<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VIII]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_ccliii.wais]


                           Chapter CCLIII.\1\
 
                       THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

   1. As to who may make the motion. Sections 2774, 2775.
   2. In relation to other motions. Sections 2776, 2777.
   3. As to vetoed bills and suspension of the rules. Sections 
     2778-2781.
   4. In relation to votes referring a bill. Sections 2782, 2783.
   5. In relation to the previous question. Section 2784.
   6. Entry and consideration of motion. Sections 2785-2787.
   7. Repetition of the motion. Sections 2788, 2789.
   8. In relation to the vote ordering the yeas and nays. Sections 
     2790, 2791.
   9. As to debate on the motion. Section 2792.
   10. General decision. Sections 2793-2795.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

  2774. A Member who failed to vote may not move to reconsider.
  On June 28, 1918,\2\ the House agreed to the conference report on the 
Post Office appropriation bill, yeas 150, nays 149.
  Mr. William Gordon, of Ohio, when his name was called, failed to vote 
on the question.
  The vote having been announced, Mr. Gordon addressed the Speaker and 
desired to know if it would be in order for him to move to reconsider 
the vote by which the conference report was agreed to.
  The Speaker \3\ called attention to the rule providing that only 
those Members voting in the affirmative were authorized to move to 
recommit, and held that as the gentleman had not voted either in the 
affirmative or in the negative he could not be recognized to offer a 
motion to reconsider.
  2775. Where the yeas and nays on a vote have not been ordered 
recorded in the Journal, any Member, irrespective of whether he voted 
with the majority or not, may make the motion to reconsider.
  On June 27, 1918,\4\ Mr. John A. Moon, of Tennessee, called up the 
conference report on the Post Office appropriation bill.
  The question being taken on agreeing to the conference report was 
decided in the negative.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Supplementary to Chapter CXXIII.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 8423.
  \3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 8386.
                                                            Sec. 2776
  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, as a parliamentary inquiry, asked 
if it were competent, where a viva voce vote had been taken, for any 
Member of the House to move to reconsider, or if only a Member who had 
voted with the majority was authorized to offer the motion.
  The Speaker \1\ held that under the circumstances any Member, 
irrespective of whether he had voted with the majority or not, might 
move to reconsider.
  2776. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the House had decided 
a question of parliamentary procedure was held not to be in order.
  A bill once rejected may not be taken up for consideration the second 
time in the same session.
  On March 9, 1910,\2\ during the Wednesday call of committee, Mr. 
Frank O. Lowden, of Illinois, by direction of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, called up the bill (H. R. 22312) for the acquisition of 
consular buildings abroad.
  Mr. George W. Prince, of Illinois made a point of order that a bill 
practically identical in substance had been previously rejected by the 
House during the same session.
  After exhaustive debate, the Speaker \2\ decided to submit the 
question to the House for decision, and put the question:

  Shall the point of order made by the gentleman from Illinois be 
sustained?

  The question being decided in the affirmative, yeas 150, nays 134, 
Mr. Prince offered a motion to reconsider and moved to lay that motion 
on the table.
  Mr. Swager Sherley, of Kentucky, made the point of order that the 
motion to reconsider was not in order.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order.
  2777. The vote by which the House refuses to order a third reading 
may be reconsidered.
  On May 4, 1921,\4\ Mr. Joseph W. Fordney, of Michigan, moved to 
reconsider the vote by which the House on the preceding day had refused 
to order the third reading of the joint resolution (S. J. 38) admitting 
Emil S. Fischer to the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United 
States.
  Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, made the point of order that the refusal 
of the House to advance the bill to a third reading amounted to a 
refusal of consideration and was not subject to reconsideration.
  After debate,\5\ the Speaker ruled:

  The rule provides that:
  ``When a motion has been made and carried or lost, it shall be in 
order for any Member of the majority, on the same or succeeding day, to 
move for the reconsideration thereof.''
  On the face of that the gentleman from Michigan, who voted yesterday 
with the majority, is obviously entitled to-day to make a motion to 
reconsider. The gentleman from Arkansas makes the point of order that 
this being Calendar Wednesday, the motion is not in order. He first 
makes the claim that the defeat of a bill on the third reading is the 
same as a refusal to con-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 2966.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 1032.
  \5\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 2778
sider a bill, and therefore the motion to reconsider is not in order. 
The Chair thinks the gentleman is correct in his claim that when the 
question of consideration is raised it is not in order to reconsider 
that decision. But the Chair does not think that the defeat of a bill 
on the third reading is at all the same as refusing consideration. If 
it were, then this bill could be taken up again, because refusing to 
consider a bill does not defeat it. But this bill can not be taken up 
again. It is dead unless it can be revived by the motion to reconsider, 
and the Chair does not think that the defeat of a bill on the third 
reading is at all identical with a refusal to consider a bill. 
Therefore the Chair overrules the point of order made by the gentleman 
from Arkansas.

  2778. The motion to reconsider may not be applied to the vote on 
reconsideration of a bill returned with the objection of the President.
  Where a two-thirds vote is required, the motion to reconsider may be 
made by anyone who voted on the prevailing side.
  On February 19, 1913,\1\ the House, upon consideration, refused to 
pass the bill S. 3175, the immigration bill, returned by the President 
without his approval.
  Mr. William E. Murray, of Massachusetts, submitted a parliamentary 
inquiry as to who might move to reconsider.
  The Speaker \2\ replied:

  It is required that he vote with the majority.

  Thereupon Mr. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, offered a motion 
to reconsider the vote by which the House had refused upon 
reconsideration to pass the immigration bill, the President's 
objections to the contrary notwithstanding.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, raised a question of order against 
the motion.
  The Speaker ruled:

  This vote was taken under the second subdivision of section 7 of 
Article I of the Constitution, which reads in this way:
  ``Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and 
the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the 
President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if 
not he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it 
shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their 
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after reconsideration, two-
thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, 
together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall 
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House 
it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both Houses 
shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons 
voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the Journal of each 
House, respectively.''
  The Chair thinks that the motion to reconsider does not apply. This 
question, so far as the Chair has found, has never been raised but 
once, and that was on June 12, 1844, when the Hon. John W. Jones, of 
Virginia, was Speaker. The Chair will read the syllabus: \2\
  ``The motion to reconsider may not be applied to the vote on 
reconsideration of a bill returned with the objections of the 
President.''
  The fact that that decision has never been raised since and has been 
acquiesced in for a period of 66 years is very persuasive.
  A motion to reconsider is carried by a simple majority vote, but a 
bill can be passed over the presidential veto only by a two-thirds 
majority. If any other view were taken than the one held by Mr. Speaker 
Jones, quoted above, we might go on in a circle to the end of the 
session, never getting anywhere.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 3430.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Section 5644 of Volume V.
                                                            Sec. 2779
  Another thing, under a suspension of the rules, also requiring a two-
third majority, the motion to reconsider does not apply. For the 
reasons above stated the point of order raised by the gentleman from 
Illinois is sustained.

  2779. On October 27, 1919,\1\ the House, on reconsideration, passed, 
over the veto of the President, the bill H. R. 6810, the prohibition-
enforcement bill.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, moved to reconsider the vote just 
taken.
  The Speaker \2\ held that the motion to reconsider was not in order.
  2780. On August 19, 1919,\3\ the Speaker laid before the House the 
bill (H. R. 3854) for the repeal of the daylight saving law, which has 
been returned with the objections of the President.
  After debate, the question being taken on the passage of the bill, 
the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding, it was 
decided in the affirmative, yeas 223, nays 101.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, offered a motion to reconsider the 
vote by which the bill was passed, and moved to lay that motion on the 
table.
  The Speaker \4\ held that the motion to reconsider a vote on 
reconsideration of a bill returned with the objections of the President 
was not in order.
  2781. The motion to reconsider may not be applied to the vote on a 
motion to suspend the rules.
  On March 2, 1909,\5\ Mr. Jesse Overstreet, of Indiana, moved to 
suspend the rules and pass the bill (S. 28) providing for ocean mail 
service between the United States and foreign ports.
  After debate, the yeas and nays being demanded and ordered on the 
motion, it was decided in the negative, yeas 172, nays 175.
  Mr. Champ Clark, of Missouri, moved to reconsider the vote by which 
the motion was rejected.
  The Speaker \6\ said:

  There is nothing to reconsider. This was a motion to suspend the 
rules, and that can not be reconsidered. If the House will be in order 
and the Speaker can have the floor, the Chair will state that this is a 
motion to discharge the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union from the further consideration of the bill and pass the same 
under suspension of the rules. Now, the House has by its vote refused 
to suspend the rules and discharge the Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union, and the bill remains on the Union Calendar.

  2782. The motion to reconsider may not be applied to a vote on the 
reference of a bill to a committee.
  On March 12, 1920,\7\ Mr. Sam Rayburn, of Texas, moved to reconsider 
the vote taken on the preceding day by which the bill (H. R. 10835) to 
fix compensation of certain officers in the Army, had been referred to 
the Committee on Ways and Means.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 7611.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3983.
  \4\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 3695.
  \6\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 4256.
Sec. 2783
  Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, raised a question of order against 
the motion.
  The Speaker pro tempore \1\ ruled:

  The Chair sustains the point of order. A motion to reconsider a 
reference of a bill, by action of the House, is not in order under the 
rules. The gentleman can make a motion at the proper time for the 
references. This is not the proper time. The rule sets forth that the 
time for taking up the matter of correcting the reference of bills is 
immediately after the reading of the Journal.

  2783. Bills reported from committees shall be accompanied by reports 
which shall be printed.
  Bills unaccompanied by written reports are not in order for 
consideration.
  Instance wherein, by unanimous consent, a bill was presented and 
referred to the calendar in advance of receipt of the report.
  On April 25, 1932,\2\ Mr. John McDuffie, of Alabama, from the select 
Committee on Economy, by direction of that committee, presented the 
bill (H. R. 11597) to effect economies in the National Government, 
unaccompanied by a report, and asked unanimous consent that the 
committee have until midnight of the following day in which to submit a 
report on the bill.
  Mr. John C. Schafer, of Wisconsin, reserved the right to object and 
inquired when the report would be available, and whether it was 
proposed to call up the bill for consideration before opportunity had 
been afforded to examine it in connection with the report.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  Let the Chair state to the gentleman from Wisconsin and to the 
Members of the House that the bill will not be printed unless there is 
some kind of a report accompanying it. Unless this request is granted, 
or a similar request, the bill will not be available to-morrow.

  2784. The motion to reconsider and the motion to lay that motion on 
the table are admitted while the previous question is operating.
  On January 11, 1918,\4\ Mr. Simeon D. Fess, of Ohio, rising to a 
parliamentary inquiry, called attention to an ambiguous statement made 
by the Speaker on the preceding day \5\ relative to the right of a 
Member to move to reconsider and simultaneously move to lay that motion 
on the table, and asked for a ruling on the question.
  The Speaker \6\ said:

  Both of those motions can be made. There is no necessity for making 
both at once--that is, you are not compelled to--but one can file a 
motion to reconsider any time during the day on which the thing occurs 
or the next day, and you can let that motion hang up as long as you 
please, until the end of the Congress. The motion to lay upon the table 
cuts out debate. The motion to reconsider is debatable. In the 
confusion the Chair did not know, but supposed that
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Speaker pro tempore.
  \2\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 8909.
  \3\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 851.
  \5\ Record, p. 811.
  \6\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 2785
what was desired was an opportunity to get at the matter to-day. A 
Member can undoubtedly make both motions.
  There is one other matter to which the Chair wishes to direct 
attention. Two gentlemen suggested yesterday that the Constitution 
provided there must be a roll call on a constitutional amendment. It 
does not provide anything of the sort. Everybody was rising, however, 
and, without ruling on the matter, the Chair ordered the Clerk to call 
the roll, because there was no use wasting time about it.

  2785. Entering a motion to reconsider and consideration of such 
motion, are separate propositions and have respective privilege.
  While the motion to reconsider may be entered at any time during the 
two days prescribed by the rule, it may not be considered while another 
question is before the house, and when relating to a bill belonging to 
a particular class of business, the consideration of the motion is in 
order only when that class of business is in order.
  On a vote on which the yeas and nays have not been ordered recorded, 
any Member may move to reconsider regardless as to whether he voted 
with the prevailing side.
  An affirmative vote on the motion to lay on the table may be 
reconsidered.
  A motion to reconsider may be entered at any time, even when 
privileged business is pending, as pending a motion to resolve into the 
Committee of the Whole for the consideration of an appropriation bill, 
but such motion may not be considered until the business to which it 
relates is again in order.
  On February 11, 1909,\1\ Mr. James S. Sherman, of New York, moved 
that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union for the consideration of the Indian 
appropriations bill.
  Pending that motion Mr. William S. Bennet, of New York, moved to 
reconsider the vote by which the conference report on the bill (H. R. 
21052) amending the act establishing the Bureau of Immigration had been 
laid on the table earlier in the day.
  Mr. John F. Fitzgerald, of New York, moved to lay the motion on the 
table.
  The Speaker \2\ reminded:

  There is a matter of privilege pending, namely, to go into Committee 
of the Whole.

  Mr. Fitzgerald protested that the motion to lay on the table took 
precedence of all motions except the motion to adjourn and was in order 
if the motion to reconsider was in order.
  The Speaker differentiated:

  Entering a motion to reconsider is one thing, and its consideration 
is another thing. A motion to reconsider, under the rule, can be 
entered at any time; for obvious reasons, of course, it can not take a 
gentleman off the floor. A motion to lay on the table may be 
reconsidered. Under the rules and practice a motion to reconsider may 
be entered at any time; but the consideration of that motion is not in 
order until business is in order to which the motion referred. Now, the 
gentleman from New York has the floor on a motion that the House 
resolve itself into the Com-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 2238.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 2786
mittee of the Whole on an appropriation bill, which is a motion of 
higher precedence, and he asks consideration of that.
  Under the rules of the House a motion to reconsider must be entered 
within two days; that is, to-day or to-morrow. Now, the entry of the 
motion is one thing. The consideration of the motion is another thing. 
If it were not in order to enter the motion at any time, privileged 
business might be pending both to-day and to-morrow, and the Member 
would be cut off from the exercise of his right, or the House might 
prevent him fro entering a reconsideration of the motion if it desired 
to do so. So that, the motion being entered, it can be called up to-
day, a wee from now, or any other time that it is the pleasure of the 
House to call it up. Consideration of the motion in only in order when 
the class of business to which it refers is in order. Now, that class 
of business is not in order, because there is a motion pending that the 
House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole to consider a 
privileged bill, namely, a general appropriation bill.

  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, made the point of order that the 
motion might not be entertained because the proponent had not voted in 
the affirmative when the question of laying on the table was taken.
  The Speaker said:

  There was no record vote. Any Member can enter a motion to 
reconsider.

  2786. A motion to reconsider business which is in order on certain 
days only, may be entered on any day, but consideration of such motion 
is in order only when that class of business is in order.
  When a motion to reconsider relates to a bill belonging to a 
particular class of business, the consideration of the motion is in 
order only when that class of business is in order.
  A motion to reconsider the vote by which recommendation of the 
Committee of the Whole House that the enacting clause of a bill on the 
Private Calendar be stricken out was agreed to, may be entered on any 
day on which recognition is had for that purpose, but the motion may be 
taken up for consideration on Private Calendar Friday only.
  The vote by which the enacting clause of a bill on the Private 
Calendar was stricken out being reconsidered, the question is pending 
on agreeing to the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole and 
being decided in the negative, sends the bill back to the Private 
Calendar.
  On January 7, 1911,\1\ Mr. William Sulzer, of New York, entered a 
motion to reconsider the vote by which the House on the preceding day, 
had agreed to the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole House to 
strike out the enacting clause of the bill (S. 1028) for the relief of 
Capt. Warren C. Beach.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, while conceding the right to enter 
the motion at this time objected to its present consideration.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The gentleman enters the motion.
  It would come up for reconsideration on Private Calendar day, unless 
the House, by unanimous consent, should agree to the motion.
  The proper way is for the gentleman to ask unanimous consent to take 
up the motion at this time to reconsider.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 640.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 2787
  The motion to reconsider has been entered. It would be in order to 
consider it only on Friday, when the bill itself would be in order; but 
the gentleman, as the Chair understands, desires unanimous consent to 
consider the motion to reconsider at this time.

  In response to further inquiries by Mr. Sulzer, the Speaker also held 
that if the motion to reconsider prevailed the question before the 
House was on concurrence in the recommendation of the Committee of the 
Whole that the enacting clause be stricken out; but if concurrence was 
delayed until the day set apart for the consideration of bills on the 
Private Calendar, the bill would go back to the Committee of the Whole 
for further report.
  The Speaker added:

  If the motion to reconsider prevails, one more step would be 
necessary, namely, Will the House concur in the recommendation? And if 
the House refuses to concur in the recommendation, it would then go to 
the Private Calendar.
  Under the rule it would go to the calendar. Is there objection? 
[After a pause.] The Chair hears none and it is so ordered.

  2787. A motion to reconsider having been entered within the time 
prescribed by the rule, is privileged and may be called up at pleasure.
  On June 12, 1916,\1\ Mr. Frank Buchanan, of Illinois, moved 
reconsideration of the vote by which the House had passed the bill (H. 
R. 15158) to fix the time for commencement of the annual term of the 
Supreme Court.
  Pending which, Mr. Buchanan submitted a parliamentary inquiry as to 
the status of the bill and when it would be in order to take up the 
motion for consideration.
  The Speaker \2\ held:

  And it comes up whenever the gentleman wants to bring it up or the 
House wants to consider it.

  2788. The House decided (overruling the Speaker) that the motion to 
reconsider the vote on a proposition having been once agreed to, and 
the vote having again been taken, a second motion to reconsider may not 
be made unless the nature of the proposition has been changed by 
amendment.
  The vote on a substitute and the vote on the original resolution as 
amended by the substitute, if the substitute entirely replaces the 
original resolution, is the same proposition within the practice 
prohibiting a second motion to reconsider the same proposition unless 
changed by amendment.
  On March 1,\3\ 1919, at the conclusion of debate on the contested-
election case of Britt v. Weaver, Mr. Walter A. Watson, of Virginia, 
offered a resolution declaring the constestee elected.
  Mr. Cassius C. Dowell, of Iowa, offered a substitute for the 
resolution declaring the contestant duly elected.
  The substitute being agreed to, yeas 182, nays 177, Mr. Watson 
offered a motion to reconsider the vote by which the substitute had 
been adopted.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 9478.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4807.
Sec. 2789
  The question being put, the House decided in favor of 
reconsideration--yeas 180, nays 177.
  The question recurring on the resolution proposed by Mr. Dowell, as a 
substitute for the resolution offered by Mr. Watson, the substitute was 
again agreed to--yeas 185, nays 183.
  The resolution as amended by the substitute was then passed--yeas 
185, nays 182.
  Mr. Watson moved to reconsider the vote by which the resolution as 
amended had been agreed to.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that the 
resolution as amended was identical with the substitute and the vote on 
the substitute having been reconsidered, and being the second time 
decided in the affirmative, a second motion to reconsider was not in 
order on the same proposition.
  The Speaker \1\ overruled the point of order.
  Mr. Mann, of Illinois, appealed from the decision of the Chair and 
Mr. Martin D. Foster, of Illinois, moved to lay the appeal on the 
table.
  The motion of lay the appeal on the table was not agreed to; and the 
question recurring on the appeal from the decision of the Speaker, it 
was decided in the negative--yeas 173, nays 182, and the decision of 
the Chair was not sustained.
  The Speaker pro tempore \2\ announced:

  The effect of the vote just announced is that the ruling of the 
Speaker does not stand as the judgment of the House, and the point of 
order against the motion to reconsider is sustained. The Chair 
therefore announces that the resolution of the gentleman from Virginia, 
as amended by the substitute of the gentleman from Iowa, is adopted, 
thereby establishing the right of the gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Britt, to a seat in this House.

  2789. After the passage of a bill, reconsideration of the vote on any 
amendment thereto may be secured only by motion to reconsider the vote 
by which the bill was passed.
  On April 21, 1926, \3\ the Senate passed the bill (H. R. 6773) for 
the settlement of the indebtedness of the Kingdom of Italy to the 
United States of America. Subsequently, on the same day, \4\ in the 
Senate, Mr. James A. Reed, on Missouri, proposed to enter a motion to 
reconsider the vote by which an amendment offered by Mr. Robert B. 
Howell, of Nebraska, had been rejected.
  Mr. David A. Reed, of Pennsylvania, made the point of order that the 
vote on a subsidiary question could not be considered after the passage 
of the bill.
  The Vice President \5\ sustained the point of order and said:

  The point of order is well taken. The motion for reconsideration 
should be upon the passage of the bill and then the bill would be open 
to amendment.

  2790. A motion to reconsider may be applied to a vote ordering the 
yeas and nays.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, Speaker pro tempore.
  \3\ Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, Speaker pro tempore.
  \4\ Record, p. 7968.
  \5\ Charles G. Dawes, of Illinois, Vice President.
                                                            Sec. 2791
  On July 15, 1919 \1\ the House was considering the sundry civil 
appropriation bill.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, moved to recommit the bill with 
instructions, to which motion Mr. James W. Good, of Iowa, offered an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute.
  Mr. Good offered a motion for the previous question which was agreed 
to, and the yeas and nays were ordered, when Mr. Good moved to 
reconsider the vote by which the previous question had been ordered, 
and pending that moved to reconsider the vote by which the yeas and 
nays were ordered.
  Mr. Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, made the point of order that in 
view of the Constitutional provision by which one-fifth may demand the 
yeas and nays, the admission of the motion to reconsider under which a 
majority would be required to sustain the order for the yeas and nays 
already made, would virtually nullify this Constitutional prerogative.
  The Speaker \2\ ruled:

  The Chair is disposed to think that the House has a right to 
reconsider the motion for the yeas and nays, but if it does so of 
course immediately the motion is pending, and one-fifth of the House 
could order the yeas and nays again, so that it seems to the Chair that 
the question is one of propriety and of usefulness rather than of 
parliamentary law. The Chair thinks that the motion to reconsider is in 
order.

  Mr. Michael F. Phelan, of Massachusetts, suggested that if the vote 
were reconsidered, one-fifth of those present would again order the 
yeas and nays, and inquired if a second motion to reconsider would then 
be in order.
  The Speaker replied:

  The Chair thinks the second motion to reconsider would be a dilatory 
motion. But the Chair does not see why it is not now in order to 
reconsider the vote by which the yeas and nays were ordered. It might 
happen that on reflection the whole House might want to do away with 
the ordering of the yeas and nays and ought to have an opportunity to 
do it.
  Immediately the question would recur on ordering the yeas and nays, 
which, under the Constitution, can be ordered by one-fifth.

  2791. The motion to reconsider may not be entertained while the House 
is dividing.
  On August 21, 1911, \3\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, by direction 
of the Committee on Rules, reported the resolution (H. Res. 295) 
providing for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12812) the cotton 
schedule tariff bill.
  On motion of Mr. Henry, by unanimous consent, the previous question 
was ordered on the resolution.
  The question being put on agreeing to the resolution, on a division, 
the yeas were 115, nays 90.
  Pending which, Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, moved to 
reconsider the vote by which the previous question was ordered.
  Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, made the point of order that the 
motion to reconsider was not in order which the House was dividing.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 2663.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 4314.
Sec. 2792
  The Speaker \1\ rules:

  The motion of the gentleman from Alabama to reconsider is out of 
order when the House is dividing. The House had divided on a rising 
vote. The yeas and nays are incident to the division, and the yeas and 
nays have been ordered. The Clerk will call the roll.

  2792. A motion to reconsider is debatable if the motion proposed to 
be reconsidered was debatable.
  On January 19, 1925,\2\ Mr. Daniel R. Anthony, Jr., of Kansas, moved 
to reconsider the vote by which the bill (H. R. 5084) amending the 
national defense act had been passed.
  Pending that motion, Mr. Anthony inquired if the motion to reconsider 
the vote was debatable.
  The Speaker \3\ held:

  It is debatable if the bill itself is debatable.

  2793. The motion to reconsider, while not entertained in the 
Committee of the Whole, is in order in the House as in Committee of the 
Whole.
  On July 9, 1913,\4\ Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, from the Committee 
on Rules, reported the resolution (H. Res. 198) providing for the 
investigation of an alleged lobby.
  On motion of Mr. Henry, by unanimous consent, it was ordered that 
general debate on the resolution be limited to one hour, at the close 
of which time the resolution should be read for amendment under the 
five-minute rule.
  General debate having been exhausted, the resolution was being 
considered under the five-minute rule, when Mr. Jefferson M. Levy, of 
New York, offered an amendment striking out authorization for 
employment of legal counsel, which was agreed to.
  Subsequently, Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, moved to reconsider the 
vote by which the amendment offered by Mr. Levy had been adopted.
  Mr. James Hay, of Virginia, made the point of order that the motion 
to reconsider was not admissible for the reason that the agreement to 
consider the resolution under the five-minute rule in the House was 
equivalent to consideration in the Committee of the Whole.
  Mr. Mann in discussing the point of order said:

  Mr. Speaker, it is undoubtedly true, as stated by the gentleman from 
Virginia that instead of pursuing an ordinary course which would be 
pursued in the House, where the gentleman in charge of the bill 
controls it and no one can offer an amendment without his consent, we 
are considering the bill under the five-minute rule for amendment. The 
gentleman from Virginia, however, failed to distinguish between the 
House considering a bill under the five-minute rule and the Committee 
of the Whole House considering a bill under the five-minute rule. The 
House in session can entertain a motion to reconsider. The Committee of 
the Whole can not entertain the motion to reconsider, and the reason is 
manifest.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker,
  \2\ Second session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 2099.
  \3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 2348.
                                                            Sec. 2794
  The adoption of an amendment in the Committee of the Whole does not 
adopt an amendment. It is a mere recommendation to the House, and the 
House adopts the amendment, and after the House has adopted an 
amendment or agreed to an amendment recommended by a Committee of the 
Whole it could reconsider the vote by which the amendment was adopted. 
Now, the gentleman's position would put the House in a position where, 
having agreed to an amendment, there was no way by which the House 
could change its mind. In the Committee of the Whole when an amendment 
is agreed to it still has to be passed through the House; still has to 
run gauntlet of a motion to reconsider.
  There is no rule in reference to the five-minute rule that prevents a 
motion for reconsideration at all. The prevention of the 
reconsideration is in the Committee of the Whole. A motion to recommit 
is not recognized in the Committee of the Whole, and the reason is that 
the action of the committee is not final. It still has to be agreed to 
by the House. The amendment has to be reported to the House and agreed 
to. That is the reason why the motion for reconsideration is not 
recognized.
  Now, we frequently consider bills in the House as in Committee of the 
Whole, and it has always been held that that does not change the status 
of the House. The motion to reconsider is a motion of right in the 
House under the rules. The rules provide that any motion agreed to in 
the House is open to the motion for reconsideration until you have gone 
to a certain extent, where you stop.

  The Speaker \1\ said:

  There are certain motions that can be made in the House and that can 
also be made in the House as in Committee of the Whole which are not 
permissible in the Committee of the Whole. For instance you can not 
have roll calls in Committee of the Whole, and you can not move the 
previous question in Committee of the Whole, and several other things 
not necessary to enumerate all of which are permissible in the House, 
but not in Committee of the Whole.
  Now, the House is really not in the House acting as in Committee of 
the Whole. But here is a resolution which was presented by the 
gentleman from Texas, which was to be considered in the House. He had 
an hour. He might do as he pleased with that hour. He could move the 
previous question whenever he got ready. But if he let the hour slip by 
without moving the previous question, then the next gentleman who was 
recognized would have an hour. But everybody recognized that this was a 
resolution of a good deal of importance. So the gentleman from Texas 
and the rest of the gentlemen entered into an agreement by which they 
would have a general debate of an hour and then consider the resolution 
under the five-minute rule.
  Now, if all these other things can be done in the House as in the 
Committee of the Whole that can not be done in the Committee of the 
Whole, the Chair thinks this motion to reconsider is proper to 
entertain.

  2794. A request for unanimous consent is in effect a motion and 
action predicated thereon is subject to reconsideration.
  Instance wherein the Speaker reversed as erroneous a decision made in 
a previous session.
  On May 23, 1916,\2\ Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, called up for 
consideration a motion entered on the preceding day to reconsider the 
action of the House in changing the reference of the bill (H. R. 6915) 
relating to civil service pensions, from the Committee on the Post 
Office and Post Roads to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.
  Mr. William E. Cox, of Indiana, made the point of order that inasmuch 
as the change in reference was made by unanimous consent, the motion to 
reconsider did not apply.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 8516.
Sec. 2795
  The Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order.
  Subsequently, on February 16, 1917,\2\ the Speaker addressed the 
House and said:

  With the consent of the House, the Chair wants to correct a ruling 
which he has been intending to do for some time. It will be remembered 
that during the last session the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Madden, 
made a motion to reconsider a vote by which unanimous consent was 
granted in a certain matter. The Chair ruled that the motion to 
reconsider does not apply to unanimous consent. On subsequent 
reflection and investigation the Chair is convinced that the ruling of 
the Chair was incorrect and untenable, and that the motion to 
reconsider does apply in such cases.
  The Chair makes this correction now, when no such controversy is 
pending, to the end that the former erroneous ruling may not go into 
the footnotes of the next Manual, to the misleading of Members.

  2795. A majority vote is sufficient to reconsider a vote taken under 
the requirements that two-thirds shall be necessary to carry the 
question.
  On October 3, 1918,\3\ in the Senate, Mr. Andrieus A. Jones, of New 
Mexico, in calling up a motion entered on a previous day to reconsider 
the action taken by the Senate relative to a proposed amendment (H. J. 
Res. 200) to the Constitution providing for woman suffrage, as a 
parliamentary inquiry, asked if the motion to reconsider such action 
was determined by a majority vote.
  The Vice President \4\ replied:

  The Chair is of the opinion that the rule plainly provides that a 
majority is all that is needed to reconsider.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 3429.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 11037.
  \4\ Thomas R. Marshall, of Indiana, Vice President.