[DOCID: f:er001.109]
From the Executive Reports Online via GPO Access
[wais.access.gpo.gov]

109 T4th Congress                                           Exec. Rept.
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                     109-01

======================================================================
 
   THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
 UNITED NATIONS WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF 
  THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS 
               U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

                                _______
                                

                T5May 18, 2005.-- Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

         Mr. T4Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                     [together with minority views]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred 
the nomination of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to 
The United Nations with Rank Of Ambassador and U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations Security Council and to be 
U.S. Representative to Sessions of the United Nations General 
Assembly during his tenure of service as U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations, having considered the same, reports without 
recommendation his nomination to the Senate.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Committee Action.................................................1
 II. Committee Comments...............................................2
III. Report on the Investigation......................................2
 IV. Minority Views.................................................276

                          I. Committee Action

    The nomination of John R. Bolton, to be the U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations was submitted to the 
Senate by President Bush and referred to the committee on March 
17, 2005. A hearing was held on April 11, 2005. An additional 
hearing was held as part of the nomination process on April 12, 
2005, when the committee heard the views on the nominee from 
Mr. Carl W. Ford, Jr., a former Assistant Secretary of State 
for Intelligence and Research.
    The committee again considered Mr. Bolton's nomination at a 
business session held on April 19, 2005 where the committee by 
general agreement, postponed the vote on the nominee until May 
12, 2005 in order for committee staff to investigate various 
allegations raised at the meeting.
    At its business meeting on May 12, 2005, the committee 
voted by a vote of 10 to 8, with a quorum present and a 
majority of those members physically present and voting in the 
affirmative, to report the nomination without recommendation. 
The following Senators voted in the affirmative: Lugar, Hagel, 
Chafee, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, 
Murkowski, and Martinez. The following Senators voted in the 
negative: Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, 
Nelson, and Obama. Senator Biden requested that a report be 
prepared to which members of the committee could submit 
addition views on the nominee.

                         II. Committee Comments

    On May 12, 2005, the committee carefully considered the 
nomination of Mr. Bolton. It recognized his many years of 
public service and depth of knowledge on matters of foreign 
policy and the United Nations, as well as his responses to 
Questions for the Record (QFRs) submitted by various committee 
members. The full text of Mr. Bolton's own opening statement to 
the committee as presented at his nomination hearing (see Annex 
A), his response to those QFRs are included in Annex (D). A 
sampling of the numerous letters of support are included in 
Annex C including letters signed by five former Secretaries of 
State, Margaret Thatcher, and former USAID and Department of 
Justice officials including Ed Meese and Richard Thornburgh.
    During the committee's consideration of the nomination of 
Mr. Bolton, Senator Biden and other members of the minority 
raised concerns about the nominee related to his interactions 
with various staff of the State Department and Central 
Intelligence Agency as well as various speeches and testimony 
related to his capacity as Undersecretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security.
    The committee determined that Secretary Bolton is a highly 
qualified nominee with deep experience in UN affairs. There was 
a consensus on the committee that the United Nations is in need 
of reform. The scandal afflicting the UN's Oil for Food Program 
has revealed serious dysfunction within the United Nations 
bureaucracy. President Bush nominated Secretary Bolton to help 
facilitate reform at the UN in addition to representing the 
American perspective. The President specifically chose 
Secretary Bolton for the position with this goal in mind.

                    III. Report on the Investigation

    The first business meeting on Secretary Bolton's 
nomination, where a vote had been scheduled, was adjourned 
without a vote after some Senators said the committee needed 
more time to look into allegations regarding Secretary Bolton's 
character and his ethical behavior while in office. An intense 
period of investigation by joint Majority and Minority staffs 
ensued. The committee sought and received some 800 pages of 
emails, memos and draft speeches from the Department of State, 
the Agency for International Development and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the committee staffs jointly 
conducted some 35 interviews which produced some 1,000 pages of 
transcripts. It is important to understand the context and the 
results of that investigation.
    In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7 
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democratic 
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the 
nomination on policy grounds. A March 8 T3Associated Press  
report states, ``Almost immediately after Bolton's nomination 
was announced, Democrats objected.'' The March 8, edition of 
the T3Baltimore Sun  said, ``Reaction from Senate Democrats 
promised contentious confirmation hearings for Bolton when he 
goes before the Foreign Relations Committee.''
    In several cases the statements by Democrats were 
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements 
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of 
possibilities that the Senator would ultimately support the 
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on 
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United 
Nations. By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton 
hearing, a T3Los Angeles Times  report noted, ``Democrats are 
likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when his 
nomination to be U.S. ambassador to the United Nations comes 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--according to 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aides.''
    Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of his 
substantive views and his past statements. However, the ethical 
inquiry into Secretary Bolton's background was pressed by 
members who planned to vote against him even before the 
committee began interviewing witnesses. They had the right to 
ask questions, and the committee had a responsibility to follow 
up credible allegations. But it also important to understand 
that at times the inquiry followed a more prosecutorial path 
than most nominees have to endure.
    The committee staff worked long and hard to run down 
allegations that were raised at the first business meeting, and 
they checked others that arose during that process.
    The end result of all this is that Secretary Bolton emerged 
looking better than when it began. Some allegations turned out 
not to be as serious as they first appeared, new information 
has cast others in a different light, most have proven to be 
groundless or, at best, highly overstated, while some were 
apparently judged by the Democratic Members as not even worth 
looking into. The interviews and documents showed Secretary 
Bolton to be a hardworking public servant, a pro-active 
policymaker eager to implement President Bush's agenda, with 
strong views and a blunt style that, frankly, sometimes rubbed 
people the wrong way.
    But there was no evidence to support the most serious 
charge, that Secretary Bolton sought to manipulate 
intelligence. He may have disagreed with intelligence findings 
but in the end, he always accepted the final judgment of the 
intelligence community.
    One of the most sensationalized accusations against 
Secretary Bolton is that 11 years ago, he chased a woman around 
a Moscow hotel throwing things at her. This is problematic 
first because the behavior described seems so out of place. But 
secondly, because it was very difficult for committee staff, 
despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to ascertain 
just what happened.
    The woman, Melody Townsel, who lives in Dallas, admits that 
she is a liberal Democrat who worked for Mothers Opposing Bush 
in the last election. Ms. Townsel also stated that her original 
accusation, contained in a letter that was made public, may 
have been too strong in some places. She said: `` `Chasing' may 
not be the best word.'' What she meant was that Secretary 
Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the hotel 
where they were both staying because, as she describes it, she 
did not want to meet with him over a legal matter. It is 
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private 
lawyer at that time. He was not representing the U.S. 
government. He was working for a company against which Ms. 
Townsel had made some very serious charges--charges which 
proved unfounded--that could have cost his company an important 
USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
    Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, 
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the 
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed this was a highly 
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it, 
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three 
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her 
complaints at the time of the events told staff that they had 
no recollection of Ms. Townsel mentioning Secretary Bolton. Her 
boss, Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly, who 
hired her for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. 
Neither did her immediate supervisor back in Washington. An 
employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in making 
her charges against the prime contractor on her project and 
with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also 
knows nothing about it. Staffs talked to three representatives 
of the contractor, a small Virginia firm which has long 
experience working for USAID overseas. Those officials also 
heard nothing about this encounter. They said that Secretary 
Bolton was in Moscow at that time, but he was working as a 
consultant for a health project they were involved in, not 
doing legal work for them. Staff did find one of Ms. Townsel's 
friends and co-workers from that time, who was not in Moscow, 
who recalls talking with her by telephone about it, as well as 
a subordinate of hers in a later USAID-funded project who 
recalls her mentioning it.
    Ultimately, the results of the lengthy investigation into 
this isolated, long-ago incident were, at most, inconclusive. 
On this point, Sen. Biden, the ranking member, concurred with 
the judgment of the chairman. At the second business meeting, 
Sen. Biden, the ranking member, said the charges remained 
``unsubstantiated.'' Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID 
project in the former Soviet Union, and the company she accused 
of mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues 
to be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary 
Bolton appeared to be overstated. On the basis of what is 
known, there was nothing to offset Secretary Bolton's long 
record of public service in several different administrations.
    It has been charged that Secretary Bolton sought to 
retaliate in some way against analysts and others with whom he 
disagreed. Committee staff looked into these cases thoroughly, 
and in each one the allegations proved to be overstated. In the 
case of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the 
committee heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a 
procedural issue and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. The 
focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Secretary Bolton should 
not have raised his objections directly with Mr. Westermann, 
not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue. Democratic 
members at the first business meeting made much of the fact 
that after this incident Secretary Powell had to go all the way 
down to INR to boost morale. But Secretary Powell's chief of 
staff, Lawrence Wilkerson, told staff that such visits were not 
uncommon. It was part of the Secretary's leadership style to 
visit with staff in the ``bowels of the building,'' including 
INR.
    In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the 
committee staff viewed make it clear that Secretary Bolton's 
primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate comments 
the analyst made to members of Congress about a speech. 
Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA. Although the 
NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by Secretary 
Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, and other 
witnesses told the committee that if he did not get the 
promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other reasons. 
Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the dispute 
was procedural. There was no attempt to fabricate intelligence.
    Other allegations related to managerial style show the same 
pattern upon examination--disagreement over procedure, not 
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in 
the non-proliferation bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy 
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed--
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor--that Mr. Ryu 
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's 
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would 
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton. 
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition 
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post 
instead, an assignment to the deputy secretary.
    The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by 
the minority, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully 
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only 
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the 
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving 
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department Legal 
Advisor, Will Taft, told committee staff that he quickly 
straightened things out. The attorney stayed on the case, and 
he even wrote the affidavit that Secretary Bolton later 
submitted to court.
    Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary 
Bolton's chief of staff, it was learned during the 
investigation, went to an INR analyst to complain that he had 
inappropriately attached to a CIA document a cover memo that 
took exception to some of the CIA's findings regarding China. 
Further inquiry revealed that no action was sought against the 
analyst and none was taken. The issue was procedural, no 
intelligence was manipulated, and Secretary Bolton was not even 
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the 
time.
    Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into 
question regarding his testimony before the committee on April 
11. Members questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to the 
CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council. Stuart 
Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that while he could not 
recall exactly why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was 
``perfectly reasonable'' to believe that was the reason. In 
fact, he added, ``I was delighted at the prospect that somebody 
would come out wanting to know more about the NIC.'' He also 
said that Secretary Bolton only talked about reassigning, not 
firing, the NIO, just as Mr. Bolton testified. The 
investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary Bolton's 
claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over procedure, 
not policy. 
    Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 
committee after Secretary Bolton's testimony about a 
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton 
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the 
speech afterwards. The ambassador told committee staff he 
indeed had thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for 
making certain changes in the speech that he had requested. 
Ambassador Hubbard told staff that he wanted to correct the 
record on that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton 
of being deliberately misleading.
    That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that 
opponents of the nomination have questioned. The investigation 
showed that many of these speeches and Congressional testimony 
were preceded by strong policy debates within the 
administration. As one witness told staff, ``That's how good 
policy is made.'' In each case it was found that, in the end, 
Secretary Bolton delivered a speech that was properly cleared 
and that expressed official U.S. policy.
    Finally, it is important to note while these are the major 
allegations that the committee has investigated against Mr. 
Bolton, they are not the only ones raised during the first 
business meeting by Democratic Members when they asked for a 
delay. For instance, one member said there were allegations 
``that he harassed a career Justice Department attorney while 
he was serving as the Attorney General for the Civil Rights 
Division--in that case Mr. Bolton allegedly went to the lengths 
to deny a career Justice Department attorney's request for 
additional unpaid maternity leave--ultimately, the Deputy 
Attorney General stepped in and overruled Mr. Bolton; that he 
may have blocked important information from going to senior 
members of the State Department, including Secretary Powell, 
Secretary Armitage, and even Secretary Rice--information that 
has been characterized, and I quote `As vital to the U.S. 
strategies on Iran,' and related to the lack of international 
support for Mr. Bolton's effort to have the head of the IAEA 
removed.'' Yet even though the Chairman granted every witness 
interview request, and did not oppose any document request, 
these other charges remain both unsubstantiated--Secretary 
Rice, for instance, has said she got all the information she 
needed from Mr. Bolton in a timely way--and uninvestigated 
because Democratic members apparently did not feel they were 
worth the trouble. The ranking member, when he said he would 
pursue the issue of getting full access to the NSA intercept 
information that Secretary Bolton had sought, stated that he 
believes that the results will be inconsequential for the 
nominee.
    Despite the fact that many charges were not proven or even 
investigated, it has been charged that collectively the 
allegations against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable 
pattern of behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by 
opponents, because it depends on doubts arising from an intense 
investigation of accusations, many of which had no 
substantiation. By its nature, it also discounts the dozens of 
positive testimonials on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former 
co-workers who attest to his character and effectiveness.
    It is important to be clear about the context of the 
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton. First, this has 
been an extremely public inquiry. By its nature, it has 
encouraged anyone with a grudge or disagreement with Secretary 
Bolton stretching back to 1983 to come forward and tell their 
story. There have been no thematic limits on the allegations 
that opponents of the nominee have asked to be investigated. No 
one working in Washington in high-ranking positions for that 
long would come out unscathed from such a process. Any 
assertive policy-maker will develop opponents based on 
stylistic differences, personal disputes, or partisan 
disagreements. Most members of this committee have been in 
public life for decades. If they were nominated for a similar 
position of responsibility after their terms in the Senate, how 
many would want the same standard to be applied to their 
confirmation process? How many of them would want any instance 
of conflict or anger directed at their staffs or colleagues to 
be fair game?
    Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all 
the way to 1983. Thus, the committee subjected 22 years of 
Secretary Bolton's career to a microscope. This included 
service in many government jobs, as well as time spent in the 
private sector. Given the length of John Bolton's service in 
high-ranking positions, it is inevitable that he would have 
conflict with co-workers of various ranks and political 
persuasions. He would have had literally thousands of contacts, 
meetings, and issues to deal with during his career. In this 
context, the volume of alleged incidents is not that profound.
    Third, in John Bolton's case unsubstantiated charges may 
seem more material than they are because he has a reputation 
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should 
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that 
historically has included a number of blunt, plain-spoken 
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former 
colleague Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has cited John 
Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that he has picked 
him for this particular job.

                                ANNEXES

                              ----------                              


                                ANNEX A


           Opening Statement of the Honorable John R. Bolton


   NOMINEE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE 
                             UNITED NATIONS

 T3Senate Foreign Relations Committee
 T3April 11, 2005

    Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, I am honored to appear 
before you today as President Bush's nominee to be the U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. I am grateful 
for your consideration and I look forward to discussing the 
critical leadership role that the United States plays in the 
United Nations. I would like to extend my warm thanks to 
Senator Warner for his kind words and introduction. He is a 
true and valued friend, and his remarks are all the more 
appreciated given his long history of service to our nation.
    Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the opportunities that I 
have had to work with this Committee over the years. This is 
the fourth time I have appeared before this Committee in a 
confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to fulfill the 
President's vision of working in close partnership with the 
United Nations.
    The United States is committed to the success of the United 
Nations and we view the UN as an important component of our 
diplomacy. As the President stated before the UN General 
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that in a decisive 
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our 
duties, or waver in meeting them.''
    The Secretary has made this a top priority as well. She was 
unequivocal in her remarks about how, ``The American people 
respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the United 
Nations and we share the UN's unshakable support for human 
dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great promise, 
the charge to the international community is clear: we who are 
on the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to 
help those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side 
of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of 
generations; yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be 
deferred. . . . Now, more than ever, the UN must play a 
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and 
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
Committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on 
American leadership. Such leadership in turn must rest on broad 
bipartisan support in Congress that must be earned by putting 
to rest skepticism that too many feel about the UN system.
    Through the course of three decades of public service, both 
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is 
not only essential, but possible. Working together, in the 
spirit of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take 
important steps to restore confidence in the United Nations. 
Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully share 
the sentiments you expressed in 1997, when you remarked that, 
``It is time to decide if we want a strong and viable United 
Nations that can serve United States interests, or a United 
Nation that is crippled by insolvency and hobbled by 
controversy and uncertainty.''

A Stronger, More Effective United Nations

    The President and Secretary Rice believe that a stronger, 
better, more effective United Nations is one which requires 
sustained and decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan 
support, and the support of the American public. If confirmed, 
that would be my objective as well. Walking away from the 
United Nations is not an option. I undertake to do my utmost to 
uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary Rice, and 
the Senate will have placed in me if confirmed.
    Mr. Chairman, now more than ever, the United Nations needs 
American leadership. President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill promoted a post-war international 
organization to avert another world war when they envisioned a 
collective security organization that would resist aggressor 
states that threatened international peace and security. 
Accordingly, the UN Charter lists as its first objective, ``to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.''
    If the UN is to play a role in fulfilling that mission, 
however, it is not enough that it reform its internal 
structures. It must also clearly and forcefully address the new 
challenges we face. Rogue states, which do not necessarily 
subscribe to theories of deterrence, now threaten the global 
community as both possessors and proliferators of weapons of 
mass destruction. These weapons could also be transferred to 
terrorist organizations that would have no compunction about 
using them in cold blood against innocent civilian populations.
    I believe my past government experience and writings 
reflect my awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of 
the United Nations. I learned much about the UN's potential 
when I served for four years as Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Organization Affairs in 1989-1993, and again 
later when I worked for the United Nations pro bono between 
1997 and 2000, assisting former Secretary of State James Baker 
in his capacity as the Secretary General's Personal Envoy for 
the Western Sahara. I saw firsthand the impact of armed 
conflict and repression, and the devastating consequences this 
can have on innocent civilian populations.
    I therefore wish to assure the Committee, the American 
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations 
that, if confirmed, I will strive to work with all interested 
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations. 
Doing so will promote not only American interests, but will 
inevitably improve and enhance the UN's ability to serve all of 
its members as well.
    Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I pledge to bring my strong 
record of experience of working cooperatively within the United 
Nations to fulfill the intentions and aspirations of its 
original promise. In particular, I will work closely with the 
Congress and this Committee to achieve that goal. In attempting 
to strengthen the UN's effort to promote international peace 
and security, I would like to identify several priorities.

Supporting Freedom and Democracy

    One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that 
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. I 
am proud of my record in this regard. In 1981, as General 
Counsel of the Agency for International Development, I proposed 
that we fund international observers to witness upcoming 
elections in El Salvador so that there would be an independent 
assessment of whether those elections would be free and fair. 
Many experts at the time thought that the Government of El 
Salvador would not accept this idea, but, with the support of 
USAID Administrator Peter McPherson and Deane Hinton, then our 
Ambassador to El Salvador, I was encouraged to raise the 
possibility with President Jose Napoleon Duarte in late 1981. I 
did so and we were able to fund international election 
observers through Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act, 
very likely the first such assistance provided by USAID, thus 
leading to further success stories in legitimizing and 
instilling confidence in democracy in countries once torn apart 
by violence.
    During my service in IO in President George H.W. Bush's 
Administration, I personally observed the legislative elections 
in Namibia in 1989 as part of a presidential delegation led by 
former Senator Edward Muskie, the largest effort to organize 
elections by the United Nations in its history to that point. 
It constituted a major test of UN capabilities and resources, 
and served as a successful model for future elections in 
Nicaragua, Cambodia and elsewhere.
    Some of these earlier missions have no doubt helped pave 
the way for the recent and remarkable success stories we have 
observed in Afghanistan and Iraq, where UN assistance in both 
countries played a critical role. Many of us today, myself 
included, still marvel at the success of those elections--
elections which are having repercussions throughout the region 
and beyond, as they are already doing in Lebanon. We appreciate 
that the United Nations is committed over the long-term to 
respond positively to the elected Iraqi Government's request 
for help with its constitutional process and subsequent 
elections, as laid out in Resolution 1546.
    Mr. Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of 
free and fair elections on a country. I look forward, if 
confirmed, to working with relevant UN agencies to enable them 
to contribute further to democratic institutions in countries 
freed from the bonds of oppression. I am sure that many of you 
are aware of our support for programs such as the Community of 
Democracies. If confirmed, I also look forward to working with 
you on President Bush's request for $10 million in the Fiscal 
Year 2006 budget to set up a Democracy Fund within the United 
Nations, and I am grateful to Secretary General Annan for 
endorsing the President's proposal in his new report on UN 
reform. This fund would have a lean staff of experts who 
identify carefully tailored projects for strengthening 
democratic institutions, political parties, administration of 
justice programs and respect for human rights advocacy. If 
successful, the Fund will be among the best diplomatic tools we 
have in the global war on terrorism.
    While the UN has had its successes in the human rights 
field, there have been problems as well, such as in the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights (``UNHRC''). For too long, 
some of the most egregious violators of human rights have 
undercut the UNHRC's principles and its effectiveness. The 
consequence, as Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said, is that 
the Commission's important work has ``been increasingly 
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism.'' 
We must work with our friends and allies to keep those who 
would usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it, 
and we must send clear and strong signals that we will not shy 
away from naming human-rights violators.
    We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its 
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been 
times when the General Assembly has gone off track. In my view, 
one of the greatest stains on the United Nations was the 
abominable Resolution 3379 equating Zionism with racism. This 
canard for many years distracted the General Assembly from 
focusing its attention on the very real problems confronting 
the international community. I am proud to have been an active 
player in getting this resolution repealed. I recall fondly the 
day of December 16, 1991, when the General Assembly voted 111-
25 to repeal this odious resolution, when our delegation was 
led by Acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, 
accompanied in the General Assembly by Senator Moynihan. I was 
proud to have served also as one of the original members of the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom from 1999-
2001.

Stopping the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Mr. Chairman, a second priority should I be confirmed will 
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most 
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our 
friends, and our allies.
    As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security, I have worked with our friends and 
allies to press states that have violated important treaties to 
stop WMD proliferation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, to live up to their obligations or face a 
referral to the UN Security Council. I have worked hard to 
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of these 
dangerous weapons. I served as the lead U.S. negotiator in the 
creation of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the 
Proliferation of WMD, through which we aim to add an additional 
$10 billion in Nunn/Lugar type programs through contributions 
by other nations. In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity 
to work in close consultation with our British colleagues in 
diplomatic efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of 
their weapons of mass destruction programs.
    I helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to 
help combat the spread of dangerous weapons through President 
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative (``PSI''). The 
Administration welcomes the endorsement of this initiative in 
the recently published Secretary Generals' Report, 
``Strengthening the United Nations: an agenda for further 
change.'' And despite fears that the U.S. withdrawal from the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty would result in a new arms race, 
exactly the opposite occurred. I was proud to serve as the 
Administration's chief negotiator for the Treaty of Moscow, 
signed by Presidents Putin and Bush in 2002, which reduced 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by two-
thirds.
    Effective multilateral solutions reflect a commitment on 
the part of this Administration to use the best tools in our 
arsenal. Activities such as these are helping to create a new 
international consensus that recognizes the danger posed by 
these weapons of terror. I have no doubt these efforts played a 
crucial role in enabling the United States to lead the Security 
Council to pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President 
Bush in his speech to the General Assembly in September, 2003. 
This resolution calls upon ``all Member States to fulfill their 
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to 
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction.'' Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind 
focusing on WMD proliferation, and I am proud that our strong 
leadership contributed to its unanimous adoption. I am happy to 
report that as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted 
reports required by the resolution outlining their plans to 
enact and implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look 
forward to working with Security Council members to achieve 
100% compliance with the Resolution.
    We also cannot ignore the real possibility that countries 
may be brought before the Security Council if they do not cease 
the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Failure of the 
Security Council to act on such fundamental threats to 
international peace and security will only weaken the Council's 
role in security issues more generally. If confirmed, I would 
make it a top priority to work with the Security Council to 
take meaningful action in the face of these grave threats.

Winning the Global War on Terror

    A third priority that I would pursue if confirmed is 
supporting the global war on terror. As we all learned on 
September 11, 2001, no one is safe from the devastating effects 
of terrorists' intent on harming innocent people. Confronting 
and triumphing in the global war on terror remains a central 
priority of the Bush Administration, and to win this war 
requires long-term cooperation with all like-minded nations.
    The President is firmly committed to working with the 
United Nations to make this shared goal of the civilized world 
a reality. As he noted in his speech to the UN General Assembly 
in September 2003, ``All governments that support terror are 
complicit in a war against civilization. No government should 
ignore the threat of terror, because to look the other way 
gives terrorists the chance to regroup, recruit and prepare. 
And all nations that fight terror, as if the lives of their own 
people depend on it, will earn the favorable judgment of 
history.''
    The United Nations has taken positive steps to support the 
war on terror, but more of course remains to be done. In the 
wake of September 11th, we have been actively encouraging 
Member States to become parties to the UN Conventions on 
Terrorism. I have been personally involved in the past four 
years as well in working to complete the negotiations on a 
Nuclear Terrorism Convention. We must build upon Security 
Council Resolution 1368, passed one day after the tragic events 
of September 11th, which for the first time classified every 
act of international terrorism as a threat to international 
peace and security. We must also work together to help Member 
States build capacities to combat terrorism as outlined in 
Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001. This resolution 
obligates all UN member states to use their domestic laws and 
courts to keep terrorists from sheltering resources or finding 
safe haven anywhere in the world and to cooperate in 
investigating, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism wherever 
it may spring up. The UN Security Council is monitoring 
compliance with the requirements of this resolution, with 
impressive results: to date 142 countries have issued orders 
freezing the assets of suspected terrorists and terrorist 
organizations; accounts totaling almost $105 million have been 
blocked--$34 million in the U.S. and over twice that amount in 
other countries. Overall, Resolution 1373 has been the 
framework for unprecedented international consultation and 
coordination against terrorism, including the provision of 
technical assistance to governments that want to do the right 
thing, but may not have the specialized expertise necessary.

International Humanitarian Efforts

    Mr. Chairman, a fourth priority of mine should I be 
confirmed is addressing humanitarian crises. Following the 
successful prosecution of the first Gulf War, we worked through 
the Security Council to address the humanitarian disaster 
caused by Saddam Hussein's repression of Shiites in southern 
Iraq and the Kurdish population in the north and east of that 
country. As we are all aware, this was a thorny and delicate 
issue--one that required carefully calibrated coordination 
within the Security Council.
    During 1990, we were successful in having the United 
Nations impose its most comprehensive economic sanctions 
package ever, in Resolution 661, against Iraq. We were also 
successful in passing the first Security Council authorization 
for the use of force since Korea in Resolution 678. It was not 
lost upon us, however, that a humanitarian crisis was beginning 
to erupt. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing Iraq into 
other countries would certainly have had a dramatic and 
destabilizing effect, in addition to the humanitarian costs of 
lives lost and displaced.
    As a result of our leadership and collaborative efforts, we 
secured the adoption of Resolution 688, which decided that 
internal repression causing substantial refugee flows could be 
a threat to international peace and security. This gave the 
Security Council jurisdiction to approve intervention into 
Iraqi territory to aid displaced persons. The United States 
took the lead in implementing this Resolution, under the name 
``Operation Provide Comfort.'' Success stories such as these 
are a direct result of decisive American leadership and our 
effective multilateral diplomacy.
    Of pressing urgency now is stopping the genocide and 
violence devastating the Darfur region in the Sudan. The United 
Nations has already played a critical role in bringing 
attention to this crisis. But we all know there is much more to 
be done. If confirmed, I pledge to work with our partners in 
the Security Council to pressure parties to stop the violence 
in Darfur, deploy the new peacekeeping mission to secure 
implementation of the comprehensive North-South peace 
agreement, and to assist the African Union mission in Darfur to 
punish those responsible for the genocide. My hope is that we 
can build upon the United Nation's considerable success record 
in helping to ensure free and fair elections in the Sudan 
despite its tortured past of violence and strife.
    Careful oversight of such operations is critical, 
particularly in light of recent reports concerning abuse by UN 
peacekeepers themselves. If confirmed, I will make every effort 
to see that the Secretary General's new zero-tolerance policy 
of such behavior by UN personnel is enforced. There is a 
pressing need to do so. In light of the current global 
situation, we anticipate that 70,000 peacekeepers will be 
deployed by the end of 2005, compared with 39,000 by the end of 
2002. Since October 2003, the UN has created four new missions 
including Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, and Haiti and has 
expanded the Congo mission. In addition to the proper oversight 
of such troops, there are additional concerns about capacity 
and stressing the UN system too far. This is not lost upon UN 
officials either. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary-General 
for Peacekeeping Operations, acknowledges the system is getting 
stretched to its limits, and that, in his own words, ``It is 
difficult to run and tie your shoelaces properly. I sincerely 
hope that the organization will not be required to deploy any 
new complex peacekeeping operations in 2005, beyond what is 
already on our plate or in the pipeline.'' Currently, we pay 
roughly 27% of the costs of these operations.
    Other humanitarian crises demand our attention as well. It 
is not just the scourge of war we must confront. We must 
confront the scourge of disease and afflictions such as HIV/
AIDS through strong U.S. leadership in the United Nations 
system. We strongly support the UN Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS and are working to ensure resources from the Global 
Fund for AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis are available to 
countries most severely affected. We are actively pursuing the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, a five-year $15 
billion investment, the largest commitment ever by a nation 
toward an international health initiative for a single disease 
or affliction.
    I will make it a key priority as well to improve programs 
that have been involved in the tsunami relief effort, so that 
we can enhance and build upon structures and institutions 
already in place. Doing so will not only help current victims 
and communities, who will surely need help for years to come, 
but will help prepare for the next time a natural disaster of 
this magnitude strikes. More broadly, we must confront the 
scourge of poverty, which leaves hundreds of millions on the 
margins of societies scrambling for food or shelter with little 
opportunity to improve their lives or those of their children.
    We also must make sure that the UN acts effectively in 
promoting the economic and social advancement of all people. 
For far too long, the UN promoted statist solutions to the 
problems of poverty and underdevelopment. Today, we know the 
private sector can do the best job in generating flows of 
investment capital and encourage small entrepreneurship, as set 
out in the remarkable report of the Commission on the Private 
Sector and Development, chaired by President Zedillo and 
Martin, and in the consensus results of the Monterey Conference 
on Financing for Development. Policy reform, institution 
building, appropriate technology transfer and private sector 
involvement are all necessary for underpinning sustained 
economic growth. We will continue to support the contribution 
of women to economic growth and development as well as their 
critical role in the growth of democratic institutions 
worldwide.
    The UN, in conjunction with U.S. leadership, is hopefully 
now recognizing that the traditional models of development are 
insufficient to achieve development objectives and better the 
lives of people around the world. The Partnership for Maternal, 
New Born and Child Health, The Global Alliance for Vaccinations 
& Immunizations, and Roll Back Malaria, are all examples of how 
UN agencies, such as UNICEF, are working along side the private 
sector, charitable organizations, and foundations, such as the 
Gates Foundation, to leverage resources, generate new 
activities and impact the lives of millions in developing 
countries.
    To enhance these efforts, if I am confirmed, I hope I would 
have your support in increasing the level of American 
representation in UN agencies and affiliated organizations. 
This is not a question of simply getting our fair share of 
positions. Americans have the skills and training to contribute 
significantly to making the UN more efficient, effective, and 
accountable.

A More Efficient UN Will Make a Stronger UN

    Accountability and reform of the United Nations is 
something I know this Committee has encouraged, including by 
holding a hearing on this important question just last month. 
This will be a top priority of mine if confirmed. During the 
first President Bush's Administration, I worked hard to secure 
appropriations to repay U.S. arrearages. Working with the 
Congress, we also made sure that the United Nations would 
target these arrearages to effective programs rather than 
treating them as a ``windfall.'' If confirmed, I would look 
forward to working with the Congress again to make certain that 
the money you allocate is spent wisely and accountably.
    I look forward if confirmed to reviving the concept of the 
``Unitary UN,'' which served as a guiding analytical construct 
during our work under Secretaries Baker and Eagleburger. As the 
system has grown, there has been too little attention paid by 
member governments to coordinating their efforts in key 
programs. The consequence is a tremendous waste of resources 
due to duplication, overlap and inefficiencies, all of which 
can be corrected if member governments have the political will.
    The Administration welcomes the Secretary-General's new 
report on UN Reform, and we are examining carefully its many 
recommendations. I hope to work closely with the Secretary-
General and my colleagues if confirmed to bring greater 
accountability and transparency to the United Nations. The key 
is to implement changes to the UN structure and management, 
including budget, personnel, and oversight reforms. Scandals, 
such as those we have witnessed with the Oil-for-Food program, 
undermine not only America's confidence in the United Nations, 
but the confidence of the international community as well. They 
must not recur. To make this outcome a reality, we must 
recognize the proper roles and capabilities of UN agencies, 
funds and programs. Some have all but concluded that the Oil-
for-Food scandal was bound to happen because it was beyond the 
UN's capabilities. Even the Deputy Secretary-General Louise 
Frechette, has lamented, ``Personally, I hope to God we never 
get another oil-for-food program or anything approaching that 
kind of responsibility, which was tantamount to trying to 
oversee the entire import-export regime of a country of 24 
million people.'' Whether or not this is so, we must never lose 
sight of the reality that ultimately it is member governments 
that must take responsibility for the UN's actions, whether 
they be successes or failures.
    The successful implementation of any reform will require 
broad consensus among member states. If confirmed, I will work 
actively with my colleagues at the United Nations and with 
Congress to help restore confidence in the organization.
    Mr. Chairman, let me close by reiterating what I said at 
the beginning. If confirmed, I will work closely and 
effectively with this Committee and both Houses of Congress. 
The President and Secretary Rice are committed to building a 
strong, effective United Nations. The United Nations affords us 
the opportunity to move our policies forward together with 
unity of purpose. Now, more than ever, the UN must play a 
critical role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and 
fundamental human rights and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom. This effort demands 
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and the 
backing of the American public. I will undertake to do my 
utmost to uphold the confidence that the President, Secretary 
Rice, and the Senate will have placed in me.
    Thank you, and I would welcome the opportunity to answer 
your questions.

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX B


                           Biographic Summary


                              (HIGHLIGHTS)

NAME:

  <bullet> John Robert Bolton

POSITION FOR WHICH CONSIDERED:

  <bullet> Representative of the United States of America to 
        the United Nations

PRESENT POSITION:

  <bullet> Under Secretary of State (Arms Control and 
        International Security Affairs)

LEGAL RESIDENCE:

  <bullet> Maryland

OFFICE ADDRESS:

  <bullet> Washington, DC

DATE/PLACE OF BIRTH:

  <bullet> November 20, 1948--Baltimore, Maryland

MARITAL STATUS:

  <bullet> Married

NAME OF SPOUSE:

  <bullet> Gretchen Louise Bolton

NAMES OF CHILDREN:

  <bullet> Jennifer Sarah Bolton

EDUCATION:

  <bullet> J.D., Yale Law School, 1971-1974;

  <bullet> B.A., Yale College, 1966-1970

MILITARY SERVICE:

  <bullet> U.S. Army Reserves, 1974-1976;

  <bullet> U.S. Army National Guard, 1970-1974 (Honorable 
        Discharge)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES:

  <bullet> French

EXPERIENCE:

  <bullet> 2001-present--Under Secretary of State (Arms Control 
        and International Security Affairs)

  <bullet> 1997-2001--Senior Vice President, American 
        Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC

  <bullet> Dec 1999-2001--Of Counsel Kutak Rock LLP, 
        Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> May 1999-2001--Commissioner, U.S. Commission on 
        International Religion Freedom

  <bullet> 1995-1996--President, National Policy Forum, 
        Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> 1994-1996--Adjunct Professor, George Mason 
        University School of Law, Arlington, Virginia

  <bullet> 1993-1999--Partner, Lerner, Reed, Bolton & McManus 
        (and predecessor firms) Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> Jan 1993-July 1993--Senior Fellow, Manhattan 
        Institute, Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> 1989-1993--Assistant Secretary of State for 
        International Organization Affairs

  <bullet> 1988-1989--Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
        Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC

  <bullet> 1985-1988--Assistant Attorney General for 
        Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice, Washington, 
        D.C.

  <bullet> 1983-1985--Partner, Covington & Burling, Washington, 
        D.C.

  <bullet> Aug 1993-Sept 1993--Consultant, Republican National 
        Committee, Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> 1983-1983--Assistant Administrator for program and 
        Policy Coordination, U.S. Agency for International 
        Development, Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> 1981-1982--General Counsel, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development, Washington, D.C.

  <bullet> 1974-1981--Associate, Covington & Burling, 
        Washington, DC

  <bullet> June 1973-Aug 1973--Summer, associate Lord, Day & 
        Lord, New York, N.Y.

  <bullet> June 1972-Aug 1972--White House summer Intern, 
        Office of the Vice President

  <bullet> 1970-1971--Executive Director, Lux et Veritas, Inc. 
        New Haven, Connecticut

HONORS/AWARDS:

  <bullet> U.S. Department of Justice Edmund J. Randolph Award, 
        1998

  <bullet> U.S. Department of State Distinguished Service 
        Award, 1993

  <bullet> Tree of Life Award, Northern and Southern New 
        England Regions of Hadassah, 1990

  <bullet> Editor, Yale Law Journal

  <bullet> Phi Sigma Alpha

  <bullet> Phi Beta Kappa

  <bullet> Scholarships to McDonogh School, Yale College and 
        Yale Law School

ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

  <bullet> Member, Subcommittee on International Law, 
        Federalist Society, 1999-2001

  <bullet> Member of Board of Directors, Project for a New 
        American Century, 1989-2001

  <bullet> Advisory Board Member, Jewish Institute for National 
        Security Affairs, 1994-2001

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX C




  BUSINESS MEETING TO CONSIDER AND VOTE ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN R. 
         BOLTON TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 12, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 
chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 
Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, 
Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman.  This business meeting of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee is called to order.
    Before beginning our testimony and our debate today, I 
would like to lay out for members how we will proceed. 
Democratic members have requested a 5-hour debate on the 
nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador to the United 
Nations, and we have agreed to that request. I have agreed to 
hold this debate to give all members of the committee an 
opportunity, once again, to explain their views, and we look 
forward to an enlightening and thoughtful debate.
    Now, in the interest of decorum and order, it's my 
intention to manage this debate much like a debate on the 
Senate floor. I will control 2\1/2\ hours of time--that is, of 
the 5 hours allotted to the debate--yielding time to Republican 
members. Senator Biden, the distinguished ranking member, will 
control the other two and a half hours, yielding time to 
Democratic members.
    Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and my designees, to 
be followed by an equal amount of time, another hour, under the 
control of Senator Biden or designees. At that stage, we will 
alternate between Democrats and Republican members until all 
time on both sides is consumed or given back.
    Now, as chairman and manager of the nomination, I'll 
reserve the final 10 minutes of our time, on the Republican 
side--that is, about 150 minutes--for myself. Throughout this 
process, members should request time through the chairman or 
through the ranking member. Senator Biden and I will be 
responsible for apportioning the time on our respective sides.
    Since 5 hours of debate time has been requested, and we 
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not 
entertain motions or other business during the 5-hour debate. 
If floor votes intervene, I believe we can continue the debate 
without interruption by voting in shifts, as we frequently do. 
I would, likewise, say, as members have need to have a bite to 
eat or to drink a sip of water, they can proceed to do that. 
Hopefully, our debate will continue on in some responsible way 
throughout that period of time.
    My hope is to complete the meeting by close to 3 p.m., as 
members will have invested 5 hours of valuable time during this 
experience. And I would just say, at that point that I begin my 
statement, I will ask the Clerk to be, again, counting the time 
so that our 150 minutes will begin to diminish as I make an 
opening statement to open the debate this morning.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today----
    Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, could I just----
    The Chairman.  Yes. Senator Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. Senator Biden's not here yet, so I'm 
reluctant--was this something we agreed to, between the Chair 
and the Ranking Member? I'm just unclear as to the--how the 
procedures will work.
    The Chairman.  No, I have not asked for agreement. I'm just 
indicating the structure of our morning. I'm trying, at least, 
in fairness, to allocate 2\1/2\ hours to both sides, indicate 
that Senator Biden and I will manage the 2\1/2\ hours. During 
that time, I hope we can continue the time running while we go 
to vote. We will have a closure vote at 11:30, more or less. In 
other words, I think these are reasonable statements, but, 
nevertheless, the prerogative of the Chair, I think, is to 
structure a debate in a fair manner, which I'm attempting to 
do.
    Senator Dodd. Fine. By the way, I'd ask consent that the--
this discussion here not be time taken away from the 
chairman's----
    The Chairman.  I thank----
    Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Senator Boxer.
    Senator Boxer. With the same caveat. Just because you 
went--I was confused--it went on awhile. Now Senator Biden is 
here. Would you please go over--I hate to do this, but could 
you go over this one more time, what your plan is for how we're 
going to take this five hours, so that Senator Biden may hear 
it?
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    Senator Biden. The staff has informed me, but, please----
    The Chairman.  I'll proceed, once again, through the 
statement, so there can be no ambiguity.
    Before beginning, I would like to lay out for all members 
how we will proceed today. Democratic members have requested a 
5-hour debate on the nomination of John Bolton to be Ambassador 
to the United Nations, and I have agreed to that plan. I have 
agreed to hold this debate to give all members of the committee 
a chance to explain their views, and I look forward to an 
enlightening and thoughtful debate.
    In the interest of decorum and order, it's my intention to 
manage the debate much like a debate on the Senate floor. I 
will control 2\1/2\ hours of time, yielding time to Republican 
members. Senator Biden will control the other two and a half 
hours, yielding time to Democratic members.
    Republicans will lead off the debate with approximately 1 
hour of time, to be controlled by myself and by my designees, 
to be followed by an equal amount of time--that is, an hour, 
more or less--under the control of Senator Biden or his 
designees. At that stage, we would alternate between Democrat 
and Republican members until all time is consumed or yielded 
back.
    As chairman and manager of the nomination, I would reserve 
the last 10 minutes of our Republican time--that is, of our 150 
minutes--for myself. Throughout this process, members should 
request time through the chairman or through the ranking 
member. Senator Biden and I will be responsible for 
apportioning the time on our respective sides.
    Since five hours of debate time has been requested, and we 
have an abundance of speakers on both sides, I will not 
entertain motions or other business during the five-hour 
debate. If floor votes intervene, I believe that we can 
continue the debate without interruption by voting in shifts, 
as we frequently do. My intention is to complete the meeting as 
close as possible to 3 p.m.
    But, with that, I would instruct the Clerk to begin keeping 
time now as I begin the opening segment, which I will do 
shortly.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I think it's good to proceed 
like we do on the floor, but the way usually do it on the floor 
is, the manager of the bill and the opponent of the bill--the 
manager speaks and then the opponent gets to speak--and then 
they control the remaining time. So, I would prefer, if you're 
willing, after you speak, for me to be able to--allowed to make 
my opening statement, and then you control the time. 
Otherwise--I mean, it's not usual, on the floor debate, that we 
would have an hour of Republican or Democratic testimony--or, 
not testimony--debate, other than if it's--if you wish to take 
an hour, that's fine by me, but I would like to be able to open 
at the time when you finish, and then you control the debate, 
in terms of the remaining time, if that's appropriate.
    The Chairman.  Well, I appreciate the Senator's suggestion. 
I would like to follow the path I set forth, because the--in 
the first hour, I will try to make a case for the nominee, but 
then I will yield the remainder of that hour to Senator 
Voinovich, who will approach the case of the nominee in his own 
way, so that members and, I think, the public will have 
perspective of our debate from that hour. And so, I would ask 
the cooperation of the ranking member in allowing us to proceed 
in that way.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I don't want this committee to 
look like we're just tied up in parliamentary problems. I will 
not object, but that is not how we do it on the floor. And I 
understand your wishing to set the terms of the debate. I got 
that part. And that's okay by me. But let's just not kid 
ourselves; this is not how we do it in the Senate floor. But 
it's okay if you want to do it that way. I understand the deal. 
And I hope you'll be as accommodating to me if I decide to do 
this if I ever become chairman again, and you'll allow me to do 
things that we don't do on the floor.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman.  Well, the Senator knows that I will be 
accommodating and as reasonable as possible, and I thank the 
Senator for his accommodation and his good humor.
    Now, I will----
    Senator Biden. I might have objected if it weren't going to 
be Voinovich second, but that's all right.
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    We will begin now, and I will ask, as I've mentioned 
before, for the countdown. And we'll make available to the 
ranking member and the chairman at various times, at our 
request, how many minutes remain on both sides, so that the 
management may continue as smoothly as possible.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to vote on the 
nomination of John Bolton to be U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. In this capacity, he would play an important role in 
securing greater international support for the national-
security and the foreign-policy objectives of the United 
States.
    The Foreign Relations Committee has reviewed Secretary 
Bolton's actions with respect to several allegations. In the 
process, we have interviewed 29 witnesses, producing 
approximately 1,000 pages of transcripts. We have received and 
reviewed more than 830 pages of documents from the State 
Department, USAID, and the CIA regarding the Bolton nomination. 
We have questioned Secretary Bolton in person for seven hours. 
We have received responses to nearly 100 questions for the 
record, many containing numerous subparts.
    This effort represents one of the most intense and far-
reaching examinations of a nominee in my experience. The depth 
and breadth of the inquiry is particularly notable given that 
Secretary Bolton has been confirmed four times by the Senate 
already and that most of us have had personal experiences with 
him.
    After reviewing this material, it's my judgment that 
Secretary Bolton should be confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations. I do not believe that the evidence supports a 
disqualification of the President's nominee.
    I was struck by the portrait of Secretary Bolton that 
emerged from interviews of witnesses that shows him serving in 
a job where some of his ideas and strategies were at odds with 
those above and below him at the State Department. It is clear 
from the transcripts that he was combative in defense of his 
perspectives. In some cases, this led to split memos fed up the 
policy chain, communicating multiple points of view. Secretary 
Bolton's actions were not always exemplary. On several 
occasions, he made incorrect assumptions about the behavior and 
motivations of subordinates. At other times, he failed to use 
proper managerial channels or unnecessarily personalized 
internal disputes.
    The picture is one of an aggressive policymaker who pressed 
his missions at every opportunity and argued vociferously for 
his point of view. In the process, his blunt style alienated 
some colleagues, but there is no evidence that he has broken 
laws or engaged in serious ethical misconduct.
    At the core of any nomination process is the question of 
whether the nominee is qualified to undertake the task for 
which he or she is nominated. I have no doubts that Secretary 
Bolton is extremely well qualified. He has just served four 
years in a key Under Secretary position that technically 
outranks the post for which he is now nominated. He has 
succeeded in several high-profile negotiation settings. He was 
the primary negotiator in the creation of the successful 
Proliferation Security Initiative and the landmark Moscow 
Treaty. He played a large role in the agreement with Libya on 
the surrender of that nation's WMD programs and the ``10 Plus 
10 Over 10'' agreement that resulted in $10 billion in pledges 
from the other G8 countries to secure the Soviet weapons-of-
mass-destruction arsenal. These are among the Bush 
administration's most important and indisputable foreign-policy 
successes.
    Opponents have argued that Secretary Bolton's personality 
will prevent him from being effective at the U.N., but his 
diplomatic successes over the last four years belie that 
expectation.
    Few people in government have thought more about U.N. 
reform than John Bolton. He served 4 years as the Assistant 
Secretary of State overseeing international organizations under 
the first President Bush. He has written and commented 
extensively on the subject.
    Senator Biden acknowledged to the nominee at the hearing, 
and I quote, ``There is no question that you have extensive 
experience in U.N. affairs,'' end of quote.
    Deputy Secretary Rich Armitage recently told reporters, and 
I quote, ``John Bolton is eminently qualified. He is one of the 
smartest guys in Washington,'' end of quote.
    Secretary Bolton also demonstrated his ability to get 
things done prior to becoming Under Secretary of State. Perhaps 
the best example is his initiative to repeal U.N. Resolution 
3379, which equated Zionism with racism. In May 1991, as 
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, 
John Bolton refused to accept the common wisdom that repealing 
this infamous resolution was impossible. He and his staff 
initiated a campaign to change votes in the General Assembly, 
even though they were advised that they would not be 
successful. Within a few months, they had made substantial 
progress. And, by the fall, the State Department put its full 
weight behind the effort. On December 16, 1991, the U.N. 
General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution, by a vote of 
111 to 25.
    In the private sector, Secretary Bolton made some blunt 
statements about the United Nations, and many of these 
statements were made in academic or think-tank settings where 
debate on these subjects was encouraged. Many of the quotes 
that have been repeated by opponents came in the context of 
much larger speeches that were more nuanced. In fact--or the 
fact that he has strong views and a long record of commentary 
on the job that he is about to undertake should not be 
disqualifying.
    During our hearing, Secretary Bolton spoke of the United 
Nations' important role in international security. He has 
emphasized that he wants the institution to work well on behalf 
of international security and the interests of the United 
States.
    Beyond qualifications, we should recognize that Secretary 
Bolton has the confidence of the President and the Secretary of 
State. The President has made it clear that this is not a 
casual appointment. He wants a specific person to do a specific 
job. President Bush has a reform agenda in mind at the United 
Nations. This reform agenda is generally supported by the U.N. 
Secretary General, who has put forward a reform plan of his 
own. The President wants John Bolton, an avowed and 
knowledgeable reformer, to carry out that reform agenda. Kofi 
Annan has welcomed John Bolton's appointment.
    I would emphasize that Secretary Bolton is being appointed 
to a position that is within the chain of command of the 
President and the Secretary of State. The Ambassador to the 
U.N. reports directly to the President and to the Secretary of 
State. In fact, historically, this ambassadorship has reflected 
directly on the President. The Ambassador is seen as the 
President's voice at the U.N. Consequently, there are few 
positions in government where the President should have more 
latitude in choosing the nominee.
    In my judgment, it would be absolutely extraordinary 
circumstances for the Senate to say, quote, ``Mr. President, 
you can't have your choice to carry out your directive at the 
U.N., even though the Senate has approved him for four other 
high-ranking positions and he is extremely knowledgeable about 
the task that you are giving him,'' end of quote.
    At times during this process, opponents have suggested that 
Secretary Bolton sits outside the mainstream in the Bush 
administration. Senator Biden devoted several minutes of his 
opening statement at Secretary Bolton's hearing to this point, 
saying that, quote, ``Your views, based on what you've said in 
the past, seems to be contrary to the direction the President 
the Secretary now want to take this administration,'' end of 
quote.
    The problem with this assertion is that President Bush is 
telling us that this is not so. President Bush is telling us 
that Secretary Bolton accurately represents his views about the 
U.N. and how that institution should be reformed. President 
Bush is saying that Secretary Bolton is his considered choice 
to implement his policies and diplomatic initiatives at the 
U.N.
    Some observers, who want a different program than the 
President's, may not agree with the President's choice, but the 
results of the 2004 election give the President the 
responsibility and the right to nominate like-minded 
representatives, and to define who a like-minded representative 
is.
    We have ample evidence that the United Nations is in need 
of reform. The Foreign Relations Committee held the first 
congressional hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal more 
than a year ago. Since that time, through the work of Paul 
Volcker and our colleague, Senator Coleman, and many others, we 
have learned much more about the extent of that corruption and 
mismanagement, and this knowledge has supported the case for 
reform. We know that billions of dollars that should have been 
spend on humanitarian needs in Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam 
Hussein's regime through a system of surcharges, bribes, and 
kickbacks. This corruption depended upon members of the U.N. 
Security Council who were willing to be complicit in these 
activities. It also depended on U.N. officials and contractors 
who were dishonest, inattentive, or willing to make damaging 
compromises in pursuit of the compassionate mission.
    United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and 
role of the United Nations have been debated in our country 
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. 
But, in 2005, we may have a unique opportunity to improve the 
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food 
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to 
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, many 
other international problems, have created momentum in favor of 
constructive reforms at the U.N.
    Secretary General Kofi Annan has proposed a substantial 
reform plan that will provide a platform for further reform 
initiatives and discussions. The United States must be a leader 
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its 
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing 
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and in 
trouble-spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N. 
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and 
increases our own burdens.
    Secretary Bolton has become closely associated with the 
United States efforts to reform the U.N. If he goes to the U.N. 
and helps achieve reform, the U.N. will gain in credibility, 
especially with the American people. If reform moves forward, 
Secretary Bolton will be in an excellent position to help 
convince skeptics that reform has occurred and that the United 
Nations can be an effective partner in achieving global 
security. If we reject Secretary Bolton without even granting 
him a vote on the Senate floor, President Bush's hand will be 
weakened at the U.N. We will recover, but we will have wasted 
time, and we will have strengthened the position of reform 
opponents.
    In the days immediately following Secretary Rice's March 7 
announcement of Secretary Bolton's nomination, most Democrat 
members of this committee expressed their opposition to the 
nomination, on policy grounds.
    A March 8th Associated Press report states, quote, ``Almost 
immediately after Bolton's nomination was announced, Democrats 
objected,'' end of quote.
    The March 8 addition of the Baltimore Sun said, quote, 
``Reaction from Senate Democrats promised contentious 
confirmation hearings for Bolton when he goes before the 
Foreign Relations Committee,'' end of quote.
    In several cases, the statements by Democrats were 
unequivocal in opposition. In several other cases, statements 
were very negative, leaving open only the smallest of 
possibilities that the Senate would ultimately support the 
nominee. In all of these cases, objections were based on 
Secretary Bolton's supposed attitudes toward the United 
Nations.
    Senator Dodd said that Secretary Bolton's, quote, 
``antipathy to the U.N. will prevent him from effectively 
discharging his duties as our ambassador,'' end of quote.
    Senator Kerry says the Bolton nomination, quote, ``was the 
most inexplicable appointment the President could make to 
represent the United States in the world community,'' end of 
quote.
    Senator Boxer said of Secretary Bolton, quote, ``He's 
contemptuous of the U.N.''
    By March 31, still almost two weeks before the Bolton 
hearing, a Los Angeles Times report noted, quote, ``Democrats 
are likely to vote unanimously against John R. Bolton when the 
nomination to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations comes 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, according to 
Democratic and Republican lawmakers and aids,'' end of quote.
    Now, Senators have the right to oppose a nominee because of 
his substantive views and his past statements. However, it's 
important to acknowledge that the ethical inquiry into 
Secretary Bolton's background has been pressed by members who 
had planned to vote against him even before we began 
interviewing the witnesses. They have the right to ask 
questions, and the committee has a responsibility to follow up 
credible allegations. But we should also understand that, at 
times, the inquiry has followed a more prosecutorial role than 
many nominees have had to endure.
    The committee staff has worked long and hard to run down 
the salvo of unsubstantiated allegations that were leveled at 
Secretary Bolton at the last business meeting. The end result 
is that many of the accusations have proven to be groundless 
or, at worse, overstated. New information has cast others in a 
different light.
    With regard to the most serious charge, that Secretary 
Bolton sought to improperly manipulate intelligence, the 
insights we have gained do not support that conclusion. He may 
have disagreed with intelligence findings, but, in the end, he 
always accepted the final judgment of the intelligence 
community, and always delivered speeches in their cleared form.
    During this inquiry, there has been the implication that if 
nominee challenged or opposed the conclusions of intelligence 
analysts, he somehow committed an ethical violation. I think we 
need to be very precise that arguing in favor of one's own 
reading of intelligence within the context of an internal 
policy debate is not wrongdoing. Intelligence reports are not 
sacrosanct. They involve interpretations, and they are intended 
to stimulate debate.
    This committee has held numerous classified briefings. The 
word ``briefing'' is perhaps a misnomer, because, as Senators, 
we spent much of the time during those briefings questioning 
the panel. We probe to determine not just what analysts think, 
but why they think it, and often we challenge their 
conclusions.
    Earlier this year, for example, our committee held a highly 
classified briefing on North Korea, in which one of our members 
pointedly disputed the conclusions of the briefer. There was a 
blunt exchange of views, and no resolution to this disagreement 
was achieved. And I am doubtful that any of us who have 
attended a good number of intelligence briefings have not done 
the same thing. My point is that the act of challenging or 
disputing intelligence conclusion is not, in and of itself, 
wrong.
    Some have appeared shocked that Secretary Bolton might have 
challenge intelligence conclusions or advanced alternative 
interpretations, even though the same thing happens every day 
in multiple departments and agencies.
    Congress has the benefit of something called the, quote, 
``speech and debate clause,'' end of quote. Article 1, Section 
6 of the Constitution states that Members of Congress, quote, 
``shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of 
the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at 
the session of their respective houses. And, in going to and 
returning from the same, and for any speech or debate in either 
house, they shall not be questioned in any other place,'' end 
of quote.
    The Founders put this extraordinary provision in the 
Constitution because they saw the value in debate. The context 
surrounding arguments within an administration over 
intelligence is different, but the principle is the same. 
Policymakers should be free to exert opinions and 
interpretations during the policymaking process.
    Clearly, there are lines that should not be crossed. Some 
may argue that Secretary Bolton crossed these lines, but the 
proof is in the result. After fighting for his interpretation, 
Secretary Bolton conformed to the clearance process and gave 
the speeches as they had been approved.
    It has been charged Secretary Bolton sought to retaliate in 
some way against analysts and others with whom he disagreed. 
Our staffs have looked into these cases thoroughly; and, in 
each one, I believe the allegations are overstated. In the case 
of Christian Westermann, the INR analyst whom the committee 
heard about from Carl Ford, the dispute was over a procedural 
issue, and Mr. Westermann continued in his job. We should 
recall that the focus of Mr. Ford's complaint was that Mr. 
Bolton should not have raised his objections directly with Mr. 
Westermann, not that Mr. Bolton was wrong to raise the issue.
    Our Democratic colleagues, last month, made much of the 
fact that, after this incident, Secretary Powell had to go all 
the way down to INR to boost morale. But we heard, last week, 
from Secretary Powell's chief of staff, that such visits were 
not uncommon, that it was part of the Secretary's leadership 
style to visit with staff in the bowels of the building, 
including INR.
    In the case of the NIO for Latin America, e-mails the 
committee staff has viewed make it clear that Secretary 
Bolton's primary objection was over disparaging and inaccurate 
comments the analysts made to Members of Congress about a 
speech. Secretary Bolton took his complaint to the CIA. 
Although the NIO has said he feels his career was damaged by 
Secretary Bolton, his superiors fully backed him at the time, 
and other witnesses have told the committee that if he did not 
get the promotions he felt he deserved, it was for other 
reasons. Again, as far as Secretary Bolton was concerned, the 
dispute was procedural; there was no attempt to fabricate 
intelligence.
    Other allegations related to managerial style show the same 
pattern, upon examination: disagreement over procedure, not 
policy. In the case of Rexon Ryu, a mid-level civil servant in 
the Nonproliferation Bureau under Secretary Bolton, no policy 
issues were involved at all. Secretary Bolton believed, 
incorrectly, according to Mr. Ryu's supervisor, that Mr. Ryu 
had deliberately neglected to share information with Bolton's 
office. Some months later, Mr. Ryu was up for a job that would 
have required him to work closely with Secretary Bolton. 
Secretary Bolton, perhaps regrettably, expressed his opposition 
to working with Mr. Ryu. Mr. Ryu was given another prized post 
instead, an assignment to be Deputy Secretary.
    The case of the State Department attorney, also raised by 
the other side, is even more off the mark. This attorney fully 
supported what Secretary Bolton wanted to do. It was only 
because of miscommunication that Secretary Bolton thought the 
attorney had given out wrong information on a case involving 
sanctions against a Chinese company. The State Department legal 
advisor, Will Taft, told our staff that he quickly straightened 
things out. The attorney stayed on the case, even wrote the 
affidavit that Secretary Bolton later submitted to the court.
    Staff also looked at a new case that came up. Secretary 
Bolton's chief of staff, we learned, went to an INR analyst to 
complaint that he had inappropriately attached to a CIA 
document a cover memo that took exception to some of the CIA's 
findings regarding China. No action was sought against the 
analyst, none was taken. The issue was procedural. No 
intelligence was manipulated. And Secretary Bolton wasn't even 
directly involved, because he was out of the country at the 
time.
    Secretary Bolton's credibility has also been called into 
question regarding his testimony before our committee on April 
11. Senator Biden questioned whether Mr. Bolton really went to 
the CIA to learn about the National Intelligence Council. 
Stuart Cohen, the acting head of the NIC, said that, while he 
could not recall why Secretary Bolton wanted to come, it was, 
quote, ``perfectly reasonable,'' end of quote, to believe that 
was the reason. In fact, he added, quote, ``I was delighted at 
the prospect that somebody would come out wanting to know more 
about the NIC,'' end of quote. He also said that Secretary 
Bolton only talked about reassigning, not firing, the NIO, just 
as Mr. Bolton testified.
    Our investigation has found nothing contrary to Secretary 
Bolton's claim that his dispute with Mr. Westermann was over 
procedure, and not policy.
    Former Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard called the 
committee, after Secretary Bolton's testimony, about a 
controversial speech he gave in South Korea. Secretary Bolton 
testified that Ambassador Hubbard had thanked him for the 
speech afterwards. The Ambassador told us he, indeed, had 
thanked Secretary Bolton afterwards, but only for making 
certain changes in the speech that he had requested. Ambassador 
Hubbard told our staff that he wanted to correct the record on 
that point, but he was not accusing Secretary Bolton of being 
deliberately misleading.
    That speech was one of several by Secretary Bolton that 
opponents to the nomination have questioned. Our investigation 
has shown that many of these speeches and congressional 
testimony were preceded by strong policy debates within the 
administration. As one witness told our staff, quote, ``That's 
how good policy is made,'' end of quote. In each case, we've 
found that, in the end, Secretary Bolton delivered a speech 
that was perfectly cleared and that expressed official U.S. 
policy.
    One of the most sensationalized accusations against 
Secretary Bolton is that, 11 years ago, he chased a woman 
around a Moscow hotel, throwing things at her. This is 
problematic, first, because the behavior described seems so out 
of place, but, secondly, because it has been very difficult for 
our staffs, despite many hours of interviews on this matter, to 
ascertain just what happened. The woman, Melody Townsel, who 
lives in Dallas, admits that she is a liberal Democrat who 
worked for Mothers Opposing Bush in the last election. Ms. 
Townsel also told our staffs that her original accusation 
contained a letter, that was made public--may have been too 
strong in some pieces. She said, quote, ``chasing,'' end of 
quote, may not be the best word. What she meant was that 
Secretary Bolton would approach her whenever he saw her at the 
hotel where they were both staying, because, as she describes 
it, she didn't want to meet with him over a legal matter. It's 
important to remember that Secretary Bolton was a private 
lawyer at the time. He was not representing the U.S. 
Government; he was working for company against which Ms. 
Townsel had made some very serious charges, charges which 
proved unfounded, that could have cost this company an 
important USAID contract in the former Soviet Union.
    Ms. Townsel provided no eyewitnesses to the incidents, 
which are said to have occurred in public or open areas of the 
hotel. Moreover, although she claimed that this was a highly 
traumatic encounter and that she told several people about it, 
staff had difficulty finding others who knew about it. Three 
people whom Ms. Townsel identified as having heard her 
complaints at the time of the events told us they had no 
recollection of Ms. Townsel's mentioning Mr. Bolton. Her boss, 
Charles Black, of Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly, who hired her 
for the post, said she never mentioned it to him. Neither did 
her intermediate supervisor back in Washington.
    An employee of a sister company who assisted Ms. Townsel in 
making her charges against the prime contractor on her project, 
and with whom she said she was in close touch at the time, also 
knows nothing about it.
    Staffs talked to three representatives of the contractor, a 
small Virginia firm, which has long experience working for 
USAID overseas. These officials also heard nothing about this 
encounter. They said that Secretary Bolton was in Moscow at the 
time, but that he was working for a consultant for a health 
project that they were involved in, not doing legal work for 
them.
    We did find one of her friends and coworkers from that 
time, who was not in Moscow, who recalls talking with her by 
telephone about it, as well as a subordinate of hers in a later 
USAID-funded project who recalls her mentioning it.
    Now, ultimately, the results of a lengthy investigation 
into this isolated, long-ago incident are, at most, 
inconclusive. Ms. Townsel went on to another USAID project in 
former Soviet Union, and the company she accused of 
mismanagement was awarded more USAID contracts and continues to 
be well regarded. The original charge against Secretary Bolton 
appears to be overstated.
    On the basis of what we do know, there is nothing to offset 
Secretary Bolton's long record of public service in several 
different administrations.
    It's been charged that, collectively, the allegations 
against Secretary Bolton form an unacceptable pattern of 
behavior. This is an unfortunate argument by opponents, because 
it depends on doubts arising from an intense investigation of 
accusations, many of which had no substantiation. By its 
nature, it also discounts the dozens of positive testimonials 
on Secretary Bolton's behalf from former coworkers, who attest 
to his character and his effectiveness.
    We need to think clearly about the context of the 
allegations leveled against Secretary Bolton.
    First, this has been an extremely public inquiry. By it's 
nature, it has encountered anyone with a grudge or a 
disagreement with Secretary Bolton, stretching back to 1983, to 
come forward and tell their story. There have been no thematic 
limits on the allegations that opponents of the nominee have 
asked to be investigated.
    I would simply submit that no one working in Washington in 
high-ranking positions for that long would come out unscathed 
from such a process. Any assertive policymaker will develop 
opponents based on stylistic differences, personal disputes, or 
partisan disagreements. Most members of this committee have 
been in public life for decades. If we were nominated for a 
similar position of responsibility after our terms in the 
Senate, how many of us would want the same standard to be 
applied to our confirmation process? How many of us would want 
any instance of conflict or anger directed at our staffs or our 
colleagues to be fair game?
    Second, as mentioned, the oldest allegation dates back all 
the way to 1983; thus, we are subjecting 22 years of Secretary 
Bolton's career to a microscope. This included service in many 
government jobs, as well as time spent in the private sector. 
And given the length of John Bolton's service in high-ranking 
positions, it's inevitable that he would have conflict with 
coworkers of various ranks and political persuasions. He would 
have had literally thousands of contacts, meetings, and issues 
to deal with during his career. In this context, the volume of 
alleged incidents is not that profound.
    Third, in John Bolton's case, unsubstantiated charges may 
seem more material than they are, because he has a reputation 
for being an aggressive and blunt negotiator. But this should 
not be a disqualifying factor, especially for a post that, 
historically, has included a number of blunt, plainspoken 
individuals, including Jeane Kirkpatrick and our former 
colleague, Senator Pat Moynihan. In fact, President Bush has 
cited John Bolton's direct style as one of the reasons that 
he's picked him for this particular job.
    It is easy to say that any inquiry into any allegation is 
justified if we are pursuing the truth. But, as Senators who 
are frequently called upon to pass judgment on nominees, we 
know reality is more complicated than that. We want to ensure 
that nominees are qualified, skilled, honest, and open. 
Clearly, we should pursue credible reports of wrongdoing; but, 
in doing so, we should understand that there can be human and 
organizational costs if the inquiry is not focused and fair. We 
have all witnessed quality nominees who have had to endure a 
contentious nomination process that opened them up to any 
charge leveled from any directions.
    Both Republicans and Democrats have been guilty of 
employing prosecuting tactics to oppose nominees with whom they 
did not agree. Some would say that nominees are fair game. If 
they accept an appointment, they enter the public arena, where 
no quarter will be given. But we need capable people who are 
willing to serve our government and the American people. And 
among all the other qualifications, it seems that we require 
nominees to subject themselves and their families to partisan 
scrutiny. This has implications well beyond the current 
nomination.
    Our Democrat colleagues have recognized this fact when they 
have defended Democrat nominees in the past. With respect to 
one nominee, in October 1993, Senator Biden said, quote, ``The 
Senate does nothing to fulfill its responsibility to advise and 
consent on presidential nominations, and does nothing to 
enhance its reputation as the world's greatest liberty body, by 
entertaining a long and disagreeable litany of past policy 
disagreements, not by entertaining anonymous and probably false 
allegations,'' end of quote.
    With regard to a troubled 1999 nomination, Senator Dodd, 
quite insightfully, stated, quote, ``I am one, Mr. Chairman, 
who worries deeply about our ability to attract the best our 
society can produce to serve our country. It is not easy to 
submit yourself and your family to the kind of public scrutiny 
that a nomination of this magnitude involves. We have got to 
sort out some ways in which we can go through this process 
without making it so discouraging to people that--those watch 
the process, think one day they might like to serve their 
country--will be discouraged from doing so, in any 
administration. And I am deeply worried that if we do not get a 
better handle on this, that that will be the net result of what 
we accomplish,'' end of quote.
    Senator Dodd also provided comments for a March 1, 1997, 
Washington Post article about the travails of a different 
nominee. He said, and I quote, ``It's getting harder and harder 
to get good people to serve in government. Advice and consent 
does not have to be abuse,'' end of quote.
    In an investigation of this type, we constantly have to ask 
where we draw the line. Where does legitimate due diligence 
turn into partisanship? Where does the desire for the truth 
turn into a competition over who wins and who loses? Not every 
line of inquiry is justified by our curiosity, or even our 
suspicions.
    The committee has focused a great deal of energy examining 
several accusations against the nominee. And this may leave 
some observers with the false impression that John Bolton's 
service has been dominated by discord and conflict. We need to 
acknowledge that a great many officials with whom he has worked 
have endorsed him, and that many subordinates have attested to 
his managerial character.
    In the interest of fairness, I would like to cite just a 
few of the comments received by the committee in support of 
Secretary Bolton. Former Secretaries of State James Baker, 
Larry Eagleburger, Alexander Haig, Henry Kissinger, and George 
Shultz; former Secretaries of Defense Frank Carlucci, and James 
Schlesinger; former Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Max 
Kampelman; former National Security Advisor Richard Allen; 
former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth 
Adelman; former Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire; and 
former Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt 
strongly endorsed Secretary Bolton in a letter to the 
committee, saying, and I quote, ``It is a moment when we must 
have an ambassador in place whose knowledge, experience, 
dedication, and drive will be vital to protecting the American 
interests in an effective, forward-looking United Nations. 
Secretary Bolton, like the administration, has his critics. 
Anyone as energetic and effective as John Bolton is bound to 
encounter those who disagree with some, or even all, of his 
administration policies. But the policies for which he is 
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the 
Department of State, which he has served with loyalty, honor, 
and distinction.''
    Andrew Natsios, the current USAID administrator, and Mr. 
Peter McPherson, a former USAID administrator, along with 37 
officials who worked with John Bolton during his years at 
USAID, wrote, quote, ``We know John to be a forceful policy 
advocate who both encourages and learns from rigorous debate. 
We know him to be a man of balanced judgment. And we know him 
to have a sense of humor, even about himself. John leads from 
in front, with courage and conviction, especially positive 
qualities, we believe, for the assignment he is being asked to 
take on. He is tough, but fair. He does not abuse power or 
people. John is direct, yet thoughtful, in his communications. 
He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a never-ending 
quest to maximize performance, yet he does not place undue time 
demands on his staff, recognizing their family obligations. 
What he does demand from his staff is personal honesty and 
intellectual clarity,'' end of quote from that letter.
    Another letter, from Former Attorneys General Ed Meese and 
Dick Thornburgh, former Governors William Weld and Frank 
Keating, former Counselors to the President C. Boyden Gray and 
Arthur Culvahouse, Jr., and 39 other distinguished officials 
stated, quote, ``Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know 
him to be a man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply 
devoted to the service to this country and the promotion of our 
foreign-policy interests, as established by this President and 
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part 
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our 
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined 
with our experiences in government and in the private sector, 
more than counterbalances the credibility of those who have 
tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a 
lifetime,'' end of quote from that letter.
    Another letter came from 21 former officials who worked 
with John Bolton in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of 
State for International Organizational Affairs, and states, 
quote, ``Despite what has been said and written in the last few 
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or 
its mission. Quite the contrary, under John's leadership the 
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original 
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed IO from a 
State Department backwater into a highly appealing workplace in 
which individuals could effectively articulate and advance U.S. 
policy and their own careers, as well,'' end of quote.
    A letter also arrived from 43 of John Bolton's former 
colleagues at the American Enterprise Institute. It stated, and 
I quote, ``As we have followed the strange allegations suddenly 
leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days, and reflected among 
ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come to 
realize how much we have learned from him, and how deep and 
lasting were his contributions. Contrary to portrayals of his 
accusers, he combines a temperate disposition, good spirit, 
utter honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional 
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a rare 
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an 
American Ambassador to the United Nations,'' end of quote.
    Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote, in a 
recent letter to Secretary Bolton, quote, ``To combine, as you 
do, clarity of thought, courtesy of expression, and an 
unshakeable commitment to justice is rare in any walk of life, 
but it's particularly so in international affairs. A capacity 
for straight-talking, rather than peddling half-truths, is a 
strength, and not a disadvantage, in diplomacy. Particularly in 
the case of a great power like America, it is essential that 
people know where you stand and assume that you mean what you 
say. With you at the U.N., they will do both. These same 
qualities are also required for any serious reform at the 
United Nations, itself, without which cooperation between 
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more 
difficult,'' end of quote from Mrs. Thatcher.
    Now, during this inquiry, we have spent a great deal of 
time scrutinizing individual conversations and incidents that 
happened several years ago. Regardless of how each Senator 
plans to vote today, we should not lose sight of the larger 
national-security issues--U.N. reform and international 
diplomacy--that are central to this nomination.
    The President has tasked Secretary Bolton to undertake this 
urgent mission. Secretary Bolton has affirmed his commitment to 
fostering a strong United Nations. He has expressed his intent 
to work hard to secure greater international support at the 
U.N. for the national-security and foreign-policy objectives of 
the United States. He has stated his belief in decisive 
American leadership at the U.N., and underscored that an 
effective United Nations is very much in the interest of U.S. 
national security.
    I believe that the President deserves to have his nominee 
represent him at the United Nations. I am hopeful that we will 
vote to report this nomination to the whole Senate.
    At this time, I would like to yield to--the first 
Republican segment--to Senator Voinovich for his comments.
    Senator Voinovich.

 STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO

    Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, let me take this opportunity to thank you and your 
staff for your graciousness and hard work on this nomination. 
You have made strong arguments in favor of the nominee 
throughout this process. Additionally, thank you for providing 
all of the members of this committee with timely information 
related to Mr. Bolton. I believe that the inquiry has been fair 
and exhaustive. I'm confident that I have enough information to 
cast my vote today. Again, I appreciate your staff's hard work, 
as well as the administration's efforts.
    Since our last meeting on this subject, I have pored over 
hundreds of pages of testimony, have spoken to dozens, or so, 
of individuals regarding their experiences, interactions, and 
thoughts about John Bolton. Most importantly, in addition to 
the meeting that I had with Mr. Bolton prior to the official 
business meeting that we had on his nomination, I, once again, 
met with Mr. Bolton this week, personally, to share my concerns 
and to listen carefully to his thoughts.
    After great thought and consideration, I have based my 
decision on what I think is the bigger picture. Frankly, there 
is a particular concern that I have about this nomination, and 
it involves the big picture of U.S. public diplomacy.
    It was not long ago when America's love of freedom was a 
force of inspiration to the world, and America was admired for 
its democracy, generosity, and its willingness to help others 
in need of protection. Today, the United States is criticized 
for what the world calls arrogance, unilateralism, and for 
failing to listen and to seek the support of its friends and 
allies. There has been a drastic change in the attitude of our 
friends and allies in such organizations as the United Nations 
and NATO and in the countries of leaders that we need to rely 
upon for help. I discovered this last November, when I met--
when I was in London with people in the Parliament there--I 
found that to be the case when we visited the NATO meeting in 
Italy--that things have really changed in the last several 
years.
    It troubled me deeply that the United States is perceived 
this way in a world community, because the United States will 
face a steeper challenge in achieving its objectives without 
their support. We will face more difficulties in conducting the 
war on terrorism, promoting peace and stability worldwide, and 
building democracies without the help from our friends to share 
the responsibilities, leadership, and costs.
    To achieve these objectives, public diplomacy must once 
again be of high importance. If we cannot win over the hearts 
and minds of the world community, and work together as a team, 
our goals will be more difficult to achieve. Additionally, we 
will be unable to reduce the burden on our own resources. The 
most important of these resources are the human resources, the 
lives of the men and women of our Armed Forces who are leaving 
their families every day to serve their country overseas.
    Just this last Tuesday, we passed an $82 billion 
supplemental bill for our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
It is clear that the costs of this war are rising all the time, 
and they are not expected to go down anytime soon. There are 
not many allies standing up to join us in bearing the costs of 
these wars, particularly Iraq. We need the help of other 
countries to share the financial burden that is adding to our 
national debt, and the human-resource burden that our Armed 
Forces, national guardsman, and contractors are bearing so 
heavily now, including the deaths of over 1500 American service 
men and women.
    And the key to this, I believe, is public diplomacy. Mr. 
Chairman, I applaud the President and Secretary of State for 
understanding that public diplomacy is an important objective 
and beginning this new term with an emphasis on repairing 
relationships. I applaud the President and Secretary Rice for 
reaching out to our friends in the world community and 
articulating that the United States does respect international 
law and protocol. And I also applaud the President's decision 
to appoint Karen Hughes to help take the lead in this effort.
    Though the United States may have differences with our 
friends at times, and though we may need to be firm with our 
positions, it is important to send the message that we're 
willing to sit down, talk about them, discuss our reasoning, 
and to work for solutions.
    The work of the President and Secretary of State Rice is a 
move in the right direction, but what message are we sending to 
the world community when, in the same breath, we have sought to 
appoint an Ambassador to the United Nations who, himself, has 
been accused of being arrogant, of not listening to his 
friends, of acting unilaterally, of bullying those who do not 
have the ability to properly defend themselves? These are the 
very characteristics that we're trying to dispel in the world 
community.
    We must understand that, next to the President, the Vice 
President, Secretary of State, the next most important 
prominent public diplomat is our Ambassador to the United 
Nations. It is my concern that the confirmation of John Bolton 
would send a contradictory and negative message to the world 
community about U.S. intentions. I'm afraid that his 
confirmation will tell the world that we're not dedicated to 
repairing our relationship or working as a team, but that we 
believe only someone with sharp elbows can deal properly with 
the international community.
    I want to make it clear that I do believe that the U.N. 
needs to be reformed if it's to be relevant in the 21st 
century. I do believe we need to pursue its transformation 
aggressively, sending the strong message that corruption's not 
going to be tolerated. The corruption that occurred under the 
Oil-for-Food Program made it possible for Saddam's Iraq to 
discredit the U.N. and undermine the goals of its members. This 
must never happen again, and severe reforms are needed to 
strengthen the organization. And, yes, I believe that it will 
be necessary to take a firm position so we can succeed. But it 
will take a special individual to succeed at this endeavor, and 
I have great concerns with the current nominee and his ability 
to get the job done.
    And to those who say a vote against John Bolton is against 
reform of the U.N., I say, nonsense. There are many other 
people who are qualified to go to the United Nations that can 
get the job done for our country.
    Frankly, I'm concerned that Mr. Bolton would make it more 
difficult for us to achieve the badly needed reforms to this 
outdated institution. I believe that there could even be more 
obstacles to reform if Mr. Bolton is sent to the United Nations 
than if he were another candidate.
    Those in the international community who do not want to see 
the U.N. reformed will act as a roadblock, and I fear that Mr. 
Bolton's reputation will make it easier for them to succeed. I 
believe that some member nations in the U.N. will use Mr. 
Bolton as part of their agenda to further question the 
integrity and credibility of the United States, and to 
reinforce their negative U.S. propaganda--and there's a lot of 
it out there today.
    Another reason I believe Mr. Bolton is not the best 
candidate for the job is his tendency to act without regard for 
the views of others, and without respect for the chain of 
command. We have heard that Mr. Bolton has a reputation for 
straying off message on occasion. Ambassador Hubbard testified 
that the tone of Mr. Bolton's speech on North Korea hurt, 
rather than helped, efforts to achieve the President's 
objectives. According to several respectable sources, Mr. 
Bolton strayed off message too often, and had to be called on 
the carpet quite often to be reprimanded. In fairness, those 
sources said that, once reprimanded, Mr. Bolton got back on 
track, but that he needs to be kept on a short leash.
    However, this leaves me a very uneasy feeling. Who is to 
say that Mr. Bolton will not continue to stray off message as 
Ambassador to the U.N.? Who is to say he will not hurt, rather 
than help, U.S. relations with the international community and 
our desire to reform the U.N.?
    When discussing all these concerns with Secretary Rice--
John Bolton's propensity to get off message, his lack of 
interpersonal skills, his tendency to abuse others who disagree 
with him--I was informed by the Secretary of State that she 
understood all these things, and, in spite of them, still feels 
that John Bolton is the best choice, and that she would be in 
frequent communication with him, and he would be closely 
supervised. My private thought at the time, and I should have 
expressed it to her, is, Why in the world would you want to 
send somebody up to the U.N. that has to be supervised?
    I'm also concerned about Mr. Bolton's interpersonal skills. 
Mr. Chairman, I understand there will be several vacant senior 
posts on the staff when Mr. Bolton arrives in his new position. 
As a matter of fact, I understand all the senior people, five 
of them, they're leaving right now. For example, Ann Patterson, 
who is highly regarded, is moving to another position. And I've 
been told by several people that, if he gets there, to be 
successful he's going to need somebody like Ann Patterson to 
get the job done for him.
    As such, Mr. Bolton's going to face a challenge. These 
people are gone right now. He's going to have to find some new 
ones. But his challenge right now is to inspire, lead, and 
manage a new team, a staff of 150 individuals that he will need 
to rely on to get the job done.
    We have all witnessed the testimony and observations 
related to Mr. Bolton's interpersonal and management skills. I 
have concerns about Mr. Bolton's ability to inspire and lead 
the team so that it can be as effective as possible in 
completing the important task before him. And I'm not the only 
one. I understand that 59 U.S. diplomats, who served under 
administrations from both sides of the aisle, sent a letter to 
the committee, saying that Mr. Bolton is the wrong man for the 
job.
    I want to note that the interview given by Colin Powell's 
chief of staff, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, has said that Mr. 
Bolton would be--would make an abysmal ambassador, that he is, 
quote, ``incapable of listening to people and taking into 
account their views.''
    I would also like to highlight the words of another person 
that I highly respect, who worked with Mr. Bolton, who told me 
that if Mr. Bolton were confirmed, he'd be okay for a short 
time, but, within 6 months his poor interpersonal skills and 
lack of self-discipline would cause major problems.
    Additionally, I wanted to note my concern that Colin 
Powell, the person to whom Mr. Bolton answered to over the last 
four years, was conspicuously absent from a letter signed by 
former Secretaries of State recommending Mr. Bolton's 
confirmation. He's the one that had to deal with him on a day-
to-day basis. He's the one that's more capable of commenting 
about whether or not he's got the ability to get the job done. 
And he--his name was not on that letter.
    We are facing an era of foreign relations in which the 
choice for our Ambassador to the United Nations should be one 
of the most thoughtful decisions we make. The candidate needs 
to be both a diplomat and a manager. A manager is important. 
Interpersonal skills are important. The way you treat other 
people--Do you treat them with dignity and respect?--very 
important. You must have the ability to persuade and to inspire 
our friends, to communicate and convince, to listen, to absorb 
the ideas of others. Without such virtues, we will face more 
challenges in our efforts to win the war on terrorism, to 
spread democracy, and to foster stability globally.
    The question is, Is John Bolton the best person for the 
job? The administration has said they believe he's the right 
man. They say that, despite his interpersonal shortcomings, he 
knows the U.N., and he can reform the organization and make it 
more powerful and relevant to the world.
    Now, let me say, there's no doubt that John Bolton should 
be commended and thanked for his service and his particular 
achievements. He has accomplished an important objective, 
against great odds. As a sponsor of legislation that 
established an Office on Global Anti-Semitism in the State 
Department, legislation that I worked very hard to get passed, 
I am particularly impressed by his work to combat global anti-
Semitism. I wholeheartedly agree with Mr. Bolton that we must 
get the U.N. to change its anti-Israeli bias. Further, I am 
impressed by Mr. Bolton's achievements in the areas of arms 
control; specifically, the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global 
Partnership Fund, and the President's Proliferation Security 
Initiative.
    Despite these successes, there is no doubt that Mr. Bolton 
has serious deficiencies in the areas that are critical to be a 
good ambassador. As Carl Ford said, ``He is a kiss-up and kick-
down leader, who will not tolerate those who disagree with him, 
and who goes out of his way to retaliate for their 
disagreement.'' As Ambassador Hubbard said, ``He does not 
listen when an esteemed colleague offers or suggests changes to 
temper language in a speech.'' And, as I've already mentioned, 
former Secretary of State Powell's chief of staff, Lawrence 
Wilkerson, said, ``He would be an abysmal ambassador.''
    As some others who have worked closely with Mr. Bolton 
stated, ``He's an ideologue, and fosters an atmosphere of 
intimidation. He does not tolerate disagreement. He does not 
tolerate dissent.'' Another esteemed individual who has worked 
with Mr. Bolton told me that, ``Even when he had success, he 
had the tendency to lord if over and say, `Hey, boy, look what 
I did.' '' Carl Ford testified that he had never seen anyone 
behave as badly in all his days at the State Department, and 
that he would not even have testified before this committee if 
John Bolton had simply followed protocol and simple rules of 
management. You know, just followed the procedure.
    Mr. Chairman, I have to say that, after poring over the 
hundreds of pages of testimony--and, you know, I wasn't here 
for those hearings, but I did my penance; I read all of it----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Voinovich  [continuing]. I believe that John Bolton 
would have been fired--fired--if he had worked for a major 
corporation. This is not the behavior of a true leader, who 
upholds the kind of democracy that President Bush is seeking to 
promote, globally. This is not the behavior that should be 
endorsed as the face of the United States to the world 
community in the United Nations. Rather, Mr. Chairman, it is my 
opinion that John Bolton is the poster-child of what someone in 
the diplomatic corps should not be. I worry about the signal 
that we're sending to thousands of individuals, under the State 
Department, who are serving their country in Foreign Service 
and Civil Service, living at posts across the world, and, in 
some cases, risking their lives, all so they can represent our 
country, promote diplomacy, and contribute to the safety of 
Americans everywhere.
    I just returned from a trip to the Balkans. I had a chance 
to spend four days with people from the State Department. He's 
not what they consider to be the ideal person, Mr. Chairman, to 
be our Ambassador to the United States--or to the United 
Nations. And I think it's important that we think about the 
signal that we send out there to those people that are all over 
this world, that are doing the very best job that they can to 
represent the United States of America. This is an important 
nomination by the President. What we're saying to these people, 
when we confirm such an individual to one of the highest 
positions--what are we saying?
    I want to emphasize that I've weighed Mr. Bolton's 
strengths carefully. I have weighed the fact that this is the 
President's nominee. All things being equal, it is my 
proclivity to support the President's nominee. However, in this 
case, all things are not equal. It's a different world today 
than it was four years ago. Our enemies are Muslim extremists 
and religious fanatics who have hijacked the Koran and have 
convinced people that the way to get to heaven is through jihad 
against the world, particularly the United States. We must 
recognize that to be successful in this war, one of our most 
important tools is public diplomacy.
    After hours of deliberations, telephone calls, personal 
conversations, reading hundreds of pages of transcripts, and 
asking for guidance from above, I have come to the 
determination that the United States can do better than John 
Bolton. The world needs an ambassador who's interested in 
encouraging other people's points of view and discouraging any 
atmosphere of intimidation. The world needs an American 
Ambassador to the U.N. who will show that the United States has 
respect for other countries and intermediary organizations, 
that we are team players and consensus builders, and promoters 
of symbiotic relationships.
    In moving forward with the international community, we 
should remember the words of the great Scot poet, who said, 
``Oh, that some great power would give me the wisdom to see 
myself as other people see me.''
    That being said, Mr. Chairman, I am not so arrogant to 
think that I should impose my judgment and perspective of the 
U.S. position in the world community on the rest of my 
colleagues. We owe it to the President to give Mr. Bolton and 
up or down vote on the floor of the U.S. Senate. My hope is 
that, on a bipartisan basis, we can sent Mr. Bolton's 
nomination to the floor without recommendation, and let the 
Senate work its will.
    If that goes to the floor, I would plead to my colleagues 
in the Senate to consider the decision and its consequences 
carefully, to read all the pertinent material--so often we get 
nominees, and we don't spend the time to look into the 
background of the individuals--and to ask themselves several 
questions:
    Will John Bolton do the best job possible representing a 
transatlantic face of America at the U.N.?
    Will he be able to pursue the needed reforms at the U.N., 
despite his damaged credibility?
    Will he share information with the right individuals, and 
will he solicit information from the right individuals, 
including his subordinates, so he can make the most informed 
decision?
    Is he capable of advancing the President and Secretary of 
State's efforts to advance our public diplomacy?
    Does he have the character, leadership, interpersonal 
skills, self-discipline, common decency, and understanding of 
the chain of command to lead his team to victory?
    Will he recognize and seize opportunities to repair and 
strengthen relationships, promote peace, uphold democracy as a 
team with our fellow nations?
    Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say this. I have met 
with Mr. Bolton on two occasions, spent almost two hours with 
him. I like Mr. Bolton. I think he's a decent man. Our 
conversations have been candid and cordial. But, Mr. Chairman, 
I really don't believe he's the best man that we can send to 
the United Nations.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
    I now turn to the distinguished ranking member for his 
statement and disposition of an opening hour of debate.

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

    Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I don't know why I thought for a moment that maybe 
Senator Voinovich shouldn't go second. I should have 
reconsidered that position. [Laughter.]
    So much for partisanship.
    Look, I don't--quite frankly, much of what I was going to 
say would be redundant and not as eloquent as what we just 
heard.
    And I have great respect for every one of my colleagues on 
this committee, on both sides of the aisle. And I do respect 
the fact that many of you may reach a conclusion different than 
I have reached and, based on what I just heard, Senator 
Voinovich has reached. I happened to reach the same 
conclusion--and I'm not being solicitous--for the same reason, 
the same basic, fundamental reason.
    I cannot think of a time in my career here where I've heard 
someone so succinctly state in one sentence what really should 
have been the question: Why would you send someone to the 
United Nations that needed to be supervised? I did ask a 
similar question, that question, to the Secretary of State, 
when she had the courtesy, which I appreciate, of calling me 
before--before--the nominee was announced. At that time, she 
asked me--and this is not violating any confidence, that--would 
I withhold stating anything publicly until I had a chance--she 
had a chance to talk with me more? And if you go back, you 
notice what you've read about what Senators said, my name does 
not appear there. I did withhold, until the day of the hearing, 
any comment--to the chagrin, I suspect, of some of my 
Democratic colleagues--my attitude and views and concerns about 
Mr. Bolton.
    I realize there is a very strong--we all are elected 
officials in the most significant legislative body, I would 
say, in the history of the world. And we all know, though, that 
each of our parties have overwhelming requirements, sometimes, 
to meet the concerns of portions of our party. That was implied 
to me as one of the reasons why Mr. Bolton was being nominated.
    The question I asked was, ``Do you know, Madam Secretary, 
how much difficulty Mr. Bolton caused for Secretary Powell, 
your predecessor?'' And the answer was, ``Yes.'' But there had 
been a discussion, and there was a need to find an important 
post for Mr. Bolton, who's been an admirable and bright and 
patriotic servant of this country for a long time. And I asked 
a rhetorical question, ``If you couldn't say no now to that 
nomination, how are you going to say no if, in fact, he 
breaches the control that you indicate to me that will be 
imposed upon him?'' I don't know the answer to that, but I 
would suggest that if there is a need to appoint him for 
reasons, including and beyond his capacity, then it may be 
difficult if, in fact, he strays. But that is not for me to 
decide.
    Mr. Chairman, you and I have worked together for a long 
time. I think it's fair to say we've never had a cross, harsh 
word. And we will not, as far as I'm concerned, have one over 
this. But your opening statement makes it sort of sound that 
it's self-evident that Mr. Bolton was going to be the guy to be 
nominated to the United Nations. I would ask a rhetorical 
question. Was anyone here in the Senate when Bolton's name was 
mentioned, unless you had been briefed ahead of time? Did 
anyone of you say, ``Ah, that fits. That's just what I was 
thinking. That's just what I was thinking--U.N.--Bolton, 
U.N.''? [Laughter.]
    I'm not being facetious. I being deadly earnest. I think it 
goes to this whole question of whether or not everybody's out 
just on a witch hunt to go after Mr. Bolton. You must admit 
that this was an unusual, if not surprising, nomination. If 
someone had said Mr. Bolton was going to head up--he was going 
to be brought in--I would have been less surprised, myself, if 
he had been--if he was going to be--have the spot Mr. Hadley 
has, a more--in some senses, a much more critical spot. I would 
have been less surprised about that. But it's a little bit like 
if one of us announced we're going go back and run for the 
state legislature. It would kind of surprise me. It wouldn't 
fit.
    I want to make a second point. We did not seek out any 
witnesses. I don't know whether you meant to imply, Mr. 
Chairman, but it sounded--it might sound to some like the 
Democrats are out there trying to dig up all they can on 
Bolton. I had nothing to do, nor did any of you, with what now 
is 102 former career ambassadors--Republican, Democratic; 
Republican appointees, Democratic appointees. To the best of my 
knowledge, my word as a--I know of no Democrat that had 
anything to do with getting those folks to write us a letter.
    Tom Hubbard, the Ambassador to South Korea, he contacted us 
after hearing Mr. Bolton's testimony. We did not contact Mr. 
Hubbard.
    Mr. Westermann--nobody contacted Mr. Westermann first. That 
came from Mr. Westermann in an inquiry by the Intelligence 
Committee as to whether or not anyone had been--felt 
intimidated. Mr. Westermann came forward to the Intelligence 
Committee. We found out from the Intelligence Committee. We did 
not go to Mr. Westermann.
    Ms. Townsel--and, I agree, the evidence is not absolutely 
conclusive. I agree with you. I think you honestly stated it, 
as you always do. But we didn't go to Mrs. Townsel. She wrote 
an open letter to us. I never met the woman, had never even 
heard of her before.
    So, I want to make the point that not only did we not seek 
out these witnesses, it would have been irresponsible, in terms 
of out constitutional responsibility, not to talk to them as 
they came forward, or seek our corroboration and/or 
contradictory statements relative to what they had to say.
    And I might point out, the primary witnesses that we 
interviewed, who had the most incredibly damaging things to--
let me rephrase that--who had some very damaging things to say 
about Mr. Bolton's actions, are all in a Republican 
administration. We did not go to a former administration. We 
did not go to the Clinton administration to find former 
assistant secretaries or heads of NIR--or INR. These are all 
Republicans; if not Republicans, appointees and/or serving 
under a Republican administration.
    And, further, the argument that we need John Bolton for 
reform at the U.N., and comparing him to Pat Moynihan--I'm 
reminded of that famous phrase of our friend from Texas, 
Senator Bentsen, ``I knew Pat Moynihan, and he's--and I know 
John Bolton--and he's no Pat Moynihan.'' I mean, I find that 
the biggest stretch--you know that old phrase we Irish say, 
``Pat's probably rolling over in his grave hearing that 
comparison.''
    And so, we're not saying--one last point before I get into 
the detail--we're not saying Mr. Bolton is not a patriotic 
American, has not done very good things in his career, has been 
a failure. We're not saying that. What we're saying is, he's 
done some very good things. One that comes to mind, referenced 
by our colleague from Ohio, the anti-Zionist resolution, 
getting it repealed. That's a big deal. That's a big deal, a 
notable accomplishment. But that does not a U.N. Ambassador 
make. A lot of people have done very good things who turn out 
not to be qualified or the right person for other assignments.
    Mr. Chairman, my intention, obviously, is not to keep our 
committee vote beyond the 3 p.m. agreement we have decided on, 
but I feel obliged to lay out for the record one of my 
institutional concerns here.
    I recognize that the State Department, the CIA, and AID 
have provided hundreds of pages of documents, and declassified 
many of them. I don't minimize that. State and CIA have made 
government officials available for interviews, and more than 
once. But this cooperation has been grudging, to say the least.
    Prior to the April 11th hearing, very little cooperation 
was provided to the Democratic requests, until you, Mr. 
Chairman, stepped in. After our first meeting, on April 19th, 
we made additional document requests to the Department. The 
chairman intervened again to help. But he also implicitly 
invited the Department to ignore part of our request, saying 
that some of our request were, quote, ``extremely broad and may 
have marginal relevance to specific allegations.'' The letter 
then expressed hope that certain specific requests would be 
fulfilled, a list that omitted four parts of the Minority 
request. The Department took the hint, and it has failed to 
turn over some important materials related to preparation of 
speeches and testimony.
    Even after--even after we narrowed our request, at the 
urging of the State Department, only a relatively small amount 
of material that we narrowed the request for was provided. In 
rejecting the request, the Department's offered an 
extraordinary rationale. I think it's important, as a 
committee, that we understand this. They said, in rejecting 
some of the information we sought, quote, The Department,'' 
quote, ``does not believe the request to be specifically tied 
to the issues being deliberated by the committee,'' end of 
quote. As my mom would say, ``Who died and left them boss?''
    Think about it for a minute. First, the Department is 
responding only to the requests endorsed by the Majority, and, 
second, the executive branch is deciding, for itself, the 
issues which are relevant to this committee's review of a 
nomination.
    I believe this is an very important issue before the 
committee. I believe it's very important whether or not Mr. 
Bolton sought to stretch intelligence, to say things in public 
statements that the intelligence would not support, and to keep 
going back to the intelligence community again and again to get 
answers he wants, not the answers the facts support. Put 
another way, Did he attempt to politicize the intelligence 
process for two former--as two former administration officials 
have testified? That's why we requested this information.
    I'm also concerned that the nominee may have given the 
committee some misleading testimony. The material that was not 
provided would shed further light on both these concerns. And 
it relates to the preparation of congressional testimony on 
Syria, their weapons-of-mass-destruction program. The 
preparation of this testimony occurred in the summer of 2003. 
Remember, we already know from intelligence officials that 
there was an intense debate about what Mr. Bolton wanted to say 
and whether he should be able to say it. And this was a time 
when there was open discussion about, Is Syria next? Mr. Bolton 
told us he didn't--hadn't seen the draft, and the Department 
told us, in--later--in the letter yesterday, that he was not 
personally involved in drafting the testimony. But this 
committee has a right and a duty to look at the evidence.
    The Department's letter, yesterday, saying that the 
material is highly classified and compartmentalized, and the 
Department is not prepared, quote, ``to share these 
deliberations that cut across the intelligence community,'' as 
their rational. This answer is unsatisfactory, as a matter of 
principle, for future inquiries by this committee. We've 
already received deliberative-process materials, some of which 
are highly classified. Why won't the administration give us 
this other material? Are they holding back relevant 
information? Could it be that Mr. Bolton was, in fact, involved 
in drafting the testimony? I don't know. But there's no cogent 
rationale why they give us some of this, and not others.
    The Department's attitude during the course of this 
nomination is a significant departure--significant departure--
from past practice, including the past four years. It's been 
the kind of--if this is the kind of cooperation we can expect 
in the future, we may have a long three and a half years.
    I'm even more concerned about the failure of the committee 
to receive information relating to Mr. Bolton's request for NSA 
information, and to identify U.S. persons that he wanted to 
know in those intercepts. On April 13th, Senator Dodd made the 
first request for this information. By a letter dated April 28, 
Senator Lugar made a request for the information through the 
Intelligence Committee. Specifically, Senator Lugar asked 
Senators Roberts and Rockefeller, to seek, quote, ``all 
information related to Mr. Bolton's request and the responses 
thereto, including the unredacted contents of the documents in 
question.'' Unredacted. And the letter said that the chairman 
was, quote, ``prepared to follow the guidance of the Select 
Committee with respect to,'' quote, ``access and storage of 
such materials, as well as the provisions under which such 
materials will be shared with members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.''
    Clearly, the chairman was pointing out that the past 
practices mean that we have access to that information, and we 
expected that access. That's why the reference to ``storage 
material and the nature of the access''--not ``if'' we could 
have access. In other words, Mr. Chairman, you made clear our 
expectations that NSA would provide, quote, ``all the 
information'' to the Intelligence Committee, which, in turn, 
would share it with us.
    And I understand that the chairman and vice chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee were briefed Tuesday by General Hayden. 
I understand that they were not given the identities of U.S. 
persons that Mr. Bolton requested and received. And I have no 
information on when, or whether, this committee or Senator 
Lugar or I will be given access to the same information given 
to the Intelligence Committee. So far as I can tell, Mr. 
Chairman, your request has not been fulfilled. And I don't know 
why. I think it's unacceptable. We have a right to this 
information, not only as members of this committee, but in our 
specific responsibility of exercising our advice-and-consent 
responsibility.
    Mr. Bolton has seen this information, but we cannot? Mr. 
Bolton could see this information, but a 32-year Senator, who 
never had once in his entire career had anybody raise a 
question about his treatment of secret or classified data--I'm 
not entitled to see it?
    I would like someone to explain that to me. Can Ambassador 
Negroponte explain it? Can General Hayden explain it? Can 
someone at least do us the courtesy of telling us why this 
information has not been provided?
    After all the work we've done in the past decade to 
strengthen the role of this committee, it is a serious mistake, 
in my view, for all of us to acquiesce when the administration 
is withholding the relevant information, whether they think it 
is relevant or not. The integrity of the nominating process and 
our constitutional role is being challenged, in my view. 
Article 2, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the 
President ``shall nominate and, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
ministers and counsels, judges of the Supreme Court, and all 
other officers of the United States,'' end of quote.
    The failure of this administration to cooperate with this 
committee, and the rationale offered for this failure, that the 
Department does not believe these requests to be specifically 
tied to issues being deliberated by the committee, it has no 
constitutional justification, and it does damage to the 
standing and the ability of this committee and other committees 
to perform its function of oversight and advice and consent.
    What makes this administration think that it has the right 
to determine what the U.S. Senate needs in order to perform its 
constitutional responsibility? It has asserted neither 
executive privilege, nor any constitutionally based rationale 
for not cooperating with this committee. It has no right under 
past practices, no right under the Constitution, to offer as a 
rationale that, quote--they ``do not believe the request to be 
specifically tied to the issues being deliberated by the 
committee.'' I repeat what my mother says, ``Who died and left 
them boss?''
    I do not work for the President of the United States of 
America. None of you work for the President of the United 
States of America. We are a coequal branch, equally powerful 
and important, with a specifically assigned constitutional 
responsibility that only we have a right to determine whether 
information is relevant or not. Period.
    The doctrine of separation of powers. It's within our 
power, and ours alone, to decide what we think is relevant to 
our deliberations in the exercise of our responsibility.
    With due respect, Mr. Chairman, I think we're making a big 
mistaken by not insisting that this information come forward. 
And I might say, for the record, I don't think the information 
requested is going to shed much light on anything. My guess 
is--I've gone out and asked former Republican--present 
Republicans--former Democrat administration officials, ``Is 
this unusual to ask for this information?'' The answer I got 
was, no, it's not that unusual. But I think this is a matter of 
principle.
    Mr. Chairman, I realize you're in a difficult position. 
I've been there. Seventeen years, I was the chairman or ranking 
member of the Judiciary Committee. I remember a President named 
Clinton contacting me, through his staff and directly. He 
wanted to have a woman named Zoe Baird to be Attorney General. 
It was his first appointment. He needed it badly. Politically, 
it was devastating to lose. I knew what my party would think 
about me, but I insisted that all relevant information be made 
available, even though they argued that it is not relevant to 
the inquiry. I made it clear to the President, ``We will not go 
forward.'' And we defeated--not an act I loved doing--the first 
major appointee after Secretary of State?--we defeated, in the 
Committee, Judiciary, the Attorney General of the United States 
of America, headed by a Democrat and the Majority Democrats.
    Then along came a woman named Zoe Baird. And I asked for 
other--I mean, excuse me, Kimba Wood--and we jointly, 
Republicans and Democrats, said, ``We insist on information 
relating to not only her, but her husband, as related to an 
accusation.'' The administration plead, ``Do not do this.'' 
And, adding insult to injury, a senior Democrat was the guy who 
defeated the second nominee of a first-term President. That's 
our constitutional responsibility.
    Whether or not it causes defeat or not is not relevant. The 
relevant point is, no administration, Democrat or Republican, 
has the right to tell me or this committee or any other 
committee, what is relevant. If they think it violates the 
separation-of-powers doctrine, state it, exert executive 
privilege, state a constitutional basis, but don't tell me, 
don't tell this Senate, ``We, the administration, do not think 
it is relevant.''
    As I said, we don't work for the President. And no 
President is entitled to the appointment of anyone he 
nominates--no President is entitled--by the mere fact he has 
nominated someone. That's why they wrote the Constitution the 
way they did. It says ``advice and consent.'' And I think we 
have undermined our authority, and we have shirked our 
constitutional responsibility. And I intend, even if, tomorrow, 
there is a vote in the Senate and they defeat it--John Bolton--
I would continue to insist we're entitled to that information. 
It's just a matter of principle.
    Let me now turn to the nomination. [Laughter.]
    By the way, this is a big deal to me. I think it's a big 
deal to this committee. We've fought so long and so hard to 
regain--and you've established the stature of this committee, 
Mr. Chairman, under your leadership. It feel in some, what you 
might call, disrepair in the '70s and '80s. We weren't taken 
seriously by Armed Services, by the Intelligence Committee, by 
the Appropriations Committee. And, because of your statute, Mr. 
Chairman, and, I hope, with a little bit of help from me, we've 
reasserted the role, responsibility, and place of this 
committee. And the idea that two guys in the Intelligence 
Committee are going to tell me I can't see this information? 
Give me a break. Give me a break.
    My concern is not about the United Nations. My concern is 
about the U.S. interests at the United Nations. And I believe 
it will be damaged if John Bolton is sent to the United 
Nations.
    Based on the hearings we've held and the interviews we've 
conducted and the documents we've examined, it is clear to me 
that John Bolton is engaged in four distinct patterns of 
conduct that should disqualify him from this job.
    First, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought the removal of 
intelligence analysts who disagreed with him. The removal of 
them. Taking away their portfolios.
    Second, in speeches and in testimony Mr. Bolton repeatedly 
tried to stretch the intelligence to fit his views, and 
repeatedly went back to the Intelligence community to get the 
facts he wanted, or, as one witness said, ``politicizing the 
process.''
    And, lest you think that's an exaggeration, let me ask all 
you--a rhetorical question of all you reporters out there. You 
write a report about this hearing, and you go back, and it's 
for a major Sunday piece, and your editor says, ``Do you really 
have to mention Lugar or Biden or Jones or whoever in that?'' 
And you say, ``Yeah, I think it's relevant to the story.'' And 
then this afternoon he says to you, ``Now, are you sure you 
really have to mention those two guys?'' And tomorrow morning 
you come in, and he says, ``Look, I read it again. Are you 
sure--are you sure, you reporter, you have to mention this?'' 
And you say, ``Yeah, I think so.'' And then he comes to you in 
the afternoon, before you leave--or evening--and says, ``Look, 
I'm going to ask you one more time, are you sure?''
    Now, I know many of you want to appear in the second 
edition of Profiles in Courage at your newspaper, but I suspect 
it would have a chilling effect on you, especially if you were 
not a nationally known, highly valued at-the-moment reporter at 
your newspaper. That's what I mean by ``politicizing.''
    Third, in his relations with colleagues and subordinates in 
and out of government, Mr. Bolton repeatedly exhibited abusive 
behavior and an intolerance of different views, as my friend 
from Ohio has said.
    And, fourth, Mr. Bolton repeatedly made misleading, 
disingenuous, or nonresponsive statements to this committee.
    But don't take my word for any of this. Look closely at the 
senior Republican--senior officials in this Republican 
administration who have testified before this committee and its 
joint staff. Carl Ford, a respected intelligence professional 
with three decades of government service, who described himself 
as a huge fan--quote, ``huge fan of Vice President Cheney.'' He 
described for us not only the attempt by Mr. Bolton to remove 
Mr. Westermann, one of his analysts, who worked for Mr. Ford, 
but the unprofessional manner in which he treated his analysts. 
Quote, ``Secretary Bolton chose to reach five or six levels 
below him in the bureaucracy, bringing an analyst into his 
office and giving him a tongue-lashing. He was so far over the 
line that he's one--that he's one of the sort of memorable 
moments in my career.'' Continuing the quote, ``I've never seen 
anybody quite like Mr. Bolton--doesn't even come close; I don't 
have a second, third, or fourth, in terms of the way he abuses 
his power, authority--and authority with little people,'' end 
of quote.
    Afterwards, Mr. Ford said the news of Mr. Westermann's 
incident, quote, ``spread like wildfire,'' end of quote, in the 
bureau; so much so that Secretary Powell made a special point 
of coming down to an assembled group of people at NIR--or INR, 
and pointing out the analyst by name, and saying to the other 
analysts that he wanted them to continue, in essence, to speak 
truth to power.
    Let me go right to the testimony here that was before us, 
Mr. Wilkerson's characterization of this, which is that Powell 
always went down. This was nothing unusual.
    Powell's chief of staff, what did he say before our joint 
staff? He said, ``That is to say, one of his leadership''--
referring to Powell--``one of his leadership techniques was to 
walk around the building. He went to the basement and talked to 
the men who clean up in the basement to find out how they felt, 
how his morale was, and so forth. And he'd do it periodically 
throughout the building. This was not that sort of unprompted 
trip. This was a trip because several of his subordinate 
leaders--in this case, I think, Carl Ford, in particular--had 
indicated to him that he thought it might be necessary.''
    So much for the fact that he was just wandering down there 
and did this all the time. He may have, in the context that his 
chief of staff--Powell's chief of staff said he went down.
    Listen to John McLaughlin, a career CIA professional, who 
served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and, for a 
time, as Acting Director--both positions under President Bush. 
When Mr. McLaughlin was told that Mr. Bolton was seeking to 
have a national intelligence officer for Latin America 
transferred, Mr. McLaughlin recalls that he firmly rejected, 
and I quote, ``the request by saying, `Well, we're not going to 
do that. Absolutely not. No way. End of story.' '' Mr. 
McLaughlin explains why he's so adamantly opposed the request, 
and it's important to his rationale why he opposed this 
request. He said, ``It's perfectly all right for a policymaker 
to express disagreement with NIO or an analyst, and it's 
perfectly all right for them to challenge their work 
vigorously, but I think it's different to then request, because 
of a disagreement, that the person be transferred. And unless 
there is a malfeasance involved here--and in this case, I had a 
high regard for the individual's work; therefore, I had a 
strong negative reaction to the suggestion of moving him.'' 
Hear what he said, ``it's different to then request transfer 
because of disagreement.''
    Listen to Robert Hutchings, chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, from 2003 to 2005. These are high-level 
intelligence analysts who do the national intelligence 
estimates that administration people get, and we get. He said, 
in the summer of 2003, Mr. Bolton and his team prepared a 
speech on Syria and weapons of mass destruction that, quote, 
``struck me as going well beyond where the evidence would 
ultimately take us. And that was the judgment of the experts on 
my staff, as well. So I said that--under these circumstances, 
that we should not clear this kind of testimony.''
    Hutchings said--went on to say Mr. Bolton took, quote, 
``isolated facts and made much more of them to build a case 
than I thought the intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, 
cherry-picking of little factoids, and little isolated bits 
were drawn out to present the starkest possible case,'' end of 
quote.
    Let me make it clear. No one is saying Mr. Bolton could not 
have his own views on intelligence. All this is about is Mr. 
Bolton, when he--when he made an intelligence analyst--analysis 
in public, had to say, ``I believe this to be case, 
notwithstanding the intelligence community doesn't.'' No one 
ever said a policymaker should be muzzled by the intelligence 
community.
    Let's get this straight, what we're talking about here. 
This is all about whether Mr. Bolton can say the ``intelligence 
community thinks.'' That's the only reason the intelligence 
community's in this.
    I can stand up, as my friend from--my chairman indicated, 
and say, ``We vigorously disagree.'' We can vigorously 
disagree, but I would never walk out of a hearing, nor would 
any member of this committee, after being briefed by the 
intelligence community, saying that there were no weapons of 
mass destruction in Xanadu, the nonexistent country, and walk 
out and say, ``You know, I just got briefed. There are weapons 
of mass destruction in Xanadu.'' I'm allowed to walk out and 
say, ``Speaking for myself, notwithstanding the fact that the 
intelligence community doesn't believe Xanadu has weapons of 
mass destruction, I think they do, and here's why.'' That's 
what this is about.
    I used to have a friend named Sid Bailick, who was a great 
trial lawyer, and I went to work with him early on, as a young 
man, and he'd say to a jury all the time, back in the days 
where--you know, Mitch Miller's long gone, and Lawrence Welk--
he'd say, ``Follow the bouncing ball. Don't take your eye off 
the ball here.'' The ball is not, Are we attempting--or anyone 
attempting to muzzle Mr. Bolton as to what his opinion is? 
That's not what the intelligence community was doing. It was 
attempting to say, ``Don't say we believe that.''
    Listen to Larry Wilkerson, the chief of staff of the 
Secretary of State, a retired marine colonel. He said that Mr. 
Bolton, quote--and I'm quoting--not my quote; his quote--``is a 
lousy leader,'' end of quote, and had objected to him being 
U.N. Ambassador because, quote, ``there are,'' quote, ``100 to 
150 people in New York that have to be led, and led well,'' end 
of quote. He described Mr. Bolton as a man who, quote, ``counts 
beans,'' continue to quote, ``with no willingness, and, in many 
cases, no capacity, to understand that other things that were 
happening around those beans. And that is just a recipe for 
problems at the United Nations,'' end of quote. A Republican, 
colonel, chief of staff for the Secretary of State, with 
indirect responsibility of supervising Mr. Bolton. Mr. 
Wilkerson knows of what he speaks, as chief of staff. He kept, 
as everyone said, and he said, an open door, literally an open 
door, and he describes a regular flow of officials walking 
through it to complain about Mr. Bolton's behavior.
    These aren't anecdotal incidences. Mr. Wilkerson told us 
that because of the problems with Mr. Bolton's speeches not 
always being properly cleared, that Deputy Secretary Armitage, 
quote, ``made a decision that John Bolton would not give any 
testimony, nor give any speech, that wasn't cleared first by 
Rich,'' referring to the Deputy Secretary of State, Rich 
Armitage. And he later told--that is, Mr. Wilkerson told the 
New York Times, and I quote, `` that, if anything, the 
restrictions on Mr. Bolton got more stringent as time went 
on.'' Quoting, ``No one else was subjected to these type 
restrictions,'' end of quote.
    Listen to John Wolf, a career Foreign Service Officer for 
35 years, who worked closely with Mr. Bolton during two 
different tours. His most recent tour was from 2001 to 2004, 
when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. 
Mr. Wolf told the committee staff, Republicans and Democrats, 
that Mr. Bolton blocked an assignment of a man he described as 
a truly outstanding civil servant some nine months after an 
inadvertent mistake by that officer. Mr. Wolf says that Mr. 
Bolton asked him to remove two other officials because of 
disagreements over policy. And then Mr. Bolton, quote, ``tended 
not to be enthusiastic about alternative views,'' end of quote. 
Talk about State-Department-speak.
    Listen to Mr. Wil Taft, who served as the State 
Department's legal advisor under Secretary Powell, and, before 
that, as general counsel in two other government departments, 
as well as Deputy Secretary of Defense and as former Ambassador 
to NATO. He told the committee that he had to take the 
extraordinary step--the extraordinary step--of going to Deputy 
Secretary Armitage to have Armitage remind Mr. Bolton that Mr. 
Bolton was required to work with Mr. Taft on lawsuits in which 
the State Department was the defendant. Why? Because Mr. Bolton 
decided he could deal with the Justice Department himself on 
the case and unilaterally decided to tell one of Mr. Taft's 
attorneys, working for Mr. Taft, that his attorney was, quote, 
``off the case.''
    Mr. Bolton is an attorney, and a very good attorney. He was 
once an attorney--he was one general counsel to AID, an 
assistant attorney general in the civil division. He should 
have understood the simple concept that the lawyers for Colin 
Powell would need to work on the lawsuit that was filed against 
Colin Powell. Yet, he had the arrogance to think that he knew 
better, and dismissed the State Department's own lawyer, and, 
consequently, had to be reminded, by Mr. Armitage, who was 
boss.
    Read the memo from Mr. Rich Armitage to Mr. Bolton in the 
package of documents the State Department gave us last Friday. 
Then ask yourself whether this is a guy who's likely to follow 
directions from Washington.
    Listen to Tom Hubbard, another career Foreign Service 
Officer of long service, whose last post was as Ambassador to 
South Korea. And I have never heard--nary a negative word, that 
I've heard, has been said about him.
    During the hearing on April 11, Senator Chafee asked Mr. 
Bolton about a speech in Seoul on the eve of the Six-Party 
talks. Mr. Bolton replied, quote, ``And I can tell you what our 
Ambassador to South Korea Tom Hubbard said after the speech. He 
said, `Thanks a lot for the speech, John. It's helps us a lot 
out here.' ''
    What did that trigger? Mr. Hubbard contacting the 
committee. He either read it or heard the answer to your 
question, Senator Chafee, and felt obliged to contact the 
committee. Nobody contacted Ambassador Hubbard, to the best of 
my knowledge.
    He comes to us, Democrat and Republican, and he says, 
basically, ``Let's get the facts straight. I remember it quite 
differently.'' And he volunteered--and when he volunteered, he 
made it clear that he disagreed wholesomely with the tone of 
Mr. Bolton's speech, thought Mr. Bolton's speech was unhelpful 
to the negotiation process, and felt that Mr. Bolton surely 
knew that.
    According to a memorandum for the record prepared by the 
Republican staff of the committee who first interviewed Mr. 
Hubbard, on April 26th, without a Democratic staff present, 
Hubbard said that he felt compelled to contact the committee, 
felt compelled to contact the Republican staff. So much for 
Democratic, you know, digging things up here. He felt compelled 
to go to the Republican staff. And he said that he's--because, 
quote, ``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising 
him for the speech.'' Let me read that again. Mr. Hubbard said, 
on his own initiative contacting the Republican staff, quote, 
``It's misleading, to say the least, to have me praising him 
for the speech,'' end of quote.
    If you're keeping track, now, that's seven senior officials 
who have served at the Department of State or the CIA in this 
administration, who have testified to the committee about Mr. 
Bolton's actions. They told us that Mr. Bolton, one, seeks 
retribution against intelligence analysts or policy officials 
who disagree with him. They told us he pushes the envelope on 
intelligence information.
    I don't recall--I've been here for seven Presidents. I'm 
not going to embarrass any of my colleagues what they recall; 
I'll tell you what I don't recall. I don't recall, ever, a 
senior official in a State Department, or Defense Department, 
for that matter, being told by the Secretary of State and/or 
the Deputy Secretary of State or Defense, that you cannot say a 
single thing before a--before the Senate
    Committees or House committees, or make a single public 
speech without clearing it first. Maybe that's happened. If it 
is, it's the best-kept secret in 32 years, since I've been 
here.
    Thirdly, what did they say, these seven senior officials? 
He doesn't like to hear dissent. He doesn't like to follow 
rules. He's a bad manager of people. He can't see the forest 
for the trees. And he mischaracterizes the views of his 
colleagues.
    This is neither hearsay nor innuendo; as suggested in our 
prior meeting, that it was hearsay or innuendo. This is what a 
judge would call direct evidence and testimony and documentary 
evidence--direct evidence. And it's all there for every Senator 
to see.
    Some people might ask, as Senator Lugar did, and may 
assert, that none of this matters. Nobody lost a job. Mr. 
Bolton gave these speeches he was authorized to give--after 
yelling at the State Department lawyer, the lawyer is put back 
in the case. And the young career officer that Mr. Bolton 
blackballed from a career-advancing assignment ultimately 
landed on his feet. No harm, no foul.
    If you think his actions don't matter, then why would so 
many serious people, not working in the government, come 
forward, with little to gain and a lot to lose, to tell their 
stories? We didn't subpoena a single person. We didn't pursue 
anyone to come. We asked, they came. And they came forward 
either without being asked or being asked because their name 
came up. They came forward because they think Mr. Bolton 
actions matter a lot.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why was it necessary 
for Rich Armitage to issue a special decree applied to Mr. 
Bolton's speeches? Because words matter, especially when spoken 
by a high-government official.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why did Armitage, 
according to Larry Wilkerson, chief of staff of the Secretary 
of State, get mad at his Asian expert, Jim Kelly, for clearing 
the Seoul speech? Because it almost impeded the Six-Party 
talks, led Secretary Powell having to send an envoy to New York 
after that speech to encourage the North Koreans to come to the 
talks.
    If you think his actions don't matter, why did Mr. Armitage 
postpone Mr. Bolton's testimony on Syria? By the way, Mr. 
Bolton told us that he canceled his own testimony. But Larry 
Wilkerson said that Secretary Armitage is the one who canceled 
it, because there was, quote, ``some diplomacy at the time that 
might not have served us well, and, also, the testimony was a 
bit off the policy line, and so, needed to be corrected 
somewhat.'' In other words, we didn't let him make the--give 
the testimony.
    Remember, this is summer of 2003, when Iraq--when we're in 
Iraq. Some people are talking about who's next. Syria's high on 
the list. Mr. Bolton wants to give a statement about Syria's 
alleged weapons-of-mass-destruction programs that Mr. Hutchings 
says was not supported by the intelligence. This is just a few 
months after faulty intelligence helped make the case for the 
war in Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is trying to push the intelligence 
envelope on Syria; and Armitage intervenes to stop it, thank 
goodness.
    Connect the dots, folks. Of course it matters. We don't 
know exactly what Mr. Bolton wanted to say, because these are 
among the documents the State Department's refused to turn 
over. But we do know the--what the intelligence community said. 
They said, ``No way. Don't characterize us that way.'' Why are 
they hiding, not providing those documents?
    If you think these actions didn't matter, then why did 
Colin Powell make a special point, to use Carl Ford's words, to 
go down to the Intelligence Bureau to tell--INR--to tell them 
do their jobs? Carl Ford said that he made visits to INR 
before, but both Ford and Larry Wilkerson, who was chief of 
staff, said this instance was a special trip.
    If you think these actions don't matter, why did John Wolf 
have to assign a brilliant mid-level officer to another bureau? 
Because he said, quote--he, Wolf, said--``He didn't want this 
brilliant young analyst manning an empty desk.'' He stayed on a 
good career tack only because Mr. Wolf worked to secure him an 
assignment away from Mr. Bolton's reach, according to Mr. Wolf.
    If you think actions don't matter, then listen to Mr. 
Hutchings on the dangerous policymakers--on the dangers of 
policymakers pushing to stretch the intelligence, even if they 
fail. Here's what he said, ``When policy officials come back 
repeatedly to push the same kind of judgments and push the 
intelligence community to confirm a particular set of 
judgments, it does have an affect of politicizing intelligence, 
because the so-called correct answer becomes all too clear. And 
even when it's successfully resisted, it has an effect.'' 
Continuing to quote, ``It creates a climate of intimidation and 
a culture of conformity that is damaging,'' end of quote.
    It matters, even if they didn't get fired.
    Is Mr. Bolton really worthy of this trouble? Is this really 
the best we can do? Are there no other tough-minded 
professionals in the Republican party?
    It's been said, usually in the same breath about Mr. 
Bolton's reputation of straight talk, that if you oppose Mr. 
Bolton, you oppose U.N. reform. Let me remind you all, it was 
Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--Joe Biden and Jesse Helms--over the 
objection of the chairman and my colleague, Mr. Sarbanes, their 
objection, that got tough on the U.N., wrote the reform 
legislation that the chairman and my senior member opposed. I 
don't need a lesson, from Mr. Bolton or anybody else, how to 
get tough with the U.N., nor does Senator Helms.
    Mr. Bolton isn't the only guy who can push the U.N. reform. 
Matter of fact, he's the worst guy. In fact, the Secretary of 
State has said as much, because--no one talks about this--I 
wanted to get that--I know the vote's almost over--four days 
after Mr. Bolton's nomination was announced, the Secretary of 
State appointed someone else to handle the issue of U.N. 
reform. On March 11th, the Secretary appointed Dr. Tahir Kheli 
to, quote, ``serve as the Secretary's senior advisor and chief 
interlocutor on U.N. reform in collaboration with the Assistant 
Secretary for International Organizations.'' Dr. Tahir Khalid 
reports directly to the Secretary of State. Continuing, the 
Secretary said, ``She will engage the U.N. Secretary General 
and the Secretary on U.N. reform efforts, including the high-
level panel report and the report of the Secretary General on 
Reform. She will coordinate within the State Department and the 
interagency community the U.S. Government's position on 
reform.''
    So much for that being the rationale for why Bolton was 
appointed. I understand why people would say that. It's the 
last straw I think you can grasp at.
    The press release makes no mention--the Secretary's press 
release makes no mention of Mr. Bolton or the U.N. Ambassador. 
So let's not kid each other. It's not about U.N. reform; it's 
about whether the appointment of Mr. Bolton is in the national 
interest. Is it in the national interest to have, as some 
Republican administration officials have characterized, have a 
bully--their words--and a lousy leader--their words--running 
our mission in New York, with 150 people who need strong 
leadership?
    Concluding, Mr. President--Mr. Chairman, I don't believe 
it's in the interest, the national interest, to have an 
ideologue who appears to have no governor on his internal 
engine representing the United States at the U.N.
    Is it in the national interest to have someone who has a 
reputation for exaggerating intelligence, seeking and speaking 
for the U.N. when the next crisis arises, whether it's Iran or 
Syria? And it will arise. We have already lost a lot of 
credibility at home and abroad after the fiasco over the 
intelligence on Iraq, and Mr. Bolton is not the man to help us 
to rebuild it. He's the wrong choice. We can do a lot better. 
And I think an awful lot of our colleagues know that, 
notwithstanding the administration wanting him.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know how much time is 
left of the hour we had.
    The Chairman.  The Senator has at least 13 minutes, but we 
just said ``more or less,'' and----
    Senator Biden. Well, I would yield to my friend, Senator 
Specter--not Senator Specter--Senator Sarbanes--he's my friend, 
too----
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. To Senator Sarbanes, as much 
time as he needs.
    I'm going to vote.
    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Senator Sarbanes.

 STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a 
moment or two of the committee's time, at the outset, to read 
the names of those who have served as the U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations, in order to set some context in thinking 
about this nomination: Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., 
James Wadsworth, Adlai Stevenson, Arthur Goldberg, George W. 
Ball, James Russell Wiggins, Charles Yost, George Bush, John 
Scali, Daniel P. Moynihan, William W. Scranton, Andrew J. 
Young, Donald F. McHenry, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Vernon Walters, 
Thomas Pickering, Edward Joseph Perkins, Madeleine Albright, 
Bill Richardson, Richard Holbrooke, John Negroponte, and John 
Danforth.
    Now, I do this to underscore the importance of the U.N. 
ambassadorship, and it's an importance that I think has been 
recognized in prior administrations. In fact, in some 
administrations the U.N. Ambassador has been given Cabinet 
status--not in all, but in some, the position has been elevated 
to Cabinet status. It's a very highly-visible position. In the 
U.N., our Ambassador to the U.N. is, in effect, our spokesman, 
in so many ways, to the world.
    Now, this has been underscored, the importance of the U.N., 
by these selections. The U.N. makes decisions that affect war 
and peace. It has a vital role in advancing U.S. foreign-policy 
objectives, if we are skillful in exercising our leadership at 
the U.N. It helps to determine whether the United States will 
have international support and allies, or will be forced to 
undertake difficult missions on its own, in the face of broad 
opposition across the globe. The United Nations is a forum for 
making our case to the world, for demonstrating international 
leadership and building multilateral cooperation.
    Our representatives at the United Nations must be men and 
women of exceptional integrity and credibility who can listen 
and persuade, whose counsel and leadership other nations will 
seek and rely on. This is a very important position. And the 
quality of the previous ambassadors demonstrates that that is 
how it's been so regarded in administration after 
administration, whether Democratic or Republican.
    Now, over a number of years, Mr. Bolton has demonstrated 
outright hostility for the United Nations as an institution and 
for the legitimacy of international law. He has argued 
repeatedly that the United States has no legal obligation to 
pay its dues to the United Nations, that treaties are nothing 
more than political commitments. He called the Law of the Sea 
Treaty, which has been endorsed by our military and submitted 
by President Bush as an urgent priority for Senate advice and 
consent, an illegitimate method of forcing fundamental policy 
changes on the United States outside the customary political 
process. He is quoted as saying that, ``It is a big mistake for 
us to grant any validity to international law, even when it may 
seem in our short-term interest to do so, because, over the 
long term, the goal of those who think that international law 
really means anything are those who want to constrict the 
United States.''
    To send someone as our Ambassador to the United Nations who 
does not demonstrate a basic respect for the institution and 
its legal foundations is a disservice to our national 
interests. This has nothing to do with whether you're going to 
carry out reforms at the U.N. or more closely monitor its 
activities. This represents very basic questions about one's 
mindset about the United States, about the United Nations, and 
about international law.
    Secondly, I think it's very clear that Mr. Bolton does not 
have the diplomatic skills or, indeed, the demeanor to 
represent our country effectively. There are certainly moments 
when the situation may call for bluntness, when abandoning 
diplomatic niceties can convey the urgency of a particular 
issue or position; however, Mr. Bolton has shown a propensity 
for making extreme and provocative statements that have caused 
unnecessary conflict and confrontation.
    Does it help us in trying to shape the direction in which 
the U.N. is to move when Mr. Bolton says that the Security 
Council should have one permanent member--the United States--
because that's real reflection of the distribution of power in 
the world?
    Does anyone think that Mr. Bolton's assertion that if the 
U.N. Secretariat building in New York lost 10 stories, it 
wouldn't make a bit of difference? Does that help us in 
persuading other countries to support U.N. reform efforts?
    These are not isolated misstatements or slips of the 
tongue, but, rather, his customary and consistent approach to 
dealing with others who disagree with him. Even given the 
opportunity to demonstrate a less confrontational approach, he 
has repeatedly declined to do so. Mr. Bolton, time and time 
again, has shown himself singularly lacking in the willingness 
to hear, to consider, and to respect opposing points of view.
    Contrast that attitude with these comments to the 
committee, in their confirmations hearings, by Ambassador 
Moynihan and by Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
    Now, I might note, Mr. Chairman, that all of these previous 
nominees to be U.N. Ambassadors were approved by overwhelming 
votes in the committee and on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Not 
a one of them had a close vote; many of them, unanimous; and in 
the instances where it wasn't, only a handful of votes.
    Pat Moynihan, in his confirmation hearing before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee--and I set out these quotes to 
contrast them with all the testimony we received about how Mr. 
Bolton carries on his activities--said, and I quote, ``A 
certain principal statement of views on both sides can be 
useful. It requires that we respect what others think, and try 
to understand what they think, and ask that they do the same in 
return. Things where we disagree are marginal compared with 
where we do agree, and yet it is so easy to grow estranged at 
the first problem. The first question is how to get away from 
the confrontation system, back to the quest for understanding 
in a situation where this is wholly possible and entirely 
necessary.''
    And Ambassador Kirkpatrick, in her confirmation hearing 
before this committee, said, and I quote, ``I do not think that 
one should ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention 
and hope of doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, 
persuasive, and consensus-building way.''
    Now, thirdly--and I want to speak to the prospects of Mr. 
Bolton's credibility as our spokesperson at the United 
Nations--the material has been quite extensively developed--and 
I'll not go into it in detail here--but it's clear that he's 
attempted to politicize intelligence in a way that I think has 
harmed our nation's diplomacy.
    He sought to transfer two intelligence analysts who 
disagreed with him on substantive matters. There was such a 
feeling of fear and intimidation in the Department that the 
Secretary of State actually visited with the analysts to give 
them reassurance. He's repeatedly attempted to stretch the 
facts to back his own ideological predispositions.
    You know, in testimony here, when he had the hearing, he 
denied that he tried to have analysts punished, or to 
discipline a CIA employee, or that he thought--or sought 
retribution against employees with dissenting views. He told 
us, and I quote, ``I shrugged my shoulders, and I moved on,'' 
when his attempts to have them reassigned were rebuffed. And 
yet we have learned, from extensive interviews with numerous 
administration officials, he did try to have the analysts 
removed from their positions, he did seek to punish people for 
disagreeing with him, and he did persist in his efforts for 
many months after he supposedly made his point and moved on.
    That he was ultimately unsuccessful does not speak for Mr. 
Bolton. The question is not solely whether the truth is in the 
results. What it speaks to is the steadiness and determination 
of those professionals who withstood his demands and refused to 
bend to this inordinate pressure that he was applying.
    Given this conduct, when he goes before the U.N. to make a 
statement about evidence of nuclear weapons production or a 
terrorist plot, or whatever it may be, who's going to believe 
him, knowing that he repeatedly punished intelligence analysts 
who delivered contradictory information, knowing that he is the 
kind of person who, as Robert Hutchings, the former chairman of 
the National Intelligence Council, put it, ``took isolated 
facts and made much more of them to build a case than I thought 
the intelligence warranted. It was a cherry-picking of little 
factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to 
present the starkest possible case.''
    We need a credible spokesman at the United Nations, and 
this past conduct on his part casts serious doubt.
    Finally, Mr. Bolton's poor administrative and management 
skills, in my view, make him unfit to exercise a senior 
leadership role. The testimony from Carl Ford, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, has 
previously been referred to. He said that, ``In my experience 
throughout my time in the executive branch, I have really never 
seen someone so abusive to such a subordinate person.'' He said 
he didn't have anyone else in mind who even comes close to John 
Bolton, in terms of the way that he abuses his power and his 
authority with little people.
    Larry Wilkerson, who was Secretary Powell's chief of staff, 
described to the committee staff the kind of problems he had on 
a daily basis in dealing with Bolton, ``Assistant secretaries, 
principal deputy assistant secretaries, acting assistant 
secretaries coming into my office and telling me, `Can I sit 
down?' And I would say to them, `Sure. Sit down. What's the 
problem?' `I've got to leave.' `What's the problem?' `Bolton.' 
'' When asked if he got similar complaints about other under 
secretaries, he replied, ``On one occasion, on one particular 
individual. The rest were all about Under Secretary Bolton.'' 
In summarizing his experience with Bolton, Wilkerson stated, 
``I think he's a lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people 
up there that have to be led. They have to be led well, and 
they have to be led properly.''
    Being Ambassador to the United Nations is not just a 
representational job, it's also a managerial job. There are 125 
full-time permanent State Department employees working there at 
our mission, alongside of numerous detailees from other 
agencies and departments. The Ambassador has supervisory 
responsibility over all these people. Most are career civil 
servants, and they are there to represent the policies of our 
President and to serve the interests of our nation. What are 
they going to do up there in New York if John Bolton repeats 
the kind of abusive behavior that led people in the State 
Department, under incredible duress, to seek the support and 
counsel of their assistant secretaries and the Deputy Secretary 
and the Secretary's chief of staff? There will no one in New 
York to shield them from the wrath and vindictiveness of John 
Bolton.
    Mr. Chairman, let me just say, because, to some now, it's a 
favorite pastime to assault the United Nations, but the United 
Nations has a very important role to play.
    Skillful U.S. leadership can enhance our national interests 
in very significant ways. And part of that skillful leadership 
is to send an ambassador who has the skill and the wisdom and 
all of the other talents that are essential to carrying out his 
responsibilities in an effective manner. I think this nominee 
falls far short of that standard, and that is why I oppose his 
confirmation.
    And let me just add a word on my respect for those 
witnesses who came forward. Now, Senator Biden is absolutely 
right, these people, in effect, volunteered themselves to give 
what they felt would be an accurate view of Mr. Bolton's 
behavior, particularly the interpersonal behavior. It took a 
lot of courage, in my view, for people like Carl Ford and Mr. 
Wilkerson, Mr. Hutchings, Ambassador Hubbard, and others to 
come forward. I'm concerned that they're going to pay a price 
for that, for a very brave action. I deeply regret if that 
should turn out to be the case. I think they--their motive in 
coming was the national interest of their country. In that 
sense, I think they were true patriots. They had nothing to 
gain by opposing the nomination; in fact, they may have much to 
lose. They clearly were not ideologues with an ax to grind. In 
fact, they were very supportive of the policies of the 
President. But they felt that it was their duty, as loyal 
Americans and as public servants, to tell the truth and to take 
the--and to follow their consciences. And I respect that. And I 
want to place that on the record and to thank them for this 
service to their country.
    Thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
    Let me ask the Clerk how much time now remains on both 
sides? An hour and 32 minutes remains on both sides. Each? 
Okay. Very well.
    I'd recognize Senator Allen, the distinguished Senator from 
Virginia.

   STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

    Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
your patience and the professional manner in which you have 
handled this nomination. You've maintained, I believe, a great 
sense of fairness and full disclosure, which I think is in the 
interest of this committee, the American people, and also this 
nominee.
    The situation here is one where I know some of the other 
side of the aisle will be quoting Senator Voinovich, and some 
seem to worry about these interpersonal skills. You hear 
worries and concerns about John Bolton's speech characterizing 
living in North Korea as ``a hellish nightmare.'' I will remind 
folks that then the North Koreans said that he was ``human 
scum.''
    The reality is, as I--I would think that it is a hellish 
nightmare to have to live in North Korea. And this committee 
has had hearings about how awful it is for those who actually 
do get to escape. They go to China, then China sends them back 
to be tortured, or worse.
    I also will note, just for the history, in some of the 
cases, from some of the colleagues on this committee, in 2001, 
when John Bolton was nominated for Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security, before all these 
concerns about speech-writing and--``interpersonal skills'' was 
the phrase used--arose, many of them voted against him then. 
And I would take note of that.
    I appreciate the opportunity to discuss John Bolton and his 
qualifications actually to serve as Ambassador to the United 
Nations. What has been lost, Mr. Chairman, though, in this 
debate, virtually from the very beginning, is the desperate 
need for reform in the United Nations. The testimony before the 
committee, and subsequent interviews conducted by staff, in all 
of this there's virtually no mention or discussion of what 
needs to be done to reform the United Nations.
    I do believe, contrary to my colleague from Maryland, 
Senator Sarbanes, that John Bolton does have the skills. He has 
the wisdom to effectuate these changes. More importantly, he 
also has the principles. I think he's the right person to 
unflinchingly lead those changes as our representative.
    Rather than focusing on all these innuendos and assertions 
against John Bolton and worrying about, gosh, people whose 
sensibilities are easily offended and this fascination with how 
speeches are crafted and noting that he said the same thing 
about Cuban biological weapons capabilities as did Mr. Ford, we 
ought to focus--the one who really ought to be getting the 
scrutiny is the United Nations. The United Nations is the one 
that we need to be worrying about them straying. And, rather 
than worrying about controlling John Bolton, I'd prefer to 
pursue the U.N. abuse and their anti-Americanism. And I'm much 
more concerned about the United Nations being used as a front 
for dictatorships and terrorism.
    The United Nations--you know, we've just witnessed scandal 
after scandal being uncovered. Unfortunately, these are not 
things that can be addressed very easily by internal changes. 
They are issues that have shaken the credibility of the United 
Nations body and caused many of our citizens here in the United 
States, and, indeed, people around the world, to wonder whether 
the United Nations has any real relevance or redeeming role in 
world affairs.
    The United Nations was founded on many principles, one of 
which was to promote universal human rights and freedoms for 
all people. And while the United Nations does a number of 
admirable things, it's also beholden to tyrants and dictators 
and repressive regimes in certain circumstances.
    Not considering even the scandals, this is an organization 
that has allowed the world's worst violators of human rights to 
chair the Commission on Human Rights. When the United States 
has made a commitment to the spread of freedom and justice 
throughout the world, it's difficult for our citizens to see 
the United Nations as anything but a waste of their tax dollars 
when countries like Libya and Sudan chair the Human Rights 
Commission. And, just recently, just last week, Zimbabwe 
selected as a member of the Human Rights Commission. Surely, 
not an indication that Secretary General Kofi Annan's call for 
reform on the Commission of Human Rights is being heeded.
    We're public servants. Obviously, we have to make decisions 
here. We're also stewards of the taxpayers' money. The United 
States is the largest contributor. And it was something that 
Senator Helms and Senator Biden worked out in the funding of 
the United Nations. Over $2 billion a year. Just for their 
regular budget, it's $439 million; but over $2 billion a year 
go to the United Nations. Twenty-two percent of their funding 
comes from American taxpayers.
    As the largest contributor to the United Nations, we ought 
to hold them accountable to certain principles and certain 
policies. One principle surely should be the Commission on 
Human Rights, and to have reasonable requirements that human 
rights are actually honored in the countries who serve on that 
commission.
    I think all Americans want reforms enacted that would 
prevent future abuse programs, such as the Oil-for-Food scandal 
that plowed in--allowed Saddam and his thugs to skim off $20 
billion. We ought to hold the U.N. peacekeepers who commit 
crimes against children accountable. The American people, I 
think, demand swift and severe action against this. And, 
indeed, if our U.S. Government had ever done anything like 
this, our citizens would certainly hold our government 
accountable for it, and we certainly ought to do the same with 
the United Nations.
    We have to look--to work with like-minded reformers at the 
U.N. to make sure policies are implemented to prevent similar 
abuses in the future. And reform is what is necessary. The 
United Nations is in a crisis, and our country and our 
taxpayers have a strong interest in seeing that it emerge as a 
credible and relevant institution once again.
    The U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy 
Agency, IAEA, they need--they're very needed in--for discussing 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the actions that are 
needed to be taken to ensure that rogue nations do not acquire 
those weapons.
    We have seen, in recent years, that the United Nations can 
provide an important role in helping spread democracy and build 
societies that have been ruined by decades of repression and 
tyranny. The United Nations has an important role to play in 
the future of global affairs and security. But it only can do 
so if it takes serious steps to reform from the extraordinary 
corruption and ineptitude that has plagued it in recent years.
    Now, John Bolton's qualifications. He comes to this 
nomination with a broad and deep knowledge of international 
affairs, from his early days as general counsel to the U.S. 
Agency for International Development under the Reagan 
administration, to his most recent post, of course, as Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Affairs. 
In all these situations, Mr. Bolton has spent a great deal of 
time and his professional life working on U.S. foreign policy 
and devising strategies to carry out effectively that policy.
    Some have criticized John Bolton as being a rigid 
unilateral--unilateralist who's incapable of building consensus 
with allies. However, his service in this administration shows 
otherwise.
    Mr. Bolton led the U.S. negotiations to develop President 
Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative. That brought in 60 
countries to work with us to help stop, or interdict, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related 
materials worldwide, and also delivery systems.
    To further combat nuclear proliferation, Mr. Bolton helped 
create the Global Partnership at the G8 Summit in Canada. This 
partnership doubled the size of the nonproliferation effort in 
the former Soviet Union by committing our G8 partners to match 
the United States $1 billion per year Cooperative Threat 
Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar, Program.
    He also played a central role in negotiating the treaty of 
Moscow, which will reduce operationally deployed nuclear 
weapons by two-thirds.
    As Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations, John Bolton led an effort to have the United 
Nations change its odious resolution which likened Zionism to 
racism. And it is hard to get the United Nations, or any group, 
to rescind a resolution, but he was able to do that.
    So, he does have the knowledge, he does have the experience 
to effectively represent the United States in the United 
Nations, and also negotiate the changes that need to be made to 
ensure its relevancy in the future.
    Now, a few of us--a few here may not agree with his 
forthright critique of the United Nations and its failings, but 
it's clear to me that Mr. Bolton has placed a great deal of 
thought into his views. And, in fact, I think his views are 
borne out by the actions, or lack of actions, by the United 
Nations. I think the American people want someone at the United 
Nations who pushes strongly for reform and is not going to be 
seduced by flowery, evasive pontifications from those 
bureaucrats.
    Senator Biden said, ``Well, who was he thinking of? And 
maybe Mr. Bolton should have had another position.'' Well, 
President Bush was elected, and that's who he thought should be 
in this position. And I think that--I'll say for myself--I 
think John Bolton is the type of person, or someone like him, 
should be in this position.
    We are not electing Mr. Congeniality. We do not need Mr. 
Milktoast in the United Nations. We're not electing Mr. Peepers 
to go there and just be really happy and drinking tea with 
their pinkies up and just saying all these meaningless things, 
when we do need a straight-talker and someone who's going to go 
there and shake it up. And it needs shaking up. It needs 
reform.
    We can't just keep spending $2 billion a year of the 
taxpayers' money and have the sort of fraud, abuse, lack of 
accountability, propping up dictators, funneling money to 
corrupt regimes, whether it's Saddam's or others.
    And so, I know that this has been a confirmation process 
that we haven't seen--at least I haven't. I haven't been here 
as long as many in the Senate. And we've pursued all these wild 
claims. They've been exaggerations. The concerns of Mr. 
Westermann or any of these folks, and the speech-crafting--the 
point of the matter, they're all in their jobs. I think they're 
more secure and safe now. But if any of them ever had anyone 
reduce their position, it would be looked upon as retribution, 
so I think, in the grievance procedures, they're safer than 
ever. I thought Mr. Ford was a very engaging, likeable 
individual, but the bottom line was, he wasn't in the meeting 
when the supposed finger-wagging was going on. He couldn't 
remember whether or not the word ``fire'' was used. The bottom 
line is, all these people are still in their positions.
    The exaggerated innuendo that came up in the last hearing 
from Ms. Townsel, I'm not going to repeat all the adequately 
rebutted arguments of our chairman, but Ms. Townsel certainly 
had--did not have much credibility, and the facts simply were 
not as she represented--in fact, clearly were not true.
    So, while we've gone through these overly hyped charges, I 
think they have been refuted, and, really, they don't have much 
bearing, at least in my view, to say there's any compelling 
reason that John Bolton is not the right person to actually 
represent the interests, the principles, and desires of the 
American people in the United Nations. I do think the President 
has selected wisely in John Bolton.
    Now, the way that this is going to proceed--after the last 
hearing we had, where we played for second down--as I 
understand it, the goal here, Mr. Chairman, is to somehow vote 
on John Bolton's nomination and to get him to proceed to the 
Senate floor, where this debate will continue for all of our 
colleagues. And so, I'm encouraged that, notwithstanding some 
of the concerns the Senator from Ohio has about Secretary 
Bolton, I thank him for allowing this nomination to proceed to 
the Senate floor. And we have moved the ball downfield.
    And I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy and 
your steady, fair leadership on this issue, as well as others.
    Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick. 
[Laughter.]
    Senator Allen. Say, what?
    Senator Biden. We're looking for an on-sides kick.
    Senator Allen. No, we just got a first down. [Laughter.]
    Haven't scored yet.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Allen.
    Senator Biden, would you designate----
    Senator Biden. Yes. Senator--we have----
    The Chairman.  Senator Dodd?
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. As I say to my colleagues, we 
have, as I understand it, roughly 15 minutes for all the 
remaining members, each. And if others don't show, then the 
time can be--we can move back. So, if we can try to stay at 15.
    Senator Dodd. Thank you. In fact, if you would put the 
clock on here, and we may try to make it even briefer than 
that.
    Senator Biden. Is that possible, to stick the clock on----
    Senator Dodd. Clock on, so we can keep an eye on our--why 
don't you put it on for 10.
    Senator Biden. Put it on for 10, and we'll see.
    Senator Dodd. And then--try and wrap it up there.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                          CONNECTICUT

    Senator Dodd. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me begin by 
thanking you, Senator Biden, and your respective staffs. It's 
been over a month--a month ago, yesterday--that we had the 
public hearing, and then, of course, this month-long period in 
which a tremendous amount of work has been done by the 
committee staff. And I would not want the moment here to pass 
without expressing our gratitude to the people who sit behind 
us here, who spent a lot of long hours over the last month in 
gathering the information they have. So, I want them to know 
how much I appreciate the efforts that you've made on behalf of 
us, who sit here in the front seats.
    I appreciate, as well, the chairman's comments during his 
opening remarks about some of my views regarding presidential 
appointees and the process of confirmation.
    I went back and tried to calculate, because of some 
accusations that I was a serial abuser when it came to 
presidential nominees, and, over the 24 years serving under--
eight years under Republican administrations, and eight years 
under a Democratic administration--in senior-level people I've 
voted on one way or another, close to 7,000 presidential 
appointees. And of those 7,000, there were 52 that I voted 
against. Three or four of those, I've written letters and 
apologized to them because I voted against them, and I 
shouldn't have. And I wrote them letters. Everett Koop is one 
that comes to mind immediately. I voted against Everett Koop, 
and regretted, afterwards, having done so, and expressed to him 
in the letter some months later.
    So, I am of a mind, not unlike my friend and colleague from 
Ohio and, I think, most of us here--I think we generally like 
to be supportive of presidential choices. I think that's--
doesn't mean you shouldn't object where you think it's 
appropriate to do so, but, as a general matter, I think we like 
to defer, particularly when it comes to a Cabinet or people who 
are going to be part of the official family, if you will, of an 
administration. And so, I want to be on record as still 
subscribing to the views that the chairman ascribed to me in 
talking about how we ought to handle these matters.
    This is uncomfortable. None of us enjoy this. I think we'd 
much rather be debating policy issues than the fate of one 
individual here to hold a high-level position. We have an awful 
lot of work to do. There are important issues that I think the 
general public would like to see us address. And so, it's 
somewhat disappointing that we find ourselves in this 
situation.
    As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I've been here for 24 years. 
And tonight--I keep a, as I think most of us do, a little 
journal. It's not every day. But with my two young children, 
two young daughters, I try to record moments that I think are 
of significance during my tenure here. And I'm going to go home 
tonight and write in my journal about a senatorial moment. We 
don't have them every single day around here, but we had one 
this morning. We had a senatorial moment. And I want to tell my 
colleague from Ohio what a privilege it is to serve with him. 
I've been where you've been on nominations on these matters. 
It's not comfortable. But I look back on those moments, and 
they're some of the proudest moments I've had as a Senator, 
when you stand up against the flow of events and your own 
party--and Senator Biden mentioned moments that he's had as--on 
similar cases. So, I thank him for what he did.
    I want to point out, as well, here that--and Senator 
Sarbanes did this, but I think it's worth noting here--this 
will be resolved in this committee and on the floor of the 
Senate, I presume, in the next number of days. And another 
issue will come along. And those of us who have disagreed on 
this will find matters which we agree on with each other, and 
we'll go about our business. But for an awful lot of people, 
roughly--almost 20 individuals, either presently serving or 
recent appointees of the Bush administration, have either sat 
at this table or sat with our staffs and have done something 
you rarely see. It wasn't just one or two. It's--in my 
experience, I can't think of another example, in my 24 hours on 
this committee, to see as many people of like political stripe, 
of common ideological and philosophical viewpoints, willing to 
come forward and say to us, as a committee, ``Please be careful 
about what you're doing.'' This is a rare moment. And our 
colleagues here need to take note of this.
    And I think it's worth just describing who these people 
are, and quickly going down the list: Stuart Cohen, Acting 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA; Alan 
Foley, former Head of WINPAC at the CIA; John McLaughlin, 
Director of Central Intelligence--Deputy Director and Acting 
Director; Jamie Miscik, former Deputy Director of Intelligence; 
Thomas Hubbard, former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea; John 
Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation; 
Christian Westermann, whom we've talked about, the INR analyst; 
Tom Finger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research; Beth Friesa, immediate supervisor to Mr. Westermann; 
a man who's asked that his name not be made public here, but an 
attorney at the State Department who was involved in the issue 
involving Mr. Bolton's efforts to move one of the employees 
there; William Taft, a legal advisor at the State Department; 
Fred Fleitz, the Acting Chief of Staff for Mr. Bolton; Neil 
Silver, the INR Office Director supervising Mr. Westermann; 
Larry Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff to Secretary Powell; 
Robert Hutchings, former Chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council.
    These are all significant people, who have all said to us, 
in their own words, one way or the other, ``This is a bad 
choice.'' And I just think it's important that these people--
whether you agree with them or not, that it's important that we 
encourage people who feel like this to express themselves to a 
committee like us here. And so, I hope that--regardless of the 
outcome of this, that there will be an appreciation of the work 
that they've done.
    And, Mr. Chairman, my--as you know, the very first question 
I asked on the April 11th hearing--in fact, it was the very 
first question the chairman asked at that hearing--had to do 
with what has been my principal concern from the very 
beginning. It's been said by others here today, but let me just 
repeat it. I have--if this were a question of a person's 
style--I think Senator Voinovich made as strong a case that 
could be made about whether or not this kind of a style is what 
you want for someone serving as an Ambassador to the United 
Nations.
    But that's not my objection. I'm--I think if we get into 
the business here of deciding to be for or against people 
because of their styles, this is not going to be terribly 
successful, in terms of how we relate to them, depending upon 
the position, although I don't disagree with his concerns about 
public diplomacy, as my colleague has expressed.
    My concern is that we've just come through an incredible 
period in American history where major decisions were made 
about this nation's foreign policy based on the intelligence we 
are receiving. People are losing their lives every single day 
in a far-off land here, because there was a firm belief, based 
on the intelligence we had, that weapons of mass destruction 
existed. Now, put aside whether or not you think it's right or 
wrong for us to be there today. The reason--the reason--that we 
voted the way we did on that issue was because it was the 
collective wisdom of the intelligence community that weapons of 
mass destruction existed. We now know that not to be the case.
    In the case of Mr. Bolton--putting aside his personality, 
putting aside his style--the fact that he tried to fire--and 
there is just--I don't know how many witnesses you need to have 
stand up here to tell that that's exactly what he did, despite 
what he claimed to do. He tried to fire--fire--intelligence 
analysts because they would not conform to what he wanted to 
say that represented the position of the United States in a 
public speech. We now have further evidence--my colleagues and 
some of them said, ``I need further information.'' During the 
30 interviews that occurred over the last 30 days, we 
discovered e-mails and additional information that, in fact, 
contradict rather significantly what Mr. Bolton said before 
this committee on April 11th, that it wasn't just a casual trip 
to the CIA, it wasn't just ended there. In fact, there were 
significant efforts to penalize, in fact, some of these people 
including taking away their building privileges or their 
identification to go into the State Department. It was--got so 
petty that it went beyond just a casual conversation at the 
CIA.
    That's my major concern here. If we can't make a statement 
to all future nominees who may be serving in critical positions 
today, ``If you do this, you disqualify yourself, in my view. 
Whatever other issues may arise, if you do this, if you try to 
fire people because you didn't like what they had to say, in a 
supervisory position, that disqualifies you, in my view. I 
don't care whether you're a Democrat in the White House, a 
Republican in the White House. Anyone who does that.''
    And my concern is not just that they may be rewarded with a 
position, but what it does down in the positions. Mr. Bolton 
said, ``I lost confidence in Mr. Westermann.'' To lose 
confidence in someone presupposes you had confidence in them 
previously. There's no evidence at all that Mr. Bolton had any 
idea who Mr. Westermann was. In fact, on the chart back here, 
as I pointed out to the committee back on the day we had the 
markup on this nomination, Mr. Bolton's position is a senior 
policy position. Mr. Westermann was down as a GS-14 in the 
analyst office. He didn't know Mr. Westermann. How do you lose 
confidence in someone you have no idea even exists, until 
you've discovered they told you you can't say what you want to 
say?
    Losing confidence in someone. That wasn't the reason that 
he decided he wanted to fire him. He didn't want some GS-14 
telling a presidential appointee that he couldn't say what he 
wanted to say. And he said, ``I'm going to fire you, or try to 
fire you, for doing it.'' That's what Carl Ford said he did. 
That's what the chief of staff of Mr. Bolton said. That's what 
every single person who had any knowledge of this case told 
this committee, either in testimony provided to the staff or in 
front of this committee, itself. That's why, more than any 
other reasons I can think of, this nominee does not deserve the 
support of this committee.
    Now, let me just make one further point here, and I won't 
go into all the details. The information is there. The 
interviews are public.
    I gather, based on what my colleague from Ohio has said 
here--and I know he's--notice he's left the room here, so I--
I'm going to talk about something he said. But, Mr. Chairman, 
there's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. And that 
is--and I'd ask to be able to go on here a couple of minutes 
yet. There's a reason why committees exist in the Senate. Our 
colleagues--we defer to each other, because there's no way a 
hundred people can sit and be busy on every single issue. And 
so, we are asked to draw judgments. I only know of one case--
and I'm sure the staff will contradict me if I'm wrong here--
but only one case in my 24 years where the committee has sent, 
without recommendation, a nominee to the floor of the Senate. I 
think it was the case of Kenneth Adelman, I believe. Now, maybe 
there are--I'm told that's not the case, but--maybe someone has 
a different example.
    The point is, it's, then, very, very rare, in my 
experience, because we're the ones who have to do the work 
here. And our colleagues, I think, would like to rely on us, to 
some degree. Now, I know it's done from time to time; it's not 
without precedent.
    But I think it's deluding ourselves to think that our 
colleagues are going to spend as much time as we have on this 
issue. They may listen to us on the floor. But, in some ways, 
these matters are painful and difficult to deal with.
    But we bear responsibility to our colleagues, and, I think, 
to the public, to move on here. I don't think we're serving the 
President well. I don't think we're serving our role at the 
United Nations well. This is going to drag on. This nominee may 
go to the floor. We're going to be on the floor with this. And 
it's not going to be a short debate on the floor. It's going to 
go on. And I don't think our interests are being well served by 
doing that. This is a painful choice to have to make of 
someone, painful for their families. I understand that.
    But I would hope the committee might reconsider. If the 
decision is not to support this nominee, then it ought to end 
here. End here. And invite the President to send us someone.
    And let me say to my friend from Virginia, who's also left 
the room--I don't--shouldn't take this as an insult--there are 
plenty of good people to fill this job. The idea that there's 
only one individual who can do the job that needs to be done at 
the United Nations is--to quote my friend from Ohio, is 
nonsense. I can think of five or six names, off the top of my 
head, that are bona fide, conservative, blunt Republicans, who 
would serve well in the United Nations and help do the things 
that need to be done there. The idea that John Bolton's the 
only person is an insult, in a way, to the leadership of the 
Republican party that no one else could possibly fulfill this 
role at all.
    And we owe it to the American public, we owe it to 
ourselves, let's end this matter, and let's move on to the more 
serious business we must deal with, major policy issues and 
filling these jobs that need to be filled to get the job done.
    I thank the Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
    The Chair recognizes, now, Senator Chafee.

 STATEMENT OF HON. LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE 
                             ISLAND

    Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    This has been a difficult few weeks as we have exercised 
our duty of advice and consent on President Bush's nominee to 
be the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton. 
There have been many charges and accusations, and I do agree 
with Senator Dodd that any intimidation of intelligence 
analysts is wrong. And I'm apprehensive that by promoting John 
Bolton, we're signaling an endorsement of that intimidation.
    And I am particularly concerned with the speech that Mr. 
Bolton gave in Seoul, South Korea, in the midst of those six-
nation talks. That speech was cleared--Mr. Bolton says that 
speech was cleared by the highest level of our government. True 
though that may be, it does not diminish the questionable 
wisdom of his having delivered it at such a sensitive time. 
There have been other instances where I've had reservations 
about Mr. Bolton's decision-making.
    I also recognize the diplomatic successes Mr. Bolton has 
had. The Proliferation Security Initiative is one. And, as 
Senator Allen said, this is a global effort that aims to stop 
shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery 
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI uses existing 
authorities, national and international, to defeat 
proliferation. Mr. Bolton worked in a multilateral fashion on 
this proposal. Ten other countries--Australia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United 
Kingdom--initially agreed to PSI, and 60 more have agreed 
since.
    I do want to take, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bolton at his word as 
to how he will perform as our Ambassador to the United Nations. 
He testified, under oath, that, ``If confirmed, I pledge to 
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership 
with the United Nations.'' And that vision is that the United 
States is committed to the success of the United Nations. And 
we view the U.N. as an important component of our diplomacy.
    Mr. Bolton said that he will work for a stronger, better, 
more effective United Nations, one which requires sustained and 
decisive American leadership, broad bipartisan support, and 
support of the American public. He said walking away from the 
United Nations is not an option.
    He also said that he assures the committee, the American 
people, and potential future colleagues at the United Nations 
that, if confirmed, he will work to--with all interested 
parties to build a stronger and more effective United Nations. 
He said, ``Doing so will promote not only American interests, 
but will inevitably improve and enhance the U.N.'s ability to 
serve all of its members, as well.'' He went on to say, ``I 
pledge to bring my strong record of experience in working 
cooperatively within the United Nations to fulfill the 
intentions and aspirations of its original promise. In 
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this 
committee to achieve that goal.'' I will repeat that, ``In 
particular, I will work closely with the Congress and this 
committee to achieve that goal.''
    So, I want to take him at his word, and I will support 
Chairman Lugar and Senator Voinovich's motion.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
    Senator Biden, would you designate----
    [Pause.]
    Senator Biden. Senator Kerry.
    The Chairman.  Senator Kerry is recognized.

      STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                         MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me 
begin, first of all, by echoing the comments of other 
colleagues. And I thank you, personally, for the way in which 
you've defended this process. And I think you've handled that 
with great grace, and I think you've been terrific at helping 
the committee to fill out the record here, though I certainly 
concur with Senator Biden, I wish we were able to have that 
full record. I think that remains something that we hope we can 
work out with you.
    Secondly, I also want to say to those people who came 
forward, I think this is a very serious moment for the 
committee. And it's hard sometimes to convey that to people, 
because a lot of what happens around here gets politicized, as 
well as trivialized. But this should not be. I regret that some 
have, sort of, circled political wagons in this effort, and I 
think this is one of the most conscientious, legitimate 
processes of the committee that I've been engaged in, in the 
time that I've been here. And it's not party interest; it's 
America's interest. And I think Senator Voinovich articulated 
that. And others, I think, in their statements have tried to 
articulate that, or have articulated it.
    And those people who have come forward, I mean, you just 
can't dismiss that. You can't reduce this, somehow, to 
politics, when people have spontaneously come forward, 
particularly people from the same workplace, people from the 
same ideology, people from the same background, people who are 
invested in the same goals as John Bolton, but who have 
spontaneously come forward to, from their gut, and at great 
risk, put their views on line here. And I think that does raise 
the level of scrutiny that each of us, as Senators, ought to be 
giving this.
    Thirdly, there's this assumption that is thrown out so 
easily by a lot of people that we ought to give a President the 
person the President puts forward. Well, generally speaking, we 
do. But the whole concept of advice and consent embodies in 
its--in the term, not just that we give advice and walk away, 
but that we have to consent, that we do consent. And, as 
Senator Biden, I thought, very forcefully stated, this is 
within the constitutional requirement of us, as Senators, of 
the Senate, and the Congress as a separate and equal branch of 
government. And that consent should not be automatic. It is not 
automatic. It has never been automatic when we conduct 
ourselves properly and do our duty to its fullest.
    Now, I wanted to comment--I'm glad Senator Voinovich is 
back here, because, you know, this puts him in a difficult 
situation, and probably our saying something nice about it puts 
him in a difficult situation. [Laughter.]
    But what I want to say, I think, is not directed only at 
him; it's directed at all of us, as Senators. I was really 
struck, at the meeting we had before, when Senator Voinovich 
stopped the proceedings, rewrote the script, based on his 
conscience. I mean, he just sat up and said, ``I'm 
uncomfortable with this.'' And, lo and behold, people were 
amazed, Washington was amazed, the country was amazed. And I 
was amazed that everybody was amazed, because what is going on 
that a Senator doesn't act according to script, acts according 
to conscience, and everybody is taken aback? I think Senator 
Chafee said this is the first time this has happened in the 
four years that I've been here. Well, then something is wrong 
with ``here,'' not with Senator Voinovich.
    And I was struck that he was, you know, set upon by certain 
automatic forces in the country that are then unleashed to 
vilify him for acting as a Senator ought to act. When I first 
came here, that's the way almost everybody did. That's the way 
it worked. And we shouldn't be so amazed that somebody, in 
fact, stops and thinks about something, and responds according 
to their conscience.
    Now, what is at stake here is not party, not Democrat, not 
Republican. What is at stake here is our national interest, our 
security interest, our ability to advance our interests within 
the United Nations.
    And I take exception with Senator Allen. You know, long 
before he was on this committee, a lot of us were working with 
Senator Kassenbaum, with Senator Helms, Senator Biden, and 
others to reform the United Nations. We were among the first to 
withhold the dues. We were among the first to withhold the 
peacekeeping money. We worked hard to try to advance the cause 
of reform, and we got some distance in that. But there's, of 
course, an enormous amount more to be done.
    This is not about reform at the United Nations. This is 
about who is the best person to advance the serious interests 
of our country in one of the most important fori in the world. 
And a lot of us approached this, indeed, I may comment, 
skeptical, because I think everybody was taken aback, as 
Senator Biden said. I mean, this appointment, on its face, 
struck a lot of people as odd. I respectfully submit that it 
struck a lot of Republican Senators as odd. But then the 
political wagons, kind of, circled.
    I think this is bigger than that now. And the question is 
whether between now and a vote on the floor of the Senate, 
people on the floor of the Senate--people are really going to 
take stock of the full measure of what is at stake here.
    Mr. Chairman, you made the right decision, in the last 
weeks, to keep this process open and to make judgments. And I 
think the record that has been compiled, the additional 
witnesses and testimony that has been compiled, underscores the 
difficulties that this nomination presents on the merits, on an 
apolitical, meritorious judgment of whether or not this is the 
best person to carry out this job, and whether or not this 
person can now, under the circumstances of what we've learned, 
actually advance the cause and our interests at the United 
Nations.
    I mean, imagine when he walks into the--one of the first 
meetings, if he's confirmed. People will sit there and say, 
``Well, here's Ambassador Bolton. Is he sitting on one of the 
floors that he wanted to eliminate?'' ``Here's Ambassador 
Bolton. Is he, today, telling us intelligence that's his view 
or someone else's view?'' And when he makes his view known, 
almost to a certainty, it's going to be second-guessed, and 
people are going to back and say, ``Well, is this--you know, 
are we getting the full speech? Is this what the intelligence 
community says?'' It's going to have to be rechecked. It's 
going to have to be double-efforted in every case, because that 
question is there.
    In fact, Ambassador Bolton, himself, to my astonishment--I 
mean, here he is seeking to represent the country at the United 
Nations, where the views you express have to be those of the 
administration and the others, and he's reserving--he's busy 
reserving the right--in answer of the question I submitted he 
said, ``I understand that, as a policy, official statements 
identifying the views of the Intelligence Committee have to be 
fully vetted. I've submitted to this process throughout my 
tenure. Your question, however, fails to recognize a second 
principle; namely, that a policy official may state his own 
reading of the intelligence as long as he doesn't purport to 
speak for the intelligence community.'' So every time he speaks 
up there, he's going to have to clarify, ``I'm not speaking for 
the intelligence community,'' or, ``I am speaking for the 
intelligence community.''
    But, even more disturbing, he also said, quote, ``The 
intelligence community needs to be pushed. It will not do its 
best unless it is pressed by policymakers, sometimes to the 
point of discomfort.''
    Now, his version of doing that, we have seen, puts people 
at risk, changes the consensus of the intelligence community 
itself, and will, in every instance in which he speaks, my 
colleagues, leave people asking the question of who he is 
speaking for. He has, himself, reiterated that and underscored 
that in this statement.
    Now, I think--you know, let--you know, let me just share 
with colleagues what a prior ambassador to the United Nations 
said about this job. I quote, ``I do not think that one should 
ever seek confrontation. What I have every intention or hope of 
doing is to operate in a low-key, quiet, persuasive, and 
consensus-building way. I think a principal objective should be 
to try to communicate effectively with the representatives of 
as many nations as possible to broaden a bit the areas of 
mutual understanding. We should try to extend a bit the 
frontiers of reason and cooperation. And I think we should work 
to that end, and we should work to establish the patterns of 
consultation and trust.'' These are the words of Jeane 
Kirkpatrick during her January 1981 confirmation.
    Can I continue?
    Senator Biden. Please.
    Senator Kerry. I don't know, how much time have I taken?
    Senator Biden. You've got another 5 minutes.
    Senator Kerry. So, no one's every going to accuse Jeane 
Kirkpatrick of shying away from her views. And, like John 
Bolton, she's a staunch conservative who speaks her mind. But 
she understood and respected the value of diplomacy, 
negotiation, listening to--listening to--and respecting other 
views, seeking a broad point of view.
    And the question is, clearly, on the basis of this record, 
whether you can say that about John Bolton, whether he sees the 
big picture, whether he seeks those views. Could he handle 
opposing points of views? Does he have the leadership skill? 
And, interestingly enough, it was Jeane Kirkpatrick, herself, 
who said of John Bolton that he is not a diplomat.
    Now, the larger issue, I'm not going to go in, because I 
don't have the time, but, you know, you can take Lawrence 
Wilkerson, who was quoted in the New York Times as saying that 
John Bolton--he is the former chief of staff to the Secretary 
of State--who said he thought he would be--John Bolton would be 
an abysmal ambassador to the United Nations. Jeane Kirkpatrick, 
who said, ``He loves to tussle. He may do diplomatic jobs for 
the U.S. Government, but John is not a diplomat.''
    Now, more disturbingly, there are a pattern of things that 
have been laid out here, and I don't have time to go into all 
of them. One is this berating of analysts and what it does to 
intelligence at a time where intelligence needs to be trusted. 
That's one very serious question. The other is the question of 
how he treated people and what that does, in terms of 
leadership. But most importantly, I think, is the question of 
credibility, itself.
    Credibility. When United States speaks to the world, we've 
got to be believable. We have an extraordinary message about 
democracy, about transformation of the world, about our 
leadership. And we need somebody there who is not going to be 
questioned in that. We may have to make the case about Iran or 
North Korea or Syria. But, in each of those cases, North Korea 
and Iran, Mr. Bolton has already made statements that have been 
questioned by the highest officials in our government. And, 
more importantly, he tried to stretch the intelligence to fit 
his own views in each of those cases. Again and again. He tried 
to inflate language about Syria's nuclear activities, beyond 
what intelligence analysts saw. The chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council ordered his staff to resist Mr. Bolton's 
efforts. This is a man who's going to speak for America with 
credibility about Syria?
    Former National Intelligence Council Chair Robert Hutchings 
said, quote, ``Let's say that he took isolated facts and made 
much more of them to build a case than I thought the 
intelligence warranted. It was, sort of, cherry-picking of 
little factoids and little isolated bits that were drawn out to 
present the starkest possible case.''
    I could go on about that, Mr. Chairman. I don't have time 
to do it, because I want to get to one of the most important 
things of all for each of us to think about.
    Not only have you questions about Mr. Bolton's credibility 
on the subject of intelligence and his voice at the U.N., but, 
frankly, we've got serious questions about his credibility 
before this committee, itself.
    In the case of Christian Westermann, he denied trying to 
have him disciplined. He denied, before this committee, under 
oath, trying to have him disciplined. He said, ``I mentioned it 
to Mr. Finger. I may have mentioned it to one or two other 
people.'' ``I may have mentioned it to one or two other 
people.'' This is an intelligent man. This is a man who's been 
cited by everybody as having a steel-trap mind, one of the best 
minds of all. ``But then I shrugged my shoulders and moved 
on,'' he said. That is not true, folks. That's not what he did. 
The testimony of Mr. Westermann and all of his superiors, all 
of his superiors at INR--Ford, Finger, Silver, as well as the 
recollection of his own chief of staff, Mr. Fleitz--make it 
clear that removing Westermann is exactly what he sought. There 
was no if, ands, and buts, no ``may have,'' no ``might have 
talked to somebody.'' He wanted him removed, and that was 
clear, and he wasn't candid with this committee.
    The dispute went on for months. There was no shrugging of 
his shoulders and moving on. It went on for months. And it had 
a lasting impact on Mr. Bolton's relationship with INR.
    Bolton said to this committee, quote, ``I basically thought 
the matter was closed when I got Mr. Finger's e-mail saying, 
`It won't happen again.' '' But a few days later, Bolton took 
up the issue with Carl Ford, and then he took it up with Neil 
Silver. And, despite his characterization to this committee, he 
hardly considered it closed.
    This was not the only time he was not candid with the 
committee, Mr. Chairman. Regarding his efforts to have the NIO 
for Latin America removed, he told the committee, ``I had one 
part of one conversation with one person, one time on Mr. 
Smith, and that was it, I let it go.'' Not true. That wasn't 
it. He didn't let it go. Documentary evidence shows that he 
took steps to remove the NIO, and it was under active 
discussion for four months.
    Letters were drafted that would be signed by Mr. Bolton and 
Otto Reich, the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere, 
demanding the NIO's removal. On one subsequent occasion, he was 
reported to have told his staff, quote, he didn't ``want the 
matter to slip any further,'' end quote.
    So, Bolton's distortions before the committee weren't 
limited even to these two cases. He told the committee he 
didn't threaten or try to have anyone punished because of their 
policy views, but several witnesses have personally said, 
directly, that he did.
    So, Mr. Chairman, again, you know, he told the committee 
that U.S. Ambassador Hubbard approved and supported his speech, 
but you now know directly from Hubbard, that was not true.
    Does it matter whether you tell the truth or don't tell the 
truth in your confirmation hearings to a committee of the U.S. 
Senate, or doesn't it matter? And if you can't tell the truth 
to this committee, are you going to tell the truth to the other 
people? And will they believe him when he goes to the United 
Nations?
    Senator, you weren't here. This is not about whether or not 
we're all for reform of the United Nations as it is; it's about 
whether or not this is the best person to effect that reform. 
And I don't think that you begin by not being candid to a 
committee of the U.S. Senate, under oath.
    So, there are these serious issues, and more, many more. 
And I hope--I don't think we ought to send it out of this 
committee, personally. I think it ought to end here, because 
this isn't the right person. Now, if it doesn't end here, we 
are going to have a serious debate on the floor of the Senate, 
and that debate will not improve Mr. Bolton's standing at the 
United Nations. So, I think we would be better off doing what 
is appropriate to the record. The record speaks for itself. And 
now this committee ought to speak for itself.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
    Senator Coleman, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

    Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, I do think it's appropriate to acknowledge 
the extraordinary steps that you have taken to work with 
Majority and Minority members in building an incredible record 
to bring us to the point we're at today.
    I also want to compliment you on your statement. I hope 
that all our colleagues on both sides of the aisle read the 
chairman's opening statement.
    I also appreciate your strong statement about U.N. reform. 
I'll talk about that later. I think we all agree on that.
    And I guess the question, in the end is, Is this the right 
guy? And who makes that decision? Who makes that judgment? I 
think we had an election that said who makes that judgment, who 
is weighing, I'm sure, all the stuff that we're weighing here, 
and has come to a conclusion about John Bolton's, and it's a 
conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that I support.
    We've had, over the course of the last 3 weeks, 35 separate 
interviews, 29 different people testifying, 1,000 pages of 
transcripts, I think 7 to 800 pages of documents. And when you 
get through the whole process, where are at? I think we're 
probably right back where we started in this process. I don't 
know if there's anything new that any of us have seen that 
would say that--certainly from my perspective, that John Bolton 
is not qualified to serve in this position. He continues to 
have the support of the President. He continues to have the 
support of the Secretary of State.
    My concern is a little bit about the process. And I'm--I 
think some of the allegations, clearly, are patently false; 
some have been blown wildly out of proportion. My concern is 
about the--as we look to the future, the chilling effect of 
what's going on here and the impact it will have on good 
people. Senator Dodd, in the past, has talked about the--how 
it's getting harder and harder to get good nominees who want to 
serve.
    At the last hearing we had, my colleagues on the other side 
of the aisle raised a concern about an incident that apparently 
took place a number of years ago, when Bolton was in private 
practice. It had to do with an incident that--regarding a 
contractor and then--that he worked for and--doing some work in 
Kyrgyzstan. And, you know, what we heard were all the 
allegations about chasing somebody down in a hotel in Moscow, 
and harassment. I didn't have it at that time, but I think I 
had read a newspaper article that, in fact, the person who 
owned the company, the subcontractor who was, in effect, 
Bolton's boss, had submitted a letter to the committee. I know 
my colleagues on the other side had a copy of that letter. What 
we heard and what the public heard, without refutation, are 
instances about outrageous conduct on the part of John Bolton 
without any retort, without folks saying, ``Hey, this''--you 
know, not only, maybe this isn't the case, but the folks who 
knew the principals and said it wasn't the case, and said it in 
some very, very strong terms.
    And so, I do worry about the chilling effect that we're 
having here. This is certainly not a court of law, and it 
certainly doesn't have the same standards. And, certainly, it's 
a world we have to live with. But I am concerned about what Mr. 
Bolton has gone through, and the nature of these allegations. 
And, as I said, I think, Mr. Chairman, in your opening 
statement, you did a good job of responding and rebutting.
    I do want to talk a little bit about the Cuba speech and 
the conversation between Mr. Bolton and Mr. Westermann.
    Bolton, himself, told Christian Westermann, I quote, ``You 
are welcome to disagree with me, just not behind my back.'' And 
during Westermann's staff interview, when asked about whether 
Bolton made such a statement, he replied, ``That does ring a 
bell.''
    And what happened there--and, again, this one of the cases 
where you get kind of two sides of the story--from Bolton's 
perspective, he was going to give a speech, it was supposed to 
be circulated, it was supposed to be circulated to other 
agencies, and they would make a judgment--intelligence 
agencies--about whether what he's saying was accurate. He 
didn't know that Westermann had put a--had torpedoed it as it 
went out. He didn't know that.
    My colleague from Connecticut has asked, you know, ``On 
what basis does he have to lose confidence in Westermann? He 
didn't have it to begin with.'' The basis is pretty clear, and 
it's in the record, it's in the e-mail that Bolton got from 
Finger when he raised the issue of what happened. And what did 
Mr. Finger--Mr. Westermann's sup---what did he say? He went on 
to say that, ``INR has no position on what a principal--in 
other words, we shouldn't have made the judgment about whether 
this was good or bad information, the right thing, and not to 
say--choice of phrase, ``does not concur, was entirely 
inappropriate.'' And these are Mr. Finger's words, not mine, 
``We screwed up.'' ``We screwed up.''
    So, if you're John Bolton, do you have a reason to lose 
confidence? I guess so. The record would demonstrate that.
    And, again, we can each bring our own take to this, but the 
record clearly shows that, from Mr. Bolton's perspective, 
somebody did something they shouldn't have done. That was 
reaffirmed to him. And then the question becomes--raised is 
whether there was--somehow he was not being candid with us. Mr. 
Bolton says, ``I didn't pursue it.''
    And I would ask the question, Where is the record that the 
dispute went on for months, as some of my colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle have talked about? There isn't any. The 
reality is, is--what you have is, you have Bolton having a 
conversation with Ford that took place over a water fountain, 
that lasted about two minutes, and then a conversation down the 
road with Silver, in which Silver says, ``I asked the issue. Is 
there any other things that you're upset about?'' And then 
Bolton volunteered that.
    This is not the pattern of behavior intent on penalizing 
and hurting somebody, somebody obsessed with ``getting at'' 
somebody because they disagree with them over policy. It's 
consistent with everything John Bolton said.
    There has been no lack of candor here, Mr. Chairman, and I 
think the record is very, very clear on that.
    We talked about the incident in dealing with Melody 
Townsel, and the allegation that she was harassed and had had 
things thrown at her. I think her own testimony challenged 
that. The letter from Jaylon Kalotra, who was the head of the 
company that Bolton was working for, and he was very, very 
clear. He indicated, by the way, that Ms. Townsel had made 
inaccurate and misleading statements. He said he didn't hear 
anything contemporaneously about the incident. He says that her 
recollection didn't square with the facts. He indicated that, 
as a team leader, she attempted, unsuccessfully, to charge the 
U.S. Government for disallowable costs, and she became enraged 
and abusive; and that he found Bolton to be highly intelligent, 
hardworking, entirely ethical.
    And so, what you have there, again, was an incident laid 
out in public to disparage the reputation and the name of John 
Bolton, and then you've got evidence, substantial evidence, on 
the other side, something to the contrary. And we don't know. I 
wasn't there, Mr. Chairman. You weren't there. But to use this 
as a basis for somehow saying that John Bolton's not qualified 
to be U.S. Ambassador is not only wrong, it is another example 
of the kind of chilling impact that I think folks looking at 
this process, who may be called upon to serve, are going to ask 
themselves, ``What am I going to be--what I am going to be 
subject to? And will that be fair?''
    So, what have we done? We've put under the microscope every 
contentious interaction John Bolton had within the State 
Department, and even outside of it. There was an interesting 
editorial. And I'm not always a big fan of the Washington Post, 
but I could say these words--they said it, and I'll say it as I 
said it--talking about--the editorial, about a vote on Bolton, 
and he said, ``The committee interviews have provided some 
colorful details without breaking new ground. What has long 
been a well-understood split in the first Bush administration, 
a split between those who saw themselves as pragmatic 
diplomats, the power camp, and those like Mr. Bolton, who saw 
themselves are more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad 
in standing up for U.S. interests.''
    And they go on to say, as I would say, that, ``The 
President is taking risks, maybe, but, in the end, the 
President knows the role that Mr. Bolton is to play. The 
nominee is intelligent and qualified. We should support him.'' 
I think that's a pretty fair summary.
    Is John Bolton strong-willed? Darn right. There's no 
question about that. But--and it's interesting, because you 
look at the record, and, you know, I guess it depends, you can 
look at all the criticism that are there.
    One of my concerns about this process, Mr. Chairman--and, 
you, again, in your opening statement, lay it out--when this 
nomination was put on the table, it was almost unanimously 
objected to by the other side. And it was about policy. It was 
about policy. Substantial policy disagreements with John Bolton 
and that he shouldn't serve as U.N. Ambassador. And then as the 
process went on, it went from policy to procedure, from policy 
to personality, from policy to the ability to interact and deal 
well with others.
    When I was a prosecutor, we used say--on closing arguments, 
I'd stand in front of the jury, and I'd say, ``You know, you've 
got to watch out for the rabbit-out-of-the-hat's trick.'' And 
what happens is that the defense would come in, they've got a 
hat, a magician's hat, and they've got lots of rabbits, and 
they go running around. And they hope that one member of the 
jury chases one of those rabbits and takes their eye off the 
goal, the main thing--being the main thing.
    And so, we have the rabbit of personal relations, and we 
have the rabbit of violating procedure, and we have the rabbit 
of lack of candor, we have the rabbit of bad policy judgments. 
But the bottom line is that in each and every instance, despite 
every measure of conflict, John Bolton delivered the approved 
speech. He never maliciously impacted the career of a single 
employee. We could just as well have spent this time simply 
reading the record, all the comments made by John Bolton for 
those who worked with him. There's a question about whether he 
can put together a team or work well with others. You had 37 
officials who worked with him at USAID. They worked with him. 
They know him. And their judgment was that, ``John leads in 
front with courage and conviction. He doesn't abuse power. He's 
direct, yet thoughtful, in communication. What he does is 
demand from his staff personal honestly and intellectual 
clarity.''
    And then the letter from 39 other former attorney generals, 
distinguished citizens, again, who know John Bolton, again, 
being extraordinarily positive. Twenty-one former presidential 
appointees, career and noncareer Civil Service and Foreign 
Service employees, again, who worked and know John Bolton. 
Forty-three of John Bolton's former colleagues at the American 
Enterprise Institute. All saying the same thing, that, ``We 
know this guy, that we work with him, and he does have the 
ability and the skill that's needed.''
    And then, in addition to that, the statements of former 
Secretaries of State who also worked with John Bolton. They 
didn't just know him. They worked with him. He's got a long and 
distinguished career. And they were very, very clear about his 
ability to do what has to be done.
    I think the issue here, Mr. Chairman, is what my colleague 
from Virginia has raised. It is about U.N. reform. That's the 
issue in front of us today. The--and I have to say, it's 
interesting, because there are a couple of folks who have been 
at the U.N. who have been pretty blunt on occasion, and one of 
them was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who once said that what takes place 
in the Security Council, and I quote, ``more closely resembles 
a mugging than either a political debate or an effort a 
problem-solving.
    And I would note that my colleague from Massachusetts 
quoted Ms. Kirkpatrick, who said that, you know, we need low-
key, quiet consensus way. And, by the way, Ms. Kirkpatrick 
supports John Bolton. Jeane Kirkpatrick signed a letter in 
support of John Bolton. She knows what the job needs. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick was Ambassador to the U.N. at a time before we had 
evidence of U.N. employees raping and being involved in child 
prostitution in South--in Africa. She was our U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N. before we had evidence of sexual harassment and 
abuse by senior U.N. officials that went undealt with for over 
8 months. She was Ambassador to the United Nations before Oil-
for-Food scandal, which--where Saddam Hussein was able to rip 
off that program for billions of dollars.
    Just today, Mr. Chairman, the committee that I chair, the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, released reports of 
payoffs to folks who are--British members of Parliament, former 
French foreign ministers, interior ministers, documenting a 
system of them receiving oil allocations and payoffs going back 
to Saddam and then being in a position to enrich their own 
pockets.
    Clearly, clearly, the U.N. needs reform. And I think we've 
got to get back to what my colleague, Senator Chafee, in the 
end, quoted, and that is that statement of John Bolton 
pledging--and I'm going to quote one part of it, ``to fulfill 
the aspirations of its original promise.'' That's what we want 
the United Nations to do.
    My challenge to the United Nations--it's not about 
attacking the United Nations or tearing it down, but it 
certainly needs some strong--right now, it needs strong 
leadership from the United States, working in concert, but 
strong leadership with an individual, John Bolton, who's 
demonstrated that capacity. And I've got to believe that that's 
what the President is looking for, Mr. Chairman. That's what 
he's looking at.
    You know, is John Bolton the nicest guy in the world? He's 
not going to win that prize. Not going to win that prize. But 
look at the challenge that we're faced with, with U.N. reform. 
Just last week, Zimbabwe put on the Human Rights Commission. We 
need a kind of strength. And it's interesting, I'm saying 
``we.'' In the end, Mr. Chairman, I do believe that John Bolton 
is the best person, the best person that the President has 
picked for this job. Because that's what it's about. Elections 
do have consequences. And the President has made a judgment, 
and he's weighed the good, and he's weighed the bad, and he's 
looked at the tough-minded negotiations, how it played a key 
role in Libya's change of heart in achieving the Treaty of 
Moscow. He's looked at what--he's look at the difficulty of 
getting 191 member nations of the United Nations, the number of 
states that changed their ways. And that's not going to be 
very, very easy, Mr. Chairman.
    So, in the end, as I said, in--most importantly, the 
President needs to have the right to appoint members of his 
team. John Bolton has the confidence of the President. In the 
absence of any wrongdoing, there's nothing on this record that 
demonstrates any wrongdoing. We may have disagreements about 
how he interacted with staff. We may have disagreements about 
what's appropriate, in terms of dealing with folks who you 
think back-doored you. But, in the end, the President should 
have the team he wants. He's made the determination that John 
Bolton is the right person to finally bring about U.N. reform. 
And I look forward, Mr. Chairman, when John Bolton is 
confirmed, to be able to work with him in the Permanent 
Subcommittee, and to work with folks at the U.N. to bring about 
reform.
    I urge my colleagues to support the President's choice for 
U.N. Ambassador. No one is better qualified to bring about U.N. 
reform than John Bolton. In the words of my colleague from 
Connecticut, the place clearly needs cleaning up. John Bolton 
represents our best chance to shape a credible, effective world 
body for the next generation. And like my colleague from Rhode 
Island, I'm willing to take him at his word. I'm willing to 
take him at his word. There's nothing in this hearing that 
should have undermined our confidence in taking him at his word 
that what he wants to do is bring back--get the U.N. to fulfill 
its original aspirations. That's a noble goal. He's made that 
commitment. Let's give him a chance.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, the committee 
congratulates you on your very conscientious work as the s 
I07ubcommittee chairman looking into U.N. reform. And we wish 
you well as you----
    Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. Continue to proceed.
    Let me just mention that, at this point, there are 58 
minutes remaining to the Republican side, 63 minutes available 
to the Democratic side.
    And I call upon my distinguished ranking member to 
designate a speaker.
    Senator Biden. I would designate Senator Feingold. And if 
he could stay within 15 minutes----

  STATEMENT OF HON. RUSS FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Feingold. Certainly. I thank the chairman. I thank 
the ranking member.
    Mr. Chairman, in 2001, this committee voted to confirm John 
Bolton to be the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security. I voted for Mr. Bolton at that time, 
despite many strong disagreements with his views on arms 
control and security policy, generally. In fact, it's my 
understanding I was the only Democrat on this committee to vote 
for Mr. Bolton for that position. I did so because I generally 
believe that the President has the right to choose executive 
branch nominees who share his overall world view, even when I 
do not. So, barring serious ethical lapses or a clear lack of 
appropriate qualifications for a give job, I tend to give the 
President a great deal of latitude in making these 
appointments.
    Mr. Chairman, I will vote to oppose--oppose--the 
confirmation of John Bolton to be the next U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations. As I indicated last month, Mr. Bolton is 
simply unsuited for the job to which he has been nominated. His 
blatant hostility toward the institution at which he would 
serve, and his history of pursuing his personal policy agenda 
while holding public office, indicate that he would be ill-
equipped to advance U.S. interests as our Ambassador to the 
United Nations.
    I share the views of many who are insisting on reform at 
the U.N. The U.N. must become more effective and more 
accountable. And, as stewards of the American taxpayers' 
dollars, we must insist on that point.
    Mr. Bolton's record suggests that his personal animosity 
toward the United Nations is so great that he would rather see 
the institution dramatically weakened, rather than strengthened 
through reform. He seems to view the U.N. as an instrument to 
be used when it suits only our immediate interests, but one 
best ignored, or even undermined, the rest of the time. His 
failure to grasp the give and take required for effective 
multilateralism makes him a real obstacle to any hope of 
pursuing vital U.S. interets and increasing burden-sharing and 
marshaling a global force strong enough to defeat the 
terrorists networks that seek to do us harm. Mr. Bolton's idea 
of U.N. reform would hurt, rather than help, U.S. interests.
    Mr. Bolton's record also reveals many, many instances of 
intemperance and rash decisionmaking. At least two senior 
intelligence officials told committee staff that Bolton's draft 
testimony prepared for a House hearing on Syria in 2003 went 
well beyond what the intelligence community could clear. This 
wasn't a case in which INR alone had concerns about Bolton's 
proposed language. The CIA, the Department of Energy, and the 
Defense Intelligence Agency all objected. And according to 
interviews conducted by the committee staff, Bolton's office, 
quote, ``pushed back,'' unquote, resisting the intelligence 
community's efforts to alter problematic provisions.
    Bolton was determined to be such a loose cannon that the 
Deputy Secretary of State instituted an extraordinary policy to 
address the problem, requiring all of Mr. Bolton's public 
presentations to be cleared by Larry Wilkerson, Secretary 
Powell's chief of staff, or Deputy Secretary Armitage, himself.
    Given this record, I do not have confidence that Mr. 
Bolton's personal agenda would always be subordinated to that 
of the Secretary of State, who, in testimony before this 
committee and in her first days in office, has placed such a 
premium on restoring frayed diplomatic ties.
    Additional information that has come to light since our 
last meeting has simply affirmed my conclusion that this is one 
of the rare cases in which I must oppose the President's 
nomination for a position in the executive branch.
    First, the record indicating that Mr. Bolton was in the 
business of suppressing dissent has only gotten stronger. It's 
a matter of record that Bolton sought to retaliate against 
intelligence analysts when their work did not suit his policy 
inclinations.
    Now, this is not about careless remarks simply made in the 
heat of a tough bureaucratic dispute. The evidence shows that 
over a period of many months, Mr. Bolton repeatedly sought Mr. 
Westermann's removal from his portfolio at INR, which would 
mean, effectively, ending his career. Mr. Bolton repeatedly 
sought the removal of Mr. Smith from his post as the National 
Intelligence Officer for Latin America, again pursuing this 
vendetta for months--not just of heated minutes, but for 
months--going so far as to consider blocking country clearance 
for Mr. Smith to travel abroad.
    In both cases, the offense that so incensed Mr. Bolton 
appears to be that the analysts did their jobs, they presented 
the facts as they saw them, and they declined to keep silent 
when the facts did not support what Mr. Bolton wanted to say. 
And, in both cases, senior officials with decades of experience 
in government, who were involved in these episodes told 
committee staff that Bolton's actions, his attempts to 
retaliate against these analysts, were absolutely 
extraordinary.
    In addition to these disturbing incidents, other interviews 
revealed a broader pattern of--to simply cut out those who 
disagreed with his policy views, or those who he believed 
disagreed with his policy views, from the policymaking process 
entirely. This kind of tunnel vision, everyone-else-out-of-the-
room approach, was summed up by Secretary of State Powell's 
chief of staff, Larry Wilkerson, who told the committee staff, 
quote, ``When people ignore diplomacy that is aimed at dealing 
with''--referring to North Korea's nuclear weapons development 
problem--``in order to push their pet rocks in other areas, it 
bothers me, as a diplomat and as a citizen of this country.'' 
And then, when asked specifically if he thought that Mr. Bolton 
had done that, Wilkerson said, ``Absolutely.''
    Mr. Wilkerson ended his interview with the committee with 
the following comments, quote, ``I would like to make just one 
statement. I don't have a large problem with Under Secretary 
Bolton serving our country. My objections to what we've been 
talking about here--that is, him being our Ambassador to the 
United Nations--stem from two basic things. One, I think he's a 
lousy leader. And there are 100 to 150 people up there that 
have to be led. They have to be led well, and they have to be 
led properly. I think in that capacity, if he goes up there, 
you'll see the proof of the pudding in a year. Second, I differ 
from a lot of people in Washington, both friend and foe of 
Under Secretary Bolton, as to his, quote, `brilliance,' 
unquote. I didn't see it. I saw a man who counted beans, who 
said, `98 today, 99 tomorrow, 100 the next day,' and had no 
willingness, and, in many cases, no capacity, to understand the 
other things that were happening around those beans. And that 
is just a recipe for problems at the United Nations, and that's 
the only reason I said anything,'' end of quote.
    Some have suggested that because Mr. Bolton did not succeed 
in his attempts to end the careers of analysts whose dissenting 
views angered him, and because he did not succeed in his 
attempts to manipulate the government's processes to shut out 
voices of disagreement, caution, or dissent, that, in the end, 
as I think the phrase that has been used, no harm, no foul, or 
that there's no problem here.
    I cannot believe that any of my colleagues actually believe 
that's true. Why, after all that we have learned about the 
vital importance of dissent in the intelligence community from 
the 9/11 Commission, the Silverman-Robb Commission, and 
numerous other investigations into the major intelligence 
failures that have gravely harmed our credibility and our 
security over the past year, why would we choose to promote to 
a position of prominence and trust and individual who has tried 
strenuously to manipulate intelligence?
    Finally, in recent weeks serious concerns have been raised 
regarding Mr. Bolton's understanding of his obligations to be 
forthcoming with this committee. Several of Mr. Bolton's 
answers to Senators' questions were misleading, and several 
were quite blatantly nonresponsive. In light of the evidence 
this committee has seen in recent weeks, most of us can 
probably agree that if Mr. Bolton does end up being our next 
Ambassador to the United Nations, extremely careful oversight 
will be required. But our oversight responsibilities depend, in 
many instances, upon the executive branch officials who come 
before us understanding that they have a constitutional 
obligation to be forthcoming with Congress. I have no 
confidence that Mr. Bolton intends to adhere to this 
obligation.
    Mr. Bolton's nomination raises fundamental questions 
regarding both credibility and accountability. The credibility 
of our representation at the U.N., the credibility of 
intelligence, the credibility of the oversight process are all 
at stake. And the question of whether or not this committee 
will hold officials who seek to dissent--suppress dissent 
accountable for their actions is before us today, as well.
    I, like many other members of this committee, deeply 
appreciate the extraordinary courage of the many people who 
came forward to share with this committee their own concerns 
about Mr. Bolton's fitness for the U.N. post or to correct 
inaccuracies in the record, in some cases at real risk to their 
careers. I am grateful for their efforts, and I deeply 
appreciate their honesty. And so, Mr. Chairman, after listening 
to them, I'm all the more certain I cannot support this 
nomination.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
    Senator Hagel.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

    Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I would like to add my thanks to you and to the ranking 
member for the work that you have produced, contributions 
you've made, the leadership you've shown at a difficult but 
important time. I would add, also, my thanks to the staff, both 
Minority and Majority, for their work.
    There have been some references today to the relevancy and 
the importance of this committee. I believe it was Mr. Biden 
who noted, as others on the Democratic side, their years of 
service on this committee and how, over those years, 
unfortunately, the Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. 
Senate has diminished, not only in stature, but in importance.
    I make this point, because I recall, when I was elected in 
1996, and I was given, as all new Senators are, their choice of 
committees--limited--and the committee that I asked to be 
considered for first was the Foreign Relations Committee. And I 
was questioned by the political experts at the time, ``Why in 
the world would you waste your time on the Foreign Relations?'' 
Not was only was it a committee that could not raise money, but 
where is the constituency in America for foreign relations? 
Where is the constituency for diplomacy? Where is the 
constituency for the United Nations, their problems. ``They're 
drains on our budget, they're drains on our energy, so why in 
the world would you do that?''
    The second ``Why would you do it?''--because it was not an 
important committee. Maybe it once was. I remember Ted Kennedy 
telling me, years ago, that his brother, John Kennedy, wanted 
to be on the Foreign Relations Committee when he came to the 
Senate, but he couldn't get on it. It took him a few years to 
get on it, because it was then regarded as one of the most 
important committees in the U.S. Senate. Why was that? It was 
after World War II, and we were literally restructuring the 
world. We. I emphasize ``we.'' The United States led, but we 
did it with alliances and coalitions and friends and strong 
allies, who believed in our purpose.
    I also mention this point, not only to, again, acknowledge 
you and the ranking member for what you have done to make this 
a relevant committee once again, but, in fact, it is the 
committee--and this was my answer to those who asked me the 
question about why I would want to be on this committee. My 
answer was, it is the committee that is the framework that 
represents America's interests around the world. When you look 
at the jurisdiction of this committee, is it wide, deep, and 
relevant, and it is becoming more and more so.
    So, therefore, this nomination that we are meeting to 
discuss today, and will vote on later, is important, and this 
committee is important, and, therefore, should never, ever be 
framed up by either the Democratic party or the Republican 
party as a partisan issue. It has never worked that way, nor 
should it ever. And the groups on both sides of this issue do a 
great disservice to our country when they try to simplify it 
into a political common denominator issue. It is not.
    This position, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, is one of the most important jobs in our 
government. It is the face, the American face, to the world. 
That's important. A hundred and ninety-one nations. No body in 
the world like the United Nations. And who structured and 
framed and led to put the United Nations together after World 
War II? The United States. The United Nations, like all 
multilateral institutions that we led on, we framed, we put 
together after World War II, have been extensions of America's 
purpose and our power, not limitations. It's given us 
alliances. It's given us opportunities to promote who we are. 
And it has, quite frankly, served our foreign-relations 
objectives.
    Now, is the United Nations in need of reform? Of course it 
is. Of course it is. And it has wandered from its original 
charter. And I do not believe that necessarily is the core 
issue here that some have tried to frame up, that if you're 
against John Bolton, you're against reforming the United 
Nations. That's patently ridiculous. That makes no sense. That 
is not the issue.
    And I would say to my friend from Virginia, I would think 
that Mr. Negroponte and our former colleague, Mr. Danforth, who 
have been recent U.N. Ambassadors, would not consider 
themselves as tea-drinkers and milktoasts, nor would I think 
that the first President Bush would consider himself as a 
milktoast and a tea-drinker. Maybe they drink tea. Nor Jeane 
Kirkpatrick. We're talking about something bigger and wider 
here than just those easy characterizations.
    Ladies and gentlemen, we're living through a 
transformational time in the history of man. This is one of the 
most defining, important times in the history of the world. 
That's the bigger picture here. Now, whether Mr. Bolton is 
qualified or not, obviously, is our more concise challenge for 
this committee.
    I have had long conversations with Secretary Rice about Mr. 
Bolton. I have known Mr. Bolton, I have worked with Mr. Bolton, 
and I have had long conversations with Mr. Bolton. As has been 
noted here, mainly on our side of the committee, he has assured 
me, he has assured the President and Secretary Rice, that he 
will carry out the policy of this administration, that policy 
set by the President. Foreign relations is set by the 
President--not the Secretary of State, but the President. And 
President Bush has been forceful, over the last few months, 
talking about the importance of the United Nations. I take the 
President at his word. I take the Secretary of State at her 
word, and Mr. Bolton, in saying that he will be--my words, I 
asked--a uniter, a builder, someone, in fact, not only who will 
carry out the interests of the United States at the United 
Nations, but will go beyond that.
    The expectations are high for Mr. Bolton. And they should 
be. Anyone we send to the United Nations to represent this 
great country to the world should be held to very high 
expectations. But, in the end, he is the agent of the 
President.
    I have enough confidence in this President, this Secretary 
of State, to take them at their word, and Mr. Bolton at his 
word, when he says that, ``I will be a uniter. I will be a 
builder,'' and do the things that will be required, not just to 
reform the United Nations, but to go beyond that.
    This isn't just about reforming the United Nations. This is 
about extending America's purpose and the optics and who we 
are, and reaching out. If there was ever a time in history that 
the United States requires friends and alliances and 
coalitions, it is now. The world is too complicated to do 
otherwise. It is too dangerous to do otherwise.
    Many of you have read Tom Friedman's new book, and I 
recommend it highly. Tom Friedman captures the essence of the 
world that we live in today, but, more importantly, the world 
our children will live in, in the next few years. The name of 
that book is, ``The World is Flat.'' There's a diffusion of 
power in the world today that we've never seen, and I think 
that's good for America. But we've worked for that. That means 
we carry less burden. Hopefully, we will become less and less 
the world's policemen. That means now we've lost--over 1600 
dead in Iraq, and over 12,000 wounded. Hopefully, there will be 
a time when that won't occur, because we are sharing 
responsibilities in the world.
    These are the big issues that we're talking about in this 
committee, and, specifically, for this nominee. Mr. Chairman, I 
am, like all on this committee, grateful to be on the 
committee. I am privileged to serve in the U.S. Senate. And as 
long as I am an elected official in the U.S. Senate, I will do 
what I think is right--not for my party, not for my President--
but for the country that I take, as all my colleagues do, an 
allegiance to when I swear to the Constitution of the United 
States.
    I say this, again, because there is afoot in this land a 
dangerous, dangerous move, in both extremes of the political 
parties, to make foreign policy and everything a political 
issue. We will not only debase our system and our process, but 
we will make the world far more dangerous than it is at a 
complicated historic transformational time in our history. We 
must stop it and get above it. We're dealing with other issues 
like this in the U.S. Senate. We are elected to uphold the 
interests of this country first.
    We will all make our vote today on the Bolton nomination. I 
will support the President, I'll support the Chairman's motion 
to move this nomination out onto the floor of the Senate.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
    Senator Biden, will you designate your speaker?
    Senator Biden. My colleague from California.
    The Chairman.  Senator Boxer.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA

    Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you, Senator Biden. Thanks to all the members of the committee 
who feel very strongly about this, one way or the other.
    And I do agree with what Senator Hagel said, that we are at 
a critical moment in U.S. foreign policy--we are a critical 
moment in U.S. foreign policy, a time where we need to lead the 
world to a better place. It is that fork in the road where one 
place is dark and one place is light. And, to do that, we need 
the world with us, so much, or the burdens on our people will 
just be too much to bear. And I think Senator Voinovich said 
that in a magnificent way. I think Senator Hagel also said that 
in a beautiful way, and other members said it in their way. And 
that's why this debate is so important, and that's why the U.N. 
Ambassador is to important. Will this individual unite the 
world with us so that we can move to that better place?
    I was sort of stunned at Senator Coleman, when he asked a 
rhetorical question. ``Who makes the judgment about who is the 
best person to represent the U.N.,'' he asked, rhetorically, 
and then went on to answer his question, ``There was an 
election.'' But, Senator, you forgot something. There was an 
election for individual Senators, too. And maybe it's because--
I remember it because I, also, was on the ballot at the same 
time as the President.
    And I would just urge the Senator to look at Article 2, 
Section 2 of the Constitution, ``The President shall nominate 
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint ambassadors.'' It doesn't say, ``With the advice and 
consent of the President if he feels like it, or if he's in the 
mood for it, or he should turn to the Senate on Monday at 
3:00.'' It's pretty clear here. It's in the same sentence. And 
I hope that you will have more pride in this institution and 
your responsibility not to say that it is the President, alone, 
regardless of whether the President is a Democrat or a 
Republican. It is a shared responsibility, and that's why this 
debate is so important.
    It also is not about whether Mr. Bolton is nice, as my 
friend said. He said it certainly shouldn't be about that, and 
he's right. It is about many other things of deep importance, 
where my friend just doesn't want to go. And I understand it.
    I do want to pick up on something Senator Dodd said, 
because I think it's key. There is not a majority on this 
committee in favor of Mr. Bolton right now. There is not. And 
it is our job to send a signal to our colleagues. And, I think, 
to send a signal that we're moving this forward would be the 
wrong signal. It's not true. There is not a majority on this 
committee who supports John Bolton today, so I will not be 
voting to move this forward without recommendation.
    And there's another point, Mr. Chairman, and it really 
involves you and Senator Biden more than it involves me. But I 
am deeply disappointed that we have not gotten all the 
information we requested. And I agree with my leader on this 
committee, Senator Biden, that this is a matter of principle. 
Perhaps there's nothing in there, perhaps there's something, 
but there are several areas--the intercepts, that's one area; 
Mr. Freedman and his potential conflicts, we've asked for that 
information; and there's some information about Syria. And I 
will just say, because I'm--Mr. Chairman, I have such respect 
for you, I would never blind-side you--that I am going to do 
all I can to see that we get this information before this moves 
out of here onto the floor--or let me say before this gets onto 
the floor, because it's not right to cast a vote where you 
really don't have the full information.
    Now, Mr. Chairman, I think there are many reasons to oppose 
Mr. Bolton, and I'm going to lay them out, but I'm not going to 
go on, hopefully not, for the full 15 minutes, but it may 
happen. Sometimes I forget to watch the clock. But I would ask 
that my full statement be placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Boxer. Thanks.
    So, I will skim through it, and I will not reiterate what 
other people have.
    First, and, to me, the most important, is the 
politicization--and I didn't say it right--of intelligence. 
This is the most important issue, when we see what phony and 
exaggerated intelligence can lead to. It can lead to war. We've 
seen it. It's happening every day. It is tragic. Thousands of 
deaths and injuries--1600 deaths, plus. And in my state we have 
about 25 percent of those deaths, people who were born in 
California or were activated from California, so, wear that 
heavily our state. So, why on earth would we want to hire 
someone who has shown he's willing to put political pressure on 
independent intelligence analysts?
    We know about Westermann. We know about Mr. Smith. I'm not 
going to go through that. We know about it.
    Robert Hutchings, Chairman of the NIC, described the risk 
of this politicizing intelligence in this way, ``I think every 
judgment ought to be challenged and questioned, but when it 
goes beyond that to a search for a pretty clearly defined 
preformed set of judgments, then it's politicization. And even 
when it's successfully resisted, it creates a climate of 
intimidation and a culture of conformity that is damaging.''
    So here we take someone who put pressure on these people--
you saw the chart that Senator Dodd had--reached down. This is 
not a person that we should be promoting when we have the war 
in Iraq that was based on this faulty intelligence. We 
shouldn't do it.
    Second reason, disdain for the U.N. I know that doesn't get 
a lot of votes around here, but, it seems to me, putting 
someone into that situation who has said, ``There is no United 
Nations,'' it just--it is shocking. I mean, Senator Biden said 
``surprising.'' It was shocking to me.
    I think, in that regard, there are inaccurate comparisons 
to Moynihan and Kirkpatrick. I think Senator Kerry pointed that 
out. And I will let that go into the record.
    International law. John Bolton's comments versus Senator 
Moynihan--it's not even in the same league.
    Then there's three, a pattern of retribution and abuse. 
And, again, we know about what he tried to do. So, it's not 
only that he tried to twist arms to get, you know, faulty 
intelligence forward, but he actually exerted retribution on 
people. That's wrong. And someone like that should not be 
promoted.
    And, again, I'll put all of that into the record.
    But I'm going to close with two areas, one that Senator 
Kerry touched on, the failure to be candid with this committee. 
My God, we ought to at least believe that we deserve someone to 
tell us the whole truth. And I want to go through this on a 
chart here, because I can't do it any other way. So, bear with 
me.
    Bolton, ``I never sought to have Mr. Westermann fired at 
all. I, in no sense, sought to have any discipline imposed on 
Mr. Westermann.''
    Carl Ford, responding to that, ``I remember going back to 
my office with the impression that I had been asked to fire the 
analyst. Now, whether the words were `fire,' whether that was, 
`Reassign. Get him away from me. I don't want to see him 
again,' I don't remember. I do remember that I came away with 
the impression that I had just been asked to fire somebody in 
the intelligence community for doing what I considered their 
job.''
    Bolton, quote, ``I may have mentioned the Westermann issue 
to one or two people, but then I shrugged my shoulders and 
moved on.''
    Several months later, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann with the 
INR director, Neil Silver. According to Mr. Silver, quote, ``To 
the best of my recollection, Bolton raised Mr. Westermann's 
name, and he asked or indicated that he would like me to 
consider having him moved to some other portfolio.''
    Bolton, ``So I basically went out to pay a courtesy call on 
Mr. Cohen, and, it's true, I drove my own car out there. I have 
to make a confession here, the CIA is, sort of, more or less, 
on the way home for me, and, from time to time, when I've gone 
out there, I've driven my own car, I've had my meetings--I hate 
to say this, but I left and went home.'' He takes a long time 
to describe how he just dropped by on the way home. He says, 
``I didn't go back to the office.''
    Well, we have Secretary--we have Secretary Bolton's 
calendar here. For the day in question, the meeting with Mr. 
Cohen was scheduled, it was on his schedule for 9:30, and he 
had other meetings scheduled that afternoon.
    And I think we go on with some other charts here. Is that 
the 10 minutes or the----
    Senator Biden. That's ten.
    Senator Boxer. Ten, okay.
    Bolton: ``I went out to pay a courtesy call, and my 
recollection is, the bulk of the meeting was composed of Mr. 
Cohen explaining to me what the NIC did, and told me what their 
complications were and how it had been created, and gave me 
some background on it.
    Committee staff member asks, ``Do you remember giving 
Bolton a primer about the NIC?''
    Mr. Cohen, ``No. I just don't recall the details of the 
meeting, other than the fact that there was a focus on Mr. 
Smith.''
    Bolton, ``I didn't seek to have these people fired. I 
didn't seek to have discipline imposed on them. I said I've 
lost trust in them, and there are other portfolios they could 
follow.''
    Carl Ford, ``I do remember that I came away with the 
impression that I had been asked to fire somebody in the 
intelligence community.''
    John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of the CIA--``Do 
you recall other--do you recall other requests similar to this, 
to remove one of your analysts?'' John McLaughlin, ``No, this 
is the only time I had ever heard of such a request. I didn't 
think it appropriate.''
    Bolton, ``And I can tell you what our Ambassador to South 
Korea, Tom Hubbard, said after the speech. He said, 'Thanks a 
lot for that speech, John. It'll help us a lot out here.' ''
    Hubbard, former Ambassador to South Korea, quote, ``At the 
very least, he greatly, greatly exaggerated my comments. I told 
the committee that if you're basing your vote on Bolton's 
assertion that I approved his speech, that is not true.''
    So, we see here lack of candor, misleading statements. It's 
absolutely shocking to me that more people on the committee 
aren't disturbed with this.
    I also would say this. The strongest opposition to Mr. 
Bolton, outside of members of this committee, comes from the 
people from the Bush administration. And I don't have time to 
read everything, but here we have, again, Carl Ford, Lawrence 
Wilkerson. He says--I won't repeat that quote, because somebody 
else gave it.
    Elizabeth Jones, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs, ``I don't know if he's capable 
of negotiation, but he's unwilling.''
    John Wolf, former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Nonproliferation, ``I believe it would be fair to say that some 
of the officers within my bureau complained that they felt 
undue pressure to conform to the views of the Under Secretary, 
versus the views that they thought they could support.''
    And, again, John McLaughlin, ``It's perfectly all right for 
a policymaker to express disagreement with an NIO or an 
analyst, and it's perfectly all right for them to challenge 
such an individual vigorously, challenge their work, but I 
think it's different to then request, because of the 
disagreement, the person be transferred. I had high regard for 
the individual's work; therefore, I had a strong negative 
reaction to the suggestion about moving him.''
    So, here you have people from the Bush administration, who 
served there proudly, in many cases saying--they're 
conservative, they're Republican, they're proud to support the 
President, the Vice President--coming out against this nominee. 
It is hard for me to understand why the President didn't simply 
say he's going to send down somebody else.
    I guess he wants a fight. I guess he's asking people to 
walk the line. And if that's where we're going, that's where 
we're going, because we're going to have a fight. If this comes 
to the floor, we're going to have a fight. And the American 
people are going to engage in it, and they're going to look at 
it. And I guess, at the end of the day, their sentiments may be 
able to sway some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle; 
frankly, I don't know even where my Democratic colleagues are 
on this, except for the ones in the committee. But that's the 
greatness of this place. We'll take this to battle. We'll take 
these quotes, we'll take these interviews down to the floor. 
And we're going to ask the American people to help us on this 
one.
    And I thank you all.
    The Chairman.  I thank you, Senator Boxer.
    The Chair would like to recognize Senator Alexander.
    Let me just add, before you commence, Senator Alexander. 
Forty-eight minutes remain on our side, so this means, 
hopefully, framing of 10-minute speeches, more or less. And if 
you would proceed on that basis, I would appreciate it.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Yes.
    Senator Biden. Without us asking for any more time--we 
won't--if you need more time, it's fine by us for your people 
to be able to speak.
    The Chairman.  I appreciate it.
    Senator Alexander.

 STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

    Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Senator Biden.
    That should be plenty of time. And if you could let me know 
when that's about expired, I'll expire, as well.
    I'd like to insert my full statement in the record, if I 
may.
    The Chairman.  It'll be included in full in the record.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Senator Alexander

    Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take a few moments to talk about the 
nominee before the committee, his qualifications, the importance of the 
post to which he's been nominated, and some of the charges made against 
him by the other side.
    I believe John Bolton will do a fine job as our next Permanent 
Representative at the United Nations.
    John Bolton has a distinguished background:

  <bullet> Last four years as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 
        and International Security;

  <bullet> Assistant Secretary for International Organizations (like 
        the UN) under the first President Bush

  <bullet> Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, 1985-
        1989;

  <bullet> Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination, 
        U.S. Agency for International Development, 1982-1983;

  <bullet> General Counsel, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
        1981-1982; and

  <bullet> He graduated with a B.A., summa cum laude, from Yale 
        University and received his J.D. from Yale Law School.

    Solid Accomplishments:

  <bullet> Helped lead the American effort to repeal Resolution 3379, 
        which equated Zionism with racism (under Bush Sr.);

  <bullet> As Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, 
        steered a critical series of resolutions supporting our 
        liberation of Kuwait in 1991 through the U.N. Security Council;

  <bullet> Joined former Secretary Jim Baker in supporting the UN's 
        work in Western Sahara in the 1990's--pro bono; and

  <bullet> Designed this administration's Proliferation Security 
        Initiative, under which more than 60 nations now share 
        intelligence and take action to stop the transfer of dangerous 
        weapons.

    Impressive Appearance Before the Foreign Relations Committee

  <bullet> Demonstrated command of the issues facing the United 
        Nations;

  <bullet> Despite intense questioning that lasted more than seven 
        hours, Bolton was calm and collected; and
  <bullet> He focused on the need for reform of the United Nations

    Strong Support:

  <bullet> Endorsed by five former Secretaries of State: James Baker, 
        Lawrence Eagleburger, Al Haig, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz;

  <bullet> Also endorsed by more than 50 former Ambassadors

    I was with one of those former ambassadors a couple weeks ago, the 
former majority leader of this body, Ejpward Baker, with whom I and 
other members had lunch. He remarked about how he had dealt with 
Secretary Bolton over the last 4 years in Tokyo, when Senator Baker was 
our Ambassador to Japan. Senator Baker liked Bolton. He was impressed 
with him. He said he spoke frankly, that he would be a good ambassador.
Intelligence Charges Against Bolton
    The second day of hearings was a little different than the first. I 
was surprised and disappointed by what I heard. There was a man named 
Carl Ford, the former Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and 
Research, who was well respected by members of the committee, who 
presented evidence that John Bolton had ``chewed out,'' to use 
colloquial words, intelligence analysts in the State Department.
    Mr. Ford, to his credit, didn't like that because those persons 
were down the line. Mr. Ford was a pretty good witness because he 
didn't overstate his case. He acknowledged that it wasn't unusual for 
policy people and intelligence analysts to argue, for policy people to 
hope for intelligence that supported their positions. He just didn't 
like the fact that in this case he had heard about--he wasn't there, he 
had heard about--that Mr. Bolton in effect chewed out one of Mr. Ford's 
employees, and Mr. Ford didn't like it. He told Mr. Bolton so, and they 
exchanged words.
    That is what Mr. Ford said.
    There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton. It was 
suggested that Mr. Bolton was misusing or compromising intelligence. 
But Mr. Ford himself said: ``In this particular case''--the one Mr. 
Ford was led there to complain about--``there wasn't politicization [of 
the intelligence].''
    Mr. Ford was very clear on that point in his testimony to the 
committee.
    In interviews conducted by this committee's staff since that time, 
another issue was raised where there was a disageement over 
intelligence. One of Mr. Bolton's subordinates, who was on detail from 
the CIA, sent a report to the Deputy Secretary of State for review and 
was unhappy that another bureau had put a memo on top of that report 
that said the report was incorrect. This sounds like a simple 
disagreement to me, a disagreement over intelligence that is quite 
common from what we've been told even by Mr. Ford. And in this case, 
there's no evidence Mr. Bolton was even aware of the dispute at all. 
So, again, there is no evidence of politicization of intelligence. 
Rather, it appears that different staff members were arguing for their 
own point of view, which shouldn't surprise anybody.
Other Questionable Charges:
    He is accused of trying to have analysts removed, or reassigned, in 
whom he had lost confidence. But there is no evidence any of these 
individuals suffered in their career path whatsoever--o one was fired 
or reassigned.
    He was accused by a former USAID contractor of ``chasing'' her 
around a Moscow hotel to stop her from damaging his client, but in her 
interview with committee staff, the accuser later admits that perhaps 
``chasing'' wasn't the best word. Rather she ``felt chased'' because he 
kept tryjng to talk to her. Her employer at the time also failed to 
corroborate her story.
    In the end, only one charge appears to have any substance: John 
Bolton has been rude to staff members below him in the bureaucracy.
    I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I didn't like 
to hear them. And perhaps he deserves to be embarrassed by the charges 
and perhaps he has learned a lesson. But what I heard doesn't change my 
vote, even though I hope it might change some of Mr. Bolton's ways of 
dealing with people with whom he works.
    How significant is this charge that he was rude to people in the 
bureaucracy? As has been mentioned by others, if that were the standard 
for remaining in the Senate, we would have a hard time getting a 
quorum.
    There are regularly occasions when busy Senators, eager to make 
their own point, are rude to their staff and even shout at one another. 
In fact, the shouting was so loud in the last business meeting of this 
committee by some of the Senators that I could barely hear the charges 
against Mr. Bolton. That is not attractive, and I don't endorse it. It 
even caused me to think back about times that I may have become angry 
or impatient or startled in dealing with a staff member or another 
person, and made me redouble my efforts to make sure I swallow my pride 
and think about what I say and not do that anymore. It's not good 
business.
    But how significant is this? Here is what former Secretary of State 
Larry Eagleburger had to say about it a couple weeks ago in the 
T3Washington Post . This deserves special attention. Larry Eagleburger 
was Secretary of State for the first President Bush, but in a way he 
was more than that. He had 27 years in the Foreign Service. We hear 
that a football player is a football player's player or a man is a 
man's man or a woman is a woman's woman. Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign 
Service officer's Secretary of State. He had and has enormous respect 
from all those men and women who put their lives on the line around the 
world and in the United States in support of our diplomacy and foreign 
policy. Here is what he said:

          As to the charge that Bolton has been tough on subordinates, 
        I can say only that in more than a decade of association with 
        him in the State Department I never saw or heard anything to 
        support such a charge. Nor do I see anything wrong with 
        challenging intelligence analysts on their findings. They can, 
        as recent history demonstrates, make mistakes. And they must be 
        prepared to defend their findings under intense questioning. If 
        John pushed too hard or dressed down subordinates, he deserves 
        criticism, but it hardly merits a vote against confirmation 
        when balanced against his many accomplishments.
    That is where I am. I think the benefit of hearing Mr. Ford's 
testimony might be a little bit of a lesson to Mr. Bolton and a 
reminder to the rest of us of how unattractive it is to shout at an 
associate or unnecessarily dress down a staff member. I agree with 
Secretary Eagleburger. John Bolton has a distinguished background and 
record. He has dedicated himself to improving our country's foreign 
policy. His action toward subordinates might have been inappropriate. 
Perhaps he has learned a lesson, but it doesn't cause me to change my 
vote. I am glad to support him.
    This is a critical time for the United Nations. Even the Secretary 
General acknowledges it is in need of reform. Billions of dollars 
filtered from the UN's coffers to Saddam Hussein's pockets in the oil-
for-food scandal. Top human rights abusers such as Sudan and Zimbabwe 
sit on the Human Rights Commission. United Nations peacekeepers in 
Africa have been found to rape and pillage.
    Now the United Nations has many important roles in the world. I am 
glad we have it. I want it to work, but I believe the President is 
right in his thinking, that we need to take action to help the UN 
reform itself, and that a frank-talking, experienced diplomat named 
John Bolton is an excellent candidate for that commission. I intend to 
vote for him in committee and on the floor. It is my hope that we will 
report Mr. Bolton's nomination to the floor and the Senate will approve 
it and give him a chance to go to work in reforming the U.N.
In Defense of the Chairman
    Mr. Chairman, I'd also like to take a moment, if I may, to comment 
about the decorum with which this committee has proceeded in 
considering Mr. Bolton's nomination. I want to compliment you, Mr. 
Chairman, because I think you have shown incredible patience and 
diligence in making sure that all Senators have the facts and are able 
to make a well-informed decision.
    Seldom has there been a more thorough investigation of a nominee. 
The committee has heard more than seven hours of sworn testimony from 
Mr. Bolton. Ninety-four questions for the record were further submitted 
to Mr. Bolton in writing, many with multiple parts, and he has 
responded. We heard sworn testimony from Mr. Ford, someone who opposed 
the President's nominee--which is a rarity in itself.
    Further, the committee has conducted 35 additional interviews that 
has resulted in over 1,000 pages of transcripts which are publicly 
available. At the Chairman's insistence, 700 pages of documents have 
been turned over to the committee from various related agencies, 
including the State Department, the CIA, and USAID.
    I have seen in the press some comments that suggest the Chairman 
has somehow ``stonewalled'' efforts to investigate Mr. Bolton. That's 
an outrageous claim, especially when compared to just how far the 
Chairman has bent over backwards to get answers to questions by members 
of the minority. The Chairman supported numerous requests by the other 
side for more information. Indeed, we wouldn't have nearly 2,000 pages 
of documentation without his active leadership.

    Senator Alexander. And I would like to thank the chairman 
for this opportunity. I'd like to summarize a few points in my 
remarks.
    I've said what I had to say before in this committee. And 
after reviewing the evidence and listening to the hearings, 
which I did, I made a statement just before the recess, about 
10 days ago, about how I felt. So, I'd like to summarize those 
thoughts.
    And, basically, since I think Mr.--I'm convinced Mr. 
Bolton's credentials for the position are well-established, 
superior credentials, and I'd like to try to put in context the 
charges that have been made against him and the conclusion I've 
come to and I evaluate those charges.
    It's important, even though it's been repeated many times, 
to remind ourselves of the credentials. Because of those 
credentials, I expected to be impressed by Mr. Bolton when he 
appeared before the committee, and I was. I mean, not many 
people have been, as the chairman indicated in his remarks, 
confirmed four times by the U.S. Senate for major positions--
Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Assistant Attorney 
General in the Department of Justice--that was in another 
administration; that was in the 1980s. Those are big jobs. 
Those are jobs that manage large numbers of attorneys in 
complex cases. And then his academic record is unusually, 
unusually good. And many of the Senators have recited his 
accomplishments in professional life--the U.N. resolution on 
Zionism, the work he did in the U.N. helping--with the U.N. 
helping to shepherd the resolutions about Kuwait in 1991, the 
fact that the Secretary General asked former Secretary of State 
Jim Baker to help with Western Sahara, and Baker invited John 
Bolton. All of those activities suggested a very accomplished 
nominee.
    And so, I was not surprised when, on the first day of our 
hearings, his performance was impressive. I listened. I was 
here for most of it. I thought he displayed a good command of 
the issues, extremely detailed knowledge of the United Nations, 
and that, while he got hard questions, as nominees are supposed 
to get--I was--once had the honor of being--going through a 
confirmation process before a committee of the U.S. Senate. 
It's a very special experience. And I thought he handled that 
experience very, very well. He handled it calmly, he answered 
the questions, he wasn't combative. I went home that day very 
impressed.
    I was impressed by the strong support from the former 
Secretaries of State, who have been mentioned, by the number of 
ambassadors, who have been mentioned. And I had lunch with one 
of those ambassadors the other day who's well known to this 
group, Senator Howard Baker, who was Ambassador to Japan, and 
he volunteered to me, this former Majority Leader of the U.S. 
Senate, how he had dealt with Secretary Bolton over the least 
four years while Senator Baker was in Japan, and how impressed 
he was with him. He said, ``He's a good man. He'd make a good 
ambassador. He spoke frankly. I enjoyed working with him.''
    So, after one day, I was very impressed.
    I was surprised and disappointed by the second day of 
testimony. It was a little different. Carl Ford, who's been 
mentioned here, was a good witness. Very believable. He didn't 
overstate his case. He acknowledged it wasn't unusual for 
policy people and intelligence people to disagree. He was 
really mad about the fact that John Bolton, in his words, ``had 
chewed out somebody way down the line.'' He didn't like it at 
all, and he felt it was important to come before the committee 
and say so. Many members of the committee know and respect him. 
I found his testimony believable, and I was disappointed by it.
    There have been some other things said about Mr. Bolton, 
which Mr. Ford, himself, dismissed. Mr. Ford, himself, said 
there was a politicization of the intelligence that Mr. Bolton 
was accused of misusing.
    There was other testimony, which has been dealt through 
here. Senator Lugar and others have talked about it.
    But it was about--as I've listened very carefully to all of 
the charges, in the one--in the end, only one charge, to me, 
seemed to have any substance, and that is that John Bolton has 
been rude to staff members who had subordinate jobs to his in 
the U.S. Government.
    I imagine Mr. Bolton is embarrassed by those charges. I 
didn't like to hear them, and perhaps he deserves to be 
embarrassed by those charges. And perhaps he's learned a 
lesson.
    What I heard didn't change my vote, but I hope it might 
change some of Mr. Bolton's ways and dealings with his 
colleagues and with other people in the bureaucracies with 
which he will be working.
    How significant is this charge of rudeness? As has been 
mentioned by others, if it were the standard for remaining in 
the U.S. Senate, we probably wouldn't be able to get a quorum. 
There are regular occasions--all of us know about them--when 
Senators eager to make their own points are rude to their 
staffs and even occasionally shout at one another. In fact, the 
noise was so loud in our first hearing, I was not sure I would 
be able to hear the charges against Mr. Bolton above the 
shouting. It's not attractive. I don't endorse it. It's even 
caused me to think back over times I may have become impatient 
or angry or startled in dealing with a staff member or another 
person, and it's redoubled my efforts to try to make sure I 
swallow my pride, think about what I say, and not do that 
anymore. It's not good business.
    But how significant is this?--is the question. Given such a 
distinguished, credentialed person, with such broad experience, 
who this body has confirmed four different times, how big a 
problem is this?
    Here's what former Secretary Larry Eagleburger had to say 
about it. Now, Larry Eagleburger's comments deserve special 
consideration in this--in this discussion. We often hear about 
a man being a football player's football player, or a woman 
who's a woman's woman. Well, Larry Eagleburger is a Foreign 
Service's--Foreign Service Officer's Secretary of State.
    Now, for 27 years he was in the Foreign Service. He has 
enormous respect from all those men and women around the world 
who put their lives on the line in support of our diplomacy and 
foreign policy. And here is what Larry Eagleburger had to say 
about John Bolton, ``As to the charge,'' quoting, ``that Bolton 
has been tough on subordinates, I can say only that in more 
than a decade of association with him in the State Department, 
I never saw or heard anything to support such a charge. I never 
saw or heard anything to support such a charge. Nor do I see 
anything wrong with challenging intelligence analysts on their 
findings. They can, as recent history demonstrates, make 
mistakes, and they must be prepared to defend their findings 
under intense questioning. If John pushed too hard or dressed-
down subordinates, he deserves criticism, but it hardly merits 
a vote against confirmation when balanced against his many 
accomplishments,'' unquote.
    Mr. Chairman, that's where I am. I think the benefit of 
hearing Mr. Ford's testimony might be a little bit of a lesson 
to Mr. Bolton and a reminder to the rest of us of how 
unattractive it is to shout at an associate or a colleague or 
unnecessarily dress-down a staff member in a moment of 
impatience or disagreement.
    I agree with Secretary Eagleburger, though. John Bolton has 
a distinguished background and record, he has dedicated himself 
to improving our country's foreign policy. His action towards 
subordinates might have been inappropriate. Perhaps he has 
learned a lesson. But it doesn't cause me to change my vote. 
I'm glad to support him.
    This is a critical time for the United Nations. It has many 
important roles. I'm glad we have it. I believe a frank-talking 
experienced diplomat named John Bolton is an excellent 
candidate for the commission. And I'm glad--I hope that he will 
move out of this committee to the floor so we can discuss it.
    Two more brief things I would like to say about members of 
the committee. I especially appreciated the comments of the 
Senator from Nebraska as he talked about the role of this 
committee and the importance of our looking at our 
responsibilities in the world on the basis that puts our 
allegiance first to the country. And I'll do my best to do 
that.
    I want to express to Senator Voinovich of Ohio my respect 
for his careful thinking about this. I know him well, and have 
for a long time. He's always been dedicated to civil servants, 
those who work for the government, and he would be the first to 
be offended by rudeness to anyone down the line. I'm not so 
surprised that he reacted strongly to this, and I respect his 
thoughtful statement.
    And I'd like to say to the chairman, who has great 
patience, that he's demonstrated almost all of it during this--
--
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Alexander  [continuing]. During this consideration. 
Ninety-four questions for the record, testimony from Mr. Ford, 
700 pages of documents, some people suggesting you're 
stonewalling.
    You have, with the cooperation of Senator Biden, over time, 
helped this committee be an outpost of decency and 
thoughtfulness in a time of increased partisanship. And for 
that, I thank you, and I appreciate your patience, which has 
been more than almost any of the rest of us would likely have 
had.
    Thank you for the time.
    The Chairman.  I thank the Senator.
    Senator Biden, you designate----
    Senator Biden. Senator Obama.
    The Chairman.  Senator Obama.

   STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

    Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Biden.
    I was extraordinarily impressed with the presentation that 
Senator Voinovich made, and I think that he expressed a number 
of the concerns that many of us share on this committee. So, 
I'm not going to reiterate all my points. I would like to have 
my statement placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    There are a couple of issues that I think are important to 
touch on. The first is, I think the tendency in this debate to 
suggest that opposition to Mr. Bolton's nomination is based on 
the fact that he is occasionally rude, he showed some bluster, 
he got mad--the previous speaker is exactly right, if that's 
the only criteria by which we would oppose the nomination, then 
most of us might not qualify, because, at any point in time, 
we've displayed probably inappropriate behavior or anger that 
we regret afterwards. And I think if somebody was to look at 
our life's work and behavior, and was able to scrutinize it, 
that a lot of us would have problems.
    That, unfortunately, is not, I think, the basis for our 
objections. I think the basis for the objections have to do 
with very specific, credible allegations that Mr. Bolton 
reached down, not to immediate subordinates of his, but reached 
far afield to attempt to have fired intelligence officers that 
would not support statements that he was making on behalf of 
the U.S. Government, or wished to make on behalf of the U.S. 
Government.
    Now, we can define ``politicization'' in various ways. What 
I do know is that there is substantial credible evidence from 
Republican appointees serving in the Bush administration that 
Mr. Bolton sought to massage intelligence to fit an ideological 
predisposition.
    Now, it's been stated that intelligence officers are often 
wrong and their analysis should be challenged. In fact, our 
recent history indicates that, where intelligence officers are 
wrong, it primarily has to do with the fact that they succumb 
to the temptation to tell the folks higher up what they want to 
hear. That appears to be part of what happened with respect to 
our failed intelligence in Iraq. And at a time when it is 
critical for us to have sound intelligence, we should be 
sending a message to our intelligence officers that, in fact, 
we want them to play it straight and to tell us stuff even when 
we don't necessarily want to hear it. And that is not what Mr. 
Bolton appears to do. That's now how he operates. And that is 
credible evidence. There may have been some other evidence of 
allegations with respect to Mr. Bolton's behavior that were not 
supported. His attempt to reach down and have intelligence 
officers removed from their positions because they provided 
analysis that was not what he wanted to hear, that does not 
appear to be largely disputed.
    Now, I think the President is entitled to the benefit of 
the doubt when appointing senior members of his team. To that 
end, I supported a number of the President's choices for top 
foreign-policy positions, including Secretary Rice and 
including Robert Zoellick to be her deputy.
    But, as has been emphasized previously, the Constitution 
gives the Senate the power to advise and consent. This is a 
responsibility I take very seriously. I think that the breach 
of the line between politics and policymaking and intelligence, 
in and of itself, renders Mr. Bolton less than credible in his 
position to the United Nations.
    Let me add one additional point that I think may not have 
been touched on in the hearing this morning. It's been 
suggested that perhaps we should vote for Mr. Bolton anyway, 
even if he has a bad temper, even if he showed some poor 
judgment with respect to how he handled intelligence, because 
he is so highly qualified for the job. The suggestion is, is 
that his competence is such, is so unique, that we are willing 
to overlook some of his warts.
    I'm a little bit baffled as to that assertion. This is not 
a line of inquiry that we really pursued much during the course 
of our discussions here. But when I look at the record of Mr. 
Bolton during the last four years at the State Department as 
the top Arms Control and Nonproliferation official for the 
United States, I am not impressed with that record.
    Let's just examine some of the things that he was 
responsible for.
    The approach that was advocated by Mr. Bolton, with respect 
to North Korea, and the administration has simply not worked. 
Here's the bottom line. Under Mr. Bolton's watch, there are no 
longer international inspectors and cameras at any site in 
North Korea. The North Koreans have withdrawn from the NPT. We 
believe that North Korea has developed six to eight nuclear 
weapons during Mr. Bolton's watch.
    Now, when North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons, the 
situation is critical. They can test one weapon and hold one 
weapon. When it has six to eight, the situation is terminal. It 
can test one, hold a couple, sell the rest. And we all know 
that North Korea will do virtually anything for money.
    That's not a record that I'm wildly impressed with.
    And when I hear Mr. Bolton testify, to my questioning, 
directly, and say--when I asked him, ``Do you think that your 
approach with respect to engaging in name-calling with--towards 
North Korea in a speech was helpful?''--and he says, ``The 
Ambassador of South Korea told me, `Thank goodness. You really 
helped out.' ''--and that same Ambassador, a Bush appointee, 
Ambassador Hubbard, has to say, publicly, in the newspapers, 
``I never said such a thing''--that indicates to me a problem.
    Another area that he was responsible with--for, 
Nonproliferation Treaty. There is little doubt that the NPT is 
a critically important tool for combating nuclear 
proliferation. At the same time, it needs to be strengthened. 
The President recognized this reality and pledged to do so, in 
a 2004 speech at National Defense University. A week later, Mr. 
Bolton pledged to do the same.
    What's happened in the interim? Virtually nothing. The 
administration has made very little progress on this issue. The 
NPT Review Conference, currently under way, is not going well. 
Newsweek reports that, quote, ``The United States has been 
losing control of the conference's agenda this week to Iran and 
other countries, a potentially serious setback to U.S. efforts 
to isolate Tehran.''
    Where's Mr. Bolton been throughout this process? In this 
same article in Newsweek, they state, ``John--since last fall, 
Bolton, Bush's embattled nominee to be America's Ambassador to 
the United Nations, has aggressively lobbied for a senior job 
in the second Bush administration. `During that time, Mr. 
Bolton did almost no diplomatic groundwork for the NPT 
Conference,' these official say. `Everyone knew the conference 
was coming and that it would be contentious,' says a former 
senior Bush official, but Bolton stopped all diplomacy on this 
six months ago.''
    This notion that somehow Mr. Bolton is uniquely qualified 
for this task, and we should overlook some of these problems 
with respect to intelligence because he is uniquely qualified 
to reform the United Nations, doesn't seem to be borne out by 
his track record doing his current job.
    Mr. Chairman, I know I'm running out of time, but let me 
just make a couple of other points on this.
    Senator Biden. Excuse me, Senator. You can have some of my 
time.
    Senator Obama. Okay.
    The administration holds up Libya as its biggest success in 
nonproliferation. This is something that Mr. Bolton touts. It 
appears that this deal with respect to Libya was struck in 
spite of Mr. Bolton, not because of Mr. Bolton. There are 
credible reports that he was sidelined from the negotiations by 
the White House, and the British Government did not want him to 
play a role. I've got an article right here, stating--this is 
from MSNBC--``Bolton, for instance, often takes, and is given, 
credit for the administration's Proliferation Security 
Initiative, an agreement to interdict suspected WMD shipments 
on the high seas, and the deal to dismantle Libya's nuclear 
program, a deal that Bolton, by the way, had sought to block. 
But the former senior Bush official who criticized Bolton's 
performance on the NPT conferences says that, in fact, Bolton's 
successor, Robert Joseph, deserves most of the credit for these 
achievements. This official adds that it was Joseph, who was in 
charge of counterproliferation at the NSC, who had to pitch in 
when Bolton fumbled preparations for the NPT conference, as 
well.''
    Last point, along these same lines. Economic Support Fund. 
``Mr. Bolton's predecessors were responsible for administering 
and overseeing around $2 billion in annual Economic Support 
Fund assistance. Secretary Bolton and his staff, during 2001, 
brought the utilization of a large portion of Economic Support 
Fund assistance to a near halt as he and his staff sought to 
micromanage virtually every obligation from the ESF fund--
assistance. It appeared that Under Secretary Bolton was seeking 
to redirect ESF on his own, without consulting other bureaus of 
the Department or, as required by custom and law, the Congress. 
In 2001, a bipartisan group in Congress, completely fed up with 
his management of this money, passed legislation which stripped 
Mr. Bolton's ability to manage this money. The provision 
originated with the House Republicans.''
    Now, here's my point. If we thought that Mr. Bolton was a 
terrific diplomat, maybe some on this committee would choose to 
overlook what I consider to be actions with respect to analysts 
that I think disqualify him from the job. But I could 
understand why some people would say, ``You know what? This is 
the guy to reform the U.N.'' But the record indicates that in 
his current job he has not had much success, which then asks 
me, Why is it that we're so confident that this is the person 
who's going to reform the U.N.?
    I would love to see the U.N. reformed. The notion that we 
have people like Zimbabwe--countries like Zimbabwe and Libya on 
the Human Rights Commission is an insult to all the people who 
are being oppressed in those countries. What happened with 
respect to the Oil-for-Food Program deserved to be 
investigated. Some people on this committee have done good 
work. We need to do some serious cleanup of the United Nations.
    Why is it that we think that this is the best qualified 
person to accomplish that? Do we really believe that there is 
not a tough, straight-talking, conservative, Republican 
diplomat somewhere out there who has credibility and who can 
accomplish this task, other than Mr. Bolton?
    Throughout this testimony, there was a lot of badmouthing 
of the United Nations. I did not hear a single actual plan for 
how Mr. Bolton was planning to reform the United Nations. I 
still don't have a plan from the Bush administration, in terms 
of how this reform is going to take place. And I would argue 
that, as a consequence of Mr. Bolton's diminished credibility, 
I think he is going to be less effective in reforming the U.N. 
than if somebody else was selected. That's the irony of this 
process. I think countries like Zimbabwe and Libya and others, 
who don't want to see reform take place--when Mr. Bolton says 
something, they are going to be able to dismiss him as a U.N.-
basher, somebody who's ideologically disposed to dislike the 
U.N., and use that as a shield to prevent the very reforms that 
need to take place.
    This is a bad choice.
    And let me just close by saying this. You know, in my 
opening testimony, I mentioned the fact that there was a 
gentleman with credibility, temperament, and the diplomatic 
skills to guide us through some very difficult times in the 
United Nations, and that was Adlai Stevenson, a great citizen 
of the state of Illinois. After the Bay of Pigs, despite the 
fact that he had been misinformed about intelligence, he still 
had the credibility to allow the United States to isolate the 
Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, and advance U.S. 
interests at the U.N.
    Given the issues that have surfaced surrounding Mr. 
Bolton's nomination, I'd simply ask my colleagues this. If a 
crisis were to occur with North Korea or Iran right now, are we 
sure that the integrity and credibility of Mr. Bolton would 
command the respect of the rest of the world? Would Mr. Bolton, 
like Adlai Stevenson, be able to convince the world that our 
intelligence and our policies are right and are true? Would Mr. 
Bolton be able to isolate our enemies and build a coalition 
that would ultimately make our troops safer and our mission 
easier?
    Regrettably, Mr. Bolton's testimony leaves me with serious 
doubts that he would be the kind of representative we need in 
the United Nations, and that's why I feel compelled to vote no 
with respect to his nomination.
    Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
    The Chair now recognizes Senator Sununu.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW 
                           HAMPSHIRE

    Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think it is instructive to note that the opponents of 
John Bolton cannot decide whether it is behavior or policy or 
management skills that bother them so much about the nominee. 
And----
    Senator Sarbanes. All of the above.
    Senator Sununu  [continuing]. And I--well, I will address 
each of the above, but let's start with behavior.
    Adlai Stevenson was mentioned. I believe it was Adlai 
Stevenson, in his capacity as Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, that shouted across the room at the Russian 
representative not to dare wait for the translation, because he 
knew what the question was, and he ought to be able to answer 
it right away regarding missile placements in Cuba. Bad 
behavior in diplomatic circles, if there ever was such a thing. 
But was it effective? Was it probably the right thing to do at 
the time for the United States and the United Nations and 
international security? I think so.
    So, you know, I think we need to be careful about reading 
too much into an individual's behavior at a particular time or 
a particular place and suggesting that that renders them 
disqualified for any particular position.
    Second, with regard to the United Nations, Senator Hagel 
made an important point, that a vote against John Bolton isn't 
a vote against reform in the United Nations. This is true. But, 
at the same time, the suggestion that has been made, that John 
Bolton is hostile to the United Nations, that John Bolton would 
like to weaken the United Nations, is demonstrably false. It 
simply cannot be justified, I believe, by any reasonable 
interpretation of the record.
    Cathy Bertini, supporting the nomination of John Bolton, 
underscores the work that he did to strengthen the World Food 
Program, to make the World Food Program work better. And anyone 
that has spent time in New York talking to United Nations 
administrators about their organizations around the world would 
underscore that the World Food Program is probably the one that 
works best and delivers the most important and greatest benefit 
more effectively than any other U.N.-sponsored organizations.
    As was pointed out by Senator Coleman and others, the Anti-
Defamation League strongly is supporting John Bolton, because 
he worked effectively within the United Nations dealing with 
the controversial Zionism-is-racism resolution.
    John Bolton worked to build an organization--or helped put 
together a coalition of 60 states--60 countries opposing the 
proliferation of weapons. And now to suggest that the lead 
State Department official responsible for nonproliferation 
shouldn't really be given any credit at all for the 
nonproliferation achievements with regard to Libya is simply 
ridiculous.
    I think we need to understand and recognize that he has 
worked effectively on a bilateral basis, but John Bolton has 
always worked very effectively with the United Nations to make 
it more effective. And in his--in capacity as a Permanent 
Representative, I think we can expect that kind of an approach 
to continue.
    Second, let me touch on two issues about policy, policy 
that was made--policy that was referenced in two speeches, 
Syria and North Korea. We have heard quotes offered by 
opponents of Mr. Bolton that suggest somehow that the speeches 
on North Korea and Syria were not cleared by the State 
Department. The suggestion that Ambassador Hubbard was--had a 
quote that he didn't agree with the tone of the speech, that 
is--that suggestion is misleading. The suggestion that these 
speeches were not clear is misleading, at best.
    In both cases, the content of the speeches were cleared 
fully and appropriately through the channels in our State 
Department. Period. The speech on North Korea was cleared. The 
testimony on Syria was cleared. Cleared not just by State, but 
also through Homeland Security and the CIA and the NSC. If we 
want to quibble about the timing or the process, that it was 
slower than it should be, well, we can do that, but was the 
testimony cleared? Yes. Was the speech in Korea cleared? 
Absolutely.
    Which brings us to this--the issue, the very specific issue 
of policy versus procedure. And this is important, because, 
again, suggestions were made that simply aren't accurate. In 
particular, I think the phrase was just used that he attempted 
to fire, or have fired, intelligence officers that would not 
support his interpretation of analysis. I think ``arm-
twisting'' was also used, that he twisted the arms of those 
that did not agree with his analysis. It's wrong.
    In two cases in particular, and the two that we've spent 
the most time on here, the Westermann case and the Smith case. 
In the Westermann case, Mr. Ford, in his testimony, said that 
the disagreement--the controversy, if you will--quote, ``had 
nothing to do with intelligence analysis. It had to do with the 
procedures that were used.'' In the Smith case, as well, the 
confrontation wasn't around disagreements on analysis--and 
there may have been disagreements on substance; I'm sure there 
have been many disagreements on substance--but the controversy, 
the argument, the bad behavior centered around disagreement in 
process and procedure.
    Now, let me touch on both of those.
    In the Smith case, there was a concern that Mr. Smith 
misrepresented the truth when he claimed that the--Mr. Bolton's 
speech on Cuba had not been properly cleared within the 
intelligence community. Now, what does that mean? What that 
means is, an intelligence officer, analyst, actually made 
reference in a hearing to, I believe, Senators, but certainly 
to other staff members, and suggested that it hadn't been 
properly cleared, that the proper procedures weren't used. What 
kind of an allegation is that? That's a very serious 
allegation, suggesting that John Bolton didn't properly handle 
intelligence, didn't properly handle information that may or 
may not be classified, that he was cavalier with intelligence.
    Now, I asked a simple question. Senator Lugar, in his 
opening statement, said, ``You know, would we want to be held 
to the same standard that some are placing on John Bolton?'' 
Well, let's look at this case, in particular. What if a staff 
member--we found out that a staff member or a fellow member of 
the Senate were making accusations against us that we couldn't 
properly handle intelligence, that we were not going through 
the proper procedure in dealing with important intelligence 
analysis? Would we be angry? I think some of us would be angry. 
Would we try to have staff fired? I believe I would not. But I 
don't think it's too strong a statement to say that there may 
be members of the U.S. Senate that would actually try to have 
staff fired. Not necessarily the right thing, not good 
behavior. And maybe none of the hundred Senators would do so. 
But what if someone had made such an allegation? And it is not 
a matter of speculation that this allegation was made; it is 
not a matter of speculation that this individual made a--
suggested that proper procedure wasn't used; it's a matter of 
public record.
    Second, the Westermann case. I think the chairman's opening 
statement, and Senator Coleman, highlighted a couple of 
important points here. But, again, this was a question of 
procedure, not a--the confrontation with Mr. Westermann wasn't 
based on a disagreement on analysis or the intelligence, 
itself, even though there may have been a different approach 
that the two have taken. But the argument, the berating, if you 
will, had to do with the fact that Mr. Westermann failed to 
follow proper clearance procedures regarding the 
declassification of this language. That's why there was an e-
mail that same day that said this was inappropriate, quote, 
``We screwed up.'' That refers to the fact that the proper 
procedures weren't followed.
    Now, here's the irony. What if John Bolton was the one that 
failed to follow the proper procedure? What would we be talking 
about then? Of course, his opponents would be criticizing him 
mercilessly for failing to follow proper procedures dealing 
with intelligence analysis.
    So, here we have--his opponents would clearly criticize him 
if he didn't use the proper procedure, and they're criticizing 
him for criticizing someone else for not using the proper 
procedure. This is a double standard, at best; and it is 
hypocrisy, pure and simple, at worse.
    But the point to underscore is that these are questions of 
procedure, where, in the cases of Syria and Korea, his 
speeches, he followed the proper procedure. In the case of his 
disagreement with Mr. Smith, it had to do with the fact that 
Smith accused him of not following procedure, when he did. And, 
in the case of Westermann, it's clear from the record that Mr. 
Westermann did not follow proper procedure.
    This isn't about firing intelligence--members of the 
intelligence community that happened to disagree with him. This 
is serious concerns about using the right procedure. We can 
talk about--and certainly we're raising the issue of whether he 
handled all cases the way he would have preferred to, in 
hindsight. But, I think, when we're making allegations or 
throwing out quotes, we need to make sure we're putting them in 
their proper context. We need to make sure that we understand 
the facts of each of these incidents before we try to cut short 
what has been, I think, a very strong and distinguished career.
    Mr. Chairman, you've been very gracious with the time. I 
thank you very much.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Sununu.
    Now, let me ask the permission of the distinguished ranking 
member to----
    Senator Biden. Yes, please.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. Recognize----
    Senator Biden. Please continue. We only have one more 
member that wishes to speak, and he's in another--he has 
another appointment. He said he will be here shortly, so----
    The Chairman.  Very well.
    Senator Biden  [continuing]. Whatever time that comes, 
we'll--I'll yield to him.
    The Chairman.  Senator Murkowski.

   STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

    Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I know that this has been a long process, not only for Mr. 
Bolton, but for the committee, as well, and I thank you for 
your indulgence, your patience.
    I also want to thank you for the delay, if you will, the 
time that we have had, since this committee last met, to do 
just exactly what Senator Sununu was talking about, was to get 
to the facts. There were things that were raised at the last 
business meeting, and it was probably your prerogative, as the 
Chair, to move forward at that point in time, but I appreciate 
the chance that you gave this committee to go out and do its 
homework.
    I, as a committee member, undertook that willingly, and 
perhaps--you know, my eyes are paying for it now, but I 
appreciate that you gave us that opportunity, because it is 
important to go into some of the allegations, to go into the 
background.
    I also want to thank the committee staff, who probably 
spent most of their recess going through with the interviews 
and providing the transcripts so that we could then review 
them. That was tough.
    The challenges and the opportunities that face the next 
U.S. Representatives to the U.N. here are incredibly 
significant, and we've heard that repeated here this afternoon. 
But we are at a point--a point in time where real reform can 
take place, where countries that are habitual abusers of human 
rights do not find seats on the Human Rights Commission, and 
that investigations into the Oil-for-Food Program are given the 
real consideration that they deserve. So, this is not the time 
for us--this is not the time for the United States to send an 
individual to the U.N. that is just going to be a caretaker, 
but one who will be proactive in pushing the United States 
agenda.
    So the question that we are faced with today, that has been 
raised by several, the question before us is, Is John Bolton 
the right individual for that particular job?
    Now, prior to the President's nomination of Mr. Bolton to 
be the Representative to the U.N., I had not had any personal 
dealings with this gentleman, I hadn't had an opportunity to 
meet him, to interact with him, so what I knew was really what 
I had heard from the media, fortunately or unfortunately, and 
comments from my colleagues. And since this intervening time in 
this past couple of months, I have come to know a great deal 
about Mr. Bolton. And as I--I told him yesterday, ``I probably 
know far more about you than I had ever hoped to.'' But I think 
it's fair to say that one of the things that I have learned 
about him is that Mr. Bolton has a management style that is 
perhaps far different than my particular management style.
    Now, there's been discussion about behavior, about 
management style, about how one conducts oneself. And, as you 
go through the transcripts, as you listen to the testimony that 
we have heard, and as I have talked to individuals who have had 
the opportunity to work with Mr. Bolton, you hear some words 
that describe him. He has been described as overcharging, hard-
charging, overbearing, and confrontation. Now, there are some 
here that view these characteristics, as--hard-charging, as 
exactly what we need in the U.N. right now, a no-nonsense, 
straight-talking, you know, this-guy's-not-going-to-take-bull-
from-anybody type of a representative.
    I've also had conversations with people, and read the 
testimony from those who have interacted with the nominee that 
have used the word ``brilliant'' when they have described him. 
But they also use the term--they say he's very difficult to 
work with. He can be focused, but he can be over-aggressive.
    It's also become clear to me that when Mr. Bolton has made 
up his mind about an issue, he can be very--it can be difficult 
to change that mindset.
    And I, too--I guess I've paid my penance, as Senator 
Voinovich said, for going through all of the pages and pages, 
the hundreds of pages of testimony. Fortunately, I've got a 
long plane ride between Alaska and D.C., so I had a lot of time 
to do the reading. But I also had a lot of time to do the 
thinking.
    You know, when I first met with Mr. Bolton in our courtesy 
visit--this was prior to the time that any allegations had come 
out that he had been abusive toward staff members, and so, it 
was a topic that we did not discuss. What we did discuss at 
that meeting, though, was his role in New York. We talked about 
some of the inflammatory statements that he had made in the 
past. And the question that I asked him was, Whose opinion 
would he be presenting at the U.N.? Would it be the 
President's, the Secretary of State's, or would it be his own?
    And I bring this up for a couple of reasons. When he made 
his comments about North Korea's leader in his speech in North 
Korea, this became part of the committee's focus during that 
interview process. And we, in Alaska, spend a lot of time and 
energy looking and focusing on the North Korea issue.
    I found Mr. Bolton's comments to be inflammatory at a time 
when we were trying to promote diplomacy in the region, and it 
seemed to me that if he was willing to fan the flames with 
disparaging rhetoric at that point in time, it was a question 
to me as to how he would conduct himself in New York. And it 
was an issue that we brought up at that initial meeting.
    I also understand that Mr. Bolton remarked during his 
confirmation hearing that he received a thank you, from then-
Ambassador Hubbard, for his speech, saying that the speech had 
been helpful, and it would do them some good in South Korea. 
And yet, when I reviewed the transcript from the interview with 
Ambassador Hubbard, it was very clear that Hubbard's intent had 
not been to thank Mr. Bolton for the speech, itself, but for 
making some factual changes to the speech so as not to spread 
the flames any further. And I have to agree with Ambassador 
Hubbard's assessment that the speech did not advance the 
President's objective of verifiably dismantling North Korea's 
nuclear program through negotiation.
    A second matter, I had had concerns that Mr. Bolton might 
get out ahead of instructions while stationed in a post outside 
of Washington. And in reviewing the transcripts, and in 
conversations that I have had with individuals, I believe that 
there is a pattern of Mr. Bolton pushing that envelope on 
whether he could or could not say in trying to push policy that 
was perhaps more ambitious than the administration might be 
willing to go. But then you dig deeper into the evidence. You 
find out Mr. Hubbard's suggestion that it was possible that Mr. 
Bolton may have misinterpreted his remarks leading to his 
comments at the hearing.
    And then we've got Secretary Powell's letter to Senator Kyl 
stating very clearly that Mr. Bolton's speech had been fully 
cleared by the State Department.
    Then you look at the transcript from Lawrence Wilkerson's 
interview, and it was very clear that Bolton went through the 
appropriate hoops and hurdles to have his speech cleared, even 
if those who cleared it may not have given it the attention 
that it needed. We saw that there had been e-mails released 
indicating the appropriate officials had signed off on that 
speech.
    So, whether you support or don't support the content of the 
speech--and I do question the language that was used at that 
particular time--the reality is that Mr. Bolton did what he was 
supposed to do in getting the speech cleared, which was 
approved by those at a higher paygrade.
    Now, when the committee, at the business meeting that we 
had last, learned of the allegations that Mr. Bolton had 
berated an INR analyst in his office, an individual who was not 
directly working for Mr. Bolton, that concerned me. It concerns 
me a great deal. And the additional charges of trying to get 
other personnel removed from their positions only added to that 
concern. Because I do believe that how one treats, not only 
those on in a similar level of authority, but also those with 
not as much power, it says a lot. It says a lot about them as a 
person and how they will work with others. And in this position 
in the U.N., our representative needs to be able to work with 
others to build that--those relationships.
    But, at the same time, I recognize that this is the 
President's nominee. The President deserves to be surrounded by 
individuals that he trusts, by individuals that he selects, and 
by individuals who will advance the interests of the 
administration. And that's a high bar to overcome.
    When it comes down to--right down to it, it's not about Mr. 
Bolton's intelligence. He's certainly demonstrated that he has 
intellectual prowess. It's not about his capability, as he's 
clearly demonstrated, in a number of global projects, he's 
advancing the U.S.'s interests. There's no question in my mind 
that Mr. Bolton has the ability to effectively represent the 
United States in a beneficial manner if that ability is 
directed appropriately.
    My concern, as you can probably tell, has more to do with 
the conduct, how Mr. Bolton conducts himself, how he treats 
those who disagree with his assessments, how he conducts 
himself with his superiors, his equals, and those below him on 
the totem pole. So, it's not how John Bolton treats Lisa 
Murkowski; it's how John Bolton will interact with other 
representatives and their staff in the U.N., and how he 
represents the United States.
    So, ultimately, in a position assigned by the President, 
that conduct is going to reflect on the President and the head 
of the Department. It's the President's responsibility to 
ensure that his nominee is part of the team, he's not a 
freelancer, and that the nominee abides by the chain of 
command, receives the appropriate input, and listens to that 
input. The President has put his trust in John Bolton. 
Secretary Rice has put her trust in John Bolton. The President 
deserves to have an individual that he believes will be most 
effective in that position. And with the understanding that how 
Mr. Bolton conducts himself at the U.N. reflects directly on 
the President of the United States, I will support moving Mr. 
Bolton's nomination to the Senate floor.
    The Chairman.  I thank you, Senator Murkowski.
    Senator Biden, may I recognize Senator Martinez?
    Senator Biden. Sure.
    The Chairman.  Senator Martinez, you're recognized.

   STATEMENT OF HON. MEL MARTINEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Martinez.  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to, in the interest of time, have my entire 
statement placed in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Martinez.  Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Martinez follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Mel Martinez

    Chairman Lugar, I would like to thank you and your staff for the 
continued time and effort you have put forth on this nomination. You 
and your team have completed an exhaustive review of Mr. Bolton, and I 
commend you for your continued effort on this important nomination.
    Over the years I have observed the work of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, and I have to say one of the reasons I was so drawn to 
working on the Foreign Relations Committee as a new Senator was the 
bipartisan nature of the work done here. So I have been a little 
disappointed by the events of the past several weeks--by what appears 
to be a departure from that proud tradition.
    This is an important appointment at a crucial moment in the history 
of the U.N. Our debate should be about how the U.S. should and can 
contribute to the reform of the United Nations, but I have not heard 
much conversation on the specifics of United Nations reform during this 
process.
    I wholeheartedly agree with the recent remarks made by Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage, ``John Bolton is eminently 
qualified. He's one of the smartest guys in Washington.''
    Mr. Bolton's legal background, tenure at USAID, experience at the 
State Department, and extensive research and related writing work makes 
him an ideal candidate to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. I cannot think of a more qualified individual and it appears 
that this very committee is also aware of Mr. Bolton's qualifications, 
having advanced Mr. Bolton's nomination three times before.
    In 1982, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton 
Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination at USAID. 
In 1989, this committee voted in favor of naming Mr. Bolton Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs. And, in 
2001, this committee voted in favor of naming for Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security. All three of these 
previous nominations were advanced by this committee and confirmed by 
the United States Senate.
    During each of these nominations, this committee undertook a very 
thorough look at Mr. Bolton's qualifications and experience. On January 
27, 1982, the committee received testimony on Mr. Bolton's first 
nomination to be Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy 
Coordination at USAID. Mr. Chairman--Even then, Mr. Bolton already 
possessed an impressive resume, which included General Counsel for 
USAID, and Legal Counsel for the White House and a graduate of Yale 
College, and Yale Law School. And because of this experience and 
background, the Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination, and Mr. 
Bolton did an honorable job of carrying out that policy during very 
uncertain Cold War times.
    In 1989, this committee again reviewed Mr. Bolton--this time for 
his nomination as the Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations Affairs. In fact, our distinguished colleague from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his nomination hearing. As Mr. 
Kerry explained in his opening remarks, as the Assistant Secretary, Mr. 
Bolton would be responsible for U.S. relations with the United Nations.
    Mr. Bolton shared his views on the UN system and why it was 
important to build upon then-recent improvements to its effectiveness. 
Mr. Bolton relayed that the then ``44-year old Charter of the United 
Nations embodies those values which have guided this nation during the 
course of more than two hundred years of our development.'' He 
identified the essence of the U.N. Charter to be a ``Respect for the 
supremacy of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes between men and nations, and most importantly, the faith that 
mankind can peacefully build a better world for succeeding 
generations.''
    More than 15 years ago, Mr. Bolton was already was talking to this 
Committee about tangible ideas to strengthen and improve the United 
Nations and make sure it was a viable part of our international 
community. This is a man who believed--and still believes--in the 
mission of the UN more than 15 years ago he was already presenting 
solid ideas about how to make the U.N. work and make it better. This is 
a man who fifteen years ago could see both the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the United Nations and identify a positive way ahead.
    For example, Mr. Bolton talked about the quiet day-to-day work the 
UN did to improve the welfare of poverty stricken women, children, the 
sick, and refugees around the world. And he explained that these 
efforts deserve the fullest possible extent of support from us and 
other nations.
    Yet, and I will quote Mr. Bolton's testimony: ``While we seek to 
support the many worthy efforts of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies we must not turn a blind eye to some excesses and 
poor management that have undermined UN effectiveness. Politicization 
and mismanagement have robbed the UN and some of its agencies of the 
moral high ground in recent years.''
    It is disappointing to me that fifteen years later, Mr. Bolton's 
warning about turning a blind eye remains so fitting to the environment 
we find ourselves in today at the U.N. Rampant corruption, waste and 
ineffectiveness are the norm at the United Nations, and we have an 
institution failing in its mission.
    During the same hearing, the presiding Chairman, our distinguished 
colleague--Mr. Kerry--discussed with Mr. Bolton his qualifications for 
the Assistant Secretary position and Mr. Bolton, I think very 
eloquently, outlined his respective experience.
    How his background as a lawyer would prepare him for the 
international law and legal procedures, which govern the UN. How his 
years at the Justice Department in the Legislative Affairs shop would 
give him insight in the Western-styled legislatures of the General 
Assembly and the various governing councils of the specialized 
agencies.
    And how his time as the General Counsel, and then as Assistant 
Administrator at USAID, gave him the opportunity to learn a 
considerable amount about economic development in the Third World and 
had an opportunity to work with a number of UN agencies, the Rome Food 
Agencies, and others. And because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the 
Senate confirmed Mr. Bolton's nomination by Unanimous Consent.
    So, now we are spring of 2001--when Mr. Bolton was again before 
this Committee--this time with a nomination to be Under Secretary of 
State for Arms Control and International Security.
    Interestingly, a principal concern about Mr. Bolton's nomination 
for the Under Secretary position was the strength of his background in 
arms control. Ironically, the concern was that Mr. Bolton's background 
was principally in international development, multi-national 
organizations, and foreign assistance. The very background that makes 
him ideal for the position he is being considered for today.
    In fact, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut remarked 
during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination, ``there is no 
question that Mr. Bolton is an individual of integrity and 
intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said Mr. Bolton had a ``distinguished 
record.'' And as Senator John Warner reported in his introduction of 
Mr. Bolton to the committee, ``he is a seasoned negotiator who knows 
how to represent American national interests in the toughest of 
situations,'' and ``has extensive personal and professional experience 
dealing with multinational organizations.''
    But, similar to today, the heart of the debate was whether or not 
you agreed with John Bolton's thinking and views.
    I think former Chairman Jesse Helms summed up the debate quite well 
when he remarked to Mr. Bolton during his nomination hearing, ``This 
ought not to be a partisan thing . . . Whether they like you or not is 
irrelevant. What should be decided here is whether you are a competent 
man.'' I couldn't agree more.
    Equally intriguing were the subsequent remarks by the Ranking 
Member, Mr. Biden. And if I could, Mr. Chairman, I will quote the 
distinguished Ranking Member directly:

          I want to make it clear, this is not about your competence. 
        My problem with you over the years has been you have been too 
        competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid and not very 
        effective. I would have been had a better shot over the years. 
        But I really mean it sincerely,--none of this, my questions, 
        nor do I believe any of my colleagues questions, relate to any 
        personal animus about you as a person. I think you're an 
        honorable man and you are extremely competent. It's about how 
        different your views are.

    And this is the very same debate we are facing today.
    This isn't a debate about Mr. Bolton's qualifications or expertise. 
This isn't about whether he has the right experience and background for 
the job the President has nominated him for--what we're dealing with 
today is a very partisan political effort to disqualify Mr. Bolton's 
nomination.
    This is about John Bolton's personality. And, at the risk of 
oversimplifying, whether he is a nice guy. And whether we like him. I 
think the majority of my colleagues--Republican and Democrat alike--
agree that Mr. Bolton is a competent man. His record speaks for itself. 
Previous attempts at discrediting his views, experience, and 
qualifications have failed, so now, all there's left to talk about is 
whether or not he is a nice guy.
    Mr. Chairman, the fact is, even the allegations against Mr. 
Bolton's character are very weak. And they surely haven't revealed any 
pattern of inappropriate conduct. I reinforced this point during the 
last month's hearing with Mr. Ford.
    Mr. Chairman, I'd like to recount my exchange with Mr. Ford, 
specifically his broad sweeping statement, under oath, regarding Mr. 
Bolton's character.

          Senator Martinez.  In other words, there was a confrontation 
        between you and he in a hallway which, admittedly we have to 
        say, you had a pretty good falling out or pretty good 
        discussion, it was heated, it was emotional, it was 
        confrontational.
          Mr. Ford.  That's correct, sir.
          Senator Martinez.  Okay, and that arose out of the same 
        circumstance, the same event which was the conversation between 
        the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?
          Mr. Ford.  That's correct.
          Senator Martinez.  But you really cannot, in good faith, 
        under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this 
        Committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in 
        Mr. Bolton's part, can you?
          Mr. Ford.  You're absolutely correct in terms of I have 
        absolutely--beyond what I've talked to you about, and 
        admittedly extremely limited--right or wrong, good or bad, I 
        still believe that this was not an exceptional day, or out of 
        the ordinary in terms of his normal management style.
          Senator Martinez.  That's your sense, that's your opinion. 
        But that's not something you can really provide.
          Mr. Ford.  No, sir.
          Senator Martinez.  In the nature of testimony under oath.
          Mr. Ford.  No, certainly not from me, you can't get that.

    Mr. Chairman, one incident does not constitute a pattern. And you 
surely can't speak of something being a pattern if you haven't 
personally witnessed it, even once. Fundamental fairness requires that 
hearsay be discounted. It's just unacceptable that this instance has 
received as much attention as it has.
    Turning to another topic that I believe has been extremely 
inaccurately portrayed, Mr. Chairman, I want to clear up any 
misunderstandings surrounding a supposedly controversial statement that 
Mr. Bolton has made previously, which is that the United States 
believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare 
research effort, and that Cuba has provided dual-use bio-technology to 
other rogue states, and a concern that such technology could support 
bio-weapons programs in those states.
    Let me set the record straight: It is the U.S. position today--as 
it has been since March 2002 when Carl Ford testified before this 
committee that the U.S. believes Cuba does indeed have some biological 
warfare capabilities.
    In February, 2002, there was on all accounts a heated confrontation 
between John Bolton and intelligence analyst, Christian Westermann. At 
issue was Mr. Westermann's attempt to block Mr. Bolton's request to 
have Cuba biological warfare related language declassified for speech 
purposes.
    Specifically, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. Bolton's back and sent 
a biased and confusing declassification request to the intelligence 
community. He subsequently misled the Under Secretary's office about 
his actions. In a nutshell, because Mr. Westermann did not agree with 
the ``message'' of the requested language, he sought to have it 
changed. Despite Mr. Westermann's efforts Bolton's language was 
ultimately approved for declassification and was included in his May 6, 
2002 Heritage Foundation speech.
    As Mr. Ford confirmed for this committee, that very same statement 
appeared in Mr. Ford's own testimony before this committee during 
March. That very same language was cleared by Mr. Ford's office, as 
well as other intelligence agencies. Former Otto Reich has also used 
the same statement in subsequent remarks.
    This had nothing to do with John Bolton trying to skew intelligence 
on Cuba's biological warfare program. This language was approved by the 
intelligence community and has been used by several sources since its 
approval. And per Mr. Ford, this multiply issued statement reflected 
the correct belief of the United States, as it stood at that time.
    The dispute with Mr. Westermann as the language was developed in 
February 2002 had to do 100% with Westermann's conduct--not a dispute 
over his analysis. I don't see any real issue here, Mr. Chairman.
    One final matter I discussed with Mr. Ford, which I'll briefly 
share with the Committee, was Mr. Ford's concern about how that 
information ultimately became a part of his Mr. Bolton's speech. 
Initially, Mr. Ford suggested to this Committee that the entire 
controversy related to the analyst would have been avoided if Mr. 
Bolton had merely come to Mr. Ford first. Mr. Ford identified this as a 
central cause of the problem. However, when questioned, Mr. Ford 
admitted that Mr. Bolton had, in fact, tried to contact him initially--
but that Mr. Ford was out of the building that day. As such, Mr. Bolton 
didn't reach Mr. Ford. But he got his Principal Deputy, Mr. Fingar. And 
the response from this Principal Deputy was that the behavior by his 
analyst was inappropriate, and that they ``screwed up.'' That ``it 
won't happen again.'' We have all seen copies of the actual email Mr. 
Fingar sent to Mr. Bolton with these remarks.
    Mr. Chairman, this was all contemporaneous with the events. Mr. 
Bolton did, in fact, try to reach Mr. Ford. And in Mr. Ford's absence, 
Mr. Bolton handled the situation with Ford's Principal Deputy. And, the 
Principal Deputy confirmed that the anaylyst was in error. Point being, 
this was a red herring. And the other allegations unearthed against Mr. 
Bolton carry similar meaning and weight. This is merely a collateral 
attack against Mr. Bolton.
    You need more than hearsay, more than unsubstantiated rhetoric to 
carry through--to destroy a person's reputation and character. We 
should be operating on a standard of fundamental fairness. We simply 
haven't met that threshold. We haven't even come close. Interestingly, 
what we do have, is a growing list of individuals coming forward with 
an opposite account of Mr. Bolton's personality and management style.
    I'd like to share, for a moment, what some people who've actually 
worked for John Bolton had to say. In an April 22nd letter to Chairman 
Lugar, 43 former associates of Mr. Bolton at the American Enterprise 
Institute wrote:

          The various allegations that have been raised before your 
        Committee, concerning Mr. Bolton's management style and conduct 
        in other organizations and circumstances, are radically at odds 
        with our experiences in more than four years of intense, 
        frequent, and continuous interaction with him.

          He was unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless 
        of our (AEI) positions or seniority.

          John Bolton's management style (at AEI) became legendary for 
        its crispness, openness, fairness, and efficiency.

    In the T3Washington Post,  on April 24, 2005, Former Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger remarked:

          [A]s to the charge that Bolton has been tough on 
        subordinates, I can say only that in more than a decade of 
        association with him in the State Department, I never saw or 
        heard anything to support such a charge.

    Mr. Chairman, I am sure you have seen a similar outpouring of 
remarks in favor of Mr. Bolton--outlining a ecidedly positive pattern 
of behavior. That said, I think we have to ask ourselves, isn't this a 
very bizarre discussion to be having when it comes to the nomination of 
our Ambassador to the United Nations? We're not voting on his 
popularity for homecoming court--we're looking at his ability to get 
the job done for which he has been nominated--the very important job of 
representing the United States as Ambassador to the United Nations.
    This debate has been hijacked to rehash different allegations about 
personality and whether or not we approve of John Bolton's management 
style, rather than reviewing his respective qualifications, and talking 
meaningfully about how he would tackle some of the key issues 
confronting the UN.
    Contrary to Mr. Bolton's three previous nominations before this 
committee--when committee members questioned Mr. Bolton about 
everything from the CTBT to USAID's partnership with PVOs), there is a 
noted absence of substantive dialogue about key issues. There has been 
no real debate about his qualifications or ability to get the job done.
    For example, what should the future role of the UN be in Haiti? 
What steps would Bolton take to move the UN out of the costly and 
dangerous mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea? And towards a final and 
binding decision of the Boundary Commission? Also absent is meaningful 
dialogue about Mr. Bolton's writings related to the UN and its reform.
    In addition to the congressional testimony I already referenced, 
Mr. Bolton's research and writings have long advocated a stronger UN.
    For example, in 1997, Mr. Bolton wrote that ``traditional 
peacekeeping, together with the often-important role the agencies of 
the U.N. system play in international delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, can work and should be continued.'' He added that the 
United Nations can be a ``useful tool in the American foreign policy 
kit.''
    To me, we should have been using recent hearings and time spent in 
countless interviews talking about John Bolton's ideas for the future 
of the U.N. To talk, in detail, about how we can work with the 
Secretary General and his desire for reform.
    The fact is, President Bush chose John Bolton because he knows how 
to get things done. This nomination is a direct reflection of the 
President's determination to make the UN work. And the President should 
have this push for reform given a chance to succeed.
    Mr. Chairman, I think you would agree that Mr. Bolton's remarks, 
writings, and action over the past twenty plus years, beginning with 
his first nomination hearing before this committee in January, 1982, 
reveal a very comprehensive understanding of the UN--an understanding 
of both its strengths and its weaknesses.
    John Bolton has long been a strong voice for UN reform and 
effective multilateralism, and will continue to be a strong voice at a 
time when the UN is undertaking essential reform initiatives. President 
Bush wants John Bolton as part of his foreign policy team and to 
represent the United States at the United Nations. He is qualified and 
prepared.
    The issues raised questioning his qualifications and character have 
failed to come anywhere close to the level of disqualifying him from 
this position.
    There is no compelling reason to deny the POTUS his choice of 
nominee for this position. I look forward to voting to confirm Mr. 
Bolton and supporting this nominee.

    Senator Martinez.  I want to thank the Chair and the 
ranking member for the manner in which you've conducted all of 
these deliberations.
    I want to also compliment the Chair for the very thoughtful 
opening remarks, which I thought were comprehensive in nature 
and covered the--in a wonderful way, and, I think, also put 
perspective and fairness into a process that I, frankly, at 
times, have wondered about.
    Let me also say that, as Senator Hagel commented, this is a 
committee that has been revered through the history of our 
nation. And as a person not born to this land, but one who's 
adopted it as his own land, I must say that I always remarked 
and marveled at the bipartisan nature of American foreign 
policy and the way in which folks with very different thoughts 
and ideas would come together for the greater good of the 
country. And I would hope, as we go forward in this committee, 
Mr. Chairman--and I know how important that is to you and to 
the ranking member--that we can always keep that in mind, 
because I think in the difficult days in which we live, and the 
difficulties the world faces, and our nation faces in the 
world, it is vitally important that we always keep in mind the 
importance of us to all pull together as Americans--not 
Democrats, not Republicans, but as Americans. And I--my hope, 
in that spirit, is that this committee will always conduct its 
deliberations----
    As I look at the nominee, I believe, first and foremost, 
the President of the United States has nominated him. I think, 
secondarily, our advice and consent responsibility, which I, 
too, take seriously, begins by analyzing the qualifications of 
the candidate. And as it relates to the qualifications of this 
particular nominee, I take a lot of comfort from the comments 
of Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who very directly 
worked with Secretary Bolton, who said, ``John Bolton is 
eminently qualified, and he's one of the smartest guys in 
Washington.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, I know that coming in the order of the 
lineup in which I do, there's a tendency to think of myself as 
cleanup. I'm also thinking, though, that I may be hitting 
number nine, which is a very different statement than cleanup. 
But, be that is it may, I want to, maybe, summarize a little of 
what's transpired.
    And I think, you know, looking at his background at USAID, 
his experience in the State Department, and extensive research 
and writing relating to many different subjects, which I think 
prepared him for this role at the United Nations. And then, of 
course, we move on to the various nominations that he has 
received in the past, and confirmations by this committee, in 
1982, as Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy 
Coordination at USAID; in 1989, this committee in favor of 
naming Mr. Bolton Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organizational Affairs; and, in 2001, voted in 
favor of naming him Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security.
    All three of these previous nominations were advanced by 
this committee and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. During each of 
these nominations, this committee undertook a thorough look at 
Mr. Bolton's qualifications and his experience. The committee 
received, on January 27 of '82, Mr. Bolton's first nomination 
for Assistant Secretary of Policy of USAID. And, even at that 
time, Mr. Chairman, he already had a distinguished record of 
accomplishment. And he, in addition to that, did a very 
honorable job in carrying out his assignments during the 
difficult years of the Cold War.
    In 1989, this committee again, reviewed Mr. Bolton; this 
time, for Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organizations. And my distinguished colleague from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, presided over his hearing at that 
time. And, as Mr. Kerry explained in his opening remarks, the 
Assistant Secretary, Mr. Bolton, would be responsible for U.S. 
relations with the United Nations.
    At that time, Mr. Bolton shared his views on the U.N. 
system, on why it was important to build upon the then-recent 
improvements to its effectiveness. And Mr. Bolton then 
relayed--the 44-year-old charter of the U.N. embodies those 
values which have guided this nation during the course of more 
than 200 years of our development, and he identified the 
essence of the U.N. charter to be a respect for the supremacy 
of law above individuals, for the peaceful resolution of 
disputes between men and nations, and, most importantly, the 
faith that mankind can peacefully build a better world for 
succeeding generations.
    This doesn't sound to me, Mr. Chairman, as far back as 15 
years ago, as someone who was bent upon the destruction of this 
organization, but someone who held it in high esteem and high 
regard. This is a man who, 15 years ago, could also see the 
strengths and the weaknesses of this organization. Mr. Bolton 
talked quietly--talked about the quiet day-to-day work of the 
U.N. that it did to improve the welfare of poverty-stricken 
women and children, the sick, and refugees around the world. 
And he explained that these efforts deserve the fullest 
possible extent of support from us and other nations.
    And yet I will quote from Mr. Bolton's testimony, ``While 
we seek to support the many worthy efforts of the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies, we must not turn a blind 
eye to some excesses and poor management that have undermined 
its effectiveness. Politicization and mismanagement have robbed 
the U.N. and some of its agencies of the high moral ground in 
recent years.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, 15 years later, it's disappointing to 
know that Mr. Bolton's warning about turning a blind eye 
remains so fitting to the environment we find ourself today in 
the United Nations. Rampant corruption, waste, and 
ineffectiveness are the norm at the U.N., and we have an 
institution that, in many ways, is failing in its mission.
    Because of this experience, Mr. Chairman, the United 
States--because of his experience, the U.S. Senate confirmed 
Mr. Bolton's nomination by unanimous consent.
    And now we're in the spring of 2001, when, again, Mr. 
Bolton was before this committee. And this time the nomination 
for Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security. And, interestingly enough, at that time, the concern 
about Mr. Bolton's nomination for this particular position was 
the strength of his background in arms control. It was then 
said that his background was in international organizations, 
where he had spent so much of his time worrying about the 
world's poor and USAID, worrying about the U.S. relationship 
with the U.N. and other international organizations, and 
whether or not, in fact, he had the sufficient background in 
the arms-control arena.
    And, as my distinguished colleague from Connecticut 
remarked during the floor debate on Mr. Bolton's nomination, 
``There is no question,'' he said, ``that Mr. Bolton is an 
individual of integrity and intelligence.'' Mr. Dodd even said 
Mr. Bolton had a distinguished record.
    Similar to today, the heart of the debate of whether or not 
you agree with--is really about whether you agree with Mr. 
Bolton's thinking. At that time, at that hearing, the remarks 
by the ranking member, Mr. Biden--and, if I could, Mr. 
Chairman, I'll quote again from the ranking member directly--he 
said, ``I want to make it clear that it's not about your 
competence. My problem with you over the years has been that 
you've been too competent. I mean, I would rather you be stupid 
and not very effective. I would have been--it would have been--
it would have been--had a better shot over the years. But I 
really mean it sincerely. None of this--my questions, nor do I 
believe any of my colleagues' questions, relate to any personal 
animus about you as a person. I think you're an honorable man, 
and you're extremely competent. It's about how different your 
views are.''
    And, Mr. Chairman, that's the very same debate we face here 
today. This is not a debate about his qualifications or 
expertise; this is about a debate of whether he has the right 
experience and background for the job. What we're dealing here 
today is a debate that has gotten somewhat partisan, and it 
really has to do about Mr. Bolton's views. The majority of my 
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats alike, agree that Mr. 
Bolton is a competent man, and I believe his record speaks for 
itself. And previous attempts at discrediting his views, 
experience, and qualifications have failed. So now we're 
talking in another direction about--a collateral attack about 
things that cannot be as easily discussed on the record, but 
about his demeanor and so forth.
    And so, I go to Mr. Ford's testimony, here in the 
committee, who made the broad, sweeping statement, under oath, 
regarding Mr. Bolton's character. He simply said that Mr. 
Bolton did not have the temperament necessary, and sweepingly 
attempted to attack his character.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I want to just briefly quote from this 
soliloquy that took place between Mr. Ford and myself.
    I asked the witness, ``In other words, there was a 
confrontation between you--in the hallway, in which--between 
the two of you in the hallway, which you admittedly have to say 
you had a pretty good falling out, a pretty good discussion. It 
was heated. It was emotional. It was confrontational.''
    Mr. Ford, ``That is correct.''
    And then I asked, ``Okay, and that arose out of the same 
circumstance, the same event, which was the conversation 
between the analyst and Secretary Bolton, correct?''
    ``That's correct,'' was his answer.
    And then I asked, ``But you really cannot, in good faith, 
under oath, suggest that you have the ability to tell this 
committee that this now represents a broader character flaw in 
Mr. Bolton's part, can you?''
    Mr. Ford--and Mr. Ford answered, ``You're absolutely 
correct. In terms of--I have absolutely--beyond what I've 
talked about, and admittedly extremely limited, right or wrong, 
good or bad, I still believe that this was not an exceptional 
day or out of the ordinary, in terms of his normal management 
style.''
    And then I asked him, ``That's your sense. That's your 
opinion. But that's not something you can really provide''----
    He interrupted and said, ``No, sir.
    ``--in the nature of testimony under oath.''
    And then he said, ``No, certainly not. Not from me. You 
can't get that.''
    One incident does not constitute a pattern. One event does 
not constitute a way of life. And I believe, Mr. Chairman, that 
one of the things that has been absent from this discussion is 
the principles of fundamental fairness. We have a man with a 
long and distinguished record of public service to his country, 
of dedicated service, of mostly competent service, and that it 
cannot be said that, by the failure of a few incidents, it's 
now without merit and someone whose entire career should be 
diminished by those comments.
    Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up, and I realize that we're 
very short on time, but I believe, in closing, that I would say 
that the fundamental fairness standard is what we should 
operate by. It should not be about hearsay.
    You detailed very well in your statement many of the 
charges that were then rebutted. I do not believe that it can 
ever be said this gentleman was guilty of massaging 
intelligence. That simply does not meet the test of the facts.
    And I would just finish by saying, Mr. Chairman, that one 
thing that should be crystal clear is that Mr. Bolton's 
statement before--the speech that he gave was the very same 
information regarding bioweapons in Cuba than had been given by 
Mr. Ford to the committee here three months earlier, and that, 
undisputed, continues to be the view of the U.S. Government 
today, that Cuba held a potential for biological weapons, and 
that it shared that information with rogue states. That is not 
changed, and that is not any different. That continues to be 
the view of the U.S. Government today.
    So, Mr. Chairman, I'm prepared to support Mr. Bolton's 
nomination. I'm prepared to move it forward. I think he's a 
dedicated and qualified man, who will make us an excellent 
Representative at the United Nations. I look forward to working 
with him, as I know the President has the confidence in him to 
put the United Nations in a better place, take it to a better 
place. It takes someone who will have the courage and the 
forcefulness of Mr. Bolton to help us fix the United Nations, 
because it is important that we have it there for us and the 
rest of the world.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you, Senator Martinez.
    Senator Biden.
    Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the staff how much 
time that's in the control of the Senator from Delaware is 
still left?
    The Chairman.  Twenty-four minutes.
    Senator Biden. Twenty-four minutes? I will yield ten 
minutes to my friend from Florida. Actually, I'll yield 15 
minutes to my friend.
    The Chairman.  Senator Nelson.

    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

    Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I don't need that much time. 
I can make my statement very clear to the committee in a very 
short period of time.
    This, to me, is about performance. This, to me, is one of 
the most important jobs that we have representing our country 
to the world body of nations of which we so desperately need 
their help at this time. Look at our position in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. We bemoan the fact that it's mainly us and the 
British that are there, and we need to bring others to table to 
support us, not only in Iraq, but around the world.
    And so, when we're talking about a representative of the 
United States of America to the United Nations, we've got to 
have the best and the brightest, and someone who can reach out 
and bring people together. The good book says, ``Come, let us 
reason together.'' That's the kind of person that we ought to 
have.
    So, to get a clue, we have a saying in the South, ``You can 
tell about where a fellow's going by where he's been.'' Well, 
let's look at his job. Does he deserve being promoted because 
of the job that he's done as arms-control negotiator? Where are 
two of the hotspots in the world where the biggest threat to 
the interest of the United States is today? It's North Korea 
and Iran. And, in four years, how much progress have we made in 
stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons in those two 
countries? And who was the person that was charged with, in 
fact, that arms-control negotiation? And now we are asked to 
promote him to a position representing us in front of the world 
body? It just doesn't make sense to me. And so, I'm going to 
vote no on the nomination.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
    Senator Biden, you have at least 20 minutes----
    Senator Biden. Oh, I won't take that long, but I'm going 
to--at your--whenever your suggest, Mr. Chairman, I will sum 
up, knowing--leaving the remainder of the time----
    The Chairman.  Well, I will leave that to you, because--we 
have four minutes on our side, so I will use that as a summing-
up----
    Senator Biden. Well, obviously, Mr. Chairman, you take as 
much time as you want to sum up. I don't--it's fine by me and 
my side.
    Let me state what I hope is the obvious. Our disagreement 
over Mr. Bolton in this committee, the disagreement you and I 
have over Mr. Bolton, and even the disagreements we've had 
internally about how to proceed, sometimes, I want to make it 
absolutely clear, I pledge that's not going to affect at all, 
regardless of the outcome of this, the continued cooperation, 
as I think it's fair to say we have cooperated, on every major 
foreign-policy issue that has come before this committee. This 
is about an individual, whether he should be in the position 
for which he's nominated. It is not about our willingness to 
cooperate, an attempt to maintain, as best we can here, a 
bipartisan foreign policy.
    And I have been proud, as I know you have, and I hope all 
members have been, that--and it's not a criticism of other 
committees directly, but this has not been a committee that has 
been contentious. This is the most contentious thing we've had 
in recent times, although there was a fairly contentious debate 
over Mr. Holbrooke, which was when you were not chairman, and a 
fairly contentious debate over Mr. Negroponte.
    And, I might add, it's been repeatedly stated here--or, 
excuse me, sorry--several times it's been stated that this has 
taken an extraordinarily long time. Well, obviously, it's been 
stated by those people, understandably, who haven't been here. 
This is not long at all, even for this committee.
    Let me just remind folks, you had, in May of the first 
year, Mr. Holbrooke's name floated to be the nominee. He did 
not get a hearing until the following February. He didn't get 
nominated until the following February. He did not get 
confirmed until the following June. Okay? It was August? 
August. Excuse me. He didn't get--so, February to June--I mean, 
February to August. I've got June on my mind, my wife's 
birthday. Anyway.
    Secondly, Mr. Negroponte. His name came up here in May, and 
he was confirmed in September. So, let's get the record 
straight. Let's get the record straight.
    And in the case of Mr. Holbrooke, he had--three separate 
hearings we brought him back. Three separate times. And none of 
my colleagues were arguing then, including us, that he wasn't--
he was being brought back too many times.
    So, for the record--for the record--just taking the recent 
history--the recent history--this is not a long time, number 
one.
    Now, the second point that I'd like to make is, I am 
confident that our two colleagues in the Intelligence committee 
are going to, at some point, produce a letter saying they 
looked at the information coming from the so- called 
intercepts, and that they see no pattern that would raise any 
alarm. But they will also tell you they were not given what Mr. 
Bolton was given. Notwithstanding the fact that they reach that 
conclusion--I believe they will reach that conclusion--they 
were redacted files. They did not have the name of, quote, 
``the American.''
    Call home. [Laughter.]
    And so, I don't have any doubt. But it doesn't, in any way, 
undercut the argument that we're entitled to see what they saw, 
and they were entitled to see more. And, as I said to you all 
the beginning, I'm not at all sure--I think it's kind of a 
blind alley. I don't think there's probably anything there, 
based on my going to present administration officials who I 
respect and past administration officials. But the facts are 
that we're not--we don't have that information.
    Now, I may be mistaken, but I don't ever recall--at least 
in my tenure on this committee, which is embarrassingly long--I 
don't ever recall a nominee being put forward by a President 
that had so many people who worked for that President come 
forward and say, ``That nominee should not be confirmed.'' I 
don't ever recall that. My friend from Maryland's been here 
almost as long as I have. I'm not being--and my friend from 
Indiana has been here almost as long as I have--I would--I 
stand to be corrected, but I don't think it's ever happened. 
Ever. At least in the last 32 years. I would note, that's 
mildly remarkable.
    And I would also point out that notwithstanding the fact--
let's assume--let's grant--as my friend from Florida, the great 
trial lawyer that he was and is, might say, let's argue this in 
the alternative here. Let's assume every one of us are being 
totally partisan. Even if that were true, it doesn't undercut a 
single thing we're saying. Sometimes even when you're partisan, 
you're right. And I would argue that just look at the number of 
significant present and former administration officials who 
said, ``Uh-uh. Bad idea.''
    Now, I go back to a version of what was stated by one of my 
Republican colleagues earlier today. I'm sure--I shouldn't say 
I'm sure--the Secretary of State has indicated to me--she has 
indicated at least one other member of this committee, based on 
what they said today, and, I suspected, indicated to a lot of 
you, ``Don't worry. He won't go off the reservation.'' I'm 
paraphrasing. ``It won't happen like it has happened at State. 
It won't happen. We'll control him.'' Wow.
    Question that was asked by one of my colleagues, Why would 
you send someone to the United Nations at this moment that you 
acknowledge you're going to need to control? Can you think of 
any time in the recent past where our interests are more at 
stake than this moment at the United Nations? Does anybody 
within earshot think that in the next three years we are not 
going to have to attempt to bring North Korea and Iraq before 
the Security Council? I suspect that may happen. Is there any 
time we might need an Adlai Stevenson, whose effectiveness in 
looking across and say, ``Don't wait''--paraphrasing--``Don't 
wait for the translation.'' Why was it so effective? Because 
that was not his style. It was so remarkable that he did that. 
It was such an exception. A little bit like me being calm. 
[Laughter.]
    So, I just think that we can't really kid ourselves here. 
And I think--and I--and, by the way--I mean this sincerely--
I've worked with a lot of you in this committee a long time. I 
hope my bona fides have--with you, personally, are real. And I 
respect your arguments that you've all made. But, as I listen 
to you all, it comes down to one really compelling argument: 
the President's entitled to his man. I respect that. I disagree 
with that. Unfortunately, Democratic President's have found out 
I disagree with that--Mr. Carter, Mr. Clinton. They found out I 
don't share that view. I don't share the view: because he wants 
it--the President wants it, that he should get it. Although I 
do believe--to quote my--paraphrase my friend from Illinois--
that, on matters of assembling your Cabinet around you, you 
should give deference--we should give deference, as opposed to 
a life-time appointment to a third branch of the government.
    But that seems to be the strongest argument for Mr. Bolton. 
I notice no one has said, on either side of the aisle, either 
side of this committee, that the assertions of Mr. Bolton's 
behavior and management style are not true. They argue that it 
shouldn't matter, or it doesn't matter as much. I didn't hear 
anybody come in here and say, ``No, no, no, this is all wrong. 
You've got this guy wrong. You've got this guy all wrong.'' I 
didn't hear anybody say that he didn't--wasn't aggressive on 
his point of dealing with the intelligence community. Some say 
he's aggressive, and that's good. Some say, he's aggressive, 
that's bad. But nobody suggests that this is a fellow who 
doesn't push his point to the point of exhaustion.
    Now, we can disagree on whether or not that is good or bad, 
appropriate or inappropriate. I think it's inappropriate. But 
no one's saying he didn't do that.
    And, again, I want to make clear, those in the intelligence 
community, or formerly in the intelligence community, who are 
opposed to Mr. Bolton and suggest he should not go forward, are 
not suggesting Mr. Bolton, in his previous position, is not 
entitled to his own opinion. What this was always about was 
whether Mr. Bolton could assert a governmental position that 
was inconsistent with, or at odds with, the intelligence 
community's opinion. In the end of the day, he didn't. That 
shouldn't be remarkable. Because had he--had he done it, he 
would have--I assume he would have gotten fired.
    But, as I say, again, how many times do you have to be 
told, as a subordinate, or at least in a subordinate position, 
by a superior that, ``Are you sure you got that right? Are you 
sure it's not that? I think it's that,'' to not get the 
message?
    Now, the remarkable thing is, most of these folks had the 
political and personal gumption to stand fast. But, more 
importantly, they had men and women of character, who were 
equal to or superior in political strength to Mr. Bolton, to 
tell them to go back sand. They had their protector in each of 
these instances. But the remarkable thing is that, even in the 
first instance, none of these folks caved.
    And I want to mention two things. I won't take any time, 
I'll just put them in the record.
    With regard to the Townsel matter, Senator Coleman made 
much of the unsubstantiated allegations by Mrs. Townsel having 
been discussed at a meeting April 19th. I'll remind everybody, 
that's why I made a motion to go into closed session. Because 
they were unsubstantiated at that moment. That's why I wanted 
to go into closed session.
    Again, I don't recall--it probably has happened, but I 
don't recall a time when a Senator has said to his colleagues, 
``Let's go into closed session for a little bit. I want to tell 
you something I know, an allegation,'' or, ``I want to discuss 
something.'' Speaking of comity, not say, ``Okay, we'll recess 
for 20 minutes and go into closed session.''
    The second point I'd make is, nobody on this side that I 
heard today used as a rationale for voting against Mr. Bolton 
the alleged conduct with regard to Mrs. Townsel. And I'll 
remind everyone that when the chairman raised it, and I--in my 
opening statement, I said what he said--it's he-said/she-said, 
and it's unsubstantiated.
    I would also like to put in the record what we actually 
learned from Mrs.--from the witnesses we, the staff, Minority 
and Majority staff, interviewed with regard to that allegation.
    The Chairman.  It will be put in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. Secondly, the issue of whether or not Mr. 
Bolton obeyed the rules on clearing speeches. It's been 
asserted, flatly, that he has. I would like to put in the 
record--not take the time now--what was stated by witnesses and 
those familiar with how the community works in clearing those 
speeches.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. And, thirdly, the assertion that Mr. Bolton 
went behind--or, excuse me, Mr. Westermann went behind Mr. 
Bolton's back and lost his trust. I just note, and I'll put it 
in the record, the testimony of Carl Ford, Tom Finger, Carol 
Rodley, Neil Silver, and Christian Westermann, confirming that 
Mr. Westermann followed standard operating procedure. And I'd 
ask that be put in the record.
    The Chairman.  It will be placed in the record in full.
    Senator Biden. And, Mr. Chairman, I understand, when we 
finish, after you conclude your statement, you're going to make 
a motion. And, in keeping with what we committed we will do, we 
will not make--unless I'm unaware of something one of my 
colleagues is going to do, we will not make any competing 
motion, if it's the motion that the Senator from Ohio indicated 
he would support, and--in order to move this, out of committee 
in almost the exact time--we said by 3 o'clock, but within the 
time that we were allotted at the beginning here.
    But I would repeat to my colleagues--and I mean this 
sincerely--I think I've demonstrated this--all of whom I 
respect--that I can understand how there is disagreement if you 
start off with this overwhelming presumption that the 
President's entitled to his person. But there are two things 
that seem to me to be operative here. One is that that is the 
controlling rationale for why Mr. Bolton should move forward by 
a majority of members of this committee, if he should move 
forward. And, secondly, that we may be ``damning with faint 
praise'' here.
    And one of my colleagues said, earlier today--and, 
obviously, it is not for me to decide, or the colleague who 
said this--but I truly believe that, in light of what I expect 
is about to happen, the President, in the interest of the 
United States would be better served by Mr. Bolton's nomination 
being pulled down. I don't expect that to happen. But I 
honestly believe he would be better served if that were the 
case. And it--there is precedent for that, in Democratic 
administrations and in Republican administrations.
    I might add, there's also precedent--on our watch, we were 
in charge, the Democrats, we voted out--someone out of the 
committee with a negative recommendation. We have voted people 
out, I would submit for the record, without recommendation. And 
we've voted people out with a favorable recommendation. But it 
is somewhat unusual. It is somewhat unusual to move that way.
    And I'm not, in any way, questioning the majority's right 
to do that, but I would suggest that it doesn't appear that Mr. 
Bolton has the confidence of the majority of this committee. 
And I would suggest that it may be worth the President's 
interest to take note of that.
    I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your 
cooperation. And I still will, on another matter, pursue those 
issues--not in terms of stopping the nomination, but as a 
matter of policy and principle that we should be able to, you 
and I and this committee, have access to the information that 
we sought. I think that is an institutional issue.
    So, I thank you, and I yield back our time.
    The Chairman.  Well, I thank the distinguished ranking 
member. I thank all members. All 18 of us have spoken. The 
statements were, I believe, thoughtful, well-drafted issues 
expressed as the debate continues.
    Let me just take this moment to thank the distinguished 
ranking member, in particular, because I can recall, although 
it is not a comparable moment, when we had debates over several 
weeks and months prior to American being engaged in Iraq. And 
we had a very difficult time wrestling with those issues in the 
committee. Now, the chairman was then Senator Biden. The 
ultimate conclusion was that we would support the President. 
But it was not unanimous in this committee, nor on the floor. 
And, indeed, historians, I suspect, will still argue some of 
the points that were argued in the committee at that point.
    I mention that because we have work to do. The chairman has 
mentioned North Korea, Iran, just to think of two, quite apart 
from the work--support in the peace process in the Middle East, 
tremendously important deliberations before this committee. The 
need for unity, insofar as we can have it, is imperative.
    And I appreciate very much the fact that members on both 
sides of the aisle were here for this business meeting, and 
stayed, and participated. That, I appreciate. I appreciate we 
were not challenged by the parliamentary procedure on the 
floor. It would have prevented us from meeting. Now, I'm sure 
that was not by chance. I thank the distinguished ranking 
member for making that possible.
    But we now have had an important debate, in which I believe 
we must move forward. The chairman has indicated the motion 
that I'm about to make. It was, I suspect, more than hinted by 
Senator Voinovich's comments earlier this morning. The Chair 
has listened carefully, has attempted to find a motion that a 
majority of our committee can agree upon.
    And so, I will say now, the question is on the nomination 
of John R. Bolton to be U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, with rank of Ambassador. The vote will be to report 
the nomination without recommendation.
    The Clerk will call the roll.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Hagel.
    Senator Hagel. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Chafee.
    Senator Chafee. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Allen.
    Senator Allen. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Coleman.
    Senator Coleman. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Voinovich.
    Senator Voinovich. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Alexander.
    Senator Alexander. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Sununu.
    Senator Sununu. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Ms. Murkowski.
    Senator Murkowski. Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Martinez.
    Senator Martinez.  Aye.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Biden.
    Senator Biden. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Sarbanes.
    Senator Sarbanes. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Dodd.
    Senator Dodd. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Kerry.
    Senator Kerry. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Feingold.
    Senator Feingold. No.
    The Clerk.  Mrs. Boxer.
    Senator Boxer. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Nelson.
    Senator Nelson. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Obama.
    Senator Obama. No.
    The Clerk.  Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman.  Aye.
    Will the Clerk please report the tally?
    The Clerk.  Ten aye, eight nay.
    The Chairman.  Ten ayes, eight nays. And, therefore, the 
nomination is reported, and the business meeting is concluded.
    Senator Biden. Wait, wait, wait. Mr. Chairman, before we 
conclude, I want to state to my colleagues what I said to you 
privately. We will have--so there is no delay, we will have the 
Minority views written and available to the committee by 
Monday.
    The Chairman.  I appreciate that.
    Senator Biden. And so, we----
    Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, right at the end you said, 
``The nomination is reported to the floor''--but without 
recommendation, is that----
    The Chairman.  That's correct. That was the motion.
    I thank the distinguished ranking member once again----
    Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman  [continuing]. And all members. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                ------                                


                                ANNEX D


            Material in Support of John Bolton's Nomination

                              ----------                               
I53 May 6, 2005.

Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office 
        Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar: The attached letter is co-signed by 
former presidential appointees, career and non-career Civil 
Service and Foreign Service employees who knew and worked with 
John Bolton from 1989-1993. These people and many more have 
indicated their strong support for Secretary Bolton. For 
example, John's former supervisors including former Secretary 
of State James A. Baker III, former Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt, and I, have publicly 
expressed our foil confidence and support for John, and our 
belief that he will be a superb representative of the United 
States in the United Nations.
    The attached letter demonstrates that many of those who 
worked for or with him share this belief. Ipersonally know if 
others who now hold positions in the United Nations or the 
State Department who support John, but for ``conflict of 
interest'' reasons prefer to express that support through 
private letters to you and your colleagues.
            Sincerely,
                                           Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

                                                       May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: We are former presidential appointees, 
career and non-career Civil Service and Foreign Service 
employees who knew and worked with John Bolton in his capacity 
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs under the leadership of Secretaries James A. Baker III 
and Lawrence S. Eagleburger from 1989-1993. While we have 
followed John's nomination to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations with great interest and enthusiasm, the recent 
and unreasonable attacks on his character and integrity during 
his Senate confirmation process have precipitated this letter 
of support; we only regret that we did not act sooner in 
conveying our views and strong support for his nomination.
    Despite what has been said and written in the last few 
weeks, John has never sought to damage the United Nations or 
its mission. Quite the contrary--under John's leadership the 
organization was properly challenged to fulfill its original 
charter. John's energy and innovation transformed 10 from a 
State Department backwater into a highly appealing work place 
in which individuals could effectively articulate and advance 
U.S. policy and their own careers as well. During the Persian 
Gulf War, John played a significant and substantive role in 
achieving the numerous Security Council resolutions adopted 
during the first Bush administration. He was also deeply 
engaged in matters beyond the spotlight of the Security 
Council, including refugees, human rights, development, 
democracy, food aid, UN management and budgets. His call for a 
``unitary UN'' guided and motivated the 10 bureau to promote 
consistent and piuductive practices across the entire gamut of 
UN organizations. John championed this concept in order to 
fashion a more effective United Nations, and a signal 
achievement in this regard was his effort to repeal the 
execrable ``Zionism is Racism'' resolution, which was a stain 
on the credibility of that institution. It is this laudable 
record of professional achievement in IO that we were 
privileged to witness, as well as over three decades of public 
service to this country, which define his character and 
capabilities.
    We are proud to have served with John, and grateful for his 
leadership, integrity, and vision. The allegations about his 
abuse of subordinates simply do not accord with our experience 
while he was Assistant Secretary for International Organization 
Affairs. His treatment now before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations is thus particularly disturbing and disheartening to 
those who have been fortunate enough to work for and with him. 
We hope this letter will help set the record straight and 
inform your committee's decision.
            Sincerely yours,

Margaret D. Tutwiler, Former Assistant Secretary for Public 
        Affairs and Spokesman
John F.W. Rogers, Former Under Secretary for Management
Ambassador Dennis Ross, Former Director of Policy Planning, 
        Former Special Middle East Coordinator
Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, Former Deputy Assistant 
        Secretary for International Organization Affairs
Sonia Landau, Former Assistant Secretary of State, rank of 
        Ambassador
Richard Burt, Former Assistant Secretary of State
Randall M. Fort, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
        Analysis and Research
Richard Schifter, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Human 
        Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
Catherine Bertini, Former Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department 
        of Agriculture
Richard T. Miller, Former U.S. Observer to UNESCO
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to Assistant 
        Secretary John R. Bolton
Christine E. Samuelian, Former Confidential Assistant to 
        Assistant Secretary John R. Bolton
David A. Schwarz, Former Special Assistant to U.S. Permanent 
        Representative to the European Office of the United 
        Nations
John M. Herzberg, Former Public Affairs Officer, Bureau for 
        International Organization Affairs
C. Craig Smith, Former Confidential Assistant to the DAS, 
        International Organization Affairs
Frederick H. Fleitz, Intelligence Analyst, Central Intelligence 
        Agency
Fran Westner, Former Director of Public Affairs, International 
        Organization Affairs
Thomas A. Johnson, Counselor for Legal Affairs, U.S. Mission, 
        Geneva
M. Deborah Wynes, Former Civil Service Employee, U.S Department 
        of State
Lena Murrell, Former Secretary to Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
        International Organization Affairs
Sam Brock, Former Action Officer, Office of UN Political 
        Affairs, Bureau for International Organization Affairs
Antonio Gayoso, Former Agency Director, USAID
                                ------                                

                                                       May 6, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar: We write to express our full 
confidence in the professionalism and integrity of John R. 
Bolton and to offer our strong support for his nomination to be 
permanent representative of the United States at the United 
Nations.
    As signatories we are diverse; career and non-career, 
Republican and Democrat, employed and retired. Many of us 
worked directly with John Bolton during his service at USAID 
under President Reagan. Some of us have served at USAID 
following his legacy. All of us deeply respect and admire John 
Bolton as a leader who exhibits the utmost integrity, fairness, 
intellect, and sense of America's national interests. Based on 
this personal experience, we know the caricature drawn of 
Secretary Bolton in this confirmation process is unrecognizable 
and grossly unfair.
    We know John to be a forceful policy advocate who both 
encourages and learns from rigorous debate. We know him to be a 
man of balanced judgment. And we know him to have a sense of 
humor, even about himself.
    John leads from in front with courage and conviction--
especially positive qualities, we believe, for the assignment 
he is being asked to take on. He is tough but fair. He does not 
abuse power or people. John is direct, yet thoughtful in his 
communication. He is highly dedicated, working long hours in a 
never-ending quest to maximize performance. Yet, he does not 
place undue time demands on his staff, recognizing their family 
obligations. What he does demand from staff is personal honesty 
and intellectual clarity.
    Throughout his illustrious career John Bolton has been an 
energetic change agent. As such, he has made enemies, for there 
are always those who abhor and resist change. But John is known 
more for his friends than his enemies. We ask that you listen 
to his friends, giving them at least equal weight.
    We highly recommend Secretary Bolton to you with the full 
confidence that be will serve his country as U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations with honor and great distinction.
            Respectfully,

M. Peter McPherson, Former Administrator, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development
Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International 
        Development
Frederick W. Schieck, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for 
        International Development
Kate Semerad, Former Assistant Administrator, External Affairs, 
        USAID
Michelle D. Laxalt, Former Director, Legislative Affairs, USAID
Frank Ruddy, Former Assistant Administrator for Africa, USAID, 
        Former General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy, 
        Former U.S. Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Elise du Pont, Former Assistant Administrator (and founder) for 
        Private Enterprise, USAID
Charlotte Norwood Walker, Former Secretary to Elise du Pont, 
        Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Otto J. Reich, Former Assistant Administrator of USAID, Former 
        U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, former Assistant 
        Secretary of State, former Special Envoy of the 
        President for Western Hemisphere Initiatives.
Marc Leland, Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
        International Affairs
Molly Hageboeck, Former Chief of Staff, USAID
Mary Beth Allen Yarbrough, Commissioned Foreign Service 
        Officer, USAID)
Franklin L. Lavin, Special Assistant Bureau for Asia, Bureau 
        for Africa, USAID
Barbara A. Upton, Former Director, Office of International 
        Donor Coordination, USAID
Sarah Tinsley Demarest, Former Director, Office of Women in 
        Development, USAID
Caroline Weil Barnett, Former Special Assistant to General 
        Counsel and Assistant Administrator John R. Bolton
Kevin E. Rushton, Former Special Assistant, USAID, Former 
        Economic Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the Asian 
        Development Bank
R. Blair Downing, Former Special Assistant USAID, Former 
        Executive Secretary, Department of Treasury
Patrice Malone Pisinski, Former Special Assistant, USAID
Liliane Willens, Ph.D., Former Desk Officer for Indian Ocean 
        States, Africa Bureau, USAID
Clark D. Horvath, Horvath and Associates
Michael Ussery, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)
John L. Wilkinson, Brigadier General, USAFR (Ret.), Former 
        Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia and 
        Near East; Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
        Bureau for Private Enterprise, USAID
Joseph P. Duggan, Formerly U.S. Mission to the United Nations; 
        Department of State; White House Staff; USAID
Richard Derham, Former General Counsel, UDAID, Former Assistant 
        Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination
Kay Davies, Former Director, Office of Women in Development
Dee Ann Smith Shuff, Executive Officer, Foreign Service (Ret.)
Carole Neideffer Gallagher, Confidential Assistant to 
        Administrator McPherson (Ret.)
David M. Rybak, U.S. Agency for International Development, 
        Retired Foreign Service
Rick Endres, Former Special Assistant, Office of Interbureau 
        Affairs and Officer, Office of Foreign, Disaster 
        Assistance, USAID; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
        Commerce for Technology Policy
Matthew C. Freedman, Former International Development Advisor, 
        USAID
Sean Walsh, Former Director of Office of Urban Programs for the 
        NIS
Kimberley McGraw Euston, Former Interim Program Officer for the 
        Caribbean--Bureau of INM, U.S. State, Department, 
        Former Confidential Assistant to the Vice President's 
        National Security Advisor
Nadine M. Hogan, Former Mission Director, USAID
Dr. Edwin W. Hullander, Former Associate Assistant 
        Administrator for Policy, Programs and Project Review; 
        Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Programs, AID
Ed Lijewski, Program Analyst, USAID
Bob Hawkins, Chairman, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
        Affairs, President of The Institute for Contemporary 
        Studies
Neal S. Zank, Former policy analyst, Bureau for Program and 
        Policy Coordination, USAID
Richard Sheppard, Former Office Director, Bureau for Program 
        and Policy Coordination, USAID
Emily Leonard, USAID (FEOC) Ret.
Peter K. Monk, Formerly Keene-Monk Associates
                                ------                                

                The Rt. Hon. the Baroness Thatcher,
                                            House of Lords,
                                      London, England, May 4, 2005.
Hon. John R. Bolton,
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, 
        Washington, DC.
     Dear John: I am writing this letter in order to let you 
know how strongly I support your nomination as U.S. ambassador 
to the United Nations. On the basis of our years of friendship, 
I know from experience the great qualities you will bring to 
that demanding post.
    To combine, as you do, clarity of thought, courtesy of 
expression and an unshakable commitment to justice is rare in 
any walk of life. But it is particularly so in international 
affairs. A capacity for straight talking rather than peddling 
half-truths is a strength and not a disadvantage in diplomacy. 
Particularly in the case of a great power like America, it is 
essential that people know where you stand and assume that you 
mean what you say. With you at the UN, they will do both. Those 
same qualities are also required for any serious reform of the 
United Nations itself, without which cooperation between 
nations to defend and extend liberty will be far more 
difficult.
    I cannot imagine anyone better fitted to undertake these 
tasks than you.
    All good wishes,
            Yours ever,
                                                 Margaret Thatcher.
                                ------                                

                                                    April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hart Senate Office Building, 
        Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: We, the undersigned, have been appalled 
at the charges that have been leveled at John Bolton during the 
course of his nomination hearing to be this country's 
ambassador to the United Nations. Rather than a rational, 
mature discussion about the future course American policy 
should take with respect to the United Nations, or whether and 
to what extent Mr. Bolton's extensive knowledge and experience 
with the UN further that course, what we have witnessed instead 
has been a character assassination masquerading as a nomination 
hearing. Mr. Bolton spent a full day before your Committee 
prepared to delve deeply into issues of foreign policy, and yet 
all but a sliver of the Committee's time was devoted to 
unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct.
    Each of us has worked with Mr. Bolton. We know him to be a 
man of personal and intellectual integrity, deeply devoted to 
the service of this country and the promotion of our foreign 
policy interests as established by this President and the 
Congress. Not one of us has ever witnessed conduct on his part 
that resembles that which has been alleged. We feel our 
collective knowledge of him and what he stands for, combined 
with our own experiences in government and in the private 
sector, more than counterbalances the credibility of those who 
have tried to destroy the distinguished achievements of a 
lifetime.
    President Bush and Secretary Rice have personally expressed 
confidence in Mr. Bolton's ability to effectively represent 
this country in the United Nations. And for those of us who 
have worked with and known John Bolton for decades, we urge you 
and the Committee to consider our views. We believe John Bolton 
deserves to have the Foreign Relations Committee's vote of 
confidence and support as well.
            Sincerely,

Ed Meese, Former Attorney General of the United States
Dick Thornburgh, Former Governor of Pennsylvania, Former 
        Attorney General of the United States, Former Under 
        Secretary General for Administration and Management, 
        The United Nations
Frank Keating, Former Governor of Oklahoma, Former Associate 
        Attorney General, Former General Counsel, Department of 
        Housing and Urban Development, Former Assistant 
        Secretary of the Treasury
William F. Weld, Former Governor of Massachusetts, Former 
        Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division
Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Former Counsel to President Ronald 
        Reagan
C. Boyden Gray, Former Counsel to the President George H.W. 
        Bush
T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., Former Assistant to the President, for 
        Domestic Affairs
Richard Willard, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Division
Wm. Bradford Reynolds, Former Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Rights Division
Douglas W. Kmiec, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legal Counsel
Thomas M. Boyd, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legislative Affairs, Former Director, Office of Policy 
        Development
James F. Rill, Former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
        Division
Charles J. Cooper, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of 
        Legal Counsel
Becky Norton Dunlop, Former Senior Special Advisor to the 
        Attorney General
Eugene W. Hickok, Former Special Assistant, Office of Legal 
        Counsel, Former Deputy Secretary of Education
Mark R. Levin, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
John Richardson, Former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General
William P. Cook, Former General Counsel, U.S. Immigration & 
        Naturalization Service
Steve Calabresi, Former Special Assistant to the Attorney 
        General
Murray Dickman, Former Assistant to the Undersecretary General 
        of the United Nations, Former Assistant to the Attorney 
        General
Terry Eastland, Former Director of Public Affairs
Roger Pilon, Former Director, Asylum Policy and Review Unit
Lee Liberman Otis, Former Associate Deputy Attorney General, 
        Former General Counsel, Department of Energy
C.H ``Bud'' Albright, Jr., Former Deputy Associate Attorney 
        General
Gary L. McDowell, Former Associate Director of Public Affairs
Laura Nelson, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office 
        of Legislative Affairs
Michael Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
        Office of Legal Counsel
Mark R. Disler, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Rights Division
Brent 0. Hatch, Former Associate White House Counsel, Former 
        General Counsel National Endowment for the Humanities, 
        Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil 
        Division
Steven R. Valentine, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
        Civil Division
David B. Rivkin, Jr., Former Deputy Director, Office of Policy 
        Development, Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the 
        Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
Lee A. Casey, Former Attorney Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, 
        Member, U.N. Sub-commission on the Promotion and 
        Protection of Human Rights
                                ------                                

                      American Enterprise Institute
                                for Public Policy Research,
                                    Washington, DC, April 22, 2005.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Biden: We were close 
colleagues of John Bolton during his tenure as senior vice 
president of the American Enterprise Institute from January 
1997 through May 2001. (Our positions at AEI during Mr. 
Bolton's tenure are given below our signatures.) We are writing 
to tell you and your colleagues that the various allegations 
that have been raised before your Committee, concerning Mr. 
Bolton's management style and conduct in other organizations 
and circumstances, are radically at odds with our experiences 
in more than four years of intense, frequent, and continuous 
interaction with him.
    Mr. Bolton was a demanding colleague--and was always at 
least as demanding of himself as of those around him. He was 
unfailingly courteous and respectful to us regardless of our 
AEI positions or seniority. Several of us were Mr. Bolton's 
subordinates, and the idea that he would seek to punish or 
settle scores with those who disagreed with him seems 
particularly preposterous to us. At AEI, whenever uncertainties 
or disagreements arose concerning research or administrative 
matters, the Bolton style was clear and consistent: he would 
state his own views openly and directly, expect others to be 
equally open and direct, and go out of his way to encourage 
subordinates to be open and direct, all in the service of 
arriving at the best possible decision. Disagreement was never 
discouraged and often led him to revise his own views; once a 
decision was reached, he expected subordinates to follow the 
decision with the same alacrity with which he followed the 
decisions of his peers or superiors.
    For these and other reasons, John Bolton's management style 
at AEI became legendary for its crispness, openness, fairness, 
and efficiency. As we have followed the strange allegations 
suddenly leveled at Mr. Bolton in recent days and reflected 
among ourselves on our own experiences with him, we have come 
to realize how much we learned from him, and how deep and 
lasting were his contributions to improving AEI's management 
and esprit de corps as well as the substance of our research 
programs. Contrary to the portrayals of his accusers, he 
combines a temperate disposition, good spirit, and utter 
honesty with his well-known attributes of exceptional 
intelligence and intensity of purpose. This is a very rare 
combination and, we would think, highly desirable for an 
American ambassador to the United Nations.
    We respectfully request that this letter be shared with the 
other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and entered 
into its records.
            Yours truly,

Leon Aron, Resident Scholar
Douglas Besharov, Resident Scholar
Claude Barfield, Resident Scholar
Frances Bolton, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Steven Berchem, Vice President
Elizabeth Bowen, Director of Conferences
Walter Berns, Resident Scholar
Karlyn Bowman, Resident Fellow
Montgomery Brown, Director of Communications
Mark Falcoff, Resident Scholar
Virginia Bryant, Director of Publications, Marketing
Isabel Ferguson, Director of Conferences
Seth Cropsey, Visiting Fellow
David Gerson, Executive Vice President
Aimee Dayhoff, Assistant to the Senior Vice President
Newt Gingrich, Senior Fellow
Christopher DeMuth, President
James Glassman, Resident Fellow
Nicholas Eberstadt, Resident Scholar
Jack Landman Goldsmith III, Adjunct Scholar
Bob Hahn, Resident Scholar
Danielle Maxwell, Marketing Manager for Donor Relations
Kevin Hassett, Resident Scholar
Allan Meltzer, Visiting Scholar
Robert Helms, Resident Scholar
Michael Novak, Resident Scholar
R. Glenn Hubbard, Visiting Scholar
Richard Perle, Resident Fellow
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senior Fellow
Jeremy Rabkin, Adjunct Scholar
Marvin Kosters, Resident Scholar
Robert Riley, Computer Operations Specialist
Michael Ledeen, Freedom Scholar
Veronique Rodman, Director of Public Affairs
Nicole Ruman Skinner, Director of Marketing
Audrey Williams, Training Manager and Research/Staff Assistant
Kathryn Staulcup, Communications Assistant
Joanna Yu, Staff Assistant
Tarn Sweeney, Marketing Communications Manager
MangHao Zhao, Research Assistant
Peter Wallison, Resident Fellow
Scott Walter, Senior Editor, The American Enterprise
Ben Wattenberg, Senior Fellow
                                ------                                

                                                    April 12, 2005.
 Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hart Senate Office 
        Building, Washington, DC.
     Dear Senator Lugar:  Your Committee will soon be reasoning 
together on the nomination of John R. Bolton as our country's 
next Ambassador to the United Nations. We urge you to give 
special weight at this time to the explosions of freedom now 
taking place in Ukraine, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, 
Zimbabwe, to name just a few. We believe that these early 
stirrings of courageous groups within countries that for too 
long have held on to rigid authoritarian or in some cases 
totalitarian rule reflect in large measure the policies and 
optimistic realism of President George W. Bush.
    No one in the world of diplomacy and geo-political policy 
has a better grounding of proven experience than John Bolton. 
He was on hand as an active participant during the period of 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and made important 
contributions to policy-making at a time of total ambiguity 
when the world of two superpowers was morphing into what we 
have today.
    We believe it is in the best interest of the community of 
nations as represented by the United Nations, for the 
maintenance of world peace and security, that the views of 
America's President be clearly and directly presented in both 
the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN.
    It is for this reason more than any other that we urge you 
to quickly and clearly approve John's nomination.
            Sincerely,

Bruce S. Geib, former Director of USIA; former Ambassador to 
        Belgium
Anne L. Armstrong, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
William S. Farish, former Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Walter J.P. Curley, former Ambassador to France and Ireland
Richard R. Burt, former Ambassador to Germany
Edward N. Ney, former Ambassador to Canada
Chic Hecht, former Ambassador to The Bahamas; former U.S. 
        Senator
Alfred H. Kingon, former Ambassador to the European Union; 
        former Assistant Secretary of Commerce
Thomas Patrick Melady, former Ambassador to The Vatican, Uganda 
        and Burundi
Frank Shakespeare, former Ambassador to Portugal and The 
        Vatican
Michael Sotirhos, former Ambassador to Greece and Jamaica
Robert D. Stuart, Jr., former Ambassador to Norway
Weston Adams, former Ambassador to Malawi
Everett E. Bierman, former Ambassador to Papua New Guinea, the 
        Solomon Islands and Vanuatu
Stephen F. Brauer, former Ambassador to Belgium
Nancy G. Brinker, former Ambassador to Hungary
Keith L. Brown, former Ambassador to Denmark and Lesotho
Richard W. Carlson, former Director of VOA; former Ambassador 
        to Seychelles
Gerald P. Carmen, former Ambassador to the United Nations
Sue McCourt Cobb, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Charles E. Cobb, Jr., former Ambassador to Iceland
Peter H. Dailey, former Ambassador to Ireland and Special Envoy 
        to NATO
Diana Lady Dougan, former Ambassador--U.S. Coordinator for 
        International Communications and Information Policy
Richard J. Egan, former Ambassador to Ireland
William H.G. Fitzgerald, former Ambassador to Ireland
Joseph Ghougassian, former Ambassador to Qatar and Senior 
        member in Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq
Joseph B. Gildenhorn, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Glen A. Holden, former Ambassador to Jamaica
Richard L. Holwill, former Ambassador to Ecuador
Charles W. Hostler, former Ambassador to Bahrain
Roy M. Huffington, former Ambassador to Austria
O. Philip Hughes, former Ambassador to Barbados, Dominica, St. 
        Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Lester B. Korn, former Ambassador to the United Nations 
        Economic and Social Council
Paul C. Lambert, former Ambassador to Ecuador
L.W. Lane, Jr., former Ambassador to Australia and Nauru
Ronald S. Lauder, former Ambassador to Austria
John Langeloth Loeb, Jr., former Ambassador to Denmark
Gregory J. Newell, former Ambassador to Sweden; former 
        Assistant Secretary of State for International 
        Organizations
Julian M. Niemczyk, former Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
Sally Z. Novetzke, former Ambassador to Malta
Penne Korth Peacock, former Ambassador to Mauritius
Joseph Canton Petrone, former Ambassador to the United Nations 
        European Office (Geneva)
Charles J. Pilliod, Jr., former Ambassador to Mexico
James W. Rawlings, former Ambassador to Zimbabwe
Frank Ruddy, former Ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
Paul A. Russo, former Ambassador to Barbados, St. Kitts, 
        Antigua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
        Dominica
Ronald J. Sorini, former Ambassador and Chief Textile 
        Negotiator
Timothy L. Towell, former Ambassador to Paraguay
Helene van Damm, former Ambassador to Austria
Leon J. Weil, former Ambassador to Nepal
Faith Whittlesey, former Ambassador to Switzerland
Joseph Zappala, former Ambassador to Spain
                                ------                                

                                                     April 5, 2005.
Senator Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman:  We write to urge that the Senate act 
expeditiously to confirm John Bolton as our ambassador to the 
United Nations. This is a moment when unprecedented turbulence 
at the United Nations is creating momentum for much needed 
reform. It is a moment when we must have an ambassador in place 
whose knowledge, experience, dedication and drive will be vital 
to protecting the American interest in an effective, forward-
looking United Nations.
    In his position as Undersecretary of State, John Bolton has 
taken the lead in strengthening international community 
approaches to the daunting problem of the proliferation of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). As a 
result of his hard work, intellectual as well as operational, 
the G-8 has supported U.S. proposals to strengthen safeguards 
and verification at the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
the Proliferation Security Initiative was launched and 
established within three months--a world speed record in these 
complex, multilateral matters. Moreover, Secretary Bolton led 
the successful effort to complete the negotiation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540, adopted unanimously in April, 
2004. UN 1540 called on member states to criminalize the 
proliferation of WMD--which it declared to be a threat to 
international peace and security--and to enact strict export 
controls.
    Secretary Bolton, like the Administration, has his critics, 
of course. Anyone as energetic and effective as John is bound 
to encounter those who disagree with some or even all of the 
Administration's policies. But the policies for which he is 
sometimes criticized are those of the President and the 
Department of State which he has served with loyalty, honor and 
distinction.
    Strong supporters of the United Nations understand the 
challenges it now faces. With his service as assistant 
secretary of state for international organizations, where he 
was instrumental in securing the repeal of the repugnant 
resolution equating Zionism with racism, and as undersecretary 
for arms control and international security, we believe John 
Bolton will bring great skill and energy to meeting those 
challenges.
            Sincerely yours,

The Honorable David Abshire, former Assistant Secretary of 
        State
The Honorable Kenneth Adelman, former Director, Antis Control 
        Disarmament Agency
The Honorable Richard Allen, former Assistant to the President 
        for National Security
The Honorable James Baker, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Frank Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Lawrence Eagleburger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Al Haig, former Secretary of State
Ambassador Max Kampelman, former Ambassador and Head of the 
        U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations with the Soviet 
        Union on Nuclear and Space Arms.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the United 
        Nations
The Honorable Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State
The Honorable James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense
The Honorable George Shultz, former Secretary of State
The Honorable Helmut Sonnenfeldt, former Counselor, Department 
        of State
                                ------                                 
I89[From the Washington Post, May 12, 2005]


                          A Vote on Mr. Bolton

    On April 19 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
unexpectedly postponed a vote on the nomination of John R. 
Bolton as ambassador to the United Nations, citing concerns 
that he had engaged in a pattern of abuse of subordinates and 
manipulation of intelligence. Three weeks of further digging, 
mostly by Democratic committee staff members, have not produced 
evidence of such a pattern. The committee ought to give Mr. 
Bolton a vote today. Ours would be an unenthusiastic, 
deference-to-the-president yes.
    It's as clear now as it was on April 19 that Mr. Bolton is 
a contentious figure who has both strong admirers and 
impassioned critics in Washington. He engages in hand-to-hand 
bureaucratic combat, and on a couple of occasions he pushed too 
hard. He challenged intelligence analysts, but it's naive to 
think that such analysts are always ideologically neutral and 
beyond politics--that they should never be challenged. What 
emerges from the interviews conducted by committee staffers is 
how intensely policy-driven, as opposed to personal, were most 
of Mt Bolton's clashes in the State Department, during 
President Bush's first term, under Secretary of State Colin L. 
PowelL
    If anyone might have been expected to provide evidence of 
dysfunctional behavior, for exaniple, it would be Lawrence B. 
Wilkerson, who was Mr. Powell's chief of staff. Mr. Wilkerson 
has said that he does not believe Mr. Bolton is fit to be U.N. 
ambassador, and by his description he knew pretty much 
everything that was happening at Foggy Bottom: ``I was also a 
sponge, sopping up everything! could about the Department, 
about its efficiency; about its effectiveness, about its people 
. . . and reporting to Powell.''
    Yet in an interview last Friday, Mr. Wilkerson was unable 
to provide any fresh examples of misbehavior by Mr. Bolton. 
Instead he complained about policy differences: Mr. Bolton was 
too eager to sanction Chinese companies that violated the 
nonproliferation regime, thereby making diplomacy more 
difficult. He was too zealous in carring out his mission to 
persuade other countries to exempt U.S. soldiers from the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. When Mr. 
Bolton delivered a speech vilifying North Korean leader Kim 
Jong II, ``Rich was very angry''--that would be former deputy 
secretary Richard L. Armitage--but, Mr. Wilkerson acknowledged, 
he was angry because the speech had been cleared by the 
assistant secretary for Asia, a Powell ally.
    The committee interviews have provided some colorful 
details without breaking new ground on what has long been a 
well-understood split in the first Bush administration: a split 
between those who saw themselves as pragmatic diplomats (the 
Powell camp) and those, like Mr. Bolton, who saw themselves as 
more willing to bruise feelings here and abroad in standing up 
for U.S. interests. Our view was that Mr. Bolton often, though 
not always, had the worse end of those arguments; he helped 
hamstring diplomacy toward Iran and North Korea, and his 
single-minded focus on the International Criminal Court 
endangered relations even with allies who were supporting the 
United States in Iraq.
    Moreover, the first-term divisions themselves were harmful 
to U.S. policymaking. Will Mr. Bolton perpetuate the divisions 
from a new perch in New York? That seems to us a risk. But it 
also strikes us as a risk that a president is entitled to take 
on if he wants. Mr. Bush surely knows what role Mr. Bolton 
played in the first term, and he says he wants to put Mr. 
Bolton's bluntness to work at the United Nations. The nominee 
is intelligent and qualified, we still see no compelling reason 
to deny the president his choice.
                                ------                                

                                    The Secretary of State,
                                   Washington, DC, August 26, 2003.
Hon. Jon Kyl,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
     Dear Jon:  I am pleased to reply to your recent letter 
concerning John Bolton's speech in Korea and our reaction.
    Undersecretary Bolton's speech was fully cleared within the 
Department. It was consistent with Administration policy, did 
not really break new ground with regard to our disdain for the 
North Korean leadership and, as such, was official. The speech 
was given during a time of delicate negotiations on the part of 
the Chinese government to arrange six-party multilateral 
discussions. As a result, it got a lot of attention in the 
regional press and drew a sharp North Korean reaction directed 
towards Secretary Bolton.
    My acting spokesman, Phil Reeker, and the president's press 
officer, Scott McClellan, both supported Mr. Bolton. Mr. Bolton 
even cleared the response Phil Reeker used at his press 
conference. We refused to be drawn into a debate with the North 
Koreans, noting that Mr. Bolton spoke officially and the 
Secretary and the President would decide who would represent 
the United States in the talks. If you read the full text of 
Mr. Armitage's statement in Australia, you will see that he 
also supported that line. Assistant Secretary Jim Kelly, during 
a background briefing on August 22, got the question yet again 
and gave the same response.
    Mr. Jack Pritchard, who you mentioned in your letter, from 
time to time meets with the North Korean Ambassador to the UN. 
His job is to listen to whatever they have to say, tell them 
whatever we want them to hear. He does not debate with them or 
even engage them beyond seeking clarification of their remarks. 
I've read the transcript of his recent meeting. They complained 
about Mr. Bolton. Mr. Pritchard took note of their complaint 
and said they were aware of U.S. policy. He did not say or 
imply that Mr. Bolton was speaking only in a personal capacity.
    We know who we are dealing with when we deal with the North 
Koreans. The President has given me solid guidance how to 
manage this difficult account and I believe we are making 
progress. I am fortunate to receive informed advice and 
judgment from Mr. Bolton, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Pritchard. Mr. 
Pritchard has just resigned having requested retirement some 
months ago. I am pleased I was able to keep him on a while 
longer and grateful for his many years of dedicated service to 
our country.
    With best wishes,
            Sincerely,
                                                   Colin L. Powell.
                                ------                                


                    A Dictatorship at the Crossroad


 BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
   SECURITY AFFAIRS, EAST ASIA INSTITUTE, SEOUL HILTON, SEOUL, SOUTH 
                          KOREA, JULY 31, 2003

    Distinguished guests, it is a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to speak to you again. Since I last spoke here in 
Seoul nearly 1 year ago, the United States and the Republic of 
Korea have forged ahead in strengthening our alliance and 
friendship. The foundation for this was made all the stronger 
by the extremely successful summit last May between President 
Bush and President Roh. At that summit, our two presidents made 
the firm commitment to move in lock-step to meet our shared 
challenges and opportunities. I am happy to say that we are 
taking the shared vision of our presidents and putting it into 
action.
    Indeed, action is needed. As we stand here today having 
just celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Armistice agreement 
that ended combat on the peninsula, the threat to the North 
posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship is a constant reminder of 
a powerful truth--freedom is not free.
    In preserving freedom, it is important for all to have a 
shared understanding of the threats we face. Unfortunately, the 
last year has seen a dizzying whirlwind of developments on the 
threat posed by the Kim Jong Il dictatorship. Being so close to 
North Korea, there is no doubt that the threat posed by Kim 
Jong Il must weigh heavily on you. While it would be naive and 
disingenuous for me to dismiss the danger, let me start off by 
striking a positive note: The world is united in working 
together to seek a peaceful solution to the threat posed by Kim 
Jong Il. Rarely have we seen the international community so 
willing to speak with the same voice and deliver a consistent 
message on an issue. In addition to consistency, there is a 
striking clarity to this message as well: The world will not 
tolerate Kim Jong Il threatening international peace and 
security with weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear 
weapons.
    The brazenness of Kim Jong Il's behavior in the past year 
is striking. While nuclear blackmail used to be the province of 
fictional spy movies, Kim Jong Il is forcing us to live that 
reality as we enter the new millennium. To give in to his 
extortionist demands would only encourage him, and perhaps more 
ominously, other would-be tyrants around the world. One needs 
little reminding that we have tested Kim Jong Il's intentions 
many times before--a test he has consistently failed. Since 
1994, billions of dollars in economic and energy assistance 
have flowed into the coffers of Pyongyang to buy off their 
nuclear weapons program. Nine years later, Kim Jong Il has 
repaid us by threatening the world with not one, but two 
separate nuclear weapons programs--one based on plutonium, the 
other highly enriched uranium.
    If history is any guide, Kim Jong Il probably expects that 
his current threats wit! result in newfound legitimacy and 
billions of dollars of economic and energy assistance pouring 
into his failed economy. in this case, however, history is not 
an especially good guide--a page has been turned. Particularly 
after September 11, the world is acutely aware of the danger 
posed to civilian populations by weapons of mass destruction 
being developed by tyrannical rogue state leaders like Kim Jong 
Il or falling into the hands of terrorists. Simply put, the 
world has changed. Consider that in 1994, I could have used the 
term ``WMD'' and most audiences would have stared at me 
blankly. In 2003, we all know it is shorthand for ``weapons of 
mass destruction.'' Clearly, this is a sad reflection on the 
dangerous times we live in.
    Let us also consider the fact that in 1994, North Korea 
could have chosen to enter the international community on a new 
and different footing. While communist dictatorships were 
collapsing or reforming across the globe, there was even hope 
that Kim Il Sung's North Korea would follow suit. When power 
passed to Kim Jong Il, the world hoped he would be more 
enlightened and recognize the benefits of participating in the 
global community--as opposed to threatening and blackmailing 
it.
    Unfortunately; this still has not come to pass. Even a 
cursory glance of the first decade of Kim Jong Il's dictatorial 
reign suggests that he has done nothing but squander 
opportunity after opportunity, olive branch after olive branch. 
Sadly, as an editorial cartoon in The Economist recently 
expressed so well, Kim Jong Il seems to care more about 
enriching uranium than enriching his own people.
    Kim Jong Il, of course, has not had to endure the 
consequences of his failed policies. While he lives like 
royalty in Pyongyang, he keeps hundreds of thousands of his 
people locked in prison camps with millions more mired in 
abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many in 
North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare. As reported by the 
State Department Report on Human Rights, we believe that some 
400,000 persons died in prison since 1972 and that starvation 
and executions were common. Entire families, including 
children, were imprisoned when only one member of the family 
was accused of a crime. Consider the testimony of Lee Soon-ok, 
a woman who spent years in North Korean prison camps. She 
testified before the U.S. Senate that she witnessed severe 
beatings and torture involving water forced into a victim's 
stomach with a rubber hose and pumped out by guards jumping on 
a board placed across the victim's abdomen. She also reported 
chemical and biological warfare experiments conducted on 
inmates by the army.
    And while Kim Jong Il is rumored to enjoy the internet so 
he can observe the outside world, he does not afford that right 
to his own people who are forced to watch and listen to only 
government television and radio programs.
    Why is Kim Jong Il so scared of letting his people observe 
the outside world? The answer, of course, is that they will see 
the freedom enjoyed by much of the world and what they have 
been denied. They will see their brothers and sisters in Seoul, 
the capital of a booming vibrant democracy. They will see that 
there is a world where children stand a good chance to live to 
adulthood--a dream of every parent. More important, they will 
see that the excuses for their failed system provided by Kim 
Jong Il don't stand scrutiny. It is not natural disasters that 
are to blame for the deprivation of the North Korean people--
but the failed policies of Kim Jong Il. They will see that, 
unless he changes course, his regime is directly responsible 
for bringing economic ruin to their country. The world already 
knows this--which is why we will continue to give humanitarian 
food aid to the starving people of North Korea. But let there 
be no doubt about where blame falls for the misery of the North 
Korean people--it falls squarely on the shoulders of Kim Jong 
Il and his regime.
    There is still hope that Kim Jong Il may change course. All 
civilized nations and peace-loving people hope this to be true. 
But Kim Jong Il must make the personal decision to do so and 
choose a different path.
    It is holding out this hope that has prompted the United 
States, in lock-step with our friends and allies in the region, 
to pursue the multilateral negotiations track. Let me be clear: 
the United States seeks a peaceful solution to this situation. 
President Bush has unambiguously led the way in mobilizing 
world public opinion to support us in finding a lasting 
multilateral solution to a problem that threatens the security 
of the entire world.
    The operative term is ``multilateral.'' It would be the 
height of irresponsibility for the Bush administration to enter 
into another bilateral agreement with the Kim Jong Il 
dictatorship. The Clinton administration bravely tried with the 
Agreed Framework but failed because Kim Jong Il instructed his 
subordinates to systematically violate it in secret. To enter 
into a similar type of agreement again would simply postpone 
the problem for some future administration--something the Bush 
administration will not do.
    Postponing the elimination of Kim Jong Il's nuclear weapons 
program will only allow him time to amass even more nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons and to develop even longer 
range missiles. Any doubts that Kim Jong Il would peddle 
nuclear materials or nuclear weapons to any buyer on the 
international market were dispelled last April when his envoy 
threatened to do just that.
    This will not stand. Some have speculated that the U.S. is 
resigned to nuclear weapons on the peninsula and we will simply 
have to learn to live with nuclear weapons in the hands of a 
tyrannical dictator, who has threatened to export them. Nothing 
could be further from the truth.
    This is why we are working so hard on pursuing the 
multilateral track in Beijing. Having just been in Beijing, I 
can confirm that we all believe this track is alive and well, 
but the ball is North Korea's court. The key now is to get 
South Korea and Japan, and ultimately Russia and others, a seat 
at the table. We know that as crucial players in the region, 
and the countries most threatened by Kim Jong Il, the roles of 
Seoul and Tokyo are vital to finding any permanent solution. 
Those with a direct stake in the outcome must be part of the 
process. On this point we will not waver.
    While the Beijing track is on course, prudence suggests 
that we pursue other tracks as well. We have been clear in 
saying that we seek a peaceful solution to resolve the threat 
posed by Kim Jong Il, but that all options are on the table. I 
would like to discuss two complementary tracks that we are 
pursuing now.
    The first is action through the United Nations Security 
Council. As the UN body charged with protecting international 
peace and security, it could play an important role in helping 
to reach a peaceful settlement. Unfortunately, the Council is 
not playing the part it should. It was 6 months ago that the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
voted overwhelmingly to report North Korea's violations to the 
Security Council.
    To date, virtually nothing has happened. We believe that 
appropriate and timely action by the Security Council would 
complement our efforts on the multilateral track in Beijing. 
Just as important, it would send a signal to the rest of the 
world that the Council takes its responsibilities seriously. I 
would note that when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty the first time in March 1993, the 
Council took action within a month. Ignoring this issue will 
not make it go away--it will only reduce confidence in the 
Council and suggest to proliferators that they can sell their 
deadly arsenals with impunity.
    The other track we are pursuing now is through the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. When I spoke in 
Seoul almost a year ago, I detailed at length the WMD programs 
actively being pursued by Kim Jong Il. The last year has seen 
Kim Jong Il accelerate these programs, particularly on the 
nuclear front. Brazenly threatening to demonstrate, even 
export, nuclear weapons, Kim Jong Il and his supports have 
defied the unanimous will of the international community.
    If Pyongyang thought the international community would 
simply ignore its threats--it was mistaken. Recently, I 
attended the second meeting of the PSI, held in Brisbane, 
Australia and met with officials from 10 other countries on the 
threats posed by dictators like Kim Jong Il. As the Chairman's 
Statement underscores, ``the PSI is a global initiative with 
global reach.'' And we ``agreed to move quickly on direct, 
practical measures to impede the trafficking in weapons of mass 
destruction, missiles and related items.'' Specifically, we are 
working on ``defining actions necessary to collectively or 
individually interdict shipments of WMD or missiles and related 
items at sea, in the air or on land.''
    While global in scope, the PSI is cognizant of the reality 
that different countries pose different degrees of threat. Just 
as the South Korean Ministry of National Defense recently 
defined North Korea as the ``main enemy,'' the nations 
participating in the PSI put North Korea and Iran at the top of 
the list of proliferant countries. That North Korea has earned 
this dubious distinction should come as little surprise in 
light of Pyongyang's trafficking in death and destruction to 
keep Kim Jong Il in power. It is practically their only source 
of hard currency earnings, unless of course you add narcotics 
and other illegal activities.
    Hopefully, initiatives such as PSI will send a clear 
message to dictators like Kim Jong Il. In his specific case, we 
hope to communicate that while actively pursuing and believing 
that multilateral talks are a preferable way to find a lasting 
solution to the situation, we are not going to allow the DPRK 
regime to peddle its deadly arsenals to rogue states and 
terrorists throughout the world. Our national security, and our 
allies, as well as the lives of our citizens are at stake. 
Already, we are, planning operational training exercises on 
interdiction utilizing both military and civilian assets. Kim 
Jong Il would be wise to consider diversifying his export base 
to something besides weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles.
    The international community's tolerance for actions that 
defy global norms is fast shrinking. There is growing political 
will to take concrete steps to prevent dictators such as Kim 
Jong Il from profiting in ill-gotten gains. We are moving to 
translate this political will into action.
    This choice is Kim Jong Il's and his alone. In coordination 
with our allies, we are prepared to welcome a reformed North 
Korea into the world of civilized nations. This would mean, 
however, that Kim Jong Il makes the political decision to 
undergo sweeping reforms. A good start would be to respect the 
human rights of his people and not starve them to death or put 
them in death camps. He should allow the families of the 
Japanese abductees to be reunited, and he should provide a full 
account of the cause of death for the eight deceased abductees.
    It would also mean respecting international norms and 
abiding by international commitments and giving up their 
extensive chemical and biological weapons programs. And it will 
certainly require Kim Jong Il to dismantle his nuclear weapons 
program--completely, verifiably, and irreversibly.
    The days of DPRK blackmail are over. Kim Jong Il is dead 
wrong to think that developing nuclear weapons will improve his 
security. Indeed, the opposite is true. As President Bush has 
made clear: ``A decision to develop a nuclear arsenal is one 
that will alienate you from the rest of the world.'' Kim Jong 
Il has already squandered the first decade of his rule. To 
continue down the path toward nuclear weapons will squander his 
legacy as well. The choice is his to make--but whichever path 
he does choose--the United States and its allies are prepared. 
Let us hope he makes the right choice.
                                ------                                


   Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats From Weapons of Mass 
                              Destruction


 BY JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
 SECURITY, REMARKS TO THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC, MAY 6, 
                                  2002

    Thank you for asking me here to the Heritage Foundation. 
I'm pleased to be able to speak to you today about the Bush 
Administration's efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction. The spread of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) to state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups is, 
in my estimation, the gravest security threat we now face. 
States engaging in this behavior--some of them parties to 
international treaties prohibiting such activities--must be 
held accountable, and must know that only by renouncing 
terrorism and verifiably forsaking WMD can they rejoin the 
community of nations.

The New Security Environment

    Eight months into the war on terror, the United States and 
its partners have made great strides. We have helped the Afghan 
people overthrow an oppressive, terrorist-harboring regime in 
Afghanistan, foiled terrorist plots in places such as Germany, 
Yemen, Spain and Singapore, and stanched the flow of funds that 
allowed Al-Qaeda's schemes to come to fruition. We have 
captured the number three man in Al-Qaeda, and will bring him 
to justice. And this is just the beginning.
    The attacks of September 11 reinforced with blinding 
clarity the need to be steadfast in the face of emerging 
threats to our security. The international security environment 
has changed, and our greatest threat comes not from the specter 
of nuclear war between two superpowers, as it did during the 
Cold War, but from transnational terrorist cells that will 
strike without warning using weapons of mass destruction. Every 
nation--not just the United States--has had to reassess its 
security situation, and to decide where it stands on the war on 
terrorism.
    In the context of this new international security 
situation, we are working hard to create a comprehensive 
security strategy with Russia, a plan President Bush calls the 
New Strategic Framework. The New Strategic Framework involves 
reducing offensive nuclear weapons, creating limited defensive 
systems that deter the threat of missile attacks, strengthening 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation measures, and 
cooperating with Russia to combat terrorism. It is based on the 
premise that the more cooperative, post-Cold War relationship 
between Rissia and the United States makes new approaches to 
these issues possible.
    In preparation for the summit meeting in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg later this month, we have been working closely with 
the Russians to embody the reductions in offensive warheads 
into a legally-binding document that will outlast the 
administrations of both Presidents. We are also working to 
draft a political declaration on the New Strategic Framework 
that would cover the issues of strategic offensive and 
defensive systems, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. 
We are optimistic that we will have agreement in time for the 
summit in Moscow, May 23rd to 25th.
    Strengthening the U.S.-Russian relationship has been a 
priority of the Bush Administration, even prior to the 
September 11 attacks. In the current security climate, 
cooperation with Russia becomes even more important, so that we 
can work together to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction, which threaten both our countries.

Preventing Terrorism's Next Wave

    President Bush believes it is critical not to underestimate 
the threat from terrorist groups and rogue states intent on 
obtaining weapons of mass destruction. As he said on the six-
month anniversary of the attacks, ``Every nation in our 
coalition must take seriously the growing threat of terror on a 
catastrophic scale--terror armed with biological, chemical, or 
nuclear weapons.'' We must not doubt for a moment the possible 
catastrophic consequences of terrorists or their rogue state 
sponsors who are willing to use disease as a weapon to spread 
chemical agents to inflict pain and death, or to send suicide-
bound adherents armed with radiological weapons on missions of 
mass murder.
    Every nation must commit itself to preventing the 
acquisition of such weapons by state sponsors of terrorism or 
terrorist groups. As President Bush said: ``Our lives, our way 
of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single 
commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and 
never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction.'' 
To this end, we use a variety of methods to combat the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction, including export controls, 
missile defense, arms control, nonproliferation and counter-
proliferation measures.
    In the past, the United States relied principally on 
passive measures to stem proliferation. Arms control and 
nonproliferation regimes, export controls, and diplomatic 
overtures were the primary tools used in this fight. But 
September 11th, the subsequent anthrax attacks, and our 
discoveries regarding Al-Qaeda and its WMD aspirations has 
required The U.S to complement these more traditional 
strategies with a new approach. The Bush Administration is 
committed to combating the spread of nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, missiles, and related equipment, and is 
determined to prevent the use of these deadly weapons against 
our citizens, troops, allies, and friends. While diplomatic 
efforts and multilateral regimes will remain important to our 
efforts, we also intend to complement this approach with other 
measures, as we work both in concert with likeminded nations, 
and on our own, to prevent terrorists and terrorist regimes 
from acquiring or using WMD. In the past, we looked at 
proliferation and terrorism as entirely separate issues. As 
Secretary Powell said in his Senate testimony April 24, ``There 
are terrorists in the world who would like nothing better than 
to get their hands on and use nuclear, chemical or biological 
weapons. So there is a definite link between terrorism and WMD. 
Not to recognize that link would be foolhardy to the extreme.''
    America is determined to prevent the next wave of terror. 
States that sponsor terror and pursue WMD must stop. States 
that renounce terror and abandon WMD can become part of our 
effort. But those that do not can expect to become our targets. 
This means directing firm international condemnation toward 
states that shelter--and in some cases directly sponsor--
terrorists within their borders. It means uncovering their 
activities that may be in violation of international treaties. 
It means having a direct dialogue with the rest of the world 
about what is at stake. It means taking action against 
proliferators, middlemen, and weapons brokers, by exposing 
them, sanctioning their behavior, and working with other 
countries to prosecute them or otherwise bring a halt to their 
activities. It means taking law-enforcement action against 
suspect shipments, front companies, and financial institutions 
that launder prollferator's funds. And it requires, above all, 
effective use, improvement, and enforcement of the multilateral 
tools at our disposal--both arms control and nonproliferation 
treaties and export control regimes.

The Problem of Noncompliance

    Multilateral agreements are important to our 
nonproliferation arsenal. This Administration strongly supports 
treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the 
Biological Weapons Convention. But in order to be effective and 
provide the assurances they are designed to bring, they must be 
carefully and universally adhered to by all signatories. 
Therefore, strict compliance with existing treaties remains a 
major goal of our arms control policy.
    This has been our aim in particular with the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC). In 1969, President Nixon announced 
that the United States would unilaterally renounce biological 
weapons. The U.S. example was soon followed by other countries, 
and by 1972 the BWC was opened for signature. This 
international treaty, to which more than 140 countries are 
parties, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition or retention of biological and toxin weapons.
    While the vast majority of the BWC's parties have 
conscientiously met their commitments, the United States is 
extremely concerned that several states are conducting 
offensive biological weapons programs while publicly avowing 
compliance with the agreement. To expose some of these 
violators to the international community, last November, I 
named publicly several states the U.S. government knows to be 
producing biological warfare agents in violation of the BWC.
    Foremost is Iraq. Although it became a signatory to the BWC 
in 1972 and became a State Party in 1991, Iraq has developed, 
produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and weapons. 
The United States strongly suspects that Iraq has taken 
advantage of more than three years of no UN inspections to 
improve all phases of its offensive BW program. Iraq also has 
developed, produced, and stockpiled chemical weapons, and shown 
a continuing interest in developing nuclear weapons and longer 
range missiles.
    Next is North Korea. North Korea has a dedicated, national-
level effort to achieve a BW capability and has developed and 
produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of 
the Convention. Despite the fact that its citizens are 
starving, the leadership in Pyongyang has spent large sums of 
money to acquire the resources, including a biotechnology 
infrastructure, capable of producing infectious agents, toxins, 
and other crude biological weapons. It likely has the 
capability to produce sufficient quantities of biological 
agents for military purposes within weeks of deciding to do so, 
and has a variety of means at its disposal for delivering these 
deadly weapons.
    In January, I also named North Korea and Iraq for their 
covert nuclear weapons programs, in violation of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty. This year, North Korea did not meet 
Congressional certification requirements because of its 
continued lack of cooperation with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, its failure to make any progress toward 
implementing the North-South Joint Denuclearization Declaration 
as called for under the Agreed Framework, and for proliferating 
long-range ballistic missiles. Finally, we believe that North 
Korea has a sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons, and can 
manufacture all manner of CW agents.
    Then comes Iran. Iran's biological weapons program began 
during the Iran-Iraq war, and accelerated after Tehran learned 
how far along Saddam Hussein had progressed in his own program. 
The Iranians have all of the necessary pharmaceutical 
expertise, as well as the commercial infrastructure needed to 
produce--and hide--a biological warfare program. The United 
States believes Iran probably has produced and weaponized BW 
agents in violation of the Convention. Again, Iran's BW program 
is complemented by an even more aggressive chemical warfare 
program, Iran's ongoing interest in nuclear weapons, and its 
aggressive ballistic missile research, development, and flight 
testing regimen.
    President Bush named these three countries in his State of 
the Union address earlier this year as the world's most 
dangerous proliferators. ``States like these, and their 
terrorist allies,'' he said, ``constitute an axis of evil, 
arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons 
of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger.''

Trouble Ahead

    Beyond the axis of evil, there are other rogue states 
intent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction--particularly 
biological weapons. Given our vulnerability to attack from 
biological agents, as evidenced recently in the anthrax 
releases, it is important to carefully assess and respond to 
potential proliferators. Today, I want to discuss three other 
state sponsors of terrorism that are pursuing or who have the 
potential to pursue weapons of mass destruction or have the 
capability to do so in violation of their treaty obligations. 
While we will continue to use diplomatic efforts and 
multilateral regimes with these countries, it is important to 
review the challenges we face and to underline the issues that 
these states must address. As the President has said, ``America 
will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security. 
We'll be deliberate. Yet time is not on our side. I will not 
wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as 
peril draws closer and closer.''
    First, Libya. There is no doubt that Libya continues its 
longstanding pursuit of nuclear weapons. We believe that since 
the suspension of UN sanctions against Libya in 1999, Libya has 
been able to increase its access to dual use nuclear 
technologies. Although Libya would need significant foreign 
assistance to acquire a nuclear weapon, Tripoli's nuclear 
infrastructure enhancement remains of concern. Qaddafi hinted 
at this in a recent (25 March) interview with Al-Jazirah when 
he said, ``We demanded the dismantling of the weapons of mass 
destruction that the Israelis have; we must continue to demand 
that. Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess that 
weapon.''
    Among its weapons of mass destruction programs, Libya--
which is not a party to the CWC--continues its goal of 
reestablishing its offensive chemical weapons ability, as well 
as pursuing an indigenous chemical warfare production 
capability. Libya has produced at least 100 tons of different 
kinds of chemical weapons, using its Rabta facility. That 
facility closed down after it was subject to media scrutiny, 
but then re-opened as a pharmaceutical plant in 1995. Although 
production of chemical agents reportedly has been halted, CW 
production at Rabta cannot be ruled out. It remains heavily 
dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals, 
technical expertise, and other key chemical warfare-related 
equipment. Following the suspension of UN sanctions in April 
1999, Libya has reestablished contacts with illicit foreign 
sources of expertise, parts, and precursor chemicals in the 
Middle East, Asia, and Western Europe.
    Conversely, Libya has publicly indicated its intent to join 
the CWC. While our perceptions of Libya would not change 
overnight, such a move could be positive. Under the CWC, Libya 
would be required to declare and destroy all chemical weapons 
production facilities and stockpiles, make declarations about 
any dual use chemical industry, undertake not to research or 
produce any chemical weapons, and not to export certain 
chemicals to countries that have not signed the CWC. Libya 
would also be subject to challenge inspections of any facility, 
declared or not.
    Significantly for predictive purposes, Libya became a State 
Party to the BWC in January 1982, but the U.S. believes that 
Libya has continued its biological warfare program. Although 
its program is in the research and development stage, Libya may 
be capable of producing small quantities of biological agent 
Libya's BW program has been hindered, in part, by the country's 
poor scientific and technological base, equipment shortages, 
and a lack of skilled personnel, as well as by UN sanctions in 
place from 1992 to 1999.
    Libya is also continuing its efforts to obtain ballistic 
missile-related equipment, materials, technology, and expertise 
from foreign sources. Outside assistance--particularly Serbian, 
Indian, North Korean, and Chinese--is critical to its ballistic 
missile development programs, and the suspension of UN 
sanctions in 1999 has allowed Tripoli to expand its procurement 
effort. Libya's current capability probably remains limited to 
its Scud B missiles, but with continued foreign assistance it 
may achieve an MRBM capability--a long desired goal-or 
extended-range Scud capability.
    Although Libya is one of seven countries on the State 
Department's list of state sponsors of terror \1\ N, the U.S. 
has noted recent positive steps by the Libyan government that 
we hope indicate that Tripoli wishes to rejoin the community of 
civilized states. In 1999, Libya turned over two Libyans wanted 
in connection with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial in the Netherlands. In 2001, it 
condemned the September 11 attacks publicly and signed the 
twelve terrorist conventions listed in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1273. And, as I have already mentioned, Libya has 
also announced its intention to accede to CWC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     N\1\ ``Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000,'' U.S. Department of 
State, April 20, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, as I have also said, words are not enough. The key 
is to see clear, hard evidence that Libya will, in fact, live 
up to the public standards it has set for itself. Libya can 
make a positive gesture in this regard by fulfilling its 
obligations under WMD treaties and becoming a party to the CWC. 
Moreover, Libya must honor the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions relating to the resolution of Pan Am 103, arguably 
the worst air terrorist disaster prior to September 11. Libya 
has yet to comply fully with these resolutions, which include 
accepting responsibility and paying compensation. It is past 
time that Libya did this.
    The United States also knows that Syria has long had a 
chemical warfare program. It has a stockpile of the nerve agent 
sarin and is engaged in research and development of the more 
toxic and persistent nerve agent VX. Although Damascus 
currently is dependent on foreign sources for key elements of 
its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and 
key production equipment, we are concerned about Syrian 
advances in its indigenous CW infrastructure which would 
significantly increase the independence of its CW program. We 
think that Syria has a variety of aerial bombs and SCUD 
warheads, which are potential means of delivery of deadly 
agents capable of striking neighboring countries.
    Syria, which has signed but not ratified the BWC, is 
pursuing the development of biological weapons and is able to 
produce at least small amounts of biological warfare agents. 
While we believe Syria would need foreign assistance to launch 
a large-scale biological weapons program right now, it may 
obtain such assistance by the end of this decade.
    Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud B, Scud 
C and SS-21 SRBMs, It is pursuing both solid- and liquid-
propellant missile programs and relies extensively on foreign 
assistance in these endeavors. North Korean and Russian 
entities have been involved in aiding Syria's ballistic missile 
development. All of Syria's missiles are mobile and can reach 
much of Israel, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well 
within the country.
    In addition to Libya and Syria, there is a threat coming 
from another BWC signatory, and one that lies just 90 miles 
from the U.S. mainland--namely, Cuba. This totalitarian state 
has long been a violator of human rights. The State Department 
said last year in its Annual Report on Human Rights Practices 
that ``the Government continued to violate systematically the 
fundamental civil and political rights of its citizens. 
Citizens do not have the right to change their government 
peacefully. Prisoners died in jail due to lack of medical care. 
Members of the security forces and prison officials continued 
to beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners . . . The 
Government denied its citizens the freedoms of speech, press, 
assembly and association.''
    Havana has long provided safehaven for terrorists, earning 
it a place on the State Department's list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. The country is known to be harboring 
terrorists from Colombia, Spain, and fugitives from the United 
States. We know that Cuba is collaborating with other state 
sponsors of terror.
    Castro has repeatedly denounced the U.S. war on terrorism. 
He continues to view terror as a legitimate tactic to further 
revolutionary objectives. Last year, Castro visited Iran. Syria 
and Libya--all designees on the same list of terrorist-
sponsoring states. At Tehran University, these were his words: 
``Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring 
America to its knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are 
witnessing this weakness from close up.''
    But Cuba's threat to our security often has been 
underplayed. An official U.S. government report in 1998 
concluded that Cuba did not represent a significant military 
threat to the United States or the region. It went only so far 
as to say that, ``Cuba has a limited capacity to engage in some 
military and intelligence activities which could pose a danger 
to U.S. citizens under some circumstances.'' However, then-
Secretary of Defense William Cohen tried to add some balance to 
this report by expressing in the preface his serious concerns 
about Cuba's intelligence activities against the United States 
and its human rights practices. Most notably, he said, ``I 
remain concerned about Cuba's potential to develop and produce 
biological agents, given its biotechnology infrastructure . . 
.''
    Why was the 1998 report on Cuba so unbalanced? Why did it 
underplay the threat Cuba posed to the United States? A major 
reason is Cuba's aggressive intelligence operations against the 
United States, which included recruiting the Defense 
Intelligence Agency's senior Cuba analyst, Ana Belen Montes, to 
spy for Cuba. Montes not only had a hand in drafting the 1998 
Cuba report but also passed some of our most sensitive 
information about Cuba back to Havana. Montes was arrested last 
fall and pleaded guilty to espionage on March 19th.
    For four decades Cuba has maintained a well-developed and 
sophisticated biomedical industry, supported until 1990 by the 
Soviet Union. This industry is one of the most advanced in 
Latin America, and leads in the production of pharmaceuticals 
and vaccines that are sold worldwide. Analysts and Cuban 
defectors have long cast suspicion on the activities conducted 
in these biomedical facilities.
    Here is what we now know: The United States believes that 
Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare 
research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use 
biotechnology to other rogue states. We are concerned that such 
technology could support BW programs in those states. We call 
on Cuba to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue 
states and to fully comply with all of its obligations under 
the Biological Weapons Convention.

Conclusion

    America is leading in the fight to root out and destroy 
terror. Our goals are to stop the development of weapons of 
mass destruction and insure compliance with existing arms 
control and nonproliferation treaties and commitments, which 
the Bush Administration strongly supports, but experience has 
shown that treaties and agreements are an insufficient check 
against state sponsors of terrorism. Noncompliance can 
undermine the efficacy and legitimacy of these treaties and 
regimes. After all, any nation ready to violate one agreement 
is perfectly capable of violating another, denying its actual 
behavior all the while. And so I close with four fundamental 
conclusions. First, that global terrorism has changed the 
nature of the threat we face. Keeping WMD out of terrorist 
hands must be a core element of our nonproliferation strategy.
    Second, the Administration supports an international 
dialogue on weapons of mass destruction and encourages 
countries to educate their publics on the WMD threat. We must 
not shy away from truth telling.
    Third, the Administration will not assume that because a 
country's formal subscription to UN counterterrorism 
conventions or its membership in multilateral regimes 
necessarily constitutes an accurate reading of its intentions. 
We call on Libya, Cuba, and Syria to live up to the agreements 
they have signed. We will watch closely their actions, not 
simply listen to their words. Working with our allies, we will 
expose those countries that do not live up to their 
commitments.
    Finally, the United States will continue to exercise strong 
leadership in multilateral forums and will take whatever steps 
are necessary to protect and defend our interests and eliminate 
the terrorist threat.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


  Announcement of Nomination of John Bolton as U.S. Ambassador to the 
                                  U.N.


BY SECRETARY CONDOLEEZZA RICE, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ROOM, WASHINGTON, DC, 
                             MARCH 7, 2005

    SECRETARY RICE: Good afternoon. This past September at the 
United Nations General Assembly, President Bush spoke of our 
nation's commitments to working in close partnership with the 
United Nations. The United States is committed to the success 
of the United Nations and we view the U.N. as an important 
component of our diplomacy. The American people respect the 
idealism that sparked the creation of the United Nations and we 
share the UN's unshakable support for human dignity.
    At this time of great opportunity and great promise, the 
charge to the International community is clear: we who are on 
the right side of freedom's divide have an obligation to help 
those who were unlucky enough to be born on the wrong side of 
that divide. The hard work of freedom is a task of generations; 
yet, it is also urgent work that cannot be deferred.
    We have watched in awe in Afghanistan, as men and women 
once suppressed by the Tatiban walked miles and stood for hours 
in the snow just to cast a ballot for their first vote as a 
free people. We have watched as millions of Iraqi men and women 
defied terrorists and cast their free votes and began their 
nation's new history. We have seen determination in the faces 
of citizens in places like Ukraine and Georgia and the 
Palestinian territories, as they have stood firm for their 
freedom.
    We are seeing political reforms begin to take place in 
Qatar and Jordan and Egypt and Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and 
this very morning we applaud the courage of those on the 
frontlines of freedom in Lebanon who are seeking free and fair 
elections. In this era of expanding freedom, there is room for 
optimism but much hard work lies ahead. The international 
community has a challenging agenda before it, from the Middle 
East to Sudan to Haiti to the Balkans from Iran to the Korean 
Peninsula and on many other issues.
    Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical role as 
it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and aspirations of 
its original promise to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, to reaffirm faith and fundamental human rights 
and to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom. President Bush has sent our most skilled and 
experienced diplomats to represent the United States at the 
U.N. Today, I am honored to continue that tradition by 
announcing that President Bush intends to nominate John Bolton 
to be our next Ambassador to the United Nations.
    The President and I have asked John to do this work because 
he knows how to get things done. He is a tough-minded diplomat, 
he has a strong record of success and he has a proven track 
record of effective multilateralism. For the past four years 
John has served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control 
and International Security Affairs. In that position, John has 
held primary responsibility for the issue that U.N. Secretary 
General Kofi Annan has identified as one of our most crucial 
challenges to international peace and security: stemming the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
    John helped build a coalition of more than 60 countries to 
help combat the spread of WMD through the President's 
Proliferation Security Initiative. John played a key diplomatic 
role in our sensitive negotiations with Libya when that nation 
made the wise choice to give up its pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction. And John was the chief negotiator of the Treaty of 
Moscow, which was signed by Presidents Putin and Bush to reduce 
nuclear warheads by two-thirds.
    In President George H.W. Bush's Administration, John served 
as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations 
and worked on several key diplomatic initiatives with the U.N., 
including work on U.N. reform and work on the repayment of 
arrearages and assessments. In 1991, John was the principal 
architect behind the initiative that finally led the United 
Nations General Assembly to repeal the notorious resolution 
that equated Zionism and racism.
    And few may remember this, but John worked between 1997 and 
2000 as an assistant to former Secretary James Baker in his 
capacity as the Secretary General's personal envoy to the 
Western Sahara. John did work pro bono. If few Americans have 
direct experience working for the United Nations, I'm confident 
that fewer still have gained that experience on their own 
nickel. Through history, some of our best ambassadors have been 
those with the strongest voices, ambassadors like Jeane 
Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
    John Bolton is personally committed to the future success 
of the United Nations and he will be a strong voice for reform 
at a time when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to 
help meet the challenging agenda before the international 
community. John will also help to build a broader base of 
support here in the United Nations for the U.N.--in the United 
States for the U.N. and its mission. As Secretary General Annan 
has said, ``U.S. support the U.N. is critical to the success of 
this institution.'' The United States will continue to do its 
part.
    John, you have my confidence and that of the President. We 
thank you for the work you have done on behalf of our nation. 
To John's wife, Gretchen, and daughter Jennifer Sarah and other 
friends of John who are here with us today, we thank you for 
all that you do. But John, your most important work is yet to 
come. And I look forward to working closely with you on behalf 
of our nation and the international community in support of the 
United Nations.

    UNDER SECRETARY BOLTON: Madame Secretary, you and the 
President have done me a great honor in nominating me to be the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations. 
If confirmed by the Senate, I will continue to work closely 
with members of Congress and our colleagues both in the Foreign 
Service and in the civil service to advance President Bush's 
policies.
    As you know, Madame Secretary, I've worked in the 
government for many years, at the Agency for International 
Development, the Department of Justice and here at the 
Department of State. This work has afforded me the opportunity 
to learn from some of our nation's finest public servants. It 
has been an honor and a privilege to represent the United 
States Government in crafting many multinational and bilateral 
agreements to further our National Security objectives.
    Madame Secretary, my record over many years demonstrates 
clear support for effective multilateral diplomacy. Whether it 
be the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 global 
partnership or adopting UN resolutions, working closely with 
others is essential to ensuring a safer world. We all agree 
that there are numerous challenges facing the United States and 
the security of our country and all freedom-loving peoples must 
be protected. Close cooperation and the time-honored tradition 
of frank communication is central to achieving our mutually-
held objectives. The United Nations affords us the opportunity 
to move our policies forward together with unity of purpose.
    As you know, I have over the years written critically about 
the U.N. Indeed, one highlight of my professional career was 
the 1991 successful effort to repeal the General Assembly's 
1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism, thus removing the 
greatest stain on the U.N.'S reputation. I have consistently 
stressed in my writings that American leadership is critical to 
the success of the U.N., an effective U.N., one that is true to 
the original intent of its charter's framers.
    This is a time of opportunity for the U.N. which, likewise, 
requires American leadership to achieve successful reform. I 
know you and the President will provide that leadership. If 
confirmed by the Senate, I will roll up my sleeves to join you 
in that effort which will require close, bipartisan 
Congressional support.
    Finally a personal note, I'd like to thank two very special 
people who have been with me for many years, my wife Gretchen 
and our daughter Jennifer Sarah, who have endured my many 
foreign trips and long absences in the service of our country.
    Madame Secretary, again, I want to thank you and the 
President for your confidence and for your support.
                                ------                                


  Memo re: Unclassified Briefing on the Process of Getting Identities 
                          From NSA Intercepts

    On Friday, May 6, officials from the State Department's 
bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) gave a briefing to 
majority and minority staffs on how policymakers and others can 
obtain the blacked-out names of Americans in intercepts from 
the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA regularly sends 
relevant, highly-classified reports to various policymakers, as 
well as to INR, as part of the normal intelligence briefing 
process. The volume of reports depends on both availability of 
information and the interest of the policymaker. Sometimes 
those reports will include excerpts of intercepted 
conversations between foreigners that mention U.S. citizens. By 
law, the American names are blacked out, and it is noted that 
speakers are referring to ``named U.S. person'', ``named U.S. 
official'' or ``named U.S. company.''
    If the person receiving the NSA report wants to know the 
identity of the ``named'' person, he or she contacts the 
relevant INR analyst and asks for it. INR prepares a formal 
request for NSA, signed by INR's Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary. The requester needs to give no special reason other 
than he/she needs the name ``to assess the intelligence value 
of the report.'' INR rarely if ever questions the requester. 
The request is sent over to the NSA, and the name comes back, 
sometimes overnight, or a day or so later. No request has ever 
been denied by NSA, as far as we were told. The analyst is 
shown the ``ident'', and then goes and informs the requester. 
Requesters can be ``any policy customer who has the authority 
to see the report.'' Typically the individual is at the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary rank or above, sometimes office director or 
above.
    The briefers said they receive ``two or three'' such 
requests a week, especially from INR analysts, who need the 
information to understand better the intelligence they are 
analyzing. The Committee has been told that during Secretary 
Bolton's tenure, 400 such requests were made by the State 
Department, including 10 by Secretary Bolton. An estimated 50% 
of the 400 requests come from INR; an almost equally large 
number are requested by officials from Diplomatic Security.
    By law, the NSA may not eavesdrop on the conversations of a 
U.S. citizen, even if that citizen is abroad. Therefore, any 
blacked-out names would be Americans who are being talked 
about, not Americans who are talking on the intercept.
    The NSA reports are typically so highly classified that 
they do not stay with the requester once he or she has read it. 
They must be stored in more secure facilities than most 
officials have in their offices. When the name comes back from 
NSA (via secure e-mail), the analyst is shown the name, but 
apparently is not given it on a piece of paper. The analyst 
then takes the original intercept report to the requester, 
discloses the ``ident'', then takes the report back again.
    There is some discrepancy about how many requests have been 
made. If the requester asks for two different names on the same 
report, INR counts that as two requests, NSA counts it as one. 
Therefore, INR counts somewhat more requests than NSA's 400. 
INR assumes that if a request comes from the chief of staff or 
some other top person in an official's office, it is coming 
from the official. The briefers did not believe INR's records 
are scrupulous in recording whether the request came directly 
from the principal or from staff. The INR records of the idents 
are destroyed within nine months.
    Like any SCI material, the NSA reports are available only a 
need to know basis. Someone with a clearance can't simply go 
rooting around NSA reports. A person requesting an ident on a 
report clearly outside his/her area would raise a red flag.
                                ------                                

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                    Washington, DC, April 28, 2005.
Hon. Pat Roberts,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
Hon. Jay Rockefeller,
Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman/Vice Chairman: As part of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations' due diligence process, in connection with 
the nomination of John Bolton to be the United States 
Representative to the United Nations, questions have arisen 
with regard to requests by the nominee in his capacity as Under 
Secretary of State for Arms Control. More specifically, Mr. 
Bolton has testified that, on approximately ten occasions 
between 2001 and 2004, he requested the names of U.S. persons 
that were redacted in the release to policymakers of various 
intelligence products.
    A number of questions have been raised regarding these 
types of requests, including the process by which such requests 
are made, transmitted, and approved. There is also concern as 
to whether information regarding Mr. Bolton's specific requests 
has been handled appropriately by those with knowledge of such 
requests.
    Therefore, the Committee, working with and through the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, 
hereby requests that you solicit from the appropriate 
intelligence agencies or elements thereof all information 
related to Mr. Bolton's requests and the responses thereto, 
including but not limited to, the unredacted contents of the 
documents in question, the process by which Mr. Bolton's 
requests were handled, the contents of the responses and the 
process by which they were communicated, as well as any 
conclusions reached by the appropriate intelligence agencies or 
elements thereto as to any violations of procedures, 
directives, regulations, or law by those with knowledge of Mr. 
Bolton's requests.
    Assuming the provision of such material, the Committee on 
Foreign Relations is prepared to follow the guidance of the 
Select Committee on Intelligence with access and storage of 
such material, as well as the provisions under which such 
materials will be shared with Members of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations.
    Thank you for your consideration of this request.
            Sincerely,
                                          Richard G. Lugar,
                                                          Chairman.
                                ------                                

                                       U.S. Senate,
                                 Committee on Intelligence,
                                       Washington, DC, May 5, 2005.
Hon. Richard Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington DC.
     Dear Mr. Chairman: The Committee has received your letter 
of April 28, 2005. As you requested in that letter, the Select 
Committee on Intelligence is prepared to assist the Foreign 
Relations Committee in its review of specific Intelligence 
Community holdings as they relate to the nomination of John 
Bolton to be the U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
    The Select Committee on Intelligence looks forward to 
working with you and your Committee in order to facilitate this 
request.
            Sincerely,
                                               Pat Roberts,
                                                          Chairman.

                                ANNEX E




 HEARING ON NOMINATION OF JOHN R. BOLTON TO BE U.S., REPRESENTATIVE TO 
                           THE UNITED NATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         MONDAY, APRIL 11, 2005

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in Room 
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, 
Chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman, 
Alexander, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, 
Nelson, and Obama.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            INDIANA

    The Chairman.  This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is called to order.
    The Foreign Relations Committee meets today to consider 
President George W. Bush's nomination of John Bolton to be 
United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Mr. Bolton has 
served the last four years as the Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In this 
capacity, he has played an important role in several of the 
Bush administration's most notable diplomatic successes, 
including the President's proliferation security initiative, 
the Moscow Treaty, the G8 Global Partnership Against the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the opening 
of Libya's WMD programs.
    Secretary Bolton also served for four years in the 
administration of George H.W. Bush, as the Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Organizations. In this position, he 
was heavily involved in matters related to the United Nations, 
including United Nations financing and reform proposals. He 
also assisted former Secretary of State James Baker in his role 
as the Secretary General's personal envoy for the Western 
Sahara.
    In announcing this nomination, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice stated, and I quote, ``John Bolton is 
personally committed to the future success of the United 
Nations, and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time 
when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help meet 
the challenging agenda before the international community,'' 
end of quote from Dr. Rice.
    Perhaps no organization is so frequently oversimplified by 
both its proponents and its detractors as the United Nations. 
The United Nations is not a monolithic entity controlled by a 
Secretary General; rather, it's a complex collection of 
agencies, programs, diplomatic venues, traditions, and 
agreements that depend on the actions of the individual member 
states. As such, the various parts of the U.N. often work 
independently from one another with little coordination or 
oversight.
    The U.N. has produced great accomplishments, even as some 
of its structures have experienced episodes of corruption, 
mismanagement, contentiousness, or timidity. Some agencies and 
programs, like the World Health Organization, the World Food 
Program, and UNICEF, have a proven record of achievement and 
are trusted by people and nations around the world. Other 
endeavors, like the Oil-for-Food Program or the U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights, have been gravely flawed and suffer from 
severe organizational deficiencies.
    Foreign Relations Committee held the first congressional 
hearing on the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food scandal a year ago this 
month. At that hearing, I said, and I quote, ``Billions of 
dollars that should have been spent on humanitarian needs in 
Iraq were siphoned off by Saddam Hussein's regime through a 
system of surcharges, bribes, and kickbacks. This corruption 
was not solely a product of Saddam Hussein's machination; he 
depended upon members of the U.N. Security Council who were 
willing to be complicit in his activities, and they needed U.N. 
officials and contractors who were dishonest, inattentive, or 
willing to make damaging compromises in pursuit of a 
compassionate mission,'' end of quote.
    During the last year, we have learned much more about the 
extent of that corruption and mismanagement involved, and this 
knowledge has supported the case for reform.
    United Nations reform is not a new issue. The structure and 
role of the United Nations has been debated in our country 
almost continuously since the U.N. was established, in 1945. 
But in 2005 we may have a unique opportunity to improve the 
operations of the U.N. The revelations of the Oil-for-Food 
scandal and the urgency of strengthening global cooperation to 
address terrorism, the AIDS crisis, nuclear proliferation, and 
many other international problems have created momentum in 
favor of constructive reforms at the U.N.
    Secretary General Annan has proposed a substantial reform 
plan that will provide a platform for further reform 
initiatives and discussion. The United States must be a leader 
in the effort to improve the United Nations, particularly its 
accountability. At a time when the United Nations is appealing 
for greater international help in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in 
trouble spots around the world, the diminishment of U.N. 
credibility because of scandal reduces U.S. options and 
increases our burdens.
    Secretary Bolton has thought a great deal about this 
subject, and we are anxious to listen to his ideas for reform, 
as well as his evaluation of the Secretary General's plan. We 
want to know what specific parts of that plan deserve United 
States support. Beyond substantive evaluation, we want to know 
how the nominee intends to pursue these reform ideas. What 
strategy does he propose for making constructive changes a 
reality? How will he apply the substantial experience in this 
area?
    Even as reform must be a priority, the world will not stop 
while we attempt to improve the structures of the U.N. The next 
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. must pursue reform without 
diminishing the effectiveness of its core diplomatic mission; 
namely, securing greater international support for the 
national-security and foreign-policy objectives of the United 
States.
    During the last several months, President Bush and 
Secretary Rice have undertaken important missions designed to 
reinvigorate relations with allies and partners. This is an 
urgent national-security imperative that cannot be neglected by 
the next ambassador to the U.N. The United States does not 
possess infinite financial and military resources. We need help 
to advance security, democracy, and human rights. This fact 
should not preclude us from taking unilateral action when it is 
in our interest, but it does require that we be persistent and 
imaginative in our pursuits of international support.
    The nomination of Secretary Bolton to be Ambassador to the 
United Nations has generated public debate on U.S. policies 
toward the United Nations and on the degree to which the United 
States should embrace multilateralism. In this context, 
opponents of Mr. Bolton have criticized some statements of the 
nominee as abrasive, confrontational, and insensitive. Some of 
these same statements have been celebrated by supporters of the 
nominee as demonstrating a tough-minded, refreshingly blunt 
approach to diplomacy. But in the diplomatic world, neither 
bluntness nor rhetorical sensitivity is a virtue, in itself. 
There are times when blunt talk serves a policy purpose. Other 
times, it does not.
    When President Ronald Reagan stood before the Brandenburg 
Gate in 1987 and said, ``Mr. Gorbachev, tear down that wall,'' 
blunt speech was serving a carefully planned diplomatic 
purpose. It reflected broader themes of democracy that had been 
nurtured for years by the Reagan administration. It reaffirmed 
to Germany, on both sides of the wall, the United States would 
have staying power in Europe. It underscored to the Kremlin, in 
a personal, tangible way, that the United States and its allies 
were intent on achieving the peaceful transformation of Eastern 
Europe.
    Blunt as it was, there was nothing gratuitous about 
President Reagan's statement. Diplomatic speech by any high-
ranking administration official has policy consequences. It 
should never be undertaken simply to score international 
debating points, to appeal to segments of the U.S. public 
opinion, or to validate a personal point of view.
    As President John Kennedy once said, and I quote, ``The 
purpose of foreign policy is not to provide an outlet for our 
own sentiments of hope or indignation; it is to shape real 
events in a real world,'' end of quote.
    I believe that diplomats serving under the President and 
Secretary of State can apply a basic three-part test to almost 
anything they utter in a diplomatic context. First, is the 
statement true? Second, is the statement consistent with the 
policies and directives of the President and the Secretary of 
State? And, third, is there a rational expectation that the 
statement will advance or support U.S. interests?
    It is particularly important that the statements of our 
ambassadors to the U.N. meet this test, because, more so than 
any other American ambassadors, they are perceived as speaking 
directly for the President of the United States.
    President Bush has selected John Bolton, a nominee of 
experience and accomplishment, to be his spokesman and 
representative at the United Nations. Given the importance of 
the position, it is vital that we act both expeditiously and 
thoroughly in evaluating the nominee. We look forward to 
hearing the nominee's insights and learning how he will work on 
behalf of the President and the Secretary of State in 
fulfilling this duty.
    I'd like to turn now to the distinguished Ranking Member of 
the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.

   STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            DELAWARE

    Senator Biden.  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, 
Mr. Secretary.
    Let me say, at the outset, I'm probably--of all the people 
up here, I'm going to be the least critical of anyone who's 
blunt. I don't like to indict myself publicly that way. But--I 
hadn't planned on starting this way, but I think that the--to 
state my grave concern with this appointment, Mr. Chairman, I 
think that the test you set out for diplomacy is the accurate 
one: true, consistent with the policy of the administration, 
and a rational expectation that it would be in U.S. interests.
    Obviously, all of this is subject to explanation and 
rebuttal and--by our friend, Mr. Bolton, but I think that my 
problem with your statements about the U.N. is, I don't think 
they're true, I don't think they're consistent with U.S. 
policy, and I don't think--I clearly believe they do not 
advance U.S. interests. And, you know, you can be blunt. 
President Reagan was blunt about the Berlin Wall, because it 
was, in fact, clear to the whole world that it was an odious 
thing. I think your statements, which I'll go into in a minute, 
about the U.N. are a little bit like being blunt about NATO. If 
you had said, which you haven't, to the best of my knowledge, 
``NATO forces can't keep with us--up with us. The French air 
force can't fly on our wing,'' et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 
That would be blunt. That be also clearly against U.S. 
interests to say those things. But it would be blunt. And I 
would think that's more akin to my criticism of what you will 
soon hear of your statements about the U.N. than the Berlin 
Wall.
    I don't believe--well, I should point out, at the outset, 
Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you for your cooperation. You 
have been, as always, straightforward and honorable and fair to 
both the witness and to the minority. I don't believe this 
hearing, quite frankly, is ready to be conducted today, because 
we've not completed the review of certain allegations, none of 
which go to the integrity, the honesty, the personal conduct of 
the nominee. When I say ``allegations,'' I'll get into what I 
mean by that, allegations involving the nominee. They all 
relate to whether or not he attempted to use his influence 
unfairly to get certain analysts fired because they didn't 
agree with his assessments. That's what I mean, at the outset, 
so the press doesn't think there's anything nefarious about 
this. That's the issue that's going to be discussed here, among 
others.
    On March 21st, I asked the State Department for access to 
certain individuals and documents related to an incident 
involving the nominee and a State Department employee relating 
to whether or not that person should or should not have been 
fired. For two weeks, the Department stonewalled. It was only 
after you, Mr. Chairman, intervened, last Thursday--and we sent 
repeated letters to the State Department--last Thursday that 
you intervened, that we received some cooperation.
    On Thursday, last, at 1:45 p.m., the Democratic staff was 
informed that two individuals--we asked for four--would be made 
available that afternoon, starting at 3:00 p.m. On Friday 
morning, some of the documents we requested began to arrive, 
but the committee was not allowed to retain them or make copies 
of them, but only take notes, further handicapping our ability 
to review the materials.
    Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides--this has 
been on both sides--I asked my chief of staff to correct me--on 
every interview, there's been a majority member staff person 
there, so this isn't a--this isn't--the Democrats are asking 
for it, but this--none of this has been done absent a majority 
staff person being present.
    Since Thursday afternoon, staff on both sides have worked 
diligently to interview the witnesses and review materials. And 
so, I'm grateful for your intervention at the time that you 
intervened, because I was having no success with Secretary 
Rice. But the committee's work to investigate this matter, 
which would have proceeded over the past two-week period, was 
compressed into 90 hours. The staff still only--has at least 
two more interviews to conduct, and I don't believe that all 
documents responsive to the request have been provided.
    And because many of the documents are classified, they 
could not be made available to Senators to review unless they 
happened to be in Washington during this period. Many of us 
were--the reason it was initially postponed is, many of us were 
in Rome with the President's funeral. Excuse me. Freudian. I 
beg your pardon. At the Pope's funeral that the President 
attended.
    This is not a way that we should do business. The 
Department's lack of cooperation--this is not Mr. Bolton; he 
did not fail to cooperate, the Department did not cooperate 
until the last possible minute--stands in marked contrast to 
the nomination four years ago for this same position. In that 
case, involving John Negroponte, the committee reviewed, with 
full cooperation, and obtained hundreds of pages of documents 
without delay or resistance. And my friend from Connecticut was 
a prime mover in dealing with that nomination.
    The fact is that, unlike four years ago, Under Secretary 
Bolton, when he came before this committee, had little 
background in Arms Controls, and we confirmed him. But there's 
no question that he comes before us today with extensive 
experience in U.N. affairs. He served as the Assistant 
Secretary of State during the first Bush administration, 
supervising policy regarding the United Nations. And he has 
written and testified frequently about the subject. And it is 
precisely the record in his first part of this--the first Bush 
term that concerns me.
    I believe the President is entitled to significant 
deference in his appointment of senior personnel, and I've --
but I have opposed nominees, however, who I believe were 
hostile to the mission for which--to which they were assigned. 
For example, I voted against two--one Secretary of the Interior 
who was--clearly had an animus toward that Department, under 
the Reagan administration. And I voted against Secretaries of 
Education appointed by Reagan, because he said he was 
appointing them for the express purpose of doing away with the 
Department of Education.
    And so, this will--not the first time I have voted against 
a--if I vote against John--it would not be the first time that 
I voted against a nominee for--that the President has put 
forward that's not a member of the judiciary.
    And, quite frankly, I'm surprised that the nominee wants 
the job that he's been nominated for, given his--the many 
negative things he had to say about the U.N., international 
institutions, and international law. Now, you've going to have 
an opportunity to respond to all these kinds of things. They're 
taken--they're attempted to be in context, but they're--but I'm 
just going to cite some of the things you said, and they'll be 
put in context during the question-and-answer period.
    You said, there's no such thing as the United Nations --
quote, ``There's no such thing as the United Nations.''
    You said, and I quote, that--excuse me--you said, If they 
removed ten stories from the 38-story U.N. headquarters, quote, 
``it wouldn't make a bit of difference,'' end of quote.
    You said that if the Security Council were to be made 
today, that you would have only one permanent member, the 
United States.
    You said that international law really isn't, quote, 
``It''--that it really isn't law, and that, quote, ``While 
treaties may well be politically or even morally binding, they 
are not legally obligatory,'' end of quote.
    You said the International Court of Justice, a body created 
under the U.N. Charter, is a, quote, ``travesty and a pretend 
court,'' end of quote.
    You said that the peace-enforcement operations of the 
United--of nation and nation-building should, quote, ``be 
relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity,'' 
end of quote, because they resulted in, as you said, quote, 
``American personnel and resources being committed to U.N. 
operations far removed from America's vital interests,'' end of 
quote, even though they wouldn't be there unless we--if we 
didn't want them there, we could veto the effort.
    I want to give you a chance to explain, clarify, and 
possibly, hopefully, repudiate these and other statements 
you've made over the years, but, for now, let me point to two 
things.
    First, the logical conclusion of your views is that--in my 
view, is that if the U.S. Embassy is sacked by a foreign state, 
or a U.S. soldier tortured, then this country and its citizens 
have no recourse under international law, because, in your 
view, there's no such thing as international law. How can that 
possibly be in America's interest?
    Second, it seems to me your views about the U.N. treaties 
and international law are out of sync with those of the 
President of the United States and Secretary Rice. Soon after 
his election, the President stated that one of his priorities 
for the second term was, quote, ``to defend our security and 
spread freedom by building effective multinational and 
multilateral institutions and supporting effective multilateral 
action,'' end of quote.
    The President, right now, is demanding, to his great 
credit, Syria's full withdrawal from Lebanon, under the 
authority of a U.N. Security Council Resolution. The 
administration has finally joined the European effort to 
convince Iran to forego nuclear weapons. Quote, ``We're working 
closely with Britain, France, and Germany,'' the President 
said, continuing the quote, ``as they insist that Tehran comply 
with international law.''
    The President recently decided the United States, quote, 
``will discharge its international obligations,'' end of quote, 
under decisions of the International Court of Justice by having 
several state courts, including courts in Texas, give effect to 
the decision of that court in certain death-penalty cases. Does 
he know that he's implementing an order that is from a 
``pretend court''?
    The administration strongly endorses the U.N. decision to 
send 10,000 peacekeepers to Sudan to help secure a North-South 
peace agreement, a mission your statements about peacekeeping 
suggest that you'd have trouble supporting.
    During her confirmation hearing, Secretary Rice told this 
committee, quote, ``that the time for diplomacy is now,'' end 
of quote.
    This month, speaking before the American Society of 
International Law, she said, and I quote, ``One of the pillars 
of that diplomacy is our strong belief that international law 
is a vital and powerful force in the search for freedom,'' end 
of quote.
    I suspect that if President Clinton's Secretary of State 
had made that same statement, you might have been leading the 
charge that this was an ill-founded statement. I could be 
wrong. I'm anxious to hear what you have to say.
    In the past two months, the President and the Secretary 
have made clear that there is a new-found commitment to work 
closely with others, including the United Nations. And I'm 
hopeful that they're trying to return America to its historic 
role in building a strong international system that serves our 
interests, rather than running roughshod over it.
    Your views seem, based on what you've said in the past, 
John, to be contradictory and contrary to the direction the 
President and the Secretary of State now want to take this 
administration, which leads me to believe that it must mean 
that you no longer agree with those statements, because they 
appointed you. I wonder, as I did in 2001, about your 
diplomatic temperament. You have a habit of belittling your 
opposition, and even some of your friends.
    You said that, quote, ``Republicans are adults on foreign-
policy questions, and we define what we're willing to do 
militarily and politically by what is in the best interest of 
the United States.'' I wonder what you think of the motives of 
some of us who aren't Republicans.
    You once quoted that the head of the International Law 
Commission--you once quoted the head of the International Law 
Commission as evidence of the grandiose ambitions of supporters 
in the International Criminal Court by saying, quote, ``That's 
not the same as knuckle-dragging''--excuse me--``That's''--
excuse me--of the International Criminal Court by saying, 
quote, ``That's not some knuckle-dragging Republican from some 
southern state, it's the head of the International Law 
Commission,'' end of quote. I don't think that's the kind of 
attitude that is going to serve us very well in the United 
Nations if it continues.
    The U.N. needs reform. Lots of it. I work with former 
Chairman Jesse Helms to promote such reforms. The Helm-Biden 
amendment was--the legislation was part of that reform. That 
work's not finished. We need a strong voice in New York who 
knows the U.N. and who can advance our reform agenda, but we 
don't need a voice which people may not be inclined to listen 
to. And I fear that, knowing your reputation, and your 
reputation known well at the U.N., people will be inclined to 
tune you out. Above all, we need an able diplomat skilled in 
working the corridors of a complex international institution. 
Some have said that sending you to New York would be like 
sending Nixon to China. I'm concerned it'll be more like 
sending a bull into a china shop.
    Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who served at the U.N. under 
President Reagan and strongly supports you, may have summed it 
up best in describing you in the New York Times. She said, ``He 
may not--he may do diplomatic jobs for the U.S. Government, but 
John is not a diplomat,'' end of quote.
    So we'll want to spend some more time exploring your views 
on the United Nations and how you approach the job, if 
confirmed. We also have an obligation to assess your 
performance in your current job, Under Secretary of State for 
Arms Control and International Security. The fact is that, on 
your watch, in areas in which you are responsible, the world 
has gotten more, and not less, dangerous. Not your fault, but 
that's a fact. We didn't create these threats, but it's our 
responsibility to contend with them wisely and effectively. 
And, in my judgement, your judgement on how to deal with the 
emerging threats have not been particularly useful.
    Over the past four years, Korea has increased its nuclear-
weapons capacity by as much as 400 percent. It may now have as 
many as eight nuclear weapons, which it could test, hide, sell, 
or sell to the highest bidder. During your 2001 confirmation 
hearing, you highlighted a danger posed by North Korea 27 
times. You were right. But the record suggests that your 
approach has undermined the efforts to address the growing 
threat posed by Pyongyang.
    Over the past four years, Iran has accelerated its own 
nuclear program. It's much closer to the bomb than when the 
President took office. The record suggests you opposed the 
President's policy, the one finally adopted by President Bush. 
He's come around to, after several years, a coordinated 
strategy of carrots and sticks with our European partners. No 
one can guarantee it will work. We do know that the approach 
you apparently advocated has not worked.
    Over the past four years, the invaluable program Chairman 
Lugar started to help Russia account and destroy excess nuclear 
weapons and a complementary program to deal with its chemical 
arsenal has to withstand efforts by some in this administration 
to cut it. Now these programs have become mired in red tape, 
and despite the fact that loose Russian weapons pose one of the 
greatest potential threats to our security, we still haven't 
cut through that red tape.
    The administration did succeed in convincing Libya to give 
up its weapons of mass destruction, but, according to press 
accounts--and I'd like to hear what your view is--that only 
happened after you were taken off the case. And that success 
was the result of a policy begun by a previous administration 
that you roundly disparaged.
    Finally, a serious concern has been raised about your 
attitude toward dissenting views. Specifically, it has been 
alleged that, on at least two occasions, you sought to have 
removed from their positions officials who disagreed with your 
assessment of critical intelligence matters. After all this 
country has been through with Iraq and faulty intelligence, if 
that's true, that's not the approach we should be rewarding. 
You'll have a full opportunity to address these complaints.
    John, I have great respect for your abilities and your 
intellectual capacity. It's your judgement and temperament, as 
well as your approach to many of these issues, that give me 
great pause.
    Let me conclude with this. After a necessary war in 
Afghanistan and a optional war in Iraq, Americans are rightly 
confident in the example of our power. But I've been concerned 
that many in this administration have forgotten the power of 
our example. Foreign policy is not a popularity contest. We 
must confront hard issues. Sometimes they require hard choices 
that other countries don't like. But, above all, they require 
American leadership. That's the kind that persuades others to 
follow. And I'm not convinced this nominee has that as his 
strongest suit.
    I thank the Chair, and I yield back to the Chair.
    The Chairman.  I thank the distinguished Ranking Member.
    I would mention that when the hearing was originally 
scheduled for Thursday of last week, our distinguished 
colleague, Senator Warner, had planned to join us to introduce 
Secretary Bolton. With the rescheduling of the hearing for this 
morning, Senator Warner is unable to attend because of 
commitments in his state. He's asked me to convey to the 
committee his strong support for the nominee. And I would ask 
unanimous consent that Senator Warner's statement be included 
in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Warner 
follows:]
    Senator Biden.  Mr. Chairman, may I clarify the point I 
made? I said ``every witness has been interviewed jointly.'' 
Three weeks ago, the Democratic staff interviewed one witness 
alone, and then, I believe, notified--am I correct?--notified 
the majority staff, who then interviewed that nominee, which 
began this ball rolling. So there was one interview, that I'm 
aware of, that the initial interview did not take place with 
both majority and minority in the room. That was the only one. 
I just wanted to clarify the record.
    The Chairman.  I thank the Senator for the clarification.
    Let me say, at the outset, that we have good attendance 
this morning, for which the Chair is grateful, and I would ask 
that Members limit their questions to ten minutes. We will have 
a ten-minute round, followed by an additional ten-minute round. 
I would just simply announce my willingness to preside over the 
committee throughout the afternoon and into an evening session, 
if that is required, for Members to have opportunity to ask all 
the questions that they wish to ask. I want to make that clear 
at the outset, that Members will have that opportunity 
throughout the morning, the afternoon, and the evening, but I 
would ask Members to respect the ten-minute time limit.
    Now, the Chair will not stop the witness from responding 
when the ten minutes comes to a conclusion, but I will ask the 
Senator involved to restrain from further doing business during 
that period until another turn comes around, in fairness to 
most Members who have changed their plans in order to be here 
today and have come at least to do business, to participate in 
the hearing.
    Having mentioned that, I will ask the Clerk to start the 
clock on my questioning, and I will ask the first ten minutes 
of questions and then yield to my distinguished colleague, 
Senator Biden. We'll go back and forth, then, with our 
questions.
    Excuse me, I've jumped the gun. We've not heard from the 
nominee. [Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  And we do want to hear from the nominee. 
[Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  We were so excited about asking you 
questions, Secretary Bolton--[Laughter.]
    The Chairman.  --that we just wanted to get right into it. 
But, nevertheless, we do look forward to your statement. Please 
take the time that is required, really, to fully express your 
views, and then I'll start the clock on my ten minutes of 
questioning.
    Secretary Bolton?

     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. 
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR 
AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
   AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO SESSIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
     GENERAL ASSEMBLY DURING HIS TENURE OF SERVICE AS U.S. 
              REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED STATES

    Mr. Bolton.  Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden.
    I am honored to appear before you today as President Bush's 
nominee to be U.S. Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations. I'm grateful for your consideration, and I look 
forward to discussing the critical leadership role that the 
United States plays in the United Nations.
    I'd like to thank Senator Warner, who would have been here, 
as you suggested, had the schedule not changed, and my wife 
Gretchen, who is here with me today.
    I do have a longer statement, Senator, if I could, I'd 
submit for the record, and I'll just read a shorter version of 
it.
    The Chairman.  It will be published in the record in full.
    Mr. Bolton.  Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for the 
opportunities that I have had to work with this committee over 
the years. This is the fourth time I have appeared before this 
committee in a confirmation hearing. If confirmed, I pledge to 
fulfill the President's vision of working in close partnership 
with the United Nations.
    The United States is committed to the success of the United 
Nations, and we view the U.N. as an important component of our 
diplomacy. As the President stated before the U.N. General 
Assembly last September, ``Let history show that, in a decisive 
decade, members of the United Nations did not grow weary in our 
duties or waver in meeting them.''
    The Secretary has made this a top priority, as well. She 
was unequivocal in her remarks, and I quote, ``The American 
people respect the idealism that sparked the creation of the 
United Nations, and we share the U.N.'s unshakeable support for 
human dignity. At this time of great opportunity and great 
promise, the charge to the international community is clear. 
We, who are on the right side of freedom's divide, have an 
obligation to help those who were unlucky enough to be born on 
the wrong side of that divide. The hard work of freedom is a 
task of generations, yet it is also urgent work that cannot be 
deferred. Now, more than ever, the U.N. must play a critical 
role as it strives to fulfill the dreams and hopes and 
aspirations of its original promise to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger freedom.''
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
committee to forge a stronger relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations, which depends critically on 
American leadership. Such leadership, in turn, must rest upon 
broad bipartisan support in Congress. It must be earned by 
putting to rest skepticism that so many feel about the U.N. 
system.
    Through the course of three decades of public service, both 
in and out of government, I have learned that this consensus is 
not only essential, but possible. Working together in a spirit 
of bipartisan cooperation, I believe we can take important 
steps to restore confidence in the United Nations.
    Mr. Chairman, we are at a critical juncture, and I fully 
share the sentiments that you expressed in 1997 when you 
remarked, and I quote, ``It is time to decide if we want a 
strong and viable United Nations that can serve United States' 
interests, or a United Nations that is crippled by insolvency 
and hobbled by controversy and uncertainty.''
    Mr. Chairman, there are four priorities that I believe are 
important to pursue if confirmed as U.S. Representative to the 
U.N. One priority is to strengthen and build institutions that 
serve as the cornerstone of freedom in nascent democracies. Mr. 
Chairman, we should never underestimate the impact of free and 
fair elections on a country. I look forward, if confirmed, to 
working with relevant U.N. agencies to enable them to 
contribute further to the growth of democratic institutions in 
countries freed from the bonds of oppression.
    I also look forward to working with you on President Bush's 
request for $10 million in the fiscal year 2006 budget to set 
up a democracy fund within the United Nations. I'm grateful to 
Secretary General Annan for endorsing the President's proposal 
in his new report in U.N. reform.
    While the U.N. has had its successes in the human-rights 
field, there have been problems, as well, such as the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights. For too long, some of the 
most egregious violators of human rights have undercut UNHRC's 
principles and its effectiveness. The consequence, as Secretary 
General Annan has said, is that the Commission's important work 
has, and I quote, ``been increasingly undermined by its 
declining credibility and professionalism,'' close quote. We 
must work with our friends and allies to keep those who would 
usurp the moral authority of this Commission off of it, and to 
send clear and strong signals that we will not shy away from 
naming human-rights violators.
    We must work to galvanize the General Assembly to focus its 
attention on issues of true importance. Sadly, there have been 
times when the General Assembly has gone off track, such as 
with the abominable Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with 
racism. I am proud to have been an active player in getting 
this resolution repealed.
    Mr. Chairman, a second priority, should I be confirmed will 
be stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to 
ensure that terrorist organizations and the world's most 
dangerous regimes are unable to threaten the United States, our 
friends, and our allies. As Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security, I have worked hard to 
promote effective multilateral action to curb the flow of 
dangerous weapons. As you know, I served as the lead U.S. 
negotiator in the creation of the G8 Global Partnership Against 
the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 
which will add an additional $10 billion over ten years in 
Nunn-Lugar-type programs.
    In the case of Libya, I had the opportunity to work in 
close consultation with our British colleagues in diplomatic 
efforts to secure the verifiable elimination of Libyan weapons 
of mass destruction. I also helped build a coalition of more 
than 60 countries to help combat the spread of dangerous 
weapons through President Bush's Proliferation Security 
Initiative.
    I have no doubt that these efforts played a critical role 
in enabling the United States to lead the Security Council to 
pass Resolution 1540, first suggested by President Bush in his 
speech to the General Assembly in September 2003. This 
resolution calls upon ``all member states to fulfill their 
obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament, and to 
prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction.''
    Resolution 1540 was the first of its kind focusing on WMD 
proliferation. I am proud that our strong leadership 
contributed to its unanimous adoption. I'm happy to report 
that, as of March 15, over 80 countries have submitted reports 
required by the resolution, outlining their plans to enact and 
implement measures to stop WMD proliferation. I look forward to 
working with Security Council members to achieve 100 percent 
compliance with the resolution.
    A third priority that I would pursue, if confirmed, is 
supporting the global war on terror. As we all le