<DOC>
[Cannon's Precedents -- Volume VI]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:cannon_ccv.wais]

 
                            Chapter CCV.

                        PRIVILEGE OF THE MEMBER.

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   1. Arrest in going to or returning from sessions. Section 589.
   2. Charges against Members in the Record, etc. Sections 590-
     603.
   3. Charges against Members in newspapers, etc. Sections 604-
     622.

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  589. All criminal offenses are comprehended by the terms ``treason, 
felony, and breach of the peace,'' as used in the Constitution, 
excepting these cases from the operation of the privilege from arrest 
therein conferred upon Senators and Representatives during their 
attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses, and in going to 
and returning from the same.
  The words ``treason, felony, and breach of the peace,'' as applied to 
the parliamentary privilege, is construed as understood in England and 
as excluding from the privilege all arrests and prosecutions for 
criminal offenses, and confining the privilege alone to arrests in 
civil cases.
  Writ of error has been sustained for arrest of a Member while 
Congress was not in session.
  Writ of error not dismissed because the Congress of which defendant 
was a Member has ceased to exist.
  On February 11, 1905 \2\ Mr. John N. Williamson, of Oregon, was 
indicted for the violation of certain statutes in proceedings for the 
purchase of public land. The defendant was found guilty in the month of 
September, 1905. On October 14, 1905, when the court was about to 
pronounce sentence, he protested on the ground that thereby he would be 
deprived of his constitutional right to attend the ensuing session of 
Congress. The objection was overruled and he was sentenced to 
imprisonment for 10 months.
  Exceptions were taken and the case reached the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice 
White at the October term, 1907.
  This opinion passes upon the argument advanced by the Government that 
the immunity of Members of Congress from arrest, even if applicable to 
criminal cases, operates only during a session of Congress, as follows:

  It is said, however, that this ease differs from the Burton case \3\ 
because there the trial and conviction was had during a session of the 
Senate, while here, at the time of the trial, conviction,
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  \1\ Supplementary to Chapter LXXXII.
  \2\ Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 425.
  \3\ Burton v. United States. 196. U. S. 283.
Sec. 589
and sentence Congress was not in session, and therefore to assert the 
protection of the constitutional provision is to reduce the claim ``to 
the point of frivolousness.'' This, however, but assumes that even if 
the constitutional privilege embraces the arrest and sentence of a 
Member of Congress for a crime like the one here involved, it is 
frivolous to assert that the privilege could possibly apply to an 
arrest and sentence at any other time than during a session of 
Congress, even although the inevitable result of such arrest and 
sentence might be an imprisonment which would preclude the possibility 
of the Member attending an approaching session. We can not give our 
assent to the proposition. Indeed, we think, if it be conceded that the 
privilege which the Constitution creates extends to an arrest for any 
criminal offense, such privilege would embrace exemption from any 
exertion of power by way of arrest and prosecution for the commission 
of crime, the effect of which exertion of power would be to prevent a 
Congressman from attending a future as well as a pending session of 
Congress. The contention that although there may have been merit in the 
claim of privilege when asserted it is now frivolous because of a 
change in the situation, is based upon the fact that at this time the 
Congress of which the accused was a Member has ceased to exist, and, 
therefore, even if the sentence was illegal when imposed, such 
illegality has been cured by the cessation of the constitutional 
privilege. But, even if the proposition be conceded, it affords no 
ground for dismissing the writ of error, since our jurisdiction depends 
upon the existence of a constitutional question at the time when the 
writ of error was sued out, and such jurisdiction, as we have 
previously said, carries with it the duty of reviewing any errors 
material to the determination of the validity of the conviction. It 
hence follows that, even if the constitutional question as asserted is 
now ``a mere abstraction,'' that fact would not avail to relieve us of 
the duty of reviewing the whole case, and hence disposing of the 
assignments of error which are addressed to other than the 
constitutional question. Besides, we do not consider the proposition 
well founded, for, if at the time the sentence was imposed it was 
illegal because in conflict with the constitutional privilege of the 
accused, we fail to perceive how the mere expiration of the term of 
Congress for which the Member was elected has operated to render that 
valid which was void because repugnant to the Constitution.

  As to the contention that the privilege of immunity under the 
Constitution extends to civil arrests on1v and does not apply to 
indictable offenses, the opinion holds:

  We come, then, to consider the clause of the Constitution relied upon 
in order to determine whether the accused, because he was a Member of 
Congress, was privileged from arrest and trial for the crime in 
question, or, upon conviction, was in any event privileged from 
sentence, which would prevent his attendance at an existing or 
approaching session of Congress.
  The full text of the first clause of section 6, Article I, of the 
Constitution is this:
  ``Sec. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out 
of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest 
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and 
in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate 
in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.''
  If the words extending the privilege to all cases were unqualified, 
and therefore embraced the arrest of a Member of Congress for the 
commission of any crime, we think, as we have previously said, they 
would not only include such an arrest as operated to prevent the Member 
from going to and returning from a pending session, but would also 
extend to prohibiting a court during an interim of a session of 
Congress from imposing a sentence of imprisonment which would prevent 
him from attending a session of Congress in the future. But the 
question is not what would be the scope of the words ``all cases'' if 
those words embraced all crimes, but, is, what is the scope of the 
qualifying clause--that is, the exception from the privilege of 
``treason, felony, and breach of the peace.'' The conflicting 
contentions are substantially these: It is insisted by the plaintiff in 
error that the privilege applied because the offense in question is 
confessedly not technically the crime of treason or felony and is not 
embraced within the words ``breach of the peace,'' as found
                                                             Sec. 590
in the exception, because ``the phrase `breach of the peace' means only 
actual breaches of the peace, offenses involving violence or public 
disturbance.'' This restricted meaning, it is said, is necessary in 
order to give effect to the whole of the excepting clause, since, if 
the words ``breach of the peace'' be broadly interpreted so as to cause 
them to embrace all crimes, then the words treason and felony will 
become superfluous. On the other hand, the Government insists that the 
words ``breach of the peace'' should not be narrowly construed, but 
should be held to embrace substantially all crimes, and therefore, as 
in effect, confining the parliamentary privilege exclusively to arrest 
in civil cases. And this is based not merely upon the ordinary 
acceptation of the meaning of the words, but upon the contention that 
the words ``treason, felony, and breach of the peace,'' as applied to 
parliamentary privilege, were commonly used in England prior to the 
Revolution and were there well understood as excluding from the 
parliamentary privilege all arrests and prosecutions for criminal 
offenses; in other words, as confining the privilege alone to arrests 
in civil cases, the deduction being that when the framers of the 
Constitution adopted the phrase in question they necessarily must be 
held to have intended that it should receive its well understood and 
accepted meaning. If the premise upon which this argument proceeds be 
well-founded, we think there can be no doubt of the correctness of the 
conclusion based upon it. Before, therefore, coming to elucidate the 
text by the ordinary principles of interpretation we proceed to trace 
the origin of the phrase ``treason, felony, and breach of the peace,'' 
as applied to parliamentary privilege, and to fix the meaning of those 
words as understood in this country and in England prior to and at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution.

  After citing English precedents construing the terms ``treason,'' 
``felony,'' and ``breach of the peace,'' as applied to parliamentary 
privilege, the opinion concludes:

  Since from the foregoing it follows that the terms ``treason,'' 
``felony,'' and ``breach of the peace,'' as used in the constitutional 
provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all 
criminal offenses, the conclusion results that the claim of privilege 
of exemption from arrest and sentence was without merit.

  590. The reading on the floor of a newspaper interview and a letter 
written by another Member, the authenticity of which was not denied, 
was held not to present a question of privilege.
  On February 3, 1910,\1\ Mr. Charles A. Crow, of Missouri, claimed the 
floor for a question of privilege touching a letter written by Mr. Crow 
to a constituent, and a newspaper article relating thereto. The letter 
promised appointment as census enumerator on condition that a political 
census not connected with the official census be taken simultaneously.
  The interview and the letter, the authenticity of which Mr. Crow 
conceded, had been read during debate on the previous day by Mr. Joseph 
T. Robinson, of Arkansas.
  Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, made the point of order that a 
question of privilege was not involved.
  The Speaker \2\ Sustained the point of order.
  591. The making of mere misstatements does not give rise to a 
question of privilege.
  Statements which, if published in a newspaper, would give rise to a 
question of privilege do not present a question of privilege when read 
from a private letter.
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  \1\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 1443.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 592
  On July 31, 1911,\1\ Mr. Carl C. Anderson, of Ohio, submitted, as 
involving a question of personal privilege, the statement that he had 
introduced a motion to discharge the Committee on Invalid Pensions from 
the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 767) in a ``sneaky, 
foxlike'' manner.
  Mr. Anderson then read from a personal letter addressed to him by 
Gen. S. S. Burdett, chairman of the pensions committee of the Grand 
Army of the Republic.
  A point of order by Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, that a 
question of privilege was not presented was sustained by the Speaker.
  Thereupon Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, submitted:

  Mr. Speaker, one word upon the point of order. Of course, the 
statement of the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Anderson, without reading the 
article to the effect that it had been said that he had in a sneaking, 
underhanded way placed the motion upon the calendar, seems to me would 
present a question of privilege.

  The Speaker \2\ said:

  There is no question in the world but that the statement of the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon] is absolutely true. The Chair 
stated to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Anderson] that if he had any 
newspaper article of that kind he might read it, but he did not read 
it, but read a private letter.

  Whereupon Mr. Isaac R. Sherwood, of Ohio, claimed the floor for a 
question of privilege, saying:

  Mr. Chairman, I rise to a question of personal privilege for the 
purpose of correcting some statements. I want to correct some 
misstatements made by the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Anderson, in regard 
to the attitude of Gen. S. S. Burdett, chairman of the pensions 
committee of the Grand Army of the Republic.

  Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, raised the point of order that 
mere misstatements made by another Member on the floor did not give 
rise to a question of privilege.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order.
  592. Charges that a Member has employed unworthy men without 
intimation that he did so knowingly do not give rise to a question of 
privilege.
  On March 1, 1921,\3\ Mr. Royal C. Johnson, of South Dakota, 
submitted, as presenting a question of privilege, a photostatic copy of 
a letter from the Secretary of War, and said:

  Mr. Speaker, of course the Secretary of Wax had no personal 
information of the matter, and it came undoubtedly through the Military 
Intelligence of the War Department. They bring my name into it as 
having hired investigators whom they claim to be blackmailers. They 
based that claim upon this photostatic copy of an alleged letter, which 
they do not now have. They bring it before this House with the idea of 
casting aspersions upon me as chairman of the committee.

  Mr. Warren Gard, of Ohio, made the point of order that the matter 
presented did not involve a question of privilege.
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  \1\ First session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 3396.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Sixty sixth Congress, Record, p. 4194.
                                                             Sec. 593
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair does not think that the gentleman has made out a case of 
personal privilege. The most the gentleman can claim, it seems to the 
Chair, is that there is a charge that he has employed men who are 
unworthy, but there is no intimation that the gentleman did so 
knowingly. The Chair does not think the gentleman makes out a case of 
personal privilege.

  593. Expression of opinion reflecting on a Member or his State, 
however offensive, if not directed against the Member in his 
representative capacity, do not involve a question of privilege.
  On May 28, 1912,\2\ Mr. J. Thomas Heffin, of Alabama, claimed the 
floor for a question of privilege, and said:

  Mr. Speaker, on yesterday the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Focht, 
in referring to me said:
  ``Now, my friend from Alabama, Mr. Heffin, has undertaken, I think, 
to do something that does not become him, and, in view of the record of 
his own State, which is indefensible.''
  In another place he says:
  ``Mr. Chairman, in substantiation of what I have read, in response to 
what the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Hellin, has said in his assaults 
on the North and labor conditions there, and to the shame of the State 
of Alabama, I want to show you the evidence of the inhumanity, 
brutality, and cruelty of his State.''
  This is a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker, and reflects upon me 
and my service here, and charges something that is not true, namely, 
that I had assaulted the North, and I desire to address the House upon 
the question of personal privilege.

  Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, submitted that a question of 
privilege was not involved.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair is inclined to think that that point is well taken. Of 
course, men might stand up here and abuse Alabama or Missouri or any 
other State until they were black in the face without laying the 
foundation for a question of personal privilege. The rule is that the 
question of privilege rests upon something that affects a man 
injuriously or sandalously in his representative capacity. The Chair 
can understand very well how the gentleman from Alabama would feel 
outraged in his feelings if somebody assaults the State of Alabama, but 
that does not make a question of personal privilege. That was just 
simply in that gentleman's opinion.

  594. Statements on the floor reflecting on the conduct of a Member in 
official capacity, whether made directly or in quotation, involve a 
question of privilege.
  On January 25, 1910,\4\ Mr. William S. Bennet, of New York, as a 
question of personal privilege, read from the Record the following 
statement made by Mr. Robert B. Macon, of Arkansas, on the previous 
day:

  The Members who went abroad were accompanied by their families and 
two of the secretaries of the commission. In fact all of the members of 
the commission, except Burnett and Howell of New Jersey, took a private 
secretary along to do such work as was absolutely necessary to be done 
while they, the commission, had fun. I understand that Mr. Bennet of 
New York and his secretary had been abroad several times at the expense 
of the commission.
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  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 7323.
  \3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \4\ Secend session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 963.
Sec. 595
  Mr. Macon called attention to the fact that he had not made the 
assertion on his own responsibility but had said that he was so 
informed.
  The Speaker \1\ recognized Mr. Bennet to present the question of 
privilege.
  595. A question of privilege supersedes consideration of the original 
question and must first be disposed of.
  An expression of opinion characterizing actions of a Member without 
reflecting upon him in his representative capacity do not give rise to 
a question of privilege.
  On September 5, 1919,\2\ Mr. Lemuel P. Padgett, of Tennessee, asked 
unanimous consent to insert certain matter in the Record, when Mr. 
Champ Clark, of Missouri, said:

  The other day the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Boies, got three long 
telegrams inserted in the Record, nothing but circular letters--no one 
knew what was in them, and they thought it might be something 
important; but it turned out that they were of no importance whatever. 
So a Member may hesitate about preventing a Member from putting matter 
into the Record.

  Whereupon Mr. William D. Boies, of Iowa, demanded the floor on a 
question of privilege predicated on the statement by Mr. Clark.
  Mr. Padgett made the point of order that his request was pending and 
should first be disposed of.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  A question of personal privilege is always in order. The gentleman 
will state his question of privilege.

  The Speaker then ruled that a question of privilege had not been 
presented.
  596. A question of privilege may not be predicated on words which 
have been stricken from the Record.
  Inferences charging treason present a question of privilege.
  On October 3, 1917 \4\ Mr. William E. Mason, of Illinois, claiming 
the floor for a question of privilege, said:

  A Member of this House, during my absence, charged me with being 
guilty of treason. He stated that I was absent, and he said, ``Let them 
come and defend themselves,'' referring to my colleague, Mr. Britten, 
and myself. Having named us, he said, ``I think they are out stirring 
up opposition to the war, to the selective draft, and to getting 
Germans to hold meetings, and asking that they be exempt from 
service.''
  He charges in the statement published in the Record substantially the 
same thing. It is a charge against my personal loyalty to my 
Government.

  Mr. Garrett, of Tennessee, called attention to the fact that the 
language complained of had been stricken from the Record by vote of the 
House.
  Mr. Mason then submitted further:

  What I will read is in the Record.
  ``It is true that the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Mason, in his 
position here does not speak the views of the people of that State.''
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  \1\ Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 4917.
  \3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 427; Record, p. 
7711.
                                                             Sec. 597
  ``Emma Goldman has been arrested and Berkman has been arrested. If I 
was President, I would point out some others who belong in the claw 
with them.''
  I charge that there again in the printed record he charges me and 
classes me with Emma Goldman and people who are anarchists.

  The Speaker \1\ said:

  It seems to the Chair that if the words are struck out by action of 
the House, they can not be complained of. On a question of privilege 
the Chair thinks that the gentleman from Illinois has a fair question 
of privilege on the part that was printed in the Record, because by 
fair inference from those remarks the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. 
Heflin] has yoked up the gentleman with Emma Goldman, Berkman, and 
other anarchists, and by inference charges the gentleman with treason.

  597. A statement in the Record charging a Member with class 
discrimination was held to present a question of privilege.
  Remarks stricken from the Record by order of the House may not be 
read in debate.
  On November 1, 1919,\2\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, claiming the 
floor for a question of personal privilege, proposed to read from the 
Record, when Frank C. Reavis, of Nebraska, made the point of order that 
the matter about to be read had been stricken from the Record by order 
of the House.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  That is not in order.

  Mr. Blanton replied that the matter to which he referred had not been 
stricken from the Record, and read the following:

  I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, to extend in the Congressional 
Record at this point a telegram dated October 30, 1919, to the 
Secretary of Labor, Mr. Wilson, from John L. Lewis, president of the 
United Mine Workers of America.
  Mr. Blanton. I object, Mr. Speaker.
  Mr. King. I expected the gentleman would object. The gentleman has 
said that he would hang them as high as Haman. I would recommend to the 
gentleman to read the history of Robespierre, of France, and his 
ending. The gentleman would hang all the laboring people.

  The Speaker said:

  The Chair is ready to rule. The Chair thinks that the statement to 
the effect that the gentleman would hang all the laboring people does 
raise a question of personal privilege, and the Chair recognizes the 
gentleman.

  598. Inference that a Member is actuated by ulterior motives in 
official conduct presents a question of privilege.
  On June 21, 1916,\4\ Mr. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, as a 
question of privilege, called attention to a statement included in 
remarks inserted in the Record on May 29 by Mr. Oscar Callaway, of 
Texas, under leave to print. In referring to Mr. Gardner the statement 
said: ``The fear that disturbs the peace of mind of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts is not that our homes will be invaded, our cities 
bombarded, or our coasts laid waste, but that stocks will shrink.''
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  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ First session, Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 7845.
  \3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 9702.
Sec. 599
  Mr. James B. Aswell, of Louisiana, raised the point of order that a 
question of privilege was not involved.
  The Speaker \1\ overruled the point of order and recognized Mr. 
Gardner.
  599. On August 2, 1916,\2\ Mr. Charles J. Linthicum, of Maryland, 
rising to a question of privilege, read from a speech by Mr. Michael E. 
Burke, of Wisconsin, as printed in the Record of July 19, under leave 
to extend remarks, the following:

  Yet it was but a short time before the real purposes of the same and 
the hypocrisy which prompted the introduction of this resolution were 
indirectly exposed in this House by a speech made by the gentleman from 
Maryland, Mr. Linthicum, delivered on the 1st day of April, 1916.
  In various parts of the speech of the gentleman from Maryland can be 
found positive evidence that such resolution was introduced and is 
being urged for passage not by those who are unselfishly interested in 
the promotion and maintenance of the public health by preventing the 
sale and distribution of insanitary dairy products. Certain remarks of 
the gentleman and quotations from certain alleged dairy and farm papers 
show conclusively to the friends of dairymen that the main purpose 
behind such resolution is to attack, to degrade, and to prejudice 
butter in the minds of the consuming public.

  Mr. Linthicum asked unanimous consent to address the House on the 
subject.
  The Speaker \1\ held that Mr. Linthicum had the right to speak on the 
question as a matter of personal privilege, and unanimous consent was 
unnecessary.
  600. Intimation of lack of veracity on the part of a Member was held 
to give rise to a question. of privilege.
  In presenting a question of privilege the Member is required to 
submit the exact language on which he bases the question and not a 
statement as to its nature or import.
  In the presentation of a question of privilege a Member is restricted 
to a defense of himself and may not attack another.
  In debate a Member should not address another in the second person or 
refer to him by name or call upon him to answer.
  On February 4, 1918,\3\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, rose to a 
question of personal privilege and said:

  Mr. Speaker, on the 31st day of January the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Wilson, just before the dose of the session on that day, obtained 
unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record. Following that 
permission he had published in the Record a five-page article, every 
portion of which was in violation of the custom of this House under the 
rule as to extending remarks. He attacked my integrity, my veracity, 
and standing as a gentleman and a Member of this House.

  The Speaker \1\ said:

  In what language did he attack it?

  Mr. Blanton continued, when the Speaker again interrupted and 
inquired:

  Is that what he said, or is that the inference?

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  \1\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 11987.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1657.
                                                             Sec. 601
  Mr. Wilson made the point of order that no question of personal 
privilege had been stated.
  The Speaker said:

  Will the gentleman from Texas please quote the language and not state 
what he thinks is the language? The Chair does not want to hear any 
remarks about what the article says, but he wants the gentleman to read 
the particular language that he says constitutes a question of personal 
privilege.

  Mr. Blanton then read from the Record, and the Speaker said:

  The Chair thinks that the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Blanton, has a 
question of privilege; not very well defined, but in three or four 
places, as far as read, the intimation of the lack of veracity is very 
plain, and the gentleman will proceed.

  During Mr. Blanton's discussion of the question of privilege Mr. 
Wilson again raised a point of order, and inquired if a Member in 
debating a question of personal privilege was at liberty to attack 
another Member.
  The Speaker held that a Member speaking to a question of personal 
privilege should confine his remarks to matters personal to himself, 
and admonished Mr. Blanton to keep within the limits prescribed by the 
rule.
  During the debate Mr. Blanton, in addressing remarks to Mr. Wilson, 
used the pronoun ``you'' instead of referring to him as ``the gentleman 
from Texas.''
  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, made the point of order that 
Members should not address each other in the second person.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order, and said:

  The gentleman must not address his colleague by name or in the second 
person; it is against the rule.

  In the further course of debate Mr. Blanton said:

  Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Chandler, is present, 
and I would like to call on him to state, at this time to the House----

  The Speaker said:

  It is a very bad practice for one Member to call on another sitting 
in his seat. The Chair saw that done in the Senate once, but does not 
think it ought to be followed in the House.

  601. A resolution that a Member has violated a promise relating to 
the transaction of official business presents a question of privilege.
  On June 7, 1912,\1\ Mr. Ralph W. Moss, of Indiana, rose to a question 
of privilege and read the following resolution (11. Res. 570) 
introduced by Mr. Theron Akin, of New York:

  Whereas the present chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in the 
Department of Agriculture of this House promised, in April, 1911, that 
there would be a rigid investigation of the Weather Bureau ``at an 
early date,'' which promise has not been kept, etc.

  The Speaker \2\ recognized Mr. Moss on a question of personal 
privilege.
  602. Statements in the Record that a Member charged with absenteeism 
was thereby ``defrauding the Government'' were held to present a 
question of privilege.
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  \1\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 7301.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 603
  To sustain a question of privilege it is not necessary that the 
Member referred to be designated by name. It is sufficient if the 
description is such as to be generally recognized.
  On October 13, 1913,\1\ Mr. Richmond Pearson Hobson, of Alabama, 
claimed the floor for a question of privilege predicated on the 
following remarks by Mr. Jeremiah Donovan, of Connecticut, appearing in 
the Record of October 10, and widely copied in the public press.

  When that great naval constructor, so to speak, who thinks he is fit 
to be President of these United States, has taken himself away from his 
duties in this House when we have sent out an order by the way of the 
Sergeant at Arms--
  When a Congressman runs away from his work and is consistently and 
frequently absent from the scene of his duties, he defrauds the people 
of that which he agreed to give them.

  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that a 
question of privilege had not been stated.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The Chair thinks that the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Hobson, has 
stated a question of personal privilege. The charge is made almost in 
the language of the rule itself. The charge goes to the conduct of the 
gentleman from Alabama in his representative capacity, and that is the 
language of the rule. Now, if the Washington Post or any newspaper in 
the country wanted to attack any Member of this House for things done 
in his personal capacity rather than his representative capacity, that 
would not furnish any question of privilege; but the offense charged 
against the gentleman from Alabama, both by the gentleman from 
Connecticut, Mr. Donovan, and by these newspapers, is that he is 
derelict in his duty as a member of the House and is defrauding the 
Government out of his salary; and if that does not raise a question of 
privilege, the Chair can not understand what would raise one.

  Mr. Mann raised the further point of order that the gentleman from 
Alabama was not named, and the charges might apply to a number of 
Members of the House.
  The Speaker said:

  He is in this different situation from the other Members. While the 
gentleman from Connecticut did not say ``Richmond P. Hobson,'' or ``the 
gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Hobson,'' he described him. If a Member 
were to get up in this House and not say anything except to call for 
the naval constructor who is a Member of this House, everybody would 
know that it was Captain Hobson whom he was talking about.

  603. Charges that a Member serves interests conflicting with his 
official duties involve a question of privilege.
  On August 3, 1914,\3\ Mr. George J. Kindel, of Colorado, rose to a 
question of privilege and read remarks by Mr. Edward Keating, of 
Colorado, appearing in the Record and reprinted in various newspapers 
declaring that Mr. Kindel, was ``an employed agent of the express 
companies.''
  The Speaker \2\ held that a question of privilege was presented.
  604. To come within the rule, a question of privilege must relate to 
the conduct of Members in their representative capacity.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 5637.
  \2\ Champ Clark of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 13166.
                                                             Sec. 605
  The validity of a question of privilege is determined by the Speaker, 
and newspaper articles upon which the alleged question is based are not 
necessarily laid before the House.
  On February 8, 1923,\1\ Mr. Manuel Herrick, of Oklahoma, claimed the 
floor for a question of personal privilege and said:

  Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of personal privilege. I base it on 
the slanderous and libelous article from the Washington Herald of 
February 6, which I send to the Clerk's desk and ask to be read.

  The Speaker \2\ examined the article without laying it before the 
House and said:

  The Chair very clearly thinks that this simply criticizes the 
gentleman personally. The Chair does not see anything in it attacking 
the House or attacking the gentleman in his representative capacity. 
The Chair thinks the gentleman does not bring himself within the rule, 
and the Chair does not see that any question of personal privilege is 
raised.

  Mr. Frank Clark, of Florida, requested that the newspaper article 
which Mr. Herrick submitted be read to the House.
  The Speaker declined to lay the article before the House.
  605. Charges made through the newspapers by a Member reflecting on 
the efficiency of another Member in his representative capacity do not 
support a question of privilege.
  On February 29, 1912,\3\ Mr. J. Hampton Moore, of Pennsylvania, 
claimed the floor and sent to the desk, as involving a question of 
privilege, the following communication addressed by Mr. Michael 
Donohoe, of Pennsylvania, to a newspaper:

To the Editor of the Public Ledger.
  Sir: Representative Moore did not appear before the Rivers and 
Harbors Committee yesterday nor at any time to urge increase for 
Delaware River, and had absolutely nothing to do with increasing the 
amount.
                                                  Michael Donohoe.
    Washington, D. C., February 27.

  Mr. Charles L. Bartlett, of Georgia, raised the point that a question 
of privilege had not been submitted.
  The Speaker \4\ sustained the point of order.
  606. Charge that a Member has used his immunity as Representative to 
circulate libels was held to constitute a question of privilege.
  In discussing a question of privilege a Member is confined to charges 
reflecting on him in his capacity as a Representative and may not 
digress to charges reflecting on him in a business capacity.
  A Member may read in full a newspaper article which has been held to 
sustain a question of privilege.
  Time consumed in discussion of incidental points of order is not 
taken from time allotted for debate under the rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 3265.
  \2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 2610.
  \4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 607
  On March 3, 1919,\1\ Mr. Louis T. McFadden, of Pennsylvania, claimed 
the floor and read, as involving a question of privilege, the following 
excerpt from a statement issued to the press by the Comptroller of the 
Currency:

  These facts stated briefly as possible explain definitely why 
Representative McFadden would like to see the comptroller's office 
abolished. The whole record shows that you acted in exact accord with 
your career as a banker when as a representative of the people you used 
your privilege to avail yourself of your immunity to circulate the 
libels for which you produced no author and which you do not dare 
present when challenged, defied, and invited where they could be placed 
and exposed as absolutely unfounded and basely and viciously false.

  The Speaker \2\ said: The Chair thinks the gentleman has submitted a 
question of privilege.
  Mr. McFadden, being recognized, proceeded to read the entire 
statement from which the excerpt was taken, when Mr. Otis Wingo, of 
Arkansas, made the point of order that portions of the statement being 
read did not relate to the question of privilege.
  The Speaker held that Member rising to a question of privilege is 
entitled to read the entire article on which the question is based.
  During debate on the several points of order Mr. Martin B. Madden, of 
Illinois, inquired if the time consumed in discussion of points of 
order was taken from the time allowed for the discussion of the 
question of privilege. The Speaker replied that it was not.
  In the course of his remarks Mr. McFadden quoted and proposed to 
discuss the following paragraph from the article:

  The comptroller calls attention to the fact that the capital of the 
bank in Pennsylvania, of which Representative McFadden has been 
continuously cashier and president, shows no change in the last 10 
years, but has remained at $100,000, while its surplus and undivided 
profits have shrunk approximately 25 per cent, while the surplus and 
profits of all other national bank in the country have increased 62 per 
cent.

  Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, made the point of order that this 
paragraph related to conduct of the Member in a business capacity 
rather than in his capacity as Representative and discussion of it was 
therefore out of order.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order.
  607. Statements charging falsehood in debate involve a question of 
privilege.
  Quotations by newspapers of statements made on the floor may not be 
made the basis of a question of privilege.
  Aspersions upon a Member unnamed may be made the basis of a question 
of privilege if it is obvious to whom application was intended.
  On August 8, 1919,\3\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, claimed the 
floor for a question of privilege, quoting a remark made on a previous 
day by Mr. William J. Burke, of Pennsylvania, as follows:

  Mr. Burke. I hope I shall be given time asked for to reply to the 
false statements just made here.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4917.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3722.
                                                             Sec. 608
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The rulings and decisions on the subject are quite clear. The Chair 
is disposed to think that the newspaper statement would hardly raise 
the question of privilege, because it has been held that where a 
newspaper simply quotes what a Member has said on the floor it does not 
of itself constitute a question of privilege. There is a precedent 
exactly in point, however, decided by Mr. Speaker Carlisle, where one 
gentleman in the House accused another of having made a false 
statement. The Speaker then held that that did raise a question of 
personal privilege. The Chair is disposed to think that the question of 
personal privilege is raised here.

  Mr. Loren E. Wheeler, of Illinois, submitted that no name was 
mentioned in the passage quoted.
  The Speaker said:

  The Chair is disposed to think the Record shows very clearly to whom 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania referred. The gentleman from Texas is 
entitled to the floor.

  608. Newspaper statements that a Member voted for or against certain 
measures, although false, do not give rise to a question of privilege.
  Charges implying disloyalty were hold to involve a question of 
privilege.
  In speaking to a question of privilege, a Member is restricted to 
discussion of those specific charges on which his question is based and 
may not discuss collateral issues.
  On February 19, 1920,\2\ Mr. James A. Frear, of Wisconsin, claimed 
the floor for a question of privilege and branded as false, statements 
in a newspaper Clipping which he read as follows:

  The chairman of the subcommittee was Representative James A. Frear, 
of Wisconsin, and the Democratic national committee charges he favored 
the McLemore resolution forbidding Americans to take passage on ocean 
liners, as well as a resolution favoring an embargo an the sale of 
munitions to the Allies.
  It is further charged by the Democratic national committee that Mr. 
Frear voted against war with Germany, against conscription, against the 
espionage act, and against the first war-revenue bill, ``among 
others.''

  Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas, made the point of order that a question 
of privilege was not involved.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair understands that this article claims that the gentleman 
voted for the McLemore resolution and voted against the war with 
Germany, against conscription, against the espionage act, and against 
the first war-revenue bill. The Chair understands that the gentleman 
himself does not claim that the charge that he voted for or against 
bills, which charges were false, gives him the right to raise a 
question of privilege. The only remaining question, as the Chair 
understands it, is that this makes charges which are not true. The only 
insinuation the Chair can see is--and perhaps it would be a fair 
inference from the article--that it amounts to a charge that the 
gentleman was pro-German in his sympathies. At the same time, of 
course, a great many Members of the House did vote for all these bills, 
and the Chair thinks the Members who did vote that way would certainly 
resent the inference that they were pro-German. The Chair is disposed 
to rule that this does not raise a question of privilege.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3136.
Sec. 609
  Mr. Frear thereupon further submitted:

  Mr. Speaker, I rise to another question of personal privilege. In an 
article quoted from John D. Ryan, of New York, appears the following:
  ``The chairman of the subcommittee having, as shown by the record in 
Congress, assumed a position hostile to the assertion of American 
rights during the pre-war period, and having voted against the 
declaration of war with Germany, can not now, I am sure, influence 
public opinion by submitting a report based on an investigation so 
thoroughly discredited as the one which he conducted.''

  Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, made a point of order against the 
privilege of the question submitted:
  The Speaker held:

  The gentleman is charged with having been hostile to the assertion of 
American rights and with having voted against the war. The Chair thinks 
the gentleman can deny that. It does not seem to the Chair that he can 
take up every bill that came before the House and go into the merits of 
a bill, as to whether each bill was patriotic or not. The gentleman 
from Wisconsin will proceed.

  609. Newspaper articles misstating or misconstruing the purport or 
effect of legislative measures supported by a Member do not give rise 
to a question of privilege.
  On January 14, 1908,\1\ Mr. Madison R. Smith, of Missouri, rose to a 
question of privilege and read the following paragraph from a local 
newspaper characterizing. it as a misstatement of the effect and 
purport of bill referred to.

  A delegate from the bookbinders said a bill had been introduced in 
Congress by Congressman Smith, of Missouri, which made it a penal 
offense for members of a labor union to. strike, and provided a 
penalty--a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment for ten years.

  Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, made the point of order that a 
question of privilege was not presented.
  The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order.
  610. Matters transpiring in committee were held to relate to a Member 
in his representative capacity.
  On April 8, 1908,\3\ Mr. Joseph H. Gaines, of West Virginia, rose to 
a question of privilege and said:

  Mr. Speaker, the newspapers of this morning very generally report 
that upon yesterday in the Committee on Election of President, Vice-
President, and Representatives in Congress there occurred a personal 
difficulty between members of the committee. I will read but one 
sentence from a newspaper of this morning, as follows:
  ``Statesmen forgot their dignity and made violent efforts to do 
bodily injury to other statesmen.''

  Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, made the point of order that the 
article did not reflect on the gentleman in his representative 
capacity.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  It seems to the Chair that it does, or that it may, if it be a 
difficulty, as alleged, over the public business by a committee of the 
House. The gentleman from West Virginia is recognized.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 685.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4504.
                                                             Sec. 611
  611. Wide latitude is allowed the press in the criticism of Members 
of Congress, and such criticism, unless reflecting on a Member in his 
representative capacity, does not present a question of privilege.
  On May 17, 1909,\1\ Mr. David A. Hollingsworth, of Ohio, claimed the 
floor for a question of privilege and sent to the desk a newspaper 
editorial including the following:

  The Ohio Congressman who got up in the House the other day and raised 
all manner of sand about the picture of Jefferson Davis being put on 
the silver service presented by the State to the battleship Mississippi 
ought to be informed that nobody cares what he says about it. A 
politically prejudiced gas bag from Ohio can no more cast a reflection 
upon the life and character of Jefferson Davis than a mangy, flea-
bitten, bobtailed cur dog can insult the moon by getting up at 2 
o'clock in the morning and barking himself to death at that pale-faced 
luminary.

  Mr. Charles L. Bartlett, of Georgia, made the point of order that the 
matter submitted did not present a question of privilege.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The Chair has listened with as careful attention as practicable, and 
while there were many things in the editorials that the Chair can 
conceive were unpleasant to the gentleman from Ohio, and possibly 
unpleasant to gentlemen on both sides of the House, yet great latitude 
is sometimes taken and at all times allowed to the press. Severe 
denunciation constantly abounds, sometimes against all the Members of 
the House, sometimes against the minority of the House, and sometimes 
against the majority of the House, and sometimes against various 
individual Members of the House. If in any communication in the public 
prints or otherwise an attack is made on a Member in his representative 
capacity, that would present a question of personal privilege. But 
after listening to these editorials that have been read, the Chair, 
following the precedents, and there is a long line of them, is inclined 
to the opinion that they do not reflect upon the gentleman from Ohio in 
his representative capacity. Therefore the Chair sustains the point of 
order.

  612. Misrepresentations in newspaper reports of remarks in the House 
do not maintain a question of privilege.
  Charges against a Member not connected with his representative 
capacity do not involve a question of privilege.
  On January 23, 1913,\3\ Mr. Frank Clark, of Florida, sent to the 
desk, as involving a question of privilege, a newspaper article which 
he charged misrepresented remarks made by him on the floor of the House 
and which referred to him as a ``member of the Ananias Club.''
  Mr. John J. Fitzgerald made the point of order that 
misrepresentations of remarks delivered on the floor do not give rise 
to a question of privilege, and the reference to the gentleman as a 
member of the Ananias Club was not in connection with his 
representative capacity.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  This Speaker has been very liberal about questions of privilege. The 
Chair does not think, upon a consultation of the decisions, that the 
truth or untruth of these newspaper charges constitutes a question of 
personal privilege if they are not made about the gentleman from 
Florida
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 2117.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 1926.
  \4\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 613
in his representative capacity; and that is the rule--that the charge 
must be made against him in his representative capacity.
  613. Newspaper charges impugning the veracity of a Member in 
statements made on the floor support a question of privilege.
  A question of privilege takes precedence of business in order on 
Calendar Wednesday.
  On Wednesday, February 5, 1913,\1\ Mr. Thetus W. Sims, of Tennessee, 
claimed the floor for a question of privilege and read an interview 
printed in various newspapers charging that statements made by him on 
the floor were ``absolute and unqualified falsehoods.''
  Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, made the point of order that the 
day was Calendar Wednesday, set apart under the rule for a special 
order of business which could not be interrupted by the presentation of 
a question of privilege.
  The Speaker \2\ held that a question of privilege took precedence of 
business in order under the rule.
  Mr. Phillip P. Campbell, of Kansas, submitted that a question of 
privilege was not presented.
  The Speaker overruled the point of order.
  614. A newspaper statement that a Member obstructed legislation, 
without implying moral turpitude, does not sustain a question of 
privilege.
  On February 16, 1921,\3\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, claimed the 
floor for a question of privilege based on a newspaper statement that 
he had ``blocked'' a resolution to investigate the escape from a 
military prison of Grover Cleveland Bergdoll.
  Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, made the point of order that a 
question of privilege was not submitted.
  The Speaker \4\ sustained the point of order.
  615. Newspaper charges that a Member had used departmental employees 
while in the service of the Government in a political campaign were 
held to reflect on him in his representative capacity.
  On February 16, 1912,\5\ Mr. John H. Small, of North Carolina, rose 
to a question of privilege and read a newspaper article charging that 
he had taken employees of the Department of Agriculture with him on a 
political campaign through his congressional district.
  Mr. Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, made the point of order that 
a question of privilege was not presented.
  The Speaker \2\ said.

  The gravamen of the charge is that the gentleman from North Carolina 
imported these agricultural agents into his district for the purpose of 
helping to reelect him to Congress; and in a political campaign. The 
Chair thinks it is a question of privilege, as it reflects on the 
gentleman from North Carolina in his representative capacity.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 2609.
  \2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3263.
  \4\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Record, p. 2122.
                                                             Sec. 616
  616. Newspaper assertions that statements made on the floor are false 
do not give rise to a question of privilege unless imputing 
dishonorable motives.
  Although a newspaper article reflecting on a Member may not mention 
him by name, yet if from the implication the identity of the Member 
referred to is unmistakable it is sufficient to warrant recognition on 
a question of privilege.
  On April 22, 1916 \1\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, submitted, as 
involving a question of privilege, the following headline from a 
Washington newspaper:

  Colladay denies jail or indictment charge. Republican committeeman 
says Blanton statement in House false.

  Mr. Bertrand H. Snell, of New York, having interposed a point of 
order, the Speaker \2\ ruled:

  The Chair does not think that is sufficient. The Chair thinks the 
statement would have to go further than the mere statement that the 
charge made was false. The Chair thinks it would have to go to the 
extent of imputing some dishonorable motive or purpose on the part of 
the gentleman. The Chair does not see that in either the headlines or 
the body of the letter.
  The only question for the Chair to decide is whether this statement 
in the newspaper affected the gentleman in his capacity as a Member of 
the House or imputed motives to him which were improper. The Chair does 
not see that at all. It is a mere denial of the facts stated by the 
gentleman from Texas with no imputation of any improper motive. The 
Chair can not fail to sustain the point of order.

  Whereupon, Mr. Blanton submitted a further excerpt from a Washington 
newspaper as supporting a question of privilege.
  Mr. Snell objected on the ground that Mr. Blanton's name was not 
mentioned in the article.
  The Speaker said:

  The Chair will read what he thinks is the ground, if there is a 
ground, on which the gentleman bases his question of personal 
privilege. This is a part of a resolution adopted by the Northwestern 
Suburban Citizens' Association.
  The resolution declares:
  ``It has happened, not often, but too frequently for a broad-minded, 
dignified body of men who should be, or and to be, an example for the 
intelligent people in all the world to follow, that men of honor and 
great repute who have climbed the ladder of success by faithful and 
dignified service, who have been respected by all right-thinking people 
who have known them, and are acceptably occupying an exalted position 
by the wish of the people whom they represent, have been shamelessly 
and in a cowardly, unpatriotic way maligned by those who so far forgot 
themselves as to insult the dignity of the House of Representatives, as 
well as to insult the entire citizenry of the United States, by 
squandering the time and patience of all fair-minded Americans, whose 
high ambition is for fair play and justice, and who are waiting for 
legislation that should be enacted, rather than listen to the rantings 
of a barn-storming political demagogue.
  ``We deplore and denounce as un-American, unpatriotic, and opposed to 
all the laws of justice and equity this plan to defame, from the Halls 
of Congress, to the whole world the character and integrity of our 
highly esteemed and worthy honorable commissioner, Col. Frederick A. 
Fenning, whom certain ones am trying to immolate without a fair and 
just opportunity to be allowed a hearing, a persecution that is 
despleasing to all fair-minded Americans.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 7983.
  \2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
Sec. 617
  The Chair thinks that, while the gentleman from Texas is not 
mentioned specifically, it is the plain intention to charge that any 
Member of the House of Representatives who made these charges, whether 
they are true in fact or not, was un-patriotic and insulted the dignity 
of the House. The Chair thinks that founds a question of privilege.

  617. It is not essential that a newspaper editorial mention a 
Member's name in order to present a question of privilege and it is 
sufficient if the reference is accurate enough to identify him.
  Statements impugning motives prompting Members in the discharge of 
their official duties sustain a question of personal privilege.
  Instance wherein the Speaker submitted to the House the question as 
to whether a statement objected to in debate was in order.
  The motion to strike from the Record is not debatable.
  A ruling that the House by voting on a motion to strike a statement 
from the Record decided simultaneously whether the language objected to 
was in order and only the one vote was required.
  A Member recognized to debate a question of personal privilege may 
not yield to another to propound irrelevant questions or inject 
extraneous subjects.
  On June 3, 1926,\1\ Mr. John B. Sosnowski, of Michigan rose to a 
question of privilege and asked that the Clerk read an editorial from a 
Chicago newspaper which included the following:

  ``It is like the Chicago gunman who is let out on parole and who 
hurries to gather as much ill-gotten gain as he can before the mills of 
justice grind out retribution upon him, ``says the embattled foreigner 
who represents Detroit. That is not the voice of a man arguing the 
merits of a proposed appropriation. The words are inspired by envy and 
malice. They can not be answered with reason because there is no reason 
in them.

  Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, objected that the article did not 
refer to any Member by name.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The article states ``the embattled foreigner who represents 
Detroit.'' The Chair is quite clear in his mind that an imputation that 
the action of a Member of the House is dictated by envy and malice 
clearly raises a question of personal privilege. The Chair thinks the 
gentleman from Michigan has founded a question of personal privilege.

  Mr. Sosnowski was proceeding in debate when interrupted by a demand 
from Mr. Madden that his words be taken down.
  Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, submitted that it was the duty of 
the Speaker to decide whether the words objected to were in order.
  The Speaker said:

  The gentleman from Illinois demands that the words be taken down.
  It is for the House to decide, and the motion is not debatable.

  Subsequently Mr. Sosnowski said:

  If being opposed to the Chicago steal is a reflection, then again my 
companions are millions.

and Mr. Madden moved that the words be stricken out.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress Record, p. 10623.
  \2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
                                                             Sec. 617
  Mr. Carl E. Mapes, of Michigan, raised the issue that the words were 
not subject to a point of order, and could not be stricken from the 
Record.
  The Speaker said:

  The gentleman from Michigan makes the point of order that the 
language complained of is not out of order. The Chair is aware of the 
fact that the precedents differ somewhat as to whether it is within the 
province of the Chair to make that decision or not. The present 
occupant of the chair thinks that in these cases it is better for the 
House to decide, and the vote of the House to strike out certain 
language should be based on the proposition that the words are not in 
order. The Chair in effect leaves to the House to determine whether the 
words were in order or not.
  The question is whether in a parliamentary sense the words are in 
order or not.

  Later in his discussion Mr. Sosnowski used this language:

  The Chicago diversion, in my humble opinion, is a ``steal,'' a moral 
as well as economic wrong against the rights of millions of people.

  Mr. Rankin having moved that the language be stricken from the 
Record, the Speaker repeated:

  As the Chair announced a few moments ago, he does not believe it is 
properly within the province of the Chair to determine whether the 
language complained of is or is not in order. The gentleman from 
Mississippi moved that the words be stricken out, and the House, in 
acting upon that, will determine the question of order.
  The rule does not provide that the Speaker shall determine that 
question, and in this case the Chair has declared that he would prefer 
not to determine it. The Chair thinks that the motion to strike out the 
words will be determined by the House on a motion, either that they are 
out of order or are in order.

  Mr. Cassius C. Dowell, of Iowa, took the position that if the 
question was to be submitted to the House it would require two votes, 
one to determine whether the language was in order and the other on the 
question of striking it from the Record.
  The Speaker dissented and said:

  No; the Chair thinks that the question is determined by one vote, and 
that is it not necessary to have two votes.
  The sole question raised by the gentleman from Iowa is whether in the 
event the Speaker has not ruled on the question it is necessary for the 
House to vote twice on the same proposition. The Chair does not think 
that is necessary. The rule has nothing to say about anything after the 
House shall have determined, but only when the Speaker shall have 
determined.
  The motion made by the gentleman from Mississippi is not debatable. 
The Chair holds, as he held before, that he does not feel it within the 
proper province of the Chair to rule on these questions; that it is for 
the House to determine whether or not the language complained of is in 
order; and that the vote taken by the House is the vote determining 
whether or not it is in order. Gentlemen voting for the motion of the 
gentleman from Mississippi will vote that the words are not in order 
and should be stricken out, and gentlemen voting the other way will 
express their opinion that the words are in order and should not be 
stricken out.

  In closing his remarks Mr. Sosnowski yielded to Mr. W.W. Chalmers, of 
Ohio, who propounded an irrelevant question and proceeded to read a 
newspaper editorial pertaining to the merits of the bill to which 
reference had been made rather than to the question of privilege.
  Mr. Otis Wingo, of Arkansas, raised a question of order and the 
Speaker ruled:

  The Chair thinks that the rule is as stated by the gentleman from 
Arkansas. The gentleman from Michigan must confine himself strictly to 
the question of personal privilege, and if he yields
Sec. 618
to another gentleman that gentleman is also bound within the same 
limits. If the matter be brought to his attention again, the Chair will 
hold that anything read by the gentleman from Ohio that is not strictly 
pertinent to the point at issue is out of order.

  618. A pamphlet charging falsehood in connection with statements made 
in debate was held to support a question of personal privilege.--On 
March 28, 1928,\1\ Mr. Vincent L. Palmisano, of Maryland, rose to a 
question of personal privilege and submitted as the basis for his 
remarks the following excerpt from a pamphlet issued in reply to a 
speech which he had delivered on the floor on February 21:

  I do not know Judge Coleman; I have never met him; I hate to use a 
sharp word, but if Mr. Palmisano said that, he was guilty of a common, 
ordinary. cheap he. Of course, Mr. Palmisano was given the nomination 
with the idea that John Philip Hill was to beat him. The more he talks 
the better off our cause will be.

  The Speaker \2\ held that the statement gave rise to a question of 
personal privilege.
  619. Newspaper charges attributing to a Member dishonorable action in 
connection with matters not related to his official duties were held to 
sustain a question of personal privilege.
  In speaking to a question of personal privilege a Member is required 
to confine his remarks to the question involved, but is entitled to 
enter into a discussion of related matters showing motives which 
prompted the charges giving rise to the question of privilege.
  On April 9, 1928,\3\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, rose to a 
question of privilege and stated that Washington newspapers had 
erroneously reported him as being arrested for violations of the 
traffic law and had falsely charged in headlines that ``Blanton made 
cop sign false paper.''
  The Speaker,\2\ expressed himself as doubting whether the erroneous 
reports of arrest were sufficient to support a question of privilege, 
but that the charges of coercing police officials in securing 
signatures to false statements were sufficient to warrant recognition.
  In debating the question Mr. Blanton referred to a recent police 
trial in which he had participated and Mr. John C. Schafer, of 
Wisconsin, having raised a point of order that the matter was 
irrelevant, the Speaker ruled:

  The Chair thinks the gentleman has strayed from the subject of 
privilege. The Chair thinks the gentleman has the right to show the 
motives that might have actuated persons in making this accusation, but 
he does not think the gentleman should discuss a police trial.

  Later in his remarks, Mr. Blanton discussed charges which he 
previously had made against officials of the police department.
  Mr. Carl R. Chindblom, of Illinois, having made a point of order that 
he should confine himself to the question of privilege, the Speaker 
ruled:

  The Chair would think that if the gentleman from Texas is undertaking 
to supply some connecting link between the chief of police or others in 
giving out or circulating the report that the gentleman from Texas 
compelled a policeman to sign a false statement, the gentleman is 
entitled to do that.
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  \1\ First session Seventieth Congress, Record, p. 5530.
  \2\ Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Seventieth Congress, Journal, p. 1015; Record, p. 
6105.
                                                             Sec. 620
  620. An error in the printing of the Record, attributing to a Member 
remarks which he did not make, was held to sustain a question of 
personal privilege.--On April 3, 1933,\1\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of 
Texas, rising to a question of personal privilege, called attention to 
the Record of the previous day in which remarks by Mr. Patrick J. 
Boland, of Pennsylvania, had been attributed erroneously to him.
  Mr. Blanton said:

  My unalterable position against intoxicating liquor, against repeal, 
against beer, and against removing present restrictions from medicinal 
whisky are so well known this error on the part of the Government 
Printing Office has placed me in an inconsistent attitude from one side 
of the United States to the other. I do not want to be placed in that 
attitude, and therefore I ask recognition under the question of 
personal privilege.

  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The gentleman is recognized.

  621. A newspaper reference to ``Rascally Leadership'' as attributed 
to a Member was held to justify recognition on a question of personal 
privilege.
  A Member addressing the House on a question of personal privilege is 
required to confine himself to the question of privilege.
  A general indictment of the House does not give rise to a question of 
personal privilege.
  On May 6, 1932,\3\ Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, based a 
request for recognition to discuss a question of personal privilege on 
the following statement from a newspaper editorial:

  An act of sheer treason to the Republic was committed by yesterday's 
vote in the House.
  Under the rascally leadership of Rankin, of Mississippi, the Members 
suspended the rules, choked off debate, and, by the overwhelming vote 
of 316 to 16, plumped for a bill pensioning widows and orphans of World 
War veterans.

  The Speaker \4\ held that the statement supported a question of 
privilege and recognized Mr. Rankin for one hour.
  In the course of Mr. Rankin's discussion, Mr. Albert Johnson, of 
Washington, interrupted and made the point of order that the gentleman 
was discussing matters extraneous to the question of privilege
  The Speaker said:

  The gentleman from Mississippi must confine himself to the question 
of personal privilege.

  After further debate, the Speaker amplified his ruling:

  Let the Chair make a statement. The gentleman from Mississippi is 
speaking to a question of personal privilege, where the Members of the 
House are charged with treason and the gentleman from Mississippi is 
charged with being a rascal and leading them. The question before the 
House is whether it is a treasonable House and whether or not the 
gentleman from Mississippi is a rascal.
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  \1\ First session Seventy-third Congress, Record, p. 1132.
  \2\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 9715.
  \4\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 622
  Mr. Robert Luce, of Massachusetts, inquired if language denouncing 
the Congress generally warranted a question of personal privilege.
  The Speaker replied:

  No. The Chair did not say that. A general indictment against the 
membership of the House is not a question of personal privilege.

  622. A newspaper characterization of a Member as alien in mind and 
lacking in loyalty to our form of government was held to give rise to a 
question of personal privilege.--On March 23, 1932,\1\ Mr. Fiorello H. 
LaGuardia, of New York, submitted as basis for a question of personal 
privilege, on which he asked recognition, the following excerpt from a 
daily newspaper:

  LaGuardia, who is alien in mind and spirit from Americanism, who has 
no loyalty to our form of government, and shows every indication that 
he is wining to destroy it.

  The Speaker said: \2\

  The Chair thinks the gentleman has clearly stated a question of 
personal privilege. The Chair has looked up the precedents and there 
are a number of instances not as strong as the one here presented which 
were held by Mr. Speaker Clark and Mr. Speaker Longworth to be 
questions of personal privilege.
  The gentleman from New York is recognized for one hour.
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  \1\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 6731.
  \2\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.