention enters into force; for a State 
Party, that such measures be implemented by the inspected State 
Party not later than 180 days after this Convention enters into 
force for it. At its discretion, the inspected State Party may 
satisfy the request. If it does not satisfy the request, the 
inspected State Party and the Director-General shall consult to 
resolve the matter.
            Systematic verification of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities and cessation of their activities
    48. The purpose of the systematic verification of a 
chemical weapons production facility shall be to ensure that 
any resumption of production of chemical weapons or removal of 
declared items will be detected at this facility.
    49. The detailed facility agreement for each chemical 
weapons production facility shall specify:
          (a) Detailed on-site inspection procedures, which may 
        include:
                  (i) Visual examinations;
                  (ii) Checking and servicing of seals and 
                other agreed devices; and
                  (iii) Obtaining and analyzing samples;
          (b) Procedures for using tamper-indicating seals and 
        other agreed equipment to prevent the undetected 
        reactivation of the facility, which shall specify:
                  (i) The type, placement, and arrangements for 
                installation; and
                  (ii) The maintenance of such seals and 
                equipment; and
          (c) Other agreed measures.
    50. The seals or other approved equipment provided for in a 
detailed agreement on inspection measures for that facility 
shall be placed not later than 240 days after this Convention 
enters into force for a State Party. Inspectors shall be 
permitted to visit each chemical weapons production facility 
for the installation of such seals or equipment.
    51. During each calendar year, the Technical Secretariat 
shall be permitted to conduct up to four inspections of each 
chemical weapons production facility.
    52. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State 
Party of his decision to inspect or visit a chemical weapons 
production facility 48 hours before the planned arrival of the 
inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or 
visits. In the case of inspections or visits to resolve urgent 
problems, this period may be shortened. The Director-General 
shall specify the purpose of the inspection or visit.
    53. Inspectors shall, in accordance with the facility 
agreements, have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical 
weapons production facilities. The items on the declared 
inventory to be inspected shall be chosen by the inspectors.
    54. The guidelines for determining the frequency of 
systematic on-site inspections shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i). 
The particular production facility to be inspected shall be 
chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to 
preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be 
inspected.
            Verification of destruction of chemical weapons production 
                    facilities
    55. The purpose of systematic verification of the 
destruction of chemical weapons production facilities shall be 
to confirm that the facility is destroyed in accordance with 
the obligations under this Convention and that each item on the 
declared inventory is destroyed in accordance with the agreed 
detailed plan for destruction.
    56. When all items on the declared inventory have been 
destroyed, the Technical Secretariat shall confirm the 
declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this 
confirmation, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the 
systematic verification of the chemical weapons production 
facility and shall promptly remove all devices and monitoring 
instruments installed by the inspectors.
    57. After this confirmation, the State Party shall make the 
declaration that the facility has been destroyed.
            Verification of temporary conversion of a chemical weapons 
                    production facility into a chemical weapons 
                    destruction facility
    58. Not later than 90 days after receiving the initial 
notification of the intent to convert temporarily a production 
facility, the inspectors shall have the right to visit the 
facility to familiarize themselves with the proposed temporary 
conversion and to study possible inspection measures that will 
be required during the conversion.
    59. Not later than 60 days after such a visit, the 
Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party shall 
conclude a transition agreement containing additional 
inspection measures for the temporary conversion period. The 
transition agreement shall specify inspection procedures, 
including the use of seals, monitoring equipment, and 
inspections, that will provide confidence that no chemical 
weapons production takes place during the conversion process. 
This agreement shall remain in force from the beginning of the 
temporary conversion activity until the facility begins 
operation as a chemical weapons destruction facility.
    60. The inspected State Party shall not remove or convert 
any portion of the facility, or remove or modify any seal or 
other agreed inspection equipment that may have been installed 
pursuant to this Convention until the transition agreement has 
been concluded.
    61. Once the facility begins operation as a chemical 
weapons destruction facility, it shall be subject to the 
provisions of Part IV (A) of this Annex applicable to chemical 
weapons destruction facilities. Arrangements for the pre-
operation period shall be governed by the transition agreement.
    62. During destruction operations the inspectors shall have 
access to all portions of the temporarily converted chemical 
weapons production facilities, including those that are not 
directly involved with the destruction of chemical weapons.
    63. Before the commencement of work at the facility to 
convert it temporarily for chemical weapons destruction 
purposes and after the facility has ceased to function as a 
facility for chemical weapons destruction, the facility shall 
be subject to the provisions of this Part applicable to 
chemical weapons production facilities.

D. Conversion of chemical weapons production facilities to purposes not 
        prohibited under this convention

            Procedures for requesting conversion
    64. A request to use a chemical weapons production facility 
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be made 
for any facility that a State Party is already using for such 
purposes before this Convention enters into force for it, or 
that it plans to use for such purposes.
    65. For a chemical weapons production facility that is 
being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention 
when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the 
request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later 
than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party. The request shall contain, in addition to data 
submitted in accordance with paragraph 1 (h) (iii), the 
following information:
          (a) A detailed justification for the request;
          (b) A general facility conversion plan that 
        specifies:
                  (i) The nature of the activity to be 
                conducted at the facility;
                  (ii) If the planned activity involves 
                production, processing, or consumption of 
                chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, 
                the flow diagram of the facility, and the 
                quantities planned to be produced, processed, 
                or consumed annually;
                  (iii) Which buildings or structures are 
                proposed to be used and what modifications are 
                proposed, if any;
                  (iv) Which buildings or structures have been 
                destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and 
                the plans for destruction;
                  (v) What equipment is to be used in the 
                facility;
                  (vi) What equipment has been removed and 
                destroyed and what equipment is proposed to be 
                removed and destroyed and the plans for its 
                destruction;
                  (vii) The proposed schedule for conversion, 
                if applicable; and
                  (viii) The nature of the activity of each 
                other facility operating at the site; and
          (c) A detailed explanation of how measures set forth 
        in subparagraph (b), as well as any other measures 
        proposed by the State Party, will ensure the prevention 
        of standby chemical weapons production capability at 
        the facility.
    66. For a chemical weapons production facility that is not 
being used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention 
when this Convention enters into force for the State Party, the 
request shall be submitted to the Director-General not later 
than 30 days after the decision to convert, but in no case 
later than four years after this Convention enters into force 
for the State Party. The request shall contain the following 
information:
         (a) A detailed justification for the request, 
        including its economic needs;
         (b) A general facility conversion plan that specifies:
                  (i) The nature of the activity planned to be 
                conducted at the facility;
                  (ii) If the planned activity involves 
                production, processing, or consumption of 
                chemicals: the name of each of the chemicals, 
                the flow diagram of the facility, and the 
                quantities planned to be produced, processed, 
                or consumed annually;
                  (iii) Which buildings or structures are 
                proposed to be retained and what modifications 
                are proposed, if any;
                  (iv) Which buildings or structures have been 
                destroyed or are proposed to be destroyed and 
                the plans for destruction;
                  (v) What equipment is proposed for use in the 
                facility;
                  (vi) What equipment is proposed to be removed 
                and destroyed and the plans for its 
                destruction;
                  (vii) The proposed schedule for conversion; 
                and
                  (viii) The nature of the activity of each 
                other facility operating at the site; and
          (c) A detailed explanation of how the measures set 
        forth in subparagraph (b), as well as any other 
        measures proposed by the State Party, will ensure the 
        prevention of standby chemical weapons production 
        capability at the facility.
    67. The State Party may propose in its request any other 
measures it deems appropriate to build confidence.
            Actions pending a decision
    68. Pending a decision of the Conference, a State Party may 
continue to use for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention a facility that was being used for such purposes 
before this Convention enters into force for it, but only if 
the State Party certifies in its request that no specialized 
equipment and no specialized buildings are being used and that 
the specialized equipment and specialized buildings have been 
rendered inactive using the methods specified in paragraph 13.
    69. If the facility, for which the request was made, was 
not being used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention before this Convention enters into force for the 
State Party, or if the certification required in paragraph 68 
is not made, the State Party shall cease immediately all 
activity pursuant to Article V, paragraph 4. The State Party 
shall close the facility in accordance with paragraph 13 not 
later than 90 days after this Convention enters into force for 
it.
            Conditions for conversion
    70. As a condition for conversion of a chemical weapons 
production facility for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention, all specialized equipment at the facility must be 
destroyed and all special features of buildings and structures 
that distinguish them from buildings and structures normally 
used for purposes not prohibited under this Convention and not 
involving Schedule 1 chemicals must be eliminated.
    71. A converted facility shall not be used:
          (a) For any activity involving production, 
        processing, or consumption of a Schedule 1 chemical or 
        a Schedule 2 chemical; or
          (b) For the production of any highly toxic chemical, 
        including any highly toxic organophosphorus chemical, 
        or for any other activity that would require special 
        equipment for handling highly toxic or highly corrosive 
        chemicals, unless the Executive Council decides that 
        such production or activity would pose no risk to the 
        object and purpose of this Convention, taking into 
        account criteria for toxicity, corrosiveness and, if 
        applicable, other technical factors, to be considered 
        and approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
        VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    72. Conversion of a chemical weapons production facility 
shall be completed not later than six years after entry into 
force of this Convention.
            Decisions by the Executive Council and the Conference
    73. Not later than 90 days after receipt of the request by 
the Director-General, an initial inspection of the facility 
shall be conducted by the Technical Secretariat. The purpose of 
this inspection shall be to determine the accuracy of the 
information provided in the request, to obtain information on 
the technical characteristics of the proposed converted 
facility, and to assess the conditions under which use for 
purposes not prohibited under this Convention may be permitted. 
The Director-General shall promptly submit a report to the 
Executive Council, the Conference, and all States Parties 
containing his recommendations on the measures necessary to 
convert the facility to purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention and to provide assurance that the converted facility 
will be used only for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.
    74. If the facility has been used for purposes not 
prohibited under this Convention before this Convention enters 
into force for the State Party, and is continuing to be in 
operation, but the measures required to be certified under 
paragraph 68 have not been taken, the Director-General shall 
immediately inform the Executive Council, which may require 
implementation of measures it deems appropriate, inter alia, 
shut-down of the facility and removal of specialized equipment 
and modification of buildings or structures. The Executive 
Council shall stipulate the deadline for implementation of 
these measures and shall suspend consideration of the request 
pending their satisfactory completion. The facility shall be 
inspected promptly after the expiration of the deadline to 
determine whether the measures have been implemented. If not, 
the State Party shall be required to shut down completely all 
facility operations.
    75. As soon as possible after receiving the report of the 
Director-General, the Conference, upon recommendation of the 
Executive Council, shall decide, taking into account the report 
and any views expressed by States Parties, whether to approve 
the request, and shall establish the conditions upon which 
approval is contingent. If any State Party objects to approval 
of the request and the associated conditions, consultations 
shall be undertaken among interested States Parties for up to 
90 days to seek a mutually acceptable solution. A decision on 
the request and associated conditions, along with any proposed 
modifications thereto, shall be taken, as a matter of 
substance, as soon as possible after the end of the 
consultation period.
    76. If the request is approved, a facility agreement shall 
be completed not later than 90 days after such a decision is 
taken. The facility agreement shall contain the conditions 
under which the conversion and use of the facility is 
permitted, including measures for verification. Conversion 
shall not begin before the facility agreement is concluded.
            Detailed plans for conversion
    77. Not less than 180 days before conversion of a chemical 
weapons production facility is planned to begin, the State 
Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the detailed 
plans for conversion of the facility, including proposed 
measures for verification of conversion, with respect to, inter 
alia:
          (a) Timing of the presence of the inspectors at the 
        facility to be converted; and
          (b) Procedures for verification of measures to be 
        applied to each item on the declared inventory.
    78. The detailed plan for conversion of each chemical 
weapons production facility shall contain:
          (a) Detailed time schedule of the conversion process;
          (b) Layout of the facility before and after 
        conversion;
          (c) Process flow diagram of the facility before, and 
        as appropriate, after the conversion;
          (d) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and 
        structures and other items to be destroyed and of the 
        buildings and structures to be modified;
          (e) Measures to be applied to each item on the 
        inventory, if any;
          (f) Proposed measures for verification;
          (g) Security/safety measures to be observed during 
        the conversion of the facility; and
          (h) Working and living conditions to be provided for 
        inspectors.
            Review of detailed plans
    79. On the basis of the detailed plan for conversion and 
proposed measures for verification submitted by the State 
Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the 
conversion of the facility, consulting closely with the State 
Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and 
the State Party concerning appropriate measures shall be 
resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be 
forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with 
a view to facilitate the full implementation of this 
Convention.
    80. To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this 
Part are fulfilled, the combined plans for conversion and 
verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council 
and the State Party. This agreement shall be completed not less 
than 60 days before conversion is planned to begin.
    81. Each member of the Executive Council may consult with 
the Technical Secretariat on any issue regarding the adequacy 
of the combined plan for conversion and verification. If there 
are no objections by any member of the Executive Council, the 
plan shall be put into action.
    82. If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council 
should enter into consultations with the State Party to 
reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved, they 
should be referred to the Conference. The resolution of any 
differences over methods of conversion should not delay the 
execution of other parts of the conversion plan that are 
acceptable.
    83. If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council 
on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification 
plan cannot be put into action, verification of conversion 
shall proceed through continuous monitoring with on-site 
instruments and physical presence of inspectors.
    84. Conversion and verification shall proceed according to 
the agreed plan. The verification shall not unduly interfere 
with the conversion process and shall be conducted through the 
presence of inspectors to confirm the conversion.
    85. For the 10 years after the Director-General certifies 
that conversion is complete, the State Party shall provide to 
inspectors unimpeded access to the facility at any time. The 
inspectors shall have the right to observe all areas, all 
activities, and all items of equipment at the facility. The 
inspectors shall have the right to verify that the activities 
at the facility are consistent with any conditions established 
under this Section, by the Executive Council and the 
Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right, in 
accordance with provisions of Part II, Section E, of this Annex 
to receive samples from any area of the facility and to analyze 
them to verify the absence of Schedule 1 chemicals, their 
stable by-products and decomposition products and of Schedule 2 
chemicals and to verify that the activities at the facility are 
consistent with any other conditions on chemical activities 
established under this Section, by the Executive Council and 
the Conference. The inspectors shall also have the right to 
managed access, in accordance with Part X, Section C, of this 
Annex, to the plant site at which the facility is located. 
During the 10-year period, the State Party shall report 
annually on the activities at the converted facility. Upon 
completion of the 10-year period, the Executive Council, taking 
into account recommendations of the Technical Secretariat, 
shall decide on the nature of continued verification measures.
    86. Costs of verification of the converted facility shall 
be allocated in accordance with Article V, paragraph 19.

                                PART VI

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. General Provisions

    1. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain or use 
Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States Parties 
and shall not transfer such chemicals outside its territory 
except to another State Party.
    2. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, 
transfer or use Schedule 1 chemicals unless:
          (a) The chemicals are applied to research, medical, 
        pharmaceutical or protective purposes; and
          (b) The types and quantities of chemicals are 
        strictly limited to those which can be justified for 
        such purposes; and
          (c) The aggregate amount of such chemicals at any 
        given time for such purposes is equal to or less than 1 
        tonne; and
          (d) The aggregate amount for such purposes acquired 
        by a State Party in any year through production, 
        withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is 
        equal to or less than 1 tonne.

B. Transfers

    3. A State Party may transfer Schedule 1 chemicals outside 
its territory only to another State Party and only for 
research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes in 
accordance with paragraph 2.
    4. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a 
third State.
    5. Not less than 30 days before any transfer to another 
State Party both States Parties shall notify the Technical 
Secretariat of the transfer.
    6. Each State Party shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding transfers during the previous year. The 
declaration shall be submitted not later than 90 days after the 
end of that year and shall for each Schedule 1 chemical that 
has been transferred include the following information:
          (a) The chemical name, structural formula and 
        Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
        assigned;
          (b) The quantity acquired from other States or 
        transferred to other States Parties. For each transfer 
        the quantity, recipient and purpose shall be included.

C. Production

            General principles for production
    7. Each State Party, during production under paragraphs 8 
to 12, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety 
of people and to protecting the environment. Each State Party 
shall conduct such production in accordance with its national 
standards for safety and emissions.
            Single small-scale facility
    8. Each State Party that produces Schedule 1 chemicals for 
research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall 
carry out the production at a single small-scale facility 
approved by the State Party, except as set forth in paragraphs 
10, 11 and 12.
    9. The production at a single small-scale facility shall be 
carried out in reaction vessels in production lines not 
configurated for continuous operation. The volume of such a 
reaction vessel shall not exceed 100 liters, and the total 
volume of all reaction vessels with a volume exceeding 5 liters 
shall not be more than 500 liters.
            Other facilities
    10. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate 
quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year may be carried out for 
protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-
scale facility. This facility shall be approved by the State 
Party.
    11. Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of 
more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, 
medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale 
facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year 
per facility. These facilities shall be approved by the State 
Party.
    12. Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical 
or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, 
may be carried out at laboratories in aggregate quantities less 
than 100 g per year per facility. These facilities shall not be 
subject to any obligation relating to declaration and 
verification as specified in Sections D and E.

D. Declarations

            Single small-scale facility
    13. Each State Party that plans to operate a single small-
scale facility shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the 
precise location and a detailed technical description of the 
facility, including an inventory of equipment and detailed 
diagrams. For existing facilities, this initial declaration 
shall be provided not later than 30 days after this Convention 
enters into force for the State Party. Initial declarations on 
new facilities shall be provided not less than 180 days before 
operations are to begin.
    14. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the 
Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial 
declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 
180 days before the changes are to take place.
    15. A State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a 
single small-scale facility shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the 
previous year. The declaration shall be submitted not later 
than 90 days after the end of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical produced, acquired, 
        consumed or stored at the facility, the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The methods employed and quantity 
                produced;
                  (iii) The name and quantity of precursors 
                listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3 used for 
                production of Schedule 1 chemicals;
                  (iv) The quantity consumed at the facility 
                and the purpose(s) of the consumption;
                  (v) The quantity received from or shipped to 
                other facilities in the State Party. For each 
                shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose 
                should be included;
                  (vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time 
                during the year; and
                  (vii) The quantity stored at the end of the 
                year; and
          (c) Information on any changes at the facility during 
        the year compared to previously submitted detailed 
        technical descriptions of the facility including 
        inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.
    16. Each State Party producing Schedule 1 chemicals at a 
single small-scale facility shall make a detailed annual 
declaration regarding the projected activities and the 
anticipated production at the facility for the coming year. The 
declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days before the 
beginning of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical anticipated to be 
        produced, consumed or stored at the facility, the 
        following information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced 
                and the purpose of the production; and
          (c) Information on any anticipated changes at the 
        facility during the year compared to previously 
        submitted detailed technical descriptions of the 
        facility including inventories of equipment and 
        detailed diagrams.
            Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11
    17. For each facility, a State Party shall provide the 
Technical Secretariat with the name, location and a detailed 
technical description of the facility or its relevant part(s) 
as requested by the Technical Secretariat. The facility 
producing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes shall be 
specifically identified. For existing facilities, this initial 
declaration shall be provided not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for the State Party. Initial 
declarations on new facilities shall be provided not less than 
180 days before operations are to begin.
    18. Each State Party shall give advance notification to the 
Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial 
declaration. The notification shall be submitted not less than 
180 days before the changes are to take place.
    19. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a 
detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the 
facility for the previous year. The declaration shall be 
submitted not later than 90 days after the end of that year and 
shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The quantity produced and, in case of 
                production for protective purposes, methods 
                employed;
                  (iii) The name and quantity of precursors 
                listed in Schedules 1, 2, or 3, used for 
                production of Schedule 1 chemicals;
                  (iv) The quantity consumed at the facility 
                and the purpose of the consumption;
                  (v) The quantity transferred to other 
                facilities within the State Party. For each 
                transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose 
                should be included;
                  (vi) The maximum quantity stored at any time 
                during the year; and
                  (vii) The quantity stored at the end of the 
                year; and
          (c) Information on any changes at the facility or its 
        relevant parts during the year compared to previously 
        submitted detailed technical description of the 
        facility.
    20. Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a 
detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities 
and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming 
year. The declaration shall be submitted not less than 90 days 
before the beginning of that year and shall include:
          (a) Identification of the facility;
          (b) For each Schedule 1 chemical the following 
        information:
                  (i) The chemical name, structural formula and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned; and
                  (ii) The quantity anticipated to be produced, 
                the time periods when the production is 
                anticipated to take place and the purposes of 
                the production; and
          (c) Information on any anticipated changes at the 
        facility or its relevant parts, during the year 
        compared to previously submitted detailed technical 
        descriptions of the facility.

E. Verification

            Single small-scale facility
    21. The aim of verification activities at the single small-
scale facility shall be to verify that the quantities of 
Schedule 1 chemicals produced are correctly declared and, in 
particular, that their aggregate amount does not exceed 1 
tonne.
    22. The facility shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    23. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of 
inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the 
nature of the activities carried out there. Appropriate 
guidelines shall be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    24. The purpose of the initial inspection shall be to 
verify information provided concerning the facility, including 
verification of the limits on reaction vessels set forth in 
paragraph 9.
    25. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters 
into force for a State Party, it shall conclude a facility 
agreement, based on a model agreement, with the Organization, 
covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility.
    26. Each State Party planning to establish a single small-
scale facility after this Convention enters into force for it 
shall conclude a facility agreement, based on a model 
agreement, with the Organization, covering detailed inspection 
procedures for the facility before it begins operation or is 
used.
    27. A model for agreements shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
            Other facilities referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11
    28. The aim of verification activities at any facility 
referred to in paragraphs 10 and 11 shall be to verify that:
          (a) The facility is not used to produce any Schedule 
        1 chemical, except for the declared chemicals;
          (b) The quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, 
        processed or consumed are correctly declared and 
        consistent with needs for the declared purpose; and
          (c) The Schedule 1 chemical is not diverted or used 
        for other purposes.
    29. The facility shall be subject to systematic 
verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-
site instruments.
    30. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of 
inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the 
risk to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of the 
facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. 
Appropriate guidelines shall be considered and approved by the 
Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    31. Not later than 180 days after this Convention enters 
into force for a State Party, it shall conclude facility 
agreements with the Organization, based on a model agreement 
covering detailed inspection procedures for each facility.
    32. Each State Party planning to establish such a facility 
after entry into force of this Convention shall conclude a 
facility agreement with the Organization before the facility 
begins operation or is used.

                                Part VII

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. Declarations

            Declarations of aggregate national data
    1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by 
each State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, 
shall include aggregate national data for the previous calendar 
year on the quantities produced, processed, consumed, imported 
and exported of each Schedule 2 chemical, as well as a 
quantitative specification of import and export for each 
country involved.
    2. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year,
          (b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after 
        the end of the previous calendar year.
            Declarations of plant sites producing, processing or 
                    consuming Schedule 2 chemicals
    3. Initial and annual declarations are required for all 
plant sites that comprise one or more plant(s) which produced, 
processed or consumed during any of the previous three calendar 
years or is anticipated to produce, process or consume in the 
next calendar year more than:
          (a) 1 kg of a chemical designated ``*'' in Schedule 
        2, part A;
          (b) 100 kg of any other chemical listed in Schedule 
        2, part A; or
          (c) 1 tonne of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, part 
        B.
    4. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year;
          (b) Annual declarations on past activities not later 
        than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar 
        year;
          (c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not 
        later than 60 days before the beginning of the 
        following calendar year. Any such activity additionally 
        planned after the annual declaration has been submitted 
        shall be declared not later than five days before this 
        activity begins.
    5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not 
required for mixtures containing a low concentration of a 
Schedule 2 chemical. They are only required, in accordance with 
guidelines, in cases where the ease of recovery from the 
mixture of the Schedule 2 chemical and its total weight are 
deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this 
Convention. These guidelines shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address; and
          (c) The number of plants within the plant site which 
        are declared pursuant to Part VIII of this Annex.
    7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include, for each plant which is located within the 
plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth 
in paragraph 3, the following information:
          (a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner, 
        company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location within the plant site 
        including the specific building or structure number, if 
        any;
          (c) Its main activities;
          (d) Whether the plant:
                  (i) Produces, processes, or consumes the 
                declared Schedule 2 chemical(s);
                  (ii) Is dedicated to such activities or 
                multi-purpose; and
                  (iii) Performs other activities with regard 
                to the declared Schedule 2 chemical(s), 
                including a specification of that other 
                activity (e.g. storage); and
          (e) The production capacity of the plant for each 
        declared Schedule 2 chemical.
    8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include the following information on each Schedule 2 
chemical above the declaration threshold:
          (a) The chemical name, common or trade name used by 
        the facility, structural formula, and Chemical 
        Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;
          (b) In the case of the initial declaration: the total 
        amount produced, processed, consumed, imported and 
        exported by the plant site in each of the three 
        previous calendar years;
          (c) In the case of the annual declaration on past 
        activities: the total amount produced, processed, 
        consumed, imported and exported by the plant site in 
        the previous calendar year;
          (d) In the case of the annual declaration on 
        anticipated activities: the total amount anticipated to 
        be produced, processed or consumed by the plant site in 
        the following calendar year, including the anticipated 
        time periods for production, processing or consumption; 
        and
          (e) The purposes for which the chemical was or will 
        be produced, processed or consumed:
                  (i) Processing and consumption on site with a 
                specification of the product types;
                  (ii) Sale or transfer within the territory or 
                to any other place under the jurisdiction or 
                control of the State Party, with a 
                specification whether to other industry, trader 
                or other destination and, if possible, of final 
                product types;
                  (iii) Direct export, with a specification of 
                the States involved; or
                  (iv) Other, including a specification of 
                these other purposes.
            Declarations on past production of Schedule 2 chemicals for 
                    chemical weapons purposes
    9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
this Convention enters into force for it, declare all plant 
sites comprising plants that produced at any time since 1 
January 1946 a Schedule 2 chemical for chemical weapons 
purposes.
    10. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 9 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address;
          (c) For each plant which is located within the plant 
        site, and which falls under the specifications set 
        forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required 
        under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (e); and
          (d) For each Schedule 2 chemical produced for 
        chemical weapons purposes:
                  (i) The chemical name, common or trade name 
                used by the plant site for chemical weapons 
                production purposes, structural formula, and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The dates when the chemical was produced 
                and the quantity produced; and
                  (iii) The location to which the chemical was 
                delivered and the final product produced there, 
                if known.
            Information to States Parties
    11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section 
together with the information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 
(a), 7 (c), 7 (d) (i), 7 (d) (iii), 8 (a) and 10 shall be 
transmitted by the Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon 
request.

B. Verification

            General
    12. Verification provided for in Article VI, paragraph 4, 
shall be carried out through on-site inspection at those of the 
declared plant sites that comprise one or more plants which 
produced, processed or consumed during any of the previous 
three calendar years or are anticipated to produce, process or 
consume in the next calendar year more than:
          (a) 10 kg of a chemical designated ``*'' in Schedule 
        2, part A;
          (b) 1 tonne of any other chemical listed in Schedule 
        2, part A; or
          (c) 10 tonnes of a chemical listed in Schedule 2, 
        part B.
    13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a) shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section. In the allocation 
of resources made available for verification under Article VI, 
the Technical Secretariat shall, during the first three years 
after the entry into force of this Convention, give priority to 
the initial inspections of plant sites declared under Section 
A. The allocation shall thereafter be reviewed on the basis of 
the experience gained.
    14. The Technical Secretariat shall conduct initial 
inspections and subsequent inspections in accordance with 
paragraphs 15 to 22.
            Inspection aims
    15. The general aim of inspections shall be to verify that 
activities are in accordance with obligations under this 
Convention and consistent with the information to be provided 
in declarations. Particular aims of inspections at plant sites 
declared under Section A shall include verification of:
          (a) The absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, 
        especially its production, except if in accordance with 
        Part VI of this Annex;
          (b) Consistency with declarations of levels of 
        production, processing or consumption of Schedule 2 
        chemicals; and
          (c) Non-diversion of Schedule 2 chemicals for 
        activities prohibited under this Convention.
            Initial inspections
    16. Each plant site to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 
12 shall receive an initial inspection as soon as possible but 
preferably not later than three years after entry into force of 
this Convention. Plant sites declared after this period shall 
receive an initial inspection not later than one year after 
production, processing or consumption is first declared. 
Selection of plant sites for initial inspections shall be made 
by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the 
prediction of precisely when the plant site is to be inspected.
    17. During the initial inspection, a draft facility 
agreement for the plant site shall be prepared unless the 
inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat agree that 
it is not needed.
    18. With regard to frequency and intensity of subsequent 
inspections, inspectors shall during the initial inspection 
assess the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention 
posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the 
plant site and the nature of the activities carried out there, 
taking into account, inter alia, the following criteria:
          (a) The toxicity of the scheduled chemicals and of 
        the end-products produced with it, if any;
          (b) The quantity of the scheduled chemicals typically 
        stored at the inspected site;
          (c) The quantity of feedstock chemicals for the 
        scheduled chemicals typically stored at the inspected 
        site;
          (d) The production capacity of the Schedule 2 plants; 
        and
          (e) The capability and convertibility for initiating 
        production, storage and filling of toxic chemicals at 
        the inspected site.
            Inspections
    19. Having received the initial inspection, each plant site 
to be inspected pursuant to paragraph 12 shall be subject to 
subsequent inspections.
    20. In selecting particular plant sites for inspection and 
in deciding on the frequency and intensity of inspections, the 
Technical Secretariat shall give due consideration to the risk 
to the object and purpose of this Convention posed by the 
relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant site and 
the nature of the activities carried out there, taking into 
account the respective facility agreement as well as the 
results of the initial inspections and subsequent inspections.
    21. The Technical Secretariat shall choose a particular 
plant site to be inspected in such a way as to preclude the 
prediction of exactly when it will be inspected.
    22. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per calendar year under the provisions of this Section. This, 
however, shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
            Inspection procedures
    23. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 24 to 30 below shall apply.
    24. A facility agreement for the declared plant site shall 
be concluded not later than 90 days after completion of the 
initial inspection between the inspected State Party and the 
Organization unless the inspected State Party and the Technical 
Secretariat agree that it is not needed. It shall be based on a 
model agreement and govern the conduct of inspections at the 
declared plant site. The agreement shall specify the frequency 
and intensity of inspections as well as detailed inspection 
procedures, consistent with paragraphs 25 to 29.
    25. The focus of the inspection shall be the declared 
Schedule 2 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the 
inspection team requests access to other parts of the plant 
site, access to these areas shall be granted in accordance with 
the obligation to provide clarification pursuant to Part II, 
paragraph 51, of this Annex and in accordance with the facility 
agreement, or, in the absence of a facility agreement, in 
accordance with the rules of managed access as specified in 
Part X, Section C, of this Annex.
    26. Access to records shall be provided, as appropriate, to 
provide assurance that there has been no diversion of the 
declared chemical and that production has been consistent with 
declarations.
    27. Sampling and analysis shall be undertaken to check for 
the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals.
    28. Areas to be inspected may include:
          (a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are 
        delivered or stored;
          (b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed 
        upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction 
        vessels;
          (c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred 
        to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the 
        reaction vessels together with any associated valves, 
        flow meters, etc.;
          (d) The external aspect of the reaction vessels and 
        ancillary equipment;
          (e) Lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- 
        or short-term storage or to equipment further 
        processing the declared Schedule 2 chemicals;
          (f) Control equipment associated with any of the 
        items under subparagraphs (a) to (e);
          (g) Equipment and areas for waste and effluent 
        handling;
          (h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals 
        not up to specification.
    29. The period of inspection shall not last more than 96 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    30. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 48 hours before the 
arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Transfers to States not party to this convention

    31. Schedule 2 chemicals shall only be transferred to or 
received from States Parties. This obligation shall take effect 
three years after entry into force of this Convention.
    32. During this interim three-year period, each State Party 
shall require an end-use certificate, as specified below, for 
transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to States not Party to this 
Convention. For such transfers, each State Party shall adopt 
the necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals 
shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require from the 
recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the 
transferred chemicals:
          (a) That they will only be used for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention;
          (b) That they will not be re-transferred;
          (c) Their types and quantities;
          (d) Their end-use(s); and
          (e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).

                               Part VIII

  ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED UNDER THIS CONVENTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
                               ARTICLE VI

    REGIME FOR SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS AND FACILITIES RELATED TO SUCH 
                               CHEMICALS

A. Declarations

            Declarations of aggregate national data
    1. The initial and annual declarations to be provided by a 
State Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraphs 7 and 8, shall 
include aggregate national data for the previous calendar year 
on the quantities produced, imported and exported of each 
Schedule 3 chemical, as well as a quantitative specification of 
import and export for each country involved.
    2. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 1 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year,
          (b) Annual declarations not later than 90 days after 
        the end of the previous calendar year.
            Declarations of plant sites producing Schedule 3 chemicals
    3. Initial and annual declarations are required for all 
plant sites that comprise one or more plants which produced 
during the previous calendar year or are anticipated to produce 
in the next calendar year more than 30 tonnes of a Schedule 3 
chemical.
    4. Each State Party shall submit:
          (a) Initial declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 not 
        later than 30 days after this Convention enters into 
        force for it; and, starting in the following calendar 
        year;
          (b) Annual declarations on past activities not later 
        than 90 days after the end of the previous calendar 
        year;
          (c) Annual declarations on anticipated activities not 
        later than 60 days before the beginning of the 
        following calendar year. Any such activity additionally 
        planned after the annual declaration has been submitted 
        shall be declared not later than five days before this 
        activity begins.
    5. Declarations pursuant to paragraph 3 are generally not 
required for mixtures containing a low concentration of a 
Schedule 3 chemical. They are only required, in accordance with 
guidelines, in such cases where the ease of recovery from the 
mixture of the Schedule 3 chemical and its total weight are 
deemed to pose a risk to the object and purpose of this 
Convention. These guidelines shall be considered and approved 
by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    6. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address; and
          (c) The number of plants within the plant site which 
        are declared pursuant to Part VII of this Annex.
    7. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include, for each plant which is located within the 
plant site and which falls under the specifications set forth 
in paragraph 3, the following information:
          (a) The name of the plant and the name of the owner, 
        company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location within the plant site, 
        including the specific building or structure number, if 
        any;
          (c) Its main activities.
    8. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 3 
shall also include the following information on each Schedule 3 
chemical above the declaration threshold:
          (a) The chemical name, common or trade name used by 
        the facility, structural formula, and Chemical 
        Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned;
          (b) The approximate amount of production of the 
        chemical in the previous calendar year, or, in case of 
        declarations on anticipated activities, anticipated for 
        the next calendar year, expressed in the ranges: 30 to 
        200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 
        tonnes, 10,000 to 100,000 tonnes, and above 100,000 
        tonnes; and
          (c) The purposes for which the chemical was or will 
        be produced.
            Declarations on past production of Schedule 3 chemicals for 
                    chemical weapons purposes
    9. Each State Party shall, not later than 30 days after 
this Convention enters into force for it, declare all plant 
sites comprising plants that produced at any time since 1 
January 1946 a Schedule 3 chemical for chemical weapons 
purposes.
    10. Declarations of a plant site pursuant to paragraph 9 
shall include:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) Its precise location including the address;
          (c) For each plant which is located within the plant 
        site, and which falls under the specifications set 
        forth in paragraph 9, the same information as required 
        under paragraph 7, subparagraphs (a) to (c); and
          (d) For each Schedule 3 chemical produced for 
        chemical weapons purposes:
                  (i) The chemical name, common or trade name 
                used by the plant site for chemical weapons 
                production purposes, structural formula, and 
                Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if 
                assigned;
                  (ii) The dates when the chemical was produced 
                and the quantity produced; and
                  (iii) The location to which the chemical was 
                delivered and the final product produced there, 
                if known.
            Information to States Parties
    11. A list of plant sites declared under this Section 
together with the information provided under paragraphs 6, 7 
(a), 7 (c), 8 (a) and 10 shall be transmitted by the Technical 
Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

B. Verification

            General
    12. Verification provided for in paragraph 5 of Article VI 
shall be carried out through on-site inspections at those 
declared plant sites which produced during the previous 
calendar year or are anticipated to produce in the next 
calendar year in excess of 200 tonnes aggregate of any Schedule 
3 chemical above the declaration threshold of 30 tonnes.
    13. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section taking into account 
Part VII, paragraph 13, of this Annex.
    14. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall 
randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate 
mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer 
software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:
          (a) Equitable geographical distribution of 
        inspections; and
          (b) The information on the declared plant sites 
        available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the 
        relevant chemical, the characteristics of the plant 
        site and the nature of the activities carried out 
        there.
    15. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, 
shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
    16. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this 
Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following 
limitation for the combined number of inspections to be 
received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and 
Part IX of this Annex: the combined number of inspections shall 
not exceed three plus 5 percent of the total number of plant 
sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and Part 
IX of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these two 
figures is lower.
            Inspection aims
    17. At plant sites declared under Section A, the general 
aim of inspections shall be to verify that activities are 
consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. 
The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of 
the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its 
production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.
            Inspection procedures
    18. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 19 to 25 below shall apply.
    19. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested 
by the inspected State Party.
    20. The focus of the inspections shall be the declared 
Schedule 3 plant(s) within the declared plant site. If the 
inspection team, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 51, of 
this Annex, requests access to other parts of the plant site 
for clarification of ambiguities, the extent of such access 
shall be agreed between the inspection team and the inspected 
State Party.
    21. The inspection team may have access to records in 
situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the 
objectives of the inspection.
    22. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to 
check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In 
case of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analyzed in a 
designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inspected State 
Party's agreement.
    23. Areas to be inspected may include:
          (a) Areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are 
        delivered or stored;
          (b) Areas where manipulative processes are performed 
        upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction 
        vessel;
          (c) Feed lines as appropriate from the areas referred 
        to in subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) to the 
        reaction vessel together with any associated valves, 
        flow meters, etc.;
          (d) The external aspect of the reaction vessels and 
        ancillary equipment;
          (e) Lines from the reaction vessels leading to long- 
        or short-term storage or to equipment further 
        processing the declared Schedule 3 chemicals;
          (f) Control equipment associated with any of the 
        items under subparagraphs (a) to (e);
          (g) Equipment and areas for waste and effluent 
        handling;
          (h) Equipment and areas for disposition of chemicals 
        not up to specification.
    24. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    25. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before 
the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Transfers to states not party to this convention

    26. When transferring Schedule 3 chemicals to States not 
Party to this Convention, each State Party shall adopt the 
necessary measures to ensure that the transferred chemicals 
shall only be used for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention. Inter alia, the State Party shall require from the 
recipient State a certificate stating, in relation to the 
transferred chemicals:
          (a) That they will only be used for purposes not 
        prohibited under this Convention;
          (b) That they will not be re-transferred;
          (c) Their types and quantities;
          (d) Their end-use(s); and
          (e) The name(s) and address(es) of the end-user(s).
    27. Five years after entry into force of this Convention, 
the Conference shall consider the need to establish other 
measures regarding transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to States 
not Party to this Convention.

                                Part IX

  activities not prohibited under this convention in accordance with 
                               article vi

            regime for other chemical production facilities

A. Declarations

            List of other chemical production facilities
    1. The initial declaration to be provided by each State 
Party pursuant to Article VI, paragraph 7, shall include a list 
of all plant sites that:
          (a) Produced by synthesis during the previous 
        calendar year more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled 
        discrete organic chemicals; or
          (b) Comprise one or more plants which produced by 
        synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 
        30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical 
        containing the elements phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine 
        (hereinafter referred to as ``PSF-plants'' and ``PSF-
        chemical'').
    2. The list of other chemical production facilities to be 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall not include plant sites 
that exclusively produced explosives or hydrocarbons.
    3. Each State Party shall submit its list of other chemical 
production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1 as part of its 
initial declaration not later than 30 days after this 
Convention enters into force for it. Each State Party shall, 
not later than 90 days after the beginning of each following 
calendar year, provide annually the information necessary to 
update the list.
    4. The list of other chemical production facilities to be 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1 shall include the following 
information on each plant site:
          (a) The name of the plant site and the name of the 
        owner, company, or enterprise operating it;
          (b) The precise location of the plant site including 
        its address;
          (c) Its main activities; and
           (d) The approximate number of plants producing the 
        chemicals specified in paragraph 1 in the plant site.
    5. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 
1 (a), the list shall also include information on the 
approximate aggregate amount of production of the unscheduled 
discrete organic chemicals in the previous calendar year 
expressed in the ranges: under 1,000 tonnes, 1,000 to 10,000 
tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.
    6. With regard to plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 
1 (b), the list shall also specify the number of PSF-plants 
within the plant site and include information on the 
approximate aggregate amount of production of PSF-chemicals 
produced by each PSF-plant in the previous calendar year 
expressed in the ranges: under 200 tonnes, 200 to 1,000 tonnes, 
1,000 to 10,000 tonnes and above 10,000 tonnes.
            Assistance by the Technical Secretariat
    7. If a State Party, for administrative reasons, deems it 
necessary to ask for assistance in compiling its list of 
chemical production facilities pursuant to paragraph 1, it may 
request the Technical Secretariat to provide such assistance. 
Questions as to the completeness of the list shall then be 
resolved through consultations between the State Party and the 
Technical Secretariat.
            Information to States Parties
    8. The lists of other chemical production facilities 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 1, including the information 
provided under paragraph 4, shall be transmitted by the 
Technical Secretariat to States Parties upon request.

B. Verification

            General
    9. Subject to the provisions of Section C, verification as 
provided for in Article VI, paragraph 6, shall be carried out 
through on-site inspection at:
          (a) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (a); 
        and
          (b) Plant sites listed pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) 
        that comprise one or more PSF-plants which produced 
        during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes 
        of a PSF-chemical.
    10. The programme and budget of the Organization to be 
adopted by the Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 
21 (a), shall contain, as a separate item, a programme and 
budget for verification under this Section after its 
implementation has started.
    11. Under this Section, the Technical Secretariat shall 
randomly select plant sites for inspection through appropriate 
mechanisms, such as the use of specially designed computer 
software, on the basis of the following weighting factors:
          (a) Equitable geographical distribution of 
        inspections;
          (b) The information on the listed plant sites 
        available to the Technical Secretariat, related to the 
        characteristics of the plant site and the activities 
        carried out there; and
          (c) Proposals by States Parties on a basis to be 
        agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 25.
    12. No plant site shall receive more than two inspections 
per year under the provisions of this Section. This, however, 
shall not limit inspections pursuant to Article IX.
    13. In selecting plant sites for inspection under this 
Section, the Technical Secretariat shall observe the following 
limitation for the combined number of inspections to be 
received by a State Party per calendar year under this Part and 
Part VIII of this Annex: the combined number of inspections 
shall not exceed three plus 5 per cent of the total number of 
plant sites declared by a State Party under both this Part and 
Part VIII of this Annex, or 20 inspections, whichever of these 
two figures is lower.
            Inspection aims
    14. At plant sites listed under Section A, the general aim 
of inspections shall be to verify that activities are 
consistent with the information to be provided in declarations. 
The particular aim of inspections shall be the verification of 
the absence of any Schedule 1 chemical, especially its 
production, except if in accordance with Part VI of this Annex.
            Inspection procedures
    15. In addition to agreed guidelines, other relevant 
provisions of this Annex and the Confidentiality Annex, 
paragraphs 16 to 20 below shall apply.
    16. There shall be no facility agreement, unless requested 
by the inspected State Party.
    17. The focus of inspection at a plant site selected for 
inspection shall be the plant(s) producing the chemicals 
specified in paragraph 1, in particular the PSF-plants listed 
pursuant to paragraph 1 (b). The inspected State Party shall 
have the right to manage access to these plants in accordance 
with the rules of managed access as specified in Part X, 
Section C, of this Annex. If the inspection team, in accordance 
with Part II, paragraph 51, of this Annex, requests access to 
other parts of the plant site for clarification of ambiguities, 
the extent of such access shall be agreed between the 
inspection team and the inspected State Party.
    18. The inspection team may have access to records in 
situations in which the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party agree that such access will assist in achieving the 
objectives of the inspection.
    19. Sampling and on-site analysis may be undertaken to 
check for the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals. In 
cases of unresolved ambiguities, samples may be analyzed in a 
designated off-site laboratory, subject to the inspected State 
Party's agreement.
    20. The period of inspection shall not last more than 24 
hours; however, extensions may be agreed between the inspection 
team and the inspected State Party.
            Notification of inspection
    21. A State Party shall be notified by the Technical 
Secretariat of the inspection not less than 120 hours before 
the arrival of the inspection team at the plant site to be 
inspected.

C. Implementation and review of Section B

            Implementation
    22. The implementation of Section B shall start at the 
beginning of the fourth year after entry into force of this 
Convention unless the Conference, at its regular session in the 
third year after entry into force of this Convention, decides 
otherwise.
    23. The Director-General shall, for the regular session of 
the Conference in the third year after entry into force of this 
Convention, prepare a report which outlines the experience of 
the Technical Secretariat in implementing the provisions of 
Parts VII and VIII of this Annex as well as of Section A of 
this Part.
    24. At its regular session in the third year after entry 
into force of this Convention, the Conference, on the basis of 
a report of the Director-General, may also decide on the 
distribution of resources available for verification under 
Section B between ``PSF-plants'' and other chemical production 
facilities. Otherwise, this distribution shall be left to the 
expertise of the Technical Secretariat and be added to the 
weighting factors in paragraph 11.
    25. At its regular session in the third year after entry 
into force of this Convention, the Conference, upon advice of 
the Executive Council, shall decide on which basis (e.g. 
regional) proposals by States Parties for inspections should be 
presented to be taken into account as a weighting factor in the 
selection process specified in paragraph 11.
            Review
    26. At the first special session of the Conference convened 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 22, the provisions of this 
Part of the Verification Annex shall be re-examined in the 
light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification 
regime for the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII to IX 
of this Annex) on the basis of the experience gained. The 
Conference shall then make recommendations so as to improve the 
effectiveness of the verification regime.

                                 Part X

              challenge inspections pursuant to article ix

A. Designation and selection of inspectors and inspection assistants

    1. Challenge inspections pursuant to Article IX shall only 
be performed by inspectors and inspection assistants especially 
designated for this function. In order to designate inspectors 
and inspection assistants for challenge inspections pursuant to 
Article IX, the Director-General shall, by selecting inspectors 
and inspection assistants from among the inspectors and 
inspection assistants for routine inspection activities, 
establish a list of proposed inspectors and inspection 
assistants. It shall comprise a sufficiently large number of 
inspectors and inspection assistants having the necessary 
qualification, experience, skill and training, to allow for 
flexibility in the selection of the inspectors, taking into 
account their availability, and the need for rotation. Due 
regard shall be paid also to the importance of selecting 
inspectors and inspection assistants on as wide a geographical 
basis as possible. The designation of inspectors and inspection 
assistants shall follow the procedures provided for under Part 
II, Section A, of this Annex.
    2. The Director-General shall determine the size of the 
inspection team and select its members taking into account the 
circumstances of a particular request. The size of the 
inspection team shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the 
proper fulfillment of the inspection mandate. No national of 
the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall 
be a member of the inspection team.

B. Pre-inspection activities

    3. Before submitting the inspection request for a challenge 
inspection, the State Party may seek confirmation from the 
Director-General that the Technical Secretariat is in a 
position to take immediate action on the request. If the 
Director-General cannot provide such confirmation immediately, 
he shall do so at the earliest opportunity, in keeping with the 
order of requests for confirmation. He shall also keep the 
State Party informed of when it is likely that immediate action 
can be taken. Should the Director-General reach the conclusion 
that timely action on requests can no longer be taken, he may 
ask the Executive Council to take appropriate action to improve 
the situation in the future.
            Notification
    4. The inspection request for a challenge inspection to be 
submitted to the Executive Council and the Director-General 
shall contain at least the following information:
          (a) The State Party to be inspected and, if 
        applicable, the Host State;
          (b) The point of entry to be used;
          (c) The size and type of the inspection site;
          (d) The concern regarding possible non-compliance 
        with this Convention including a specification of the 
        relevant provisions of this Convention about which the 
        concern has arisen, and of the nature and circumstances 
        of the possible non-compliance as well as all 
        appropriate information on the basis of which the 
        concern has arisen; and
          (e) The name of the observer of the requesting State 
        Party.
The requesting State Party may submit any additional 
information it deems necessary.
    5. The Director-General shall within one hour acknowledge 
to the requesting State Party receipt of its request.
    6. The requesting State Party shall notify the Director-
General of the location of the inspection site in due time for 
the Director-General to be able to provide this information to 
the inspected State Party not less than 12 hours before the 
planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
    7. The inspection site shall be designated by the 
requesting State Party as specifically as possible by providing 
a site diagram related to a reference point with geographic 
coordinates, specified to the nearest second if possible. If 
possible, the requesting State Party shall also provide a map 
with a general indication of the inspection site and a diagram 
specifying as precisely as possible the requested perimeter of 
the site to be inspected.
    8. The requested perimeter shall:
          (a) Run at least a 10 meter distance outside any 
        buildings or other structures;
          (b) Not cut through existing security enclosures; and
          (c) Run at least a 10 meter distance outside any 
        existing security enclosures that the requesting State 
        Party intends to include within the requested 
        perimeter.
    9. If the requested perimeter does not conform with the 
specifications of paragraph 8, it shall be redrawn by the 
inspection team so as to conform with that provision.
    10. The Director-General shall, not less than 12 hours 
before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point 
of entry, inform the Executive Council about the location of 
the inspection site as specified in paragraph 7.
    11. Contemporaneously with informing the Executive Council 
according to paragraph 10, the Director-General shall transmit 
the inspection request to the inspected State Party including 
the location of the inspection site as specified in paragraph 
7. This notification shall also include the information 
specified in Part II, paragraph 32, of this Annex.
    12. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the point of 
entry, the inspected State Party shall be informed by the 
inspection team of the inspection mandate.
            Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or 
                    the Host State
    13. The Director-General shall, in accordance with Article 
IX, paragraphs 13 to 18, dispatch an inspection team as soon as 
possible after an inspection request has been received. The 
inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in 
the request in the minimum time possible, consistent with the 
provisions of paragraphs 10 and 11.
    14. If the requested perimeter is acceptable to the 
inspected State Party, it shall be designated as the final 
perimeter as early as possible, but in no case later than 24 
hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of 
entry. The inspected State Party shall transport the inspection 
team to the final perimeter of the inspection site. If the 
inspected State Party deems it necessary, such transportation 
may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of the time period 
specified in this paragraph for the designation of the final 
perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be completed not 
later than 36 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at 
the point of entry.
    15. For all declared facilities, the procedures in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall apply. (For the purposes of 
this Part, ``declared facility'' means all facilities declared 
pursuant to Articles III, IV, and V. With regard to Article VI, 
``declared facility'' means only facilities declared pursuant 
to Part VI of this Annex, as well as declared plants specified 
by declarations pursuant to Part VII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), 
and Part VIII, paragraphs 7 and 10 (c), of this Annex.)
           (a) If the requested perimeter is contained within 
        or conforms with the declared perimeter, the declared 
        perimeter shall be considered the final perimeter. The 
        final perimeter may, however, if agreed by the 
        inspected State Party, be made smaller in order to 
        conform with the perimeter requested by the requesting 
        State Party.
           (b) The inspected State Party shall transport the 
        inspection team to the final perimeter as soon as 
        practicable, but in any case shall ensure their arrival 
        at the perimeter not later than 24 hours after the 
        arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
            Alternative determination of final perimeter
    16. At the point of entry, if the inspected State Party 
cannot accept the requested perimeter, it shall propose an 
alternative perimeter as soon as possible, but in any case not 
later than 24 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at 
the point of entry. In case of differences of opinion, the 
inspected State Party and the inspection team shall engage in 
negotiations with the aim of reaching agreement on a final 
perimeter.
    17. The alternative perimeter should be designated as 
specifically as possible in accordance with paragraph 8. It 
shall include the whole of the requested perimeter and should, 
as a rule, bear a close relationship to the latter, taking into 
account natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It 
should normally run close to the surrounding security barrier 
if such a barrier exists. The inspected State Party should seek 
to establish such a relationship between the perimeters by a 
combination of at least two of the following means:
           (a) An alternative perimeter that does not extend to 
        an area significantly greater than that of the 
        requested perimeter;
           (b) An alternative perimeter that is a short, 
        uniform distance from the requested perimeter;
           (c) At least part of the requested perimeter is 
        visible from the alternative perimeter.
    18. If the alternative perimeter is acceptable to the 
inspection team, it shall become the final perimeter and the 
inspection team shall be transported from the point of entry to 
that perimeter. If the inspected State Party deems it 
necessary, such transportation may begin up to 12 hours before 
the expiry of the time period specified in paragraph 16 for 
proposing an alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in 
any case, be completed not later than 36 hours after the 
arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.
    19. If a final perimeter is not agreed, the perimeter 
negotiations shall be concluded as early as possible, but in no 
case shall they continue more than 24 hours after the arrival 
of the inspection team at the point of entry. If no agreement 
is reached, the inspected State Party shall transport the 
inspection team to a location at the alternative perimeter. If 
the inspected State Party deems it necessary, such 
transportation may begin up to 12 hours before the expiry of 
the time period specified in paragraph 16 for proposing an 
alternative perimeter. Transportation shall, in any case, be 
completed not later than 36 hours after the arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry.
    20. Once at the location, the inspected State Party shall 
provide the inspection team with prompt access to the 
alternative perimeter to facilitate negotiations and agreement 
on the final perimeter and access within the final perimeter.
    21. If no agreement is reached within 72 hours after the 
arrival of the inspection team at the location, the alternative 
perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter.
            Verification of location
    22. To help establish that the inspection site to which the 
inspection team has been transported corresponds to the 
inspection site specified by the requesting State Party, the 
inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-
finding equipment and have such equipment installed according 
to its directions. The inspection team may verify its location 
by reference to local landmarks identified from maps. The 
inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this 
task.
            Securing the site, exit monitoring
    23. Not later than 12 hours after the arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry, the inspected State 
Party shall begin collecting factual information of all 
vehicular exit activity from all exit points for all land, air, 
and water vehicles of the requested perimeter. It shall provide 
this information to the inspection team upon its arrival at the 
alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first.
    24. This obligation may be met by collecting factual 
information in the form of traffic logs, photographs, video 
recordings, or data from chemical evidence equipment provided 
by the inspection team to monitor such exit activity. 
Alternatively, the inspected State Party may also meet this 
obligation by allowing one or more members of the inspection 
team independently to maintain traffic logs, take photographs, 
make video recordings of exit traffic, or use chemical evidence 
equipment, and conduct other activities as may be agreed 
between the inspected State Party and the inspection team.
    25. Upon the inspection team's arrival at the alternative 
perimeter or final perimeter, whichever occurs first, securing 
the site, which means exit monitoring procedures by the 
inspection team, shall begin.
    26. Such procedures shall include: the identification of 
vehicular exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of 
photographs, and the making of video recordings by the 
inspection team of exits and exit traffic. The inspection team 
has the right to go, under escort, to any other part of the 
perimeter to check that there is no other exit activity.
    27. Additional procedures for exit monitoring activities as 
agreed upon by the inspection team and the inspected State 
Party may include, inter alia:
           (a) Use of sensors;
           (b) Random selective access;
           (c) Sample analysis.
    28. All activities for securing the site and exit 
monitoring shall take place within a band around the outside of 
the perimeter, not exceeding 50 meters in width, measured 
outward.
    29. The inspection team has the right to inspect on a 
managed access basis vehicular traffic exiting the site. The 
inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to 
demonstrate to the inspection team that any vehicle, subject to 
inspection, to which the inspection team is not granted full 
access, is not being used for purposes related to the possible 
non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request.
    30. Personnel and vehicles entering and personnel and 
personal passenger vehicles exiting the site are not subject to 
inspection.
    31. The application of the above procedures may continue 
for the duration of the inspection, but may not unreasonably 
hamper or delay the normal operation of the facility.
            Pre-inspection briefing and inspection plan
    32. To facilitate development of an inspection plan, the 
inspected State Party shall provide a safety and logistical 
briefing to the inspection team prior to access.
    33. The pre-inspection briefing shall be held in accordance 
with Part II, paragraph 37, of this Annex. In the course of the 
pre-inspection briefing, the inspected State Party may indicate 
to the inspection team the equipment, documentation, or areas 
it considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the 
challenge inspection. In addition, personnel responsible for 
the site shall brief the inspection team on the physical layout 
and other relevant characteristics of the site. The inspection 
team shall be provided with a map or sketch drawn to scale 
showing all structures and significant geographic features at 
the site. The inspection team shall also be briefed on the 
availability of facility personnel and records.
    34. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team 
shall prepare, on the basis of the information available and 
appropriate to it, an initial inspection plan which specifies 
the activities to be carried out by the inspection team, 
including the specific areas of the site to which access is 
desired. The inspection plan shall also specify whether the 
inspection team will be divided into subgroups. The inspection 
plan shall be made available to the representatives of the 
inspected State Party and the inspection site. Its 
implementation shall be consistent with the provisions of 
Section C, including those related to access and activities.
            Perimeter activities
    35. Upon the inspection team's arrival at the final or 
alternative perimeter, whichever occurs first, the team shall 
have the right to commence immediately perimeter activities in 
accordance with the procedures set forth under this Section, 
and to continue these activities until the completion of the 
challenge inspection.
    36. In conducting the perimeter activities, the inspection 
team shall have the right to:
          (a) Use monitoring instruments in accordance with 
        Part II, paragraphs 27 to 30, of this Annex;
          (b) Take wipes, air, soil or effluent samples; and
          (c) Conduct any additional activities which may be 
        agreed between the inspection team and the inspected 
        State Party.
    37. The perimeter activities of the inspection team may be 
conducted within a band around the outside of the perimeter up 
to 50 meters in width measured outward from the perimeter. If 
the inspected State Party agrees, the inspection team may also 
have access to any building or structure within the perimeter 
band. All directional monitoring shall be oriented inward. For 
declared facilities, at the discretion of the inspected State 
Party, the band could run inside, outside, or on both sides of 
the declared perimeter.

C. Conduct of inspections

            General rules
    38. The inspected State Party shall provide access within 
the requested perimeter as well as, if different, the final 
perimeter. The extent and nature of access to a particular 
place or places within these perimeters shall be negotiated 
between the inspection team and the inspected State Party on a 
managed access basis.
    39. The inspected State Party shall provide access within 
the requested perimeter as soon as possible, but in any case 
not later than 108 hours after the arrival of the inspection 
team at the point of entry in order to clarify the concern 
regarding possible non-compliance with this Convention raised 
in the inspection request.
    40. Upon the request of the inspection team, the inspected 
State Party may provide aerial access to the inspection site.
    41. In meeting the requirement to provide access as 
specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State Party shall be 
under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access 
taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have 
with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures. The 
inspected State Party has the right under managed access to 
take such measures as are necessary to protect national 
security. The provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked 
by the inspected State Party to conceal evasion of its 
obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under this 
Convention.
    42. If the inspected State Party provides less than full 
access to places, activities, or information, it shall be under 
the obligation to make every reasonable effort to provide 
alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance 
concern that generated the challenge inspection.
    43. Upon arrival at the final perimeter of facilities 
declared pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI, access shall be 
granted following the pre-inspection briefing and discussion of 
the inspection plan which shall be limited to the minimum 
necessary and in any event shall not exceed three hours. For 
facilities declared pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1(d), 
negotiations shall be conducted and managed access commenced 
not later than 12 hours after arrival at the final perimeter.
    44. In carrying out the challenge inspection in accordance 
with the inspection request, the inspection team shall use only 
those methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to 
clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with the 
provisions of this Convention, and shall refrain from 
activities not relevant thereto. It shall collect and document 
such facts as are related to the possible non-compliance with 
this Convention by the inspected State Party, but shall neither 
seek nor document information which is clearly not related 
thereto, unless the inspected State Party expressly requests it 
to do so. Any material collected and subsequently found not to 
be relevant shall not be retained.
    45. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of 
conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive 
manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of its mission. Wherever possible, it shall 
begin with the least intrusive procedures it deems acceptable 
and proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems 
necessary.
            Managed access
    46. The inspection team shall take into consideration 
suggested modifications of the inspection plan and proposals 
which may be made by the inspected State Party, at whatever 
stage of the inspection including the pre-inspection briefing, 
to ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas, not 
related to chemical weapons, are protected.
    47. The inspected State Party shall designate the perimeter 
entry/exit points to be used for access. The inspection team 
and the inspected State Party shall negotiate: the extent of 
access to any particular place or places within the final and 
requested perimeters as provided in paragraph 48; the 
particular inspection activities, including sampling, to be 
conducted by the inspection team; the performance of particular 
activities by the inspected State Party; and the provision of 
particular information by the inspected State Party.
    48. In conformity with the relevant provisions in the 
Confidentiality Annex the inspected State Party shall have the 
right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and 
prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not 
related to chemical weapons. Such measures may include, inter 
alia:
          (a) Removal of sensitive papers from office spaces;
          (b) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and 
        equipment;
          (c) Shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such 
        as computer or electronic systems;
          (d) Logging off of computer systems and turning off 
        of data indicating devices;
          (e) Restriction of sample analysis to presence or 
        absence of chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 or 
        appropriate degradation products;
          (f) Using random selective access techniques whereby 
        the inspectors are requested to select a given 
        percentage or number of buildings of their choice to 
        inspect; the same principle can apply to the interior 
        and content of sensitive buildings;
          (g) In exceptional cases, giving only individual 
        inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection 
        site.
    49. The inspected State Party shall make every reasonable 
effort to demonstrate to the inspection team that any object, 
building, structure, container or vehicle to which the 
inspection team has not had full access, or which has been 
protected in accordance with paragraph 48, is not used for 
purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised 
in the inspection request.
    50. This may be accomplished by means of, inter alia, the 
partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, 
at the discretion of the inspected State Party, by means of a 
visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its 
entrance, or by other methods.
    51. In the case of facilities declared pursuant to Articles 
IV, V and VI, the following shall apply:
          (a) For facilities with facility agreements, access 
        and activities within the final perimeter shall be 
        unimpeded within the boundaries established by the 
        agreements;
          (b) For facilities without facility agreements, 
        negotiation of access and activities shall be governed 
        by the applicable general inspection guidelines 
        established under this Convention;
          (c) Access beyond that granted for inspections under 
        Articles IV, V and VI shall be managed in accordance 
        with procedures of this section.
    52. In the case of facilities declared pursuant to Article 
III, paragraph 1 (d), the following shall apply: if the 
inspected State Party, using procedures of paragraphs 47 and 
48, has not granted full access to areas or structures not 
related to chemical weapons, it shall make every reasonable 
effort to demonstrate to the inspection team that such areas or 
structures are not used for purposes related to the possible 
non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request.
            Observer
    53. In accordance with the provisions of Article IX, 
paragraph 12, on the participation of an observer in the 
challenge inspection, the requesting State Party shall liaise 
with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate the arrival of the 
observer at the same point of entry as the inspection team 
within a reasonable period of the inspection team's arrival.
    54. The observer shall have the right throughout the period 
of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the 
requesting State Party located in the inspected State Party or 
in the Host State or, in the case of absence of an embassy, 
with the requesting State Party itself. The inspected State 
Party shall provide means of communication to the observer.
    55. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the 
alternative or final perimeter of the inspection site, wherever 
the inspection team arrives first, and to have access to the 
inspection site as granted by the inspected State Party. The 
observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the 
inspection team, which the team shall take into account to the 
extent it deems appropriate. Throughout the inspection, the 
inspection team shall keep the observer informed about the 
conduct of the inspection and the findings.
    56. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected State 
Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for 
the observer such as communication means, interpretation 
services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and 
medical care. All the costs in connection with the stay of the 
observer on the territory of the inspected State Party or the 
Host State shall be borne by the requesting State Party.
            Duration of inspection
    57. The period of inspection shall not exceed 84 hours, 
unless extended by agreement with the inspected State Party.

D. Post-inspection activities

            Departure
    58. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures at 
the inspection site, the inspection team and the observer of 
the requesting State Party shall proceed promptly to a point of 
entry and shall then leave the territory of the inspected State 
Party in the minimum time possible.
            Reports
    59. The inspection report shall summarize in a general way 
the activities conducted by the inspection team and the factual 
findings of the inspection team, particularly with regard to 
the concerns regarding possible non-compliance with this 
Convention cited in the request for the challenge inspection, 
and shall be limited to information directly related to this 
Convention. It shall also include an assessment by the 
inspection team of the degree and nature of access and 
cooperation granted to the inspectors and the extent to which 
this enabled them to fulfil the inspection mandate. Detailed 
information relating to the concerns regarding possible non-
compliance with this Convention cited in the request for the 
challenge inspection shall be submitted as an Appendix to the 
final report and be retained within the Technical Secretariat 
under appropriate safeguards to protect sensitive information.
    60. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours 
after its return to its primary work location, submit a 
preliminary inspection report, having taken into account, inter 
alia, paragraph 17 of the Confidentiality Annex, to the 
Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly transmit 
the preliminary inspection report to the requesting State 
Party, the inspected State Party and to the Executive Council.
    61. A draft final inspection report shall be made available 
to the inspected State Party not later than 20 days after the 
completion of the challenge inspection. The inspected State 
Party has the right to identify any information and data not 
related to chemical weapons which should, in its view, due to 
its confidential character, not be circulated outside the 
Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall consider 
proposals for changes to the draft final inspection report made 
by the inspected State Party and, using its own discretion, 
wherever possible, adopt them. The final report shall then be 
submitted not later than 30 days after the completion of the 
challenge inspection to the Director-General for further 
distribution and consideration in accordance with Article IX, 
paragraphs 21 to 25.

                                Part XI

       INVESTIGATIONS IN CASES OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. General

    1. Investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, or of 
alleged use of riot control agents as a method of warfare, 
initiated pursuant to Articles IX or X, shall be conducted in 
accordance with this Annex and detailed procedures to be 
established by the Director-General.
    2. The following additional provisions address specific 
procedures required in cases of alleged use of chemical 
weapons.

B. Pre-inspection activities

            Request for an investigation
    3. The request for an investigation of an alleged use of 
chemical weapons to be submitted to the Director-General, to 
the extent possible, should include the following information:
          (a) The State Party on whose territory use of 
        chemical weapons is alleged to have taken place;
          (b) The point of entry or other suggested safe routes 
        of access;
          (c) Location and characteristics of the areas where 
        chemical weapons are alleged to have been used;
          (d) When chemical weapons are alleged to have been 
        used;
          (e) Types of chemical weapons believed to have been 
        used;
          (f) Extent of alleged use;
          (g) Characteristics of the possible toxic chemicals;
          (h) Effects on humans, animals and vegetation;
          (i) Request for specific assistance, if applicable.
    4. The State Party which has requested an investigation may 
submit at any time any additional information it deems 
necessary.
            Notification
    5. The Director-General shall immediately acknowledge 
receipt to the requesting State Party of its request and inform 
the Executive Council and all States Parties.
    6. If applicable, the Director-General shall notify the 
State Party on whose territory an investigation has been 
requested. The Director-General shall also notify other States 
Parties if access to their territories might be required during 
the investigation.
            Assignment of inspection team
    7. The Director-General shall prepare a list of qualified 
experts whose particular field of expertise could be required 
in an investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons and 
constantly keep this list updated. This list shall be 
communicated, in writing, to each State Party not later than 30 
days after entry into force of this Convention and after each 
change to the list. Any qualified expert included in this list 
shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, not later 
than 30 days after its receipt of the list, declares its non-
acceptance in writing.
    8. The Director-General shall select the leader and members 
of an inspection team from the inspectors and inspection 
assistants already designated for challenge inspections taking 
into account the circumstances and specific nature of a 
particular request. In addition, members of the inspection team 
may be selected from the list of qualified experts when, in the 
view of the Director-General, expertise not available among 
inspectors already designated is required for the proper 
conduct of a particular investigation.
    9. When briefing the inspection team, the Director-General 
shall include any additional information provided by the 
requesting State Party, or any other sources, to ensure that 
the inspection can be carried out in the most effective and 
expedient manner.
            Dispatch of inspection team
    10. Immediately upon the receipt of a request for an 
investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons the Director-
General shall, through contacts with the relevant States 
Parties, request and confirm arrangements for the safe 
reception of the team.
    11. The Director-General shall dispatch the team at the 
earliest opportunity, taking into account the safety of the 
team.
    12. If the inspection team has not been dispatched within 
24 hours from the receipt of the request, the Director-General 
shall inform the Executive Council and the States Parties 
concerned about the reasons for the delay.
            Briefings
    13. The inspection team shall have the right to be briefed 
by representatives of the inspected State Party upon arrival 
and at any time during the inspection.
    14. Before the commencement of the inspection the 
inspection team shall prepare an inspection plan to serve, 
inter alia, as a basis for logistic and safety arrangements. 
The inspection plan shall be updated as need arises.

C. Conduct of inspections

            Access
    15. The inspection team shall have the right of access to 
any and all areas which could be affected by the alleged use of 
chemical weapons. It shall also have the right of access to 
hospitals, refugee camps and other locations it deems relevant 
to the effective investigation of the alleged use of chemical 
weapons. For such access, the inspection team shall consult 
with the inspected State Party.
            Sampling
    16. The inspection team shall have the right to collect 
samples of types, and in quantities it considers necessary. If 
the inspection team deems it necessary, and if so requested by 
it, the inspected State Party shall assist in the collection of 
samples under the supervision of inspectors or inspection 
assistants. The inspected State Party shall also permit and 
cooperate in the collection of appropriate control samples from 
areas neighboring the site of the alleged use and from other 
areas as requested by the inspection team.
    17. Samples of importance in the investigation of alleged 
use include toxic chemicals, munitions and devices, remnants of 
munitions and devices, environmental samples (air, soil, 
vegetation, water, snow, etc.) and biomedical samples from 
human or animal sources (blood, urine, excreta, tissue etc.).
    18. If duplicate samples cannot be taken and the analysis 
is performed at off-site laboratories, any remaining sample 
shall, if so requested, be returned to the inspected State 
Party after the completion of the analysis.
            Extension of inspection site
    19. If the inspection team during an inspection deems it 
necessary to extend the investigation into a neighboring State 
Party, the Director-General shall notify that State Party about 
the need for access to its territory and request and confirm 
arrangements for the safe reception of the team.
            Extension of inspection duration
    20. If the inspection team deems that safe access to a 
specific area relevant to the investigation is not possible, 
the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. If 
necessary, the period of inspection shall be extended until 
safe access can be provided and the inspection team will have 
concluded its mission.
            Interviews
    21. The inspection team shall have the right to interview 
and examine persons who may have been affected by the alleged 
use of chemical weapons. It shall also have the right to 
interview eyewitnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons 
and medical personnel, and other persons who have treated or 
have come into contact with persons who may have been affected 
by the alleged use of chemical weapons. The inspection team 
shall have access to medical histories, if available, and be 
permitted to participate in autopsies, as appropriate, of 
persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of 
chemical weapons.

D. Reports

            Procedures
    22. The inspection team shall, not later than 24 hours 
after its arrival on the territory of the inspected State 
Party, send a situation report to the Director-General. It 
shall further throughout the investigation send progress 
reports as necessary.
    23. The inspection team shall, not later than 72 hours 
after its return to its primary work location, submit a 
preliminary report to the Director-General. The final report 
shall be submitted to the Director-General not later than 30 
days after its return to its primary work location. The 
Director-General shall promptly transmit the preliminary and 
final reports to the Executive Council and to all States 
Parties.
            Contents
    24. The situation report shall indicate any urgent need for 
assistance and any other relevant information. The progress 
reports shall indicate any further need for assistance that 
might be identified during the course of the investigation.
    25. The final report shall summarize the factual findings 
of the inspection, particularly with regard to the alleged use 
cited in the request. In addition, a report of an investigation 
of an alleged use shall include a description of the 
investigation process, tracing its various stages, with special 
reference to:
          (a) The locations and time of sampling and on-site 
        analyses; and
          (b) Supporting evidence, such as the records of 
        interviews, the results of medical examinations and 
        scientific analyses, and the documents examined by the 
        inspection team.
    26. If the inspection team collects through, inter alia, 
identification of any impurities or other substances during 
laboratory analysis of samples taken, any information in the 
course of its investigation that might serve to identify the 
origin of any chemical weapons used, that information shall be 
included in the report.

E. States not party to this convention

    27. In the case of alleged use of chemical weapons 
involving a State not Party to this Convention or in territory 
not controlled by a State Party, the Organization shall closely 
cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If 
so requested, the Organization shall put its resources at the 
disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

ANNEX ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION (``CONFIDENTIALITY 
                                ANNEX'')

   A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

    1. The obligation to protect confidential information shall 
pertain to the verification of both civil and military 
activities and facilities. Pursuant to the general obligations 
set forth in Article VIII, the Organization shall:
          (a) Require only the minimum amount of information 
        and data necessary for the timely and efficient 
        carrying out of its responsibilities under this 
        Convention;
          (b) Take the necessary measures to ensure that 
        inspectors and other staff members of the Technical 
        Secretariat meet the highest standards of efficiency, 
        competence, and integrity;
          (c) Develop agreements and regulations to implement 
        the provisions of this Convention and shall specify as 
        precisely as possible the information to which the 
        Organization shall be given access by a State Party.
    2. The Director-General shall have the primary 
responsibility for ensuring the protection of confidential 
information. The Director-General shall establish a stringent 
regime governing the handling of confidential information by 
the Technical Secretariat, and in doing so, shall observe the 
following guidelines:
          (a) Information shall be considered confidential if:
                  (i) It is so designated by the State Party 
                from which the information was obtained and to 
                which the information refers; or
                  (ii) In the judgement of the Director-
                General, its unauthorized disclosure could 
                reasonably be expected to cause damage to the 
                State Party to which it refers or to the 
                mechanisms for implementation of this 
                Convention;
          (b) All data and documents obtained by the Technical 
        Secretariat shall be evaluated by the appropriate unit 
        of the Technical Secretariat in order to establish 
        whether they contain confidential information. Data 
        required by States Parties to be assured of the 
        continued compliance with this Convention by other 
        States Parties shall be routinely provided to them. 
        Such data shall encompass:
                  (i) The initial and annual reports and 
                declarations provided by States Parties under 
                Articles III, IV, V and VI, in accordance with 
                the provisions set forth in the Verification 
                Annex;
                  (ii) General reports on the results and 
                effectiveness of verification activities; and
                  (iii) Information to be supplied to all 
                States Parties in accordance with the 
                provisions of this Convention;
          (c) No information obtained by the Organization in 
        connection with the implementation of this Convention 
        shall be published or otherwise released, except, as 
        follows:
                  (i) General information on the implementation 
                of this Convention may be compiled and released 
                publicly in accordance with the decisions of 
                the Conference or the Executive Council;
                  (ii) Any information may be released with the 
                express consent of the State Party to which the 
                information refers;
                  (iii) Information classified as confidential 
                shall be released by the Organization only 
                through procedures which ensure that the 
                release of information only occurs in strict 
                conformity with the needs of this Convention. 
                Such procedures shall be considered and 
                approved by the Conference pursuant to Article 
                VIII, paragraph 21 (i);
          (d) The level of sensitivity of confidential data or 
        documents shall be established, based on criteria to be 
        applied uniformly in order to ensure their appropriate 
        handling and protection. For this purpose, a 
        classification system shall be introduced, which by 
        taking account of relevant work undertaken in the 
        preparation of this Convention shall provide for clear 
        criteria ensuring the inclusion of information into 
        appropriate categories of confidentiality and the 
        justified durability of the confidential nature of 
        information. While providing for the necessary 
        flexibility in its implementation the classification 
        system shall protect the rights of States Parties 
        providing confidential information. A classification 
        system shall be considered and approved by the 
        Conference pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i);
          (e) Confidential information shall be stored securely 
        at the premises of the Organization. Some data or 
        documents may also be stored with the National 
        Authority of a State Party. Sensitive information, 
        including, inter alia, photographs, plans and other 
        documents required only for the inspection of a 
        specific facility may be kept under lock and key at 
        this facility;
          (f) To the greatest extent consistent with the 
        effective implementation of the verification provisions 
        of this Convention, information shall be handled and 
        stored by the Technical Secretariat in a form that 
        precludes direct identification of the facility to 
        which it pertains;
          (g) The amount of confidential information removed 
        from a facility shall be kept to the minimum necessary 
        for the timely and effective implementation of the 
        verification provisions of this Convention; and
          (h) Access to confidential information shall be 
        regulated in accordance with its classification. The 
        dissemination of confidential information within the 
        Organization shall be strictly on a need-to-know basis.
    3. The Director-General shall report annually to the 
Conference on the implementation of the regime governing the 
handling of confidential information by the Technical 
Secretariat.
    4. Each State Party shall treat information which it 
receives from the Organization in accordance with the level of 
confidentiality established for that information. Upon request, 
a State Party shall provide details on the handling of 
information provided to it by the Organization.

  B. EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL IN THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

    5. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to 
ensure that access to and handling of confidential information 
shall be in conformity with the procedures established by the 
Director-General in accordance with Section A.
    6. Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be 
governed by a formal position description that specifies the 
scope of access to confidential information, if any, needed in 
that position.
    7. The Director-General, the inspectors and the other 
members of the staff shall not disclose even after termination 
of their functions to any unauthorized persons any confidential 
information coming to their knowledge in the performance of 
their official duties. They shall not communicate to any State, 
organization or person outside the Technical Secretariat any 
information to which they have access in connection with their 
activities in relation to any State Party.
    8. In the discharge of their functions inspectors shall 
only request the information and data which are necessary to 
fulfil their mandate. They shall not make any records of 
information collected incidentally and not related to 
verification of compliance with this Convention.
    9. The staff shall enter into individual secrecy agreements 
with the Technical Secretariat covering their period of 
employment and a period of five years after it is terminated.
    10. In order to avoid improper disclosures, inspectors and 
staff members shall be appropriately advised and reminded about 
security considerations and of the possible penalties that they 
would incur in the event of improper disclosure.
    11. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given 
clearance for access to confidential information that refers to 
activities on the territory or in any other place under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party, the State Party 
concerned shall be notified of the proposed clearance. For 
inspectors the notification of a proposed designation shall 
fulfil this requirement.
    12. In evaluating the performance of inspectors and any 
other employees of the Technical Secretariat, specific 
attention shall be given to the employee's record regarding 
protection of confidential information.

 C. MEASURES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS AND PREVENT DISCLOSURE 
 OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA IN THE COURSE OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

    13. States Parties may take such measures as they deem 
necessary to protect confidentiality, provided that they fulfil 
their obligations to demonstrate compliance in accordance with 
the relevant Articles and the Verification Annex. When 
receiving an inspection, the State Party may indicate to the 
inspection team the equipment, documentation or areas that it 
considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the 
inspection.
    14. Inspection teams shall be guided by the principle of 
conducting on-site inspections in the least intrusive manner 
possible consistent with the effective and timely 
accomplishment of their mission. They shall take into 
consideration proposals which may be made by the State Party 
receiving the inspection, at whatever stage of the inspection, 
to ensure that sensitive equipment or information, not related 
to chemical weapons, is protected.
    15. Inspection teams shall strictly abide by the provisions 
set forth in the relevant Articles and Annexes governing the 
conduct of inspections. They shall fully respect the procedures 
designed to protect sensitive installations and to prevent the 
disclosure of confidential data.
    16. In the elaboration of arrangements and facility 
agreements, due regard shall be paid to the requirement of 
protecting confidential information. Agreements on inspection 
procedures for individual facilities shall also include 
specific and detailed arrangements with regard to the 
determination of those areas of the facility to which 
inspectors are granted access, the storage of confidential 
information on-site, the scope of the inspection effort in 
agreed areas, the taking of samples and their analysis, the 
access to records and the use of instruments and continuous 
monitoring equipment.
    17. The report to be prepared after each inspection shall 
only contain facts relevant to compliance with this Convention. 
The report shall be handled in accordance with the regulations 
established by the Organization governing the handling of 
confidential information. If necessary, the information 
contained in the report shall be processed into less sensitive 
forms before it is transmitted outside the Technical 
Secretariat and the inspected State Party.

       D. PROCEDURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED BREACHES OF 
                            CONFIDENTIALITY

    18. The Director-General shall establish necessary 
procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged 
breaches of confidentiality, taking into account 
recommendations to be considered and approved by the Conference 
pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i).
    19. The Director-General shall oversee the implementation 
of individual secrecy agreements. The Director-General shall 
promptly initiate an investigation if, in his judgement, there 
is sufficient indication that obligations concerning the 
protection of confidential information have been violated. The 
Director-General shall also promptly initiate an investigation 
if an allegation concerning a breach of confidentiality is made 
by a State Party.
    20. The Director-General shall impose appropriate punitive 
and disciplinary measures on staff members who have violated 
their obligations to protect confidential information. In cases 
of serious breaches, the immunity from jurisdiction may be 
waived by the Director-General.
    21. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, cooperate 
and support the Director-General in investigating any breach or 
alleged breach of confidentiality and in taking appropriate 
action in case a breach has been established.
    22. The Organization shall not be held liable for any 
breach of confidentiality committed by members of the Technical 
Secretariat.
    23. For breaches involving both a State Party and the 
Organization, a ``Commission for the settlement of disputes 
related to confidentiality'', set up as a subsidiary organ of 
the Conference, shall consider the case. This Commission shall 
be appointed by the Conference. Rules governing its composition 
and operating procedures shall be adopted by the Conference at 
its first session.

             OTHER DOCUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONVENTION

RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANIZATION 
                FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

     The States signatories of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by the 
Conference on Disarmament At Geneva on 3 September 1992,
     Having decided to take all necessary measures to ensure 
the rapid and effective establishment of the future 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
     Having decided to this end to establish a Preparatory 
Commission.
     1. Approve the Text on the Establishment of a Preparatory 
Commission, as annexed to the present resolution;
     2. Request the Secretary-General, in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of resolution A/RES/47/39, adopted by the General 
Assembly on 30 November 1992, on the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, to provide the 
services required to initiate the work of the Preparatory 
Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons.

         TEXT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMISSION

    1. There is hereby established the Preparatory Commission 
for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(hereinafter referred to as ``the Commission'') for the purpose 
of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective 
implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on their Destruction, and for preparing for the 
first session of the Conference of the States Parties to that 
Convention.
    2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
convene the Commission for its first session at The Hague, 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, not later than 30 days after the 
Convention has been signed by 50 States.
    3. The Seat of the Commission shall be The Hague, Kingdom 
of the Netherlands.
    4. The Commission shall be composed of all States which 
sign the Convention. Each signatory State shall have one 
representative in the Commission, who may be accompanied by 
alternates and advisers.
    5. The expenses of the Commission, including those of the 
provisional Technical Secretariat, shall be met by the States 
signatories to the Convention, participating in the Commission, 
in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, 
adjusted to take into account differences between the United 
Nations membership and the participation of States signatories 
in the Commission and timing of signature. The Commission and 
the provisional Technical Secretariat may also benefit from 
voluntary contributions.
    6. All decisions of the Commission should be taken by 
consensus. If, notwithstanding the efforts of representatives 
to achieve consensus, an issue comes up for voting, the 
Chairman of the Commission shall defer the vote for 24 hours 
and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to 
facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the 
Commission before the end of the period. If consensus is not 
possible at the end of 24 hours, the Commission shall take 
decision on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the 
members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance 
shall be taken by two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting. When the issue arises as to whether the question is 
one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as a 
matter of substance unless otherwise decided by the Commission 
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
    7. The Commission shall have such legal capacity as 
necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment 
of its purposes.
    8. The Commission shall:
          (a) Elect its Chairman and other officers, adopt its 
        rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and 
        establish such committees as it deems useful;
          (b) Appoint its Executive Secretary;
          (c) Establish a provisional Technical Secretariat to 
        assist the Commission in its activity and to exercise 
        such functions as the Commission may determine, and 
        appoint the necessary staff in charge of preparatory 
        work concerning the main activities to be carried out 
        by the Technical Secretariat to be established by the 
        Convention. Only nationals of signatory States shall be 
        appointed to the provisional Technical Secretariat;
          (d) Establish administrative and financial 
        regulations in respect of its own expenditure and 
        accounts.
    9. The Commission shall make arrangements for the first 
session of the Conference of the States Parties, including the 
preparation of a draft agenda and draft rules of procedure.
    10. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the 
following tasks concerning the organization and work of the 
Technical Secretariat and requiring immediate attention after 
entry into force of the Convention:
          (a) Elaboration of a detailed staffing pattern of the 
        Technical Secretariat, including decision-making flow 
        charts;
          (b) Assessments of personnel requirements;
          (c) Staff rules for recruitment and service 
        conditions;
          (d) Recruitment and training of technical personnel 
        and support staff;
          (e) Organization of office and administrative 
        services;
          (f) Preparation of administrative and financial 
        regulations;
          (g) Purchase and standardization of equipment.
    11. The Commission shall undertake, inter alia, the 
following tasks on matters of the organization requiring 
immediate attention after the entry into force of the 
Convention:
          (a) Preparation of programme of work and budget of 
        the first year of activities of the Organization;
          (b) Preparation of detailed budgetary provisions for 
        the Organization taking into account that the budget 
        shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to 
        administrative and other costs, and one relating to 
        verification costs;
          (c) Preparation of the scale of financial 
        contributions to the Organization;
          (d) Preparation of administrative and financial 
        regulations for the Organization providing for inter 
        alia:
                  (i) Proper financial control and accounting 
                by the Organization;
                  (ii) Preparation and approval of periodic 
                financial statements by the Organization;
                  (iii) Independent audit of the Organization's 
                financial statements;
                  (iv) Annual presentation of the audited 
                financial statements to a regular session of 
                the Conference of the States Parties for formal 
                acceptance;
          (e) Development of arrangements to facilitate the 
        election of 20 members for a term of one year for the 
        first election of the Executive Council.
    12. The Commission shall develop, inter alia, the following 
draft agreements, provisions and guidelines for consideration 
and approval by the Conference of the States Parties pursuant 
to Article VIII, paragraph 21 (i) of the Convention:
          (a) Guidelines on detailed procedures for 
        verification and for the conduct of inspections, in 
        accordance with, inter alia, Part II, paragraph 42, of 
        the Verification Annex;
          (b) Lists of items to be stockpiled for emergency and 
        humanitarian assistance in accordance with Article 
        VIII, paragraph 39 (b);
          (c) Agreements between the Organization and the 
        States Parties in accordance with Article VIII, 
        paragraph 50;
          (d) Procedures for the provision of information by 
        States Parties on their programmes related to 
        protective purposes, in accordance with Article X, 
        paragraph 4;
          (e) A list of approved equipment, in accordance with 
        Part II, paragraph 27, of the Verification Annex;
          (f) Procedures for the inspection of equipment, in 
        accordance with Part II, paragraph 29, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (g) Procedures concerning the implementation of 
        safety requirements for activities of inspectors and 
        inspection assistants, in accordance with Part II, 
        paragraph 43, of the Verification Annex;
          (h) Procedures for inclusion in the inspection manual 
        concerning the security, integrity and preservation of 
        samples and for ensuring the protection of the 
        confidentiality of samples transferred for analysis 
        off-site, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 56, of 
        the Verification Annex;
          (i) Models for facility agreements in accordance with 
        Part III, paragraph 8, of the Verification Annex;
          (j) Appropriate detailed procedures to implement Part 
        III, paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Verification Annex, in 
        accordance with paragraph 13 of that Part;
          (k) Deadlines for submission of the information 
        specified in Part IV (A), paragraphs 30 to 32 of the 
        Verification Annex, in accordance with paragraph 34 of 
        that Part;
          (l) Recommendations for determining the frequency of 
        systematic on-site inspection of storage facilities, in 
        accordance with Part IV (A), paragraph 44, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (m) Recommendations for guidelines for transitional 
        verification arrangements, in accordance with Part IV 
        (A), paragraph 51, of the Verification Annex;
          (n) Guidelines to determine the usability of chemical 
        weapons produced between 1925 and 1946, in accordance 
        with Part IV (B), paragraph 5, of the Verification 
        Annex;
          (o) Guidelines for determining the frequency of 
        systematic on-site inspections of chemical weapons 
        production facilities, in accordance with Part V, 
        paragraph 54, of the Verification Annex;
          (p) Criteria for toxicity, corrosiveness and, if 
        applicable, other technical factors, in accordance with 
        Part V, paragraph 71 (b), of the Verification Annex;
          (q) Guidelines to assess the risk to the object and 
        purpose of the Convention posed by the relevant 
        chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the 
        nature of the activities carried out there, in 
        accordance with Part VI, paragraph 23, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (r) Models for facility agreements covering detailed 
        inspection procedures, in accordance with Part VI, 
        paragraph 27, of the Verification Annex;
          (s) Guidelines to assess the risk to the object and 
        purpose of the Convention posed by the quantities of 
        chemicals produced, the characteristics of the facility 
        and the nature of the activities carried out there, in 
        accordance with Part VI, paragraph 30, of the 
        Verification Annex;
          (t) Guidelines for provisions regarding scheduled 
        chemicals in low concentrations, including in mixtures, 
        in accordance with Part VII, paragraph 5, and Part 
        VIII, paragraph 5, of the Verification Annex;
          (u) Guidelines for procedures on the release of 
        classified information by the Organization, in 
        accordance with paragraph 2 (c) (iii) of the 
        Confidentiality Annex;
          (v) A classification system for levels of sensitivity 
        of confidential data and documents, taking into account 
        relevant work undertaken in the preparation of the 
        Convention, in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of the 
        Confidentiality Annex;
          (w) Recommendations for procedures to be followed in 
        case of breaches or alleged breaches of 
        confidentiality, in accordance with paragraph 18 of the 
        Confidentiality Annex.
    13. Pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 50, of the 
Convention, the Commission shall develop the Headquarters 
Agreement with the Host Country, based, inter alia, on the 
privileges, immunities and practical arrangements as specified 
in Annex 2 to this text.
    14. The Commission shall:
          (a) Facilitate the exchange of information between 
        signatory States concerning legal and administrative 
        measures for the implementation of the Convention and, 
        if requested, give advice to signatory States on these 
        matters;
          (b) Prepare such studies, reports and records as it 
        deems necessary.
    15. The Commission shall prepare a final report on all 
matters within its mandate for the first session of the 
Conference of the States Parties and the first meeting of the 
Executive Council.
    16. The property, functions and recommendations of the 
Commission shall be transferred to the Organization at the 
first session of the Conference of the States Parties. The 
Commission shall make recommendations to the Conference of the 
States Parties on this matter.
    17. The Commission shall remain in existence until the 
conclusion of the first session of the Conference of the States 
Parties.
    18. The Host Country undertakes to accord the Commission, 
its staff, as well as the delegates of signatory States such 
legal status, privileges and immunities as are necessary for 
the independent exercise of their functions in connection with 
the Commission and the fulfillment of its object and purpose, 
as outlined in Annex 1 to this text.

                                Annex 1

 PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH 
               THE HOSTING OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

    1. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to grant 
to the delegates to the Preparatory Commission, who have been 
notified as such by the sending State, and who reside in The 
Hague, privileges and immunities similar to those granted by 
the Government of the Netherlands to diplomats of comparable 
rank of diplomatic missions accredited to the Netherlands.
    2. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to apply 
Article V of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947 to nonresiding 
delegates to the Preparatory Commission while exercising their 
function and during their journeys to and from the place of 
meeting.
    3. The Government of the Netherlands is prepared to grant 
to the Executive Secretary and staff members of the Preparatory 
Commission privileges and immunities similar to those which the 
Government of the Netherlands has undertaken to grant to the 
Director-General and staff members of the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as set out under Annex 3, 
``Privileges and Immunities'', points 1, 2, and 3, ``Social 
Security'', point 13, and ``Employment'', points 14 and 15.
    4. It is understood that the above will be elaborated in an 
agreement to be concluded with the Government of the 
Netherlands.
    5. The practical arrangements for the hosting for the 
Preparatory Commission shall be based on the information 
submitted and commitments undertaken by the Netherlands and by 
the City of The Hague as contained in Annex 3 on the 
Netherlands bid, under ``Building and Equipment''.

                                Annex 2

 privileges, immunities and practical arrangements to be laid down in 
                       the headquarters agreement

    1. The Headquarters Agreement between the Organization and 
the Netherlands, where the seat of the Organization is located, 
shall be based on the information submitted and commitments 
undertaken by the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague as 
contained in Annex 3 on the Netherlands bid.
    2. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the 
Organization, the privileges and immunities to be laid down in 
the Headquarters Agreement shall be in conformity with the 
regime of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the Specialized Agencies of 21 November 1947 (United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 179/II).
    3. In order to ensure the effective functioning of the 
Organization, the Headquarters Agreement shall also include 
provisions for:
          3.1 the granting to Heads of Delegations to the 
        Organization of ambassadorial rank the title of 
        Permanent Representative and the privileges and 
        immunities to which Ambassadors to the Netherlands are 
        entitled;
          3.2 the establishment of a tax-free commissary for 
        the officials of the Organization entitled to duty free 
        privileges;
          3.3 the exemption from tax on or in respect of 
        salaries and emoluments paid by the Organization; the 
        Host Country shall not take into account the salaries 
        and emoluments thus exempted when assessing the amount 
        of tax to be applied to income from other sources.

                                Annex 3

information submitted and commitments undertaken by the netherlands and 
                        by the city of the hague

    The following information is given and commitments are 
undertaken by the Netherlands and by the City of The Hague with 
respect to arrangements for the hosting of the Preparatory 
Commission as well as for the Headquarters Agreement. These are 
reflected in:
          The Annex to Paper No. 1 of 28 April 1992 of the 
        ``Friend of the Chair on the Seat of the 
        Organization'';
          The Bidbook of 18 May 1992 presented by the 
        Netherlands;
          The statement of 2 June 1992, made by Mr. Martini, 
        Acting Burgomaster of The Hague, to the Ad Hoc 
        Committee on Chemical Weapons;
          The statement of 2 June 1992 made by Mr. M. van Zelm, 
        Programme Director of the Prins Maurits Laboratory, to 
        the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.
    These documents are filed with the Secretariat of the 
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
    Other aspects may be included in the Headquarters Agreement 
by mutual agreement.

Privileges and Immunities

    1. Full diplomatic privileges will be granted to those 
staff members of the Organization and their dependents who 
qualify under the relevant provisions of the Agreement. 
Pursuant to Annex 1, the Netherlands is prepared to extend 
diplomatic privileges to personnel with ranks comparable to P-5 
and above in conformity with the regime of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 21 
November 1947 (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 179/
II).
    2. Other staff members will enjoy:
          (a) immunity from legal proceedings of any kind with 
        respect to words spoken or written and all acts 
        performed by them in their official capacity;
          (b) in any event, immunity shall not extend to a 
        civil action by a third party for damage arising from 
        an accident caused by a motor vehicle belonging to, 
        driven by or operated on behalf of a staff member or in 
        respect of a traffic offense involving such a vehicle;
          (c) inviolability of all their official papers and 
        documents;
          (d) immunity from inspection of official baggage;
          (e) exemption from Netherlands income tax on salaries 
        and emoluments paid to them by the Organization.
    Moreover, staff members who do not have the Dutch 
nationality will:
          (f) enjoy exemption with respect to themselves and 
        members of their families who are part of their 
        households from all measures restricting entry and 
        alien registration. Any visas which may be required 
        shall be issued without charge as promptly as possible;
          (g) be given the same repatriation facilities in the 
        time of international crisis as officials of diplomatic 
        missions, together with members of their families who 
        form part of their households;
          (h) not require a work permit for their official 
        duties with the Organization;
          (i) in accordance with the regulations in force, have 
        relief from import duties and taxes, except payments 
        for services, in respect of their furniture and 
        personal effects and the right to export furniture and 
        personal effects with relief from duty on termination 
        of their duties in the Netherlands. Personal effects 
        may include a reasonable number of cars that have been 
        in use in the household and are older than six months.
    3. In addition, persons who have lived outside the 
Netherlands for at least 12 months before taking up a position 
with the Organization will be allowed to import one motor 
vehicle tax-free. The vehicle should be imported within 12 
months after they take up their position and can be sold tax-
free after 12 months.
    4. Pursuant to Annex 2, the Netherlands is furthermore 
prepared to grant to the Heads of Delegation with ambassadorial 
rank, accredited to the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, the title of Permanent Representatives and 
the privileges and immunities to which Ambassadors to the 
Netherlands are entitled.

Building and equipment

    5. An office building of 3,300 square meters will be 
supplied free of charge during the preparatory phase (maximum 
of five years). The building is located at the center of The 
Hague near the Peace Palace and several embassies. The 
Netherlands Congress Center is 1 km away. The modern office 
building was built in 1986 and consists of 3,300 square meters 
of office space divided over five floors. Office space can be 
made available immediately as soon as the Organization begins 
working in The Hague. The building offers sufficient 
flexibility to allow the Organization to grow in stages up to a 
maximum of 200 people. The Hague and the Netherlands will pay 
for the rent of the office space, parking places for the 
Organization, maintenance costs of the building and the 
installations energy costs (heating, cooling, electricity, 
water) and turnkey costs (carpeting, partitioning) during the 
preparatory phase.
    6. Before the full implementation phase, office space with 
a maximum of 18,000 square meters is foreseen to be made 
available for the Organization in a new purpose-built office 
building, to be known as the ``Peace Tower''. Construction can 
be started as soon as the Organization can specify the required 
volume and further details. The building is expected to be 
completed two and a half years later. The Tower will be 
situated in the city center business district next to Central 
Station.
    For a period of 3 years during the full implementation 
phase, The Hague and the Netherlands will pay for the rent of 
the office space, 110 parking places for the Organization 
inside the building, maintenance costs of the building and the 
installations, energy costs (heating, cooling, electricity, 
water) and turnkey costs (carpeting, partitioning).
    The building is flexible enough to allow space to be made 
available to the Organization in proportion to the number of 
staff, up to a maximum of 18,000 square meters. After the 
period in which the Netherlands Government will pay for the 
office space as described above, office space can be leased by 
the Organization at a guaranteed price of US$ 250 per square 
meter (indexed on the basis of the 1992 price level, basic 
rent).
    If required expansion needs of the Organization are known 
before the end of 1993, the building can be expanded to a 
maximum of 22,000 square meters. This expansion can be leased 
by the Organization at a guaranteed price of US$ 250 per square 
meter (indexed on the basis of 1992 price levels, basic rent).
    7. When needed, a conference room for approximately 170 
delegations will be made available, free of charge, during the 
maximum eight year period of the Netherlands bid at the nearby 
Peace Palace or Netherlands Congress Center.
    8. Subject to the promise that all office supplies, service 
contracts and other office materials for which the Organization 
will pay, shall be purchased at the normal going rates from a 
supplier designated by The Hague, the Netherlands offer during 
the preparatory phase (maximum of five years) includes:
          Providing all necessary office furniture according to 
        official European standards, free of charge;
          Providing all the reasonably necessary office 
        equipment, free of charge;
    During the preparatory phase (maximum of five years) the 
Netherlands offer also includes:
          Providing a fully integrated digital telephone 
        switchboard, telephones on every desk and 10 fax 
        machines free of charge.
    9. After the preparatory phase during a period of three 
years office furniture (according to official European 
standards) and reasonably necessary office equipment will be 
supplied free of charge on a one-time basis, provided that all 
office supplies, service contracts and other office materials 
for which the Organization will pay, shall be purchased at the 
normal going rates from a supplier designated by The Hague.

Laboratory/training

    10. The Prins Maurits Laboratory (PML) of the Netherlands 
Organization for Applied Scientific Research (TNO), a fully 
independent not-for-profit research organization, will grant 
the Organization access to its database with analytical 
chemical data, free of charge. This database contains 
spectrometric and chromatographic data of a large number of 
compounds relevant to the Convention.
    11. PML is also prepared to provide a technical training 
programme for 100-150 candidate inspectors of the future 
Organization drawn from developing countries mainly. The 
training programme will be free of charge for the participants.
    12. Finally PML, if needed in cooperation with other TNO 
institutes, could carry out a number of technical functions of 
the Organization, such as analyses of samples, development of 
analytical chemical methods, synthesis of reference compounds, 
calibration and development of verification equipment, advice 
on and development of detection and protection equipment, 
sampling equipment, seals and markers, etc., at a price 
determined by the integral costs of its activities.

Social security

    13. If the Organization establishes its own social security 
system with comparable coverage to Dutch schemes, the 
Netherlands Government will exempt the Organization, its 
Director and staff members/personnel from compulsory insurance 
under national social security schemes. The exemption rules 
will be laid down in the Headquarters Agreement. For persons 
who are not exempt, compulsory insurance schemes will apply and 
the Organization will be responsible for paying contributions.

Employment

    14. Non-Dutch employees of international organizations in 
the Netherlands who do not carry diplomatic status, will be--as 
a matter of routine--granted work and residence permits for the 
duration of their employment in the Netherlands.
    15. Family members of persons working at the Organization 
who have the nationality of one of the member States of the 
European Community may take up employment in the Netherlands. 
Members of the family who do not have the nationality of one of 
the member States of the European Community may take up 
employment subject to the requirements of the labor market.

General conditions relating to the Netherlands bid

    16. The Dutch bid applies if the Organization is to remain 
in The Hague throughout its existence.
    17. Property, furniture, equipment and other items that are 
made available will remain the property of the supplier and/or 
the Netherlands.
                          VIII. MAJORITY VIEWS

                                                                   Page
  I. Background.....................................................163
      A. Historical background...................................   164
      B. Recent developments.....................................   165
 II. The Chemical Weapons Threat....................................167
      A. Description.............................................   167
      B. Delivery................................................   167
      C. Destructive effects.....................................   168
      D. Utility.................................................   168
      E. Proliferant countries...................................   169
      F. Implications of proliferation...........................   170
      G. Purpose and provisions of the Chemical Weapons 
        Convention...............................................   171
III. Issues Considered in Resolution of Ratification................173
      A. Verification and implementation issues..................   173
          1. Verifiability.......................................   173
          2. Universality and effectiveness......................   179
          3. Costs...............................................   182
          4. Enforcement/sanctions...............................   184
          5. Destruction of stockpiles...........................   185
          6.  ``Rogue'' inspectors...............................   190
          7. Chemical Weapons Convention funding.................   191
          8. Chemical Weapons Convention costs...................   192
          9. The Chemical Weapons Convention preparatory 
            commission...........................................   192
          10. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
            Weapons..............................................   194
      B. Security and Military Implications......................   194
          1. Retaliatory capability..............................   194
          2. Deterrence..........................................   196
          3. Defenses............................................   197
          4. Riot control agents.................................   198
          5. Russia and cheating.................................   200
          6. Non-lethal weapons development......................   207
          7. Protecting national security information............   208
          8. The impact on anti-terrorism efforts................   209
      C. Commercial considerations...............................   211
          1. Constitutional issues...............................   211
          2. U.S. industry and the CWC...........................   214
          3. Repercussions on U.S. industry if the U.S. does not 
            ratify the CWC.......................................   219
      D. Popular misconceptions of the CWC.......................   220
 IV. Conclusions....................................................224
      A. Bipartisan support......................................   224
      B. Summary.................................................   225
      C. Continuing concerns.....................................   227
      D. Judgment................................................   228
  V. Appendices.....................................................229
      Letter of support from George Bush.........................   229
      Letters of support from the chemical industry:
          1. The Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA)........   230
          2. The Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers 
            Association (SOCMA)..................................   235
          3. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
            America (PhRMA)......................................   235
          4. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO).......   236
          5. The American Chemical Society (ACS).................   237
          6. 53 senior chemical industry executives..............   238

                             1. Background

    Several developments in recent years have led to an 
increased concern over the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Economic and technological development around the 
world has led to a greater diffusion of the technology needed 
to produce such weapons. Meanwhile, the end of the cold war has 
been followed by the reemergence of regional conflicts, in 
which weapons of mass destruction are most likely to be used if 
available. The breakup of the Soviet Union has spawned new 
states with advanced unconventional weapons capabilities. 
Accordingly, the Clinton administration has stated repeatedly 
that nonproliferation is one of the primary objectives of its 
foreign policy.
    Some 20 nations are now suspected of having chemical 
weapons or developing a chemical weapons capability. Among 
these states are Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Libya--countries 
not known for their restraint. Chemical weapons have been 
termed the ``poor man's nuclear bomb'' because they can be 
manufactured cheaply from chemicals that, although they are in 
many cases controlled, are nevertheless available for 
commercial purposes. And now, the dangers from chemical weapons 
are aggravated by the production and potential proliferation of 
ballistic missiles that can hurl a CW warhead hundreds of 
miles. Moreover, unlike the nuclear threshold, the chemical 
weapons threshold has proved all too easy to cross.
    In the twentieth century, nuclear weapons have been used 
but once, when they were employed to end the Pacific war. 
During this same time, however, nations repeatedly have 
unleashed chemical weapons to achieve their military or 
political goals. Soldiers on both sides, including U.S. troops, 
were gassed in World War I. Chemical weapons were used in 
Ethiopia in the 1930's, in Manchuria in the 1940's, and in 
Yemen in the 1960's. During the Iran/Iraq war, chemical attacks 
became commonplace. Saddam Hussein dropped chemical bombs on 
the Kurds in order to suppress their rebellion in 1989. As 
recently as the Persian Gulf war, our own troops faced a 
potential chemical weapons threat from Iraq.
    It is important to note that two-thirds of the some 20 
countries identified as having chemical weapons or developing a 
chemical weapons capability have signed the CWC. The United 
States wants those nations to ratify it as well, and ultimately 
to attain universal adherence to the Convention.
    The Chemical Weapons Convention represents the most far-
reaching multilateral chemical weapons regime in history. Since 
it was opened for signature in January 1993, 160 countries, 
including the United States, have signed the agreement, and 50, 
as of April 1996, have ratified it. The Convention bans for the 
first time the development, production, and possession of 
chemical weapons, and reinforces the international norm against 
the use of such weapons. The Convention enters into force 180 
days after the 65th country has ratified it, allowing parties 
time to enact implementing legislation and for the Preparatory 
Commission to conclude detailed implementation procedures. As 
of this writing in August 1996, more than 60 had already 
ratified. President Clinton transmitted the Convention to the 
U.S. Senate on November 23, 1993, for its consent to 
ratification. The Convention was then referred to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.

                        A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

    In 1925, at the Geneva Conference for the Supervision of 
the International Traffic in Arms, the United States proposed a 
prohibition on the export of gases for use in war and the 
French proposed a ban on the use of poisonous gas in war. At 
Poland's suggestion, the prohibition was extended to 
bacteriological weapons. The Geneva Protocol was the result. It 
bans the use in war (thus avoiding prohibiting a country's 
internal use, as in the instance of Iraqi gassing of Kurds) of 
chemical and biological weapons, but not the production, 
stockpiling, or transfer of such weapons. The Committee on 
Foreign Relations favorably reported the treaty in 1926, but 
the Senate did not act on it in that period.
    In the post-World War II period, there were a number of 
discussions of the possibility of multilateral chemical and 
biological weapons bans, but no significant progress was made 
until the late 1960's. In 1969, President Nixon announced that 
he would resubmit the protocol to the Senate. He reaffirmed 
U.S. renunciation of first use of lethal chemical weapons, as 
well as incapacitating chemicals.
    In 1970, the President resubmitted the protocol with a 
reservation that the United States could retaliate with 
chemical weapons in the event that it was attacked by such 
weapons. He also declared that the protocol would not apply to 
the use in war of riot-control agents and herbicides. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations disagreed with the narrow 
coverage and deferred action. In 1971, the Soviets accepted the 
U.S. view that a ban on biological weapons presented less 
intractable problems and should not be held up awaiting 
agreement in the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical 
weapons ban. As a result, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention was negotiated quickly, opened for signature and 
submitted to the Senate in 1972. The Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee deferred action pending resolution of the U.S. 
commitment under the Geneva Protocol.
    In 1974, the Ford administration reopened the issue with 
the committee, and Dr. Fred Ikle, the Director of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency said that the President, while 
reaffirming the scope of the Geneva Protocol, was prepared ``to 
renounce as a matter of national policy: (1) first use of 
herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to 
their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases 
and installations or around their immediate defensive 
perimeters; and (2) first use of riot-control agents in war 
except in defensive military modes to save lives * * *.'' 
Moreover, Dr. Ikle testified, ``The President, under an earlier 
directive still in force, must approve in advance any use of 
riot-control agents and chemical herbicides in war.'' With that 
and related understandings, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee voted unanimously 2 days later to report the 
Convention and the protocol favorably. Four days later, the 
Senate approved the protocol and the Convention unanimously.

                         B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

    In recent years, the issue of chemical weapons 
proliferation has gained more immediacy as a result of a number 
of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use. The 
United States used riot-control agents and herbicides in 
Vietnam, but denied charges it had used lethal chemicals or 
biological agents. In the mid 1960's, Egypt was accused of 
using chemical weapons with Soviet help in the Yemeni civil 
war. North Vietnam was accused of using chemical weapons and 
toxins in Laos and Cambodia. The Ethiopian government was 
suspected of using chemicals against rebels in 1980. The United 
States charged that the Soviets used chemical weapons and 
toxins in Afghanistan.
    The event which provoked the sharpest response from the 
international community, and from the U.S. Congress, was Iraq's 
repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, which 
led to Iranian retaliation with chemical weapons, subsequently 
Iraq callously used poison gas against its own Kurdish citizens 
in 1988. Congress responded by passing the Pell-Helms Chemical 
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act, 
which imposed sanctions on nations using chemical weapons and 
against companies aiding the chemical weapons programs in 
certain countries. President Bush vetoed the legislation in 
1990, however, because it did not allow a Presidential waiver 
of sanctions. The Bush administration subsequently established 
controls and sanctions by Executive order, but with complete 
leeway on waivers of penalties. The legislation was modified to 
permit a Presidential waiver of sanctions against countries 
using chemical weapons, but with a congressional right to 
override the waiver specified with executive branch support, 
passed again by Congress and became law in