[Deschler's Precedents]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID:52093c03_txt-2]
[Page 143-148]
CHAPTER 3
Party Organization
A. INTRODUCTION
Sec. 1. In General
This chapter describes the nature and functions of the party
structure in the House, including the party leadership and the major
party organizations.<SUP>(1)</SUP> It should be borne in mind that some
of the organizations described do not remain constant in their
influence or importance as instruments for the formation or promotion
of party policy. Thus, the Democratic Caucus is more active at present
than at times in the recent past;<SUP>(2)</SUP> the Republican
Conference has in some measure assumed functions formerly undertaken by
the Policy Committee;<SUP>(3)</SUP> and the Democratic Steering
Committee has been relatively inactive in recent years.<SUP>(4)</SUP>
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1. See also the discussion of party organizations in 8 Cannon's
Precedents Sec. Sec. 3602-3629.
This chapter discusses significant developments through the
93d Congress, first session. For discussion of later changes in
the structure and procedures of the party organizations, see
supplements to this edition as they appear.
2. See Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the Congress of the United
States, Congressional Quarterly Service (Washington, D.C.,
1971), p. 604.
3. Id. at p. 142.
4. Id.
For discussion of recent developments, including the new
role assumed by the Democratic Steering and Policy Committee,
see supplements to this edition as they appear.
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Much of the legislative business that is done is, of course, a
result of interaction between the political parties. Many of the rules
and procedures of the House can be understood only in the context of
the system of government through parties. Jefferson regarded the rules
of proceeding as, in some degree, a check on the power of the majority;
he stated that,<SUP>(5)</SUP>
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5. Jefferson's Manual, sec. 1 (House Rules and Manual Sec. 283
[1973]).
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. . . [A]s it is always in the power of the majority, by their
numbers, to stop any improper measures proposed on the part of
their opponents, the only weapons by which the minority can defend
themselves against similar attempts from those in power are the
forms and rules of proceeding which . . . [have] become the law of
the House, by a strict adherence to which the weaker party can only
be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms
were intended to check. . . .
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At the same time, it has often been observed that the rules of
proceeding are an instrument through which a majority may work its will
in the face of the determined opposition of a minority.
Although not always the case, frequently the attitude of members of
the same party toward particular legislation is fairly
uniform,<SUP>(6)</SUP> so that sentiment in the House with respect to
such legislation divides according to party alignment.<SUP>(7)</SUP>
Despite the traditional role of partisan rivalry in shaping
legislation, however, the spirit of comity that exists between the
parties has often been noted.<SUP>(8)</SUP>
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6. See Sec. 10, infra, as to means by which a party may seek to
promote uniformity among its members.
7. The terms ``majority'' and ``minority,'' of course, need not
necessarily refer to parties, but may refer to the division of
sentiment on an issue where such sentiment does not depend on
party alignment. For an instance in which the term ``minority''
in a special order was construed to refer to the minority party
in the House and not to those in the minority on the pending
question, see 7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 767. It is also stated
(in 7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 766) that a division of time for
debate between those ``for and against'' a proposition does not
necessarily provide for such division between the majority and
minority parties of the House but between those actually
favoring and opposing the measure.
8. See, for example, 117 Cong. Rec. 1709, 92d Cong. 1st Sess., Feb. 4,
1971 (remarks of Mr. James G. Fulton [Pa.]).
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Steps are taken to ensure that in every phase of legislative
proceedings each party's interests are represented. Thus, each standing
committee is composed of members selected by the respective
parties.<SUP>(9)</SUP> Where memberships are added to a committee, they
are apportioned between majority and minority.<SUP>(10)</SUP> Similar
principles of apportionment are applied with respect to
subcommittees.<SUP>(11)</SUP> With respect to the appointment of
committee staff personnel, the rules typically contain a provision such
as the following:
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9. See Sec. 9, infra.
10. See Sec. 17.8 infra.
11. See, for example, 4 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 4551.
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The minority party on any such standing committee is entitled
to and shall receive fair consideration in the appointment of
committee staff personnel pursuant to each such primary or
additional expense resolution.<SUP>(12)</SUP>
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12. Rule XI clause 32(c), House Rules and Manual (1971). This language,
offered as part of H. Res. 5, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971),
engendered considerable controversy, being a modification of a
proposed more specific rule.
A statute [2 USCA Sec. 72a(b)] provides that, subject to
appropriations which it shall be in order to include in
appropriation bills, the Committee on Appropriations of each
House is authorized to appoint such staff, in addition to the
clerk thereof and assistants for the minority, as each such
committee, by a majority vote, shall determine to be necessary,
such personnel, other than the minority assistants, to possess
such qualifications as the committees respectively may
prescribe.
As to committees and committee staff generally, see Ch. 17,
infra.
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[[Page 145]]
Similarly, provision is generally made for majority and minority
representation on joint committees.<SUP>(13)</SUP>
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13. See House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 983a et seq. (1973).
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Care is also taken that the parties are fairly represented on other
committees or commissions created for special purposes. For example,
commissions that have been appointed for purposes of making
recommendations regarding improvement, reconstruction, or the like, of
the physical facilities of the Capitol, have been comprised of Members
apportioned from the majority and minority parties, including
designated party leaders.<SUP>(14)</SUP>
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14. See 40 USCA Sec. 166 (notes); see also Sec. 17 infra, discussing
measures taken to ensure equitable representation on the
Commission on the Extension of the Capitol.
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Although the majority party's candidates for various House offices
are routinely elected thereto, the minority's candidates for the
offices are generally named to positions as ``minority employees'' in
the House.<SUP>(15)</SUP> Moreover, provision is made for the
appointment and compensation of a minority pair clerk and a ``staff
director to the minority.''<SUP>(16)</SUP>
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15. See 117 Cong. Rec. 13 (resolution naming minority candidates), 15
(resolution as to compensation of certain minority employees),
92d Cong. 1st Sess., Jan. 21, 1971. As a further example, see
99 Cong. Rec. 15, 24, 25, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., Jan. 3, 1953.
Resolutions relating to minority employees of the House are
discussed further in Sec. 17.10, infra.
16. See, for example, 117 Cong. Rec. 15 (H. Res. 6), 92d Cong. 1st
Sess., Jan. 21, 1971. See also H. Res. 441, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. (1969).
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On occasion, a Member has changed party affiliation, sometimes
after acts on his part that his party has deemed disloyal and for which
the party has imposed discipline on the Member. Thus, Mr. Albert W.
Watson, of South Carolina, who had been elected to the 89th Congress as
a Democrat, was the subject of punitive action taken by the caucus on
account of his having supported a Republican Presidential candidate.
Mr. Watson subsequently announced his intention to change his political
affiliation from Democratic to Republican and to resign so that his
constituents could, by their votes in a special election, indicate
[[Page 146]]
their approval or disapproval of his activities. Mr. Watson's letters
tendering his resignation to the Governor of his state and informing
the Speaker of such resignation appear in the Congressional
Record.<SUP>(17)</SUP>
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17. 111 Cong. Rec. 1452, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., Jan. 28, 1955.
As to constitutionality, construction, and application of
statutes regarding party affiliation or change thereof as
affecting eligibility to nomination for public office, see
annotation, 153 ALR 641.
In the 85th Congress, Mr. Vincent J. Dellay, of New Jersey, changed
his party affiliation from Republican to Democratic. A letter written
by him to the Republican floor leader appears in the Congressional
Record;<SUP>(18)</SUP> the letter indicated that Mr. Dellay had
informed certain Democratic leaders on both the national and state
levels of his intention to change party affiliation. Also appearing in
the Record<SUP>(19)</SUP> is Mr. Dellay's letter of resignation from a
House committee as a Republican Member. Mr. Dellay was subsequently
elected as a Democratic Member to certain House
committees.<SUP>(20)</SUP>
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18. 104 Cong. Rec. 674, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 20, 1958.
19. Id.
20. See H. Res. 452, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958).
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Speaker's Relation to Party Structure
Since the Speaker is the subject of another chapter (Ch. 6, infra)
no attempt will be made here to discuss his office in depth. It is
worth quoting here, however, certain remarks of Minority Leader Gerald
R. Ford, of Michigan, on the subject of the Speakership; the remarks,
made during discussion of a resolution commending John W. McCormack, of
Massachusetts, on his length of service as Speaker, were as
follows:<SUP>(1)</SUP>
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1. 116 Cong. Rec. 17021, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. May 26, 1970.
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The office of the Speaker is a unique one in the American
Government. He is at once the leader of his party and the impartial
Presiding Officer of the House. As his powers are great, so must
his sense of fairness be extraordinary. As his position is exalted
among his legislative equals, so must his tact and consideration .
. . be constantly exercised.
The Speaker is, of course, his party's leader. Nominated by the
party caucus, he has received, in the election that takes place in the
House at the beginning of a Congress, the universal support of the
members of his party despite the range of ideological variations that
may exist in the party. Historically, moreover, the Speaker will
frequently rise to that posi
[[Page 147]]
tion after having served as his party's floor leader and perhaps, prior
to that service, as the party whip. The minority party's candidate for
Speaker generally becomes that party's floor leader, and may reasonably
expect to be elevated to the Speakership upon a shift of power in the
House.<SUP>(2)</SUP>
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2. See, generally, the discussion of leadership posts in the House in
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the Congress of the United
States, Congressional Quarterly Service (Washington, D.C.,
1971), pp. 140, 141. In 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 35 is cited
an unusual instance in which Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, of
Illinois, following a vote upon an essential question
indicating a change in the party control of the House,
announced that under such circumstances it was incumbent upon
the Speaker either to resign or to recognize for a motion
declaring vacant the office of Speaker.
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The Speaker has on occasion taken the floor to promote certain
measures that have been endorsed by his party. Thus, on Jan. 4,
1965,<SUP>(3)</SUP> Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, took
the floor to urge adoption of rules for the 89th Congress that included
certain provisions that had the endorsement of the Democratic Caucus.
He stated that since the resolution under consideration contemplated
certain changes in the rules, he felt that his views should be made
known to the Members of the House.
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3. 111 Cong. Rec. 23, 89th Cong. 1st Sess.
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On one occasion, the caucus chairman inserted in the Record a
resolution, previously approved by the caucus, praising the Speaker of
the House for his efforts on behalf of Democratic candidates in a
recent election campaign.<SUP>(4)</SUP>
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4. See Sec. 3.18, infra.
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In fulfilling the duties of the Chair, the Speaker is impartial,
and assiduous in protecting the rights of the minority. Of course, this
does not mean that the exigencies of business in the House cannot
interfere with his ability to accommodate the minority party in
particular instances. Thus, on a day on which the House was considering
the 1951 amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
the Speaker declined to entertain a request of the Minority Leader,
made shortly after convening on that day, that the House take a two-
hour recess for a Republican Conference.<SUP>(5)</SUP> But a Speaker
must always concur with the sentiments expressed by Speaker John W.
McCormack, of Massachusetts, in the 91st Congress:<SUP>(6)</SUP>
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5. See Sec. 5.5, infra.
6. 116 Cong. Rec. 17041, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., May 26, 1970.
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There is one thing that I would like to be remembered for by my
colleagues and that is that John McCormack was always the Members'
Speaker. . . . It is because of the intense love I have in my heart
for the House of Representatives and the deep respect I have for
all Members. And also for the fact that whenever a Member takes the
Chair as Speaker he represents all of the Members without regard to
political party; to protect their rights under the Rules of the
House of Representatives; and, even more, protecting their rights
on a broader scale where that is necessary. I have always tried to
impartially carry out the Rules of the House of Representatives.