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[Hinds Precedents -- Volume V]
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[DOCID: f:hinds_cxiv.wais]

 
                             Chapter CXIV.

                          DISORDER IN DEBATE.

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   1. Reflections on the House or its membership. Sections 5131-
     5139.
   2. References to Members and their actions. Sections 5140-
     5146.\1\
   3. Personalities in debate. Sections 5147-5156.
   4. Questioning the statements of other Members. Sections 5157-
     5160.
   5. Duty of the Speaker in preventing personalities. Sections 
     5161-5169.
   6. General decisions. Sections 5170-5174.
   7. Action by the House as to Member called to order. Sections 
     5175-5202.\2\

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  5131. Indecent language against the proceedings of the House or 
reflections on its prior determinations are not in order in debate.
  Mentioning a Member by name, arraigning the motives of Members, and 
personalities generally are not in order in debate.
  It is the duty of the Speaker to suppress personalities in debate.
  Section XVII of Jefferson's Manual has this provision:

  No person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the 
House, no prior determination of which is to be reflected on by any 
Member, unless he means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. (2 
Hats., 169, 170; Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42.) But while a proposition 
under consideration is still in fieri, though it has even been reported 
by a committee, reflections on it are no reflections on the House. (9 
Grey, 508.)
  No person, in speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his 
name, but to describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, 
or on the other side of the question, etc. (Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's 
Comw., L. 2, c. 3); nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the 
person (Scob., 31; Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166), by speaking, 
reviling, nipping, or unmannerly words against a particular Member. 
(Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.) The consequences of a measure may be 
reprobated in strong terms; but to arraign the motives of those who 
propose to advocate it is a personality, and against order. Qui 
digreditur a materia ad personam, Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. (Ord. 
Com., 1604, Apr. 19.)

  5132. It is not in order in debate to cast reflections on either the 
House or its membership or its decisions, whether present or past.--On 
February 10, 1837,\3\ during the consideration of the case of R. M. 
Whitney, a con-
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  \1\ In case of words printed under ``leave to print.'' (Sec. 7017 of 
this volume.)
  Disorderly words stricken from the Congressional Record. (Secs. 6975-
6982 of this volume.)
  \2\ Instance of censure proposed when words were not taken down. 
(Sec. 1655 of Vol. II.)
  Action taken as to disorderly words after intervention of other 
business. (Sec. 2637 of Vol. III.)
  Disorderly language by counsel in an impeachment trial. (Sec. 2140 of 
Vol. III.)
  \3\ Second session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 1693.
Sec. 5133
tumacious witness, Mr. John F. H. Claiborne, of Mississippi, having the 
floor in debate, said:

  Talk not to me of vindicating your insulted dignity by the 
prosecution of Whitney. You have no dignity to vindicate.

  Here the Speaker,\1\ interposed, and said that the rules did not 
permit reflections on the House.
  5133. On May 20, 1840,\2\ Mr. David Petrikin, of Pennsylvania, in 
debating a motion to amend the Journal, said that ``it could not be 
denied that of late the proceedings of the House had been such as not 
only to degrade it as a body, but also to degrade the country.''
  The Speaker,\3\ said that the gentleman from Pennsylvania was not in 
order in saying anything disrespectful to the House of Representatives.
  5134. On July 14, 1866,\4\ while the House was considering the bill 
(S. 236) to authorize the construction of certain bridges, Mr. John 
Hogan, of Mississippi, having the floor, was called to order for the 
following words spoken:

  They have their agents here upon this floor; they have their 
interested stockholders here to vote upon this measure; they have their 
feed attorneys here to vote upon this measure and rob the people of the 
West of the great God-given right to navigate freely the great 
Mississippi River.

  The Speaker,\5\ decided that the words were out of order, as they 
contained a reflection upon Members of the House.
  Mr. Hogan having taken his seat, and objection being made to his 
proceeding further, Mr. M. Russell Thayer, of Pennsylvania, moved that 
he be allowed to proceed in order.
  This motion was agreed to.
  5135. On March 15, 1866,\6\ Mr. Green Clay Smith, of Kentucky, in the 
course of a personal explanation, was called to order for pronouncing 
opinions and decisions of the House ``damnable heresies.''
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The Chair sustains the point of order. The gentleman from Kentucky 
has no right to reflect upon the decisions of the House.
  The Speaker then directed the gentleman from Kentucky to take his 
seat, and the question was put on allowing the gentleman to proceed in 
order. And there were yeas 55, nays 70. So the House refused to allow 
Mr. Smith to proceed with his remarks.
  5136. On June 8, 1872,\7\ during the debate on the conference report 
on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the sundry civil 
appropriation bill (H. R.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 405.
  \3\ Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 1016; Globe, p. 
3812.
  \5\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \6\ First session Thirty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 407; Globe, p. 
1423.
  \7\ Second session Forty-second Congress, Journal, p. 1108; Globe, p. 
4441.
                                                            Sec. 5137
2705), Mr. John A. Bingham, of Ohio, was called to order for the use of 
the following words in debate:

  I say here and now, and stand ready to make it good before the 
tribunal of history and the great tribunal of the American people, that 
the proposition pretended to be set up here of the right of the 
minority to stay indefinitely the right of the majority to legislate is 
as disgraceful, as dishonorable--

  The Speaker \1\ ruled that the language was not parliamentary.
  Thereupon, on motion of Mr. Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, Mr. 
Bingham was permitted to proceed in order.\2\
  5137. On June 3, 1797,\3\ Mr. Matthew Lyon, of Vermont, was 
addressing the Chair, when he recalled the act of the House in 
inflicting its censure on a former occasion.
  The Speaker \4\ reminded Mr. Lyon that it was out of order to censure 
the proceedings of the House on any former occasion.
  Later Mr. Lyon referred to a statement made by another Member in the 
debate of the preceding day.
  The Speaker again reminded him that it was out of order to refer to 
the proceedings of a former day.
  5138. On June 13, 1842,\5\ Mr. Mark A. Cooper, of Georgia, said:

  The reason why the House was not more dignified was because its 
Members sat here tamely, acting as the passive instruments and tools of 
the aspirants for the Presidency in the other body. This was the truth.

  Mr. Cooper was called to order, and presently the Chair \6\ ruled 
that he was not in order.
  5139. Words spoken in debate impeaching the loyalty of a portion of 
the membership of the House were ruled out of order.--On January 15, 
1868,\7\ the House was considering the bill (H. R. 439) supplementary 
to the act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel 
States, when Mr. John F. Farnsworth, of Illinois, was called to order 
for words spoken in debate, which, on the demand of Mr. William Mungen, 
of Ohio, were taken down as follows:

  And whoever commends himself to the affections of the rebel element 
there commends himself equally to the affections of their rebel 
brethren on this floor.

  The Speaker \8\ decided the words out of order, not being proper to 
use in reference to Members of the House.
  Mr. Farnsworth having requested permission to explain, the question 
was put on giving such permission, and it was decided in the 
affirmative.
  Then Mr. Farnsworth withdrew so much of the words spoken as relates 
to Members ``on this floor.''
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  \1\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ The Journal does not give the words excepted to.
  \3\ First session Fifth Congress, Annals, pp. 234, 235.
  \4\ Jonathan Dayton, of New Jersey, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, p. 621.
  \6\ John White, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Journal, p. 196; Globe, p. 560.
  \8\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
Sec. 5140
  Then, on motion of Mr. George S. Boutwell, of Massachusetts, Mr. 
Farnsworth was allowed to proceed with his remarks in order.
  Mr. Mungen then offered a resolution that Mr. Farnsworth be 
reprimanded by the Speaker for the words taken down, but the resolution 
was laid on the table.
  5140. In debate a Member should not address another in the second 
person.--On January 18, 1899,\1\ while the House had under 
consideration the bill (H. R. 26) for the establishment of a light and 
fog signal station on Hog Island Shoal, Rhode Island, a debate arose 
between Mr. William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, and Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of 
Illinois, in the course of which the latter addressed the former by the 
personal pronoun ``you'' instead of referring to him as ``the gentleman 
from Iowa.''
  The Speaker \2\ thereupon called Mr. Cannon to order, saying:

  The gentleman from Illinois should not use the second person in 
addressing a Member.

  5141. On January 30, 1899,\3\ the House was in Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union considering the bill (H. R. 11022) for 
the reorganization of the Army of the United States.
  Mr. Charles B. Landis, of Indiana, in the course of a colloquy, 
addressed a Member with the personal pronoun ``you.''
  The Chairman,\4\ calling him to order, said:

  The gentleman from Indiana should not address his colleague in the 
second person.

  5142. On March 11, 1904,\5\ during consideration of a resolution 
relating to the conduct of certain Members in relation to transactions 
in the Post-Office Department, Mr. Henry A. Cooper, of Wisconsin, in 
debate, referring to another Member, used the pronoun ``you.''
  The Speaker \6\ said:

  Gentlemen will not interrupt without the consent of the Member 
speaking, and the Chair again cautions the House that it is not proper 
to refer to Members except in the usual way of the gentleman so-and-so.

  5143. On January 27, 1842,\7\ during a debate on the floor between 
Messrs. Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, and John M. Botts, of the same 
State, Mr. Botts addressed Mr. Wise, using the pronoun ``you.''
  The Speaker \8\ called Mr. Botts to order, saying that he had no 
right to so address a Member on the floor.
  5144. A Member may not in debate refer to another Member by name.--On 
March 3, 1898,\9\ the bill (H. R. 5359) to amend the postal laws 
relating to second-class matter was under consideration, and Mr. James 
M. Robinson, of
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  \1\ Third session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 762.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ Third session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1289.
  \4\ Sereno E. Payne, of New York, Chairman.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3152.
  \6\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, p. 182.
  \8\ John White, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \9\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 2433.
                                                            Sec. 5145
Indiana, had the floor. Having in the course of his remarks mentioned 
the chairman of the Appropriations Committee by name, the Speaker \1\ 
called him to order, saying:

  The gentleman is out of order. He should not allude to Members by 
name.

  5145. It is not in order in debate to mention a Member by name or to 
indulge in personalties.--On December 13, 1905,\2\ Mr. William B. 
Lamar, of Florida, having the floor in general debate in Committee of 
the Whole House on the state of the Union, referred to another Member, 
Mr. John Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, as follows:

  Now, Mr. Chairman, I could state with more truth than he has to 
charge me with party unfealty that that caucus was not right; that it 
was party treachery and party perfidy. I do not make that charge. His 
charge is more than an injustice, and unless Mr. Williams places 
himself before a caucus of Democrats--

  The Chairman \3\ interposed:

  The Chair will call the attention of the gentleman from Florida to 
the fact that under the rules he should not mention by name any other 
Member of the House.

  Later Mr. Lamar continued:

  The minority leader would like to have quietude over here, and would 
like to be followed. Here is how he would like to be followed by the 
Democracy:
  ``Minority Leader. Do you see yonder cloud that's almost in shape of 
a camel?
  ``Some Democratic Member. By the mass, and 'tis like a camel indeed.
  ``Williams. Methinks--''

  The Chairman again interposed:

  The gentleman from Florida must obey the rules of the House.

  Again Mr. Lamar said:

  I shall follow him as a leader as long as he holds that position, but 
I'repudiate, with all the contempt that I have for him, the idea that 
he is fit to lead anybody anywhere. Now, I shall ask him--I say it on 
the floor of this House--

  Mr. Williams here interposed:

  Mr. Chairman, I very much dislike to call attention to a rule of the 
House, but as it is apt by its enforcement to prevent unpleasant things 
from happening on the floor I do call attention to the fact that the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Lamar] is not permitted by the rules of the 
House to use insulting language on the floor.

  The Chairman said:

  The gentleman will please proceed in order and not indulge in 
personalities.

  5146. It is not in order in debate to call a Member by name and 
comment on his action in a preceding Congress.--On January 22, 1836,\4\ 
during a discussion of a resolution to investigate the failure of the 
fortifications appropriation bill in the closing hours of the last 
Congress, Mr. Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, in debate, was proceeding to 
read from the Journal of the last Congress the names
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  \1\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-ninth Congress, Record, pp. 352, 356.
  \3\ Thomas S. Butler, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
  \4\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, pp. 2281, 2283, 
2285, 2294, 2295.
Sec. 5147
of several gentlemen, Members of the present House, showing their votes 
at the time the bill failed to be acted on.
  The Speaker \1\ several times interposed and informed the gentleman 
from Virginia that it was not in order to call Members by their names, 
but permitted Mr. Wise to read their names from the Journal of the last 
session, when he did so without comment personal to the Members. 
Finally the Speaker said that he would repeat to the gentleman from 
Virginia that in reminding him a few moments ago that it was against 
order to refer to honorable Members of the last House who were also 
Members of the present House, and in their seats, by their names, it 
was far from the intention of the Chair to interfere with any of the 
rights of the gentleman from Virginia, and would exceedingly regret to 
interfere with the rights of any gentleman on the floor. The Chair 
thought it out of order and supposed such a course of debate, if 
suffered to proceed, was likely to produce excitement and collision, 
and he had therefore wished to arrest it. He felt sure that the 
gentleman from Virginia and every other Member would see the necessity 
for such a course, and would sustain the Chair in his efforts to 
preserve the order and harmony of the proceedings of the House.
  5147. It is improper in debate to arraign the motives of Members.
  A Member who has been called to order in debate and directed to sit 
down may not proceed on yielded time.
  On the calendar day of March 2, 1903 \2\ (legislative day of February 
26), the House was discussing the bill (H.R. 17546) ``to provide for a 
Delegate to the House of Representatives of the United States from 
Porto Rico,'' when Mr. George A. Pearre, of Maryland, referring to an 
opponent in debate, said:

  The gentleman is guilty of a worse offense in concealing the truth 
from this House, especially when the gentleman knows the motive was a 
personal one.

  The Speaker \3\ called Mr. Pearre to order, saying:

  The motives of gentlemen must not be impugned.

  Mr. Pearre was about to proceed, when Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of 
Alabama, made the point of order that Mr. Pearre having been called to 
order, must sit down.
  The Speaker sustained the point of order, and Mr. Pearre took his 
seat.
  Mr. Henry A. Cooper, of Wisconsin, who controlled the time, proposed 
to yield time to Mr. Pearre that he might continue; but the Speaker 
said:

  The gentleman from Wisconsin can not do that. The gentleman from 
Maryland was admonished to take his seat, and if the gentleman from 
Wisconsin desires to proceed he can do so, but he can not yield to the 
gentleman from Maryland.

  Soon after, Mr. Charles H. Grosvenor, of Ohio, moved that Mr. Pearre 
be allowed to proceed in order, and this motion being decided in the 
affirmative, Mr. Pearre proceeded.
  5148. On April 3, 1902,\4\ while the House was in Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union considering the bill (S. 1025) to 
promote the effi-
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  \1\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, pp. 2926, 2927.
  \3\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 3631.
                                                            Sec. 5149
ciency of the Revenue-Cutter Service, Mr. William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, 
while in a colloquy with Mr. John F. Lacey, of Iowa, said:

  You have been opposing the bill. * * * And therefore I doubt very 
much your sincerity in this matter.

  The Chairman,\1\ interposing, said:

  Gentlemen will not impugn the motives of fellow-Members.

  5149. On April 20, 1904,\2\ the House was considering the bill (H.R. 
7262) entitled ``A bill to provide for the allotment of lands in 
severalty to the Indians in the State of New York, and extend the 
protection of the laws of the United States and of the State of New 
York over such Indians, and for other purposes,'' Mr. Edward B. 
Vreeland, of New York, having charge thereof.
  In the course of the debate Mr. William Sulzer, of New York, read a 
letter from a former Member of the House, John Van Voorhis, in the 
course of which occurred this paragraph:

  White speculators want to get at the valuable oil privileges that are 
on those reservation lands, as they have in the past secured most of 
them for nothing. I would like at this moment to put Mr. Vreeland on 
the witness stand under oath, and ask him if it is not a fact that he 
himself has got rich off these very Indians, and if one corporation 
formed to exploit these lands was not formed by himself.

  Mr. Sulzer also read another letter from W. H. Samson, president of 
the Rochester Historical Society, saying:

  The purpose of the Vreeland bill, in my opinion, is to get the 
Indians' land and not to Christianize the Indians, not to civilize 
them, and one of the saddest and most discouraging things about the 
whole business is that Mr. Vreeland has deluded a whole lot of good 
people into the idea that its purpose is strictly philanthropical

  The Speaker pro tempore \3\ said:

  The gentleman will suspend for one moment. The Chair feels it his 
duty to remind the gentleman that the rule of the House forbids 
reference to Members by name, and it is just as much a violation of the 
rule to read something somebody else has said as if the gentleman had 
stated it himself. It is also against the rules of the House to impugn 
the motives of other gentlemen.

  5150. On April 21, 1904,\4\ the House was considering a resolution 
relating to certain ballots before the Committee on Elections No. 2 in 
the Colorado election case of Bonynge v. Shafroth, of Colorado.
  In the course of the debate Mr. John S. Williams, of Mississippi, 
referred to the speech of Mr. Robert W. Bonynge, of Colorado, and the 
following occurred:

  Mr. Williams, of Mississippi. The gentleman used this rather cutting 
language, ``A grand jury summoned by a Democratic sheriff,'' with the 
intent to leave that impression. [Cries of ``Oh!'' on the Republican 
side.] He said, ``A grand jury summoned by a Democratic sheriff.''
  Mr. Bonynge. That is a fact.
  Mr. Williams, of Mississippi. And I purposely said, ``A Democratic 
grand jury,'' so as to hear the gentleman's explanation of that rather 
cunning way of putting it.
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  \1\ Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 5205.
  \3\ Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, Speaker pro tempore.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, pp. 5279, 5280.
Sec. 5151
  Mr. Bonynge. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a moment? Did 
the gentleman from Mississippi say that he purposely misquoted my 
language?
  Mr. Williams, of Mississippi. Oh, I purposely quoted what you 
intended to leave as an impression upon the House. [Cries of ``Oh!'' on 
the Republican side.]

  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair calls the attention of the House again to the fact that in 
debate it is against the rules of sound parliamentary usage to impugn 
the motives of Members.

  5151. On May 8, 1902,\2\ in the Senate, during a colloquy between 
Messrs. Jonathan P. Dolliver, of Iowa, and Edward W. Carmack, of 
Tennessee, the latter said:

  A few moments ago when I unguardedly used an expression about the 
impudence of Senators upon the other side of the Chamber, the Senator 
from Wisconsin suggested to me that it was an improper expression, and 
I thought so, and withdrew it. The Senator from Iowa speaks of Senators 
upon this side of the Chamber as a syndicate of vituperation. I did not 
call the Senator from Iowa to order. If it had been any other Senator 
upon the other side of the Chamber I would have done so. But I did not 
call the Senator from Iowa to order because I know that to require him 
to speak the language of decency and courtesy in debate would be to 
condemn him to absolute silence for the rest of his life.

  Mr. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, having called the Senator from 
Tennessee to order, the words were taken down, and the President pro 
tempore \3\ decided that the language was ``very clearly out of 
order.''
  Later Mr. Carmack withdrew the language by consent of the Senate.
  5152. Personalities aimed at a Member in a capacity other than that 
of Representative are not in order.--On April 20, 1871,\4\ Mr. John F. 
Farnsworth, of Illinois, having the floor for a personal explanation, 
referred to Mr. Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts, in his capacity 
as custodian of certain public money, as follows:

  Making a parade of his charity, he has been gorging himself and 
speculating with this money.

  Mr. Butler objected to these words as not parliamentary.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  The gentleman from Illinois, referring by evasion, as the Chair 
understands, to the gentleman from Massachusetts, speaks of the 
``treasurer of the asylums.'' That officer is known to be identical 
with the gentleman from Massachusetts. The Chair rules that the 
language used transgresses the rules of the House.

  Then, on motion of Mr. Samuel S. Cox, of New York, Mr. Farnsworth was 
allowed to proceed in order.
  5153. It is not in order in debate for one Member to accuse another 
of an offense not connected with the representative capacity of the 
latter.
  Questions involving the distinction between general language and 
personalities in debate.
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  \1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 5171.
  \3\ William P. Frye, of Maine, President pro tempore.
  \4\ First session Forty-second Congress, Journal, p. 202; Globe, pp. 
839, 840.
  \5\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5153
  On February 13, 1905,\1\ Mr. John A. Sullivan, of Massachusetts, was, 
by unanimous consent, permitted to occupy the floor for a personal 
explanation, and proceeded to reply to an article printed in the New 
York American, a newspaper owned and edited by Mr. William R. Hearst, a 
Member from New York.
  In the course of the remarks of Mr. Sullivan Mr. James M. Robinson, 
of Indiana, made the point of order that he was referring to another 
Member in unparliamentary language, and cited the following:

  The writer raises the query whether my ``ignorance (of pending 
measures) was due to congenital incapacity or indifference to the 
people's rights.'' ``Congenital incapacity'' is a serious charge, yet 
obviously one which a person accused would not care to discuss. If the 
charge is true, he is not guilty but simply unfortunate, and it is 
surely a grievous misfortune not to be able to appreciate the value of 
the legislative services of the gentleman from New York. But congenital 
incapacity to understand is a term that covers a wide range of mental 
and moral deficiencies. It covers the case of the moral degenerate, who 
insolently casts his lecherous eyes upon the noblest of women whose 
virtue places them beyond the contamination of his lust. It covers the 
case of the unclean, unproductive, shiftless member of society who 
stands before the jeweler's window condemning the economic and 
municipal laws that place the beautiful gems beyond his reach. And it 
includes the man who, totally bereft of the sense of proportion, raises 
his profaning eyes toward the splendid temple of the people's highest 
gift--the Presidency of the United States--blissfully unconscious of 
the woeful contrast between the qualifications requisite for that high 
office and his own contemptible mental and moral equipment.

  The Speaker \2\ ruled:

  The House will observe that the language used by the gentleman from 
Massachusetts would be unparliamentary if there were anything in the 
language to connect it with any Member upon the floor of the House. The 
Chair in passing upon the point of order can not enter the domain of 
speculation to say whether it refers to any Member of the House. To 
illustrate, if it were set out as a matter of pleading in a declaration 
it would need an averment that would connect it with a Member of the 
House. So that upon the face of the language as uttered by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts the Chair can not say that he is out of 
order.

  At the conclusion of Mr. Sullivan's remarks Mr. William R. Hearst, of 
New York, asked and was granted unanimous consent to reply.\3\
  In the course of his remarks Mr. Hearst said:

  There is a certain class of gentlemen who are peculiarly sensitive to 
newspaper criticism, and have every reason to be. I was criticised on 
the floor of this House once before by a gentleman from California, Mr. 
Johnson. That gentleman had been attacked in my newspapers for 
subserviency to the Southern Pacific Railway. He had gone back to his 
constituents for vindication, and the district which had elected him by 
5,000 Republican majority repudiated him and went 5,000 Democratic. It 
was the first time that district had gone Democratic, and it has never 
gone Democratic since that time, so it was obviously in order to reject 
the gentleman from California, Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson had been 
indicted for forgery--

  Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, made the point of order that it was 
not in order to attack a former Member of the House; but withdrew the 
point.
  Proceeding further, Mr. Hearst said:

   I had no desire, really, to criticise the gentleman from 
Massachusetts, and if I had I should certainly not have done it in so 
puerile a way. When I was at Harvard College in 1885 a murder was 
committed in a low saloon in Cambridge. A man partly incapacitated from 
drink bought in that
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 2479.
  \2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \3\ Record, pp. 2481, 2482.
Sec. 5153
saloon on Sunday morning, when the saloon was open against the law, was 
assaulted by the two owners of that saloon and brutally kicked to 
death. The name of one of the owners of that saloon was John A. 
Sullivan, and these two men were arrested and indicted by the grand 
jury for manslaughter and tried and convicted. I would like to ask the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Sullivan] if he knows anything about 
that incident, and whether, if I desired to make a hostile criticism, I 
could not have referred to that crime?

  Mr. Thomas S. Butler, of Pennsylvania, objected to this language as 
unparliamentary.
  The Speaker said:

  Up to this time, in the references to an individual not a Member of 
the House, the gentleman was in order touching that. So far as the 
Chair is able to judge from the question of the gentleman from New York 
[Mr. Hearst], the Chair can not see that the gentleman is out of order, 
and the Chair will again read to the House what he read to the House 
during the remarks of the gentleman from Massachusetts:
  ``No person, in speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his 
name, but to describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, 
or on the other side of the question, etc., nor to digress from the 
matter to fall upon the person by speaking, reviling, nipping, or 
unmannerly words against a particular Member.''

  Mr. Butler, of Pennsylvania, objected further:

  Mr. Speaker, if I understood the gentleman from New York [Mr. Hearst] 
rightly, he inferentially charged the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Sullivan] with either having murdered some one or conspired to murder.

  The Speaker said:

  He does not, from anything that the gentleman has so far said. An 
averment would have to be made before the Chair could know that he is 
referring to any Member of the House. * * *
  The Chair recollects the language. The Chair was giving attention 
closely to the remarks. The Chair will state that the Chair himself 
hesitates sometimes in writing and halts in putting his own initials 
when he signs his name, and the Chair will state--although that is 
certain which may be rendered certain--that the Chair does not now even 
know the Christian name of either the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Sullivan] or the gentleman from New York [Mr. Hearst]; nor does the 
Chair know whether of the 80,000,000 of people there are others bearing 
the same name. The Chair assumes that the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Hearst] was not referring to the gentleman from Massachusetts. In other 
words, there is nothing so far to show on its face that the gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Hearst] is referring to the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Sullivan].

  Mr. Hearst then continued:

  Mr. Speaker, I recognize the inherent justice of the remark that the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania has made about the character of discussion 
that has been going on in this House and I greatly regret it, but I 
must define the kind and character of men who have made their attacks 
upon me and their reasons for it. I must state there is a certain class 
of man who is peculiarly sensitive to criticism and particularly 
deserving of it, and I must say that it is the duty of a newspaper when 
such men are in public life to refer to their past and their character 
for the protection of the public.

  The Speaker here intervened, saying:

  The Chair will state, in view of the remarks of the gentleman, that 
an accusation of homicide against a Member--even although the alleged 
offense occurred before he was elected to this House--would seem to the 
Chair to fall within the parliamentary prohibition of being calculated 
``to provoke disturbance and disorder and to bring the body itself into 
contempt and criticism.'' The Chair will state that the words quoted 
are from a carefully considered report made to the House some years ago 
in a case wherein one Member charged against another an offense 
committed before the latter became a Member of the House. The gentleman 
from New York, the Chair presumes and believes, is quite familiar with 
parliamentary rules and usages and will proceed in order.
                                                            Sec. 5154
  5154. The explanation of a Member being referred to by another Member 
in debate ``as worthy of a Nero or a Jeffreys,'' the Speaker intervened 
and the language was withdrawn.--On July 20, 1867,\1\ Mr. Frederick E. 
Woodbridge, of Vermont, having the floor for a personal explanation as 
to his action as a member of the Judiciary Committee in connection with 
the proceedings for the impeachment of President Johnson, said of a 
fellow-member of that committee:

  Unlike my friend from Pennsylvania [Mr. Thomas Williams], I had not 
determined at that time what my vote would finally be. He, by his own 
statement before the House, had determined the question prior to the 
adjournment in June, and required no further testimony. The expression, 
sir, is more worthy of a Nero or a Jeffreys than a learned Member of 
the law committee of this House.

  The Speaker,\2\ interposing, said:

  The Chair will state to the gentleman from Vermont that his language 
is not parliamentary.

  Mr. Woodbridge thereupon withdrew the offensive words.
  5155. Where charges of bribery had been made against a Senator, a 
question propounded to him by another Senator on the subject, was held 
to be in order.--On May 7, 1879,\3\ in the Senate, during discussion of 
a proposition relating to the reopening of the case of Spofford v. 
Kellogg, from Louisiana, Mr. John T. Morgan, of Alabama, in colloquy 
with Mr. Kellogg, said:

  Has the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Kellogg] any objection to the 
Committee on Privileges and Elections investigating the question 
whether or not he bribed the members of the legislature that elected 
him?

  Mr. George F. Edmunds, of Vermont, raised a question of order, that 
it was not in order, where another Senator was personally concerned and 
a resolution was offered affecting his character, to propound such a 
question.
  The President pro tempore \4\ decided that, in the opinion of the 
Chair, the language used by the Senator from Alabama contained no 
imputation upon the Senator from Louisiana, and was in order. He said:

  If the Chair understood the observation of the Senator from Vermont, 
he claims that it was out of order upon the ground that it was 
insulting to the Senator from Louisiana. The Chair is unable to see 
anything of insult in the question. It is proposed that a certain 
charge against the Senator from Louisiana shall be referred to a 
committee for investigation. The Senator from Alabama simply asked the 
Senator from Louisiana whether he was willing that that charge should 
be investigated. The Chair can see nothing insulting, nothing 
criminating, nothing asking the Senator from Louisiana to criminate 
himself, in that question, and therefore rules that the point of order 
is not well taken.

  5156. Instance of personalities in debate in the Senate.--On March 1, 
1879,\5\ in the Senate, Mr. George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts, offered 
an amendment relating to an exception of Jefferson Davis from the 
provisions of a proposed law to pension soldiers of the Mexican war.
  Mr. L. Q. C. Lamar, of Mississippi, in the course of debate said:

  I must confess my surprise and regret that the Senator from 
Massachusetts should have wantonly, without provocation, flung this 
insult--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 759.
  \2\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 1120, 1121.
  \4\ Allen G. Thurman, of Ohio, President pro tempore.
  \5\ Third session Forty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 2227.
Sec. 5157
  At this point the Presiding Officer \1\ intervened, and ruled that 
the words were out of order.
  Mr. Lamar having appealed, the decision of the Chair was reversed, 
yeas 15, nays 26, and it was decided that the words were in order.
  5157. While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared 
untrue by another, yet in so doing an accusation of intentional 
misrepresentation must not be implied.--On February 16, 1836,\2\ the 
House was considering a motion to take from the files of the House and 
print a letter sent to the House at the last session of the preceding 
Congress by the late Postmaster-General. Mr. Albert G. Hawes, of 
Kentucky, having the floor in debate on the motion, was called to order 
by the Speaker for referring to matters irrelevant to the subject, and 
for using the words ``grossly false,'' as applied to statements made by 
Mr. F. O. J. Smith, of Maine, in a publication made by him during the 
late recess of Congress; which irrelevant matter and words the Speaker 
\3\ decided to be a violation of that rule of the House which provided 
that a Member ``shall confine himself to the question under debate, and 
avoid personality.''
  Mr. Hawes, who had taken his seat, was permitted to explain, and said 
that the pamphlet to which he referred had been published privately by 
the gentleman from Maine in the recess before the present House had 
come into existence.
  Mr. Waddy Thompson, jr., of South Carolina, having appealed, the 
decision of the Chair was sustained, yeas 160, nays 42.
  5158. On May 1, 1868,\4\ in debate Mr. John A. Logan, of Illinois, 
said of the statement of another Member of the House:

  That is not true, and he knows it.

  Mr. Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, objected to these words, and 
on his motion the words were taken down.
  A decision of the Chair having been demanded, the Speaker \5\ said:

  The Chair thinks that those words are not unparliamentary. If the 
gentleman from Illinois had made use of opprobrious words sometimes 
used, but which the Chair will not repeat, he would have been out of 
order. But any gentleman has the right to say that a proposition is not 
true, and possibly that the one making it knew that it was not true. 
The Chair thinks that the words used may be severe, but they are not 
offensive in any sense in which it is forbidden to Members to use 
offensive language toward their fellow Members, and did not seem to be 
uttered in an offensive tone.

  5159. On April 10, 1906,\6\ the post-office appropriation bill was 
under consideration in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, when Mr. Frank A. Hopkins, of Kentucky, having the floor, was 
addressing the Committee.
  Mr. William S. Bennet, of New York, rising to a question of order, 
demanded that the words just uttered by Mr. Hopkins be taken down.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ George F. Edmunds, of Vermont, Presiding Officer.
  \2\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 360, 361; 
Debates, pp. 2539, 2541.
  \3\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 2341.
  \5\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \6\ First session Fifty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 5015.
                                                            Sec. 5160
  The Chairman \1\ said:

  The Reporter informs the Chair that he has not been taking down the 
remarks of the gentleman from Kentucky for the reason that the 
gentleman from Kentucky informed him that his remarks were in 
manuscript and that there was no need of reporting them. If the 
gentleman from Kentucky will permit the Chair to see the manuscript, 
the question can be determined.

  The Chairman, from suggestion made by Mr. Bennet, stated the 
objectionable words:

  He says [referring to the gentleman from New York] that 30.6 per cent 
of the voters of the country in which I live can neither read nor 
write, which is not true.

  Mr. John S. Williams, of Mississippi, made the point that the 
language was in order.
  The Chairman said:

  The Chair rules that the language is not unparliamentary, and the 
gentleman from Kentucky will proceed.

  5160. On February 13, 1835,\2\ in the Senate, Mr. Thomas H. Benton, 
of Missouri, had the floor in debate, and was replying to some remarks 
made by Mr. John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina. In the course of his 
remarks Mr. Benton said that a certain accusation made by Mr. Calhoun 
was ``a bold and direct attack upon truth.''
  Mr. George Poindexter, of Mississippi, called Mr. Benton to order.
  The Vice-President \3\ having decided that Mr. Benton was in order, 
Mr. Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, appealed, saying that the word 
untruth implied an intentional misrepresentation, and the application 
of it to a member of that body was unparliamentary and out of order. A 
member might not, he said, get up and say that the words of another 
were untrue. He might say that the words of another were founded on 
misconception, that he was mistaken, or had unintentionally made an 
erroneous statement, but he could not charge him with uttering an 
untruth. He remembered a case of this kind in the other House when a 
gentleman of distinction from South Carolina presided there. A Member 
applied certain epithets to the war then pending with Great Britain. He 
said it was a French war, and another Member answered that it was 
untrue. The Chair decided that the charge implied want of veracity, and 
that the Member making it was out of order.
  The Senate, by a vote of 23 to 21, overruled the Vice-President, and 
Mr. Benton's remark was held to be out of order.
  5161. In the early practice of the House the Speaker intervened to 
prevent in debate even the mildest imputation on the motives of a 
Member.--On June 17, 1813,\4\ Mr. Samuel Farrow, of South Carolina, in 
debating a resolution of inquiry proposed by Mr. Daniel Webster, of New 
Hampshire, said, in the course of his remarks:

  Information, in reply to those inquiries, is not the object of the 
honorable Member from New Hampshire. * * * Those resolutions are 
intended as a plea in bar to the demand of this nation for money.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ James S. Sherman, of New York, Chairman.
  \2\ Second session Twenty-third Congress, Debates, pp. 427-432.
  \3\ Martin Van Buren, of New York, Vice-President.
  \4\ First session Thirteenth Congress, Annals, p. 185.
Sec. 5162
  Here the Speaker \1\ stated that it was not proper to state the 
motives of the Member from New Hampshire.
  5162. On January 25, 1836,\2\ during the discussion of the agitation 
of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, Mr. Thomas 
Glascock, of Georgia, said of Mr. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, 
who had presented several petitions on the subject:

  To press these petitions now, under circumstances like these, seems 
to me to be intended to produce excitement, and wound the feelings of 
the Southern Members.

  The Speaker \3\ reminded the gentleman from Georgia that it was not 
in order to impugn the motives of any Member of the House.
  5163. Examples of personal and recriminating remarks held out of 
order in debate by the Speakers.
  The Speaker sometimes interposes to prevent breach of order in 
debate, without waiting for a question to be raised by a Member.
  On January 26, 1828,\4\ Mr. Samuel P. Carson, of North Carolina, 
referring to the argument of an opponent in debate, said:

  I am perfectly secure from his malignant shafts.

  The Speaker \5\ interposed and reminded Mr. Carson that his remarks 
were out of order.
  On the same day, Mr. John Floyd, of Virginia, said of words spoken by 
an opponent in debate:

  If that remark was intended for me, I say that the remark itself is a 
base insinuation, and as such I hurl it back in his teeth.

  The Speaker here called Mr. Floyd to order.
  Later the Speaker rose and addressed the House as follows.\6\
  He felt, he said, very deep regret at the personal and unpleasant 
character which the debate had assumed, and which, if continued, was 
calculated to have a baneful effect upon the character and 
deliberations of the House. The Speaker certainly could have no wish to 
restrict improperly the freedom of debate. He had never attempted it; 
he never should; but at the same time he felt it a duty that he owed 
the House, the nation, and himself to interpose the authority of the 
Chair in maintaining the order and dignity of the House and in 
repressing personalities and recriminations, which could produce no 
other effect than deep excitement and personal altercations. In the 
eagerness of controversy and the commotion of debate it was often very 
difficult for the Chair to interpose successfully his authority in 
preserving order and limiting debate; in cases of great or unusual 
excitement it could never be done without the most prompt and vigorous 
cooperation of the House. In making these remarks the Chair intended no 
allusion to any particular Member of the House. He had risen to impress 
upon the House
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 2317.
  \3\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 1195, 1201, 1203.
  \5\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \6\ Debates, p. 1203.
                                                            Sec. 5164
the necessity of enforcing order and sustaining the Chair, and to 
entreat gentlemen who might be disposed to mingle in the debate to 
refrain from personal and recriminating remarks toward each other and 
to confine themselves to the subject under consideration.
  5164. On January 29, 1828,\1\ Mr. Joseph Vance, of Ohio, in debate, 
thus referred to Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia:

  The Member from Virginia talked very pathetically about the poor 
man--his pound of sugar, peck of salt, etc. Now, sir, I would be glad 
to know when all these feelings came athwart the Member. Are they since 
the Huskisson dinner at Liverpool? They do not comport with what the 
Member is reported to have said after the excursion in the Dublin steam 
packets.

  Mr. Vance here said he should read for the information of the House 
the Member's sentiments at that time.
  The Chair \2\ said it would be out of order, admonishing the 
gentleman from Ohio that personal allusions were out of order.
  5165. On February 9, 1827,\3\ during debate arising over the 
relations of the United States and Georgia, Mr. William Haile, of 
Mississippi, referring to Mr. Daniel Webster, of Massachusetts, said it 
was true the gentleman from Massachusetts was, in many respects, far 
superior to him, and was possessed of high standing and great 
influence, both in the nation and in the House; and if the gentleman 
chose to direct that influence against him----
  Mr. Haile being called to order at this point, the Chair 4 decided 
that all reflections or observations touching the standing or influence 
of any Member were a violation of the decorum of debate.
  5166. On January 24, 1828,\5\ Mr. Henry Daniel, of Kentucky, while 
debating the resolutions relating to retrenchment of the expenditures 
of the Government, referred to an opponent as follows:

  His great argument appeared to be that, if the pay of Members of 
Congress were to be reduced, they could not so well educate their 
horses to go electioneering; and, indeed, sir, when those remarks fell 
from the Member I was greatly at a loss to determine which possessed 
the most native genius, the horse which was spoken of or his master.

  The Speaker \2\ here declared all personal observations out of order.
  5167. On June 18, 1813,\6\ Mr. Alexander C. Hanson, of Maryland, 
replying to Mr. Felix Grandy, of Tennessee, referred to the latter as 
``the apologist of France,'' and as possessing ``a characteristic skill 
and cunning, for which he understood the Member stood unrivaled and 
preeminent in the highly civilized, polished, and re-fined State which 
honored the House with his presence here.''
  The Speaker \7\ called the gentleman from Maryland to order, stating 
that the epithet ``cunning was not proper to be applied to a Member of 
the House, and still more was it out of order to use the words 
``apologist of France.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, p. 1229.
  \2\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Nineteenth Congress, Debates, p. 1046.
  \4\ John W. Taylor, of New York, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 1141, 1142.
  \6\ First session Thirteenth Congress, Annals, p. 252.
  \7\ Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Speaker.
Sec. 5168
  5168. On January 30, 1840,\1\ during the discussion of the subject of 
the public printing, a colloquy occurred between Messrs. Edward Stanly, 
of North Carolina, and F. O. J. Smith, of Maine, in the course of which 
Mr. Stanly said that he should blush to receive a compliment from the 
gentleman from Maine.
  Mr. Isaac E. Crary, of Michigan, called the gentleman from North 
Carolina to order for using the words.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that Mr. Stanly's words were not in order, 
and that he could not proceed without leave of the House.
  5169. On November 21, 1867,\3\ during debate the Speaker \4\ called 
Mr. James Brooks, of New York, to order for words spoken in debate. 
Being questioned as to what words were disorderly, the Speaker said:

  The language to which the Chair excepted was this: That the gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Henry L. Dawes] ``had done a mean thing'' 
toward the gentleman from New York [Mr. Brooks]. That language was not 
parliamentary. The gentleman from New York will now proceed in order.

  5170. A Member is allowed a wide latitude in debate relating to a 
contumacious witness at the bar of the Rouse.--On June 8, 1868,\5\ the 
House was considering the case of C. W. Wooley, a contumacious witness 
who had been arrested and was at the bar of the House. During the 
procedure, Mr. John Covode, of Pennsylvania, was called to order by Mr. 
Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin, for the use of the following words 
in reference to the witness, viz:

  The witness present was not only guilty of contempt of the House, but 
guilty of perjury.

  The Speaker \4\ submitted the decision to the House, saying:

  In a case parallel to this which occurred in the Thirty-eighth 
Congress, when the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Orth] alluded to a 
Member from Maryland as a ``traitor,'' after the House of 
Representatives had adopted a resolution that he had given aid and 
comfort to the enemy by certain remarks which he had offered on the 
floor of the House, it was ruled, and the ruling was sustained on 
appeal, that the gentleman had a right to make that charge, because the 
House of Representatives had, by its resolution, made such a 
declaration. In this case the House must, in like manner, decide 
whether the language used by the gentleman from Pennsylvania is 
justifiable, in view of the facts and evidence within the knowledge of 
the House.

  The question being put, ``Are the said words out of order?'' it was 
decided in the negative, yeas 37, nays 70.
  5171. A Member in debate may impeach the testimony of a witness 
before a committee.--On April 17, 1828,\6\ during discussion of the 
tariff bill, Mr. Churchill C. Cambreleng, of New York, criticised 
certain testimony given on the subject of prices of cloths as wrong.
  Mr. David Woodcock, of New York, as a parliamentary inquiry, asked 
whether a Member had the right to impeach the testimony of a witness 
who had been sent for by the committee.
  The Speaker \7\ replied that he had.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 157.
  \2\ Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 776.
  \4\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Journal, pp. 819, 820; Globe, 
p. 2945.
  \6\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, pp. 2366, 2367.
  \7\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5172
  5172. A Member may not be required to give the authority of any 
respectful statement which he may quote in debate.--On April 15, 
1830,\1\ the bill in ``alteration of the several acts laying duties on 
imports'' was under consideration in Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union.
  In the course of the debate, Mr. Rollin C. Mallary, of Vermont, read 
from a paper, giving certain statements as to the subject under debate.
  Mr. Churchill C. Cambreleng, of New York, having inquired as to the 
authority of the evidence, Mr. Mallary replied that it was of the most 
unquestioned respectability.
  Mr. William Drayton, of South Carolina, raised a question of order as 
to whether it was not a matter of right to demand the authority of a 
paper which was presented for the purpose of influencing a committee.
  The Chairman \2\ decided that a Member, while addressing the 
committee, might read in his place any paper containing respectful 
language, and could not be required to give up the authority on which 
it was founded. It was for the committee to judge of the value of what 
was disclosed.
  5173. Questions of order have been raised when language used in 
debate has been such as to suggest the dissolution of the Government.--
On January 14, 1811,\3\ the House was considering the bill to enable 
the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and State government, 
when Mr. Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, was called to order by Mr. 
George Poindexter, the Delegate from Mississippi Territory, for using 
the following expressions which, he claimed, tended to dissolve the 
Government and reduce the House itself to ``dust and ashes:''

  If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually 
a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their 
moral obligations; and that as it will then be the right of all, so it 
will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for separation, 
amicably if they can, violently if they must.

  The Speaker \4\ decided that the expressions following the words 
``moral obligations'' were out of order.
  An appeal being taken, the decision of the Chair was overruled by the 
House, yeas 53, nays 56.
  5174. On April 9, 1864,\5\ during debate on a resolution for the 
expulsion of Mr. Alexander Long, of Ohio, Mr. Benjamin G. Harris, of 
Maryland, who had the floor in debate, was called to order by Mr. Elihu 
B. Washburne, of Illinois, for the use of the following words:

  The South asked you to let them live in peace. But no; you said you 
would bring them into subjugation. That is not done yet; and God 
Almighty grant that it never may be. I hope that you will never 
subjugate the South.

  The Speaker pro tempore \6\ sustained the point of order, and Mr. 
Harris thereupon took his seat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twenty-first Congress, Debates, p. 797.
  \2\ William D. Martin, of South Carolina, Chairman.
  \3\ Third session Eleventh Congress, Journal, p. 481 (Gales and 
Seaton ed.); Anna1s, pp. 525, 526.
  \4\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Thirty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 506 Globe, p. 
1516.
  \6\ Edward H. Rollins, of New Hampshire, Speaker pro tempore.
Sec. 5175
  5175. If any Member in speaking or otherwise transgress the rules of 
the House, it is the duty of the Speaker and the privilege of any 
Member to call him to order, and he may be punished by censure or 
otherwise.
  A Member called to order shall immediately sit down, unless the 
House, on motion, but without debate, shall permit him to explain or 
proceed in order.
  Present form and history of section 4 of Rule XIV.
  Section 4 of Rule XIV provides:

  If any Member, in speaking or otherwise, transgress the rules of the 
House, the Speaker shall, or any Member may, call him to order; in 
which case he shall immediately sit down, unless permitted, on motion 
of another Member, to explain, and the House shall, if appealed to, 
decide on the case without debate. If the decision is in favor of the 
Member called to order he shall be at liberty to proceed, but not 
otherwise; and, if the case require it, he shall be liable to censure 
or such punishment as the House may deem proper.

  This is the form of the rule reported in the revision of 1880,\1\ but 
that form was taken almost verbatim from the original rule of April 7, 
1789.\2\
  On February 28, 1820,\3\ Mr. William Lowndes, of South Carolina, 
proposed a provision that in case the decision should be against the 
Member called to order, he should not proceed without leave of the 
House if there should be objection. Mr. Lowndes urged that it was 
necessary to prevent waste of the time of the House in irrelevant 
debate, but the argument that it would be oppressive to the Member 
prevailed for the time being; but in 1822 \4\ the provision was 
engrafted in the rule. On March 4, 1868,\5\ Mr. Speaker Colfax held 
that the rule required an objection from the floor in order to justify 
the Speaker in forbidding the Member to proceed. By an amendment of the 
rule adopted in 1880 this was changed so as to provide that the Member 
should not proceed at all after an adverse decision. Also, in 1880, it 
was provided that the permission to explain should be given ``on motion 
of another Member.''
  5176. The parliamentary law relating to naming a Member who persists 
in irregularity, and punishment by the House.--Chapter XVII of 
Jefferson's Manual provides:

  If repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by his 
name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon the 
House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in 
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense 
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will 
inflict.\6\ (2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.)

  5177. When a Member is called to order for words spoken in debate, 
the words are to be taken down at once; and he shall not be held to 
answer or be subject to censure if debate or business intervene.
  Present form and history of section 5 of Rule XIV.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \2\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \3\ First session Sixteenth Congress, Journal, pp. 258, 282; Annals, 
pp. 1557, 1592.
  \4\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Journal, p. 350.
  \5\ Second session Fortieth Congress, Globe, p. 2356.
  \6\ This form of procedure has rarely, if ever, occurred in the 
House, the rules providing a method of procedure more definite and 
satisfactory.
                                                            Sec. 5178
  Section 5 of Rule XIV provides:

  If a Member is called to order for words spoken in debate, the Member 
calling him to order shall indicate the words excepted to, and they 
shall be taken down in writing at the Clerk's desk and read aloud to 
the House; but he shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to the 
censure of the House therefor, if further debate or other business has 
intervened.

  On February 24, 1808,\1\ Mr. John Smilie, of Pennsylvania, proposed a 
rule providing that objectionable words might be taken down at the time 
they should be uttered. This rule was not adopted, but on December 30, 
1808,\2\ one Member having called another to order, Mr. Speaker Varnum. 
asked the objecting Member to put down in writing the words to which he 
objected. And thereafter it seems to have been the custom, when there 
was a desire to press a question of order for words spoken in debate, 
to have the words written down, as is illustrated by an incident on 
February 6, 1828.\3\ The rule as it exists to-day evidently had its 
origin in a contest which occurred in the House in 1832 over a 
resolution proposing to censure Mr. William Stanberry, of Ohio, for a 
speech which charged the Speaker of the House with shaping his course 
so as to secure office from the President of the United States.\4\ It 
was objected that the words complained of had been spoken on the 
previous day, and had not been taken down at the time; and Mr. John 
Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, refused to vote on the resolution, on 
the ground that it proceeded upon inferences from words spoken without 
giving the words themselves. For this refusal to vote it was proposed 
to censure Mr. Adams.
  On July 13, 1832, Mr. Adams proposed this rule,\5\ which was not 
adopted then:

  If a Member be called to order for words spoken in debate, the person 
calling him to order shall repeat the words excepted to, and they shall 
be taken down in writing at the Clerk's table, and no Member shall be 
held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the House for words 
spoken in debate, if any other Member has spoken, or other business has 
intervened after the words spoken, and before exception to them shall 
have been taken.

  On September 14, 1837, however, the rule was adopted,\6\ and in the 
revision of 1880 \7\ it was given the form which it now has.
  5178. The demand that disorderly words be taken down must be made at 
once before debate intervenes.--On August 27, 1890,\8\ during debate on 
the question of approving the Journal, Mr. Benjamin A. Enloe, of 
Tennessee, made the point of order that words used by Mr. Joseph G. 
Cannon, of Illinois, were not in order, and demanded that the same be 
taken down so far as they applied to Mr. William McAdoo, of New Jersey, 
and read to the House.
  The Speaker \9\ overruled the point of order, on the ground that the 
demand came too late, debate having intervened subsequently to the 
words excepted to. The
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Tenth Congress, Journal, p. 191; Annals, p. 1679.
  \2\ Second session Tenth Congress, Annals, p. 964.
  \3\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, p. 1420.
  \4\ First session Twenty-second Congress, Annals, pp. 3888-3913.
  \5\ First session Twenty-second Congress, Journal, p. 1171.
  \6\ First session Twenty-fifth Congress, Globe, p. 31. Mr. Adams had 
evidently persisted in favor of this rule, for on January 5, 1836 
(first session Twenty-fourth Congress, Report No. 83), the Committee on 
Rules, of which Mr. Adams was a member, had reported it, but it was not 
then adopted.
  \7\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \8\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 994; Record, p. 
9234.
  \9\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
Sec. 5179
Speaker further held that under Rule XIV, clauses 4 and 5,\1\ the 
Member who it was alleged had transgressed the rule of the House must 
be called to order and the words excepted to indicated, which had not 
been done in the present instance.
  Mr. Enloe appealed from the decision of the Chair; and the question 
being put, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the judgment of the 
House? it was decided in the affirmative, yeas 103, nays 78.
  5179. When a Member who has been called to order in debate denies 
that the words taken down are the exact words used by himself, the 
question as to the words is put to the House for decision.--On January 
22, 1836 \2\ the following resolution was under consideration:

  Resolved, That so much of the message of the President of the United 
States to Congress at the commencement of the present session as 
relates to the failure at the-last session of Congress of the bill 
containing the ordinary appropriations for fortifications be referred 
to a select committee, with instructions to inquire into, and report to 
the House, the causes and circumstances of the failure of that bill.

  Mr. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, while debating the 
resolution, was called to order by Mr. Charles F. Mercer, of Virginia, 
who, by direction of the Speaker, reduced to writing the words to which 
he excepted:

  The Member from Massachusetts remarked, in terms, that in the debate 
in the paper, meaning the National Intelligence, and the debate to be a 
late debate in the Senate, that a charge had been made that the 
appropriation of three millions, meaning the amendment moved in a bill 
of this House of the last session, called the fortifications bill, was 
unconstitutional, thus referring to a late debate in the Senate of the 
United States.

  Mr. Adams denied that he used the precise words excepted to and 
reduced to writing by Mr. Mercer, as herein set forth.
  The question was then put to the House: ``Are the words reduced to 
writing by Mr. Mercer the words spoken by Mr. Adams?''
  And it was decided in the negative.
  Thereupon Mr. Adams proceeded with his remarks.
  5180. On February 15, 1836,\3\ the House was considering the 
reception of a petition of citizens of Schoharie, N. Y., praying for 
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. Mr. Henry A. 
Wise, of Virginia, having the floor in debate, was called to order for 
using certain expressions personal to Mr. Henry L. Pinckney, of South 
Carolina. The Speaker decided the words to be out of order, and at the 
request of a Member ordered them to be reduced to writing by the Clerk. 
The words were then read, as follows:

  He hissed him and spurned him as a deserter from the principles of 
the South.

  Mr. Wise disclaimed using the precise words as put down.
  In response to an inquiry by Mr. Francis Granger, of New York, the 
Speaker said that the House must pass upon the words, and proceeded to 
put the question: ``Are the words as put down the words used by the 
Member from Virginia?''
  Before the question was put, Mr. Wise was permitted to explain, and 
admitted that he had used these words:

  Hissed him as a deserter from the principles of the South, upon this 
question of slavery.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ See sections 5175 and 5177 of this chapter.
  \2\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 231; Debates, 
pp. 2268, 2269.
  \3\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 355, 356; 
Debates, pp. 2533-2536.
  \4\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5181
  The Speaker then decided that the words admitted to have been used 
were out of order, and that under the rule of the House Mr. Wise could 
``not be permitted to proceed without the leave of the House.''
  From this decision Mr. Wise appealed to the House, but subsequently 
withdrew the appeal.
  Then, on motion of Mr. John Bell, of Tennessee, and by a vote of yeas 
108, nays 92, Mr. Wise was permitted to proceed.
  5181. A Member called to order in debate must take his seat, although 
he may be permitted by the House to proceed in order or explain, even 
after his words have been taken down.--On January 23, 1891,\1\ Mr. 
George W. Cooper, of Indiana, claiming the floor for a question of 
privilege, offered a resolution relating to the investigation then 
going on of the conduct in of the Commissioner of Pensions.
  Mr. William McKinley, jr., of Ohio, made the point of order that the 
resolution was not privileged.
  Mr. Cooper, who proceeded to debate the point of order, was several 
times admonished by the Speaker to confine himself to the point of 
order, and finally was directed by the Speaker to take his seat.
  Thereupon Mr. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, moved that the gentleman 
from Indiana be allowed to proceed in order.
  Mr. W. C. P. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, called attention to the fact 
that the debate was on a point of order, and that the Speaker had the 
right to say, to the Member that he did not desire to hear further 
argument.
  The Speaker \2\ said:

  The Chair desires to state the case to the House, because the 
gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Breckinridge] has made some observations 
which it is desirable that the House should pay attention to. The 
Speaker endeavored in every way possible to induce the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Cooper] to address the Chair upon the point of order in 
order. He did not exercise the power, which is inherent in the Chair, 
of saying that he did not desire to hear anything more, because he was 
perfectly willing to hear anything that was in order, but the gentleman 
from Indiana continued to proceed, as the Chair thinks, out of order. 
The Chair then called him to order, and the gentleman from Missouri 
[Mr. Bland] now makes the motion that the gentleman from Indiana be 
heard further in order, and that is the motion that is to be put to the 
House without debate.
  5182. On April 13, 1898,\3\ during the consideration of the 
resolution authorizing intervention in Cuba, Mr. David B. Henderson, of 
Iowa, had the floor, when he was interrupted by Mr. Henry U. Johnson, 
of Indiana.
  Mr. Henderson having declined to yield, and Mr. Johnson having 
persisted, the Speaker \2\ said:

  The gentleman from Indiana must take his seat. The gentleman from 
Iowa declines to yield.
  [Mr. Johnson continued speaking.]
  The Sergeant-at-Arms will proceed unless the gentleman resumes his 
seat; and the House will please be in order.

  The Sergeant-at-Arms appeared with the mace, and Mr. Johnson resumed 
his seat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-first Congress, Record, p. 1788; Journal, p. 
174.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 3814.
Sec. 5183
  5183. On February 5, 1894,\1\ the House, pursuant to the special 
order, proceeded to the consideration of, the resolutions (Mis. Doe., 
75) relating to Hawaiian affairs.
  Pending the debate, on the demand of Mr. Joseph H. Outhwaite, of 
Ohio, the following words, spoken by Mr. Elijah A. Morse, of 
Massachusetts, were taken down:

  On the other side are not only white men and women, but nearly or 
quite all of the virtuous and intelligent white people of the islands. 
And yet, strange to tell, that at the command of their master, the 
great Grover Cleveland, the cuckoos in the House and in the Senate, 
stanch Southern Democrats--

  Mr. Outhwaite made the point that the language was against order.
  The Speaker \2\ held that the language was not parliamentary.
  On motion of Mr. Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, Mr. Morse was 
permitted to explain.\3\
  5184. On March 3, 1892,\4\ the House resumed consideration of the 
bill (H. R. 372) to amend section 22 of an act entitled ``An act to 
regulate commerce,'' approved February 4, 1887, and amended March 2, 
1889, so as to give common carriers a right to allow a greater weight 
of sample baggage to commercial travelers and their employees and 
reduced rates of transportation.
  In the course of debate on the bill and amendments Mr. Jerry Simpson, 
of Kansas, referred to a Member of the Senate as an iniquitous railroad 
attorney.
  Mr. John Lind, of Minnesota, made the point of order that the 
language used by Mr. Simpson was a violation of the rules of the House 
and out of order.
  The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order.
  5185. Words spoken being held out of order, and the House having 
permitted the Member to explain, it is then in order to move that he be 
permitted to proceed.--On February 26,1894,\5\ Mr. Lafe Pence, of 
Colorado, was recognized, and stated that he proposed to present a 
question of personal privilege. Proceeding with his statement, on the 
suggestion of Mr. Eugene I. Hainer, of Nebraska, the following language 
of Mr. Pence was taken down by the Clerk:

   I do not think the gentleman from Oregon has made any statement, 
taken any action, or cast any vote on his own hook from the beginning 
of the session last August.

  Mr. Hainer made the point that this language was out of order.
  The Speaker \2\ held that the language was not in order.
  5186. On July 28, 1892,\6\ Mr. Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, as a 
matter of privilege, sent to the Clerk's desk a pamphlet purporting to 
have been prepared by Mr. Thomas E. Watson, a Representative in 
Congress from Georgia, which contained the following language, 
referring to the House of Representatives of the present Congress; 
which was read at the desk:

  Lack of common business prudence never more glaring. Drunken Members 
have reeled about the aisles-a disgrace to the Republic. Drunken 
speakers have debated grave issues on the floor, and in the midst of 
maudlin ramblings have been heard to ask, ``Mr. Speaker, where was I 
at?''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 137; Record, pp. 
1879, 1880.
  \2\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \3\ See also Journal, first session Fifty-fourth Congress, p. 190, 
for instance where a Member was permitted to explain after his words 
were taken down.
  \4\ First session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 87; Record, p. 
1703.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 204; Record, p. 
2450.
  \6\ First session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 343.
                                                            Sec. 5187
  Mr. Wheeler denounced the charges as false, unfounded, and libelous.
  Mr. Watson took the floor in reply to the remarks of Mr. Wheeler, and 
in the course of his remarks stated that every word in that book 
(meaning the book from which the extract just mentioned had been read) 
was literally true.
  Mr. Charles Tracey, of New York, made the point of order that the 
language of Mr. Watson, in connection with the extract which had been 
read, was disorderly and a violation of the rules of the House.
  The Speaker \1\ held that the language of Mr. Watson was out of 
order, and directed that Mr. Watson take his seat.
  On motion of Mr. Jerry Simpson, of Kansas, Mr. Watson was allowed to 
explain.
  Upon the conclusion of Mr. Watson's explanation, the question was 
put, ``Shall Mr. Watson be allowed to proceed with his remarks?'' and 
it was decided in the negative.
  5187. The words of a Member having been taken down, and the Speaker 
having decided that they were not in order, it was held that a motion 
that the Member be permitted to explain had precedence of a motion that 
he be permitted to proceed in order.--On February 2, 1894,\2\ the House 
was considering a report from the Committee on Rules, and Mr. T. C. 
Catchings, of Mississippi, had the floor, when, upon the demand of Mr. 
Charles A. Boutelle, of Maine, the following words spoken by Mr. 
Catchings were taken down by the Clerk:

  Now, Mr. Speaker, we did not submit it to the gentleman from Maine 
[Mr. Boutelle], because we knew in advance that nothing would receive 
his approval that did not give him free range to perform his fantastic 
and Bedlamite gyrations on this floor.

  Mr. Boutelle made the point that said language was not in order.
  Mr. Benton McMillin, of Tennessee, moved that Mr. Catchings be 
permitted to proceed in order.
  Pending the vote on agreeing to this motion, Mr. W. C. P. 
Breckinridge, of Kentucky, made the point that, until it was decided 
that the language taken down was a transgression of the rules, the 
motion that he be permitted to proceed was unnecessary and premature.
  The Speaker \1\ stated that he recognized the force of the suggestion 
of Mr. Breckinridge, but inasmuch as the motion of Mr. McMillin had 
been submitted without objection, and the House was dividing thereon, 
the vote would proceed on said motion.
  The motion of Mr. McMillin was then agreed to.
  Mr. Catchings continued his remarks; when, on the demand of Mr. 
Boutelle, the following words spoken by Mr. Catchings were taken down.
  Mr. Boutelle submitted that the language taken down was against 
order.

  In common with many other gentlemen on the floor, I have regarded him 
as afflicted with a species of harmless mania for making on all 
occasions an exhibition of himself.

  The Speaker held that the language complained of was hardly 
parliamentary.
  Mr. Joseph H. Outhwaite, of Ohio, moved that Mr. Catchings be 
permitted to proceed in order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 132; Record, p. 
1811.
Sec. 5188
  Pending this, Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York, made the point that 
the question should first be taken on permitting Mr. Catchings to 
explain his remarks.
  The Speaker held that the proper motion should be, that the gentleman 
be permitted to explain.
  On motion of Mr. Outhwaite, it was ``Ordered, That Mr. Catchings be 
permitted to explain his remarks.''
  Mr. Catchings explained, after which explanation the former motion of 
Mr. Outhwaite was agreed to and Mr. Catchings was permitted to proceed.
  5188. When a Member is called to order for violation of the rules of 
debate, it is the practice to test the opinion of the House by a motion 
``that the gentleman be allowed to proceed in order.''
  Complaint of the conduct of the Speaker should be presented directly 
for the action of the House and not by way of debate on other matters.
  The Speaker remained in the chair and ruled as to the relevance of 
language criticising his conduct as Speaker.
  On May 13, 1897,\1\ the question before the House was the approval of 
the Journal, and Mr. Jerry Simpson, of Kansas, having the floor, was 
proceeding to comment upon the fact that the Speaker had not appointed 
the committees, and to discuss the general observance of the rules of 
the House.
  Mr. Nelson Dingley, of Maine, having raised the point of order that 
the debate was not proceeding in order, the Speaker' \2\ sustained it, 
saying that the question before the House was the approval of the 
Journal, not obedience to the rules; and under the rule directed the 
gentleman from Kansas to take his seat.
  Mr. James D. Richardson, of Tennessee, moved that the gentleman from 
Kansas be allowed to proceed in order, and the House agreed to the 
motion.
  Mr. Simpson was proceeding, when again, on a point of order made by 
Mr. Dingley, he was called to order; and again the House voted that he 
be allowed to proceed in order.
  Again Mr. Simpson was proceeding, discussing the alleged arbitrary 
way in which Members were deprived of their rights in the House and 
reflecting upon the Speaker, when Mr. Dingley again called him to 
order.
  The Speaker, in ruling, said:

  The Chair desires to say to the House in regard to this matter that 
when an appeal is made to him on a question of order, it becomes his 
duty to make a ruling upon the question as he understands it. So far as 
the Chair is concerned, he has only requested the gentleman from Kansas 
to confine himself to the subject that is under discussion. The Chair 
submits to the House that allusions or criticisms of what the Chair did 
at some past time is certainly not in order. Not because the Chair is 
above criticism or above attack, but for two reasons: First, because 
the Speaker is the Speaker of the House, and such attacks are not 
conducive to the good order of the House; and, second, because the 
Speaker can not reply to them except in a very fragmentary fashion, and 
it is not desirable that he should reply to them. For these reasons 
such attacks ought not to be made.
  If there be any complaint of the conduct of the Speaker it ought to 
be presented directly for the action of the House, but this continual 
making of attacks with no proper opportunity for reply every Member 
must see, whatever may be his relation to the pending question, is not 
suitable and ought not to be indulged in. If there be any objections to 
the acts of the Speaker they are not above criticism
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, pp. 1067, 1068.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5189
by direct presentation for the action of the House. It seems to the 
Chair that this view must commend itself to every gentleman present who 
has a regard for the honor and dignity of the House.
  The Chair felt it his duty to hold that the words of the gentleman 
from Kansas, as the Chair understood them, were an attack of this kind, 
and that such an attack was not suitable to be made, and upon that he 
asks the favorable judgment of the House.\1\

  Mr. William L. Terry, of Arkansas, moved that the gentleman from 
Kansas be allowed to proceed in order. This motion was negatived by the 
House, 96 nays to 83 yeas, 14 answering present. So the gentleman from 
Kansas was not allowed to proceed in order.
  5189. On February 10, 1898,\2\ the House was considering the bill (H. 
R. 2196) directing the issue of a duplicate lost check, and Mr. Levin 
I. Handy, of Delaware, who had the floor, was proceeding to discuss a 
subject relating to the State of Delaware.
  Mr. George D. Perkins, of Iowa, thereupon made the point of order 
that the gentleman was not confining himself to the subject under 
debate.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair desires to call the gentleman's attention to the fact that 
under the rules of the House a speech foreign to the bill ought not to 
be made.

  Again Mr. Handy was called to order by Mr. Dalzell for not confining 
himself to the subject under debate.
  Mr. Joseph W. Bailey, of Texas, moved that Mr. Handy be permitted to 
proceed. The Chair declined to entertain that motion, the proper 
motion, he stated, being to permit the Member to proceed ``in order.''
  Mr. Bailey having modified his motion, it was agreed to; and the 
Speaker announced that the gentleman from Delaware would proceed in 
order.\4\
  5190. Although debate on a question of order is within control of the 
Speaker, yet he puts to the House the question whether a Member called 
to order during such debate shall ``be allowed to proceed in order.''--
On January 23, 1891,\5\ Mr. George W. Cooper, of Indiana, was 
presenting a question of privilege relating to the report of the 
committee appointed to investigate the charges against the Commissioner 
of Pensions.
  The Speaker called Mr. Cooper to order for transgressing the rules of 
the House as to debate, and directed him to take his seat, under clause 
4 of Rule XV.
  Mr. Richard P. Bland, of Missouri, under that clause, moved that Mr. 
Cooper be allowed to proceed in order.
  Mr. W. C. P. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, made the point of order that 
the, motion of Mr. Bland was not in order, for the reason that the 
debate, being on a question of order, was addressed to the Chair, which 
it was in his power to stop at any moment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ On March 1, 1837, Mr. Bailie Peyton, of Tennessee, addressed very 
scathing remarks to the Speaker, accusing him of having not only 
humbled himself to the Executive, but to the vilest instruments of the 
Executive, and of having made up an investigating committee so that it 
should not investigate. (Second session Twenty-fourth Congress, 
Debates, p. 2084.)
  \2\ Second session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, pp. 1632-1635.
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ For a similar instance see Record, second session Fifty-fifth 
Congress, p. 6767.
  \5\ Second session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 174; Record, pp. 
1778, 1788.
Sec. 5191
  The Speaker \1\ thereupon made the following statement:

  The Chair desires to state the case to the House, because the 
gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Breckinridge] has made some observations 
which it is desirable that the House should pay attention to. The 
Speaker endeavored in every way possible to induce the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Cooper] to address the Chair upon the point of order in 
order. He did not exercise the power, which is inherent in the Chair, 
of saying that he did not desire to hear anything more, because he was 
perfectly willing to hear anything that was in order, but the gentleman 
from Indiana continued to proceed, as the Chair thinks, out of order. 
The Chair then called him to order, and the gentleman from Missouri 
[Mr. Bland] now makes the motion that the gentleman from Indiana be 
heard further, in order, and that is the motion that is to be put to 
the House without debate.

  The Speaker then put the question, ``Shall Mr. Cooper be allowed to 
proceed in order?'' And it was decided in the negative, yeas 117, nays 
142. So the House refused to allow Mr. Cooper to proceed in order.
  5191. The House often votes that a Member who has been decided out of 
order in debate shall be allowed to proceed in order.--On June 16, 1841 
\2\ during consideration of a resolution relating to the adoption of 
rules, and while the propriety of putting the previous question was 
being debated, Mr. Samuel Gordon, of New York, was called to order by 
Mr. Thomas D. Arnold, of Tennessee, for irrelevancy, and the call being 
sustained he took his seat.
  Mr. John Campbell, of South Carolina, moved that Mr. Gordon have 
leave to proceed with his remarks, which was refused by the House.
  Whereupon Mr. William M. Oliver, of New York, moved that Mr. Gordon 
have leave to proceed ``in order.'' This was agreed to by the House.
  5192. On December 21, 1843,\3\ Mr. John Quincy Adams, of 
Massachusetts, had the floor on an appeal relating to the reception of 
a petition remonstrating against the admission of Texas into the Union 
while she tolerated slavery. In the course of his remarks he said:

  Why, according to the construction of some human skulls, nothing that 
bears directly on the subject before the House is relevant, and it 
sometimes happens that the skulls of that kind have sympathy with the 
skull of the Speaker.

  The Speaker \4\ said that the Chair could not and would not permit 
reflections of that kind to be made on the House or on the Chair. He 
therefore called Mr. Adams to order for offensive remarks and directed 
him to take his seat.
  Objection was made to allowing Mr. Adams to proceed in order, but Mr. 
John White, of Kentucky, contended that it had been the custom to 
permit a motion that the gentleman called to order be allowed to 
proceed in order, since not to allow such a motion might work 
injustice.
  So Mr. White was permitted to move that Mr. Adams be permitted to 
proceed in order, and the House agreed to the motion.
  5193. On April 29, 1864,\5\ the House was considering a resolution 
calling on the President of the United States for certain documents 
relating to the holding of a commission in the Army by Francis P. 
Blair, jr. During the debate Mr. James
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Twenty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 140; Globe, p. 
62.
  \3\ First session Twenty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 90; Globe, pp. 
60, 61.
  \4\ John W. Jones, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Thirty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 595; Globe, p. 
1969.
                                                            Sec. 5194
Brooks, of New York, was proceeding to speak of alleged corruption in 
the Treasury Department.
  Mr. John M. Broomall, of Pennsylvania, after raising a question as to 
the relevancy of the debate several times, insisted on the enforcement 
of the rule, and the Speaker\1\ decided that Mr. Brooks was not in 
order, and required him to take his seat.
  Mr. Brooks having submitted to the decision of the Chair, Mr. William 
H. Miller, of Pennsylvania, moved that he be permitted to proceed in 
order.
  The question being taken, the motion was agreed to, yeas 83, nays 36.
  5194. A Member having been allowed by general consent to proceed in 
debate after he had been called to order, it was held that a vote of 
the House on the question might not be demanded.--On March 3, 1849,\2\ 
Mr. Meredith P. Gentry, of Tennessee, in the course of debate, was 
called to order by the Speaker for personalities. But no objection 
having been made, he proceeded with his remarks in order.
  Subsequently, Mr. Thomas J. Henley, of Indiana, rose and insisted 
that the gentleman from Tennessee, having been pronounced out of order 
by the Chair, should be required to take his seat and should not be 
permitted to proceed without a vote of the House.
  The Speaker \3\ decided that the objection came too late, the 
gentleman from Tennessee having already been permitted to proceed in 
order by the general consent of the House.
  Mr. Henley having appealed, the decision of the Chair was sustained, 
yeas 130, nays 6.
  5195. A Member who has been called to order in debate and granted 
leave to proceed, must still confine himself within the rules governing 
debate.
  To a proposition to censure a Member for presenting a petition on the 
subject of slavery, debate on the opinions of statesmen of former times 
on the general subject of slavery was held to be irrelevant.
  On February 9, 1837,\4\ during the discussion of a resolution to 
censure Mr. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, for having proposed to 
present to the House a petition from certain slaves, Mr. George Evans, 
of Maine, having the floor in debate, was proceeding to give the 
opinions of some of the former statesmen of Virginia on the subject of 
slavery.
  Mr. Albert G. Harrison, of Missouri, rising to a question of order, 
presented his point in writing, as follows:

  The gentleman from Maine [Mr. Evans] is called to order because he is 
speaking the opinions of others on the subject of slavery, when that is 
not the question before the House.

  The Speaker \5\ decided that Mr. Evans was not in order.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Schuyler Colfax, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Thirtieth Congress, Journal, p. 669.
  \3\ Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 360; Debates, 
pp. 1668-1670.
  \5\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
Sec. 5196
  Thereupon Mr. Evans took his seat, and a motion was made by Mr. 
Franklin H. Elmore, of South Carolina, that Mr. Evans have leave to 
proceed.
  Mr. Harrison inquired whether, if Mr. Evans should be granted leave 
to proceed, he must not still confine himself within the rules of the 
House.
  The Speaker said that the gentleman from Maine would still be limited 
by the rules of debate.
  The Speaker, in putting the question, said:

  The gentleman from Maine is called to order because he is speaking of 
the opinions of others on the subject of slavery, when that question is 
not before the House. The Chair decides that it is not in order to 
discuss the question of slavery or to cite the opinions of others on 
that subject on the question before the House. The gentleman from Maine 
resumed his seat and acquiesced in the decision of the Chair, taking no 
appeal. The rule required, therefore, that before the gentleman could 
proceed the sense of the House must be taken.

  The question being taken, the House voted that Mr. Evans might 
proceed.
  5196. A Member who has been called to order in debate and decided out 
of order, loses the floor and another may be recognized.--On February 
20, 1801,\1\ a motion was made and seconded that the House do come to 
the following resolution:

  Resolved, That the power of the Speaker or Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole shall not be construed to extend (unless by consent of the 
House previously obtained, or in case of disorderly behavior) to the 
expulsion of any person, either from the lobby, when introduced by any 
Member of the House, or from the gallery, when the same is generally 
opened.

  The previous question being demanded and under consideration,\2\ Mr. 
Henry W. Livingston, of New York, was called to order by the Speaker 
\3\ for proceeding, in the opinion of the Chair, to debate the merits 
of the main question, upon which the said Member from New York did not 
immediately sit down, pursuant to a rule of the House, and was again 
called to order by the Speaker.
  An appeal being made to the House the decision of the Speaker was 
sustained, yeas 60, nays 42.
  The previous question being put was decided in the negative, yeas 50, 
nays 53.
  5197. On February 6, 1828,\4\ during debate on resolutions relating 
to retrenchment of the expenditures of the Government, Mr. Lewis 
Williams, of North Carolina, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, asked 
if Mr. Thomas Whipple, jr., of New Hampshire, who had been called to 
order by the Speaker, and had taken his seat when required to do so by 
the Chair, might not proceed.
  The Speaker \5\ said that the gentleman from New Hampshire had 
forfeited his right to the floor. The Speaker felt no wish to restrain, 
improperly, any Member from addressing the House. For the last nine or 
ten hours he had been, although indisposed, in his chair, anxiously 
endeavoring to preserve the order and dignity of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Sixth Congress, Journal, pp. 194-199 (old ed.), 
811-813 (Gales & Seaton, ed.); Annals, p. 1041.
  \2\ At that time the demand for the previous question was debatable. 
See section 5443 of this volume.
  \3\ Theodore Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Twentieth Congress, Debates, p. 1455.
  \5\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5198
the House, and restrain anything like disorder; but he found it 
impossible without interposing the power of the Chair. He had, 
therefore, deemed it his duty, after repeated calls and violations of 
order, to direct the Member from New Hampshire to take his seat, and 
should not permit him to proceed without the assent of the House.
  No motion being made, Mr. Whipple did not get the floor.
  5198. On January 2, 1844,\1\ the House was considering a motion made 
by Mr. Lucius Q. C. Elmer, of New Jersey, that the Committee on 
Elections be authorized to employ a clerk.
  During debate Mr. Charles H. Carroll, of New York, was called to 
order for irrelevancy, and the Speaker decided that the remarks of Mr. 
Carroll were irrelevant to the question under consideration.
  Thereupon Mr. Elmer withdrew his motion, and Mr. William J. Brown, of 
Indiana, moved that the House adjourn.
  Mr. Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio, made the following question of order:

  That the call of Mr. Carroll to order, and the decision of the 
Speaker that he was out of order, did not deprive him of the floor, no 
person having objected to his proceeding in order. Therefore Mr. Elmer 
could not rightfully obtain the floor to withdraw the motion upon which 
Mr. Carroll was addressing the House; neither was Mr. Brown entitled to 
the floor to move an adjournment; and that the question still was, of 
right, on the motion of Mr. Elmer, upon which Mr. Carroll was entitled 
to the floor.

  The Speaker \2\ decided that Mr. Carroll having been decided out of 
order by the Speaker was presumed, under the thirty-fifth rule \3\ * * 
* of the House, to have taken his seat; and the floor was thus open to 
Mr. Elmer, who, under the Forty-fifth rule \4\ * * * , had the right at 
any time before a decision or amendment to withdraw the motion made by 
him. He therefore overruled the question of order made by Mr. Schenck.
  Mr. Schenck having appealed, the House, on the succeeding day, 
sustained the decision of the Chair.
  5199. On February 1, 1805,\5\ during debate Mr. Matthew Lyon, of 
Kentucky, was called to order by Mr. Joseph H. Nicholson, of Maryland, 
for a breach of decorum in debate, contrary to the rules of the House, 
by alleging that ``he had been belied by another Member of the House.''
  Thereupon Mr. Lyon sat down, and the Speaker decided that he was out 
of order; after which Mr. Lyon again arose to proceed in the debate, 
and addressed the Chair.
  This being excepted to as not in order, the Speaker \6\ decided that 
Mr. Lyon was in order.
  On appeal, this decision was sustained, yeas 81, nays 34.
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  \1\ First session Twenty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 143.
  \2\ John W. Jones, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \3\ See section 5175 of this volume.
  \4\ See section 5300 of this volume.
  \5\ Second session Eighth Congress, Journal, p. 277, (old ed.), 114 
(Gales and Seaton ed.); I Annals, p. 1115.
  \6\ Nathaniel Macon, of Georgia, Speaker.
Sec. 5200
  5200. A Member whose remarks have been decided out of order as 
irrelevant may not proceed, under the rule, except with the permission 
of the House expressly granted.
  On a proposition relating to the abolition of slavery in a particular 
locality or country, debate at large on the subject of slavery was held 
not to be relevant.
  On December 20, 1837,\1\ Mr. William Slade, of Vermont, presented 
sundry petitions from persons in Vermont praying the abolition of 
slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia.
  Mr. Slade moved that the memorials be referred to a select committee 
with instructions to report a bill providing for the abolition of 
slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia.
  While Mr. Slade was debating this motion he was proceeding to refer 
to the subject of slavery in the State of Virginia, when Mr. Robert 
Barnwell Rhett, of South Carolina, rising to a point of order, asked 
whether the discussion of the question of slavery in the States was in 
order in debating the motion before the House.
  The Speaker \2\ decided that Mr. Slade was not in order in so 
extending the limits of the discussion.
  Mr. Slade was proceeding with his remarks, when Mr. James J. McKay, 
of North Carolina, objected that under the rule he could not proceed.
  Mr. Slade thereupon took his seat by direction of the Speaker, and 
the question whether or not he should be allowed to proceed was put to 
the House.
  5201. On June 10, 1841,\3\ the House was considering a motion to 
reconsider the vote whereby the House had agreed to an amendment 
excepting the twenty-first rule from a resolution adopting the rules of 
the last House temporarily. This twenty-first rule was that forbidding 
the reception by the House of any petition praying the abolition of 
slavery or the slave trade in the United States.
  Mr. Charles J. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, having the floor, in 
debate was proceeding to discuss the relations of the British 
Government to the slave trade, when he was called to order by the 
Speaker \4\ for the reason that his remarks were irrelevant to the 
question before the House and in violation of the rule which declares 
that a Member ``shall confine himself to the question under debate.''
  Mr. Ingersoll then took his seat; but the House, on motion of Mr. 
Nathan Clifford, of Maine, voted that he have leave to proceed.
  5202. It is not in order as a question of privilege in the House to 
propose censure of a Member for disorderly words spoken in Committee of 
the Whole, but not taken down or reported therefrom.--On April 24, 
1862,\5\ Mr. John Hutchins, of Ohio, proposed to submit, as a question 
of privilege, the following preamble and resolution:

  Whereas the Hon. C. L. Vallandigham, a Member of this House from the 
State of Ohio, in Committee of the Whole, made use of the following 
language concerning the Hon. B. F. Wade, a Senator in
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Twenty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 125; Globe, p. 
41.
  \2\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Twenty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 76; Globe, pp. 
37, 38.
  \4\ John White, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Thirty-seventh Congress, Journal, p. 610.
                                                            Sec. 5202
Congress: ``Mr. Chairman: I have waited patiently for three days for 
this the earliest occasion presented for a personal explanation. In a 
speech delivered in this city the other day, not in this House, 
certainly not in the Senate--no such speech could have been tolerated 
in an American Senate--I find the following: * * * Now, sir, here in my 
place in the House and as a Representative, I denounce, and I speak it 
advisedly, the author of that speech as a liar, a scoundrel, and a 
coward, and his name is Benjamin F. Wade;'' and whereas said remarks 
are a violation of the rules of this House, and a breech of decorum, 
and demand the censure of this House: Therefore,
  Resolved, That said C. L. Vallandigham, for said violation of the 
rules of the House and its decorum, is deserving of censure, and is 
hereby censured.

  The same having been read, Mr. Vallandigham made the point of order 
that, under the express language of the sixty-second rule of the House, 
he could not be held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the 
House for the words spoken, another Member having spoken and other 
business having intervened before exception to them was taken; and that 
consequently the preamble and resolution could not be entertained by 
the House.
  On April 25, the Speaker \1\ sustained the point of order, and 
decided that the preamble and resolution proposed to be submitted as a 
question of privilege by Mr. Hutchins were out of order.
  In this decision of the Chair the House acquiesced.
  The record of debate \2\ shows that the Speaker, in deciding the 
question, quoted both the rule and also the paragraph of Jefferson's 
Manuel:

  Disorderly words spoken in a committee must be written down as in the 
House, but the committee can only report them to the House for 
animadversion.

  The Speaker decided that as the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hutchins) in 
his resolution had not complied with either the rule of the House or 
the provision of parliamentary law, that therefore the point of order 
was well taken.\3\
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  \1\ Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Thirty-seventh Congress, Globe, pp. 1829, 1833.
  \3\ Section XVII of Jefferson's Manual provides ``Disorderly words 
spoken in a committee must be written down as in the House; but the 
committee can only report them to the House for animadversion.'' (6 
Grey, 46.)