<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VIII]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_cclxxiii.wais]



                          Chapter CCLXXIII.\1\
 
                    QUESTIONS OF ORDER AND APPEALS.

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    1. The Speaker decides. Section 3427.
    2. Statement and reservation of. Sections 3428-3434.
    3. Once decided on appeal, may not be renewed. Section 3435.
    4. May be raised as to whole or part of proposition. Section 
     3436.
    5. Time of making. Sections 3437-3445.
    6. Debate on. Sections 3446-3479.
    7. Reserving on appropriation bills. Sections 3450, 3451.
    8. Not in order when another appeal is pending. Section 3452.
    9. Debate on an appeal. Sections 3453-3456.
   10. General decisions. Sections 3457, 3458.

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  3427. It is not the duty of the Chair to construe the Constitution as 
affecting proposed legislation.
  An appropriation for the administration of the national prohibition 
law was held to be authorized by law and in order on an appropriation 
bill.
  On January 18, 1930,\2\ during consideration of the Treasury and Post 
Office appropriation bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, the paragraph providing for the enforcement of the 
national prohibition act was reached.
  Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of New York, made the point of order that 
there was no authorization for the proposed appropriation.
  After debate, the Chairman \3\ ruled:

  The gentleman from New York has made a point of order against the 
appropriated carried in this section for the expenses of enforcing the 
provisions of the national prohibition act. He makes this point of 
order: First, that there is no authoritative law for the appropriation, 
because this appropriation is based on the laws that have been passed 
for the enforcement of the prohibition act, which act itself depends 
for its validity on the constitutionality of the eighteenth, or 
prohibition, amendment. In other words, his point of order is based on 
the supposition of fact that there is no operative eighteenth amendment 
at the present time. In the beginning of his argument he made the 
statement that he was not arguing the constitutionality of this law and 
that this is not the time or place to raise a constitutional question. 
With that part of the gentleman's argument the Chair entirely agrees. 
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, or even the Speaker of the 
House, is not called upon to decide a constitutional question or even 
render an opinion on a
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  \1\ Supplementary to Chapter CXLIII.
  \2\ Second session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 1903.
  \3\ Betrand H. Snell, of New York, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 3428
constitional question. Notwithstanding that statement by the gentleman 
from New York, he immediately launched into a very long, carefully 
prepared, and somewhat ingenious argument to uphold his contention that 
the eighteenth amendment is not operative at the present time.
  Now, what is the practical situation before the Committee? We are 
governed by the rules and practices of the House, and as far as the 
Chair knows there are only one or two extreme occasions where we have 
ever relied upon the Constitution itself as authority for making an 
appropriation in one of the regular appropriation bills. The Chair has 
seen one decision in connection with appropriations for ambassadors to 
foreign countries, where the only authorization was the clause in the 
Constitution which provides for the appointment of ambassadors.
  That was considered as sufficient authorization for making the 
appropriation. However, as a usual thing we are governed entirely by 
the rules and practices of the House. Clause 2 of Rule XXI reads as 
follows:
  ``No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation 
bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not 
previously authorized by law.''
  The subcommittee on appropriations has very carefully and fully set 
out in the first page and a half of this special section all of the 
laws that have furnished the authority for the appropriation. The Chair 
has examined some of these authorities and he believes there is 
sufficient and ample authority in the laws that are enumerated for 
making the appropriation. The gentleman from New York in his argument 
has not claimed that all of these laws have been repealed or, in fact, 
that any one of them has been repealed. As far as the present occupant 
of the chair is informed or knows, none of them have been repealed.
  Therefore the Chair is of the opinion that there is ample authority 
of law for making the appropriation; that the Committee on 
Appropriations has not gone beyond the authority that is given it and 
therefore the point of order is overruled.

  3428. A point of order being reserved, the pending question may be 
debated on its merits if no Member demands the regular order.
  On August 23, 1918,\1\ while the bill (H. R. 12731) amending the 
draft law, was under consideration in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union, Mr. Dudley Doolittle, of Kansas, offered an 
amendment confirming the right of suffrage to soldiers in the service 
of the United States.
  Mr. S. Hubert Dent, of Alabama, reserved a point of order on the 
amendment.
  Mr. Doolittle inquired if the amendment was debatable after 
reservation of a point of order against it.
  The Chairman \2\ held that the point of order was in abeyance during 
reservation and the pending amendment was subject to debate on its 
merits if no Member demanded the regular order.
  3429. Reservation of a point of order is by unanimous consent only 
and must be made or waived on demand for the regular order.
  A point of order when reserved is not subject to debate.
  A point of order being withdrawn, and Member may renew it.
  On December 18, 1912,\3\ an appropriation bill was under 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.
  The Clerk read a paragraph providing for the instruction of Indian 
women in household duties and the conduct of experiments in forestry on 
Indian agency farms.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, reserved a point of order on the 
paragraph, but after debate withdrew it.
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  \1\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 9457.
  \2\ Courtney W. Hamlin, of Missouri, Chairman.
  \3\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 878.
Sec. 3430
  Thereupon, Mr. H. Robert Fowler, of Illinois, renewed the point of 
order and was proceeding in debate when Mr. Martin Dies, of Texas, 
objected that debate was not in order.
  The Chairman \1\ said:

  The gentleman from Illinois is recognized under the familiar practice 
in the Committee of the Whole to extend recognition, when requested, to 
a Member reserving a point of order. Strictly speaking under this 
recognition the gentleman is not entitled to five minutes, if objection 
is made. But the usual practice allows him to proceed in the absence of 
objection for certainly as much as five minutes.

  Mr. Fowler having concluded, Mr. Scott Ferris, of Oklahoma, proposed 
to debate the point or order which has been reserved.
  The Chairman held that a point or order which has been reserved was 
not subject to debate and said:

  The Chair does not see how the gentleman can be heard on a point of 
order that is reserved. There is nothing before the committee.
  The point of order was reserved by the gentleman from Illinois, and 
his rights, if any, were exhausted in the opinion of the Chair, at the 
expiration of five minutes. There is no point of order to discuss, none 
having been made.

  Mr. Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, demanded the regular order.
  The Chairman referred to section 6869 of Hinds' Precedents and said:

  In conformity with the authority quoted, the Chair rules now, as it 
has ruled heretofore, that the reservation of a point of order is not a 
matter of right under the rules, but of general acquiescence. All 
proceedings under such a reservation are a form of unanimous consent. 
Objection having been made, the gentleman from Illinois is requested to 
state his point or order.

  3430. A point or order may be reserved but must be decided or 
withdrawn on the demand of any Member for the regular order.
  If reservation of a point or order is withdrawn another Member may 
renew it.
  Debate under reservation of a point of order is by unanimous consent 
and may be terminated at any time by a demand for the regular order.
  A proposition to be accepted as a substitute must relate to the same 
subject and propose a related objective.
  On October 24, 1921,\2\ the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union was considering the bill (H. R. 8762) to create a 
commission authorized to refund foreign obligations.
  Mr. James A. Frear, of Wisconsin, offered as an amendment a proposal 
to incorporate in the bill the following proviso:

  Provided, That the total amount of interest payable on any such 
obligation received hereunder shall not be less than an amount equal to 
interest on the principal thereof at the rate of 5 per cent per annum.

  Mr. James W. Collier, of Mississippi, offered as a substitute for the 
amendment the following:

  Provided, That no agreement or agreements so entered into with 
respect to any matter herein authorized shall be deemed to have been 
completed nor to have force and effect until it shall have been 
submitted to the Congress of the United States and embodied in a law 
passed by Congress.
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  \1\ Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, Chairman.
  \2\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 7468.
                                                            Sec. 3431
  Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, objected that the purported 
substitute was not in fact a substitute in that it differed from the 
pending amendment both in subject matter and purpose.
  At the request of Mr. Collier, Mr. Longworth, consented to reserve 
the point of order to permit debate on the merits of the proposal.
  After debate Mr. Eugene Black, of Texas, demanded the regular order 
and the Chairman \1\ announced:

  The Chair understands the gentleman demands the regular order. Does 
the gentleman from Ohio press his point or order?
  The Chair will state for the information of the committee that debate 
on a reservation of a point of order is by unanimous consent, and it is 
within the privilege of any member of the committee at any time to 
demand the regular order, when it is incumbent on the member who has 
made the point of order to either withdraw the point of order or make 
it. I understand the gentleman from Texas demands the regular order, 
and the Chair is inquiring of the gentleman from Ohio whether he 
desires to withdraw the point of order or make it.

  Thereupon, Mr. Longworth, not insisting on the point of order, Mr. 
Albert Johnson, of Washington, renewed it.
  The Chairman held that the proposal was not a substitute and said:

  The amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin provides that ``the 
total amount of interest payable on any such obligation received 
hereunder shall not be less than an amount equal to interest on the 
principal thereof at the rate of 5 per cent per annum.'' The object of 
the amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin is for the sole purpose 
of restricting the discretion of the commission as to the interest 
arrangements that may be entered into. The substitute offered by the 
gentleman from Mississippi goes much further. In fact, it makes no 
references whatsoever to the purport, directly or indirectly, of the 
amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin. It relates to agreements 
that may be entered into. It has a much broader scope that the pending 
amendment. In fact, it has no relation to it except in a very distant 
degree, and therefore it can not be considered a substitute, and the 
Chair sustains the point or order.

  3431. On December 22, 1932,\2\ the Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union was considering the Interior Department 
appropriation bill, when Mr. Samuel S. Arentz, of Nevada, offered an 
amendment making provision for school-room equipment in Indian schools.
  Mr. William W. Hastings, of Oklahoma, reserved a point of order on 
the amendment.
  After debate, Mr. Hastings having withdrawn the point of order, Mr. 
Philip D. Swing, of California, proposed to renew the reservation.
  Mr. Arentz made the point or over that debate had intervened and the 
amendment was no longer subject to a point of order.
  The Chairman \3\ dissented and held that the reservation of a point 
of order withdrawn by one Member might be renewed immediately by 
another Member.
  3432. Submission of a question of order precludes further 
consideration until disposed of.
  On January 14, 1913,\4\ the Post Office appropriation bill was 
ordered to be engrossed and was read a third time, when Mr. Victor 
Murdock, of Kansas, moved to
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  \1\ William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 925.
  \3\ Schuyler Otis Bland, of Virginia, Chairman.
  \4\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 1519.
Sec. 3433
recommit the bill to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads 
with instructions to report it back instanter with an amendment 
interdicting the transportation of mail matter advertising intoxicating 
liquors.
  Mr. Swagar Sherley, of Kentucky, objected that the amendment embodied 
in the motion to recommit was not germane and pending the point of 
order demanded a division of the question on the various substantive 
propositions presented in the motion.
  Mr. Murdock made the point of order that the demand for a division of 
the question could not be made until the pending point of order had 
been decided.
  The Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order and addressed himself to 
the question of germaneness raised by Mr. Sherley.
  3433. The previous question may not be demanded on a proposition 
against which a point of order is pending.
  On January 16, 1917,\2\ the House had under consideration the Post 
Office appropriation bill with amendments recommended by the Committee 
of the Whole House on the state of the Union.
  Mr. Charles H. Randall, of California, moved to recommit the bill to 
the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, with instructions to 
report it back forthwith with an amendment prohibiting the transmission 
through the mails of matter advertising intoxicants.
  Mr. Swagar Shirley, of Kentucky, made the point of order that the 
amendment proposed legislation on an appropriation bill.
  Mr. Randall demanded the previous question on the motion to recommit, 
when Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, raised the question of the right 
to move the previous question while a point of order was pending.
  The Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order and held the demand for 
the previous question could not be entertained until the question of 
order was disposed of.
  3434. An amendment read for information is not pending and 
reservation of points of order is not required to preserve rights 
thereon.
  On February 22, 1910,\3\ the Indian appropriation bill was being 
considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.
  A section making provision for the expense of the Five Civilized 
Tribes being read, Mr. John H. Stephens, of Texas, gave notice that at 
the proper time he proposed to offer an amendment requiring the 
commission to enroll and provide for certain members of the Choctaw 
Tribe.
  On request of Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, the amendment was read 
for information.
  Mr. Charles D. Carter, of Oklahoma, proposed to raise a question of 
order against the amendment.
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  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 1484.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 2216.
                                                            Sec. 3435
  The Chairman \1\ declined to entertain the reservation and held that 
as the amendment was merely read for information it was not pending and 
a point of order was not required to preserve the rights of Members to 
object when it was offered.
  3435. An instance wherein the Chair after announcing a decision 
subsequently reversed the opinion.
  Where a Government agency was required by law to fix salaries in 
accordance with the classification act, a proposal under which it would 
be possible to fix salaries in excess of the maximum provided by the 
classification act was held to constitute legislation.
  On January 12, 1927,\2\ the independent offices appropriation bill 
was being considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union.
  The Clerk read:

  For every expenditure requisite for and incident to the work of the 
Board of Tax Appeals as authorized under Title IX, section 900, of the 
revenue act of 1924, approved June 2, 1924, as amended by Title X of 
the revenue act of 1926, approved February 26, 1926, personal services 
(including 12 employees at rates of compensation to be fixed by the 
board, not in excess of $7,500 each per annum), stenographic reporting 
services to be obtained on and after the passage of this act by the 
board in its discretion, through the civil service or by contract, or 
renewal of existing contract, or otherwise, rent at the seat of 
government and elsewhere, traveling expenses, car fare, stationery, 
furniture, office equipment, purchase and exchange of typewriters, law 
books and books of reference, periodicals, and all other necessary 
supplies, $682,740.

  Mr. Eugene Black, of Texas, made a point of order that the language--

  Including 12 employees at rates of compensation to be fixed by the 
board, not in excess of $7,500 each per annum.

was a proposition to enact legislation.
  Mr. Black cited section 910 of the code as follows:

  The board is authorized, in accordance with the civil service laws, 
to appoint, and in accordance with the classification act of 1923 to 
fix the compensation of such employees, and to make such expenditures, 
including expenditures for personal services and rent at the seat of 
government and elsewhere, and for law books, books of references, 
periodicals, etc.

and contended that the authorization to fix salaries at a figure not in 
excess of $7,500 was a proposal to fix them in excess of the maximum 
provided in the statute cited.
  The Chairman \3\ overruled the point of order, but subsequently asked 
the attention of the Committee and announced.

  The Chair finds himself in a rather peculiar position and hopes that 
he is not the only occupant of the chair who has so found himself. A 
few moments ago a point of order was made to lines 2 and 3, and the 
Chair overruled the point or order. Now an amendment is offered, which 
in addition to the language found in lines 2 and 3, includes the words 
``stenographic reporting services.'' On further investigation the Chair 
has come to the conclusion that the revenue act of 1926 authorizes the 
board to appoint these employees under civil-service rules and fix 
their salaries only in accordance with the reclassification act.
  When the Chair made his first ruling he took snap judgment 
apparently, in holding that the language, ``compensation to be fixed by 
the board,'' did not change existing law. But after careful 
consideration the Chair is compelled to reverse that ruling and hold 
that this does change the basic law, since apparently it permits the 
fixing of the salaries of these 12 employees without reference to
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  \1\ Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 1513.
  \3\ James T. Begg, of Ohio, Chairman.
Sec. 3436
the reclassification act. The Chair therefore sustains the point of 
order made against the amendment.

  3436. If a portion of paragraph is out of order the entire paragraph 
may be stricken from the bill, but after that portion has been ruled 
out it is too late to lodge the point of order against the paragraph as 
a whole as if the objectionable matter had not been stricken from the 
bill.
  On January 31, 1921,\1\ the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union had under consideration the river and harbor bill.
  The Clerk read the paragraph:

  For the preservation and maintenance of existing river and harbor 
works, and for the prosecution of such projects heretofore authorized 
as may be most desirable in the interests of commerce and navigation, 
$15,000,000: Provided, That allotments from this sum shall be made by 
the Secretary of War upon the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers: 
Provided further, That at the beginning of the second session of the 
Sixty-seventh Congress a special report shall be made to Congress by 
the Secretary of War showing the amount allotted under this 
appropriation for each work of improvement or maintenance.

  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, having submitted a point of order 
against the two provisos, the Chairman sustained the point of order and 
the provisos were stricken from the paragraph.
  Whereupon Mr. Blanton lodged a point of order against the remainder 
of the paragraph on the ground that if a portion was out of order the 
entire paragraph was subject to a point of order.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, objected and argued:

  The gentleman might have made a point of order against the whole 
paragraph. The gentleman did make a point of order against the two 
provisos. Before the Chair ruled upon that he might have made a point 
of order against the whole paragraph, but he did not attempt to make a 
point of order against the whole paragraph until the Chair ruled out 
the two provisos. Now, the gentleman is entitled to make a point of 
order against the balance of the paragraph, but the provisos are out of 
it, and he can not sustain the point of order now on the ground that it 
has the provisos in it, because they are already out.

  The Chairman \2\ acquiesced and said:

  That is exactly the position taken by the Chair, as the Chair has 
already stated. The paragraph is not now subject to a point of order 
for the reason stated by the gentleman from Illinois.

  3437. An amendment being offered, and the reading having begun, a 
point of order may interrupt the reading and the Chair may rule the 
amendment out if enough has been read to show that it is out of order.
  On April 7, 1980,\3\ while the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union was considering the District of Columbia 
appropriation bill, the Clerk read:

  Attendance officers: For two attendance officers, authorized by the 
act providing for compulsory education in the District of Columbia, 
approved June 8, 1906, at $600 each; one attendance officer, $900; in 
all, $2,100.

  Mr. Andrew J. Peters, of Massachusetts, sent the desk and amendment 
which the Clerk reported as follows:

  That from and after the passage of this act the labor of children--

  At this point Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, rose to submit a 
point of order.
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  \1\ Third session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 2349.
  \2\ James W. Husted, of New York, Chairman.
  \3\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4483.
                                                            Sec. 3438
  The Chairman \1\ declined recognition and said:

  As soon as there is sufficient of the amendment read to indicate what 
the purpose is, the Chair will rule on the point of order. The Clerk 
will continue the reading.

  The Clerk continued:

  That from and after the passage of this act the labor of children in 
the District of Columbia shall be subject to the following 
regulations--

  The Chairman interposed:

  The Clerk will cease reading. That is clearly out of order. It is 
legislation, pure and simple. The point of order is sustained.

  3438. On January 26, 1917,\2\ during the consideration of the river 
and harbor bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, Mr. Murray Hulbert, of New York, offered an amendment which he 
sent to the desk to be reported by the Clerk.
  The Clerk read:

  Sec. 9. That the following amendment to section 7, Article I, of the 
Constitution is hereby proposed and submitted to the several States, as 
follows.

  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, interrupted and demanded to be heard 
on a point of order against the amendment.
  The Chairman reminded that the reading of the amendment had not yet 
been concluded.
  Mr. Mann submitted:

  Enough has been read to show that the amendment is a proposed 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I make the point of 
order so as to prevent showing what it is.

  The Chairman \3\ entertained the objection and sustained the point of 
order.
  3439. On October 30, 1919,\4\ the bill (S. 2775), the mineral leasing 
bill, was being considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union.
   Mr. John E. Raker. of California, offered an amendment in the nature 
of a substitute.
  After a portion of the amendment had been read, Mr. Thomas L. Blanton 
of Texas, interposed a question of order.
  The Chairman \5\ objected:

  The Chair can not decide the point of order on a matter that he knows 
nothing about.
  It is manifest that any point of order against this amendment can not 
be given consideration by the Chair until the Chair knows what is 
contained in the amendment. The Chair is no mind reader----

  The Clerk continued until section 40 of the amendment was read, 
prohibiting one corporation from acquiring or controlling the stock of 
another corporation, when Mr. Blanton again interrupted and made the 
point of order that the amendment was not germane.
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  \1\ John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 2082.
  \3\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Chairman.
  \4\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 7783.
  \5\ Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, Chairman.
Sec. 3440
  The Chairman entertained the point of order and said:

  The reading having disclosed that section 40 of the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from California is contrary to the spirit of the 
provisions of the bill, and seeks to prevent the acquisition of stock 
in a corporation by individuals or stockholders of another corporation, 
and provides for punishment under certain circumstances, and indicates 
by the provisions of the section that it has no relation whatever to 
the provisions of the bill, wishes to say that the former Speaker of 
the House, Mr. Speaker Clark, on December 5, 1912, having ruled upon a 
question on all fours with this, on a point of order made to a bill 
providing for the physical valuation of railroads, when a provision 
dealing with the future issuance of stocks and bonds was pending, and 
held the amendment not to be germane, and held the point of order made 
against it as good, and sustained it, so the chair under the present 
circumstances feels constrained to rule that the amendment of the 
gentleman from California offered at this stage of the bill, covering 
cases already having been passed upon during the consideration of the 
bill, is out of order, and the point of order is sustained.

  3440. It is too late to raise a question of order against the 
consideration of a proposition after debate on it has begun.
  On March 25, 1910,\1\ the House was in the Committee of the Whole for 
consideration of bills on the Private Calendar.
  The bill (S. 4040) to grant land to the city of Cheyenne was taken up 
for consideration.
  After debate, Mr. Charles L. Bartlett, of Georgia, made the point of 
order that the bill was a public bill and was improperly on the Private 
Calendar.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, objected that the bill had been 
debated and the point of order came too late.
  The Chairman \2\ ruled:

  After the bill now under consideration had been read by the Clerk the 
gentleman from Illinois took the floor and discussed the merits of the 
measure for something like forty minutes, and a number of other 
gentlemen took part in the colloquy. The gentleman from Georgia then 
made the point of order that the bill was not properly on the Private 
Calendar, and that, therefore, the consideration of the measure should 
be suspended. The Chair would refer the committee to the precedents on 
this point, which are numerous.

  The Chairman cited section 6895 of Hinds' Precedents as particularly 
applicable and concluded:

  There are numerous other precedents coming down to within the last 
Congress to the same effect, that a point of order as to the place of a 
bill on the calendar should be made when the bill is first called, and, 
as in the first case quoted, a mere parliamentary inquiry was held to 
be intervening debate.
  Exactly the same point is decided in a number of other cases, and the 
decisions from the Chair are based on the fact that it was not 
necessary for the Chair to consider the merits of a point of order, as 
the point of order came too late, it having considered the measure. In 
this case, as the consideration lasted for a full hour, the Chair 
overrules the point of order.

  3441. On January 26, 1932,\3\ in the course of the consideration of 
the Agriculture Department appropriation bill in the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union, Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, of 
New York, offered an amendment to the pending paragraph of the bill.
  The Clerk having read the amendment, Mr. LaGuardia said in debate:

  If the chairman will accept my amendment, I will not take any time of 
the committee.

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  \1\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 3777.
  \2\ Henry S. Boutell, of Illinois, Chairman.
  \3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 2743.
                                                            Sec. 3442
  Mr. James P. Buchanan, of Texas, the Chairman of the subcommittee 
reporting the bill, declined to accept the amendment.
  Whereupon, Mr. John Taber, of New York, proposed a point of order 
against the amendment.
  The Chairman \1\ refused recognition and said:

  The Chair will state that the point of order of the gentleman from 
New York should have been before the gentleman from New York began his 
remarks. The Chair overrules the point of order because debate has 
intervened between the reading of the amendment and the raising of the 
point of order.

  3442. A point of order against the motion to strike out the enacting 
clause must be made before debate has begun,.
  On December 5, 1919,\2\ the House resolved into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of 
the bill (H. R. 9755) to establish the standard of weights and measures 
for wheat-mill and corn-mill products.
  Mr. William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, moved to strike out the enacting 
clause, and being recognized consumed five minutes in debate.
  Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, was recognized for five minutes in 
opposition to the motion.
  Thereupon, Mr. Nicholas J. Sinnott, of Oregon, made the point of 
order that the motion to strike out the enacting clause was not 
admissible under the terms of the special order under which the bill 
was being considered.
  Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, objected that a point of order against a 
motion to strike out the enacting clause came too late after it had 
been debated.
  The Chairman \3\ ruled:

  The question raised here is rather involved, but the Chair has 
consulted several authorities referred to in the debate and feels clear 
on the point. The gentleman from Oregon refers to the paragraph 3215 of 
Hinds' Precedents, in support of his contention. It seems to the Chair 
that in the decision referred to in that paragraph, the whole matter 
hinged on whether or not the point of order was made before debate had 
begun. We must concede in the point of order now before the committee 
that debate had taken place before the point of order was made. The 
gentleman from Alabama had made his motion to strike out the enacting 
clause and had debated it for a number of minutes. Therefore, as debate 
had taken place, in the Chair's opinion the citation of paragraph 3215 
does not parallel the question now under discussion, because debate had 
already been had, while in that reference the decision was based on the 
fact that debate had not taken place previous to the point of order 
being made.
  The Chair now refers to Hinds' Precedents, section 6902. It seems to 
the Chair that this case is almost a parallel case to the one now 
presented to the committee. The Chair will not repeat the ruling 
rendered at that time, a ruling on which he founds his own ruling, but 
will insert it as part of his decision, as the reason why he is going 
to overrule the point of order. The Chair therefore overrules the point 
of order made by the gentleman from Oregon on the ground that the point 
comes too late.
  The question now is on the motion made by the gentleman from Alabama 
to strike out the enacting clause.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 209.
  \3\ Frederick C. Hicks, of New York, Chairman.
Sec. 3443
  3443. A point of order against a proposition must be made before an 
amendment is offered.
  On September 19, 1918,\1\ the revenue bill was being considered in 
the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, when the 
Clerk read:

  Sec. 1200. That there is hereby created a board to be known as the 
``Advisory Tax Board,'' hereinafter called the board, and to be 
composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the United 
States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The board 
shall remain in existence during the continuance of the present war 
with the Imperial German Government and for a period of 12 months after 
the termination of such war as declared by proclamation of the 
President.

  Mr. William P. Borland, a Missouri, proposed this amendment.

  The members of the board first appointed shall be appointed for terms 
of one, two, three, four, and five years, respectively, and thereafter 
the term of each member shall be five years.

  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, made a point of order against the 
amendment, which was overruled by the Chair.
  Whereupon Mr. Madden lodged a point of order against the paragraph to 
which the amendment was proposed.
  Mr. Borland submitted that the point of order against the paragraph 
came too late after an amendment had been proposed and was under 
consideration.
  The Chairman \2\ ruled:

  The gentleman can not direct a point of order against the entire 
paragraph after an amendment has been offered.
  The paragraph was read. It was then before the House and open first 
for a point of order, and then for amendment. Anyone making, or 
reserving a point of order would have entitled to prior recognition to 
the gentleman from Missouri. No one made a point of order to the 
paragraph. Hence the gentleman from Missouri asking recognition to 
offer an amendment, was in order. He was recognized, and submitted an 
amendment to the paragraph to which an amendment was directed.

  The Chairman then read from sections 6899 and 6902 of Hinds' 
Precedents and concluded:

  In this case no point or order was made to the paragraph, or sought 
to be made, before the amendment was offered. After the amendment was 
offered, and held to be in order, it was too late to make a point of 
order to the paragraph. This ruling in the judgment of the Chair 
conforms to the precedents, and practice of the House.

  Subsequently, the Chairman supplemented his decision (Record, p. 
10519):

  The Chair will ask the indulgence of the committee. A few moments ago 
the Chair had to rule on a question of order of interest to every 
Member of the House, and with respect to which he had no opportunity to 
look up the precedents and cite same in connection with his ruling. The 
Chair since that time has found the following precedent which is 
precisely in point. The situation presented when the Chair made its 
ruling, was as follows:
  The first paragraph in the section relating to the advisory tax board 
had been read without any objection, or point of order, or reservation 
of a point of order. An amendment was then offered to which a point of 
order was made. The point of order as overruled, and the gentleman from 
Illinois undertook to make a point of order to the original paragraph 
to which the amendment of the gentleman from Missouri had been offered. 
The Chair held that under the rules this motion
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 10517.
  \2\ Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 3444
came too late, briefly giving the reasons sustaining the ruling. The 
Chair now desires to put into the Record the following decision which 
is precisely in point:

  The Chairman then read section 6911 of Hinds' Precedents and 
continued:

  In the case cited the amendment was rejected on a point of order. In 
the case before the House the point of order to the amendment was 
overruled, and the amendment thereby held to be in order.
  The committee will note that while the case cited is not so strong a 
case on the facts as the case upon which the Chair had occasion to 
rule, it fully sustains the ruling of the Chair to the effect that 
after an amendment is offered to a paragraph it is then too late to 
make a point of order to the paragraph to which that amendment relates.

  3444. On April 22, 1932,\1\ the Navy Department appropriation bill 
was under consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union.
  The Clerk read the paragraph providing for the naval reserve, when 
Mr. William A. Ayres, of Kansas, offered an amendment.
  Before the amendment could be read by the Clerk, Mr. Fred A. Britten, 
of Illinois, proposed to reserve a point of order on the paragraph.
  The Chairman \2\ declined to entertain the reservation and said:

  The gentleman's point of order comes too late. An amendment has been 
offered and is in the hands of the Clerk.

  3445. A point of order may not be raised against a proposition after 
an amendment is offered and even a pro forma amendment precludes a 
question of order.
  On June 26, 1916,\3\ during the consideration of the river and harbor 
bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, the 
Clerk read this paragraph.

  For the construction of a navigable waterway of suitable depth and 
width to answer the needs of commerce, connecting the waters of the 
Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers in the State of Georgia.

  Mr. Charles Pope Caldwell, of New York, moved to strike out the last 
word for the purpose of asking a question, and then raised a question 
of order against the paragraph.
  The chairman \4\ overruled and point of order on the ground that it 
came to late after the pro forma amendment had been offered.
  3446. Debate on a point of order is for the information of the Chair, 
and therefore within his discretion.
  A resolution of the House may not by amendment be changed to a bill.
  A proposition in the form of a bill may not be offered as a 
substitute for a proposition in the form of a simple resolution.
  On November 6, 1919,\5\ the House was considering the resolution (H. 
R. 362) directing the Secretary of War to deliver surplus motor trucks 
to the Secretary of Agriculture for use in the construction of roads.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 8704.
  \2\ Claude A. Fuller, of Arkansas, Chairman.
  \3\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4317.
  \4\ Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, Chairman.
  \5\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 8049.
Sec. 3447
  The question being put on agreeing to the resolution, Mr. Charles 
Pope Caldwell, of New York, moved to recommit the resolution to the 
Committee on Expenditures in the War Department with instructions to 
report it back instanter with an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute for the entire resolution.
  Mr. Sydney Anderson, of Minnesota, made the point of order that a 
bill could not be offered as a substitute for a resolution of the 
House.
  Mr. Caldwell, being recognized to debate the point of order, was 
discussing the merits of the proposed amendment when admonished by the 
Speaker \1\ that debate should be confined to the subject.
  Mr. Caldwell insisted that he was within his rights in stating the 
predicate on which he based his argument, and that he was entitled to 
make a statement of fact.
  The Speaker dissented:

  The Chair does not desire the gentleman to discuss the merits of it. 
The Chair will say to the gentleman that the gentleman's discussion is 
entirely in the discretion of the Chair.

  Mr. Caldwell took issue on the germaneness of his argument, when the 
Speaker ruled:

  The Chair refuses to hear the genleman further.

  3447. On February 11, 1921,\2\ the naval appropriation bill was being 
considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.
  Mr. Fred A. Britten, of Illinois, lodged a point of order against an 
item in the bill.
  After debate on the question of order had proceeded for some time, 
Mr. James V. McClintic, of Oklahoma, made the point of order that 
debate had been exhausted.
  The Chairman \3\ said:

  The Chair overrules the point of order. Debate on points is in the 
discretion of the Chair.

  3448. Debate on a point of order is at the discretion of the Chair 
and Members may speak as often as recognized.
  On May 31, 1910,\4\ during consideration of the sundry civil 
appropriation bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union, Mr. Albert Douglas, of Ohio, offered an amendment providing 
for the general expenses of the Bureau of Mines.
  Mr. James A. Tawney, of Minnesota, made a point of order against the 
amendment, and spoke repeatedly in the debate on the subject, until Mr. 
Politte Elvins, of Missouri, submitted a parliamentary inquiry asking 
how often a gentleman was entitled to speak on the same point of order.
  The Chairman \5\ replied:

  Just as many times as the Chair will recognize the gentleman.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ Third session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3012.
  \3\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Chairman.
  \4\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 7163.
  \5\ James R. Mann, of Illinois, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 3449
  3449. In discussing questions of order the rule of relevancy is 
strictly construed and debate is confined to the point of order and 
does not admit reference to the merits of the pending proposition.
  On August 12, 1919,\1\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, called up a 
privileged resolution of inquiry requesting certain information from 
the Secretary of Labor.
  Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, directed a point of order against 
the resolution, and Mr. Blanton in debating the point of order touched 
on the merits of the proposition involved.
  The Speaker \2\ admonished:

  The gentleman must not discuss the merits of the case, but the 
gentleman must confine himself to the point of order.

  3450. Points of order are usually reserved when appropriated bills 
are referred to the Committee of the Whole in order that portions in 
violation of rules may be eliminated by raising points of order in 
committee.
  On March 7, 1922,\3\ Mr. S. Wallace Dempsey, of New York, by 
direction of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, reported the river 
and harbor bill.
  Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, submitted a parliamentary inquiry as to 
whether it was necessary to reserve points of order on the bill, and to 
the general appropriation bills when reported, or whether it was merely 
a custom without a reason.
  In discussing the inquiry, Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, said:

  Mr. Speaker, there is considerable reasoning about the matter in 
Hinds' Precedents; it seems to be a precedent based on very good 
reason, as I have read the statements of Mr. Hinds in regard to it. 
Immediately upon being presented, the matter is referred to the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, and he argues, 
and it seems to me with a good deal of force, that that being the case 
it is necessary that all points of order shall be reserved in the 
House.

  In response to the inquiry the Speaker \2\ said:

  It is simply a matter of precedent. It has always been the custom 
that points of order must be reserved in the House in order that they 
may be then made in the Committee of the Whole.

  Whereupon, Mr. Garner reserved all points of order on the bill.
  3451. On July 15, 1919,\4\ the sundry civil service appropriation 
bill was under consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union.
  The Clerk read a paragraph authorizing the Secretary of Labor to 
maintain a national system of employment offices in the several States.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that the 
paragraph comprised new legislation and was not in order on an 
appropriation bill.
  Mr. James W. Good, of Iowa, submitted that the point of order came 
too late, inasmuch as no points of order had been reserved on the bill 
when it was reported.
  Mr. Blanton replied that while it was the custom to reserve points of 
order on the general appropriation bills when reported to the House, 
such reservation was a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3804.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 3935.
  \4\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 2662.
Sec. 3452
mere formality and was not essential, and a point of order, if 
meritorious, could be presented when the paragraph to which it applied 
was reached as the bill was read for amendment.
  The Chairman \1\ held:

  The Chair holds that unless there is a reservation under 
circumstances of this kind a point of order can not be entertained to a 
part or a section of the bill. It seems to the Chair clear that points 
of order must be reserved, else it is the duty of the committee to 
report the bill as it is.

  3452. An amendment may not be offered to a paragraph in a bill while 
a point of order against the paragraph is pending.
  On April 2, 1908,\2\ the Agricultural appropriation bill was under 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.
  The Clerk read a paragraph authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture 
to inquire into additional sources of raw material for paper making.
  Mr. Edgar D. Crumpacker, of Indiana, reserved a point of order 
against the paragraph.
  Thereupon, Mr. Champ Clark, of Missouri, proposed an amendment 
placing all raw materials entering into the manufacture of paper on the 
free list.
  The Chairman \3\ declined to entertain the amendment and said:

  Amendments are not in order. The gentleman from Missouri has the 
floor, but the gentleman from Missouri has not the floor to offer an 
amendment, because no amendment is in order until the point of order is 
disposed of.

  3453. An appeal from the decision of the Chair is debatable both in 
the House and in the Committee of the Whole, but debate may be closed 
in the House by a motion to lay on the table and in the Committee of 
the Whole by a motion to close debate or to rise and report.
  Debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole is under the 5-
minute rule subject to the will of the committee.
  On June 16, 1917,\4\ while the river and harbor bill was being 
considered in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, Mr. Martin D. Foster, of Illinois, raised a question of order 
against a paragraph providing for the purchase of the Cape Cod Canal.
  The Chairman \5\ sustained the point of order and Mr. J. Hampton 
Moore, of Pennsylvania, having appealed from the decision of the Chair, 
Mr. Irvine L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, was recognized to debate the 
question raised by the appeal.
  Mr. Richard W. Austin, of Tennessee, made the point of order that an 
appeal from the decision of the Chair was not debatable.
  The Chairman held:

  It is debatable. The present occupant of the chair some time ago made 
an erroneous statement, saying that it was not debatable, but 
afterwards corrected that statement by saying an appeal was debatable, 
subject to the will of the committee.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Horace M. Towner, of Iowa, Chairman.
  \2\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4298.
  \3\ David J. Foster, of Vermont, Chairman.
  \4\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 3727.
  \5\ Pat Harrison, of Mississippi, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 3454
  The committee can close it in the committee or rise and close debate 
in the House. In the House debate is avoided by moving to lay the 
appeal on the table, but no such rule applies in the committee, so the 
only way to close debate is by moving that it be done.

  Mr. William H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, being recognized to debate the 
question, protested against being limited to five minutes and submitted 
that debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole was under the 
hour rule. He further insisted that debate on appeal could be limited 
only by a vote that the committee rise.
  The Chairman overruled the contention and held:

  Let the Chair state to the gentleman right here that debate can be 
closed any time by the gentleman having the floor moving to close 
debate. It can be done either way.
  Under the precedents, and there are not very many of them, he is led 
to believe that the question of appeal does not come under the one-hour 
rule but under the five-minute rule, the same as discussions upon 
amendments. So the Chair hold that it is under the five-minute rule.
  There is no question in the mind of the Chair, so far as the right to 
control debate is concerned. That has been decided as shown by 
paragraph 6949 of volume 5 of Hinds' Precedents.
  It is within the province of the committee to close debate when it 
sees fit, or the chairman of the committee in charge of the bill has 
the right to move that the committee rise and go into the House and so 
close debate.

  3454. Debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole is under the 
5-minute rule.
  On January 29, 1919,\1\ the Committee of the Whole House on the state 
of the Union was considering the sundry civil appropriation bill.
  Mr. Leonidas C. Dyer, of Missouri, proposed to amend the bill by 
inserting the following proviso:

  Provided, That no part of the appropriation herein shall be used 
unless all former Government employees who have been drafted or 
enlisted in the military service of the United States in the war with 
Germany shall be reinstated on application to their former positions 
appropriated for herein if they have received an honorable discharge 
and are qualified to perform the duties of the position.

  Mr. Swagar Sherley, of Kentucky, made the point of order that the 
amendment was a proposition to incorporate legislation in an 
appropriation bill.
  Mr. Dyer took the position that while it provided legislation it was 
admissible as a limitation.
  The Chairman \2\ overruled the point of order.
  Mr. Edward W. Saunders, of Virginia, having appealed from the 
decision of the Chair, Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, asked to be 
recognized for one hour to debate the appeal.
  The Chairman \3\ held that the Committee of the Whole was proceeding 
under the 5-minute rule and that debate on an appeal was no exception, 
and recognized Mr. Mann for five minutes.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 2324.
  \2\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Chairman.
  \3\ Charles R. Crisp, of Georgia, Chairman.
Sec. 3455
  3455. Debate in an appeal in the Committee of the Whole is under the 
5-minute rule and many be closed by committee.
  In recognizing for debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole 
the Chairman alternates between those favoring and those opposing.
  The motion to lay on the table is not in order in Committee of the 
Whole.
  On May 21, 1926,\1\ Mr. Cassius C. Dowell, of Iowa appealed from the 
decision of the Chair on a question, giving a motion to rise and report 
to the House recommending reference priority over a motion to rise and 
report to the House recommending passage.
  Mr. Ernest R. Ackerman, of New Jersey, moved to lay the appeal on the 
table.
  The Chairman \2\ called attention to the fact that the motion to lay 
on the table was not in order in the Committee of the Whole.
  Members having been recognized to debate the question raised by the 
appeal Mr. David H. Kincheloe, of Kentucky, submitted as a 
parliamentary inquiry, that one 5-minute speech had been made in favor 
of sustaining the decision of the Chair and one 5-minute speech in 
opposition, and that debate had now been exhausted.
  The Chairman ruled:

  The suggestion of the gentleman is as to the right for the debate to 
continue after 10 minutes has been exhausted by reason of the fact that 
no amendment can be offered as in the usual case under 5-minute rule in 
the consideration of the bill. The Chair is advised that former Speaker 
Crisp ruled that debate on an appeal from the decision of the Chair 
proceeded under the 5-minute rule. Under a strict construction of the 
rules, possibly there could be no debate at all. The practice has 
been--which this present incumbent of the chair feels inclined to 
follow--to permit the debate to proceed under the 5-minute rule until 
debate is exhausted or the committee sees fit to close the debate, and 
it will be the desire of the Chair while the debate continues to 
alternate in granting recognition.

  After further debate, Mr. Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, moved that 
debate on the pending appeal do now close.
  The motion was agreed to.
  3456. On May 24, 1921,\3\ the second deficiency bill was under 
consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, when the Clerk read an item providing for salaries in the 
General Land Office at annual rates during the fiscal year 1922.
  Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas made the point of order that the 
appropriation was not a deficiency appropriation.
  The Chairman \4\ having sustained the point of order and;
  Mr. James W. Good, of Iowa, having appealed from the decision of the 
Chair, Mr. Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee, inquired if the question of 
appeal was debatable.
  The Chairman held it to be debatable under the five-minute rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 9855.
  \2\ Louis C. Cramton, of Michigan, Chairman.
  \3\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 1697.
  \4\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 3457
  Mr. Finis J. Garret, of Tennessee, as a parliamentary inquiry, asked 
if it were in order to move to lay the appeal on the table.
  The Chairman said:

  The Chair would state that that motion is not in order in Committee 
of the Whole. It has been construed that the motion to adjourn or the 
motion to lay on the table is not in order in Committee of the Whole. 
In Hinds' Precedents, section 4719, the Chairman ruled that, the motion 
to lay on the table is not in order in Committee of the Whole. It was 
an appeal from the decision of the Chair. A Member from Massachusetts 
moved to lay the appeal on the table. The appeal was taken from the 
decision of the Chair. Mr. Fowler, of Massachusetts, moved to lay the 
appeal on the table, and the Chairman held that the motion was not in 
order in Committee of the Whole. That ruling was followed by the 
Chairman of the committee as late thereafter as 1902, and has been 
followed, the Chair thinks, several times since that time. The question 
is, Shall the decision of the Chair sustaining the point of order stand 
as the judgment of the committee?

  The question being taken, the committee voted to sustain the decision 
of the Chair.
  3457. An appeal may not be taken from a response of the Speaker to a 
parliamentary inquiry.
  On April 3, 1908.\1\ Mr. David A. De Armond, of Missouri, raised a 
question of order against a resolution submitted by Mr. John Dalzell, 
of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on Rules, providing for the 
consideration of the District of Columbia appropriation bill. Mr. De 
Armond based his objection on the ground that it contravened a special 
order agreed to by unanimous consent on the previous day.
  The Speaker overruled the point of order and Mr. De Armond propounded 
a parliamentary inquiry as to whether it would be in order under 
consideration.
  The Speaker \2\ replied:

  It has to be done under a rule, and such motion would not be in order 
under the rules as they stand, but under the Constitution the House can 
make its rule and regulations, and change them, or amend them; and 
this, as the rules provide, is a report from the Committee on Rules, 
which is a privileged committee, and proposes to the House not only to 
do away with the unanimous consent, but to impose other terms that 
would exist under the rules as we now have them; and the very object of 
the organization of the House, with a Committee on Rules with that 
privilege, is to give the House an opportunity to do anything in the 
event the House, proceeding in an orderly way, desires so to do.

  From this response by the Chair Mr. De Armond proposed to appeal to 
the House.
  The Speaker ruled:

  The gentleman can hardly appeal from an answer to a parliamentary 
inquiry.

  3458. The Chair does not rule on the consistency of a proposed 
amendment.
  The consistency of a proposed amendment with the text is a question 
to be passed on by the House and not by the Speaker.
  On June 4, 1929,\3\ the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union was considering the bill (S. 312), the apportionment bill.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4350.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Record, p. 2349.
Sec. 3458
  The Clerk read as follows:

  Sec. 2. That the period of three years beginning the 1st day of July 
next preceding the census provided for in section 1 of this act shall 
be known as the decennial census period, and the reports upon the 
inquires provided for in said section shall be completed within such 
period: Provided, That the tabulation of total population by States as 
required for the apportionment of Representatives shall be completed 
within 12 months and reported by the Director of the Census to the 
Secretary of Commerce and by him to the President of the United States.

  Mr. Clarence J. McLeod, of Michigan proposed to insert after the word 
``months'' the following:

  after the beginning of the above-described period.

  Mr. John E. Ranking, of Mississippi, objected that the amendment was 
in the nature of a duplication and was inconsistent with the text.
  The Chairman \1\ declined to pass on the question and said:

  There is no rule of the House under which duplication is subject to 
the point of order as far as the Chair is aware. Unless the amendment 
violates one of the specific rules of the House, the Chair is not 
empowered to rule it out of order. The Chair overrules the point of 
order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Carl R. Chindblom, of Illinois, Chairman.