<DOC>
[Hinds Precedents -- Volume V]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:hinds_cxii.wais]

 
                             Chapter CXII.

                    CONDUCT OF DEBATE IN THE HOUSE.

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   1. The rules. Sections 4978, 4979.
   2. Member's action in. Sections 4980, 4981.\1\
   3. Motion must be stated before. Sections 4982-4989.
   4. Member's limitations. Sections 4990-4994.
   5. Rights as to opening and closing. Sections 4995-5002.
   6. Division of time. Sections 5003-5005.
   7. Interruption of another Member. Sections 5006-5008.\2\
   8. Yielding the floor to motions, etc. Sections 5009-5017.
   9. Yielding the floor to another Member. Sections 5018-5041.
   10. Relevancy in debate. Sections 5042-5055.
   11. Appeals from decisions as to relevancy. Sections 5056-6063.
   12. Personal explanations. Sections 5064-5079.

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  4978. The rule of recognition and the hour rule for debate.
  Form and history of Rule XIV, section 2.
  Section 2 of Rule XIV governs the recognition of Members for debate 
and the time of debate:

  When two or more Members rise at once, the Speaker shall name the 
Member who is first to speak, and no Member shall occupy more than one 
hour in debate on any question in the House or in committee; except as 
further provided in this rule.

  This rule is in the form adopted in the revision of 1880.\3\ Previous 
to that the subject was covered by rules 59 and 60. The former dated 
from April 7, 1789,\4\ and provided:

  When two or more Members happen to rise at once, the Speaker shall 
name the Member who is first to speak.\5\
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  \1\ For cases of censure of Members for conduct in debate see 
sections 1244-1259 of Volume II.
  As to recognitions by the Speaker, sections 1419-1479, Chapter XLVI 
of Volume II; the Speaker's right of participation in, is limited, 
sections 1367-1376 of Volume II.
  The forty minutes of debate after the previous question is ordered, 
sections 5495-5509 of this volume.
  Debate on the motion to reconsider, sections 5694-5702 of this 
volume.
  Debate on points of order, sections 6919, 6920, and on appeals, 
sections 6947-6952 of this volume.
  ``Leave to print'' remarks in the Congressional Record, sections 
6990-7012 of this volume.
  \2\ The motion to adjourn may not interrupt a Member having the floor 
in debate. (Secs. 5369, 5370.)
  \3\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 206, 830.
  \4\ Journal, first session First Congress, p. 9.
  \5\ The rule of the Continental Congress (Journal, May 26, 1778) was: 
``When two persons rise together, the President shall name the person 
to speak.''
                                                            Sec. 4979
  The clause limiting the time the Member may occupy in debate to one 
hour dates from December 18, 1847.\1\ The hour limitation, however, is 
older than that rule, the first rule for the purpose having been 
adopted on motion of Mr. Lott Warren, of Georgia, July 6, 1841.\2\ This 
was a temporary rule, but on June 13, 1842,\3\ it was made one of the 
standing rules of the House that no Member should occupy ``more than 
one hour in debate on any question, either in the House or in the 
Committee of the Whole.'' This rule was adopted on motion of Mr. 
Benjamin S. Cowen, of Ohio. The rule had been long agitated. On March 
26, 1820, Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, spoke more than four hours on 
the Missouri bill,\4\ and on April 28, 1820, Mr. Stevenson Archer, of 
Maryland, proposed a rule that no Member should speak longer than an 
hour at a time and that no question should be discussed over five 
days.\5\ This proposed rule was not acted on. In 1822 the hour limit of 
debate was again proposed by Mr. John Cocke, of Tennessee, but was not 
adopted.\6\ In 1828, Mr. William Haile, of Mississippi, reviewed the 
tediousness of the debates and again proposed the hour rule, but 
unsuccessfully.\7\ On March 1, 1833,\8\ Mr. Frank E. Plummer, of 
Mississippi, so wearied the House in the last hours of the Congress 
that repeated attempts were made to induce him to resume his seat, and 
the House was frequently in extreme confusion and disorder. But the 
hour rule was not adopted until the practice of unlimited debate had 
caused the greatest danger to bills in Committee of the Whole.\9\ The 
rule was often attacked,\10\ but the necessities of public business 
always compelled its retention.
  4979. Rule regulating the act of the Member in seeking recognition 
for debate.
  Rule governing the Member in debate, forbidding personalities and 
requiring him to confine himself to the question.
  Form of history of Rule XIV, section 1.
  Section 1 of Rule XIV provides:

  When any Member desires to speak or deliver any matter to the House, 
he shall rise and respectfully address himself to ``Mr. Speaker,'' and 
on being recognized, may address the House from any place on the floor 
or from the Clerk's desk,\11\ and shall confine himself to the question 
under debate, avoiding personality.
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  \1\ Congressional Globe, first session Thirtieth Congress, p. 47.
  \2\ First session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, pp. 152-155.
  \3\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, p. 620; Journal, 
p. 954.
  \4\ First session Sixteenth Congress, Annals, p. 1541.
  \5\ First session Sixteenth Congress, Journal, p. 456; Annals, p. 
2093.
  \6\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Annals, Vol. II, p. 1301.
  \7\ First session Twentieth Congress, Journal, p. 370; Debates, pp. 
1754-1756.
  \8\ Second session Twenty-second Congress, Debates, p. 1919.
  \9\ See section 5221 of this volume.
  \10\ See Globe of December 18, 1847, first session Thirtieth 
Congress, pp. 43-47, for an attack in the House. Thomas H. Benton, in 
his Thirty Years' View (Vol. II, pp. 247-257), and Mr. Clement L. 
Vallandigham, in the House, at the time of the revision of 1860 (see 
Congressional Globe, first session Thirty-sixth Congress, March 15, 
1860), assailed the rule vigorously.
  \11\ Thus, on February 1, 1875, Mr. Benjamin F. Butler, of 
Massachusetts, when Members made the point of order that he was 
addressing the galleries and not the Chair, took his place on the 
platform beside the Clerk's desk. A question being raised, Mr. Speaker 
Blaine said that the rule specifically gave the Member the right to 
speak from the Clerk's desk. (Second session Forty-third Congress, 
Record, pp. 1896,1897.) At that time the rule was numbered 58 and was 
as follows: ``Members may address the House or committee from the 
Clerk's desk, or from a place near the Speaker's chair.'' It has been 
extremely rare for a Member to avail himself of this privilege. (See 
sec. 4981.)
Sec. 4980
  The rule has remained unchanged since the revision of the rules in 
1880.\1\ It was derived from the old rule, No. 57, which was, with the 
dates upon which the portions originated, as follows:

  When any Member is about to speak in debate, or deliver any matter to 
the House, he shall rise from his seat \2\ and respectfully address 
himself to ``Mr. Speaker,''--April 7, 1789 \3\--and shall confine 
himself to the question under debate, and avoid personality--December 
23, 1811.\4\

  4980. A Member, in addressing the House, must also address the 
Chair.--On May 9, 1864,\5\ the Speaker \6\ called to order a Member 
who, in speaking from a position in front of the Chair, spoke for 
several minutes with his back to the Chair. The Speaker reminded the 
Member that it was the usage, in addressing Members of the House, to 
address the Chair.
  4981. Instance wherein a Member addressed the House from the Clerk's 
desk.--On June 26, 1850,\7\ Mr. Jacob B. Thompson, of Kentucky, in 
addressing the House spoke ``from the rostrum,'' these words of the 
record of debates meaning evidently that Mr. Thompson availed himself 
of the privilege given by the rule of addressing the House from the 
Clerk's desk.
  On November 14, 1870,\8\ Mr. Simeon B. Chittenden, of New York, said 
in debate:

  When I went to the unusual place of the Clerk's desk to speak 
yesterday, I went to speak the truth.

  So unusual was this that another Member referred to him as having 
spoken ``from his perch.'' \9\
  4982. Debate should not begin until the question has been stated by 
the Speaker.--Section 2 of Rule XVI \10\ provides:

  When a motion has been made, the Speaker shall state it or (if it be 
in writing) cause it to be read aloud by the Clerk before being 
debated.

  4983. The House insists on compliance with the rule that a motion 
must be stated by the Speaker or read by the Clerk before debate shall 
begin.--On March 2, 1885,\11\ the House took up the contested election 
case of Frederick v. Wilson. It having been voted to consider the case, 
Mr. Risden T. Bennett, of North Carolina, proceeded to debate.
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  \1\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 206, 830.
  \2\ This did not mean any particular seat, but merely that the Member 
should rise. (See ruling of Mr. Speaker Stevenson, July 12, 1832, first 
session Twenty-second Congress, Debates, p. 3910.)
  \3\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \4\ First session Twelfth Congress, Report No. 38.
  \5\ First session Thirty-eighth Congress, Globe, p. 2194.
  \6\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \7\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, p. 294.
  \8\ First session Forty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 405.
  \9\ It is said to have been a custom of Thaddeus Stevens to speak, 
from the Clerk's desk; but the practice was then considered 
exceptional, and has ceased. (See footnote of sec. 4979.) In the 
assemblies of the Latin nations the Member always speaks from a rostrum 
in front of the desk of the presiding officer.
  \10\ See section 5304 of this volume for the full form and history of 
this rule.
  \11\ Second session Forty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 745; Record, 
pp. 2412, 2413.
                                                            Sec. 4984
  Mr. Edward K. Valentine, of Nebraska, made the point of order that 
the resolutions accompanying the report must be stated by the Speaker 
or read by the Clerk, as required by clause 2 of Rule XV1,\1\ before 
being debated.
  The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order.
  4984. A motion must be made before the Member may proceed in 
debate.--On June 25, 1902,\3\ the House had agreed to the conference 
report on the army appropriation bill, when Mr. John A. T. Hull took 
the floor and proceeded to debate as to the disposition of the 
remaining Senate amendments in disagreement.
  Mr. James D. Richardson, of Tennessee, raised the question of order 
that as no motion had been made there was nothing before the House.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The Chair will state that if the gentleman from Tennessee insists 
upon his point of order the Chair will be obliged to sustain it.

  Thereupon Mr. Hull submitted a motion, and proceeded in debate.
  4985. On December 18, 1893,\5\ after the reading of two messages from 
the President, Mr. Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine, stated that he 
desired to submit a privileged motion, and proceeded to make remarks 
thereon.
  Mr. Benjamin A. Enloe, of Tennessee, made the point of order that the 
motion should be first submitted before being discussed.
  The Speaker \6\ sustained the point of order, holding that the motion 
proposed by Mr. Boutelle must be read at the desk before discussion 
thereof was in order.
  4986. Before debate is in order the motion must be stated by the 
Member or even be reduced to writing if required, and announced by the 
Chair.
  After a Member has offered a motion, the House has the right before 
debate begins to determine whether it will consider it or not.
  On May 29, 1812,\7\ Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, was addressing 
the House at length on the foreign relations of the nation. He had 
intimated his intention to submit a motion, but had not in fact done 
so. In the course of his remarks Mr. John C. Calhoun, of South 
Carolina, rising to a question of order, said there was no question 
before the House and the gentleman was speaking contrary to order.
  Mr. William W. Bibb, of Georgia, who was temporarily in the chair, 
said that the objection was not valid, as the gentleman from Virginia 
had announced his intention to make a motion, and it had been usual in 
such cases to permit a wide range of debate.
  Mr. Randolph was proceeding when Mr. Calhoun again interposed a point 
of order, that if the course now taken were parliamentary and should 
continue, it would be in the power of any Member at any time to 
embarrass the proceedings of the House.
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  \1\ See section 5304 of this volume.
  \2\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 7387.
  \4\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 37-41; Record, 
p. 376.
  \6\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \7\ First session Twelfth Congress, Journal, pp. 355, 534 (Gales & 
Seaton ed.); Annals, 1461-1466.
Sec. 4987
  The Speaker \1\ decided that Mr. Randolph was bound to state his 
proposition, which, moreover, ought to be seconded,\2\ announced from 
the Chair, and reduced to writing, if required, before he proceeded to 
debate it.
  Mr. Randolph having appealed, the decision of the Chair was 
sustained, yeas 67, nays 42.
  The question of consideration being put, the House declined to 
consider Mr. Randolph's resolution when he presented it.
  Mr. Clay, the Speaker, writing unofficially but to the public, said 
at this time: \3\

  Two principles are settled by these decisions; the first is that the 
House has a right to know, through its organ, the specific motion which 
a Member intends making before he intends to argue it at large; and, in 
the second place, that it reserves to itself the exercise of the power 
of determining whether it will consider it at the particular time when 
offered prior to his thus proceeding to argue it.
  It would seem to be altogether reasonable that when a Member intends 
addressing a copious argument to a public body for the purpose of 
enforcing a motion he should disclose the motion intended to be 
supported. It is the practice of the British Parliament, and of 
several, if not all, of the State assemblies to require not only that 
this should be done, but that it should be seconded, thus affording a 
protection against the obtrusion upon the body of the whimsical or 
eccentric propositions of a disordered or irregular mind by the 
coincidence in opinion of at least two individuals. At what particular 
period the proposition ought to be submitted is, perhaps, not exactly 
defined or definable. Certainly in the courtesy of all bodies will be 
found a sufficient safeguard against the exclusion of matter properly 
introductive, explanatory, or prefatory to the motion. The line 
separating matter of this kind from arguments in chief is not 
susceptible of accurate description. It does not, however, present more 
practical difficulty than to discriminate between observations which 
are relevant or otherwise, decorous or reprehensible.

  4987. A communication or a report being before the House may be 
debated before any specific motion has been made in relation to it.--On 
January 14, 1875,\4\ the House was considering a communication from the 
Sergeant-at-Arms, when a question was raised as to the pending motion.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The communication from the Sergeant-at-Arms itself affords a basis of 
discussion. There might be some motion made in regard to it; as, for 
instance, to refer to a committee with or without instructions, but the 
Chair thinks the discussion is proceeding in a very natural manner upon 
the question, and that the House, prior to the discussion, need not be 
forced to a particular line of policy.

  4988. On December 15, 1877,\6\ the House was proceeding to the 
consideration of resolutions providing for a general investigation of 
the Executive Departments, reported from the Committee on Ways and 
Means, when Mr. John M. Thompson, of Pennsylvania, made the point of 
order that it was not in order to discuss a report, however privileged 
it might be, without first making a motion to dispose of the subject-
matter in some way.
  The Speaker \7\ overruled the point of order, on the ground that a 
motion was neither required by the rules nor in accordance with the 
practice to debate a report from a committee.
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  \1\ Henry Clay, Speaker.
  \2\ The second is no longer required.
  \3\ Annals, first session Twelfth Congress, p. 1470 (footnote).
  \4\ Second session Forty-third Congress, Record, p. 473.
  \5\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
  \6\ Second session Forty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 137; Record, pp. 
239, 240.
  \7\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 4989
  4989. The withdrawal of a matter precludes further debate on it.--On 
February 17, 1834,\1\ Mr. Abijah Mann, jr., of New York, objected to 
the printing of certain memorials relating to the United States Bank.
  Subsequently Mr. Mann withdrew his objections.
  Thereupon Mr. John G. Watmough, of Pennsylvania, proceeded to discuss 
the objection.
  The Speaker \2\ called him to order, on the ground that the objection 
was withdrawn.
  4990. The hour rule applies to debate on a question of privilege as 
well as to debate on other questions.--On September 4, 1890,\3\ Mr. 
Amos J. Cummings, of New York, claimed the floor on a question of 
personal privilege, and, being recognized, addressed the House. When he 
had spoken for one hour, the Speaker pro tempore \4\ stated that the 
time allotted under the rule (clause 2, Rule XIV) had expired.
  From the ruling of the Speaker pro tempore that a Member was entitled 
to but one hour on a question of privilege Mr. Cummings appealed.
  After debate on the appeal, Mr. Cummings withdrew the same.
  4991. No Member may speak more than once to the same question unless 
he be the mover or proposer, in which case he may speak in reply after 
all choosing to speak have spoken.
  Present form and history of section 6 of Rule XIV.
  Section 6 of Rule XIV is as follows:

  No Member shall speak more than once to the same question without 
leave of the House, unless he be the mover, proposer, or introducer of 
the matter pending, in which case he shall be permitted to speak in 
reply, but not until every Member choosing to speak shall have spoken.

  This form was established in the revision of 1880.\5\ It was taken 
verbatim from the old rule, No. 63, which was made up on January 14, 
1840, from the original rule of April 7, 1789. The form of 1789 \6\ 
was:

  No Member shall speak more than twice to the same question without 
leave of the House; \7\ nor more than once until every Member choosing 
to speak shall have spoken.

  In 1840 the words ``more than twice'' were changed to ``more than 
once,'' and the clause allowing the speech in reply was added, although 
it was opposed as too suggestive of legal proceedings and as tending to 
produce inequality in debate.\8\ At this time the hour rule for debate 
had not been adopted.\9\
  4992. It is too late to make the point of order that a Member has 
already spoken if no one claims the floor until he has made some prog-
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  \1\ First session Twenty-third Congress, Debates, p. 2728.
  \2\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 1013; Record, p. 
9679.
  \4\ Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, Speaker pro tempore.
  \5\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \6\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \7\ On May 18, 1798 (second session Fifth Congress, Journal, pp. 302, 
322; Annals, pp. 1855, 1866) the House agreed to a rule that a Member 
should not in House or in Committee of the Whole speak more than once 
to a measure, but on June 1 rescinded it, because of the difficulty of 
preventing evasions.
  \8\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 121.
  \9\ See section 4978 of this volume.
Sec. 4993
ress in his speech.--On June 9, 1846,\1\ Mr. Shelton F. Leake, of 
Virginia, rose, was recognized by the Speaker, and proceeded to address 
the House.
  While proceeding in his remarks Mr. Thomas J. Henley, of Indiana, 
rose and claimed the floor on the ground that Mr. Leake, having once 
addressed the House on the question, had no right, under Rule 36, which 
provided that ``No Member shall speak more than once on the same 
question without leave of the House,'' to proceed with his remarks.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that Mr. Leake, having risen, been 
recognized, and proceeded to address the House, no one claiming the 
floor, and no one having objected, must be considered as speaking by 
leave of the House, and he therefore overruled the question of order 
raised by Mr. Henley, and decided that Mr. Leake was in order.
  4993. A Member who has spoken once to the main question may speak 
again to an amendment.--Jefferson's Manual, in Section XXXV, provides:

  On an amendment being moved, a Member who has spoken to the main 
question may speak again to the amendment. (Scob., 23.)

  4994. On March 7, 1844,\3\ the House was considering the bill (No. 
80) to amend an act entitled ``An act relative to the election of a 
President and Vice-President of the United States, and declaring the 
officers who shall act as President and Vice-President of the United 
States in case of vacancies in the offices of both President and Vice-
President,'' approved March 1, 1792.
  Mr. Alexander Duncan, of Ohio, rose and debated the question for one 
hour. Then Mr. Lucius Q. C. Elmer, of New Jersey, moved an amendment 
striking out all after the enacting clause and inserting a substitute. 
And, after debate, Mr. Duncan again obtained the floor and proceeded to 
debate the question on the amendment.
  Mr. David W. Dickinson, of Tennessee, made a question of order that 
Mr. Duncan, having spoken one hour since this bill was taken up for 
consideration, was not in order in speaking again.
  The Speaker pro tempore \4\ decided that, inasmuch as an amendment 
had been offered since Mr. Duncan had spoken, and the question was 
entirely changed, he was entitled to the floor.
  On an appeal the decision of the Chair was sustained by the House.
  4995. The right of the ``mover, proposer, or introducer of the matter 
pending'' to close debate does not belong to a Member who has merely 
moved to reconsider the vote on a bill which he did not report.
  In the earlier practice of the House the right of the mover to close 
the debate might not be cut off by the previous question.
  On January 12, 1876,\5\ the House proceeded to the consideration of 
the unfinished business, which was the motion to reconsider the vote by 
which the amnesty bill was rejected by the House. This motion to 
reconsider had been made by Mr. James G. Blaine, of Maine.
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  \1\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 934.
  \2\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Twenty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 532; Globe, p. 
356.
  \4\ George W. Hopkins, of Virginia, Speaker pro tempore.
  \5\ First session Forty-fourth Congress, Record, pp. 382, 390.
                                                            Sec. 4995
  Mr. Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, announced that it was his 
purpose at an appropriate time that day to call for the previous 
question.
  This elicited from Mr. Blaine the following inquiry:

  By what right, under the rules, does the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 
Mr. Randall, observing the courtesies of debate, announce that he will 
call the previous question on my motion?

  Mr. Randall replied:

  I claim the right, just as the gentleman did, he being on the 
prevailing side, to move a reconsideration. The gentleman will observe 
that the motion for the previous question is a majority motion which I 
have the right to make. * * * Because otherwise the minority side of 
this House might continue the debate without limit, contrary to the 
wish of the majority, of which I am one.

  Mr. Blaine then cited Rule 63: \1\

  No Member shall speak more than once to the same question without 
leave of the House unless he be the mover, proposer, or introducer of 
the matter pending; in which case he shall be permitted to speak in 
reply, but not until every Member choosing to speak shall have spoken,

and made the point that as the amnesty bill, which the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania had introduced, was utterly defeated by the House, he had 
lost all control of it. Therefore he, Mr. Blaine, as the mover, the 
proposer, the introducer of the motion to reconsider was entitled to 
the privilege given by the rule.
  There was some debate on the point, Mr. Nathaniel P. Banks, of 
Massachusetts, holding that the motion to reconsider was a subsidiary 
motion merely, like the motion to postpone, and did not give the Member 
making it the benefit of the rule.
  The Speaker,\2\ in ruling, said:

  It is claimed that because the motion in this case to reconsider the 
vote by which the amnesty bill was defeated was made by the gentleman 
from Maine, therefore he is entitled to open and close the debate--
practically to control it. The Chair invites the attention of the House 
to the sixtieth rule,\3\ a part of which the Chair will read:
  ``No Member shall occupy more than one hour in debate on any question 
in the House or in committee; but a Member reporting the measure under 
consideration from a committee may open and close debate.''
  The gentleman from Maine did not report this measure from a 
committee. A ruling is given on page 86 of the Digest, which is as 
follows:
  ``The right of the `Member reporting the measure' to open and close 
debate is not affected by an order either for the previous question or 
that debate shall cease in committee.''
  Now, the Chair is very reluctant to hold that in this case the 
gentleman from Maine is not of right entitled to close this debate. The 
Chair would prefer to hold that under this ruling, which relates to 
Rule 60, the right of the gentleman to close the debate is clear, 
notwithstanding the House may have sustained the previous question; 
that, in other words, he would be entitled, after the previous question 
is sustained, to close the debate. But upon the peculiar attitude of 
this question the Chair feels compelled to rule that, inasmuch as the 
gentleman from Maine did not report this bill to the House from any 
committee or in any other way, he has no right to close the debate or 
to speak after the previous question shall have been demanded by 
another Member, as in this case. * * * The Chair desires only in 
addition to say, and he is glad to be able to say it, that in this 
ruling he is upon all points sustained by the venerable journal clerk 
\4\ of this House, the author of our Digest, who has had experience of 
twenty-eight years.
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  \1\ Now section 6 of Rule XIV. (See sec. 4991 of this volume.)
  \2\ Michael C. Kerr, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \3\ Now section 3 of Rule XIV. (See sec. 4996 of this chapter.)
  \4\ Mr. Barclay.
Sec. 4996
  4996. The Member reporting the measure under consideration may open 
and close where general debate is had; and may have an additional hour 
to close if debate extend beyond a day.
  Present form and history of section 3 of Rule XIV.
  Section 3 of Rule XIV provides:

  The Member reporting the measure under consideration from a committee 
may open and close where general debate has been had thereon; and if it 
shall extend beyond one day he shall be entitled to one hour to close 
notwithstanding he may have used an hour in opening.

  This is the exact form of rule adopted in the revision of 1880.\1\ 
While it was considered a new rule at that time, it was in reality an 
amplification of the idea contained in the old rule, No. 60, which 
dated from December 18, 1847,\2\ when the hour rule of debate was 
adopted permanently and the five-minute rule was instituted:

  No Member shall occupy more than one hour in debate on any question 
in the House or in committee; but a Member reporting the measure under 
consideration from a committee may open and close the debate: Provided, 
That where debate is closed by order of the House, any Member shall be 
allowed in committee five minutes to explain any amendment he may 
offer.

  The Committee on Rules, who made the revision of 1880, explained that 
the form of rule which they adopted, and which is the present form, was 
intended to cover a point settled by repeated decisions.
  4997. In the later practice of the House the Member reporting the 
matter under consideration may not exercise his right to close after 
the previous question is ordered.
  The earlier practice as to the right to close debate permitted its 
exercise after the time for terminating general debate in Committee of 
the Whole as well as after the ordering of the previous question.
  On June 28, 1850,\3\ the House resumed the consideration of the 
report of the Committee on Elections in the Iowa contested-election 
case of Miller v. Thompson, the following resolution, with an 
amendment, being pending:

  Resolved, That William Thompson is entitled to the seat in this House 
which he now holds as the Representative from the First Congressional 
district of Iowa.

  Mr. Armistead Burt, of South Carolina, moved the previous question; 
which was seconded, and the main question ordered to be put; when Mr. 
William Strong, of Pennsylvania, rose and was proceeding to close the 
debate.
  Mr. Alexander Evans, of Maryland, made the point of order that the 
previous question having been seconded, and the main question ordered 
to be put, it was not in order for Mr. Strong to proceed.
  The Speaker \4\ decided that the Member from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Strong], having reported the measure under consideration from a 
committee, was entitled, under the thirty-fourth rule \5\ of the House, 
to open and close the debate thereon, and that he did not think he was 
deprived of that right by the previous question having been seconded 
and the main question ordered to be put. That rule was adopted during 
the last
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  \1\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \2\ First session Thirtieth Congress, Globe, pp. 43-47. (See also 
sec. 4978 of this volume.)
  \3\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, p. 1056; Globe, p. 
1308.
  \4\ Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \5\ See sections 4991 and 4996 of this chapter.
                                                            Sec. 4998
Congress, and, at the same session, the question arose in Committee of 
the Whole on the state of the Union as to the right of the Member to 
make his closing speech after the expiration of the hour at which the 
debate had been ordered to be closed. It was then held by the committee 
\1\ that he had the right, and, by a parity of reasoning (the rule 
applying as well to the House as the committee), it would seem to be 
his privilege in the present case, especially as there had been no 
debate on the subject in Committee of the Whole on the state of the 
Union; otherwise the Member reporting the measure would be deprived of 
the benefit of the rule.
  From this decision Mr. Alexander Evans appealed, and the question 
being put, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the 
House? it was decided in the affirmative. So the decision of the Chair 
was sustained, and Mr. Strong, proceeded to close the debate.
  4998. On January 10, 1877,\2\ the regular order being demanded, the 
Speaker announced the regular order of business to be the further 
consideration of the bill of the House (H. R. 2263) for the repeal of 
so much of the act of December 17, 1872, as provides for a pivot draw 
in any bridge to be erected across the Ohio River between the cities of 
Covington, Ky., and Cincinnati, Ohio.
  The House having resumed its consideration, after debate,
  Mr. John H. Reagan, of Texas, demanded the previous question; which 
was seconded and the main question ordered to be put.
  Then Mr. Reagan rose, and was proceeding to further debate the bill; 
when Mr. Milton Sayler, of Ohio, made the point of order that Mr. 
Reagan, having already consumed an hour in opening the debate upon the 
pending bill, was not entitled to another hour to close it.
  The Speaker \3\ sustained the point of order.
  This point of order gave rise to much debate, and was carefully 
considered by the Speaker, who on January 17 gave his reasons at 
length, as follows:

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  \1\ This ruling occurred on February 16, 1848 (first session 
Thirtieth Congress, Globe, p. 363), the House being in Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union considering the bill to authorize 
a loan of not to exceed $18,500,000. The hour of 2 o'clock arrived and 
the general debate was closed in accordance with previous order. Then 
Mr. Samuel F. Vinton, of Ohio, who reported the bill from the Committee 
on Ways and Means, availed himself of the privilege granted under the 
thirty-fourth rule of closing the debate.
  This point first arose January 6, 1848 (first session Thirtieth 
Congress, Globe, p. 119), while the House was in Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union (Mr. Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, in the 
chair) considering a bill relating to the transportation of mails. The 
hour which the House had fixed for the closing of debate having 
arrived, Mr. William L. Goggin, of Virginia, chairman of the Committee 
on the Post-Office and Post-Roads, who had reported the bill, was on 
the floor in the midst of his speech. Mr. Jacob Thompson, of 
Mississippi, made the point that the hour had arrived at which the 
House had ordered the termination of the debate.
  The Chairman said that the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goggin], 
being the chairman of the committee which had reported the resolution, 
was entitled to one hour after the point of time fixed for the 
conclusion of the debate.
  Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, remarked that the explanation 
of the Chairman perfectly accorded with the opinion which prevailed in 
the Committee on Rules when the rule was adopted.
  On appeal the question was debated at length, and on January 7 
(Globe, p. 127) the Chair was sustained by a vote of 101 to 73.
  \2\ Second session Forty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 201, 202, 250; 
Record, pp. 544, 708.
  \3\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
Sec. 4998
  Rule 63 reads as follows:
  ``No Member shall speak more than once to the same question without 
leave of the House (April 7, 1789) unless he be the mover, proposer, or 
introducer of the matter pending; in which case he shall be permitted 
to speak in reply, but not until every Member choosing to speak shall 
have spoken (January 14, 1840).''
  It appears that this last clause of the present sixty-third rule, 
adopted January 14, 1840, was intended to restrict debate, as indeed it 
was so stated at the time.
  Rules 29 and 30, as existing at the close of the Twenty-fifth 
Congress, were as follows, namely:
  ``Rule 29. No Member shall speak more than twice to the same question 
without leave of the House, nor more than once until every Member 
choosing to speak shall have spoken.
  ``Rule 30. If a question pending be lost by adjournment of the House 
and revived on the succeeding day, no Member who shall have spoken 
twice on the preceding day shall be permitted to speak without leave.''
  These rules were merged, as amended, into what is now the sixty-third 
rule of the House, in the Twenty-seventh Congress. From the debate it 
fully appears that it was intended to restrict or curtail debate, and 
that this was rendered necessary by the dilatory debates of preceding 
Congresses, especially those in the Twenty-sixth Congress.
  In the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, and Twenty-ninth Congresses it 
appears that this rule was construed and held to prevent any Member 
from speaking more than one hour, except where an amendment had been 
offered, thereby changing the question. The Member entitled to the 
floor on the pending measure was then entitled to an additional hour. 
(See House Journal, first session Twenty-eighth Congress, p. 532.)
  It was found, however, that this rule was evaded by the practice of 
offering amendments, and the Committee on Rules in the first session of 
the Thirtieth Congress reported, on the 14th of December, 1847, the 
following as a substitute for the thirty-third, or ``hour rule,'' as it 
was called, namely:
  ``It shall be in order to entertain a motion when made to limit the 
time which each Member may occupy in debating any question in the House 
or committee to a period not less than one hour: Provided, That where 
the House has made an order fixing the time for discharging the 
committee from the further consideration of any bill, or other matter 
referred to it (after acting without debate on all amendments pending 
or that may be offered), debate by any one Member before such order 
takes effect may be limited to one-quarter of an hour, and thereafter 
the Member who reported the measure under consideration from any 
committee may debate the same for one hour; and any Member shall be 
allowed in committee five minutes to explain the object, nature, and 
effect of any amendment which he may offer; and all motions made to 
carry out this rule shall be decided without debate.''
  And also the following as an alternative proposition:
  ``No Member shall occupy more than one hour and a half in debate on 
any question in the House or in committee; but a Member reporting the 
measure under consideration from a committee may open and close the 
debate: Provided, That where debate is closed by order of the House, 
any Member shall be allowed in committee five minutes to explain any 
amendment he may offer.''
  From the debate which took place on the 18th of December, 1847, when 
the report was considered, it fully appears that the intent was to 
further limit or restrict debate, and this is confirmed by the 
amendment of Mr. Pollock to strike out the words ``and a half,'' so as 
to limit the debate to one hour, which amendment was adopted without 
division. In the case cited on the 9th instant by the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Burchard], the decision by Speaker Cobb in the first 
session Thirty-first Congress (see House Journal, first session Thirty-
first Congress, p. 1056), it was decided that the gentleman who 
reported the then pending measure was entitled to an hour to close the 
debate after the main question had been ordered to be put.
  In that case--the contested election case of Miller v. Thompson, from 
Iowa--the report was made by Mr. Strong, who opened the debate, which 
occupied two days, and then, an amendment having been submitted and 
several gentlemen having spoken in opposition to the resolutions 
reported by the committee, the Speaker decided that Mr. Strong was 
entitled to an hour to close the debate, though the main question had 
been ordered. In that case every Member so desiring had spoken an hour 
or occupied so much of his hour as he wished. In the present case the 
gentleman reporting the measure opened the debate, occupied or 
controlled the floor for one hour, and then it was claimed, the 
previous question having been sustained, that he had a right to another 
hour to close.
  The Chair believes that any other construction than the one he has 
given would tend to destroy the equality of privileges which should 
exist, and which in fact does exist, between Members of the House; and, 
in addition, the Chair is of opinion that the ruling will expedite and 
dispatch the public business, while the contrary course would retard 
and delay it.
  The hour rule was adopted in these interests, and as practiced in the 
courts it gives to the plaintiff and defendant each the same extent of 
time, but to the plaintiff the privilege to divide his time so as to 
have the opportunity to open and close his case.
  The Chair might give further reasons in support of his decision; but, 
believing the foregoing to be sufficient, will only refer to a decision 
made by the Speaker of the last House [Mr. Blaine] which is directly in 
point, which decision passed unquestioned by the gentlemen who have 
questioned the correctness of the decision under consideration.
  On the 6th of June, 1874, in the first session of the Forty-third 
Congress, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cannon], from the Committee 
on the Post-Office and Post-Roads, reported back with amendments House 
bill No. 3414, to provide for the prepayment of postage on printed 
matter, and for other purposes. Mr. Cannon took the floor, or, in the 
language of the rule, ``opened the debate'' on the said bill, and after 
replying to various interrogatories propounded, at the end of the hour 
demanded the previous question. Thereupon Mr. Hawley said he wanted it 
distinctly understood that if the previous question was to be ordered 
there could be no more debate. The Speaker said that there could be 
none, and after the previous question was ordered denied further time, 
on the ground that the gentleman took his hour before the previous 
question was ordered.\1\
  The Chair believes that a liberal construction should be allowed in 
case of general debate having occurred over a lengthened period, and in 
such a case would rule an hour to close debate by the Member reporting 
a measure, as in case where a bill has been open to amendments; but to 
give to a Member two consecutive hours in debate is, in the opinion of 
the Chair, at variance with the spirit of the rule, as well as against 
equity and propriety. The Committee on Rules have been consulted by the 
Chair in relation thereto, and are of the opinion, with a single 
exception [Mr. Banks], that the ruling made by the Chair is the correct 
one. They have, however, in view further action, so as to submit to the 
House an amendment to the rules which will make the present rule 
plainer by the use of more explicit language in relation thereto.\2\

  4999. On January 17, 1884,\3\ the House had under consideration a 
bill for immediate improvement of the Mississippi River, and the 
previous question had been ordered on the passage. Thereupon Mr. Albert 
S. Willis, of Kentucky, who had called up the bill, said: ``I believe 
that under the rule one hour is allowed for debate.''
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The Chair is in doubt whether, under the rule, there is an hour 
allowed for debate in this case. This is not a bill reported by the 
Committee on Rivers and Harbors, of which the gentleman from Kentucky 
[Mr. Willis] is chairman, but it is a Senate bill, which has been taken 
from the Speaker's table by action of the House and referred to the 
Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and it was reported 
back to the House by the gentleman from New York as chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union. The Chair thinks that 
under the rule there is not an hour for debate.

  5000. On February 15, 1884,\5\ the contested election case of 
Chalmers v. Manning being under consideration, Mr. Henry G. Turner, of 
Georgia, took the floor and
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  \1\ On January 10, 1879 (third session Forty-fifth Congress, Record, 
p. 412), we find Chairman Horatio C. Burchard, of Illinois, allowing an 
hour to close in Committee of the Whole after the time limit of general 
debate had expired. But this is not the present practice, and appears 
to have been an exceptional ruling.
  \2\ Such a rule does not seem to have been adopted at this session. 
The rules cited in this opinion were in the revisions of 1880 merged 
into sections 3 and 6 of Rule XIV. (See sees. 4996 and 4991 of this 
volume.)
  \3\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Journal, pp. 338, 339; 
Record, p. 466.
  \4\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1167.
Sec. 5001
announced that at the end of an hour he should demand the previous 
question, whereupon Mr. John A. Kasson, of Iowa, told him that he must 
demand it at once. Then arose a controversy as to whether the Member 
reporting a measure was entitled to an hour after the previous question 
was ordered.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  Under the former rules of the House it was well settled that the hour 
for closing debate could be occupied as well after as before the 
previous question was ordered; and, indeed, it was the practice to 
occupy it after the ordering of the previous question. But under the 
new rules the question is presented, which so far the present incumbent 
of the chair has not decided, whether the hour can be taken after the 
previous question is ordered unless it is so understood at the time 
when it is ordered. * * * The present occupant of the chair is inclined 
to think the hour can be occupied after as before the previous question 
is ordered. But the Chair has not yet been called upon to render a 
decision on this question.

  5001. Discussion as to the rights of a contestant who is permitted to 
address the House to close debate in a contested election case.--On May 
6, 1864,\2\ a question arose as to the respective rights of a 
contestant and a sitting Member to close debate in a contested election 
case, wherein the contestant had received the usual permission to take 
a seat on the floor and speak to the merits of the case.
  The Speakers \3\ said:

  The Chair would suggest that the proper way would be for the 
contestant to open, the sitting Member to follow, and the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Ganson], representing the majority of the committee, 
to close the debate. The Chair finds in the case of Barrett against 
Blair, Mr. Phelps, of Missouri, at that time the father of the House, 
made this remark:
  ``During my service in this body in the various cases of contested 
elections that have arisen, whenever the contestant has been permitted 
to address the House he has presented his argument and the sitting 
Member has replied and, so far as those two persons were concerned, 
there was an end of that argument.''
  Mr. Phelps, then the oldest Member of the House, proposed that the 
contestant should open with a speech of one hour, that the sitting 
Member should then follow with a speech of two hours, and that the 
contestant should then have one hour for reply, which was adopted by 
unanimous consent, changing the practice as it had before existed. The 
Chair has merely stated these facts, hoping that the sitting Member and 
the contestant will agree as to the order of debate.

  Mr. Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, recalled that in the case 
referred to the position of Mr. Phelps was contested and the principle 
was enforced that the man who had the affirmative of the case, as every 
other plaintiff in court, had the right to close. So the contestant in 
that case was permitted to close after the sitting Member had spoken.
  The Speaker, in accordance with suggestions from Members, put to the 
House the request that the sitting Member should speak first and then 
that the contestant should occupy the time in closing that the member 
of the committee in charge of the majority report would be entitled to 
under the practice. By unanimous consent this request was granted, and 
the debate was arranged in this way.
  5002. A Member rising to a question of personal privilege was not 
permitted to take from the floor another Member who had been recog-
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  \1\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirty-eighth Congress, Globe, p. 2166.
  \3\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5003
nized for debate.--On May 29, 1906,\1\ Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New 
York, had the floor on his motion to approve the Journal, when Mr. 
Arthur P. Murphy, of Missouri, claimed the floor for a question of 
personal privilege.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The gentleman from Missouri rises to a question of the highest 
personal privilege. The motion before the House is to approve the 
Journal. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Payne] has the floor. In the 
opinion of the Chair, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Murphy] can 
raise his question of the highest personal privilege when the gentleman 
from New York is not upon the floor.

  Mr. John W. Gaines, of Tennessee, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, 
said:

  Does the gentleman state that his question of personal privilege 
grows out of the approval of the Journal?

  The Speaker replied:

  No; nor has the Chair conceded that it would make any difference if 
it did, in the time of the gentleman from New York. The gentleman from 
Missouri can not take the gentleman from New York [Mr. Payne] off of 
the floor upon a question of personal privilege, in the opinion of the 
Chair.

  5003. Under the rules only the Speaker or Chairman may recognize for 
debate, but by unanimous consent the time is sometimes controlled by 
the two Members in charge of the two contentions on the floor.
  Under the rules the Speaker recognizes the Members who address the 
House.
  On March 1, 1898,\3\ the House being about to consider the bill (H. 
R. 5359) to amend the postal laws relating to second-class matter, a 
question arose as to the division of time.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  Under the rules of the House, unless the House unanimously agrees to 
the contrary, the Speaker recognizes the Members who address the House, 
and it has usually been understood that the Speaker will endeavor to 
see that the debate is fairly conducted. That is a part of the duties 
of his office.

  Sometimes, by unanimous consent, the debate is controlled by Members 
in charge on the floor.\5\
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  \1\ First session Fifty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 7622.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 2328.
  \4\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \5\ It is quite common for the House to arrange for the time to be 
controlled by the two Members in charge, one on either side. But if 
such arrangement can not be made, the Speaker recognizes. On January 
31, 1898 (second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1260), Senate 
concurrent resolution No. 22, relating to the redemption of bonds in 
silver, was before the House under a special order which provided for a 
vote at 5 p. m. that day. An attempt was made to have the distribution 
of time made by Mr. Dingley, of Maine, on one side, and Mr. Bailey, of 
Texas, on the other (party leaders, respectively, on Ways and Means 
Committee, which reported the resolution), but this attempt failed, 
leaving the control of recognitions with the Speaker. He recognized 
first the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee (Mr. Dingley), and 
next Mr. Bailey. This was in accordance with usage, and each was 
entitled to an hour. So, also, would the other members of the Ways and 
Means Committee who would come next in order be entitled to an hour 
each. But with so much pressure for time the leading members of the 
committee did not attempt to monopolize the time. Mr. Dingley spoke 
thirty minutes and yielded the rest of the time. Mr. Bailey took even 
less of his time, yielding the remainder. Other members of the Ways and 
Means Committee (Messrs. Payne, of New York, and Robertson, of 
Louisiana) were also recognized, and after using a little time yielded 
the remainder. Thus the time was appor-
Sec. 5004
  5004. The time of a debate having been divided and assigned to the 
control of the two sides, it must be assigned to Members in accordance 
with the rules, no Member being allowed more than one hour.--On May 13, 
1896,\1\ the House was considering the contested election case of 
Rinaker v. Downing, and by unanimous consent it had been agreed that 
the time should be divided between the two sides and controlled by 
gentlemen representing them. Mr. Edward D. Cooke, of Illinois, who 
controlled the time on the side of the majority of the committee, 
having yielded to Mr. James A. Connolly, of Illinois, such time as he 
might desire, the latter in his remarks exceeded one hour.
  Mr. William H. Moody, of Massachusetts, made the point of order that 
the other side were entitled to the floor.
  The Speaker pro tempore \2\ said:

  If the gentleman makes the point of order that the time of the 
gentleman from Illinois has expired, the Chair will so hold. He was 
about to state why he so held; but if the gentleman from Illinois does 
not care to hear the reason he need not. The Chair holds that the 
gentleman's time has expired. * * * The present occupant of the Chair 
fails to find from the Record that there was an absolute agreement as 
to unlimited time. There was simply an agreement, not to fix any time, 
but to allow the time occupied to be controlled on the one side by the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cooke] and on the other side by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moody]. Under the circumstances, the 
time occupied by any particular Member would be governed by the rules 
of the House, and the gentleman from Illinois could have been granted 
but one hour. He has exceeded that time; therefore his time has 
expired, and he can not proceed now unless by unanimous consent.

  Several parliamentary inquiries having been made as to the right of 
Mr. Cooke to yield unlimited time to Mr. Connolly, the Speaker,\3\ who 
had resumed the Chair, said:

  Whenever the time is under the control of two gentlemen on opposite 
sides of the question, it is always understood that it is under such 
control subject to the rules of the House, and the rule of the House 
limits any Member to sixty minutes unless by unanimous consent it is 
changed.
  5005. On January 5, 1897,\4\ the bill (H. R. 4566) to amend the 
postal laws relating to second-class matter was under consideration in 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, and the time of 
debate had, by unanimous consent, been placed under the control of Mr. 
Eugene F. Loud, of California, on the one side, and Mr. Lemuel E. 
Quigg, of New York, on the other.
  Mr. Quigg having taken the floor, and having at the end of an hour 
been informed that one hour had expired, was proceeding, when the 
Chairman informed him that he was proceeding by unanimous consent.
  Mr. Quigg thereupon made the point that he was proceeding in his own 
time.
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tioned out by members of the Ways and Means Committee, the Speaker 
making only the recognitions required by usage. With a longer time for 
debate the usage generally is to recognize the members of the committee 
for an hour each, and then, if it is necessary to economize time and 
there is much pressure, it is customary for the Speaker or Chairman by 
general consent to recognize members for stipulated periods less than 
the hour allowed by the rules. In this way more members are allowed to 
speak than could be accommodated did each Member recognized use the 
hour allotted him by the rules.
  \1\ First session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 5199.
  \2\ James S. Sherman, of New York, Speaker pro tempore.
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, pp. 462, 465.
                                                            Sec. 5006
  The Chairman\1\ said:

  But the gentleman could not, without the unanimous consent of the 
committee, which had been given, occupy more than one hour.

  On January 7, 1897,\2\ the House was in Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union considering the Pacific Railroad funding bill 
(H. R. 8189), and it had been arranged by unanimous consent that the 
time should be controlled by Mr. H. Henry Powers, of Vermont, on the 
one side, and by Mr. Joel D. Hubbard, of Missouri, on the other.
  Mr. Powers having taken the floor, was informed, at the end of one 
hour, that his time had expired.
  Mr. Powers made the point that he had entire control of the time on 
one side.
  The Chairman \3\ said:

  That is correct; but under the rules of the House, even where 
unlimited time is within the control of a Member, he is not allowed, 
except by unanimous consent, to occupy the floor for more than one 
hour.

  5006. A Member desiring to interrupt another in debate should address 
the Chair for permission of the Member speaking.--On January 5, 
1901,\4\ during debate on the bill (H. R. 12740) ``making an 
apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States 
under the Twelfth Census,'' a discussion arose between Messrs. Charles 
E. Littlefield, of Maine, and Albert J. Hopkins, of Illinois.
  The Chair,\5\ interrupting, said:

  The Chair wants to say that it is utterly out of the question to have 
an orderly debate in the House unless the rules of the House are 
observed. The rules of the House require that when a Member rises he 
shall first address the Chair, and the rules also forbid one Member to 
address another in the second person. The Chair hopes that Members will 
conform to the rules of the House.

  On January 8,\6\ during discussion of the same bill and under similar 
circumstances, the Speaker \7\ said:

  The Chair will state that if anyone desires to interrupt the Member 
who is speaking he must rise and address the Chair, and get permission.

  5007. It is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying 
the floor in debate to determine when and by whom he shall be 
interrupted.--On January 15, 1868,\8\ the House was considering the 
bill (H. R. 208) ``extending the time for the completion of the Dubuque 
and Sioux City Railroad,'' Mr. Benjamin F. Hopkins, of Wisconsin, 
having the floor.
  Mr. Hopkins yielded to Mr. Elihu B. Washburne, for an interruption, 
and then, having withdrawn his consent to further interruption, yielded 
the floor to Mr. Rufus P. Spalding, of Ohio.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ James S. Sherman, of New York, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 559.
  \3\ John A. T. Hull, of Iowa, Chairman.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 593.
  \5\ John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, Speaker pro tempore.
  \6\ Record, p. 710.
  \7\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \8\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Journal, p. 191; Globe, p. 541.
Sec. 5008
  Mr. Washburne made the point of order that it was not competent for a 
Member entitled to the floor to refuse to be interrupted by one Member 
and then yield to another.
  The Speaker,\1\ overruled the point of order.
  Mr. Washburne having appealed, the decision of the Chair was 
affirmed, yeas 136, nays 0.
  5008. On March 23, 1904,\2\ during debate on the post-office 
appropriation bill in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, Mr. Robert Baker, of New York, interrupted a Member who had 
declined to yield to him.
  Whereupon the Chairman \3\ said:

  The gentleman from New York is out of order, and the gentleman has 
transgressed the rules of orderly procedure of the House of 
Representatives.

  And when Mr. Baker persisted, the Chairman said:

  The gentleman is still out of order. The gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Baker] has again transgressed the rules of orderly procedure of the 
House of Representatives.

  5009. In the House a Member may yield the floor for a motion to 
adjourn without losing his right to continue when the subject shall be 
considered again.--On May 16, 1900,\4\ the regular order being 
demanded, the Speaker directed the call of committees in the morning 
hour.
  The call rested on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which on the 
preceding day had presented the bill (S. 2931) ``to incorporate the 
American National Red Cross Association, and for other purposes.''
  This bill being undisposed of, the Speaker announced that Mr. 
Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, who on the previous day had 
yielded the floor for a motion to adjourn, was recognized for the 
fifteen minutes remaining of his hour.
  Mr. Champ Clark, of Missouri, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, 
asked if the gentleman from Massachusetts did not on the previous day, 
by yielding the floor for a motion to adjourn, lose his right to 
reoccupy it.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The Chair thinks not, as he only yielded for a motion to adjourn.

  5010. On January 29, 1861,\6\ Speaker pro tempore George A. Briggs, 
of New York, decided that a Member who in the House yielded the floor 
for a motion to adjourn, yielded it unconditionally and lost the right 
to resume it. On appeal this decision was sustained.
  5011. A Member who has yielded the floor for a motion to adjourn is 
entitled to prior recognition after that motion is decided in the 
negative.--On March 26, 1836,\7\ during the consideration of a 
contested election case from North Carolina, Mr. John Calhoon, of 
Kentucky, who had the floor in debate,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3587.
  \3\ H. S. Boutell, of Illinois, Chairman.
  \4\ First session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 5618.
  \5\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \6\ Second session Thirty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 247; Globe, pp. 
628, 629.
  \7\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 2986.
                                                            Sec. 5012
yielded the floor in order that Mr. Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, might 
move an adjournment.
  The motion to adjourn having been made, and decided in the negative 
on a vote by yeas and nays, Mr. Samuel Cushman, of New Hampshire, arose 
and addressed the Chair for the purpose of demanding the previous 
question.
  The Speaker \1\ decided that Mr. Calhoon was entitled to the floor. 
To give the gentleman from Kentucky the floor under the circumstances 
was in conformity with the practice and courtesy of the House.
  5012. A Member having the floor in debate in Committee of the Whole 
may yield for a motion that the committee rise without losing his right 
to continue at the next sitting.--On February 14, 1850,\2\ the House 
resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union, and the Chairman stated that the business before the 
committee was the consideration of the resolution referring the various 
subjects of the President's message to the several committees of the 
House, and that on that question the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Henry 
W. Hilliard, who held the floor in continuation of remarks commenced by 
him on a previous day, was entitled to the floor. Mr. Hilliard had 
obtained the floor on February 12, and had yielded to a motion that the 
committee rise.
  Mr. Preston King, of New York, moved to lay aside the consideration 
of the resolutions before the committee, with a view to take up the 
message of the President concerning California.
  The Chairman \3\ decided that the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. 
Hilliard] was entitled to the floor, and that the motion of the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. King] was not in order.
  On appeal the decision of the Chair was sustained.
  5013. On February 22, 1851,\4\ the House was in Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union, considering the fortifications 
appropriation bill. Mr. John W. Houston, of Delaware, had the floor, 
when he yielded it to Mr. Robert M. McLane, of Maryland, to move that 
the committee might rise in order to close debate.
  Mr. George W. Jones, of Tennessee, raised the point of order that the 
gentleman from Delaware could not, under the rules and practice of the 
House, yield the floor, even for an explanation, without the unanimous 
consent, and that the gentleman from Maryland, having had the floor on 
this subject, was not entitled to it again.
  The Chairman \5\ stated that it had been the invariable practice of 
the House for one Member to yield the floor to another for a motion to 
rise. It was not, of course, for the Chair to inquire what was the 
object in moving that the committee rise.
  On an appeal by Mr. Jones the decision of the Chair was sustained.
  5014. A Member who has yielded the floor to enable the subject to be 
postponed to a day certain was held to be entitled to prior recognition
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, pp. 340, 358.
  \3\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Chairman.
  \4\ Second session Thirty-first Congress; Globe, p. 645.
  \5\ James S. Green, of Virginia, Chairman.
Sec. 5015
when the subject was again considered.--On April 25, 1836,\1\ the House 
was considering resolutions of the legislature of Kentucky relating to 
the revenue arising from the sale of public lands, and Mr. Albert G. 
Hawes, of Kentucky, arose to address the House.
  Mr. Sherrod Williams, of Kentucky, rose and inquired whether Mr. 
Hawes, who had yielded the floor on the day when the subject was last 
under consideration of the House, to another Member to make a motion to 
postpone the same to a future day, had now the right to the floor on 
the question pending before the House ``until every Member choosing to 
speak shall have spoken.''
  The Speaker \2\ stated the facts to the House, viz: Mr. Hawes, when 
the subject was last under discussion, being entitled to the floor, had 
proceeded to address the House, and before he had concluded his 
remarks, yielded the floor to a Member to make a motion to postpone the 
subject to a future day; and the subject was accordingly postponed. 
Under this state of facts the Speaker took the sense of the House, 
whether Mr. Hawes was now entitled to the floor.
  The House decided in the affirmative, and Mr. Hawes proceeded, 
concluding his remarks.
  5015. A Member who resumes his seat while a paper is being read in 
his time does not thereby lose his right to proceed.--On May 20, 
1830,\3\ the House was considering a bill to reduce the duty on salt, 
and a motion to commit the bill was pending.
  Mr. Ralph I. Ingersoll, of Connecticut, moved to amend the motion to 
commit by adding certain instructions, which he sent to the Clerk's 
desk to be read.
  While the Clerk was reading Mr. Ingersoll resumed his seat.
  At the conclusion of the reading Mr. Starling Tucker, of South 
Carolina, rose and addressed the Chair.
  Mr. Ingersoll claimed his right to the floor.
  The Speaker \4\ decided that he was entitled to proceed in speaking 
to his motion,
  5016. A Member who resumes his seat after being called to order, 
loses his claim to prior right of recognition.--On February 27, 
1810,\5\ during the consideration of the bill entitled ``An act 
respecting the commercial intercourse between the United States and 
Great Britain and France, and for other purposes,'' Mr. Barent 
Gardenier, of New York, was called to order by Mr. John W. Eppes, of 
Virginia, for deviating from the question before the House, which was a 
motion to refer to a select committee.
  The Speaker \6\ sustained the point of order.
  Mr. Gardenier having sat down, and being about to proceed after 
another Member had risen and addressed the Chair, the Speaker decided 
that the Member from 'New York had lost his prior right to the floor.
  An appeal being taken, the decision of the Chair was sustained, yeas 
77, nays 43.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 749; Debates, 
p. 3360.
  \2\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Twenty-first Congress, Journal, p. 987.
  \4\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Eleventh Congress, Journal, p. 253 (Gales and 
Seaton ed.); Annals, p. 1462.
  \6\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5017
  5017. A Senator who had yielded the floor to a message from the House 
was held entitled to resume the floor to the exclusion of other 
business.--On February 25, 1868,\1\ in the Senate, Mr. Garrett Davis, 
of Kentucky, had the floor in debate, when a committee from the House 
of Representatives appeared at the bar of the Senate to impeach Andrew 
Johnson, President of the United States.
  The President pro tempore \2\ said:

  The Senator from Kentucky will yield.

  Mr. Davis thereupon yielded, and the committee delivered their 
message and withdrew.
  Thereupon Mr. Jacob M. Howard, of Michigan, proposed as a question of 
privilege a resolution relating to the message just received.
  Mr. Davis claimed the floor and declined to yield for the resolution. 
He said that, according to the universal usage and courtesy between the 
two Houses, he had yielded for the message, but that as soon as that 
had been delivered his right to the floor was resumed, and he could not 
be taken from the floor by a privileged motion or anything else. Mr. 
George F. Edmunds, of Vermont, argued in support of this contention.
  The President pro tempore having submitted the question to the 
Senate, it was decided that Mr. Davis was entitled to the floor.
  5018. According to the later practice a Member having time for debate 
may yield such portion of it as he may choose to another.--On July 17, 
1866,\3\ Mr. Rufus P. Spalding, of Ohio, having a few minutes of his 
hour remaining, proposed to yield the remaining time to Mr. Nathaniel 
P. Banks, of Massachusetts.
  Mr. Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, raised a question of order as 
to the right of the gentleman from Ohio to do this.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The Chair sustains the right of the gentleman from Ohio to keep the 
floor and yield it until the end of his hour.\5\ The gentleman has 
fourteen minutes remaining, which he yields to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts.

  5019. On May 27, 1870,\6\ Mr. Samuel J. Randall, having three minutes 
of time remaining, proposed to yield it to another Member.
  A question as to his right so to do being raised, Mr. Speaker Blaine 
said:

  When a gentleman has been granted time by the House, he has the 
control of the disposition of that time.

  5020. On March 31, 1870,\7\ a question arose as to the right of a 
Member in debate to yield of his time to another.
  Mr. James Brooks, of New York, contended that a Member might yield to 
another for explanation, but not for general discussion.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, pp. 1405, 1406.
  \2\ Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, President pro tempore.
  \3\ First session Thirty-ninth Congress, Globe, p. 3890.
  \4\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \5\ This is the unquestioned practice of the House at the present 
time.
  \6\ Second session Forty-first Congress, Globe, p. 3863.
  \7\ Second session Forty-first Congress, Globe, pp. 2324, 2325.
Sec. 5021
  The Speaker \1\ said that a Member might yield any portion of his 
time for the discussion of whatever measure might be pending. He only 
lost his right to the floor when he yielded for an amendment. He also 
quoted the Journal Clerk,\2\ whose service reached back twenty-five 
years, in support of this as the usage of the House, Mr. Brooks having 
denied that such had been the practice of the past.
  5021. The practice of permitting a Member to yield time within his 
control for debate to another Member began about 1852, but was 
questioned even as late as 1879.
  The practice of yielding time in debate grew up in the House after 
the establishment of the hour rule had made it practicable. (Footnote.)
  A Member who has the floor in debate may not yield to another Member 
to offer an amendment without losing control of his time.
  On March 29, 1852,\3\ Mr. Frederick P. Stanton, of Tennessee, from 
the Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred a Senate bill (No. 
154), ``An act to enforce discipline and promote good conduct in the 
naval service of the United States,'' the rules having been suspended 
for that purpose, reported the same with an amendment.
  The Speaker stated the question to be on agreeing to the said 
amendment.
  During discussion, Mr. Charles E. Stuart, of Michigan, who was 
entitled to the floor, yielded the same to Mr. Willard P. Hall, of 
Missouri.
  Mr. George W. Jones, of Tennessee, made the point of order that the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Hall] was not in order in explaining the 
bill, it only being competent for him to make a personal explanation.
  The Speaker \4\ decided that under the uniform practice of the House 
it was competent for Mr. Hall to pursue the course of remarks in which 
he was engaged.
  On appeal, the Speaker was sustained by a vote of 93 to 30, by 
tellers.
  The record of the debate shows that Mr. Jones, in rising to the 
question of order, asked if the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Stuart, 
could take the floor and ``farm it out'' to everyone who wished to 
speak upon the bill.
  The Speaker stated that the universal practice of the House had been 
for a Member having the floor to yield to others for explanation 
connected with the subject-matter before the House. It was a different 
case to yield the floor for amendments. That might be objected to. It 
had been common for gentlemen having the floor for an hour to yield to 
other gentlemen who might wish to make explanations within that 
hour.\5\
  Mr. Jones, in taking his appeal, said he wished to let the House 
determine whether gentlemen could take the floor and ``farm it out'' to 
others.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ Mr. Barclay.
  \3\ First session Thirty-second Congress, Journal, p. 524; Globe, p. 
911.
  \4\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ On February 9, 1827 (second session Nineteenth Congress, Debates, 
p. 1045), before the adoption of the hour rule in debate, Mr. Speaker 
Taylor decided that a gentleman who yielded the floor had no power to 
determine who next should have it.
                                                            Sec. 5022
  5022. On February 19, 1855,\1\ during debate on the veto message 
relating to the French spoliation claims, Mr. Mordecai Oliver, of 
Missouri, having the floor, Mr. Louis D. Campbell, of Ohio, asked the 
gentleman to allow him ``to say a word.''
  Mr. John Wheeler, of New York, objected to ``this farming out the 
floor.''
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The Chair would remark that it is not in order for any gentleman to 
yield the floor except for the purpose of explanation.

  5023. On August 12, 1848,\3\ during consideration of a communication 
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Mr. James J. Faran, of Ohio, 
having the floor in debate, yielded it to Mr. John D. Cummins, of Ohio.
  Mr. Cummins was proceeding to offer some remarks when Mr. William 
Duer, of New York, raised the question of order that the gentleman 
could not yield the floor without losing entirely his right to reoccupy 
it.
  The Speaker \4\ stated that, by the courtesy of the House, gentlemen 
had been allowed to yield to others for explanations and still retain 
the floor; but, by the strict parliamentary law, if it was insisted on, 
but one gentleman could be entitled to the floor at a time.
  5024. On February 22, 1853,\5\ Mr. Thomas S. Bocock, of Virginia, as 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
held that during debate a gentleman had the right to yield the floor 
only for explanation. A Member having an hour had announced his 
disposition to transfer his time to such members of the Indian Affairs 
Committee as might wish to speak on the bill. The Chairman did not 
permit this.
  5025. On February 14, 1861,\6\ Speaker pro tempore William Kellogg, 
of Illinois, held that a Member having the floor might yield his time 
to another Member; but the House overruled this decision.
  5026. On June 21, 1864 \7\ Mr. Speaker Colfax informing Mr. Robert C. 
Schenck, of Ohio, who, after speaking some time, proposed to yield to 
Mr. Garfield, of Ohio, for a few minutes, that he could not yield the 
floor unless he yielded it unconditionally.
  5027. On May 13, 1879,\8\ Mr. Speaker Randall said:

  On a recent occasion the Chair decided upon an expressed opinion of 
the House that a Member had no right to ``farm out'' to other Members 
portions of his time. * * * The members of a committee reporting a bill 
have a right to the preference. The Chair thinks that that preference, 
under the disposition manifested by the House, should be confined to 
the time occupied by the Member himself, or they might otherwise take 
up the whole time allowed for the discussion of a bill, and exclude 
from participation in debate those who are perhaps as much interested 
in the subject as members of the committee, and who may not have an 
opportunity of inducing a member of the committee to give them the time 
they desired. Now, the Chair thinks that the practice is right, because 
the responsibility of the disposition of the floor should be in the 
Chair, and not in Members on the floor of the House.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, p. 815.
  \2\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Thirtieth Congress, Globe, p. 1069.
  \4\ Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Thirty-second Congress, Globe, p. 785.
  \6\ Second session Thirty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 318; Globe, pp. 
916, 917.
  \7\ First session Thirty-eighth Congress, Globe, p. 3147.
  \8\ First session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 1312.
Sec. 5028
  5028. The right of a Member to yield of his time has been modified by 
the principle that members of the committee reporting the subject are 
entitled to prior recognition.--On January 22, 1874,\1\ during the 
consideration of the West Virginia election cases, the Speaker \2\ 
said:

  The Chair suggests that the rules of the House give to a committee 
making a report the first right to the floor; and the gentleman from 
Ohio, Mr. Robinson [who had proposed to yield to one not a member of 
the Committee on Elections], is clearly entitled to an hour in his own 
right. But if that gentleman has no disposition to occupy his hour, the 
Chair suggests that the balance of his time should go to other members 
of the Committee on Elections before gentlemen who are not members of 
the committee are heard. That would be in accordance with the 
groundwork of the rules of the House on this subject.

  5029. A Member may control the time allowed him by the rules, 
yielding time to others for debate, but not for amendment.--On April 9, 
1869,\3\ during debate on the election case of Myers v. Moffet, the 
Speaker \2\ ruled:

  The Chair would state that according to the uniform and unbroken 
usage of the House, where a gentleman rises to debate under the hour 
rule, if he yields a portion of his time he controls the question of 
making motions within that hour if he yields for debate only, and it is 
not the right of any gentleman speaking within his time to make an 
adverse or hostile motion.

  5030. On January 30, 1904,\4\ the House was considering the bill (H. 
R. 10418) to ratify and amend an agreement with the Sioux tribe of 
Indians. Mr. Charles H. Burke, of South Dakota, having the floor, 
proposed to yield for an amendment.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The Chair will state to the gentleman from South Dakota that the 
Chair understands the rule to be this: In the hour that the gentleman 
controls the bill is not subject to amendment, and that so far the 
amendments have been read for information. Now, if the gentleman yields 
the floor the bill will be subject to amendment. * * * The amendments 
reported from the committee are pending. The gentleman from South 
Dakota can offer an amendment if he sees proper, and then call the 
previous question. He can test the sense of the House at any time he 
desires.

  5031. A Member who, having the floor in debate, yields to another to 
offer an amendment loses his right to resume.--On January 29, 1840,\6\ 
the House having before it a proposition relating to the printing of 
the House, the question was on an amendment submitted by Mr. William J. 
Graves, of Kentucky, when a motion was made by Mr. Rice Garland, of 
Louisiana, to amend the same by inserting therein, after the word 
``same,'' these words: ``And into the expediency of entirely separating 
the patronage of the Government from the newspaper or public press of 
the country.''
  A question of order was raised by Mr. Aaron Vanderpoel, of New York, 
that the amendment proposed by Mr. Garland was not in order for this--
that Mr. Graves, who was entitled to the floor, had no right to yield 
it to Mr. Garland to offer his amendment, and that, therefore, the 
amendment of Mr. Garland was not rightfully before the House.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Forty-third Congress, Record, p. 848.
  \2\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Globe, p. 683.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 1428.
  \5\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \6\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 248; Globe, pp. 
153, 154.
                                                            Sec. 5032
  The Speaker \1\ decided that Mr. Graves had a right to yield the 
floor to Mr. Garland, but that when he did so he yielded it 
unconditionally; that any other Member would have been entitled to 
succeed Mr. Garland who could obtain the floor by rising first; that, 
consequently, the amendment of Mr. Garland was rightfully before the 
House.
  From this decision Mr. Vanderpoel appealed to the House, and the 
decision of the Chair was sustained--126 yeas to 71 nays.
  5032. When a Member yields of his time for debate, an amendment may 
not be offered in the yielded time without his consent.--On February 
24, 1897,\2\ Mr. John P. Tracey, of Missouri, presented a resolution 
from the Committee on Accounts, and took the floor, yielding time to 
others with the apparent intention of moving the previous question 
before the expiration of the hour, thus confining the debate within 
that time.
  Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, to whom a few moments had been 
yielded by Mr. Tracey, proposed to offer an amendment, asking of the 
Speaker if it would be in order for him to do so.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair thinks it is not in order without the consent of the 
gentleman from Missouri. * * * The Chair thinks that when a gentleman 
yields the floor under such circumstances, retaining control of it, an 
amendment can not be offered without his consent, because he has a 
right to test the will of the House by moving the previous question 
free from the amendment. * * * The proper way is to vote the previous 
question down if the House desires to consider the amendment.

  5033. A Member who receives time in debate from another may yield of 
it to a third only with the consent of the original possessor.--On 
February 19, 1897,\4\ Mr. Fernando C. Layton, of Ohio, presented a 
conference report on the bill (S. 3150) granting a pension to Mary 
Gould Carr.
  Mr. G. C. Crowther, of Missouri, having been recognized in his own 
right, yielded of his time to others. Among them was Mr. Layton, who, 
as a parliamentary inquiry, asked of the Speaker if in turn he could 
yield a portion of his time to another Member, his colleague.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair would suppose that the gentleman could yield to his 
colleague, with the consent of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
Crowther.]

  5034. On February 10, 1898,\5\ the House was considering the bill (H. 
R. 2196) directing the issue of a duplicate lost check.
  Mr. George D. Perkins, of Iowa, being recognized, yielded thirty 
minutes to Mr. Joseph W. Bailey, of Texas, whereupon Mr. Bailey 
proposed to yield the time so obtained to Mr. Levin I. Handy, of 
Delaware.
  Mr. Perkins made the point of order that Mr. Bailey could not thus 
yield yielded time.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 2208.
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 1995.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1632.
Sec. 5035
  The Speaker \1\ decided that time thus yielded could not be yielded 
again except by the consent of the Member originally yielding the time.
  Mr. Perkins having consented to the transfer of the time to Mr. 
Handy, the latter proceeded.
  5035. Members may not yield time during the five-minute debate.--On 
May 14, 1890,\2\ the House was in Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union considering the bill (H. R. 9416) to reduce the 
revenue and equalize the duty on imports, and for other purposes.
  The time of Mr. Mark H. Dunnell, of Minnesota, having expired, the 
debate being under the five-minute rule, Mr. Richard P. Bland, of 
Missouri, proposed to be recognized in order to yield time to Mr. 
Dunnell.
  The Chairman \3\ said:

  The Chair will follow the ruling of his predecessor in the chair, and 
will not recognize the right of gentlemen to yield time in the five-
minute debate.

  Again, on May 16,\4\ the same Chairman, in a similar case, said, in 
response to a suggestion of Mr. David B. Henderson, of Iowa, in regard 
to yielding time:

  The Chair can not recognize the gentleman's right to yield to 
anybody; that is the established usage in the Committee.

  5036. On March 30, 1897,\5\ the House was in Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union considering the tariff bill (H. R. 379) 
under the five minute rule. Mr. George W. Steele, of Indiana, having 
been recognized, proposed to yield a portion of his five minutes to 
another Member.
  The Chairman \6\ said:

  The Chair thinks the gentleman must occupy his own time.\7\

  5037. On June 13, 1902,\8\ the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union was considering the bill (S. 3057) ``for the 
reclamation of arid lands by irrigation,'' when Mr. Frank W. Mondell, 
of Wyoming, having been recognized for debate under the five-minute 
rule, proposed to yield four minutes to Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois.
  Mr. James M. Robinson, of Indiana, objected.
  The Chairman \9\ held that the gentleman from Wyoming was not 
entitled to yield time.
  5038. Before the adoption of rules, while the House was proceeding 
under general parliamentary law, it was held that a Member having the 
floor in debate might not yield the floor to another without losing the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Record, p. 4662.
  \3\ Charles H. Grosvenor, of Ohio, Chairman.
  \4\ Record, p. 4776.
  \5\ First session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 481.
  \6\ James S. Sherman, of New York, Chairman.
  \7\ Time is quite often yielded under the five-minute rule, no one 
objecting, and in at least one instance with the approval of the 
Chairman. (See Record, first session Fifty-fourth Congress, p. 2503.)
  \8\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6751.
  \9\ James A. Tawney, of Minnesota, Chairman.
                                                            Sec. 5039
right to resume.--On January 29, 1890,\1\ the House not having adopted 
rules, and the proceedings being under general parliamentary law, Mr. 
Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, took the floor and was proceeding to 
discuss the ruling of the Speaker in relation to the counting of the 
quorum present, when Mr. Joseph W. Covert, of New York, requested that 
the gentleman from Georgia yield to him for a moment.
  A question arising as to the right to yield, the Speaker \2\ said:

  The gentleman from Georgia has the floor and if he yields the floor 
he must yield it entirely

  5039. On February 7, 1890,\3\ the House being still conducting its 
proceedings under general parliamentary law \4\ a bill (H. R. 14) for 
the erection of a monument to the memory of Major-General Knox was 
under consideration.
  Mr. Charles H. Mansur, of Missouri, having the floor, proposed to 
yield to another Member, when Mr. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, made 
the point of order that a Member occupying the floor can not yield it 
to other Members and still retain the right to the floor.
  The Speaker pro tempore \5\ sustained the point of order.
  5040. On December 23, 1859,\6\ before the election of a Speaker or 
the adoption of rules, the Clerk (Mr. James C. Allen, of Illinois) gave 
the following opinion in regard to yielding the floor in debate:

  The Clerk will state that by the parliamentary law the gentleman, if 
he yield the floor, will only be entitled to it again as a matter of 
courtesy.\7\ It has been usual, however, when the gentlemen yield the 
floor for any purpose whatever, with an understanding that they shall 
resume it, that they are permitted to resume it when the discussion is 
resumed.

  5041. In the Senate a Senator may not take the floor and then yield 
periods of time to other Senators.--On March 3, 1905,\8\ in the Senate, 
the President \9\ pro tempore said:

  The Chair does not wish to be misunderstood. The Chair did not rule 
that a Senator could not yield to a brother Senator. He simply ruled 
that it is entirely beyond the custom in the United States Senate for a 
Senator to take the floor and hold it for a quarter of an hour, or half 
an hour, or an hour, and parcel out the time, as is done sometimes in 
the other House. The Chair intended to say nothing that would prevent a 
Senator from yielding to a brother Senator once or more. * * * The 
Chair never has ruled in relation to that matter before an objection 
has been made; and, in the opinion of the Chair, when objection is made 
the Chair will be obliged to rule that the Senator has no right to 
yield the floor.\10\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Record, pp. 955, 1010.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 209; Record, p. 
1146.
  \4\ The rules were not adopted until February 14, 1890.
  \5\ Lewis E. Payson, of Illinois, Speaker pro tempore.
  \6\ First session Thirty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 224.
  \7\ As there is no rule in general parliamentary law limiting the 
time which a Member may use in debate, the right to yield the floor to 
another would evidently be subversive of the rights of Members 
generally.
  \8\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3945.
  \9\ William P. Frye, of Maine, President pro tempore.
  \10\ As the Senate has no rule limiting the time during which a 
Senator may occupy the floor in debate, the principle of this rule is 
evidently essential to the fairness of procedure. In the House with the 
hour rule, it is not necessary.
Sec. 5042
  5042. The Member shall confine himself to the question under debate, 
avoiding personality.--The final clause of section 1 of Rule XIV \1\ 
provides that the Member ``shall confine himself to the question under 
debate, avoiding personality.''
  Jefferson's Manual, in Section XVII, also has the still older 
parliamentary rule:

  No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluous, 
or tediously. (Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl., 133.)

  5043. It has always been held, and generally quite strictly, that in 
the House the Member must confine himself to the subject under debate.
  Reference to an early criticism of the rules as too strict in 
relation to freedom of debate. (Footnote.)
  On February 7, 1825,\2\ the rules for the government of the coming 
Presidential election by the House were taken from the Committee of the 
Whole, and Mr. George McDuffie, of South Carolina, proceeded to 
continue the debate begun in Committee of the Whole. The question 
before the House was a motion to strike out a provision allowing the 
galleries to be cleared on the motion of one State during the election 
of President. Mr. McDuffie was discussing whether the people had the 
right to instruct their delegates, this being brought about through 
discussion of the influence of people in the galleries.
  In the midst of the speech Mr. Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, 
observed that he rose with great pain, and he hoped the gentleman from 
South Carolina would do him the justice to believe that nothing but an 
imperious conviction of duty induced him to interrupt an argument which 
he knew it would give him pleasure to hear; but he submitted whether it 
was in order to go into an argument in the House in reply to an 
argument urged in Committee of the Whole any more than if it had been 
urged in a select committee.
  The Speaker \3\ decided that the observations of Mr. McDuffie were 
not in order, on the ground stated, and that they were not in order for 
another reason, viz, that the whole scope of the debate was irrelevant 
to the question actually before the House.
  Mr. McDuffie, upon the latter ground, submitted to the decision of 
the Chair.\4\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ For the form and history of this rule see section 4979 of this 
volume.
  \2\ Second session Eighteenth Congress, Debates, p. 510.
  \3\ Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ A commentary on the strictness with which the rule was enforced 
is afforded at an earlier date than this. On January 19, 1816 (first 
session Fourteenth Congress, Annals, p. 698), Mr. John Randolph, of 
Virginia, in debating the rule relating to the previous question, said: 
``There are other members of those rules which might well content those 
gentlemen, whatever their appetite might be for despotism. Some that 
might satisfy the Grand Inquisitor himself,'' One of these was the 
``call to order.'' The Annals say: ``On this subject Mr. Randolph was 
very pointed and powerful. He showed from the rules of the British 
House of Commons, laid down by Mr. Hatsell, that no instance ever was 
known in that body of a member's being prevented from discussing any 
proposition, either immediately sub judice or that he wished to bring 
before them, and that the only interruption allowable in it was 
confined to cases where anything touching the royal authority was 
introduced.''
  lt was the custom of the earlier Speakers to hold the Member speaking 
strictly to the question before the House, without waiting for the 
point to be made on the floor. (See instances in 1828, first session 
Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 927, 928, 933, 937, 947, 965.)
                                                            Sec. 5044
  5044. On May 7,1846,\1\ a motion was made by Mr. Joshua R. Giddings, 
of Ohio, to reconsider the vote by which the House on the previous day 
ordered the message of the President of the United States, in relation 
to shooting soldiers for desertion, printed.
  Mr. Giddings proceeded to debate his motion, and while proceeding 
therein was called to order by Mr. Armistead Burt, of South Carolina, 
for irrelevancy.
  Mr. Giddings took his seat.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that the remarks of Mr. Giddings were not in 
order.
  From this decision Mr. Reuben Chapman, of Alabama, appealed, and 
moved that his appeal be laid upon the table; which motion was agreed 
to.
  And so Mr. Giddings was precluded from debating further his motion to 
reconsider.
  5045. On April 9, 1884,\3\ the House having passed a bill requiring 
the governors of Territories to be residents of the Territories for two 
years preceding appointment, the question of agreeing to the title of 
the bill came up.
  Pending this, Mr. John D. White, of Kentucky, moved to amend the 
title by adding thereto the following words, viz, ``by restricting the 
appointing power of the President.''
  During debate on this amendment Mr. James H. Budd, of California, 
made the point of order that Mr. White was not in order in discussing 
the amendment, for the reason that he was not confining himself to the 
question under debate.
  The Speaker \4\ sustained the point of order, and held that under the 
rule Mr. White must confine himself to the question before the House.
  5046. On December 2, 1890,\5\ the Speaker laid before the House the 
bill of the Senate (S. 2591) giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction of 
the claims on account of property of the Chesapeake Female College 
possessed and used by the United States military authorities.
  The House having proceeded to its consideration, and the question 
being on its third reading, Mr. Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, obtained 
the floor and proceeded to address the House upon the subject of the 
tariff.
  Mr. William J. Stone, of Kentucky, made the point of order that Mr. 
Wheeler was not speaking upon the question before the House, and was 
therefore not in order.
  The Speaker \6\ sustained the point of order.
  5047. On February 10, 1898,\7\ the House was proceeding with the 
consideration of the bill (H.R. 7559) making Rockland, Me., a subport 
of entry. Mr. Levin I. Handy, of Delaware, having obtained the floor, 
was proceeding to discuss a subject relating to a citizen of his own 
State, when Mr. John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, called him to order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, pp. 764, 769.
  \2\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 1014.
  \4\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 13; Record, p. 
30.
  \6\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, pp. 1632-1635.
Sec. 5048
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair has no desire to make any strict enforcement of the rule 
upon any subject unless it be such as is absolutely necessary for the 
proper transaction of the public business of this House.
  While the custom of the House of Representatives heretofore has 
allowed a very wide latitude of debate in the Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union, such latitude has not been allowed--or 
such has not been the custom--in the House itself. In the House itself 
a Member addressing himself to a subject under consideration is 
expected to confine himself to the subject of the debate. If he wanders 
from that, and it is evident that it is his intention to do so, then he 
is out of order, and either the Speaker of the House himself, or any 
Member of the House, can call him to order. That being the case, he 
must proceed in order under the rules and address himself to the 
subject-matter of debate--the matter under consideration.
  Now, the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. 
Handy] both, with the utmost frankness, have stated that the gentleman 
from Delaware, to whom time was yielded, did not intend to discuss the 
bill before the House for consideration, but that he did propose to 
introduce extraneous matter; and the Chair is quite sure that both 
sides of the House will see that it is not a suitable subject for 
discussion on a bill of this character.
  All sides will agree that it is not suitable that we should adopt 
here a system by which any matter or subject could be discussed in the 
consideration of a proposition pending before the House rather than the 
one actually before it.
  The early custom of the House, as the Chair has stated, when there 
was plenty of time and the House had little to do, comparatively, 
permitted a very great latitude of debate in Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union in general debate. But the Chair doubts 
very much if any such latitude was ever allowed, even in the early 
days, under the five-minute rule of debate, as has been so frequently 
exercised here during the present session.
  The Chair desires to repeat that it is quite sure that both 
gentlemen, and all gentlemen on both sides of the Chamber, must feel it 
to be wise to conform to the parliamentary usages and rules of the 
body, intended to promote the transaction of the public business, 
namely, that the Members shall address themselves exclusively to the 
matter under consideration.

  5048. On March 1, 1898,\2\ the House having under consideration the 
bill (H. R. 5359) to amend the postal laws relating to second-class 
matter, Mr. William W. Kitchin, of North Carolina, proceeded to speak 
concerning current party politics.
  After the Speaker had admonished the gentleman from North Carolina 
that he should confine himself to the subject under discussion, and 
after some discussion as to the propriety of invoking the rule, the 
Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair hopes the House will listen to him for one moment. In 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, in general 
debate, it has been somewhat the custom--it was much the custom in 
earlier days--to discuss any question that a Member saw fit to discuss. 
But gradually that has been very much lessened, and very little has 
been done in the way of general discussion. That was owing to the 
general sentiment and feeling of the House; but the practice of 
discussing general questions in Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union seems to have been rather on the increase of late, 
and now it is proposed that when the House itself has one subject 
before it, another subject shall be discussed.
  It seems to me that every Member of the House must realize that the 
result of that will be confusion and nothing else. There have been one 
or two instances this session in which, without interference from 
anybody, the present occupant of the chair not being in the chair at 
the time, general debate has been allowed to go on, although the 
temporary chairman, when appealed to, decided against it. It is very 
evident from the little discussion we have had that it is really 
necessary and desirable that the public sentiment of the House should 
reach that point that Members should not discuss in the House anything 
but the question before them.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, pp. 2343, 2344.
                                                            Sec. 5049
  For that is the plain rule of the House; and while the Chair would 
not undertake to interfere with a gentleman's method of presenting an 
argument, yet the difference between addressing the House upon the 
subject that is before it and the making of a political or other 
discourse upon a subject not before the House is exceedingly obvious, 
and so far as there being any different kind of treatment to be 
administered to either side of the House, the Chair will try to take 
care of that. The first gentleman who came to me was a gentleman on the 
Republican side of the House, and the Chair told him very distinctly 
that so far as he was concerned he should call him to order.

  On May 27, 1898,\1\ the House had under consideration the bill (S. 
1424) granting a pension to Richard P. Seltzer, when Mr. Thomas H. 
Tongue, of Oregon, having been recognized, proceeded to speak generally 
upon the subject of pensions and the early struggles for possession of 
the Oregon Territory.
  A point of order having been made by Mr. William L. Greene, of 
Nebraska, that the gentleman from Oregon was not confining himself to 
the question under debate, the Speaker pro tempore \2\ ruled as 
follows:

  The question before the House is the bill S. 1424, an act granting a 
pension to Richard P. Seltzer. There is no question before the House as 
to the expediency or inexpediency of general pension legislation. The 
remarks of the gentleman from Oregon have related so far simply to 
pension legislation in general, and the Chair feels constrained, in 
construing the rule as it has been construed this session, to hold that 
the gentleman is out of order.

  Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, having appealed from the decision, 
the appeal was laid on the table, and the Chair was sustained by a vote 
of yeas 104, nays 9, present 36.
  5049. On a motion to amend, debate in the House is confined to the 
amendment and may not include the general merits of the proposition.--
On January 19, 1810,\3\ the House was considering the bill respecting 
commercial intercourse between the United States and Great Britain and 
France.
  The pending question was a motion to amend by striking out the 
twelfth section, which section limited the duration of the proposed 
act.
  During the debate Mr. Philip B. Key, of Maryland, who was addressing 
the Chair, was called to order by Mr. Daniel Sheffey, of Virginia, who 
alleged that he thought the gentleman from Maryland out of order, 
because he says his object is to show that there are features in the 
bill which ought not to be adopted, and consequently that the bill 
ought not to be unlimited, and therefore the amendment ought not to 
prevail.
  The Speaker \4\ decided the range of argument taken by the gentleman 
from Maryland to be out of the order of debate upon the question under 
the consideration of the House.
  Mr. Key having appealed, the decision of the Chair was sustained, 
yeas 68, nays 46.
  5050. On December 31, 1827,\5\ the House was considering a 
resolution,

  Resolved, That the Committee on Manufactures be vested with the power 
to send for persons and papers.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 5303.
  \2\ John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, Speaker pro tempore.
  \3\ Second session Eleventh Congress, Journal, p. 183 (Gales and 
Seaton ed.); Annals, p. 1245.
  \4\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 866-869.
Sec. 5051
  Mr. Thomas J. Oakley, of New York, proposed an amendment to add the 
words, ``with a view to ascertain and report to the House such facts as 
may be useful to guide the judgment of this House in relation to a 
revision of the tariff duties on imported goods.''
  Mr. Rollin C. Mallary, of Vermont, was proceeding to debate generally 
the resolution when Mr. Oakley made the point of order that it was not 
in order to go into the merits of the resolution itself when an 
amendment to it only was under consideration.
  The Speaker \1\ held that the remarks of Mr. Mallary were not 
strictly in order. Later, on January 8, 1828,\2\ the Speaker, in a 
similar case, said that it was not in order, on a question of 
amendment, to discuss the general merits of the proposition.
  5051. On February 8, 1833,\3\ the tariff bill was under consideration 
in the House, having been reported from the Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union with certain amendments.
  The pending question was on the first amendment, relating to the duty 
on twist and yarn made of wool.
  Mr. John Davis, of Massachusetts, having the floor in debate, spoke 
of the general features of the bill.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The gentleman must confine his remark to the amendment.

  5052. It has been held not in order during debate in the House to 
answer an argument made in Committee of the Whole.--On January 18, 
1828,\4\ the House was occupied in discussion of the bill ``for the 
relief of Marigny D'Auterive,'' which had been reported from the 
Committee of the Whole on a preceding day. The pending question being 
on a motion to recommit the bill to the Committee on Claims, Mr. John 
Leeds Kerr, of Maryland, in the course of debate devoted his remarks to 
a reply to a speech of ``the gentleman from New York,'' in Committee of 
the Whole.
  Mr. Henry R. Storrs, of New York, made the point of order that it was 
not in order in the House to answer an argument made in Committee of 
the Whole.
  The Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order. Later, in the same 
debate, he called Mr. Joel B. Sutherland, of Pennsylvania, to order for 
the same thing, admonishing him ``that he could not follow the 
honorable Member into his debate in committee.''
  5053. It is not in order in debate to refer to a bill not yet 
reported from a committee.--On March 10, 1828,\5\ Mr. John Taliaferro, 
of Virginia, in debating resolutions relating to deported slaves, 
referred to a bill before a committee relating to the same subject.
  The Speaker \1\ held that it was not in order to refer to a bill now 
under consideration in a committee of the House, and not reported 
therefrom.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \2\ Debates, p. 927.
  \3\ Second session Twenty-second Congress, Debates, p. 1661.
  \4\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 1049, 1055.
  \5\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, p. 1830.
                                                            Sec. 5054
  5054. On January 20, 1810,\1\ the House was considering the bill 
respecting commercial intercourse between the United States and Great 
Britain and France, the pending question being the motion ``that the 
said bill be recommitted to a select committee.''
  That motion being under debate Mr. John W. Eppes, of Virginia, who 
was addressing the Chair, was called to order by Mr. Daniel Sheffey, of 
Virginia, for asserting that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. John 
Smilie] declared that his friends were determined, if he would not go 
with them in war measures, they would not go with him in any other, 
which declaration was out of order, and was so declared. In answer to 
this Mr. Eppes arose and explained that he was a farmer and all his 
interests were against war.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that the range of debate taken by the 
gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Eppes, was out of order.
  On an appeal this decision was sustained.
  5055. On an appeal from a decision of the Chair it is not in order to 
debate the merits of the measure under consideration when the question 
of order was raised.--On January 4, 1836,\3\ Mr. John Quincy Adams, of 
Massachusetts, presented a memorial from sundry inhabitants of his 
State praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
  A question of order being raised, the Chair decided that a motion 
that the petition be not received was debatable. Mr. Adams having 
appealed from this decision, a discussion arose, in the course of which 
Mr. Jesse A. Bynum, of North Carolina, declared that whenever the 
rights of his constituents to their property was ``invaded, it would be 
settled, not here, but on the battlefield.''
  The Speaker \4\ reminded Mr. Bynum that he could not debate the 
merits of the main question on an appeal, and must confine himself to 
the motion before the House.
  5056. While the Speakers have entertained appeals from their 
decisions as to irrelevancy in debate they have held that such appeals 
were not debatable.--On August 11, 1842,\5\ Mr. W. W. Irwin, of 
Pennsylvania, asked to be excused from serving on the select committee 
appointed on the Message of the President returning with his objections 
the bill (H. R. 472) ``to provide revenue from imports,'' etc. Mr. 
Irwin was giving reasons why he should be excused, saying that the 
Constitution provided in express terms the mode in which either House 
of Congress should dispose of the objections made by the Executive to a 
bill returned by him to it; and considering that the injunction of the 
Constitution had already been complied with--namely, by spreading those 
objections on the Journal and making them a matter of record--he 
believed that neither House of Congress had any power, by any rule or 
regulation of its own, to depart from the mode of procedure prescribed 
by that instrument. Therefore he considered that the reference of the 
message was unconstitutional.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Eleventh Congress, Journal, p. 188 (Gales & Seaton 
ed.).
  \2\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 2131.
  \4\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 1265; Globe, 
p. 882.
Sec. 5057
  The Speaker \1\ here called Mr. Irwin to order for irrelevancy.
  Mr. Irwin appealed to the House from the decision of the Speaker.
  This appeal was laid on the table, yeas 78, nays 74.
  5057. On January 21, 1851,\2\ the House was considering the bill (S. 
12) ``allowing exchanges of and granting additional school lands in the 
several States which contain public lands, and for other purposes,'' 
the pending question being on a motion to recommit the bill with 
instructions to amend so as to give an equal share of the public lands 
to all the schools in the United States.
  Mr. Richard K. Meade, of Virginia, had the floor in debate, when Mr. 
William Strong, of Pennsylvania, submitted as a point of order that it 
was not in order for the gentleman from Virginia, on the pending 
motion, to discuss the general policy of the Government in reference to 
the disposition of the public lands.
  The Speaker \3\ decided that it was not competent for the gentleman 
from Virginia to take so wide a range, and that in doing so he was 
clearly out of order. He must confine his remarks to the question of 
the disposition of the public lands in reference to the public schools.
  Mr. Meade having appealed, the decision of the Chair was sustained.
  5058. On February 1, 1847,\4\ the House was considering the bill (H. 
R. 637) ``to regulate the carriage of passengers in merchant vessels,'' 
when Mr. Lewis C. Levin, of Pennsylvania, who had the floor, was called 
to order by Mr. George W. Hopkins, of Virginia, for irrelevancy.
  The Speaker pro tempore decided that Mr. Levin was not in order in 
discussing the subject of the late election while this bill was under 
consideration.
  Mr. Levin called on Mr. Hopkins to reduce the objectionable words to 
writing.
  The Speaker pro tempore \5\ decided that Mr. Levin could not, under 
the rules of the House, require Mr. Hopkins to reduce the objectionable 
words to writing.
  Mr. Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio, having appealed, the decision of the 
Chair was sustained.
  5059. On January 4, 1842,\6\ the House was considering a motion to 
reconsider the vote whereby the appointment of three select committees 
had been authorized, when Mr. Thomas D. Arnold, of Tennessee, proceeded 
to make a reply to a Member who had charged in debate that some of the 
constituents of Mr. Brown could not read or write.
  Mr. Samuel S. Bowne, of New York, called Mr. Arnold to order for not 
discussing the question before the House.
  The Speaker \1\ said that strictly the debate was not in order. Nor 
had much of the debate on the question been in order. But as the debate 
had widened out by degrees, he did not feel at liberty to arrest it 
now. Therefore he should allow the gentleman from Tennessee to proceed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ John White, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, p. 171; Globe, p. 
292.
  \3\ Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, pp. 289, 290.
  \5\ Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Speaker pro tempore.
  \6\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Journal, pp. 120, 123; 
Globe, pp. 92, 95.
                                                            Sec. 5060
  From this decision Mr. Bowne appealed, and on the succeeding day the 
decision of the Speaker was reversed, yeas 67, nays 89.
  During the consideration of this appeal on January 5, the Speaker 
decided that appeals on questions of irrelevancy and personality were 
not debatable.
  5060. On August 11, 1842,\1\ Mr. Speaker John White ruled that a 
Member was not confining himself to the subject under debate. The 
Member appealed, and attempted to debate the appeal, but the Speaker 
held that the appeal was not debatable.
  5061. On September 4, 1850,\2\ Mr. Speaker Cobb held:

  When a Member is called to order in debate, all questions arising out 
of the point of order, whether upon appeal or otherwise, must be 
decided without debate.

  5062. On January 15, 1816,\3\ Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, was 
called to order by the Speaker for not confining himself, in his 
remarks, to the question under debate.
  From which an appeal was taken to the House by Mr. Alexander C. 
Hanson, of Maryland.
  And on the question the decision of the Chair was sustained, yeas 79, 
nays 59.\4\
  5063. On March 3, 1849,\5\ a Member being called to order for 
irrelevancy, Mr. Speaker Winthrop decided that he was in order and 
might proceed. An appeal was taken, and the Speaker was overruled, and 
thus the Member was not allowed to proceed.
  5064. Personal explanations are allowed only by unanimous consent.--
On April 27, 1846,\6\ Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, rose and 
asked leave to make a brief personal explanation. Mr. Hugh A. Haralson, 
of Georgia, said that if the application related to personal matters 
between the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Ingersoll, and the 
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Webster,\7\ he should object. The 
time of the country was too precious to be wasted in personal 
criminations and recriminations.
  Mr. Ingersoll then proposed a motion to suspend the rules to enable 
him to make the statement, whereupon Mr. Thomas J. Henley, of Indiana, 
asked the Speaker what rule it was necessary to suspend in order that a 
gentleman might make a personal explanation.
  The Speaker \8\ said that there was no such thing in matters of 
legislation as a personal explanation. Such things were constantly 
tolerated by unanimous consent. No personal explanation could be made 
within any strict technical rule of the House, and, if tolerated at 
all, it must be either by unanimous consent or by a suspension of all 
rules relating to the order of business.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, p. 882.
  \2\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, p. 1747.
  \3\ First session Fourteenth Congress, Journal, p. 165 (Davis ed.); 
Annals, pp. 677, 678.
  \4\ Instance of an appeal from a decision of the Speaker as to 
whether or not a Member was taking too wide a latitude in debate. 
(January 28, 1828, first session Twentieth Congress, Journal, p. 1037; 
Debates, p. 1222.)
  \5\ Second session Thirtieth Congress, Journal, p. 645.
  \6\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Globe, p. 729.
  \7\ Daniel Webster was at this time a Senator.
  \8\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
Sec. 5065
  5065. Unanimous consent having been given for a personal explanation, 
the Member may not be interrupted by a single objection.--On April 20, 
1864,\1\ Mr. Francis W. Kellogg, of Michigan, moved to reconsider the 
vote by which the Raritan and Delaware Railroad bill was postponed for 
two weeks. Over this motion a desultory debate arose as to whether an 
arrangement made did not require that the bill should not be considered 
before the expiration of the two weeks. A motion was made for a call of 
the House, but was negatived. Mr. Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, 
objected to further debate. Air. Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, 
inquired whether, after unanimous consent had been given, a discussion 
could be stopped.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  When a Member has unanimous consent given to make a speech or 
personal explanation he can not be stopped by a single objection. But 
when, in the absence of a quorum, a desultory debate is progressing by 
general consent, any Member can arrest it by demanding the enforcement 
of the rules.

  5066. A Member having the floor to make a personal explanation may 
not be interrupted while he keeps within parliamentary bounds.--On 
February 28, 1867,\3\ Mr. Francis C. Le Blond, having obtained 
unanimous consent to make a personal explanation, proceeded to comment 
on the recent action of certain State legislatures in regard to a 
pending constitutional amendment.
  Mr. Hamilton Ward, of New York, raised the point of order that the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Le Blond] had been granted leave to make a 
personal explanation.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  As the point of order has been raised, although the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Le Blond] has taken his seat, the Chair will rule upon the 
point of order. When the House grants unanimous consent to any Member 
to make a personal explanation, the rulings of all Speakers, whose 
decisions the Chair has examined, is that the Chair can not interrupt 
the Member while he keeps within parliamentary practice.

  5067. In the earlier practice of the House a Member having the floor 
for a personal explanation was allowed the largest latitude in 
debate.--On February 11, 1846,\4\ Mr. Thomas Butler King, of Georgia, 
asked and obtained the unanimous consent of the House to make an 
explanation, personal to himself, and while proceeding with such 
explanation, Mr. George Rathbun, of New York, objected to his 
proceeding on the ground that his remarks were taking a wider range 
than leave to make a mere personal explanation allowed.
  The Speaker \5\ then put the question, ``Shall Mr. King have leave to 
proceed?'' and it was decided in the affirmative, yeas 86, nays 63.
  Mr. King then proceeded and concluded his remarks.
  5068. On April 27, 1846,\6\ the House, by vote, suspended the rules 
to enable Mr. George Ashmun, of Massachusetts, to reply to the remarks 
of Mr. Charles J.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Globe, first session Thirty-eighth Congress, p. 1762.
  \2\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \3\ Congressional Globe, second session Thirty-ninth Congress, p. 
1651.
  \4\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 382; Globe, pp. 
357, 358.
  \5\ JohnW. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \6\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, pp. 720, 721; 
Globe, p. 732.
                                                            Sec. 5069
Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, who had criticised the official acts of 
Daniel Webster as Secretary of State.
  Mr. Ashmun proceeded with his reply, and was remarking upon the 
course of Mr. Ingersoll when he held the office of district attorney of 
the United States in the eastern district of Pennsylvania.
  Mr. George W. Hopkins, of Virginia, raised the question of order that 
it was not in order, under the leave granted to Mr. Ashmun, to go into 
a history of the course of Mr. Ingersoll while district attorney, that 
having no relation to the remarks of Mr. Ingersoll, to which he was 
replying.
  The Speaker \1\ decided Mr. Ashmun to be in order, there being no 
particular subject under debate, and therefore the question of 
irrelevancy of remarks could not apply.
  Mr. Hopkins having appealed, the appeal was laid on the table, yeas 
90, nays 67.
  5069. On February 2, 1848,\2\ Mr. Robert Barnwell Rhett, of South 
Carolina, by the unanimous consent of the House, proceeded to make an 
explanation personal to himself.
  While he was so doing, Mr. Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, raised the 
question of order, that the House, by unanimous consent, permitted the 
gentleman from South Carolina to make a personal explanation, and that 
he, abusing the courtesy of the House, was reaffirming his former 
positions, and supporting those positions by arguments; whereas a 
personal explanation could alone consist in correcting a misstatement 
of fact, which impute motives, or argument, or positions to a gentleman 
which, not being corrected, would be injurious to his standing as a 
gentleman or his character as a public man.
  The Speaker \3\ said that the gentleman was speaking by the unanimous 
consent of the House; there was no question before the House, and the 
remarks of the gentleman could hardly be objected to on the score of 
irrelevancy. The gentleman from South Carolina had received permission 
to say whatever he might deem necessary to an explanation of his 
personal course; and as long as he confined himself to the general 
subject of the charges which had been brought against him, and avoided 
personalities, the Chair could perceive no grounds for arresting his 
remarks. Permissions to make personal explanations had always been 
subject to abuse, and the only remedy would be for the House to make 
some specific rule in regard to them. It had been uniformly decided by 
his predecessors that the Chair could not undertake to decide as to 
what any gentleman might think necessary to a personal explanation. The 
Speaker, therefore, overruled the point of order.
  Mr. Smith having appealed, the appeal was laid on the table.
  5070. On December 15, 1851,\4\ on motion of Mr. Fayette McMullin, of 
Virginia, the rules having been suspended for that purpose, leave was 
granted to Mr. William R. Smith, of Alabama, to make a personal 
explanation.
  Mr. Smith was proceeding with his remarks when Mr. Charles Skelton, 
of New Jersey, made the point of order that it was not competent for 
the gentleman from
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  \1\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirtieth Congress, Journal, p. 343; Globe, pp. 
285, 286.
  \3\ Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-second Congress, Journal, p. 91; Globe, pp. 
97, 98.
Sec. 5071
Alabama to discuss the general policy of the Government in regard to 
Kossuth. The House had only given him the privilege of making a 
personal explanation, and it was not in order for him to discuss such 
matters, especially when the previous question deprived other Members 
of an opportunity to answer.
  The Speaker \1\ overruled the point of order on the ground that under 
the uniform practice of the House, whenever a Member was allowed to 
make a personal explanation, much latitude was allowed. It was not in 
the power of the Chair to anticipate the application which the 
gentleman from Alabama might make of the course of remarks he was now 
pursuing.
  Mr. David K. Cartter, of Ohio, having appealed, the appeal was laid 
on the table.
  5071. In 1861 the House, overruling the Speaker, established the new 
rule that a Member making a personal explanation should confine his 
remarks to that which was personal to himself.--On July 18, 1861,\2\ 
the House was considering a report from the Committee on the Judiciary 
in relation to charges that Hon. Henry May, of Maryland, a Member of 
the House, had been holding intercourse and correspondence with persons 
in armed rebellion against the Government of the United States.
  Leave having been granted to Mr. May to make a personal explanation, 
Mr. May was proceeding with his remarks, when Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, of 
Pennsylvania, called him to order on the ground that he was abusing the 
privilege granted him by the House.
  The Speaker \3\ decided that under the usage, the House having 
granted unanimous consent for a personal explanation, he had no power 
to control the line of remarks to be pursued by Mr. May.
  Mr. Stevens having appealed from this decision, Mr. Clement L. 
Vallandigham, of Ohio, moved that the appeal be laid on the table. This 
motion was decided in the negative, yeas 53, nays 82.
  Then, the question being taken, ``Shall the decision of the Chair 
stand as the judgment of the House?'' it was decided in the negative.
  Then, on motion of Mr. Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, it was

  Ordered, That leave be granted to Mr. May to proceed in order.

  5072. On March 15, 1866,\4\ Mr. Green Clay Smith, of Kentucky, was 
addressing the House, having obtained the floor for a personal 
explanation.
  A question arose as to whether or not Mr. Smith was confining himself 
to the subject, and Mr. Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, expressed 
the opinion that leave for a personal explanation gave the Member 
having it freedom to discuss whatever he considered necessary to his 
explanation.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The Chair will state, as the gentleman from Massachusetts has alluded 
to the subject, that the present occupant of the chair since he has 
filled the position, has always held that in a personal explana-
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  \1\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirty-seventh Congress, Journal, pp. 105, 106; 
Globe, pp. 196, 197.
  \3\ Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-ninth Congress, Globe, p. 1423.
  \5\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5073
tion a gentleman may state any ground on which he considers himself 
aggrieved, connecting his remarks in some way with the subject, 
directly or indirectly. The Chair thinks that the gentleman from 
Kentucky, in vindicating himself against what he deems an u