<DOC>
[Hinds Precedents -- Volume V]
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[DOCID: f:hinds_cxi.wais]

 
                              Chapter CXI.

                     THE QUESTION OF CONSIDERATION.

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   1. Rule and evolution of the question of consideration. Section 
     4936.
   2. Not to be demanded after debate begins. Sections 4937-4939.
   3. Refusal to consider not a rejection. Section 4940.
   4. May be demanded against question of privilege. Sections 
     4941, 4942.
   5. In relation to other motions and debate. Sections 4943-
     4945.\1\
   6. In relation to adjournment. Sections 4946-4949.
   7. In relation to questions of order. Sections 4950-4952.\2\
   8. In relation to special orders. Sections 4953-4960.
   9. As to reports from the Committee on Rules. Sections 4961-
     4963.
   10. Propositions of reference merely. Section 4964.
   11. After previous question is demanded. Sections 4965-4968.
   12. Not in order against vetoed bills. Sections 4969, 4970.
   13. Not in order against motions relating to the order of 
     business. Sections 4971-4977.

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  4936. The question of consideration has been established by long 
practice as a means by which the House may protect itself against 
business which it does not wish to consider.
  The rule provides that the question of consideration shall not be put 
unless demanded by a Member.
  Present form and history of section 3 of Rule XVI.
  Section 3 of Rule XVI provides:

  When any motion or proposition is made, the question, ``Will the 
House now consider it?'' shall not be put unless demanded by a Member.

  It appears that in the very early years of the House a practice grew 
up, without any rule, of putting the question of consideration in 
regard to any matter of business without a motion by a Member and 
apparently at the suggestion of the Speaker. On March 31, 1808,\3\ 
during proceedings in secret session of the House on each of two 
resolutions offered by Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, the question of 
consideration was put and the House declined to consider them. The 
Journal does not indicate that the question of consideration was 
demanded by any Member. On the next day, April 1, Mr. Randolph spoke of 
what had been done and said it was in accordance with a practice very 
lately introduced into the House. It was
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  \1\ In relation to the motion to reconsider. (Sec. 5626 of this 
volume.)
  \2\ See section 4598 of Vol. IV.
  \3\ First session Tenth Congress, Journal (supplemental), pp. 252 
324, 325; Annals, pp. 1887, 1889.
                                                            Sec. 4936
in his opinion an engine of oppression in the hands of the majority, 
and he proposed, but without result, a rule that the question of 
considering should not intervene to prevent debate. On April 1 \1\ Mr. 
Speaker Varnum held that the question of consideration was not 
debatable, saying that was the ruling also of his predecessor, Mr. 
Speaker Macon. From the debate at this time it seems evident that the 
ruling as to the question of consideration was to prevent delay of 
public business. On December 23, 1811,\2\ Mr. Richard Stanford, of 
North Carolina, proposed a rule, ``but no question of consideration 
shall be required upon an original motion.'' This was negatived, yeas 
30, nays 68. On May 29, 1812,\3\ Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, 
assailed bitterly the practice of having first a vote on considering a 
matter as restrictive of the rights of the Member. It was replied that 
the House could not be subjected to the caprice of the individual, and 
Mr. Speaker Clay said that while at first he had had doubts about the 
propriety of the practice, he had become convinced that it was wise. So 
much controversy arose that the Speaker defended his ruling in a letter 
\4\ to the press, in which he said:

  In England a motion to proceed to the orders of the day puts by 
whatever subject is under consideration and the rule is not used there 
to consider. In the House of Representatives we practice the rule to 
consider, and do not the motion to proceed to the orders of the day. * 
* * This rule to consider was a novel one to me when I came into the 
House of Representatives. I found most of the old Members clinging to 
it with great tenacity, and subsequent observation satisfied me of its 
wisdom and removed whatever doubts I entertained originally of its 
propriety. * * * The right of one or two Members to compel a body to 
consider a proposition which on account of the time, its manner, or its 
matter, they do not think proper to deliberate upon can only be 
maintained by a reversal of the rule that the plurality of the Members 
is to govern, and would, as to that particular subject, make the mover 
and his second superior to the whole body.

  Mr. Randolph, replying to the Speaker, called attention to the fact 
that the question to consider was not mentioned in the rules and orders 
of the House. On January 27, 1814,\5\ Mr. Cyrus King, of Massachusetts, 
made the charge that the question of consideration as applied was 
subversive of the rights of Members, unconstitutional, and not 
warranted by any rule of the House. He therefore offered a resolution 
preventing its use as an original motion or resolution. The House voted 
not to consider it, yeas 21, nays 102. The exact usage as to the motion 
seems to have been a matter of doubt. Mr. Speaker Barbour, at a later 
date,\6\ said that he had admitted this motion as conformable to 
English practice, but ruled that it was not allowable under the rule 
specifying the motions allowable when a question was under debate.
  Finally this rule was adopted on December 12, 1817,\7\ on motion of 
Mr. Burwell Bassett, of Virginia:

  When any motion or proposition is made, the question, ``Will the 
House now consider it?'' shall not be put unless it is demanded by some 
Member, or is deemed necessary by the Speaker.
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  \1\ First session Tenth Congress, Annals, p. 1891.
  \2\ First session Twelfth Congress, Journal, p. 91; Annals, p. 581.
  \3\ First session Twelfth Congress, Annals, pp. 1467, 1468.
  \4\ Annals, pp, 1472 (footnote), 1478.
  \5\ Second session Thirteenth Congress, Journal, pp. 259-261; Annals, 
pp. 1154-1157.
  \6\ On March 11, 1822. First session Seventeenth Congress, Annals, p. 
1250.
  \7\ First session Fifteenth Congress, Journal, pp. 40, 46; Annals, p. 
445.
Sec. 4937
  In connection with the adoption of this rule, the Annals of Congress 
for that date says:

  The question of consideration, which has heretofore been a matter of 
much contention in the House in the days of party conflict, is thus 
expunged from the rules of the House.

  On February 14, 1831,\1\ Mr. Speaker Stevenson, in the course of a 
decision, said that during the whole time while he had presided in the 
chair he had never exercised the privilege of requiring the question of 
consideration.
  The present form of the rule dates from the revision of 1880.\2\
  4937. The question of consideration may not be demanded as to a 
proposition after debate has begun.
  A Member must submit his proposition and it must be stated by the 
Chair before it is in order for debate to proceed.
  On February 28, 1822,\3\ Mr. Ezekiel Whitman, of Maine, rose and 
intimated his intention of submitting certain resolutions, proposing a 
disposition of the documents accompanying the President's message of 
the 28th January, and proceeded to urge the propriety of adopting the 
course suggested, when, being called to order by a Member, the Speaker 
declared Mr. Whitman out of order in his remarks until his proposition 
was stated from the chair, or, being in writing, ``was handed to the 
Chair and read aloud by the Clerk.''
  Mr. Whitman then submitted certain resolutions relating to referring 
parts of the message of the President of January 28, relating to the 
actions of Andrew Jackson in Florida, to the Committees on Foreign 
Relations, Judiciary, and Military Affairs.
  These having been read, Mr. Whitman proceeded in his argument, until 
Mr. John Rhea, of Tennessee, demanded that the question be put: ``Will 
the House, now consider it?''
  This demand the Speaker \4\ declared out of order because it had not 
been deemed necessary by the Speaker nor demanded by any Member until 
the mover had proceeded to discuss his resolutions and was actually 
discussing them.
  Mr. Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, having appealed, the decision of the 
Chair was sustained.
  4938. On March 5, 1828,\5\ Mr. William Haile, of Mississippi, having 
proposed a resolution, was recognized, and had proceeded with his 
remarks for a short time, when Mr. Lewis Condict, of New Jersey, moved 
the question of consideration.
  The Speaker \6\ decided that the motion was not in order, being too 
long delayed.
  4939. On April 27, 1858 \7\ while the House was considering a 
resolution offered by Mr. James Hughes, of Indiana, to censure Mr. 
Francis E. Spinner, of New York, and after debate had begun on the 
resolution, Mr. Joshua R. Giddings, of Ohio, proposed to raise the 
question of consideration.
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  \1\ Second session Twenty-first Congress, Debates, p. 683.
  \2\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \3\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Journal, pp. 296, 297; 
Annals, pp. 1156-1158.
  \4\ Philip P. Barbour, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, p. 1755.
  \6\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \7\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Globe, p. 1830.
                                                            Sec. 4940
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair thinks that the application of the gentleman from Ohio 
comes too late when the House has permitted debate on the pending 
proposition.

  4940. The refusal of the House to consider a bill does not amount to 
its rejection and does not prevent its being brought before the House 
again.--On February 7, 1885,\2\ Mr. William A. Russell, of 
Massachusetts, moved that the House proceed to the consideration of a 
bill relating to certain drawbacks on duties, the bill being on the 
Calendar of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.
  Mr. Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, made the point of order that this 
motion was not in order, for the reason that the bill named had been 
heretofore indicated under the special rule and rejected.
  The Speaker pro tempore \3\ overruled the point of order, on the 
ground that the bill had not been rejected, but that the motion to 
consider the same had not been brought before the House by reason of 
the objection of ten Members thereto.
  More than ten Members objecting thereto, the motion was not 
considered.\4\
  4941. The question of consideration may be demanded against a 
question of the highest privilege, such as the right of a Member to his 
seat.--On June 11, 1858,\5\ Mr. Thomas L. Harris, of Illinois, having 
proposed to call up the report of the Committee of Elections in the 
case of W. Pinkney Whyte, contesting the right of J. Morrison Harris to 
a seat in the House from the State of Maryland, Mr. Israel Washburn, 
jr., of Maine, demanded that the question be put, ``Will the House now 
consider it?''
  Mr. Thomas L. Harris made the point of order that the report being a 
question of privilege it was not competent for a Member to raise the 
question of consideration.
  The Speaker \1\ overruled the point of order, and decided that, under 
the fifth \6\ rule of the House, it was competent for a majority, upon 
the demand of a Member, to determine whether they would now consider 
the report.
  From this decision of the Chair Mr. George S. Houston, of Alabama, 
appealed. The appeal was laid on the table.
  The record of debate \7\ shows that in the course of the debate on 
the point of order Mr. George W. Jones, of Tennessee, quoted the 
paragraph from Jefferson's Manual:

  A matter of privilege arising out of any question, or from a quarrel 
between two Members, or any other cause, supersedes the consideration 
of the original question, and must be fast disposed of.

  From this Mr. Jones argued that other business must be suspended 
until the question of privilege could be disposed of.
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  \1\ James L. Orr, of South Carolina, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Forty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 491; Record, p. 
1388.
  \3\ Joseph C. S. Blackburn, of Kentucky, Speaker pro tempore.
  \4\ This precedent did not arise under the rule relating to 
consideration (see sec. 4936 of this work); but under a special and 
temporary rule, which provided for a morning hour, during which a bill 
on any of the calendars or on the Speaker's table might be called up, 
subject to the objection of ten Members. (See p. 1290 of Record.)
  \5\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Journal, pp. 1083, 1085.
  \6\ See section 4936.
  \7\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Globe, pp. 2959, 2960.
Sec. 4942
  The Speaker said:

  The gentleman will perceive that if the House had taken up the 
subject without objection it would have been perfectly competent for 
the House to have postponed its consideration; and if it be competent 
for the House to relieve itself from the immediate consideration of a 
question of privilege by postponement to a day certain, or till next 
session, or by an indefinite postponement, why may not the House, under 
his rule, have the privilege of saying that they will not consider the 
subject?

  4942. Although the House may vote not to consider a matter of 
privilege, it may be called up again on the same legislative day, and 
the question of consideration may be demanded again.--On June 8, 
1896,\1\ Mr. Charles Daniels, of New York, called up the contested 
election case of Aldrich v. Underwood, from Alabama.
  Mr. Benton McMillin, of Tennessee, raised the question of 
consideration, and on a division there were 55 ayes and 64 noes; so the 
House determined not to consider the case.
  After intervening business Mr. Daniels again called up the case.
  Mr. McMillin made the point of order that, as the House had already 
decided the question of consideration adversely, the case could not be 
called up again on the same legislative day.
  The Speaker pro tempore \2\ said:

  The Chair will have to overrule the point of order of the gentleman 
from Tennessee. It is entirely competent to call up a contested 
election case, which is a matter of the highest privilege, at this time 
and the Clerk will report the resolutions submitted by the Committee on 
Elections.

  Mr. McMillin having again raised the question of consideration, the 
House by a vote of 131 yeas to 68 nays decided to consider the case.
  4943. The question of consideration may be raised after a motion to 
lay on the table has been made.--On March 4, 1828,\3\ Mr. Thomas 
Whipple, jr., of New Hampshire, presented resolutions relating to the 
execution of certain soldiers of General Jackson's command at Mobile in 
1814.
  The resolutions having been read, Mr. Whipple moved that they lie on 
the table.
  Mr. Richard H. Wilde, of Georgia, raised the question of 
consideration.
  Mr. Whipple asked whether, after the motion to lay on the table had 
been entertained, the question of consideration could be raised.
  The Speaker \4\ decided that it was perfectly in order. The 
particular moment at which the question of consideration might be 
demanded, might sometimes be a subject of difficulty, but in the 
present case he felt none, and decided the motion to be in order.\5\
  4944. A Member may demand the question of consideration although the 
Member in charge of the bill may claim the floor for debate, but the
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  \1\ First session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, pp. 6283, 6299.
  \2\ John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, Speaker pro tempore.
  \3\ First session Twentieth Congress, Journal, p. 375; Debates, p. 
726.
  \4\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \5\ The debates show that the yeas and nays were also ordered on the 
motion to lay on the table, and that the Speaker took account of this 
fact in his decision. But the Journal does not show such ordering of 
the yeas and nays.
                                                            Sec. 4945

previous question may not be demanded in a similar way.--On June 10, 
1898,\1\ Mr. James Hay, of Virginia, from the Committee on Military 
Affairs, called up a privileged resolution of inquiry relating to 
positions in the Volunteer Army.
  Mr. Charles H. Grosvenor, of Ohio, asked for the previous question on 
the adoption of the resolution.
  Mr. Hay claimed the floor for debate.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that Mr. Hay was entitled to the floor.
  Mr. Grosvenor then raised the question of consideration.
  Mr. John S. Williams, of Mississippi, made the point of order that 
the gentleman from Virginia had the floor and the gentleman from Ohio 
could not be recognized.
  The Speaker decided:

  Any Member has a right to raise the question of consideration, and in 
order to raise it he has to be given the floor.

  4945. On June 18, 1884,\3\ the contested-election case from the 
Second Mississippi district had been called up by Mr. Samuel H. Miller, 
of Pennsylvania. Mr. Philip B. Thompson, jr., of Kentucky, raised the 
question of consideration. Mr. Miller said that he had not yielded the 
floor for any such purpose.
  The Speaker \4\ ruled:

  The gentleman can not deprive the House of the opportunity to 
determine whether it will consider the matter now or not. It was 
formerly the rule and practice of the House for the Chair to submit the 
question of consideration to the House in all cases, but under the 
existing rules it is provided that the Chair shall not submit that 
question unless some gentleman demands it. Every gentleman has the 
right to demand that the question of consideration shall be put, and 
there must of course be a time, after a proposition is submitted and 
before its consideration has actually commenced, when the demand can be 
in order.

  4946. The intervention of an adjournment does not destroy an existing 
right to raise the question of consideration.--On January 18, 1877,\5\ 
the regular order being demanded, the Speaker announced the regular 
order of business to be the motion of Mr. J. Proctor Knott, of 
Kentucky, to reconsider the vote by which certain resolutions relating 
to the counting of the electoral votes were recommitted to the Select 
Committee on the Privileges, Powers, and Duties of the House of 
Representatives in counting the vote for President and Vice-President 
of the United States.
  Mr. James Wilson, of Iowa, raised the question of consideration.
  The Speaker \6\ stated that the motion to reconsider was called up on 
the preceding day by Mr. Knott, who then yielded for a motion to 
adjourn, and being pending at the time of adjournment became the 
unfinished business of the previous session, and was thereby the 
regular order of business after the reading of the Journal. The 
gentleman from Iowa [Mr. James Wilson] having stated his purpose to 
raise the question of consideration, which he was precluded from doing 
by the motion to adjourn, the Chair would now entertain the question of 
consideration.
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  \1\ Congressional Record, second session Fifty-fifth Congress, June 
10, 1898.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 5299.
  \4\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Forty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 252; Record, p. 
725.
  \6\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
Sec. 4947
  The record of the debate shows that the Speaker said:

  This question, therefore, turns upon the matter of fact whether the 
gentleman from Iowa is in time in raising the question of consideration 
this morning, the resolutions having been called up yesterday. But the 
Chair recognizes also the fact that when the resolutions then came 
before the House a higher question was immediately raised, which was 
not by the rules debatable--that is, a motion to adjourn. If the 
gentleman from Iowa now states that yesterday he wished to raise the 
question of consideration, the Chair will entertain it.

  The gentleman from Iowa having so stated, the question was 
entertained.
  4947. When the question of consideration is undisposed of at an 
adjournment, it does not recur as unfinished business on a succeeding 
day.--On January 5, 1894,\1\ during the call of committees for 
reports,\2\ Mr. Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine, submitted the question 
of order whether the resolution introduced by him, upon which the 
question of consideration was pending when the House adjourned on the 
preceding day, did not recur to-day and take precedence before the call 
of committees.
  The Speaker \3\ ruled that the resolution did not recur until its 
consideration should be demanded, and that the question pending on the 
previous day terminated with the adjournment of the House.
  4948. On January 6, 1894,\4\ after Mr. T. C. Catchings, of 
Mississippi, had been recognized to call up a privileged report from 
the Committee on Rules, Mr. Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine, made the 
point that the resolution called up by him on Wednesday, the 3d 
instant, involved a question of privilege under Rule IX,\5\ and that 
its consideration took precedence over the resolution reported from the 
Committee on Rules. He therefore demanded that said resolution, 
presented by himself, be first considered.
  The Speaker \3\ declined to entertain the demand of Mr. Boutelle for 
the consideration of his said resolution, and held as follows:

  The rules provide that when any matter is called up the question of 
consideration shall not be put to the House unless some Member demands 
it. The resolution of the gentleman from Maine has never been before 
the House in the sense of being before it for consideration, because 
when it was called up by the gentleman from Maine the gentleman from 
Tennessee (Mr. McMillin) raised the question of consideration, 
whereupon it became a question for the House to determine, Will the 
House proceed to consider the resolution?
  Upon the question, ``Will the House proceed to consider the 
resolution?'' no quorum voted, and with the business in that position 
the House adjourned. That question of consideration might be raised 
each day. For instance, the House might refuse one day to consider the 
resolution, and yet the next day the gentleman might call it up again. 
The business of the House might be in such a condition on one day that 
the House would not consider the resolution, and on the next day 
business might be in such a condition that the House would consider the 
resolution.
  Now, then, the question of consideration having been raised, no 
quorum having voted, and adjournment having taken place, the Chair held 
that on the next legislative day the resolution was not before the 
House, but that the gentleman might call it up again; that the 
practical effect of the failure to obtain a quorum was when the 
adjournment took place the same as though the House had refused to 
consider the resolution, because the proceedings of that day were 
ended; and the only
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  \1\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 57; Record, p. 
501.
  \2\ Reports of committees are now filed with the Clerk.
  \3\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 66, 67; Record, 
pp. 508, 509.
  \5\ See section 2521 of Vol. III of this work.
                                                            Sec. 4949
purpose of the question raised by the gentleman from Tennessee was that 
the House should determine whether that day it would consider that 
resolution.
  Therefore the Chair held and holds that the resolution was not before 
the House, but that the resolution was just exactly where it was before 
the gentleman from Maine made his motion; that is to say, it had been 
reported back by the Committee on Foreign Affairs with the 
recommendation that it be laid on the table. It was laid on the table, 
not being thus finally disposed of by a vote of the House, but laid on 
the table temporarily until called up and acted upon by the House.
  Now, on yesterday the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Catchings) 
called up the report from the Committee on Rules which is pending. The 
question of consideration was raised against that report. The Chair 
held that the question of consideration could not be raised against the 
report of the committee, for it was a question which was res adjudicata 
in the House; that the Chair had previously so held, and on an appeal 
from that decision by the vote of a large majority of the House the 
appeal was laid on the table, which had the effect of sustaining the 
judgment of the Chair.
  So the distinction between the case the gentleman from Maine presents 
and the present question--that is, the report of the Committee on Rules 
presented by the gentleman from Mississippi to the House on yesterday--
is very clear; for in one case--the resolution presented by the 
gentleman from Maine--the House had not determined to consider the 
resolution which he called up, whereas on the other hand the House had 
entered upon the consideration of the report of the Committee on Rules. 
The gentleman from Mississippi had demanded the previous question on 
the report. The yeas and nays had been ordered on the demand for the 
previous question, so that the pending question before the House, the 
regular order of business, would be the consideration of the report 
from the Committee on Rules when called up by the gentleman having it 
in charge.

  4949. A vote by yeas and nays having been without result because of 
the failure of a quorum, it was held that the question of consideration 
might not intervene on a succeeding day before the second call of the 
yeas and nays.--On August 11, 1890,\1\ Mr. Louis E. Atkinson, of 
Pennsylvania, called up the bill of the House (H. R. 8243) 
supplementary to an act entitled ``An act to authorize the construction 
of the Baltimore and Potomac Railroad in the District of Columbia,'' 
coming over as unfinished business from July 14, on which day, the yeas 
and nays having been ordered and taken, no quorum had appeared.
  Mr. Seth L. Milliken, of Maine, raised the question of consideration.
  Mr. Atkinson, of Pennsylvania, made the point of order that the 
question could not be raised at this stage of the proceedings.
  The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order on the ground that the 
yeas and nays having been ordered and taken on the motion on the 14th 
of July, when a quorum failed to vote and the House adjourned, the roll 
call to be now taken was merely a continuation of the call then ordered 
and had and was in the nature of a continuous proceeding, which could 
not be interrupted for any purpose except by unanimous consent.
  4950. A point of order which, if sustained, might prevent the 
consideration of a bill, should be made and decided before the question 
of consideration is put.
  A point of order relating merely to the manner of considering a bill 
should be passed on after the House has decided the question of 
consideration.
  On June 30, 1898,\3\ Mr. Ebenezer J. Hill, of Connecticut, called up 
from the House Calendar, under the call of committees, the bill (H. R. 
10807) ``to carry into
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 941; Record, p. 
8432.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 6553.
Sec. 4951
effect the recommendations of the International American Conference by 
the incorporation of the International American Bank.''
  Mr. Joseph W. Bailey, of Texas, inquired of the Chair whether or not 
raising the question of consideration would waive the further point 
that the bill was not of the special class that could be called up in 
the morning hour under the call of committees.
  The Speaker \1\ expressed the opinion that it would waive the point.
  Thereupon Mr. Bailey made the point that the bill was improperly on 
the House Calendar.
  On March 11, 1890,\2\ Mr. Charles S. Baker, of New York, from the 
Committee on the Territories, to which was recommitted the bill of the 
House (H. R. 982) to provide for the admission of the State of Wyoming 
into the Union, reported the same with amendments.
  Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, raised the question of 
consideration against the bill, and also made the point of order that 
under clause 3 of Rule XXIII \3\ the bill must receive its first 
consideration in a Committee of the Whole.
  The Speaker \1\ held that the point of order could not be made or 
passed upon until the question of consideration had been determined by 
the House.
  It having been decided to consider the bill, Mr. Springer renewed his 
point of order, which was sustained.
  4951. On May 16, 1868,\4\ Mr. Speaker Colfax, in response to a 
parliamentary inquiry raised by Mr. James G. Blaine, of Maine, stated 
that the question as to whether a resolution involved a question of 
privilege, when raised, should be decided before the question of 
consideration could be put.
  4952. The House having given unanimous consent for the consideration 
of a bill with a proposed committee amendment this action was held to 
be in effect an affirmative decision of the question of consideration, 
thus precluding a point of order against the amendment.--On April 24, 
1900,\5\ Mr. Henry A. Cooper, of Wisconsin, from the Committee on 
Insular Affairs, reported a joint resolution (S. 116) ``to provide for 
the administration of civil affairs in Porto Rico pending the 
appointment and qualification of civil officers provided for in the act 
approved April 12, 1900, entitled,'' etc., with amendments in relation 
to the granting of franchises, proposed by the Committee on Insular 
Affairs.
  Mr. Cooper asked unanimous consent for the consideration of the 
resolution.
  The resolution and the amendments proposed by the Committee on 
Insular Affairs having been read, the Speaker asked if there was 
objection to present Consideration. There was no objection, and debate 
began as to an arrangement of the time for discussion.
  Thereupon Mr. Ebenezer J. Hill, of Connecticut, said that he desired 
to reserve a point of order against the amendment.
  During the debate on the point of order, Mr. William H. Moody, of 
Massachusetts, made the argument that the gentleman from Connecticut, 
Mr. Hill, had reserved his point of order too late.
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  \1\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 331; Record, p. 
2133.
  \3\ See section 4792 of Vol. IV of this work.
  \4\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 2498.
  \5\ First session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 4615, 4616; 
Journal, pp. 500, 501.
                                                            Sec. 4952
  After debate the Speaker said:\1\

  The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moody], however, submits a 
point of order against the point of order, on the question of the time 
at which the point of order was made. The Chair has directed the Clerk 
to bring the record here. The Chair is very accurate in his 
recollection, and this morning before the matter came up gave some 
thought to the possible questions that might arise, and had reached the 
conclusion that if consent were given for consideration of the joint 
resolution, that it was past raising the point of order. When the Chair 
was listening to a gentleman on the right, who addressed the Chair, he 
was also addressed vigorously and promptly by the gentleman from 
Connecticut, but who did not state that he rose to a point of order, 
and as soon as the gentleman got the attention of the Chair he made the 
point of order. Now, the Chair is not certain whether the matter had 
reached the point of consideration after he had declared that there was 
no objection, and has sent for the Record to ascertain the facts, and 
will not be prepared finally to dispose of the question until the 
Record is before him. The Chair, as suggested by one gentleman, will 
not permit anyone to be deprived of his rights if he understands what 
they are.
  I now have the Record, and it shows this, and the Chair asks the 
attention of the House:
  ``The Speaker. The gentleman from Wisconsin asks unanimous consent 
for the consideration of Senate joint resolution 116. Is there 
objection?
  ``Mr. McRae. I ask that it be read, Mr. Speaker.
  ``The Speaker. Let the resolution be reported.
  ``The joint resolution was read, as follows.''
  Then follows the joint resolution.
  ``Mr. McRae. I make no objection, Mr. Speaker.
  ``The Speaker. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears 
none. Is there any arrangement as to time?
  ``Mr. Cooper, of Wisconsin. I spoke to the gentleman from Virginia 
[Mr. Jones] last evening, and he said that an hour would be sufficient.
  ``Mr. Hill. Mr. Speaker, I wish to reserve the point of order against 
the two amendments.
  ``The Speaker. What was the statement of the gentleman from 
Wisconsin?
  ``Mr. Cooper, of Wisconsin. I spoke to the gentleman from Virginia 
last night, who is the leading member of the committee on the other 
side, concerning the resolution, and he consented that an hour should 
be allowed.
  ``The Speaker. Then it is understood that there is to be an hour's 
debate, thirty minutes to be controlled by the gentleman from Wisconsin 
and thirty minutes by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Jones]. Is there 
objection?
  ``Mr. Hill. Mr. Speaker, it is understood that I reserved the point 
of order against the two amendments?
  ``The Speaker. The gentleman's statement was heard. The Chair will 
state to the gentleman from Connecticut that unanimous consent has been 
given for the consideration of the bill.''
  It would seem, therefore, from the Record that the matter was 
submitted to the House. That is the recollection of the Chair, that 
unanimous consent was given and two or three interlocutory remarks were 
made. Then the gentleman from Connecticut for the first time made his 
point of order. Subsequent discussion went on, when he made it again, 
and the Chair called the gentleman's attention to the fact that 
unanimous consent had been given.
  While the Chair is clearly of the opinion that this point of order, 
if made in time, should have been sustained, the Chair is equally clear 
that his point of order came too late. If the gentleman had addressed 
the Chair in the first instance, when he was giving it attention, and 
said, ``A point of order,'' the Chair would have dropped every colloquy 
with other members and given his attention to the gentleman from 
Connecticut, but that point was not made until the point of 
consideration was passed.
  The House very well knows--it has been held over and over again--that 
after the question of consideration has been raised and the House has 
voted to consider a matter a point of order can not be raised. The 
question of consideration was submitted as soon as the bill and the 
amendments proposed by the committee were read and the unanimous 
consent of the House was granted. This, the Chair
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa., Speaker.
Sec. 4953
considers, was equivalent to a vote that the House would consider the 
bill and amendments proposed by the committee. After that the Chair 
holds that the point of order came too late, and therefore overrules 
it.\1\
  The committee reports a bill with a proposed amendment. This 
amendment is a part of the matter reported--to such an extent a part 
that the proposition of the committee would be defective without it.
  The matter reported by the committee is presented to the House. The 
committee amendment as well as the bill has been reported, and the 
committee amendment as well as the bill is presented to the House.
  The presentation being by unanimous consent, the bill with committee 
amendment is subject to two conditions--a Member must be recognized by 
the Speaker in order to have the bill and committee amendment read for 
information, and then the House must decide unanimously to consider 
them, after having heard them read.
  This reading of the bill, although for information, is in effect the 
second reading. It is the only second reading that ever occurs in such 
a case. If it is not a second reading, no bill passed by unanimous 
consent ever gets a second reading. If it is not a second reading, then 
a second reading may be demanded after consent for consideration is 
given. And if the second reading may be so demanded, the House is face 
to face with the theory that a bill presented by unanimous consent must 
be read in full twice before being debated, if demand is made. When the 
length of some bills is considered, the awkwardness of the theory is 
manifest.
  The bill and committee amendment having been read the second time 
through the agency of the Speaker's recognition, the Speaker says:
  ``Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? There 
being no objection the House has voted to consider the bill. The 
question of consideration has been decided. If it has not been, then a 
Member may raise it and force a vote. No one would say that such a 
thing could be done unless his motive were the consumption of time.
  ``Now when the House votes to consider a matter it votes to consider 
that which has been presented by the reading clerk--in this case the 
bill with the committee amendment.
  ``The time to raise a point of order, either against the bill or the 
committee amendment, is when they are presented through the reading 
clerk. It is in accordance with the regular practice of the House that 
the point of order should follow the reading.
  ``If a point of order is to be made against what is read, it should 
be made before the question of consideration is put, since the decision 
of the point may remove the matter and obviate the necessity of a vote 
on consideration. For the same reason, after the House has decided to 
consider a matter, it should not be deprived of that consideration by 
the removal of the matter through a point of order.''

  4953. Although a bill may come up by reason of being individually 
specified in a special order, yet the question of consideration may be 
raised against it.--On July 22, 1886,\2\ Mr. Hilary A. Herbert, of 
Alabama, as a privileged question, under the special order of the 20th 
instant, called up the bill of the House to increase the naval 
establishment, reported from the Committee on Naval Affairs on the 10th 
of March last.
  Mr. John H. Reagan, of Texas, raised the question of consideration.
  Mr. Herbert made the point of order that the question of 
consideration could not be raised against the bill, the same having 
been made a special order and a day having been assigned and set apart 
for its consideration, basing, his point on the decision of the Speaker 
in the first session of the Forty-seventh Congress,\3\ that the 
question of consideration could not be raised as against a day set 
apart for the busi
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ The status of a bill presented for unanimous consent, and the 
relations of the committee amendments to the bill are involved in this 
decision.
  \2\ First session Forty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 2297; Record, p. 
7335.
  \3\ See section 4959 of this chapter.
                                                            Sec. 4954
ness of a particular committee, and that in the present case there was 
but one bill assigned for consideration.
  The Speaker \1\ held that, while the decision referred to was 
correct, it could not be held that it was competent to raise the 
question of consideration seriatim against any particular bill 
presented by a committee under such an order, and thus refuse to 
consider any bill and all bills called up, and not permit the same 
question to be raised in the case of a single bill assigned for 
consideration on a particular day.
  The question then recurred on the question of consideration raised by 
Mr. Reagan; and the House refused to consider the bill.
  4954. On February 12, 1887,\2\ Mr. Williaim M. Springer, of Illinois, 
called for the special order of the day, which was as follows:

  Resolved, That the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union be discharged from the further consideration of Senate bill 199, 
entitled ``An act for the retirement and recoinage of the trade 
dollar,'' and that Saturday, February 12, immediately after the reading 
of the Journal, be set apart for the consideration of the same in the 
House, no other business to be transacted until the consideration of 
said bill is concluded.

  Mr. John J. O'Neill, of Missouri, raised the question of 
consideration against the bill.
  Mr. Springer made a point of order against the question of 
consideration.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  There have been quite a number of orders made containing 
substantially the same language, and it has been always held to be 
within the power of the House to consider the order or not. The House 
never deprives itself of the right to determine whether it will or will 
not consider a question.

  4955. On March 30, 1888,\3\ a Friday, the House had before it the 
bills (H. R. 3191) granting a pension to Mary S. Logan and (S. 574) to 
increase the pension of Mrs. Apolline A. Blair, which had been made a 
special order for the day at an evening session on a previous Friday, 
the terms of the order being that after a certain time for debate the 
previous question should be considered as ordered.
  Mr. Samuel W. T. Lanham, of Texas, having made a parliamentary 
inquiry, the Speaker \1\ said:

  This is a special order which has to be disposed of before the House 
goes into Committee of the Whole; but the gentleman can raise the 
question of consideration. It is always in the power of the House to 
decide, if it so chooses, that it will not proceed to take up the 
consideration of any particular matter. The gentleman from Texas can 
raise that question.

  4956. On January 21, 1889,\4\ the House adopted a special order 
providing that January 24 be set apart for the consideration of the 
bill (H. R. 10614) ``to organize the Territory of Oklahoma, and for 
other purposes,'' and that at 4 o'clock on that day the previous 
question should be considered as ordered upon the bill and amendments 
to the final passage, etc. It was also provided that if the bill should 
not be taken up on January 24 the order should continue until one day 
should have been occupied, as specified in the order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Forty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 1684; Journal, p. 
581.
  \3\ First session Fiftieth Congress, Record, p. 2514.
  \4\ Second session Fiftieth Congress, Record, pp. 1062, 1400.
Sec. 4957
  On February 1 the bill came over from the preceding day as unfinished 
business, with the previous question ordered according to the terms of 
the order.
  Mr. Samuel W. T. Lanham, of Texas, having proposed to raise the 
question of consideration against the bill, Mr. William M. Springer, of 
Illinois, made the point that such question could not be raised.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair will state that the situation of the Oklahoma bill is this: 
The bill, if it comes up this morning, comes up not because of the 
special order assigning a day for its consideration, but simply because 
the previous question has been ordered upon its passage.
  On the day set apart for the consideration of the bill under the 
special order made by the House, after the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union had reported the bill back to the House, the 
question of consideration could not have been made. But on another, 
subsequent day, the Chair will repeat, if the bill comes up at all it 
comes up not by reason of the fact of the special order, but solely by 
reason of the fact that the previous question was ordered upon it, and 
the question of consideration can be raised against it.\2\

  The House voted to consider the bill, 135 ayes to 3 noes.
  4957. On Friday, April 21, 1882,\3\ the Speaker had ruled that 
private business must yield to the consideration of the bill (H. R. 
684), which had been made a special order ``from day to day until 
disposed of.''
  Thereupon Mr. George C. Hazleton, of Wisconsin, raised the question 
of consideration against the bill.
  The Speaker \4\ entertained the question, saying:

  The House has always the right to refuse to consider any business 
that may otherwise be in order.

  4958. The question of consideration may not be demanded against a 
class of business in order under a special order or a rule, but may be 
demanded against each bill individually as it is brought up.
  It is not in order to move to postpone a special order providing for 
the consideration of a class of bills.
  On June 26, 1882,\5\ the regular order was the consideration of 
business presented by the Committee for the District of Columbia, under 
a special order which provided that on the second and fourth Mondays of 
each calendar month during the Forty-seventh Congress the time, after 
the call of States and Territories for bills and joint resolutions, 
should be devoted to business presented by this committee.\6\
  Mr. William D. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, proposed to raise the 
question of consideration against the special order.
  The Speaker \4\ held that this day being set apart for the 
consideration of such business as might be presented by the Committee 
for the District of Columbia, the question of consideration could not 
be raised against such special order, but could only be raised as 
against a particular bill or measure. The Speaker further held
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ See also section 4965 of this chapter.
  \3\ First session Forty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 3146.
  \4\ J. Warren Keifer, of Ohio, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Forty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 5349; Journal, 
p. 1540.
  \6\ This committee now has these days regularly under section 3 of 
Rule XXVI. (See sec. 3304 of Vol. IV of this work.
                                                            Sec. 4959
that a motion to postpone the special order was not in order, and that 
the Committee for the District of Columbia could not be dispossessed of 
their rights under the terms of the special order so long as the 
committee had any business to present and claimed their rights under 
the order.
  In this decision of the Chair the House acquiesced.
  4959. On January 14, 1889,\1\ Mr. John J. Hemphill, of South 
Carolina, from the Committee for the District of Columbia, presented a 
bill (H. R. 11785) relative to the laying of certain railroad tracks in 
the District.
  Mr. Newton C. Blanchard, of Louisiana, raised the question of 
consideration against the bill.
  Mr. Hemphill having called attention to Rule XXVI \2\ giving the 
second and fourth Mondays of each month to the Committee for the 
District of Columbia, made the point that it was not in order to demand 
the question of consideration.
  The Speaker \3\ held:

  It is not competent for the House, except by an order made by 
unanimous consent, or upon a suspension of the rules, or upon a report 
from the Committee on Rules, to vacate the order setting apart this day 
for the consideration of business reported from the Committee on the 
District of Columbia. But it is in order for any gentleman on the floor 
of the House to raise the question of consideration on any bill called 
up by the committee, just as may be done on Friday when, though private 
business may not be dispensed with, the question of consideration can 
be raised with reference to any private bill. The House might desire to 
go on with the consideration of business reported from the Committee on 
the District of Columbia, but may not want to consider this particular 
bill; and the Chair has always held that the question of consideration 
can be raised against each bill.
  The Chair overrules the point of order.

  4960. Where a special order provides that immediately upon its 
adoption a certain bill shall be considered, the question of 
consideration may not be raised against that bill.--On July 16, 
1894,\4\ Mr. T. C. Catchings, of Mississippi, submitted from the 
Committee on Rules and the House agreed to this resolution:

  Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution the 
House shall proceed to consider House bill 4609, ``a bill to establish 
a uniform system of bankruptcy,'' in the House as in Committee of the 
Whole on the state of the Union. That after an hour of general debate 
there shall be two hours' debate under the five-minute rule. The 
previous question shall be considered ordered on the amendments, if 
any, and, without intervening motion, the vote shall then be taken on 
the bill and amendments to its final passage.
  That the remainder of this day and Tuesday, the 17th instant, after 
the morning hour, be assigned to the consideration of business reported 
from the Committee on the Judiciary.

  The bill mentioned in the resolution (H. R. 4609), to establish a 
uniform system of bankruptcy, was accordingly read.
  Mr. Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, demanded that the question of 
consideration be put.
  The Speaker pro tempore \5\ held that the resolution just agreed to 
was a decision of the question of consideration and that the House was, 
by its terms, required to proceed immediately with the consideration of 
the bill.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fiftieth Congress, Record, p. 762; Journal, p. 
239.
  \2\ See section 3304 of Vol. IV of this work.
  \3\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 484, 485; 
Record, p. 7548.
  \5\ James D. Richardson, of Tennessee, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 4961
  4961. In the later, but not in the earlier, practice, it has been 
held that the question of consideration may not be raised against a 
report from the Committee on Rules relating to the order for 
considering individual bills.--On March 7, 1892,\1\ Mr. T. C. 
Catchings, of Mississippi, called up a resolution from the Committee on 
Rules providing for the consideration of a bill (H. R. 4426) for the 
free coinage of gold and silver, etc.
  Mr. Charles Tracey, of New York, demanded that the question be put, 
``Will the House now consider said resolution?''
  The Speaker \2\ refused to entertain the demand, holding that a 
report from the Committee on Rules was not subject to the question of 
consideration.\3\
  Mr. Tracey appealed from the decision of the Chair, refusing to 
entertain his demand for the question of consideration. The appeal was 
laid on the table by a vote of 178 yeas to 82 nays.
  4962. On January 8, 1894,\4\ while the House was considering a 
resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, Mr. Thomas B. Reed, of 
Maine, asked a reconsideration by the Speaker of his former decision, 
to wit, that the question of consideration could not be demanded 
against the report from the Committee on Rules.
  The Speaker\2\ stated that the report involved the order of business 
of the House, and inasmuch as it had been held in former Congresses 
that the question of consideration could not be raised against the 
order of business, the Chair would adhere to the decision previously 
made.
  Mr. Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine, stated that he appealed from the 
decision just made.
  The Speaker declined to recognize the appeal, upon the ground that 
the consideration of the report from the Committee on Rules could not 
be interrupted.
  4963. On February 20, 1891,\5\ Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, 
from the Committee on Rules, reported a resolution relating to the 
consideration of certain bills reported from the Committee on the 
Judiciary and relating to the courts of the United States.
  Mr. W. C. P. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, raised the question of 
consideration against the said resolution.
  The question being put by the Speaker,\6\ the House determined, by a 
vote of 115 yeas to 80 nays, to consider the resolution.
  On February 24, 1891,\7\ Mr. William McKinley, jr., of Ohio, from the 
Committee on Rules, reported a resolution to provide a time for the 
consideration of the bill (S. 172) to refund the direct tax of 1861.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 91.
  \2\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \3\ The Record (first session Fifty-second Congress, pp. 1826, 1827) 
shows that the Speaker based his ruling upon the provision, then 
recently adopted, of Rule XI, which provided that ``it shall always be 
in order to call up for consideration a report from the Committee on 
Rules.'' (See sec. 4621 of Vol. IV of this work.)
  \4\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 71-72; Record, 
p. 528.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-first Congress, Journal p. 273.
  \6\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 295.
                                                            Sec. 4964
  Mr. Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, raised the question of consideration 
against the resolution, and the House, by a vote of 130 to 78, decided 
to consider it.
  4964. The question of consideration may not be raised against a 
proposition before the House for reference merely.
  Incidental discussion of the right of the House to decline to receive 
a petition.
  On April 15, 1878,\1\ Mr. Thomas Swann, of Maryland, presented a 
resolution of the general assembly of Maryland proposing to bring 
before the Supreme Court for revision the action of the Electoral 
Commission of 1876. Mr. Swann moved the reference of the resolution to 
the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, raised the question of 
consideration, under Rule 41.\2\
  The Speaker \3\ held that the resolution was before the House under 
Rule 130,\4\ which prescribed the mode of procedure during the morning 
hour of Monday, and that Rule 41 referred and related only to the mode 
and time of considering a subject already before the House, and in 
effect related only to the order of business, and being long anterior 
in date to Rule 130, could not change the specific provisions of the 
latter rule.
  This question of order was debated at some length. Mr. James A. 
Garfield, of Ohio, raised the point that if the question of 
consideration might not be raised on a matter presented for reference, 
the House would be compelled to consider by its committee that which it 
might not wish to consider. Mr. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, on 
the other hand, contended that the rule relating to the question of 
consideration was for the purpose of deciding, ``Will we act upon the 
measure now?'' But the question before the House in this case was 
whether the proposition from the Maryland legislature should be 
received or rejected. He contended that the House had the right to say 
whether it would receive or reject petitions. This was an inherent 
right. ``It should,'' he said, ``be discreetly, prudently, wisely, and 
patriotically exercised. The grand mistake of those who contended 
against the policy of receiving petitions of a certain character was 
discovered when it was too late. The great right of the American people 
to petition and have their petitions received on all subjects is now 
settled, I think, as the best policy. The power to reject, however, 
still exists.''
  The Speaker said:

  The Chair thinks that the inherent right alluded to by the gentleman 
from Georgia as existing in every legislative body is realized by the 
body in case they should refuse to refer. For a refusal to refer is in 
effect equivalent to an adverse expression.

  4965. The question of consideration may not be raised against a bill 
on which the previous question has been ordered.--On June 24, 1884,\5\ 
the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Forty-fifth Congress, Journal, pp. 844, 845; 
Record, pp. 2523-2527.
  \2\ Now section 3 of Rule XV, I; see section 4936 of this volume.
  \3\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \4\ Rule 130 provided for a call of the States and Territories for 
the introduction of bills and resolutions. They are now referred 
through the box at the Clerk's desk. Rule 130 then provided 
specifically that joint resolutions of State and Territorial 
legislatures should be introduced under the call provided in this rule.
  \5\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 5543.
Sec. 4966
House proceeded to the consideration of unfinished business, the 
Speaker making the statement that there were pending as unfinished 
business two bills on which the previous question had been ordered--a 
bill to repeal the preemption laws and the timber-culture laws--to 
which various amendments had been offered; and also an unfinished 
report from the select committee on the law respecting the election of 
President, etc. The bill from the Committee on Public Lands would come 
first, as it was unfinished business, having priority when the other 
bill was taken up.
  Mr. Albert S. Willis, of Kentucky, then proposed to raise the 
question of consideration against the unfinished business, his purpose 
being to ask the House to take up the education bill.
  Mr. J. Warren Keifer, of Ohio, made the point that the question of 
consideration might not be raised against a bill on which the previous 
question had been ordered.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair has some doubts. It has been the custom of the House to 
take up at once as unfinished business bills on which the previous 
question has been ordered. It happens that in this case there are two 
bills in precisely the same situation.

  Then, at the suggestion of Mr. Keifer, the bills were taken up in the 
order of priority.\2\
  4966. On January 6, 1893,\3\ the order of business was the 
consideration of bills heretofore reported from the Committee of the 
Whole House at the Friday evening session of July 2, 1892, and on the 
passage of which the previous question had been ordered.
  Mr. F. E. Beltzhoover, of Pennsylvania, submitted the question of 
order whether it was in order to raise the question of consideration 
against the bills on the passage of which the previous question had 
been ordered.
  The Speaker \4\ held that the effect of the previous question being 
to bring the House to an immediate vote on the question on which it was 
ordered, namely, the third reading and passage of the bills, the 
question of consideration could not be raised against them.
  4967. The question of consideration has been admitted where other 
business has intervened between the ordering and execution of the 
previous question, but not after an adjournment merely.--On February 
28, 1881,\5\ Mr. Hiram Price, of Iowa, demanded the consideration of 
the bill (H. R. 7026) making an apportionment of Representatives in 
Congress, etc., on which bill the previous question had been ordered on 
February 24.\6\
  Mr. John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, raised the question of 
consideration on the bill.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ See also section 4956 of this chapter, wherein the same Speaker 
inclined to the view that the question of consideration could be raised 
against a bill on which the previous question had been ordered on a 
preceding day.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 33; Record, p. 
381.
  \4\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \5\ Third session Forty-sixth Congress, Journal, pp. 537, 538; 
Record, pp. 2235-2298.
  \6\ Journal, p. 490.
                                                            Sec. 4968
  Mr. J. Warren Keifer, of Ohio, made the point of order that the 
question of consideration could not be raised against a bill on which 
the previous question had been ordered.
  After debate the Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky to raise the 
question of consideration. Many days have elapsed since the main 
question was ordered, and other subjects considered. * * * It is the 
inherent right of every legislative body that the majority shall 
regulate its course of proceeding in reference to the transaction of 
business. And every rule of every legislative body, so far as the Chair 
is advised, conforms to that feature as illustrative of the power of 
the majority to control its proceedings. Now, in reference to this case 
the Chair recognizes, and it is not disputed, that it has the semblance 
of unfinished business, and that the main question was ordered upon it. 
The binding feature of the previous question should have operated 
immediately upon reassembling after the adjournment. But at any time 
the motion is in order to test whether the House will proceed to 
consider the unfinished business; and the Chair recognizes that as the 
substance of the effort made by the gentleman from Kentucky. There can 
not be a doubt but that the House in its inherent right, and the right 
under the very rules that govern it, has the power to say whether it 
will consider unfinished business. And that right of consideration can 
not be interfered with or interrupted.

  The Speaker referred in this connection to a decision in the Forty-
fourth Congress.\2\
  Mr. Keifer having appealed, the appeal was laid on the table, yeas 
121, nays 93.
  4968. On January 4, 1889,\3\ Mr. Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, as a 
privileged question, called up the following resolution reported from 
the Committee on Rules and under consideration at the adjournment on 
the preceding day, the pending question being upon the demand for the 
previous question, the yeas and nays having been ordered:

  Resolved, That during the remainder of the present session of 
Congress there shall be no call of the States and Territories \4\ on 
the first and third Mondays of each month.

  Mr. John A. Anderson, of Kansas, proposed to raise the question of 
consideration against the resolution.
  Mr. Reed made the point of order that the question of consideration 
could not now be raised against the resolution:
  After debate the Speaker \5\ said:

  So far as the Chair is advised this is entirely a new question. The 
general rule of the House is that the question of consideration can be 
raised against any proposition when reached on the Calendar or called 
up, even though a privileged measure. In the present instance the 
question is this: This resolution was reported from the Committee on 
Rules yesterday as a matter of privilege and its consideration entered 
upon. The previous question was demanded by a Member and the yeas and 
nays ordered by the House, and the vote was actually being taken; in 
fact, according to the recollection of the Chair, two or three efforts 
were made to take a vote and secure a quorum, but they failed. Now, 
when the matter is called up again to-day, still being a matter of 
privilege under the rules of the House, the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. 
Anderson, raises the question of consideration against it; and the 
Chair rules, though he announces this decision with some hesitation and 
some doubt, that under the circumstances the question of consideration 
can not be made against it.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \2\ See section 4946 of this chapter.
  \3\ Second session Fiftieth Congress, Journal, p. 155; Record, p. 
544.
  \4\ This was the old method of introducing bills.
  \5\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
Sec. 4969
  4969. The question of consideration may not be demanded against a 
bill returned with the objections of the President.--On April 4, 
1894,\1\ Mr. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, demanded that the House 
proceed to the consideration of the bill H. R. 4956, entitled ``An act 
directing the coinage of silver bullion in the Treasury, and for other 
purposes,'' heretofore returned to the House by the President with his 
objections thereto.
  Mr. Daniel E. Sickles, of New York, thereupon demanded that the 
question of consideration be put.
  Mr. Joseph W. Bailey, of Texas, made the point that inasmuch as the 
Constitution required the House to reconsider the bill the question of 
consideration could not be demanded.
  After debate the Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order, holding as 
follows:

  The Constitution of the United States declares that the message shall 
be sent to the House in which the bill originated, which House shall 
proceed to reconsider the bill. The present message was sent to the 
House a few days ago, at which time the House had under consideration a 
contested-election case, and was operating under a rule which might 
fairly be held to postpone the consideration of any other question 
until that question had been disposed of. Undoubtedly the House would 
have the right, as has been the precedent, to postpone the 
consideration of a veto message, although the question of consideration 
might not be raised. Postponement is itself consideration; and it may 
be fairly held that the order adopted by the House, under which they 
were considering the contested-election case, was a postponement of any 
question that might come in to interfere with the measure until the 
House had fully disposed of it. Treating it in that way, it is regarded 
as a postponement of this veto message until that order had exhausted 
itself. The order has now exhausted itself; the message is before the 
House. The Constitution says the House must proceed to consider it; the 
House the other day ordered a postponement until that order was 
exhausted, and that time has come. Therefore the Chair holds that the 
question of consideration can not now be raised.

  4970. On March 2, 1895,\3\ Mr. Hugh A. Dinsmore, of Arkansas, moved 
that the Committee on Indian Affairs be discharged from the 
consideration of the bill (H. R. 8681) authorizing the Arkansas 
Northwestern Railway Company to construct and operate a railway through 
the Indian Territory, and for other purposes, heretofore returned to 
the House by the President with his objections thereto, and that the 
House proceed to its reconsideration.
  Mr. Albert J. Hopkins, of Illinois, submitted the question of order, 
whether the question of consideration could not be demanded thereon.
  The Speaker \2\ expressed the opinion that, under the provisions of 
the Constitution and under the rulings heretofore made in such cases, 
the question of consideration could not be demanded, but that the 
subject having been presented, a motion to postpone its further 
consideration might be entertained.
  4971. The question of consideration may not be raised on a motion 
relating to the order of business.
  While the House was proceeding under general parliamentary law, 
before rules had been adopted, a Member offered from the floor a 
special order for the consideration of a bill.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 312; Record, pp. 
3458, 3459.
  \2\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 190.
                                                            Sec. 4972
  On January 7, 1890,\1\ Mr. Louis E. McComas, of Maryland, submitted 
the following resolution:

  Resolved, That the House now resolve itself into Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
of the House (H. R. 3711), the District of Columbia appropriation bill, 
and that general debate thereon shall be limited to one hour, after 
which the bill shall be considered by clauses or paragraphs under the 
rules of the last House relating to the considemtion of general 
appropriation bills in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union.\2\

  Mr. W. C. P. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, raised the question of 
consideration.
  The Speaker \3\ ruled that the question of consideration could not be 
raised on a motion relating to the order of business.
  From this decision of the Chair Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, took 
an appeal.
  After debate on the appeal, the Speaker stated the situation to be as 
follows: On the motion of Mr. McComas, that the House resolve itself 
into the Committee of the Whole to consider a certain bill designated, 
the question of consideration was raised by Mr. Breckinridge, of 
Kentucky. He had thereupon held that the question of consideration 
could not be raised on the motion which itself proposed the 
consideration of a bill, on the ground that under common parliamentary 
law a doubling up of motions was to be avoided, and he thereupon stated 
the question to be:
  ``Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the 
House?'' And it was decided in the affirmative--yeas 134, nays 125.
  4972. On August 19, 1890,\4\ Mr. Ormsby B. Thomas, of Wisconsin, as a 
privileged question, moved to lay on the table the motion to reconsider 
the vote by which the House passed the bill of the Senate (S. 846) for 
the relief of Nathaniel McKay and the executors of Donald McKay.
  Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, proposed to raise the question 
of consideration.
  The Speaker \3\ held the question to be not in order.
  4973. On January 24, 1893,\5\ Mr. William S. Holman, of Indiana, 
moved that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union to consider general appropriation bills.
  Mr. William C. Oates, of Alabama, demanded that the question of 
consideration be put on the motion of Mr. Holman.
  The Speaker \6\ held that the question of consideration could not be 
demanded against the motion.
  4974. On February 7, 1894,\7\ Mr. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, 
presented as a matter of privilege the bill (H. R. 4956) directing the 
coinage of the silver bullion held in the Treasury, and for other 
purposes, heretofore reported from the Committee on Coinage, Weights, 
and Measures, and the same was refererd to the Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 103; Record, p. 
433.
  \2\ This occurred before the adoption of rules and while the House 
was acting under general parliamentary law.
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 968; Record, p. 
8814.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 56; Record, p. 
822.
  \6\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 145; Record, p. 
2009.
Sec. 4975
  Mr. Bland moved that the House resolve itself into Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union to consider said bill.
  Mr. Charles Tracey, of New York, demanded that the question of 
consideration be put.
  The Speaker \1\ held that it was not in order to demand the question 
of consideration against the motion of Mr. Bland, opposition to the 
consideration of the proposed measure being available by voting down 
the pending motion.
  The Speaker said:

  The Committee on Coinage, Weights, and Measures is accorded under the 
rules the right to report at any time.\2\ That right carries with it 
the right of consideration at the time the report is made. The 
gentleman from Missouri has reported from the Committee on Coinage, 
Weights, and Measures a bill which, by reason of the nature of its 
provisions, must have its first consideration in the Committee of the 
Whole. There can not be raised any question as to the right of the 
gentleman to make this report. There can be raised a question as to the 
desire of the House to consider the report.
  Now, in this particular case, inasmuch as the bill must be considered 
in the Committee of the Whole under the rules, the gentleman from 
Missouri must move, as he has done, that the House resolve itself into 
Committee of the Whole to consider the bill. It has been held that the 
question of consideration can not be raised against a motion, but that 
the way to accomplish the same purpose that would be accomplished by 
raising the question of consideration is to vote up or down the motion 
to go into Committee of the Whole.
  Therefore the Chair thinks that in this case the object sought in 
raising the question of consideration against the bill of the gentleman 
from Missouri can only be attained, and is effectually attained, by 
voting up or down the motion made by him. If the House desires to 
proceed to consider the bill, it will vote in favor of the motion; but 
if it does not desire that the bill be now proceeded with, then it will 
vote down the motion, in which case the bill will not be considered.

  4975. On February 23, 1901,\3\ Mr. William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, under 
the terms of a special order which made his motion the regular order, 
moved that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 
5499) to promote the efficiency of the Revenue-Cutter Service.
  Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, rising to a parliamentary 
inquiry, asked if it would be in order to raise the question of 
consideration.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The Chair thinks not; but the question can be tested on the motion to 
go into Committee of the Whole. That presents the same situation as if 
the question of consideration were raised.

  4976. On February 20, 1903,\5\, Mr. Charles N. Fowler, of New Jersey, 
moved that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 
16228) relating to the currency.
  Mr. Charles L. Bartlett, of Georgia, proposed to raise the question 
of consideration.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \2\ That committee no longer has this privilege. See section 4621 of 
Vol. IV of this work.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 2917.
  \4\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 271; Record, 
pp. 2426, 2427.
                                                            Sec. 4977
  The Speaker pro tempore \1\ held that this question might not be 
raised, saying, after debate:

  There is no difference between the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. 
Bartlett] and the Chair on this question, except a difference of form. 
The present occupant of the chair stated the other day on the floor of 
the House that the question of consideration could be raised on this 
bill. Now, there are two methods of raising the question of 
consideration. One of them applies to bills on the House Calendar and 
the other to bills on the Union Calendar. As to bills on the House 
Calendar, the question of consideration is raised directly by an appeal 
to the House, the bill being in the House. As to bills that are in the 
custody of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union 
and on the Union Calendar, the question is raised by voting down the 
motion to go into Committee of the Whole, in which committee the bill 
is pending; so that it is perfectly apparent that between the attitude 
of the present occupant of the chair in his ruling now and his attitude 
while on the floor the other day there is no possible inconsistency.

  4977. The question of consideration may not be demanded against a 
motion to discharge a committee.--On March 3, 1905,\2\ Mr. Willard D. 
Vandiver, of Missouri, moved to discharge the Committee on the 
Judiciary from the consideration of a resolution of inquiry relating to 
the so-called ``armor-plate trust.''
  Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, proposed to raise the question of 
consideration on the motion.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair finds the following in the Digest: ``The question of 
consideration may not be raised on a motion relating to the order of 
business.''

  So the question of consideration was not entertained.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, Speaker pro tempore.
  \2\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p 4021.
  \3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.