<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VI]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_cciii.wais]

 
                           Chapter CCIII.

              QUESTIONS OF PRIVILEGE AND THEIR PRECEDENCE.

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   1. Debate and other procedure on. Sections 553-562.
   2. Basis for raising question of privilege. Section 563.
   3. During call of the House. Section 564.
   4. Presentation of, by Member. Sections 565-570.

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  553. A question of privilege takes precedence over business in order 
under the rule on ``suspension day.''
  A Member, questioned because of words spoken in debate, rose to a 
question of privilege and submitted the matter to the House for 
consideration and disposition.
  The issue raised by the questioning of a Member for words spoken in 
debate was referred to the Judiciary Committee.
  A newspaper correspondent who violated the privileges of the House 
was, by resolution, excluded from that portion of the Capitol under the 
jurisdiction of the House for a period of 10 days.
  On February 6, 1911,\2\ a suspension day, Mr. Robert B. Macon, of 
Arkansas, rose to a question of personal privilege and stated that he 
had been questioned by one Walter J. Fahy, a newspaper correspondent, 
for words spoken in debate on the floor of the House, and that he 
submitted the matter to the House for its consideration and 
disposition.
  Thereupon Mr. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, offered the 
following resolution:

  Resolved, That the matter brought to the attention of the House by 
the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. Macon] be referred to the Committee on 
Rules, with authority to send for persons and papers, to examine 
witnesses upon oath, with instructions to report not later than March 
1, 1911.

  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that, the day 
being set apart by the rules for the consideration of bills on the 
unanimous consent calendar and for motions to discharge committees, the 
resolution proposed by Mr. Gardner was not in order.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair is prepared to rule. The constitutional provision is as 
follows:
  ``* * * They [the Senators and Representatives] shall in all cases, 
except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from 
arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective 
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; * * *.''
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  \1\ Supplementary to Chapter LXXX.
  \2\ Third session Sixty-first Congress, Journal, p. 258; Record, p. 
1997.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 554
  And further:
  ``* * * and for any speech or debate in either House, they [the 
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other 
place.''
  Now, this resolution, as it seems to the Chair, raises the question 
of high constitutional privilege, namely, touching the questioning of 
the Representative from Arkansas, Mr. Macon, in another place than in a 
session of the House.
  The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann, makes the point of order that, 
even if it be a question of privilege, this is a day especially set 
apart by the rules for the Unanimous Consent Calendar, Discharge of 
Committee Calendar, and Suspension Calendar. The Chair has no 
hesitation in holding that when a constitutional privilege, affecting a 
Member of this House, is presented, and affecting the freedom of debate 
in the House, it takes precedence of any other business affected by any 
rule that the House has made or can make governing its order of 
business.

  The resolution was then amended and agreed to, as follows:

  Resolved, That the matter brought to the attention of the House by 
the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Macon) be referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary, with authority to send for persons and papers and to 
proceed, by subcommittee or committee, to examine witnesses upon oath, 
and with instructions to report not later than February 18, 1911.

  On February 9 the Speaker laid before the House a letter of apology 
from Walter J. Fahy, which was referred to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  On February 15,\1\ Mr. Wayne R. Parker, of New Jersey, submitted the 
report of the committee, recommending the adoption of the following 
resolution, which was agreed to without debate or division:

  Resolved, That Walter J. Fahy did, on the fourth day of February, 
nineteen hundred and eleven, commit a breach of the privileges of the 
House of Representatives, and that he be excluded from the House of 
Representatives and from all privileges therein for ten days.

  554. A question of privilege is in order after the House has voted to 
resolve into Committee of the Whole, the Speaker being still in the 
chair.
  A question of privilege may not interrupt a roll call.
  On April 29, 1918,\2\ the House agreed to a motion to resolve into 
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the 
consideration of the war metals bill.
  After the result of the roll call had been announced but before the 
Speaker had left the chair, Mr. Britten, of Illinois, claimed the floor 
for a question of privilege.
  Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, made the point of order that the House 
having voted to go into the Committee of the Whole, it was too late to 
present a question of privilege.
  The Speaker \3\ replied that a question of privilege took precedence 
over all other business and was in order at any time except during roll 
call, and recognized Mr. Britten.
  555. A statement by a Member in debate that he would ``need a crooked 
spine to walk in the crooked paths'' in which a colleague would lead 
him was ruled not to entitle the latter to recognition on a question of 
privilege.
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  \1\ House Report No. 2167.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 347; Record, p. 
5774.
  \3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
                                                             Sec. 556
  A question of personal privilege takes precedence over matters merely 
privileged under the rules and is in order following the adoption of a 
resolution granting privilege to motions to resolve into Committee of 
the Whole.
  On March 4, 1927,\1\ the House agreed to the resolution (H. Res. 447) 
giving precedence to motions making it in order to move to resolve into 
the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the bill (S. 3896) 
to amend the merchant marine act, when Mr. Albert Johnson, of 
Washington, demanded recognition to speak to a question of personal 
privilege.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that 
questions of privilege were not in order after the adoption of the 
resolution.
  The Speaker \2\ declined to entertain the point of order, and Mr. 
Johnson submitted in support of his claim to the floor the following 
excerpt from a speech made by Mr. John C. Box of Texas, in the House on 
the preceding day:

  I would hate to be a sheep and have the gentleman from Washington for 
a shepherd. I would need a crooked and weak spine to walk in all the 
crooked paths in which he would lead me.
  Mr. Tom Connally, of Texas, objected that the remarks complained of 
did not impute any personal reflection on which a question of privilege 
could be based.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order and said:

  The Chair has read this language carefully several times. The Chair 
does not think that it raises a question of privilege. He does not 
think there is any imputation upon the standing of the gentleman from 
Washington as a Member. It occurs to the Chair that the word 
``crooked'' there simply refers to a path, and not to the gentleman 
from Washington.
  There is much latitude allowed in debate. In the opinion of the Chair 
the gentleman from Texas did not impute anything dishonorable to the 
gentleman from Washington. The Chair sustains the point of order.

  556. A Member rising to a question of privilege was recognized in 
preference to the Member in charge without inquiry as to the purpose 
for which the latter rose.
  On August 7, 1919,\3\ Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, the majority 
leader, addressed the Chair. Simultaneously Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of 
Texas, claimed the floor for a question of privilege.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The gentleman from Texas rises to a question of personal privilege. 
The Chair thinks that takes precedence.

  557. Although a Member had been recognized to present a privileged 
report from the Committee on Ways and Means, a question of privilege 
was given precedence.
  On August 5, 1919,\5\ Mr. Joseph W. Fordney, of Michigan, from the 
Committee on Ways and Means was recognized to submit a privileged 
report from that committee, when Mr. William L. Igoe, of Missouri 
claimed the floor for a question of privilege.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 5936.
  \2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3701.
  \4\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ First Session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3662.
Sec. 558
  The Speaker \1\ recognized Mr. Igoe, who proceeded to address the 
House relative to a newspaper statement--

that the Speaker, in explaining his action, said that he ``did not 
intend that one man, Igoe, should bulldoze the House.''

  Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, made the point of order that Mr. 
Igoe was not discussing a matter of personal privilege.
  The Speaker said:

  Inasmuch as the matter affects what the Speaker is reported to have 
said, the Speaker, of course, is going to be very liberal and will hold 
that it is a matter of personal privilege.

  558. A motion raising a question relating to the privilege of the 
House was held to take precedence over a special order.
  On November 10, 1919,\2\ the House was considering the resolution (H. 
Res. 6) declaring Victor L. Berger, of Wisconsin, ineligible to take 
the oath of office as a Member of the House. Under a special order 
providing for five and one-half hours debate, certain time was allotted 
to Mr. Berger. At the conclusion of Mr. Berger's remarks, Mr. William 
W. Rucker, of Missouri, moved that the remarks be excluded from the 
Record.
  Mr. Frederick W. Dallinger, of Massachusetts, made the point of order 
that under the special order debate continued for five and a half hours 
and therefore Mr. Rucker's motion was not then in order.
  The Speaker \3\ held that the motion raised a question of the 
privilege of the House and took precedence over the special rule.
  559. A Member proposing a resolution relating to the privilege of the 
House was recognized in preference to a Member requesting recognition 
to call up a conference report.
  On March 11, 1924 \4\ Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, submitted 
as privileged a resolution (H. Res. 217) providing for an investigation 
by a select committee of certain charges against two Members of the 
House.
  Mr. Louis C. Cramton, of Michigan, asked recognition to call up the 
conference report on the Interior Department appropriation bill.
  The Speaker,\3\ after expressing doubt as to the relative privilege 
of the conference report and the resolution, held that the resolution 
involved the privilege of the House and recognized Mr. Garrett.
  560. A question of privilege has precedence at a time set apart by 
special order for other business.
  The question of consideration may be raised on a question involving 
the privilege of the House.
  A resolution presenting a question of privilege may be laid on the 
table.
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  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 8236.
  \3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3995.
                                                             Sec. 561
  On August 20, 1921,\1\ during the consideration of the revenue bill 
under a special order adopted by the House, Mr. W. Bourke Cochran, of 
New York, claimed the floor for a question of privilege, and proposed 
to present a resolution relating thereto.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, submitted that, under the special 
order under which the House was proceeding, no business could be 
transacted until the pending bill was disposed of, and a question of 
privilege was not then in order.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  This is a question for the Chair to decide. It has been held 
constantly that questions of privilege may be presented at any time, 
and the Chair finds in the precedents one case which it seems to the 
Chair cannot be distinguished from this, where in the House a certain 
time was set apart by a rule for the business of the House, but a 
question of privilege was brought in, and it was allowed, on the theory 
that the rights and privileges of the House and its Members take 
precedence of everything else. If the House wishes to consider it, any 
person who thinks it is a proper time to bring it up has the right and 
the Chair feels constrained to rule that it is a question of privilege 
of the House the gentleman brings up, he has the right to present it.

  Thereupon Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, raised the question of 
consideration.
  The Speaker held that the question of consideration was in order, but 
before it could be raised the resolution should be reported.
  The resolution was read by the Clerk, when Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of 
Wyoming, moved to lay the resolution on the table.
  Mr. Cochran made the point of order that the motion to table could 
not be applied to a resolution relating to the privilege of the House.
  The Speaker overruled the point of order and, the question being 
taken, the motion was agreed to and the resolution was laid on the 
table.
  561. Although the previous question had been ordered on a pending 
resolution, it was held that a question of privilege might be debated.
  A Member may present a question of privilege involving words spoken 
in debate notwithstanding the rule affording another method of 
procedure under such circumstances.
  On December 12, 1912,\3\ the House was considering the contested 
election case of McLean v. Bowman. The previous question had been 
ordered on the resolution offered by Mr. S. F. Prouty, of Iowa, as a 
substitute for the resolution (H. Res. 687) recommended by the 
Committee on Elections No. 1, when Mr. A. Mitchell Palmer, of 
Pennsylvania, claimed the floor for a question of privilege based on 
personal references made in debate by Mr. John R. Farr, of 
Pennsylvania.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, submitted that the proper procedure 
under the circumstances was to demand that the words objected to be 
taken down under the rule, and a question of privilege was not 
involved.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  It seems to the Chair it would be an outrageous decision to hold that 
a man can stand here as a Member and say anything he happens to think 
of about another Member and the one who is
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 436; Record, p. 
5356.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Journal, p. 52; Record, p. 
549.
  \4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 562
assaulted shall not have personal privilege of replying. That is a 
general rule. If the gentleman, Mr. Palmer, will state what the other 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Farr, said, then the Chair will rule 
whether it is a question of personal privilege.

  Thereupon Mr. Mann made the further point of order that the previous 
question having been ordered Mr. Palmer could not be recognized to 
present a question of privilege until the vote was taken on the pending 
resolution.
  The Speaker said:

  The only question in deciding this point of order is whether, the 
previous question having been ordered on this contest, it brings the 
transaction to such a conclusion that the gentleman will have to wait 
until the House gets through voting. That is the point of order last 
made by the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mann.
  The Chair is of the opinion that if there is a question of personal 
privilege involved the gentleman ought to be heard on it, 
notwithstanding the fact that the previous question has been ordered on 
the pending resolutions.

  562. Having presented one question of privilege, a Member, before 
discussing it, may submit a second question of privilege related to the 
first and discuss both on one recognition.
  Newspaper statements that Cabinet members regard the official acts of 
a Member as a nuisance do not present a question of privilege.
  The application of epithets which subject a Member to ridicule give 
rise to a question of privilege.
  Assertions in a circular letter that a Member has broken faith with 
his constituents involve a question of privilege.
  On June 14, 1919,\1\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, presented, as 
involving a question of privilege, an extract from a newspaper article, 
which he read, as follows:

  The Cabinet officials make no secret of the fact that they regard the 
Blanton resolutions as a nuisance.

  Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, submitted that the extract did 
not constitute a question of privilege. The Speaker pro tempore \2\ 
Sustained the point of order.
  Mr. Blanton then submitted, as involving a question of privilege, the 
following paragraph from another paper:

  He then took occasion to refer to Representative Blanton, of Texas, 
as ``Bleating Blanton'' for remarks the Congressman recently made.
  ``As time goes on,'' said Mr. Gompers, ``Blanton will be eliminated 
or left at home, as others of his stamp have been.''

  Mr. James B. Aswell, of Louisiana, raised the point of order that the 
quotations submitted did not present a question of privilege.
  The Speaker pro tempore said:

  The Chair will state that the reference to the gentleman from Texas 
in the newspaper article as ``a man of his stamp,'' in the Chair's 
opinion, does not present a question of personal privilege. The 
reference to the gentleman from Texas as ``Bleating Blanton'' might be 
considered a reference which would hold the gentleman up to ridicule 
and contempt, and, although the question is rather close, the Chair is 
inclined to rule that the gentleman has stated a question of personal 
privilege in the characterization of the article as referring to him as 
``Bleating Blanton.'' The gentleman will proceed and confine his 
remarks to that characterization.
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  \1\ First Sixty-Sixth Congress, Record p. 1102.
  \2\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Speaker pro tempore.
                                                             Sec. 563
  Mr. Blanton then proposed to present, as related to the question 
already submitted and pending, the following excerpt from a circular 
letter mailed to newspapers from a departmental bureau--

  Asserting that Congressman Blanton has broken faith with his 
constituents, and, despite his promises to support an appropriation for 
the United States Employment Service, he has killed it in the House on 
a point of order.

  Mr. Clifton N. McArthur, of Oregon, made the point of order that only 
one question could be pending at a time, and a second question of 
privilege was not in order until the first had been disposed of.
  The Speaker pro tempore overruled the point of order and recognized 
Mr. Blanton.
  In response to an inquiry from Mr. Blanton, the Speaker pro tempore 
added:

  The words charge the gentleman with a breach of faith, and the Chair 
thinks the gentleman has presented a question of personal privilege, 
and the gentleman will proceed.

  563. A Member recognized to present a question of privilege based on 
a telegram was permitted to discuss subjects indirectly referred to in 
a resolution mentioned in the telegram.
  A Member recognized to discuss a question of privilege may not yield 
for debate.
  The statement in a telegram, published in a newspaper, that a 
resolution introduced by a Member was ``a tissue of misrepresentation'' 
was held to involve a question of personal privilege.
  On May 6, 1909,\1\ Mr. Arthur P. Murphy, of Missouri, rose to a 
question of privilege and stated that he had recently introduced in the 
House a resolution relating to the 2-cent passenger fare litigation in 
Missouri, and then read a telegram from an attorney representing 
litigants in the case, which included the following:

  Representative Murphy's resolution about the Missouri Rate case is an 
outrageous tissue of misrepresentation by one who has no knowledge of 
the facts.

  Mr. Henry D. Clayton, of Alabama, made the point of order that no 
question of personal privilege was presented.
  The Speaker \2\ held that the communication reflected upon the Member 
in his representative capacity and recognized Mr. Murphy.
  During his discussion of the question of privilege Mr. Murphy 
proposed to yield to Mr. William W. Rucker, of Missouri, for a 
corroborating statement, when Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, made 
the point of order that in addressing himself to a question of 
privilege a Member may not yield for debate. The Speaker sustained the 
point of order.
  Mr. Payne made the further point of order that in debating the 
question of privilege Mr. Murphy was referring to incidents attending 
the trial of the rate cases, which were not mentioned in either the 
telegram or the resolution on which the question of privilege was 
premised.
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  \1\ First session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 1801.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 564
  The Speaker said:

  The Chair understands the gentleman from New York to make the point 
of order that the remarks of the gentleman from Missouri are not the 
question of privilege that arises from his resolution, and would not 
arise were it not for the telegram which the Chair now holds in his 
hand. The Chair has hastily glanced at the resolution, and will read 
the telegram. This is a telegram to the Attorney General. The telegram 
is very broad:
  ``Representative Murphy's resolution about the Missouri Rate case is 
an outrageous tissue of misrepresentation by one who has no knowledge 
of the facts.''
  It clearly refers to that part of the resolution touching the rate 
cases. The resolution is broader than the rate cases, somewhat general 
in its terms. But the telegram is also broad. The gentleman's 
resolution is broad; the telegram is broad. The gentleman is familiar 
with his resolution and with the telegram. The gentleman will proceed 
in order.

  564. A roll call may not be interrupted for the presentation of a 
question of privilege.
  March 1, 1919,\1\ during a roll call on the adoption of a resolution 
offered as a substitute for the resolution reported by the Committee on 
Elections No. 3 in the contested election case of Britt v. Weaver, Mr. 
Martin Dies, of Texas, claimed the floor on a question of privilege.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that a roll 
call may not be interrupted by the presentation of a question of 
privilege.
  The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order.
  565. In presenting a question involving the privilege of the House 
the Member is required in the first instance to make a motion or offer 
a resolution, but not in presenting a question of personal privilege.
  A question of privilege takes precedence over business in order under 
the rule on ``suspension day.''
  A resolution condemning an official act of the Speaker was decided by 
the House not to involve a question of privilege.
  A quorum is presumed to be present unless it is otherwise determined 
and it is not necessarily the function of the Speaker to ascertain the 
presence of a quorum unless the point is raised.
  The Speaker called a Member to the chair during consideration of a 
resolution criticizing his official conduct.
  Instance in which a question of procedure was submitted by the 
Speaker to the House, which overruled his former decision.
  On April 20, 1908,\3\ immediately following the reading and approval 
of the Journal, Mr. John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, addressed the 
Speaker and announced that he desired to be heard on a question 
involving the privilege of the House.
  In response to an inquiry from the Speaker as to whether he proposed 
to offer a resolution thereon, Mr. Williams said:

  It is not easily susceptible of a resolution. It is a question 
concerning the privilege of the House under Rule IX.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4803.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Journal, p. 760, Record, p. 
4972.
                                                            Sec. 565a
  If the Chair will permit me to state the question, I think the Chair 
will agree with me it is almost impossible to put it specifically in 
the shape of a resolution.

  The Speaker \1\ held:

  The gentleman can proceed by unanimous consent without a resolution, 
but under the rules the question of the privilege of the House requires 
a resolution. A question of personal privilege to the Member does not.

  Mr. Williams continued:

  Does the Chair decline to let me state what the question of 
privilege, in my opinion, is before arguing? The power of recognition 
is within the discretion of the Chair. If the Chair will recognize me 
to state----

  The Speaker said:

  Not on a question of privilege of the House. That is a question of 
the highest privilege and under the rules requires a resolution.

  Whereupon Mr. William submitted the following:

  Resolved, That the action of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives in adjourning the House on Saturday, April 18, 1908, 
was a breach of the privileges of the House affecting its safety, 
dignity, and the integrity of its proceedings.

  Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, having raised the point of order 
that the resolution did not present a question of privilege, the 
Speaker overruled the point of order and called Mr. John Dalzell, of 
Pennsylvania, to the chair.
  On motion of Mr. Payne, the resolution was laid on the table, yeas 
148, nays; 119.
  565a. On April 18, 1910,\2\ the Speaker directed the Clerk to read 
the Journal of the proceedings of the previous day, when Mr. Robert L. 
Henry, of Texas, claimed the floor and offered as involving the 
privilege of the House the following resolution:

  Resolved, That the action of the Speaker in refusing each day to 
ascertain the appearance of a quorum before the reading of the Journal 
of proceedings of the previous day is in violation of the mandatory 
provisions of Rule I, subdivision 1, and other rules, and subject to 
objection, and he is hereby instructed to enforce the mandates of said 
rule.

  Mr. Sereno, E. Payne, of New York, made the point of order that the 
resolution did not present a question of privilege.
  Mr. Martin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, made the further point of 
order that, under paragraph 3 of Rule XIII, the consideration of bills 
on the Unanimous Consent Calendar was in order and might not be 
displaced by a question of privilege.
  The Speaker \3\ said.

  The Chair, on this unanimous-consent and committee suspension day, 
desires to consume as little time as possible in disposing of this 
resolution. The rule referred to and read by the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Olmsted] on the point of order made by the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Payne] is mandatory in its language, that on this 
day, Monday, the House shall, immediately
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Journal, p. 579; Record, p. 
4900.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 565a
after the approval of the Journal, proceed to the consideration of 
bills on the Unanimous Consent Calendar.
  The resolution which the gentleman submits reads as follows:
  ``Resolved, That the action of the Speaker in refusing from day to 
day to ascertain the appearance of a quorum before the reading of the 
Journal of proceedings of the previous day is in violation of the 
mandatory provisions of Rule I, subdivision 1, and other rules, and 
subject to objection, and he is hereby instructed to enforce the 
mandates of said rule.''
  Now, the rule to which the gentleman referred reads as follows:
  ``The Speaker shall take the chair on every legislative day precisely 
at the hour to which the House shall have adjourned at the last 
sitting, immediately call the Members to order, and on the appearance 
of a quorum cause the Journal of the proceedings of the last day's 
sitting to be read, having previously examined and approved the same.''
  Now, the following note appears to that rule:
  ``This rule was adopted in 1789 and perfected in 1811 and 1824.''
  But the part to which the gentleman referred was adopted in 1789, one 
hundred and twenty years ago. In all that time the question that the 
gentleman from Texas raises has never been raised in any Congress by 
any Member.
  Now, the Speaker assumes the presence of a quorum. At that time and 
at all other times under the universal practice of the House in all the 
history of the Republic the Speaker has never assumed otherwise. Now, 
before the Journal is read, after the Journal is read, or at any time, 
it is within the power of any one of the 391 Members of the House to 
suggest the absence of a quorum. And the Chair has never found a 
precedent, and, in fact, there is no precedent, of any Speaker ever 
having refused to proceed as the rules provide to ascertain the 
presence of a quorum, except in the case of a mere dilatory proceeding, 
where a quorum was, in fact, present. And whenever the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Henry] or anyone else has, before the reading of the 
Journal, raised the question of the absence of a quorum, the Chair has 
immediately proceeded under the rule to ascertain whether or not a 
quorum was present. So the Chair has not refused, as the resolution 
says, to ascertain the presence of a quorum.
  The gentleman from Texas calls attention to the index, which reads:
  ``A resolution condemning an official act of the Speaker was offered 
and submitted as a matter of privilege. (60th Cong., 1st., pp. 4972, 
4974; from the old Digest.'')
  The Chair has the Record showing the resolution that was offered, and 
the disposition made of it by the House. Mr. Williams offered the 
following resolution:
  ``Resolved, That the action of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives in adjourning the House on Saturday, April 18,1908, was 
a breach of the privileges of the House, affecting its safety, dignity, 
and the integrity of its proceedings.''
  Mr. Payne moved to lay the resolution on the table.
  The conditions then existing will be recollected by the House, as it 
was during the famous filibuster that was led in the Sixtieth Congress 
for many weeks by the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Williams], then 
minority leader. If this were an original question, the Chair might 
well question whether it presents a question of privilege, but the 
Chair, under the then conditions, held that it did present a privileged 
question. The motion was made and the resolution was laid on the table. 
And as this resolution affects the conduct of the Chair, the Chair 
prefers to treat it as a question of privilege to the extent of 
submitting it to the House.

  Thereupon the Speaker submitted to the House the question, as 
follows:

  Does the resolution presented by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Henry] 
involve a question of the privileges of the House? As many as are of 
the opinion that the resolution involves such question of privilege 
will say ``aye,'' and those opposed will say ``no.''

  The yeas and nays being demanded by Mr. Henry, and ordered, it was 
decided in the negative, yeas 120, nays 162.
  So the House decided that the resolution did not present a question 
of privilege.
                                                             Sec. 566
  566. In presenting a question of personal privilege a Member is not 
required to offer a motion or resolution, but must take this 
preliminary step in raising a question involving the privilege of the 
House.
  Strictures in newspaper articles, however severe, do not present a 
question of privilege unless directed against a Member in his 
representative capacity.
  A newspaper reference to Members as ``demagogues'' does not warrant 
the raising of a question of privilege.
  On February 19, 1917,\1\ Mr. J. Hampton Moore, of Pennsylvania, 
presented, as involving a question of privilege, a newspaper editorial 
referring to Members of Congress as ``demagogues.''
  The Speaker asked if the question related to the privileges of the 
House or to a matter of personal privilege, and explained that if it 
related to the former it would be necessary to offer a resolution; if 
to the latter, no resolution was required.
  Mr. Moore read extracts from the editorial, and Mr. Swagar Sherley, 
of Kentucky, made the point of order that a question of privilege was 
not involved.
  Mr. Moore retorted that the statements read were untrue and he 
desired to reply to them.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  A reply is one thing and a question of privilege is another. The rule 
is this: A newspaper can print all sorts of things about a Member 
personally; but if the charge is as to his conduct as a Member of the 
House, that makes it a question of privilege.

  567. On February 13, 1917,\3\ Mr. J. Hampton Moore, of Pennsylvania, 
claiming the floor for a question of privilege, proceeded to read 
remarks printed in the Congressional Record of February 9, under leave, 
by Mr. Oscar Callaway, of Texas, charging that English interests had 
purchased control of newspapers in the United States and through them 
were attempting to influence Congress in favor of the Allies.
  Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, made the point of order that a question 
of privilege was not presented.
  The Speaker \4\ inquired if the question presented was one of 
personal privilege or of the privilege of the House, and upon Mr. 
Moore's statement that it related to the latter, held that a question 
of privilege of the House could be presented only through the 
submission of a resolution. Thereupon Mr. Moore proceeded by unanimous 
consent.
  568. Questions of the privileges of the House are raised by 
presentation of resolutions.
  Proceedings in the Senate reflecting on the dignity of the House or 
affecting the comity between the Houses were held to justify a 
resolution calling the attention of the Senate to the infringement of 
the rule.
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  \1\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 3618.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 3216.
  \4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Chairman.
Sec. 568
  While it is in order to discuss proceedings of conference committees, 
it has been held improper to criticize the conferees of the other House 
in such a manner as to reflect on them in their official capacity.
  It is not in order in debate to criticize Members of the other body, 
but such rule does not apply to criticism of statements made by Members 
of the other body outside the Chamber.
  On June 8, 1929,\1\ in the Senate, during consideration of the 
conference report on the bill (H. R. 1) to establish a Federal Farm 
Board to promote the effective merchandizing of agricultural 
commodities in interstate and foreign commerce, and to place 
agriculture on a basis of economic equality with other industries, Mr. 
Kenneth McKellar, of Tennessee, said:

  As I understood the Senator a few moments ago, it is his judgment, 
after this conference, that the sole reason actuating the members of 
the conference committee on the part of the House in not submitting the 
debenture plan to the House was the desire to relieve Members of the 
House of the embarrassment which would come from voting on the 
debenture plan.

  On the following legislative day \2\ Mr. Edward E. Denison, of 
Illinois, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, cited sections 364 and 301 
of Jefferson's Manual and proposed to read from the Record the 
statement made by Mr. McKellar in the Senate on the preceding 
legislative day, when Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, interposed the 
point of order that the gentleman was violating the very rule which he 
had just read and his reference to debate in the Senate was not in 
order.
  The Speaker \3\ ruled:

  As the Chair understands the custom, questions of the privileges of 
the House are raised by the presenting of a resolution. The Chair has 
been listening to the gentleman to find out whether his remarks were 
introductory to the offering of a resolution.
  If the gentleman will pardon the Chair for a moment, it seems to the 
Chair that so far this proceeding has been quite irregular.
  The attention of the House has not been called to any specific thing 
upon which to base a question of privilege of the House. Of course, the 
gentleman may propound a parliamentary inquiry any time he sees fit; 
but if we are proceeding now on a question of the privilege of the 
House, the Chair thinks his attention should be called to a specific 
subject and that the remedy should be offered at the same time.
  It is almost the invariable custom in the House, where a question of 
privilege of the House is raised, to proceed by resolution.
  The Chair thinks that the House may at any time, when in its opinion 
the Senate has violated or reflected on the dignity of the House or 
brought up questions that would affect the comity between the Houses, 
it would be in order to offer a resolution respectfully calling the 
attention of the Senate to the matter to which it took exception.

  In response to an inquiry by Mr. Denison as to whether the matter 
could be referred to the Committee on Rules, the Speaker continued:

  The Chair thinks it would be in order to refer such a resolution to 
the Committee on Rules, but would doubt the propriety of such a course 
in instances like these. The Chair thinks that would go further in 
destroying amity between the Houses. The Chair thinks the only thing 
the House could do, if in its opinion certain things said in another 
body reflected on the dignity of the
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  \1\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 2565.
  \2\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 2617.
  \3\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
                                                             Sec. 569
House and threatened to destroy friendly feeling between the two 
bodies, would be to send a resolution to the other body calling 
attention to that fact, and nothing more; then the other body could 
take such action as it saw fit.

  Replying to a further inquiry as to propriety of calling the 
attention of the House to passages in the Record submitted as violating 
the rule, the Speaker reiterated:

  The Chair thinks the gentleman can not call the attention of the 
House to such matters unless they are based on a resolution. Then it 
would be for the House to decide whether it desired to call the 
attention of the Senate to those remarks or not.

  Mr. Denison then inquired:

  I desire to present this parliamentary inquiry: Does the rule to 
which I have been referring make it improper to criticize in either 
Chamber the conferees that are appointed by the other Chamber on 
account of what they say or do in the performance of their duty as 
conferees? When conferees are appointed to manage the conference on the 
part of the respective Chambers, they are usually appointed at the 
request of the other Chamber and are performing the duties of their 
respective Chambers. They are representing their respective Chambers. 
If it is improper to criticize in one Chamber the actions or the words 
of Members of the other Chamber, I propose the inquiry to the Speaker 
whether or not that rule would apply to the actions and the words of 
the representatives of the Chambers when they are engaged in their 
business in the conference for which the two Houses have appointed 
them.

  The Speaker replied:

  The Chair thinks that if reference be made to the proceedings of 
conferees on the part of another House which tend to reflect upon them, 
such reference would not be in order, but the mere discussion of the 
proceedings the Chair thinks would be in order.
  Of course, the trouble the Chair finds himself in is upon the 
question whether such criticism was made. Generally speaking, all the 
Chair can say, until his attention is called to some specific instance, 
is that it is not proper for Members of either House to criticize 
Members of the other House, either on the floor or as members of a 
conference committee. Before ruling any further on the question the 
Chair thinks the gentleman from Illinois ought to introduce a 
resolution and call attention to the remarks of which he complains, and 
it will then be for the House to decide whether or not those remarks 
invade the rule of comity between the two Houses; and if so, the House 
may then send a resolution to the Senate respectfully calling the 
attention of the Senate to that fact.

  569. In presenting a question involving the privilege of the House, a 
Member is required to submit a resolution before proceeding in debate.
  While a question relating to the privilege of the House may be raised 
by any Member, a question of personal privilege may be raised only by 
the Member to whom it relates.
  A newspaper article criticizing a Member personally and not in his 
representative capacity does not present a question of privilege.
  On February 8, 1923,\1\ Mr. Manuel Herrick, of Oklahoma, presented, 
as a question of personal privilege, a newspaper article relating to 
personalities.
  The Speaker \2\ held that as it did not attack the gentleman in his 
representative capacity, no question of privilege was presented.
  Thereupon Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, submitted that the article 
involved the privilege of the House. The Speaker sustained a point of 
order by Mr. Everett Sanders, of Indiana, that such question must be 
presented by resolution.
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  \1\ Fourth session, Sixty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 196; Record, 
p. 3266.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 570
  Mr. Blanton then submitted, further, that the article ridiculed a 
Member of the House and claimed the floor for a question of personal 
privilege relating to Mr. Herrick.
  The Speaker said:

  Any Member of Congress has the right to raise the question of 
privilege of the House. Any gentleman has the right to raise the 
question of his own privilege, but the Chair is not aware of any 
precedent where one gentleman can rise to a question of personal 
privilege respecting another gentleman.

  Mr. Blanton appealed from the decision of the Chair. On motion of Mr. 
Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, the appeal was laid on the table.
  570. Vague charges in newspaper articles have not been entertained as 
questions of privilege.
  A Member has the right to withdraw a resolution before a decision 
thereon, and may modify the proposition in the House, but not in the 
committee.
  On March 7, 1924,\1\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, offered as 
involving a question of the privilege of the House, the following:

  Whereas the Star, Times, and News, published in Washington, D.C., 
yesterday afternoon, and the Post, published this morning, all state 
that when arrested near the House Office Building one B. F. Dorsey had 
in his possession a half-gallon jug of whisky which he claimed he had 
procured for and was taking to a Congressman in said House Office 
Building, where he claimed to be employed: Therefore be it
  Resolved, That the said B. F. Dorsey be directed to transmit to the 
House of Representatives the name of the Congressman whom he alleges he 
procured said whisky for, and instructions, if any, that were given him 
by such Congressman.

  The resolution having been read by the Clerk, Mr. Blanton asked to 
amend the last paragraph to read as follows:

  Resolved, That the Speaker appoint a special committee of five 
Members of the House to investigate as to the truth or falsity of these 
charges and report back to the House at the earliest possible moment.

  Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, objected, and argued that the 
resolution could be modified only by consent of the House.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  In committee he has not, but in the House the gentleman has the right 
to modify his resolution.

  Mr. Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, made the point of order that the 
resolution did not present a question of privilege.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order and said:

  Of course, the Chair always wishes, as the membership undoubtedly 
wishes, to protect the privileges of the House, but the Chair is 
disposed to think that the citations made by the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Snell], stating that vague rumors or accusations against the 
House do not constitute privilege, are applicable here. This is simply 
a statement by an individual whom the gentleman from New York says is 
not an employee of the House endeavoring to excuse himself from a 
breach of the law by implicating a Member of the House. The Chair does 
not think this is such a charge against the dignity of the House as to 
make it privileged. The Chair sustains the point of order.
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  \1\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3773.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.