<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VIII]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_cclx.wais]



                            Chapter CCLX.\1\
 
                  DIVISION OF THE QUESTION FOR VOTING.

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   1. Principles governing division. Sections 3163-3166.
   2. In order on a report from the Committee on rules. Section 
     3167.
   3. Motions to strike out and insert not divisible. Sections 
     3168, 3169.
   4. Not in order on vote to refer with instructions. Section 
     3170.
   5. Not in order on vote to suspend the rules. Section 3171.
   6. Not in order on vote on the stages of a bill. Section 3172.
   7. After previous question is ordered. Sections 3173, 3174.
   8. Not in order on a vote on Senate amendments. Sections 3175, 
     3176.

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  3163. A resolution may be divided if it contains more than one 
section which standing alone would constitute a substantive 
proposition.
  Instance wherein references to a colleague in an extension of remarks 
were held to give rise to a question of privilege.
  Language not used in debate and inserted without leave was by 
resolution stricken from the Record.
  On September 11, 1919,\2\ Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, rising to a 
question of privilege offered the following resolution:

  Where as in the record of the proceedings of the House of 
Representatives of September 5, 1919, as the same appears in the 
Congressional Record, on pages 4942 and 4943, there appears in the 
remarks of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dewalt, what purport to 
be statements made by the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Blanton, as 
follows, to wit:
  ``He is mad because I will not permit him to ruthlessly waste and 
misappropriate the people's money from the Treasury.
  ``I ask the Chair to keep the gentleman in order without forcing me 
to continually interrupt him. If he were not protected under the rules 
of this House, as construed by the present occupant of the chair, he 
would not dare to thus abuse me. He is now applauded by Members who 
have in their pockets private bills seeking to take public money out of 
the Treasury and put it into the pockets of private individuals and 
corporations without argument and without proper consideration, and 
they are all mad because I blocked the proceedings. The gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Dewalt, imagines that he will injure me with my 
constituents. He does not know west Texas. They will size up his bunk, 
and in the next election I will get 10 votes to very 1 he gets.
  ``The gentleman's statement is untrue. He is mad because I have 
forced him to come to the House of Representatives occasionally.
  ``Against such childish abuse repeatedly continued in violation of 
the chair's ruling and the rules of this House. The gentleman knows he 
is not stating the truth, for it was only by such objections that I 
prevented numerous pernicious and unmeritorious measures from passing, 
which angered certain friends of such legislation.
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  \1\ Supplementary of chapter CXXX.
  \2\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 5259.
                                                            Sec. 3164
  ``Falsely and wrongly. When he knows he is not stating the truth.
  ``The gentleman is maliciously and willfully abusing me personally, 
when he would not dare do it off the floor of the House, and is 
willfully violating the rules of the House.''
  And
  Whereas the said statements were not, as a matter of fact, made by 
the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Blanton, upon the floor but were by him 
without the knowledge of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dewalt, 
and without the leave of the House, inserted by interlining the 
typewritten copy of the stenographer's notes furnished to the 
Government Printing Office; and
  Whereas the greater part of said statements so injected were 
unparliamentary, out of order, and a violation of the privileges of the 
House; and if the same had been uttered upon the floor of the House 
would have been subject to a point of order: Now, therefore, be it
  Resolved by the House of Representatives--
  First. That it condemns the said falsification of the records of its 
proceedings;
  and Second. That the said remarks of the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Blanton, be stricken from the Record.

  The Speaker \1\ held the resolution to present a matter of privilege 
and recognized Mr. Wingo for debate.
  Debate having been concluded, and the previous question being 
ordered, Mr. Warren Gard, of Ohio, demanded a separate vote on the 
subdivisions of the resolution. Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, made 
the point of order that the resolution was not divisible.
  The Speaker overruled the point of order and held:

  This resolution is fairly divisible. It presents two separate 
questions, each of which by itself would offer a distinct subject on 
which the House could vote, and that the House can properly have a 
division. Therefore the vote will come on the first proposition, which, 
without objection, the Clerk will report.

  The question being taken severally on the two branches of the 
resolution, both were agreed to without division.
  So the language was ordered stricken from the Record.
  3164. A question may be divided for the vote if it contains more than 
one substantive proposition.
  A question that is divisible may be divided for the vote on the 
demand of any Member.
  Propositions to elect members of standing committees and special 
orders reported by the Committee on Rules are exceptions and are not 
divisible.
  Form and history of section 6 of Rule XVI.\2\
  Section 6 of Rule XVI provides:

  On the demand of any Member, before the question is put, a question 
shall be divided if it includes propositions so distinct in substance 
that one being taken away a substantive proposition shall remain: 
Provided, That any motion or resolution to elect members of any portion 
of the members of the standing committees of the House, and the joint 
standing committees, shall not be divisible, nor shall any resolution 
or order reported by the Committee on Rules, providing a special order 
of business, be divisible.
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  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ Hind's Precedents, V. 6107.
Sec. 3165
  The first clause of this rule is the form agreed to in the revision 
of 1980.\1\ It was taken with no material change from the old rule, No. 
46, which existed at that time.
  The rule for the division of the question is older than the House 
itself. The Continental Congress had this rule: \2\

  If a question in debate contain several points, any Member may have 
the same divided.

  When the first rules of the House were adopted, on April 7, 1789,\3\ 
the rule took this form:

  Any Member may call for a division of the question where the sense 
will admit of it.

  As this rule was construed, its working was not wholly satisfactory, 
as a division of the question would be made in cases where, if the 
first portion should be decided in the negative, the second portion 
would have to be abandoned because it would not be, alone, a substitute 
proposition. Thus on March 27, 1792,\4\ on a resolution calling for an 
inquiry into the defeat of General St. Clair, a division of the 
question was called for, and it was put first on the first clause, 
which was--

  Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to 
institute an inquiry into the causes of the late defeat of the Army 
under the command of major General St. Clair.

  This was decided in the negative. Then of course there would be no 
object in voting on the remainder: ``and also into the causes of the 
detentions or delays which are suggested to have attended,'' etc.; and 
the House simply abandoned the latter portion.
  Undoubtedly to remedy this awkward practice, the House on March 13, 
1822,\5\ adopted this rule:

  Any Member may call for a division of the question, which shall be 
divided if it comprehends questions so distinct that one being taken 
away the rest may stand entire for the decision of the House.

  On September 15, 1837,\6\ the House discarded this rule and adopted 
the form which, with no material change, became in 1880 the first 
clause of the present rule. The rule was continued in this form until 
April 2, 1917,\7\ when the first clause of the proviso was added to 
supplement the change in the rules providing for the election of 
committees.
  The last clause of the proviso was adopted, May 3, 1933,\3\ to 
facilitate the consideration of special orders reported from the 
Committee on Rules.
  3165. Although a question presents two propositions grammatically, it 
is not divisible if either does not constitute a substantive 
proposition when considered alone.
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  \1\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \2\ See Journal of Continental Congress, May 26, 1778.
  \3\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \4\ First session Second Congress, Journal, p. 551.
  \5\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Journal, p. 350.
  \6\ First session Twenty-fifth Congress, Congressional Globe, p. 34
  \7\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 113.
  \8\ First session Seventy-third Congress, Record p. 2816.
                                                            Sec. 3166
  On January 18, 1919,\1\ the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union reported to the House the legislative, executive, and 
judicial appropriation bill with certain amendments.
  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, requested a separate vote on the 
following amendment reported by the Committee of the Whole:

  Clerk hire, Members and Delegates: For clerk hire each Member, 
Delegate, and Resident Commissioner for clerk hire necessarily employed 
by him in the discharge of his official and representative duties, 
$3,200 per annum, in monthly installments $1,408,000, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary: Provided, That no part thereof shall be 
paid to any Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner.

  Mr. Thomas U. Sisson, of Mississippi, demanded a separate vote on the 
proviso.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, submitted that the proposition was 
not susceptible of division and said:

  Mr. Speaker, the rule is that on demand of any Member before the 
question is put the question shall be divided if it includes 
propositions so distinct in substance that if one be taken away a 
substantive proposition shall remain. My recollection is that this must 
apply to each of the propositions, that either one being taken away a 
substantive proposition must remain upon which action can be taken by 
the House. In other words, where an amendment is proposed containing 
two propositions where the House may reject one of them and then might 
agree to the other having a substantive proposition, the amendment is 
divisible, but that is plainly not this case. The House can not adopt 
this provision which the gentleman seeks to have voted upon separately 
and make any sense, ``Provided, That no part thereof shall be paid to 
any Member, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner.'' Provided, That no 
part thereof shall be paid to any Member, Delegate, or Resident 
Commissioner.'' I will not say can not, because the House could agree 
to it; but it means nothing. It is not a substantive proposition by 
itself. It must, if agreed to by the House, come in with the main 
proposition making an appropriation and instead of being a substantive 
proposition it is a subsidiary proposition to the main proposition.

  The Speaker \2\ said:

  Suppose the House were to vote down the first proposition and vote in 
the last proposition . Would there be any sense at all in the 
amendment? It is not divisible.

  3166. A proposition to strike out various unrelated phrases may be 
resolved into a separate question for each proposed elision.
  On February 13, 1918,\3\ the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union was considering the bill (H. R. 5667) to provide for 
the deportation of certain aliens, known as the alien slacker bill.
  Mr. Richard Wayne Parker, of New Jersey, offered this amendment.

  Page 1, line 3, after the words ``that any alien,'' strike out the 
words ``eligible by existing law to become a naturalized citizen''; 
also all of lines 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9; and also the word ``said,'' in 
line 11 after the words ``exemption from''; also on page 2, line 3, 
strike out ``and shall as soon as practicable be deported''; also 
strike out all of line 4 and the words ``and deportation'' in line 11, 
so that as amended the paragraph will read:
  ``That any alien who by himself or by anyone else has heretofore 
claimed, or shall hereafter claim, exemption from selective draft on 
account of being an alien, shall forever be denied the right of 
becoming a citizen of the United States or of any of its possessions.
  ``Any alien who may have been exempted from said selective draft on 
account of his alienage prior to the passage of this act may, within 60 
days after the passage of this act, withdraw such
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  \1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1697.
  \3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 2071.
Sec. 3167
exemption and submit himself to the operation of said selective draft, 
and in that event shall not be held to be within the operations of this 
section as to the forfeiture of citizenship.''

  Mr. John E. Raker, of California, called for a separate vote on each 
proposed elision.
  The Chairman \1\ sustained the demand for a division and ruled.

  The Chair has looked into this in the limited time that he has had, 
and he is satisfied that the amendment is division. It strikes out 
language in four different places. One might be agreed to by the House 
and another defeated and still not interfere with the sense of the 
section. I see no reason why it should be held to be individuals when 
it is to strike out language in four places.

  3167. Formerly a separate vote might be demanded on each substantive 
proposition reported by the Committee on Rules.
  To warrant division of a question the propositions presented must be 
substantive and not merely grammatical.
  On April 8, 1908, Mr. John Dalzell,\2\ of Pennsylvania, from the 
Committee on Rules, submitted a report from that committee providing 
for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill.
  The resolution provided that on the following Thursday the House 
should recess until the next calendar day; that on Friday the Speaker 
should declare the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union for the consideration of the bill; that on Saturday 
and Monday, respectively, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
should declare the Committee in recess until the succeeding legislative 
day; that general debate should close Saturday.
  Consideration of the resolution having been concluded, Mr. John J. 
Fitzgerald, of New York, demanded a separate vote of five proposition 
in the resolution.
  The Speaker \3\ directed the Clerk to read the resolution and 
announced there were but three substantive propositions on which a 
separate vote could be taken.
  Mr. Fitzgerald submitted that the provisions for recess were distinct 
provisions and should be voted on separately.
  The Speaker ruled:

  Seemingly so, but in fact not so.
  The Chair, on reexamination of the rule, is inclined to think that 
there are only three substantive propositions. The Chair is willing to 
admit that the question is somewhat close and that several clauses may 
be segregated, each of which makes a grammatical proposition but not a 
substantial proposition in the sense that it makes a substantive rule 
for action of the House. Thus, one or two clauses in what may fairly be 
considered the second portion make, it is true, grammatical 
propositions, but they do not make substantive propositions within the 
intent of the resolution which is to provide a rule of action. Thus 
those clauses provide for the Committee of the Whole to take a recess, 
but hardly make a substantive rule without the other clause, which 
provides that there shall be a Committee of the Whole at the time the 
recess is to be taken.

  3168. Substitute resolutions offered as an amendment are not divible.
  On September 16, 1918,\4\ the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union had under consideration the bill H. R. 12863, the 
revenue bill.
  Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, proposed an amendment in the 
nature of a substitute.
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  \1\ Joseph J. Russell, of Missouri, Chairman.
  \2\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4510.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 10370.
                                                            Sec. 3169
  Mr. Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, demanded a division of the 
substitute.
  The Chairman \1\ held that the substitute must be voted on as a whole 
and said:

  The Chair will state that there would appear to be two substantive 
proposition possibly more, is his substitute; but the precedents of the 
House are that a substitute in the nature of an amendment to an 
amendment is not divisible. The Chair will not undertake to argue the 
reasons underlying these precedents, but will simply refer to the 
ruling found in section 6127, Volume V, of Hinds' Precedents to the 
following effect:
  ``Substitute resolutions offered as an amendment are not divisible.''
  This would to be decisive of the request for a division of the 
substitute. The question is on the substitute in the nature of an 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

  3169. A motion to strike out and insert is indivisible either as to 
the two branches of the motion or the language proposed for insertion.
  On May 27, 1929,\2\ the bill H. R. 2667, the tariff bill, was under 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.
  Mr. Frank Crowther, of New York, offered a committee amendment 
proposing to strike out a paragraph in the leather schedule and insert 
in lieu thereof a paragraph embracing numerous sections and 
subsections.
  Mr. William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, proposed a division of the 
matter to be inserted.
  The Chairman \3\ reminded:

  Under the rules of the House a motion to strike out and insert is 
indivisible.

  Mr. Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, raised the issue that while, under 
the rules, the two branches of a motion to strike out and insert were 
indivisible, the matter proposed to be inserted was subject to 
division.
  The Chairman dissented and said:

  Under the interpretation of the rule stated by the Chair, a motion to 
strike out and insert is indivisible, and the decisions sustain the 
plan language of the rule. The Chair has examined the decision of 
Speaker Orr, found in Hinda' Precedents, Volume V, section 6125, and 
the decision of Speaker pro tempore Dalzell, Volume V, section 6128, 
and they bear out the construction the Chair has given to the first 
part of clause 7 of Rule XVI. Of course there is a way by which the 
result which the gentleman is seeking may be obtained, and that would 
be to proceed to amend the committee amendment.
  The Chair thinks the gentleman would be within the rule if he made 
the motion to amend any part of the committee amendment at any time, 
provided he was recognized for that purpose.

  3170. A division of the question is not in order on a motion to 
recommit with instructions or on the different branches of the 
instructions.
  On April 26, 1924,\4\ the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 184) proposing 
an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the 
regulation of child labor was read a third time.
  Mr. Andrew J. Montague, of Virginia, offered a motion to recommit the 
joint resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to 
report it back forthwith with three unrelated amendments.
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  \1\ Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, Chairman.
  \2\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 2014.
  \3\ Earl C. Michener, of Michigan, Chairman.
  \4\ First session Sixty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 7294.
Sec. 3171
  Mr. C. William Ramseyer, of Iowa, submitted that the amendments 
presented three distinct substantive propositions and requested a 
separate vote on each of the three.
  The Speaker \1\ ruled:

  The Chair does not think it is subject to a division.
  That might be plausible if that were a new question, but it has been 
decided. Section 6134, Hinds' Precedents, volumn 5, says:
  ``A division of the question is not in order on a motion to commit 
with instructions or on the different branches of the instructions.''

  3171. On a motion to suspend the rules and pass a bill with 
amendments it is not in order to demand a separate vote on the 
amendments.
  On February 26, 1909,\2\ Mr. Mames A. Tawney, of Minnesota, moved to 
suspend the rules and pass the sundry civil appropriation bill with 
certain amendments.
  Mr. John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, proposed a division of the 
question on the amendments.
  The Speaker \3\ held that the question should be taken on the motion 
in its entirety and a demand for a separate vote on the amendments was 
not in order.
  3172. In voting on the engrossment and third reading and passage of a 
bill, a separate vote on the various propositions of the bill may not 
be demanded.
  On May 21, 1930,\4\ the House was considering the joint resolution 
(H. J. Res. 331) reading as follows:

  Resolved, etc., That the Congress of the United States of America 
expresses its approval of the action of the United States delegation at 
The Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law in voting 
against the ``convention on certain questions relating to the conflict 
of nationality law.''
  Resolved further, That it is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
United States of America that there should be absolute equality for 
both sexes in nationality, and that in the treaties, law, and practice 
of the United States relating to nationality there should be no 
distinction based on sex.

  Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, being recognized to propound a 
parliamentary inquiry, called attention to the difference in the 
propositions presented by the two branches of the resolution and asked 
if under clause 6 of Rule XVI a separate vote on the respective 
questions presented could be had on the passage of the resolution.
  The Speaker \5\ ruled:

  The Chair is familiar with that rule, but he doubts if it applies to 
a case like this. The Chair is of opinion that this resolution can not 
be divided. The Chair finds in the Manual, section 775, this:
  ``In voting on the engrossment or passage of a bill or joint 
resolution a separate vote on the various portions may not be 
demanded.''
  These decisions before the Chair are very old, as old as 1856.
  The Chair thinks you can not divide the question here.
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  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 3312.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 9321.
  \5\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 3173
  3173. An order for the previous question does not preclude the demand 
for a separate vote on component substantive propositions.
  Under the former provisions of the rule a separate vote could be 
demanded on each substantive proposition reported by the Committee on 
Rules. \1\
  On April 18, 1912,\2\ the House was considering the resolution (H. 
Res. 444) reported from the Committee on Rules, as follows:

  Resolved, That after the adoption of this rule it shall be in order 
in the consideration of H.R. 21279, a bill making appropriations for 
the service of the Post Office Department for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1913, and for other purposes, to consider the new legislation 
on said bill hereinafter mentioned notwithstanding the general rules of 
the House.

  The resolution then quoted all sections of the bill carrying 
legislation subject to a point or order.
  The previous question having been ordered on the resolution, Mr. 
James R. Mann, of Illinois, demanded a separate vote on various 
substantive propositions incorporated in the resolution.
  Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, raised a question of order and argued 
that the request for a division could not be entertained--first, 
because a report from the Committee on Rules was not susceptible to 
division; second, because a separate vote could not be requested after 
an order for the previous question was operating; and, third, because a 
division was not in order on the final passage of a bill or resolution.
  Controverting the argument that a division was not in order after the 
previous question had been ordered on a report from the Committee on 
Rules, Mr. Mann said:

  The question is whether after the previous question has been ordered 
on the report from the Committee on Rules, or a resolution providing 
that certain things shall be in order, the substantive propositions in 
that resolution shall be separated and voted upon separately.
  The matter is not without precedents in the House. The Speaker will 
remember that at the first session of the Sixtieth Congress the 
Democratic side of the House, under the able leadership of Mr. 
Williams, of Mississippi, was conducting and open and avowed 
filibuster.
  The Committee on Rules, on April 8, 1908, page 4505 of the Record, 
reported this rule as a privileged report, the report being made by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dalzell:
  ``Resolved, That on this day and on Thursday of this week the House 
shall take a recess at 5 o'clock p.m. until 11.30 a.m. of the next 
calendar day; that on Friday, April 10, at 11.30 a.m., the Speaker 
shall declare the House in Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union for the consideration of H.R. 20471, the naval appropriation 
bill; that at 5 o'clock p.m. on Friday, April 10, the Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union shall declare 
the committee in recess until 11.30 a.m. on Saturday, April 11, the 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union 
shall declare the committee in recess until 11.30 o'clock a.m. on 
Monday, April 13.
  ``That general debate on the naval appropriation bill shall close not 
later than at 5 o'clock p.m., Saturday, April 11; the time to be 
equally divided between the majority and minority and controlled by the 
chairman of the Naval Committee and by the senior member of the 
minority: Provided, That if general debate shall be concluded prior to 
5 p.m. on Saturday the 11th, the Chairman of the committee of the Whole 
shall at once declare the committee in recess until Monday, April 13, 
at 11.30 a.m.''
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  \1\ The rule as amended, May 3, 1933, now specifically excepts 
reports from the Committee on Rules from the provisions of the section.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 5006.
Sec. 3173
  On that report the gentleman from Pennsylvania demanded the previous 
question. The previous question was ordered. Twenty minutes' debate was 
had upon a side, precisely as has been the case in the present 
instance, with the exception that here the debate, by unanimous consent 
has been a little longer, and the Speaker will notice that that entire 
resolution which I have just read related to the same general subject 
matter, namely, the meeting of the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union on the consideration of the naval appropriation 
bill. When debate had concluded under the twenty-minutes-a-side rule, 
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald the most distinguished 
parliamentarian upon that side of the House, if not in the country, 
rose and said:
  ``Mr. Speaker, I ask for a division of the resolution.''
  And he called attention to the rule which I have just read. He was 
asked by the Speaker to state the different substantive propositions, 
which he proceeded to do. The gentleman from Pennsylvania made this 
statement:
  ``The resolution is nothing more nor less than a program of 
legislative proceeding, and it is absolutely impossible to make any 
distinction and take away a part of it.''
  But the Speaker, Mr. Cannon, who has at different times in the 
country, by different people, been accused of being a czar and of not 
giving the minority that fair treatment which they sometime insisted 
they should have--and I think I have heard the gentleman from Texas 
make such remarks--said:
  ``The Chair is prepared to rule. On a careful examination of this 
rule the Chair finds that there are five substantive propositions, and 
five only, so that if the gentleman demands a separate vote upon either 
or all of them a separate vote will be taken.''
  And a separate vote was taken.

  In answer to the contention that a division was not in order on the 
final passage of the resolution, Mr. Mann argued:

  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Texas first claimed that a division 
of this question is not in order, because on the final passage of a 
bill or resolution a division is not in order. No one on this side, I 
think, supposes that you can divide a bill into different parts on the 
final passage of the bill on a roll call. The gentleman then says that 
the proposition we now make is not applicable because it can only be 
applied when there are various resolving clauses in the resolution, and 
that if there were different resolving clauses in the resolution, then 
each of those resolving clauses would have a separate vote. First, Mr. 
Speaker, in the case which I have cited to you where the rule was made 
by Mr. Speaker Cannon there was but one resolving clause; and second, 
if the gentleman from Texas were familiar with the provisions of the 
Revised Statutes which are applicable to this subject he would know 
that a resolution which has more than one resolving clause was out of 
order, because the statutes adopted by this House and Senate jointly 
provided:
  ``No enacting or resolving words shall be used in any section of any 
act or resolution of Congress except in the first.''
  The gentleman's proposition seems to be now that you can not have a 
separate vote upon anything unless in the preparation of it you have 
violated the statutes. Now, Mr. Speaker, the case which the gentleman 
stated does not bear out his contention. In the resolution which was 
offered referred to by the gentleman there was a proposition to adopt 
the rules of the previous Congress as the rules of the Fifty-sixth 
Congress. Mr. Speaker Henderson then held that the different 
propositions in that resolution were separable, and that one could have 
a separate vote upon each proposition involved, but he held, and held 
properly, that a resolution to adopt the rules of a previous Congress 
by itself was not subject to be considered as containing different 
substantive propositions and did not authorize a separate vote upon 
each of the rules of the previous Congress. No one seriously ever 
claimed that a proposition in this Congress to adopt the rules of 
previous Congresses would authorize a separate vote upon each rule, but 
when there was coupled with that proposition another resolution 
expressly providing another rule, the Speaker held that they were 
subject to separation, because each was a substantive proposition. I 
hope and I believe that the present Speaker of this House will without 
question on this subject follow the ruling of Mr. Speaker Cannon, made 
in fairness at a time when the House was under great stress of feeling
                                                            Sec. 3174
and excitement, on the request of the gentleman from New York, at that 
time representing the Democratic side of the House, in his request. 
Then the Speaker divided into substantive propositions a resolution 
wholly relating to the question of meeting and adjournment. There is 
the resolution, the different parts of which have no relation whatever 
to each other. I contend that the House is entitled, in voting, to vote 
upon the separate propositions and is not compelled to carry out any 
bargain which may have been made by the supporters of the different 
propositions, of ``you tickle me and I will tickle you,'' all at one 
time.

  The Speaker \1\ ruled:

  There are not very many precedents on this subject, one way or the 
other.
  The two precedents cited from Speaker Henderson are really parts and 
parcels of one precedent. A division was demanded on a resolution. His 
first decision was that there should be a separate vote taken on each 
resolve. When that was through with, somebody undertook to divide the 
first resolve, and he held that could not be done.
  The most elaborate precedent, and the last one, is that on page 4509, 
Congressional Record, first session of the Sixtieth Congress. The 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Dalzell, reported a rule from the 
Committee on Rules. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, 
demanded a division, claiming that there were seven substantive 
propositions in the rule. The gentleman from Pennsylvania took 
identically the same position then that the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Henry, takes to-day, and the gentleman from New York, took precisely 
the same position then that the gentleman from Illinois takes to-day. 
The gentleman from Illinois was himself mixed up in that debate. He 
seems to have agreed with the gentleman from New York on the 
proposition that a division could be had, but he differed from the 
gentleman from New York as to how many substantive propositions there 
were involved.
  Mr. Speaker Cannon, after listening to the debate, decided that the 
division could be had.
  So it seems to the Chair that the precedents are in favor of the 
contention of the gentleman from Illinois and against the point of 
order of the gentleman from Texas.
  In addition to that, it seems to the Chair that the reason of the 
thing is the same way. There are several substantive legislative 
propositions embraced in this rule that have no connection whatever 
with one another. A Member might, and most probably would, be in favor 
of some and against others. He has a right to vote his sentiments on 
each, which he can not do if they are bunched together. Therefore the 
point of order is overruled, and the Clerk will report the first 
proposition.

  3174. On April 27, 1932,\2\ Mr. William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, from 
the Committee on Rules, called up the following resolution:

  Resolved, That after the adoption of this resolution it shall be in 
order in the consideration of H.R. 11267, the legislative appropriation 
bill, for the chairman of the Economy Committee or any member of the 
Economy Committee acting for him, by direction of that committee, to 
offer an amendment to said bill, any rule of the House to the contrary 
notwithstanding. On said amendment there shall be two hours of general 
debate, one-half to be controlled by the chairman of the Economy 
Committee and one-half by the ranking member of that committee. At the 
termination of such debate the amendment shall be considered under the 
5-minute rule as an original bill and shall be considered by titles. 
Each title as it is read shall be open to four amendments, said 
amendments not being subject to amendment, and no further amendments 
shall be entertained by the Chair. The provisions of clause 7, Rule 
XVI, or clause 2, Rule XXI, shall not apply to the substitute amendment 
offered to Title I of the Economy Committee amendment. At the 
conclusion of the consideration of the bill in the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union the committee shall rise and 
report the bill to the House with the amendments, including the 
amendment offered by the Economy Committee as amended, and any Member 
may demand a separate vote in the House on any of the amendments 
adopted in the Committee of the
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  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ First session, Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 9056.
Sec. 3175
Whole to the Economy Committee amendment. The previous question shall 
be considered as ordered on the bill and Economy Committee amendment, 
including the amendments to the Economy Committee amendment to final 
passage without intervening motion except two motions to recommit, and 
such motions to recommit shall be in order, any rule of the House to 
the contrary notwithstanding.

  Debate having been concluded, the previous question was ordered on 
the resolution, when Mr. Clarence Cannon, of Missouri, requested a 
separate vote on the following paragraph:

  Each title as it is read shall be open to four amendments, said 
amendments not being subject to amendment, and no further amendments 
shall be entertained by the Chair.

  Mr. John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, raised the question of order that 
the resolution was not divisible.
  The Speaker \1\ ruled:

  The gentleman from Missouri has asked for a division of the 
resolution. It occurs to the Chair that if the provision that the 
gentleman from Missouri has suggested is voted out there will be a 
complete special rule remaining. So it seems to the Chair it comes 
within the spirit of the rule.
  An examination of this particular rule shows that it contains a 
number of substantive propositions. In a ruling made by Mr. Speaker 
Cannon on April 8, 1908 (Record, p. 4509), he said:
  ``The Chair is prepared to rule. On a careful examination of this 
rule, the Chair finds that there are five substantive propositions and 
five only, so that if the gentleman demands a separate vote upon either 
or all of them, a separate vote will be taken.''
  The rule is quite specific. It provides that if there is a 
substantive proposition left a Member is entitled to a division.
  The Chair overrules the point of order.

  3175. On the question of agreeing or disagreeing to a Senate 
amendment it is not in order to demand a division so as to vote 
separately on different portion of the amendment.
  On February 25, 1919,\2\ Mr. S. Hubert Dent, of Alabama, called up 
the conference report on the bill (H. R. 13274) to provide relief where 
formal contracts have not been made in the manner required by law.
  The committee of conference having reported that they were unable to 
agree, Mr. Dent moved that the House further insist on its disagreement 
to the pending Senate amendment.
  Mr. Thomas W. Harrison, of Virginia, as a parliament inquiry, asked 
if it would be in order to move to concur in a portion of the Senate 
amendment and disagree to the remainder.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois the inquiry, said:

  Mr. Speaker, it is not in order to concur in a part of the Senate 
amendment with an amendment. The House must by its action in the end 
dispose of the Senate amendment. The House can concur in the Senate 
amendment with an amendment, or it can insist upon its disagreement to 
the Senate amendment, but it can not concur in a part of the Senate 
amendment with an amendment. It must act upon the whole amendment.
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  \1\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
  \2\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4257.
                                                            Sec. 3176
  The gentleman's suggestion was with reference to section 7 of the 
Senate amendment. The Senate made one amendment to the entire bill. The 
action taken by the House, whatever it may be, must be upon the entire 
amendment. Of course we can concur in the Senate amendment, with an 
amendment striking out all of the Senate amendment and inserting what 
the House thinks should be inserted, but you can not concur in a part 
of the Senate amendment.

  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The gentleman from Illinois has answered the inquiry of the gentleman 
from Virginia, and the Chair concurs in his answer.

  3176. Before the stage of disagreement is reached the motion to 
concur with an amendment is not divisible.
  On June 10, 1912,\2\ the House had under consideration Senate 
amendments to the bill H. R. 18642, a tariff bill fixing the metal 
schedule.
  Mr. George W. Norris, of Nebraska, moved to concur in the Senate 
amendment to section 2, repealing certain clauses in existing law and 
placing a duty of $2 a ton on a paper with an amendment striking out 
the duty of $2.
  Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, requested a division of the 
question with separate votes on concurrence and on agreeing to the 
proposed amendment.
  Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, made the point of order that 
prior to disagreement the motion to concur with an amendment was not 
divisible.
  The Speaker \1\ held:

  The proposition to concur with an amendment is the first proposition 
to be voted on.
  The feature of the proposition of the gentleman from Nebraska that 
makes his motion preferential, and also the other motion, is the 
feature of concurring with an amendment. The Chair sustains the point 
of order made by the gentleman from Alabama. The question is on the 
motion of the gentleman from Nebraska to concur with an amendment.
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  \1\ Champ Clerk, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, P. 7937.