<DOC>
[Hinds Precedents -- Volume V]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:hinds_cxvii.wais]

 
                             Chapter CXVII.

                         MOTIONS IN GENERAL.\1\

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   1. Rule for offering motions. Section 5300.\2\
   2. Rule of precedence of motions. Sections 5301-5303.\3\
   3. Rule for stating a motion. Section 5304.
   4. Matter not privileged not in order with a privileged motion. 
     Section 5305.
   5. Notion to postpone to a day certain. Sections 5306-5315.\4\
   6. Motion to postpone indefinitely. Sections 5316-5318.
   7. In relation to the previous question. Sections 5319-5321.
   8. In relation to motion to suspend the rules. Section 5322.
   9. The motion to rescind. Sections 5323-5325.\5\
   10. Motion to strike out the enacting words. Sections 5326-
     5346.
   11. Withdrawal of motions. Sections 5347-5358.

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  5300. Every motion made to the House and entertained by the Speaker 
shall be reduced to writing on the demand of any Member.
  Every motion entertained by the Speaker shall be entered on the 
Journal with the name of the Member making it unless it be withdrawn 
the same day.
  Present form and history of section 1 of Rule XVI.
  Section 1 of Rule XVI provides:

  Every motion made to the House and entertained by the Speaker shall 
be reduced to writing on the demand of any Member, and shall be entered 
on the Journal with the name of the Member making it, unless it is 
withdrawn the same day.
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  \1\ For precedents relating to the following motions:
  To adjourn. (Secs. 5359-5388 of this volume.)
  To lay on the table. (Secs. 5389-5442 of this volume.)
  The previous question. (Secs. 5443-5520 of this volume.)
  To refer. (Secs. 5521-5568 of this volume.)
  To refer after previous question is ordered. (Secs. 5569-5604 of this 
volume.)
  To reconsider. (Secs. 5605-5705 of this volume.)
  To suspend the rules. (Secs. 6790-6862 of this volume.)
  Dilatory motions. (Secs. 5706-752 of this volume.)
  \2\ The usage governing recognition by the Speaker. (Secs. 1419-1479 
of Vol. II.) In an impeachment trial. (Sec. 2131 of Vol. III.)
  \3\ Relation of question of consideration to motions. (Secs. 4943, 
4971-4977 of this volume.)
  \4\ Effect of motion to postpone to a day certain. (Sec. 263 of Vol. 
I.)
  Relation of motion to postpone to special orders. (Secs. 3177-3182 of 
Vol. IV and 4958 of this volume.
  \5\ Use of, in proceedings at organization. (See. 222 of Vol. I.) See 
also section 2442 of Volume III.
                                                            Sec. 5301
  This is the form agreed to in the revision of 1880. As reported 
originally it did not contain the words ``and entertained by the 
Speaker,'' which were added on February 11, 1880,\1\ on motion of Mr. 
J. S. C. Blackburn, of Kentucky. The rule was taken from the old rule, 
No. 39, of which the portion providing that ``every motion shall be 
reduced to writing if the Speaker or any Member desire it,'' dated from 
April 7, 1789.\2\ On March 22, 1806, a committee, which had been 
appointed to amend the rules in regard to the Journal, reported and the 
House adopted a rule that ``every written motion made to the House 
shall be inserted in the Journal, with the name of the Member making 
it, unless it be withdrawn on the same day on which it was submitted.'' 
\3\
  Mr. Michael Leib, of Pennsylvania, who proposed the rule, declared 
that the Journal generally should be kept so that the people might know 
what was being done.
  5301. When a question is under debate, certain motions only are 
received and their precedence is governed by rule.
  The motions to adjourn, lay on the table, and for the previous 
question are not debatable and have precedence in the order named.
  A motion to postpone to a day certain, refer or postpone 
indefinitely, being decided, is not again in order on the same day at 
the same stage of the question.
  The House has long since discarded the use of the parliamentary 
motion to proceed to the orders of the day.
  The motions to fix the day to which the House shall adjourn and for a 
recess are no longer in the list of privileged motions.
  Present form and history of section 4 of Rule XVI.
  Section 4 of Rule XVI provides:

  When a question is under debate, no motion shall be received but to 
adjourn, to lay on the table, for the previous question (which motions 
shall be decided without debate), to postpone to a day certain, to 
refer, or to amend, or postpone indefinitely, which several motions 
shall have precedence in the foregoing order; and no motion to postpone 
to a day certain, to refer, or to postpone indefinitely being decided, 
shall be again allowed on the same day at the same stage of the 
question.

  The first rule on this subject, adopted April 7, 1789,\4\ was:

  When a question is under debate, no motion shall be received, unless 
to amend it, to commit it, for the previous question, or to adjourn.\5\

  On December 23, 1811,\6\ the rule adopted arranged the motions in 
this order: Adjourn, lie on the table, previous question, postpone 
indefinitely, postpone to a day certain, commit, or amend. The rule 
also provided that ``these several motions shall have precedence of the 
other in the order they stand arranged.''
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  \1\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 206 and 830.
  \2\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \3\ First session Ninth Congress, Journal, p. 264; Annals, p. 446.
  \4\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \5\ The rule of the Continental Congress (Journal, May 26, 1778) had 
been similar: ``While a question is before the House, no motion shall 
be received, unless for an amendment, for the previous question, to 
postpone the consideration of the main question, or to commit it.''
  \6\ First session Twelfth Congress, Journal, p. 187; Reports of the 
House No. 38.
Sec. 5302
  In the early days of the House the motion to proceed to the orders of 
the day was used to set aside a pending proposition; but on March 9, 
1822,\1\ Mr. Speaker Barbour held that it could not be admitted 
conformably with this rule, although he admitted that he had 
entertained it more than once in the past, relying for authority on the 
usage of the English Parliament. As late as May 26, 1836,\2\ however, 
the motion to proceed to the orders of the day was in use as a means of 
setting aside a bill up for consideration in the morning hour, although 
the rule for the order of business might not justify such a motion at 
that particular time.\3\
  On March 13, 1822,\4\ the order of motions mentioned in the rule of 
1811 appears changed in one respect only. The motion to postpone 
indefinitely has been taken from its place after the previous question 
and placed at the end of the list. There is also added the clause:

  And no motion to postpone to a day certain, to commit, or to postpone 
indefinitely, being decided, shall be again allowed on the same day, 
and at the same stage of the bill or proposition.

  On January 14, 1840,\5\ the motion to fix the day to which the House 
shall adjourn was given privilege by inserting it in the rule of 1822 
after the motion to adjourn.
  In the revision of 1880 \6\ the motion to fix the day to which the 
House shall adjourn was given the first place, before the motion to 
adjourn, thereby conforming to a practice which had grown up; and the 
motion for a recess was inserted after the motion to adjourn.\7\ The 
clause providing that there should be no debate on the previous 
question was a transfer of an old rule of December 17, 1805.\8\
  In the revision of 1890 the motions to fix the day to which the House 
shall adjourn and for a recess were dropped from the list of privileged 
motions,\9\ as they had been much used for obstructive purposes. They 
were restored in the Fifty-second and Fifty-third Congresses and 
dropped again in the Fifty-fourth.
  The motion to rescind, it will be noted, is not in the list of 
privileged motions enumerated in this rule.
  5302. No question being under debate, and a motion to adjourn having 
been made, motions for a recess and to fix the day to which the House 
should adjourn were not entertained.--On February 20, 1904,\10\ Mr. 
Sereno E.
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  \1\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Annals, p. 1250.
  \2\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 885.
  \3\ The rule for the order of business (see sec. 3056 of Vol. IV) 
still retains ``orders of the day'' as the last stage in the daily 
order; but for many years no business has ever come up as an order of 
the day. The House makes special orders which set aside the entire 
order of business and come up as highly privileged, and has entirely 
abandoned the old method of directing a bill to be made the order for a 
certain day, then to come up at a period set apart for such orders.
  \4\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Journal, p. 350.
  \5\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 207; Globe, p. 
121.
  \6\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 202-206.
  \7\ The motion for a recess was at times given a very high privilege, 
as in a ruling by Speaker pro tempore McCreary, which admitted it even 
during the reading of a bill. (First session Fiftieth Congress, 
Journal, p. 2255; Record, p. 5854.)
  \8\ First session Ninth Congress, Annals, pp. 284, 286.
  \9\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Report No. 23.
  \10\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 2178.
                                                            Sec. 5303
Payne, of New York, moved that the House do adjourn, there being no 
business before the House at the time.
  Mr. John S. Williams, of Mississippi, moved that when the House 
adjourn it be to meet on Monday next.
  Mr. Payne having objected that the motion was not in order, Mr. 
Williams moved that the House take a recess.
  Mr. Payne objected that the motion was not in order.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair is informed that since the adoption of the rules of the 
Fifty-first Congress the motion to fix a day to which the House shall 
adjourn and the motion to take a recess lost their high privileges as 
against the motion to adjourn.
  Before the adoption of the rules of the Fifty-first Congress and the 
rules of the present Congress, which are substantially the same, the 
motion which the gentleman refers to had precedence, as the Chair is 
informed, over the motion to adjourn; but under the rules of the House 
from the Fifty-first Congress to this time the motion to adjourn has 
had precedence.

  5303. Whether ``a question is under debate'' or not, a motion to lay 
on the table has precedence of a motion to refer.--On January 3, 
1854,\2\ the Speaker announced as the business next in order the bill 
(H. R. 102) ``granting lands equally to the several States to aid in 
the construction of railroads and for the support of schools,'' 
introduced on leave when the States were last called for resolutions; 
and that the pending question was on the motion of Mr. George W. Jones, 
of Tennessee, to lay the bill on the table.
  Mr. Henry Bennett, of New York, made the point of order that the 
motion to lay on the table did not take precedence of the motion to 
refer to the Committee on Public Lands, which was made prior to the 
motion to lay on the table. Mr. Bennett held that the latter motion 
derived its precedence over the former from the forty-ninth rule only, 
and that rule applied only to ``questions under debate,'' which was not 
the case in the present instance.\3\
  The Speaker \4\ decided that in this, as in all other cases, the 
motion to lay on the table took precedence of the motion to refer, and 
that the question must be first put on the former motion.
  The House acquiesced in this decision.
  5304. When a motion is made, the Speaker shall state it or cause it 
to be read by the Clerk before being debated.
  A motion which has been stated by the Speaker or read by the Clerk is 
in possession of the House, but may be withdrawn before a decision or 
amendment.
  The rules of the House do not require that an ordinary motion be 
seconded.
  Present form and history of section 2 of Rule XVI.
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  \1\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 152, 153 Globe, 
pp. 111, 112.
  \3\ This bill had been introduced after leave had been given under 
the call for resolutions. Under that procedure, which no longer exists, 
debate was not in order on the date of introduction.
  \4\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
Sec. 5305
  Section 2 of Rule XVI provides:

  When a motion has been made, the Speaker shall state it \1\ or (if it 
be in writing) cause it to be read aloud by the Clerk before being 
debated, and it shall then be in possession of the House, but may be 
withdrawn at any time before a decision or amendment.

  This is the form adopted in the revision of 1880.\2\ The rule at that 
time was made up from two old rules, each of which dated from April 7, 
1789: \3\

  38. When a motion is made and seconded, it shall be stated by the 
Speaker, or, being in writing, shall be handed to the Chair and read 
aloud by the Clerk before debated.\4\
  40. After a motion is stated by the Speaker, or read by the Clerk, it 
shall be deemed to be in possession of the House, but may be withdrawn 
at any time before a decision or amendment.

  The Journals of the earlier Congresses show that motions were 
seconded, but many years before the requirement of a second was dropped 
from the rule it seems to have been dropped in practice.
  5305. A privileged motion loses its precedence if other matter be 
connected therewith.--On November 1, 1877,\5\ Mr. Clarkson N. Potter, 
of New York, presented the following:

  Resolved, That when the House adjourn to-morrow it adjourn to meet 
upon Tuesday next, and that when it then meets no business shall be in 
order but a motion to then adjourn to the following Thursday.

  Mr. Horatio C. Burchard, of Illinois, made the point of order that 
the latter portion of the resolution required unanimous consent for its 
present consideration.\6\
  The Speaker \7\ sustained the point of order, whereupon Mr. Potter 
modified the motion by striking out all after the words ``Tuesday 
next.''
  Debate arising over the motion as modified, Mr. Auburn L. Pridemore, 
of Virginia, made the point of order that the question was not 
debatable.
  The Speaker \7\ sustained the point of order.
  5306. A motion to postpone must include the whole of a pending 
resolution, and may not apply to a portion only.--On January 8, 
1850,\8\ the House was proceeding under the following order, adopted on 
December 31, 1849:

  Resolved, That the House will proceed to the election of Clerk and 
other officers on Thursday, the 3d day of January, 1850.

  On the tenth vote for Clerk, no person having received a majority of 
the whole number of votes given in, Mr. James Brooks, of New York, 
moved that the further
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  \1\ If a motion shall appear to the Speaker as incorrect in point of 
form, or contrary to some standing order, he will state his reason to 
the House for not putting it in the words given, and suggest an 
alteration, which the House may adopt without going through the form of 
taking a question upon the alteration by motion of amendment. 
(Cobbett's Parliamentary History of England, vol. 31, p. 202.)
  \2\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \3\ First session First Congress, Journal, p. 9.
  \4\ The rule of the Continental Congress (Journal, May 26, 1778) was: 
``When a motion shall be made and seconded, it shall be reduced to 
writing, if desired by the President or any Member, delivered in at the 
table, and read by the President, before the same shall be allowed to 
be debated.''
  \5\ First session Forty-fifth Congress, Journal, pp. 115, 116; 
Record, pp. 214, 215.
  \6\ The motion to adjourn over had a privilege under the rules then.
  \7\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \8\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, pp. 190, 251; 
Globe, p. 117.
                                                            Sec. 5307
execution of the resolution be postponed, so far as the same related to 
the election of officers other than the Sergeant-at-Arms, until the 1st 
of September next.
  The Speaker \1\ stated that, as the resolution provided for the 
election of Clerk and other officers, it was not in order to move to 
postpone a part thereof, but that the motion must include the whole 
resolution.
  5307. The motion to postpone may specify the day but not the hour of 
that day.--On February 17, 1855,\2\ the House was considering the 
message of the President transmitting his reasons for not approving the 
bill for the payment of French spoliation claims, when Mr. John 
Letcher, of Virginia, moved that the consideration of the message be 
postponed until Wednesday next, at 7.30 o'clock in the evening.
  Mr. Rufus W. Peckham, of New York, raised a question of order.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The motion is not in order in the opinion of the Chair. A question of 
order being raised upon the Chair, the Chair asks the attention of 
gentlemen to his decision, which is, that it is not in order to fix the 
hour at all. There is but a single proposition pending, which is to 
postpone this subject until Wednesday next.

  5308. The election of certain officers of the House having been 
postponed to a day certain, the Speaker ruled out a motion providing 
for their earlier election.--On January 24, 1850,\4\ the House agreed 
to the concurrent resolution of the Senate providing for the election 
of two chaplains of different denominations, one by the Senate and the 
other by the House.\5\
  Mr. John Van Dyke, of New Jersey, then moved that the House proceed 
to the election of chaplain.
  Mr. David K. Cartter, of Ohio, moved to amend by adding after the 
word ``chaplain'' the words ``a doorkeeper and a postmaster.''
  The Speaker \1\ decided the amendment out of order, on the ground 
that the House had postponed the election of a doorkeeper and a 
postmaster until the 1st of March, 1851.
  Mr. Cartter having appealed, the decision of the Chair was sustained.
  5309. The motion to postpone to a day certain is debatable within 
very narrow limits only.--On April 9, 1869,\6\ while the House was 
considering the election case of Myers v. Moffit, Mr. George W. 
Woodward, of Pennsylvania, moved to postpone the further consideration 
of the resolution until the first Monday in December next.
  Mr Woodward having proposed to debate, the Speaker \7\ said in 
relation to the motion:

  Under the rules it is debatable within very narrow limits.
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  \1\ Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \2\ Second session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, p. 802.
  \3\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, pp. 404, 405; 
Globe, p. 223.
  \5\ At this time the chaplain was not an officer of the House in the 
sense that he is at present, being elected in accordance with a joint 
arrangement of the two Houses.
  \6\ First session Forty-first Congress, Globe, p. 683.
  \7\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
Sec. 5310
  Also on February 21, 1857,\1\ on a motion to postpone to a day 
certain a resolution for the impeachment of John C. Watrous, district 
judge of the United States for the district of Texas, the Speaker \2\ 
said:

  The Chair must remind the gentleman that the question of postponement 
does not open the general question of impeachment.

  5310. On March 9, 1904,\3\ the House was considering a resolution 
relating to the conduct of Members in relation to transactions in the 
Post-Office Department.
  Mr. Jesse Overstreet, of Indiana, moved to postpone the resolution to 
a day certain, viz, Monday next.
  Mr. Henry A. Cooper, of Wisconsin, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, 
asked if that motion was debatable.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The motion is debatable only as to the desirability of postponing the 
consideration of the resolution until Monday next.

  5311. On motion to postpone to a day certain, the merits of the bill 
may not be debated.--On April 22, 1826,\5\ Mr. George W. Owen, of 
Alabama, offered a resolution relating to the claim of Francis Larche.
  After debate Mr. Owen moved that the consideration of the subject be 
postponed until Tuesday next.
  Mr. Lewis Williams, of North Carolina, and Mr. John Forsyth, of 
Georgia, in the course of the debate, were severally called to order, 
the Speaker \6\ holding that they were discussing the merits of the 
case, whereas their remarks should be confined to the question of 
postponement alone.
  5312. On February 27, 1833,\7\ the House was considering the bill 
further to provide for the collection of the revenue.
  Mr. Gulian C. Verplanck, of New York, moved that the bill be 
postponed until the next day.
  Twice during the debate, once while Mr. Samuel Beardsley, of New 
York, was speaking, and again when Mr. Albert G. Hawes, of Kentucky, 
had the floor, the Speaker \8\ called to order, on the ground that the 
question before the House was postponement, and the merits of the bill 
could not be gone into.
  5313. On February 26, 1836,\9\ the House was considering a contested 
election case from North Carolina, when Mr. Abijah Mann, jr., of New 
York, moved to postpone the subject till Tuesday week.
  Mr. James Graham, of North Carolina, in debating this motion, was 
called to order by Mr. Jesse A. Bynum, of North Carolina, who asked if 
it was in order for his colleague to go into a detailed statement of 
the case at this stage of the proceeding.
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  \1\ Third session Thirty-fourth Congress, Globe, p. 798.
  \2\ Nathaniel P. Banks, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \3\ Second session Fifty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 3047.
  \4\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Nineteenth Congress, Debates, pp. 2509, 2510.
  \6\ John W. Taylor, of New York, Speaker.
  \7\ Second session Twenty-second Congress, Debates, pp. 1819, 1822.
  \8\ Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, Speaker.
  \9\ First session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 2640.
                                                            Sec. 5314
  The Speaker \1\ said that, though the merits of the question were not 
open, the gentleman had a right to state the grounds upon which he 
urged that the House should not postpone the subject to a day certain.
  5314. On February 27, 1852,\2\ Mr. Speaker Boyd, after brief 
consultation with Members, decided that a motion to postpone to a day 
certain was not debatable under the practice of the House.
  5315. On February 17, 1855,\3\ the House was considering the message 
of the President vetoing the bill providing for the payment of certain 
French Spoliation claims, the pending question being a motion to 
postpone the message until Wednesday next.
  Mr. James L. Orr, of South Carolina, raised a question of order as to 
the extent of debate allowable on the motion.
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  The Chair thinks the practice under the rules uniformly has been, 
when debate has been allowed at all--and, I believe, some of my 
predecessors have decided that the motion was not debatable at all--
that it must be limited to the question of time to which the 
consideration shall be postponed.

  5316. A motion to postpone indefinitely opens to debate all the 
merits of the proposition.--On January 11, 1836,\5\ a motion was 
proposed to postpone indefinitely the ``bill to reduce the revenue of 
the United States to the wants of the Government.''
  Mr. Joseph R. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, rising to a parliamentary 
inquiry, asked if such a motion would open a discussion.
  The Speaker \1\ replied that the motion to postpone indefinitely 
opened the whole merits of a proposition to discussion.
  5317. The motion to postpone indefinitely may not be applied to the 
motion to refer.--On June 21, 1809,\6\ while the House was considering 
a report of the Committee on Manufactures relating to the imposition of 
additional duties, Mr. Thomas Newton, of Virginia, moved that the 
report be committed to the consideration of a Committee of the Whole 
House.
  Mr. John Randolph, of Virginia, moved that the question of commitment 
be postponed indefinitely.
  The Speaker \7\ declared the motion out of order.
  Mr. Randolph having appealed, the decision of the Chair was 
sustained.
  5318. It has been held in order to move to postpone indefinitely the 
further execution of an order relating to the election of officers of 
the House.--On January 10, 1850,\8\ the House was proceeding with the 
election of a Clerk in accordance with the following:
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  \1\ James K. Polk, of Tennessee, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Thirty-second Congress, Globe, p. 648.
  \3\ Second session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, p. 802.
  \4\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \5\ Second session Twenty-fourth Congress, Debates, p. 1349.
  \6\ First session Eleventh Congress, Journal, p. 75 (Gales and Seaton 
ed.).
  \7\ Joseph B. Varnum, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
  \8\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Journal, p. 281; Globe, pp. 
130, 131.
Sec. 5319
  Resolved, That the House will proceed to the election of Clerk and 
other officers on Thursday, the 3d day of January, 1850.

  Mr. Edward D. Baker, of Illinois, moved that the further execution of 
the order be postponed indefinitely.
  Mr. James Thompson, of Pennsylvania, raised the question of order 
that the motion to postpone indefinitely was not in order, it being 
equivalent to the motion to rescind, which motion had heretofore been 
decided out of order.
  The Speaker \1\ decided that a motion to postpone indefinitely, or a 
motion to postpone to a day certain, was in order.
  Mr. Thompson having appealed, the decision of the Chair was 
sustained.
  5319. After the previous question is ordered on a bill a motion to 
postpone the bill is not in order.--On July 23, 1886,\2\ the joint 
resolution (H. Res. 72) to provide for the settlement of accounts with 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company was before the House, the previous 
question having been ordered on its engrossment and third reading.
  Mr. William S. Holman, of Indiana, moved that the bill be postponed 
until the next Friday.
  Mr. William C. Oates, of Alabama, raised a point of order against 
that motion.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  The Chair thinks that until the question has been taken upon the 
engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution, upon which the 
previous question has been ordered, postponement could be made only by 
unanimous consent. As soon as the vote is taken on that question it 
could be postponed by a majority vote of the House. The reason, the 
Chair will state, is this: The effect of the previous question is to 
bring the House to an immediate vote on the question then pending, 
which is the engrossment and third reading of the resolution. The 
motion to postpone would defeat that order; but as soon as that vote is 
taken a majority can then postpone the resolution or take such other 
steps as it may see proper.

  5320. The motion to postpone may not be entertained after the 
previous question has been ordered.--On May 30, 1900,\4\ the bill (S. 
1939) ``authorizing the President of the United States to appoint a 
commission to study and make fall report upon the commercial and 
industrial conditions of China and Japan,'' etc., was before the House, 
the previous question having been ordered on April 30, 1900, on a 
motion to concur in the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole 
House on the state of the Union that the enacting clause of the bill be 
stricken out.
  The bill being brought up on a demand for the regular order, Mr. 
William H. Moody, of Massachusetts, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, 
asked if it would be in order to move that the consideration of the 
bill be postponed until the next day.
  The Speaker \5\ said:

  That can not be done after the previous question has been ordered by 
the House.
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  \1\ Howell Cobb, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Forty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 7393; Journal, pp. 
2313, 2314.
  \3\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 6250.
  \5\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5321
  5321. On February 9, 1899,\1\ the House was considering the bill (H. 
R. 10969) for the erection of a public building at Blair, Nebr., upon 
which the previous question had been ordered to the final passage.
  The bill having been read a third time, Mr. Alexander M. Dockery, of 
Missouri, moved to recommit the bill to the Committee on Public 
Buildings and Grounds.\2\
  Pending this motion, Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, rising to a 
parliamentary inquiry, asked whether or not it would be in order to 
move to postpone the bill to a certain day.
  The Speaker \3\ said:

  It is not in order after the previous question has been ordered, 
because it is a motion made when the bill is not under consideration. 
When the previous question is ordered, consideration has ceased.

  5322. The motion to postpone indefinitely may not be applied to a 
motion to suspend the rules.
  The motion to amend may not be applied to a motion to suspend the 
rules.
  On January 14, 1840,\4\ Mr. Waddy Thompson, of South Carolina, handed 
to the Chair the following resolution, which was read for the 
information of the House, and moved a suspension of the rules to enable 
him to offer it:

  Resolved, That upon the presentation of any memorial or petition 
praying for the abolition of slavery or the slave trade in any 
District, Territory, or State of the Union, and upon the presentation 
of any resolution or other paper touching that subject, the reception 
of such memorial, petition, resolution, or paper shall be considered as 
objected to, and the question of its reception shall be laid upon the 
table without debate or further action thereon.

  Mr. Horace Everett, of Vermont, asked for the yeas and nays on the 
question.
  Mr. John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, moved the indefinite 
postponement of the motion to suspend the rules.
  The Chair \5\ was of the opinion that the motion of the gentleman 
from Massachusetts was not in order, because, if it prevailed, the 
effect would be that no motion to suspend the rules would be in order 
for the remainder of the session.
  Mr. Edward J. Black, of Georgia, asked whether, if the motion of the 
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Thompson) to suspend the rules 
should prevail, it would be in order for him to offer an amendment to 
the resolution of that gentleman.
  The Chair replied in the affirmative.
  5323. A motion to rescind a special order was decided by the House 
not to be privileged under the rules.
  Discussion as to the distinction between a special order and a 
standing order.
  Instance wherein the Speaker submitted the decision of a question of 
order to the House.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Fifty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 1661.
  \2\ This motion is authorized by a special rule. (See sec. 5443 of 
this volume.)
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 121.
  \5\ Robert M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, Speaker.
Sec. 5324
  On April 12, 1884,\1\ Mr. Philip B. Thompson, jr., of Kentucky, on 
the ground of its being a privileged question under clause 1, Rule 
XXVIII,\2\ moved to rescind the special order adopted by the House on 
the 7th instant, setting apart Wednesday, April 9, for consideration of 
bills from the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.
  Mr. Samuel Dibble, of South Carolina, made the point of order that 
the motion was not in order for the reason that the special order was 
adopted by a two-thirds vote of the House on a motion to suspend the 
rules, and was in terms a ``special order,'' and therefore was not a 
``standing order'' in the sense contemplated in clause 1, Rule XXVIII.
  The Speaker \3\ having expressed the opinion that the order of the 
7th instant under consideration was not a ``standing order,'' under the 
rules and practices of the House, stated that in view of its being a 
new as well as important question touching the power of a majority to 
control the business of the House, he would submit the question for the 
consideration of the House.
  It was decided, 101 yeas to 78 nays, that Mr. Thompson's motion was 
not a privileged question.
  5324. Under general parliamentary law, before the adoption of rules, 
the motion to rescind is used.--On December 28, 1855,\4\ and January 21 
and February 2, 1856, before the election of a Speaker and before the 
adoption of rules, the motion to rescind was entertained as the proper 
way of abrogating such rules and orders as had been made temporarily.
  5325. As to the repetition of the motion to rescind under general 
parliamentary law.--On February 2, 1856,\5\ before the election of 
Speaker or the adoption of rules, a motion was made to rescind the rule 
providing for the choice of Speaker by a plurality of votes, and that 
motion to rescind was laid on the table.
  A motion to adjourn was then made and decided in the negative.
  Then Mr. Percy Walker, of Alabama, moved again to rescind the rule.
  Mr. Thomas L. Clingman, of North Carolina, made the point of order 
that it was not in order to repeat the motion to rescind.
  The Clerk \6\ expressed the opinion that the motion was in order, but 
submitted the matter to the House.\7\
  And the question being put, the motion was decided to be out of 
order, yeas 83, nays 128.
  5326. The motion to strike out the enacting words (which is 
authorized in a rule relating to the Committee of the Whole) has 
precedence of a motion to amend.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Forty-eighth Congress, Journal, p. 1051.
  \2\ See section 6790 of this volume. This rule at that time provided: 
``No standing rule or order of the House shall be rescinded or changed 
without one day's notice of the motion therefor.'' This clause is no 
longer a part of the rule.
  \3\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 195, 338, 434, 
435.
  \5\ First session Thirty-fourth Congress, Journal, pp. 434, 435; 
Globe, p. 336.
  \6\ John W. Forney, Clerk.
  \7\ While the Clerk decided points of order during this time, he 
repeatedly declined to make a decision where there was an evident 
division of opinion on the part of the Members. Such a division 
existing, he referred the question to the House. (See instance on 
February 1, Journal, p. 417.)
                                                            Sec. 5326
  Striking out the enacting words of a bill constitutes its rejection.
  When the House disagrees to the recommendation of the Committee of 
the Whole that the enacting words be stricken out, the bill stands 
recommitted to the Committee of the Whole unless the House refer it 
otherwise.
  Present form and history of section 7 of Rule XXIII.
  Rule XXIII, which relates to procedure in Committee of the Whole, 
has, as section 7, the following:

  A motion to strike out the enacting words of a bill shall have 
precedence of a motion to amend, and, if carried, shall be considered 
equivalent to its rejection. Whenever a bill is reported from a 
Committee of the Whole with an adverse recommendation, and such 
recommendation is disagreed to by the House, the bill shall stand 
recommitted to the said committee without further action by the House; 
but before the question of concurrence is submitted it is in order to 
entertain a motion to refer the bill to any committee, with or without 
instructions, and when the same is again reported to the House it shall 
be referred to the Committee of the Whole without debate.

  Although not often used at the present time, this rule has played an 
important part in the parliamentary history of the House. The present 
form of the rule dates from the revision of 1880;\1\ but that revision 
made no essential changes in the form of old Rule No. 123 that had 
existed since 1870, and which was as follows, with the dates of the 
adoption of its various portions:

  A motion to strike out the enacting words of a bill shall have 
precedence of a motion to amend, and, if carried, shall be considered 
equivalent to its rejection.--March 13, 1822. Whenever a bill is 
reported from a Committee of the Whole with a recommendation to strike 
out the enacting words, and such recommendation is disagreed to by the 
House, the bill shall stand recommitted to the said committee without 
further action by the House.--March 16, 1860. But before the question 
of concurrence is submitted it is in order to entertain a motion to 
refer the bill to any committee, with or without instructions, and when 
the same is again reported to the House it shall be referred to the 
Committee of the Whole without debate, and resume its original place on 
the Calendar.--May 26, 1870.

  The first rule of 1822 was merely for the purpose of giving greater 
definiteness to a practice which had been growing in the House for a 
decade at least. On April 13, 1812,\2\ the Committee of the Whole 
reported the bill to incorporate the Louisiana Lead Company, with an 
amendment striking out the first section. The House having concurred in 
this amendment, Mr. Speaker Clay decided that the bill was rejected. 
Apparently this practice continued, and on April 5, 1814,\3\ the 
Committee of the Whole again reported a bill with an amendment striking 
out the first section. As the bill had only one section, Mr. Speaker 
Cheves ruled that the amendment would amount to a rejection of the 
bill, and therefore was not in order. He did not, however, refuse to 
receive the entire report, as was afterwards intimated when this ruling 
was discussed during the Kansas-Nebraska contest, for the bill came 
before the House and was indefinitely postponed. The use of the motion 
to strike out the first section continued, and on February 25, 1822,\4\ 
while the bill to establish a system of bankruptcy was under 
consideration in Committee of the Whole, Mr. A. Smyth, of Virginia, 
made the motion and it was debated until March 9, when it was
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Forty-eighth Congress, Record, p. 206.
  \2\ First session Twelfth Congress, Journal, pp. 289, 290, 533; 
Annals, p. 1318.
  \3\ Second session Thirteenth Congress, Journal, p. 386.
  \4\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Annals, pp. 792, 1246.
Sec. 5326
decided in the negative. A few days later, on March 13, 1822,\1\ the 
House adopted the rule giving the motion a definite standing and 
defining it as a motion ``to strike out the enacting words.'' \2\ And 
it was not included among the rules relating particularly to the 
Committee of the Whole, but as a part of that rule \3\ which prescribed 
the precedence of motions admissible when a question was under debate.
  In 1841 \4\ the Committee on Rules reported a proposed amendment to 
the rule providing that in Committee of the Whole the motion to strike 
out the enacting clause should not have precedence of the motion to 
amend, but the House apparently did not agree to it.\5\ This proposed 
amendment indicates what is shown in fact that the motion to strike out 
the enacting clause was in use in the House as well as in Committee of 
the Whole. Thus, on March 1, 1830,\6\ when a bill had been reported 
from the Committee of the Whole with amendments, Mr. Speaker Stevenson 
held that a motion to strike out the enacting clause had precedence of 
the question on concurring in the amendments.
  In 1843 \7\ the rule was separated from its old connection and became 
a separate rule, numbered 119 and classified under the subdivision of 
``Bills.''
  In 1854,\8\ during the contest over the bill (H. R. 236) ``to 
organize the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska,'' Mr. Alexander H. 
Stephens, of Georgia, moved to strike out the enacting clause in order 
to avert a course of proposed amendments apparently interminable. Mr. 
Israel Washburn, jr., of Maine, urged that this motion under the rule 
applied in the House but not in Committee of the Whole; but his 
contention was overruled, and after five minutes of debate for the 
motion and five against the question was taken. The votes of the 
friends of the measure carried the motion to strike out the enacting 
clause, and the bill with that amendment was reported to the House, 
where the previous question could be used to cut off the obstructive 
amendments which threatened the bill in Committee of the Whole. The 
House disagreed to the recommendation that the enacting clause be 
stricken out, and then the bill was put on its passage.
  This device, to avoid full and sometimes obstructive consideration in 
Committee of the Whole, came into quite frequent use, and in 1858 \9\ 
the Committee on Rules reported an amendment to prevent it which, on 
March 16, 1860,\10\ became a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Seventeenth Congress, Journal, p. 350.
  \2\ On March 24, 1826 (first session Nineteenth Congress, Journal, p. 
377; Debates, p. 1764), the old motion to strike out the first section 
was made and carried in Committee of the Whole, but the report made to 
the House stated that the enacting clause had been stricken out.
  \3\ Now section 4 of Rule XVI. See section 5301 of this volume.
  \4\ First session Twenty-seventh Congress, Report No. 11, p. 12.
  \5\ Yet on February 16, 1842 (second session Twenty-seventh Congress, 
Globe, pp. 244, 245), Chairman George N. Briggs, of Massachusetts, held 
that the motion might not be made in Committee of the Whole before the 
bill had been read for amendments.
  \6\ First session Twenty-first Congress, Journal, pp. 986, 987.
  \7\ See Appendix of Journal, first session Twenty-eighth Congress.
  \8\ First session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, p. 1241.
  \9\ Second session Thirty-fifth Congress, Report No. 1.
  \10\ First session Thirty-sixth Congress, Globe, p. 1179. For further 
particulars as to this rule and the rules to prevent obstruction in 
Committee of the Whole see sections 5221, 5224 of this volume.
                                                            Sec. 5327
part of the rule. That amendment destroyed much of the usefulness of 
the rule, which was restored by the addition made on May 26, 1870.\1\
  It was not until the revision of 1880 \2\ that the rule relating to 
the motion to strike out the enacting clause was classified among those 
rules relating particularly to the Committee of the Whole.
  5327. The motion to strike out the enacting clause may not be made 
until the first section of the bill has been read.--On May 12, 1902,\3\ 
the bill (H. R. 13405) ``authorizing the Washington Gaslight Company to 
purchase the Georgetown Gaslight Company, and for other purposes,'' was 
under consideration in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union, and general debate had been closed. The Clerk began the reading 
of the bill by sections for amendment, when Mr. William S. Cowherd, of 
Missouri, moved to strike out the enacting clause.
  The Chairman \4\ ruled that the first section should be read before 
the motion was submitted.
  5328. The motion to strike out the enacting clause has precedence of 
the motion to amend, and may be offered while an amendment is 
pending.--On February 22, 1851,\5\ the use of the motion to strike out 
the enacting clause in Committee of the Whole was discussed in the 
light of the rule and recent usage, and Chairman James S. Green, of 
Missouri, decided, and on appeal was sustained by the Committee, that 
in Committee of the Whole the motion to strike out the enacting clause 
had precedence of a motion to amend. The Chairman admitted that the 
practice had heretofore been different.
  5329. On January 27, 1855,\6\ while the bill (H. R. 117) to provide 
for the ascertainment and satisfaction of the French spoliation claims 
was under consideration for amendment in Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union, Mr. Edward A. Warren, of Arkansas, moved to 
strike out the enacting clause.
  Mr. Samuel W. Parker, of Indiana, made the point of order that, as 
there was an amendment pending, the motion was not in order.
  The Chairman \7\ said:

  Whatever doubts the Chair may have upon that question, the precedents 
are such that he does not feel himself at liberty to disregard them, 
and he therefore rules the motion of the gentleman from Arkansas to be 
in order.

  An appeal having been taken, the Chair was sustained, ayes 96, noes 
31.
  5330. On February 20, 1857,\8\ Chairman Humphrey Marshall, of 
Kentucky, held that a motion to strike out the enacting words of a bill 
was in order pending an amendment. This was during the consideration of 
the tariff bill in Committee of the Whole, and the motion was made and 
carried for the purpose of getting
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Forty-first Congress, Globe, pp. 3848, 3349.
  \2\ Second session Forty-eighth Congress.
  \3\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 5336.
  \4\ Kittredge Haskins, of Vermont, Chairman.
  \5\ Second session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, p. 648.
  \6\ Second session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, pp. 426-428.
  \7\ Origen S. Seymour, of Connecticut, Chairman.
  \8\ Third session Thirty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 479; Globe, p. 
789.
Sec. 5331
the bill out of the Committee of the Whole and into the House, where it 
could be acted on.
  5331. On June 12, 1858,\1\ the bill (H. R. 582) to authorize a 
fifteen millions loan was taken out of the Committee of the Whole by 
striking out the enacting clause before the consideration for amendment 
had ceased. Speaker Orr sustained the proceeding, although objection 
was made.
  5332. The motion to strike out the enacting clause applies in the 
Committee of the Whole.--On April 30, 1900,\2\ the bill (S. 1939) 
authorizing the President of the United States to appoint a commission 
to study and make full report upon the commercial and industrial 
conditions of China and Japan was under consideration in Committee of 
the Whole House on the state of the Union, the reading of the bill for 
amendments had begun and amendments had been agreed to.
  Pending further amendment, Mr. John S. Williams, of Mississippi, 
asked if a motion to strike out the enacting clause would be in order.
  The Chairman,\3\ having read the rule,\4\ stated that it would be in 
order.
  Mr. Williams having made the motion, Mr. William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, 
made the point of order that the motion was not in order in Committee 
of the Whole.
  The Chairman said:

  This is a rule relating to the Committee of the Whole. The Chairman 
overrules the point of order.

  The motion to strike out the enacting clause was then agreed to.
  5333. In Committee of the Whole the motion to strike out the enacting 
clause is debatable, and in later usage is governed by the five-minute 
rule.--On December 6, 1882,\5\ the bill (H. R. 110) to refund to the 
State of Georgia certain money expended for the common defense in 1777 
was under consideration in Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union, when Mr. Frank Hiscock, of New York, moved to strike out the 
enacting clause.
  Debate continuing, Mr. Hiscock made the point of order that the 
motion was not debatable.
  After debate on the point of order, the Chairman \6\ submitted the 
question to the decision of the Committee, and the Committee voted not 
to sustain the point of order,\7\ and the debate proceeded.\8\
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 1116; Globe, pp. 
3022, 3023.
  \2\ First session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 4887.
  \3\ Sereno E. Payne, of New York, Chairman.
  \4\ Section 7 of Rule XXIII. (See sec. 5326 of this volume.)
  \5\ Second session Forty-seventh Congress, Record, pp. 60-62.
  \6\ John Turner Wait, of Connecticut, Chairman.
  \7\ Under the earlier usage, when the motion was used as a means for 
getting bills out of the Committee of the Whole, the motion to strike 
out the enacting clause was held not to be debatable. (First session 
Thirty-fifth Congress, Globe, p. 154.) In a recent instance of the use 
of the motion, in 1893, there was no attempt to debate. (Second session 
Fifty-third Congress, Record, pp. 120, 121.)
  \8\ On January 5, 1826, Mr. Charles F. Mercer, of Virginia, moved to 
strike out the ``first section'' of the Judiciary bill in Committee of 
the Whole, and that motion was debated at length. (First session 
Nineteenth Congress, Debates, p. 892.)
                                                            Sec. 5334
  5334. On February 7, 1855,\1\ the bill (S. 96) for the payment of 
certain creditors of the late Republic of Texas was under consideration 
in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, when Mr. 
John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, moved to strike out the enacting 
clause.
  Mr. John S. Millson, of Virginia, raised a question of order as to 
whether or not the motion was debatable.
  The Chairman \2\ held:

  The recollection of the Chair is that on some occasions during this 
session of Congress it has been held that the motion to strike out the 
enacting clause of a bill is debatable, but that the last decision was 
that the motion is not debatable. The Chair now decides that the motion 
is not debatable.

  On December 22, 1857,\3\ the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union was considering the bill (S. 13) to authorize the 
issue of Treasury notes, the bill being in the course of being read for 
amendment under the five-minute rule, when Mr. William Barksdale, of 
Mississippi, moved to strike out the enacting clause.
  Mr. Lewis D. Campbell of Ohio, was proceeding to debate the motion 
when the Chairman \4\ ruled:

  The motion to strike out the enacting clause takes precedence of an 
amendment, and is not of the nature of an amendment for it is for the 
purpose of withdrawing the bill. The Chair therefore rules that the 
motion is not debatable.

  On an appeal the decision of the Chair was sustained.
  5335. On June 10, 1902,\5\ the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union was considering the bill (H. R. 11536) to transfer 
certain forest reserves to the control of the Department of 
Agriculture. The reading of the bill for amendment having begun, Mr. 
Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, moved to strike out the enacting clause.
  A question having arisen as to debate the Chairman \6\ held:

  At this point, in order to avoid possible misunderstanding later, the 
Chair calls attention to the fact that whether a motion to strike out 
the enacting clause is debatable at all, or, if so, to what extent, is 
a matter upon which the precedents are conflicting. In the second 
session of the Thirty-third Congress (February 7, 1855, Globe, p. 616) 
Mr. Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, in the chair, sustained the point 
of order made by Mr. John S. Millson, of Virginia, and ruled that ``the 
motion is not debatable.'' In the Thirty-fifth Congress, first session 
(December 22, 1857, Globe, p. 154), Mr. John S. Phelps, of Missouri, in 
the chair, a similar ruling was made, and on an appeal the decision of 
the Chair was sustained.
  On the other hand, in the Forty-seventh Congress, second session, the 
point of order having been made by Mr. Hiscock, of New York, was 
submitted by the Chair to the Committee of the Whole and not being 
sustained, the motion was apparently treated as debatable without limit 
(Hinds' Precedents, 941). This ruling was made without much discussion 
or citation of precedents, and was manifestly wrong. As the motion to 
strike out the enacting clause is not in order at all in Committee of 
the Whole until general debate has been closed, it certainly can not 
be, under the rules properly construed, the subject of general debate. 
Such a motion is in order after the first paragraph of the bill has 
been read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It is now made at 
that point.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Thirty-third Congress, Globe, p. 616.
  \2\ Thomas A. Hendricks, of Indiana, Chairman.
  \3\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Globe, p. 154.
  \4\ John S. Phelps, of Missouri, Chairman.
  \5\ First session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6567.
  \6\ Marlin E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
Sec. 5336
  The present occupant of the chair is of opinion that it should be 
treated for this purpose as in the nature of, or at least analogous to, 
an amendment and debatable accordingly, and in this view is apparently 
sustained by the observation of Speaker Blaine in the first session of 
the Forty-third Congress (Record, p. 2338), who, in ruling that such a 
motion when made in the House was debatable, said:
  ``There is no express rule prohibiting its being debated in Committee 
of the Whole. The impression prevails that it is not debatable from 
this fact that the motion is usually made in Committee of the Whole 
after debate has been closed or when the five-minute debate is in 
order. The motion in Committee of the Whole to strike out the enacting 
clause would never by any usage of the House be debated over five 
minutes on each side, and generally not debated at all.''
  The Chair holds that the motion is debatable five minutes on either 
side, and after that only by unanimous consent.

  5336. On a motion to strike out the enacting clause a Member may 
debate the merits of the bill, but must confine himself to its 
provisions.--On July 1, 1841,\1\ the House was in Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union considering a bill ``to 
appropriate the proceeds of the sale of the public lands and to grant 
preemption rights,'' the pending motion being to strike out the 
enacting clause of the bill, on which extended debate had taken place.
  While Mr. Aaron V. Brown, of Tennessee, had the floor, Mr. 
Christopher Morgan, of New York, asked if they were to be detained ``by 
discussing everything under the heavens.'' The gentleman's remarks had 
no reference to the subject under consideration.
  The Chairman \2\ stated that the question then pending was on 
striking out the enacting clause of the bill, and the gentleman had a 
right to go into the whole merits of it; but the gentleman must confine 
himself to the provisions of the bill.\3\
  5337. A bill being reported from the Committee of the Whole with the 
recommendation that the enacting words be stricken out, the motion to 
concur is debatable in the House.
  A bill being reported from the Committee of the Whole with the 
recommendation that the enacting words be stricken out, a motion to lay 
on the table is not in order.
  The Member on whose motion the enacting clause of a bill is stricken 
out in Committee of the Whole is entitled to prior recognition when the 
bill is reported to the House.
  On March 21, 1874,\4\ the House was considering the bill (H. R. 2106) 
to authorize the construction of a bridge across the Eastern Branch of 
the Potomac. The bill had been reported from the Committee of the Whole 
with the recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out, and 
the question before the House was upon concurring in the recommendation 
of the Committee of the Whole.
  A question arising as to the construction of the rule, the Speaker 
\5\ expressed the opinion that the question of concurring was debatable 
in the House, and that the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Twenty-seventh Congress, Globe, p. 135.
  \2\ Joseph Lawrence, of Pennsylvania, Chairman.
  \3\ This decision was made before the adoption of the rule limiting 
debate on amendments in Committee of the Whole to five minutes for and 
five minutes against.
  \4\ First session Forty-third Congress, Journal, p. 629; Record, p. 
2342.
  \5\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5337
spirit of the rule was, under such circumstances, adverse to a motion 
to lay on the table. The Speaker also made the following statement as 
to the rule:

  As the motion to strike out the enacting clause of a bill may be 
frequently used hereafter, the Chair, if the House will give its 
attention, will state very briefly the history of the rule on the 
subject. Previous to the revision of the rules in 1860, the motion to 
strike out the enacting clause was used in one notable instance to 
bring a bill from the Committee of the Whole, and the bill when 
reported to the House was regarded as before the House for whatever 
action it might see fit to adopt. The Nebraska bill was brought out of 
the Committee of the Whole on the motion to strike out the enacting 
clause; and when the House refused to concur in that motion, the 
Speaker ruled that the bill was before the House. The House, however, 
was dissatisfied with that construction, because it enabled the 
majority in the Committee of the Whole at any time to terminate debate, 
thus practically carrying into the Committee of the Whole the full 
force and effect of the previous question, which it is one object of 
the Committee of the Whole to get rid of. Hence in the revision of 
1860, which was a very notable revision of the rules, there was added 
to the rule a provision that when a bill should be reported from the 
Committee of the Whole with the enacting clause struck out, the first 
question in the House should be upon concurrence in that 
recommendation; that if the House should nonconcur in striking out the 
enacting clause, the bill was thereby at once recommitted to the 
Committee of the Whole, and stood upon its original place upon the 
Calendar, while, if the motion was concurred in, the bill, of course, 
would be dead.
  The operation of this rule was found inconvenient in practice, as it 
really kept the House in a parliamentary straitjacket. In the summer of 
1870 a lengthy tariff bill was under discussion in Committee of the 
Whole, under the charge of the then chairman of the Committee on Ways 
and Means, a very skillful parliamentarian, now minister to England. 
The House found that it had before it in Committee of the Whole a bill 
of several hundred pages, which could not be got rid of except by going 
through every paragraph. It was found that striking out the enacting 
clause would do no good, because when the bill was returned to the 
House, the House must either concur or nonconcur. If it concurred, the 
bill was dead; and the House did not desire to kill the bill. If it 
nonconcurred, the bill was put right back to its original place in the 
Committee of the Whole. In view of the difficulty thus arising the rule 
was subsequently amended by the addition of this clause:
  ``But before the question of concurrence is submitted, it is in order 
to entertain a motion to refer the bill to any committee of the House, 
with or without instructions, and when the same is again reported to 
the House it shall be referred to the Committee of the Whole without 
debate, and resume its original place on the Calendar.''
  Under the rule, when the Committee of the Whole reports a bill to the 
House, with the enacting clause struck out, the House can send the bill 
to the standing committee from which it came, with instructions to 
report it in a new form; and when so reported, it goes back to its 
original place on the Calendar. Now, the Chair thinks that, when a bill 
is reported from the Committee of the Whole with the enacting clause 
struck out, this rule, fairly construed, prohibits any motion whatever, 
except those specifically defined in the rule--first, will the House 
concur or nonconcur with the recommendation of the Committee of the 
Whole; or, secondly, will it prefer to refer the bill to some standing 
committee, with or without instructions? The Chair thinks that it will 
simplify the practice to hold the House rigidly to the motions provided 
for in the rule.

  In response to inquiries the Speaker further gave the opinion that 
when a bill reaches the House, having been thus reported with the 
enacting clause stricken out, the right to the floor belongs to the 
Member upon whose motion the enacting clause was struck out in 
Committee of the Whole.
  After debate, Mr. Robert S. Hale, of New York, moved the previous 
question.
  Mr. Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, moved that the bill be laid 
on the table.
  The Speaker decided that the motion was out of order, and in this 
decision of the Chair the House acquiesced.
  The question then recurring on the demand for the previous question, 
it was seconded and the main question ordered and put, viz, Shall the 
enacting words be stricken out? And it was decided in the affirmative, 
yeas 121, nays 84.
Sec. 5338
  5338. On December 8, 1893,\1\ on motion of Mr. William C. Oates, of 
Alabama, the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union; and after some time spent therein, the Speaker 
resumed the chair, and Mr. Joseph H. Outhwaite, of Ohio, reported that 
the committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 139) to 
establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States, 
had directed him to report the same to the House with the 
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out.
  The question being on concurring in the recommendation of the 
Committee of the Whole, Mr. Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, took the 
floor and proceeded to debate the question.
  Mr. William H. Hatch, of Missouri, made the point of order that the 
pending question was not subject to debate.
  The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order, holding as follows:

  The Chair thinks that under our system of rules all matters are 
debatable unless there is some express limitation in the rules. The 
general rule is that any proposition is debatable. Debate was exhausted 
in Committee of the Whole, but not in the House. The House instructed 
the committee to close debate, but this is in the nature of an 
amendment. True, if it is concurred in by the House, it finally 
disposes of the bill; but in the absence of the previous question the 
Chair thinks the matter is debatable.

  After debate the House concurred in the recommendation of the 
Committee of the Whole.
  5339. On April 21, 1826,\3\ the bill providing for the expense of the 
mission to Panama was reported to the House from the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union.
  Thereupon, in the House, Mr. George McDuffie, of South Carolina, 
moved to strike out the enacting words \4\ of the bill, and proceeded 
to debate it at length.
  The motion was decided in the negative.
  5340. On March 21, 1874,\1\ the bill (H. R. 2106) to authorize the 
construction of a bridge over the Potomac was reported from the 
Committee of the Whole with, the enacting clause stricken out.
  Mr. Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, objected to debate.
  The Speaker \6\ said:

  The motion to strike out the enacting clause is debatable.

  Thereupon Mr. William S. Holman, of Indiana, said that the motion was 
not debatable in Committee of the Whole, to which the Speaker replied:

  It is not usually debated in Committee of the Whole. There is no 
express rule prohibiting its being debated in Committee of the Whole. 
The impression prevails that it is not debatable from this fact, that 
the motion is usually made in Committee of the Whole after debate has 
been closed, or when the five-minute debate is in order. The motion in 
Committee of the Whole to strike out the enacting
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 21, 22; Record, 
pp. 120, 121, 124.
  \2\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Nineteenth Congress, Journal, p. 459; Debates, p. 
2491.
  \4\ Rule 30 in 1826 provided for striking out the enacting clause, 
and contemplated its use in the House. (See sec. 5326 of this volume.)
  \5\ First session Forty-third Congress, Record, p. 2338.
  \6\ James G. Blaine, of Maine, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5341
clause would never, by any usage of the House, be debated over five 
minutes on each side, and generally not debated at all. But there is 
nothing in the rules that prevents its debate in the House.\1\

  5341. An amendment reported from Committee of the Whole striking out 
all after the enacting clause of a bill and inserting new matter is, 
when reported, treated like any other amendment reported from that 
Committee.--On January 26, 1887,\2\ the Committee of the Whole House on 
the state of the Union had risen and had reported the river and harbor 
appropriation bill with an amendment which struck out all after the 
enacting clause and inserted a new text. This amendment had been agreed 
to before the consideration of the bill by paragraphs had been 
completed.\3\
  Mr. Nelson Dingley, jr., of Maine, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, 
asked:

  If the House shall refuse to agree to the substitute amendment, would 
the vote then come up under the operation of the previous question on 
passing the bill for which the substitute was made, or would the bill 
have to go back to the Committee of the Whole to be considered?

  The Speaker \4\ said:

  If the House refuse to agree to the substitute the next question is 
on ordering the bill to be engrossed and read a third time; that is to 
say, on the bill referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, without regard to any amendments which may have 
been agreed to.

  Mr. Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, having suggested that the bill 
had never been considered by the committee, the Speaker said:

  That is a question for the House. The Committee has reported it back 
to the House. The Committee has no power over it.
  The Chair will further state, in response to the gentleman from 
Maine, that the bill will not go back to the Committee unless the House 
refers it to the Committee. Under the rules and practice of the House, 
when the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union strikes 
out the enacting clause of a bill, the effect of which is to destroy 
the bill, and the House refuses to concur in that action, the committee 
resumes its session. But where the committee strikes out all after the 
enacting clause it is but an amendment. Then a vote to nonconcur in the 
amendment of the Committee in the nature of a substitute would at once 
bring the House to vote on the bill.

  5342. A bill being reported from the Committee of the Whole with the 
recommendation that the enacting words be stricken out, the previous 
question may be moved on a motion to concur without applying also to 
further action on the bill.
  Instances of the former practice of using the motion to strike out 
the enacting words as a means of taking bills from the Committee of the 
Whole.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ It is very rare that a motion to strike out the enacting clause 
is made in the House as an original motion, and the practice has not 
always been in accordance with this opinion of Mr. Speaker Blaine. On 
December 9, 1902 (second session Fifty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 
168), the House was considering the bill (H. R. 9059) to amend an act 
entitled ``An act relating to navigation of vessels, bills of lading, 
and to certain obligations, duties, and rights in connection with the 
carriage of property,'' when Mr. James S. Sherman, of New York, moved 
to strike out the enacting clause.
  Mr. James A. Tawney, of Minnesota, having asked if the motion was 
debatable, the Speaker pro tempore (John Dalzell, of Pennsylvania) 
said:
  ``The Chair would state that it is not.''
  \2\ Second session Forty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 1060.
  \3\ Such proceeding was irregular. Under the ordinary practice, an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute may not be voted on until the 
original text has been perfected.
  \4\ John G. Carlisle, of Kentucky, Speaker.
Sec. 5343
  Instance of prolonged obstruction by the alternating of privileged 
motions.
  On May 2, 1854,\1\ the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House 
on the state of the Union reported that the Committee having, according 
to order, had the state of the Union generally under consideration, and 
particularly the bill of the House (No. 236) to organize the 
Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, had directed him to report the 
same, with a recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out.
  The Speaker having stated the question to be on agreeing to the 
report, Mr. William A. Richardson, of Illinois, moved the previous 
question.
  Finally, after fifteen roll calls on motions to adjourn, to fix the 
day, and to lay on the table, alternated for purposes of delay, the 
previous question was ordered, and under its operation the report of 
the Committee of the Whole was disagreed to.
  Mr. Richardson then moved a substitute for the bill.\2\
  Mr. Solomon G. Haven, of New York, made the point of order that the 
previous question was not exhausted, but was still pending, which would 
prevent the offering of the substitute.
  The Speaker \3\ ruled:

  The Chair overrules the question of order raised by the gentleman 
from New York, and for the reason that the proposition of the Committee 
of the Whole on the state of the Union was nothing more nor less, in 
substance, than a motion to reject the bill; and it has no such 
connection with any one of the readings of the bill as that the 
previous question would cover both. For instance, the previous question 
ordered to be put will not cover two readings of a bill, neither can it 
cover the report of the Committee, which proposed to reject the bill, 
and an amendment that is afterwards offered, or the ordering of the 
bill to a third reading.\4\

  The previous question was then ordered and the substitute was agreed 
to.
  5343. On February 20, 1857,\1\ Mr. Humphrey Marshall, of Kentucky, 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
reported that the committee having, according to order, had the state 
of the Union generally under consideration, and particularly the 
special order, H. R. 566, a bill reducing the duty on imports, and for 
other purposes, had directed him to report the same, with a 
recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out.
  The Speaker having stated the question to be on agreeing to the said 
report,
  Mr. Lewis D. Campbell, of Ohio, moved the previous question; which 
was seconded and the main question ordered, and under the operation 
thereof the report was disagreed to.
  The Speaker then stated the question to be on the engrossment of the 
bill.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Thirty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 872, 901, 918.
  \2\ This procedure occurred when the motion to strike out the 
enacting clause was used as a means of taking a bill from the Committee 
of the Whole before it had been read through for amendment, and before 
amendments to the rule had stopped the practice. See section 5326 of 
this volume.
  \3\ Linn Boyd, of Kentucky, Speaker.
  \4\ The rule for the previous question has been changed since this 
decision. (See sec. 5443 of this volume.)
  \5\ Third session Thirty-fourth Congress, Journal, p. 479; Globe, pp. 
789, 790.
                                                            Sec. 5344
  Mr. Lewis D. Campbell moved to amend the same by striking out all 
after the enacting clause and inserting in lieu thereof a new tariff 
bill.
  This substitute was agreed to, and ultimately became the law.
  5344. On December 22, 1857,\1\ Mr. John S. Phelps, of Missouri, 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, 
reported that the committee having, according to order, had the state 
of the Union generally under consideration, and particularly the bill 
of the Senate (S. 13) to authorize the issue of Treasury notes, had 
directed him to report the same, with a recommendation that the 
enacting clause be stricken out.
  The Speaker having stated the question to be on agreeing to the 
recommendation of the committee, that the enacting clause of the bill 
be stricken out, Mr. J. Glancy Jones, of Pennsylvania, moved the 
previous question; which was seconded and the main question ordered, 
and, under the operation thereof, the House refused to strike out the 
enacting clause of the bill.
  The bill was then put upon its passage.
  5345. When the House disagrees to the recommendation of the Committee 
of the Whole that the enacting words of a bill be stricken out, the 
bill goes back to the Calendar of the Committee of the Whole as 
unfinished business.--On Friday, March 14, 1890,\2\ the Speaker 
announced as the regular order the bill (H. R. 3538) for the relief of 
Albert H. Emery, which had been reported from the Committee of the 
Whole House on the preceding Friday, with the recommendation that the 
enacting clause be stricken out. The Speaker then put the question, 
``Will the House concur in that recommendation?''
  The question being taken, there were yeas 66, nays 143; so the House 
refused to concur.
  Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, then asked, as a parliamentary 
inquiry, as to the status of the bill on the Calendar of the Committee 
of the Whole House, to which it was recommitted under the rule.\3\
  The Speaker \4\ said:

  This bill goes to the Committee of the Whole House and takes its 
position on the Calendar as if it had never been sent back to the 
House. It becomes the first bill on the Calendar, as the unfinished 
business, to be considered when the House again resumes consideration 
of the Private Calendar.

  5346. On May 30, 1900,\5\ the House was about to vote on the bill (S. 
1939) ``authorizing the President of the United States to appoint a 
commission to study and make full report upon the commercial and 
industrial conditions of China and Japan,'' etc., the bill having been 
reported from the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the 
Union with the recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out 
and the previous question having been ordered on the motion to concur 
in the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Thirty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 107; Globe, p. 
154.
  \2\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Record, pp. 2237, 2238.
  \3\ See section 5326 of this volume.
  \4\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \5\ First session Fifty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 6250.
Sec. 5347
  Mr. William P. Hepburn, of Iowa, having made a parliamentary inquiry 
as to the situation of the bill, the Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair is of the opinion that if the action of the Committee of 
the Whole is sustained, that ends it. If the action of the Committee of 
the Whole is reversed, the bill will fall back to its old place in the 
Committee. * * * It will be on the Calendar of the Committee of the 
Whole House on the state of the Union. * * * In other words, it would 
leave this bill practically where it was when the first motion was made 
in the morning hour. On this matter the previous question has been 
ordered. So the question is on concurring in the recommendation of the 
Committee of the Whole, to strike out the enacting clause.

  5347. A motion may be withdrawn in the House, although an amendment 
to it may have been offered and may be pending.--On April 14, 1892,\2\ 
Mr. Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, moved that there be omitted from 
the Congressional Record the chapters of a book entitled ``Protection 
and Free Trade,'' which had been incorporated in the remarks of Mr. 
William Stone, of Kentucky.
  Mr. George W. Fithian, of Illinois, moved to amend the motion by 
striking out from the Record a certain letter published in a speech of 
Mr. J. P. Dolliver, of Iowa.
  Mr. Burrows then withdrew his motion, to which withdrawal Mr. Fithian 
objected, and submitted the question of order, whether the resolution 
could be withdrawn without the consent of the House pending the motion 
to amend.
  The Speaker \3\ held that the mover could withdraw the resolution, 
there having been no amendment adopted or decision thereon.
  5348. Even after the affirmative side had been taken in a division on 
a motion in Committee of the Whole, the withdrawal of the motion was 
permitted, as the Committee had come to no decision.--On February 8, 
1850,\4\ the House was in Committee of the Whole House on the state of 
the Union, considering the joint resolution from the Senate ``limiting 
the expenses of collecting revenue from customs for the present fiscal 
year.''
  An amendment from the Committee of Ways and Means was pending, when 
Mr. David Rumsey, jr., of New York, moved that the Committee now rise 
and report the bill.
  The question was put, and the Chair proceeded to count the 
affirmative, when Mr. Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio, made the point of 
order that the Committee had not yet voted on the amendment pending.
  The Chairman stated that the gentleman from New York, before the 
count was completed, withdrew the motion for the Committee to rise.
  Mr. Samuel W. Inge, of Alabama, made a point of order against the 
withdrawal of the motion after the count on one side was announced.
  The Chairman \5\ decided that in accordance with the practice of the 
House the motion could be withdrawn at any time before the decision was 
announced.\6\
  On an appeal the Chair was sustained.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ David B. Henderson, of Iowa, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-second Congress, Journal, p. 144; Record, pp. 
3299-3301.
  \3\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \4\ First session Thirty-first Congress, Globe, p. 318.
  \5\ Emery D. Potter, of Ohio, Chairman.
  \6\ The withdrawal of this motion should not be confounded with the 
rule of the Committee of the Whole, adopted August 13, 1850, to prevent 
the withdrawing of amendments.
                                                            Sec. 5349
  5349. A motion may be withdrawn after the viva voce vote has been 
taken and after tellers have been ordered and appointed.--On February 
5, 1881,\1\ Mr. William J. Samford, of Alabama, moved that the House 
adjourn. On division there appeared, ayes 62, noes 63. Tellers being 
ordered, Messrs. Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, and S. S. Cox, of New York, 
were appointed tellers.
  Thereupon Mr. Samford withdrew his motion.
  Mr. Omar D. Conger, of Michigan, objected that it was not in order to 
withdraw the motion.
  The Speaker \2\ held that under Rule XVI,\3\ section 2, Mr. Samford 
had the right to withdraw the motion, no decision or amendment having 
been made thereon.
  Mr. Conger appealed, as follows:

  I appeal from the decision of the Chair that a motion to adjourn may 
be withdrawn while the House is dividing, and after the viva voce vote 
has been taken and announced.

  This appeal was laid on the table.
  5350. While the House was dividing on a second of the previous 
question on a motion to refer a proposition, a Member was permitted to 
withdraw it, the House having made no decision.--On January 27, 
1847,\4\ Mr. Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio, by unanimous consent of the 
House, introduced a joint resolution providing for a termination of the 
war with Mexico.
  Mr. Schenck moved that the resolution be committed to the Committee 
of the Whole House on the state of the Union, and that it be printed.
  Mr. Thomas J. Henley, of Indiana, moved the previous question; and 
while the House was in the act of dividing for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether there was a second for the same,\5\ Mr. Schenck 
proposed to withdraw his resolution.
  Mr. Reuben Chapman, of Alabama, made the point of order, that while 
the House was in the act of dividing upon a question, it was not in 
order for the mover to withdraw the proposition under consideration.
  The Speaker \6\ overruled the point of order, no decision having been 
made by the House, and decided that Mr. Schenck could withdraw his 
resolution.\7\
  On Mr. Chapman's appeal, the Chair was sustained, 93 to 87.
  5351. A refusal to lay a motion on the table was held to be such a 
decision by the House as would prevent the withdrawal of the motion.--
On March 23, 1880,\8\ during the consideration of a motion made by Mr. 
James A. Garfield, of Ohio, to amend the Journal, the House voted to 
lay Mr. Garfield's motion on the table.
  The Speaker having stated that a motion to reconsider the last vote 
and to lay that motion on the table would be in order, Mr. Richard W. 
Townshend, of Illinois,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Third session Forty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 338; Record, p. 
1277.
  \2\ Samuel J. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \3\ See section 5304 of this volume.
  \4\ Second session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, p. 241 , Globe, p. 
272.
  \5\ The previous question no longer requires a second. (See sec. 5343 
of this volume.)
  \6\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \7\ This was cited in the Manual and Digest for many years previous 
to 1900 as the withdrawal of a motion, and it was such in effect. Had 
Mr. Schenck been reporting the joint resolution from a committee, 
instead of on his own motion, the case would have been very different.
  \8\ Second session Forty-sixth Congress, Record, pp. 1807, 1808; 
Journal, p. 842.
Sec. 5352
made such motion. Upon a vote the House refused to lay on the table the 
motion to reconsider.
  Thereupon Mr. Townshend proposed to withdraw the motion to 
reconsider.
  The Speaker \1\ said:

  The Chair would consider that the vote of the House against laying on 
the table the motion to reconsider is a procedure on the part of the 
House to consider the motion to reconsider, and in a vital sense a 
proceeding upon that subject. Therefore, if objection be made to the 
withdrawal, the Chair would rule that the motion to reconsider is in 
possession of the House. A decision by the Chair to the contrary would 
be unusual and unjust to the House, because a majority of the House by 
a yea-and-nay vote have indicated a purpose to proceed with the motion 
to reconsider to its conclusion.

  Objection being made, the Chair decided that the motion could not be 
withdrawn.
  An appeal having been taken by Mr. Townshend, the appeal was laid on 
the table by a vote of 152 yeas to 57 nays.
  5352. On April 27, 1846 \2\ Mr. Robert C. Schenck, of Ohio, offered a 
resolution relating to a statement made on the floor as to the use of 
the contingent funds of the State Department, and providing for a 
select committee to determine how the seal of confidence imposed by law 
in regard to that subject had been broken.
  Mr. Shelton F. Leake, of Virginia, moved that the whole subject be 
laid on the table. This motion was decided in the negative, yeas 61, 
nays 100.
  Mr. Schenck then proposed to modify his resolution.
  Mr. Reuben Chapman, of Alabama, raised the question of order that, a 
vote having been taken on the motion to lay on the table, it was not 
now in order for the mover to modify it.
  The Speaker \3\ decided that, in accordance with the invariable 
custom of the House, the modification was in order.
  Mr. Chapman appealed, but later withdrew the appeal.
  5353. The ordering of the yeas and nays on a motion is such a 
decision by the House as prevents withdrawal of the motion.--On April 
10, 1894,\4\ Mr. Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, called up for consideration, 
as involving a question of privilege, the motion of Mr. William M. 
Springer, of Illinois, to discharge the Sergeant-at-Arms from the 
further execution of a warrant of arrest, which motion was pending when 
the House adjourned on Saturday last.
  Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, thereupon proposed to withdraw 
the motion.
  Mr. Reed made the point that, the yeas and nays having been ordered 
on the question of agreeing to the motion, and the yeas and nays having 
been taken thereon and a quorum not being disclosed, it was not now in 
order to withdraw the motion.
  By unanimous consent, the further consideration of the question of 
order was postponed until the next day, when the Speaker \5\ held that 
where the yeas and nays have been ordered on a proposition it is not in 
order for the mover to withdraw such proposition.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Samuel.T. Randall, of Pennsylvania, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Twenty-ninth Congress, Journal, pp. 723-725; Globe, 
p. 734.
  \3\ John W. Davis, of Indiana, Speaker.
  \4\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, pp. 323, 324; 
Record, pp. 3630, 3683.
  \5\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
                                                            Sec. 5354
  5354. The ordering of the yeas and nays on a motion to lay an appeal 
on the table was held to be such a ``decision'' by the House as would 
prevent the withdrawal of the appeal.--On June 21, 1890,\1\ the Speaker 
stated the pending question to be the motion of Mr. William McKinley, 
jr., of Ohio, to lay on the table the appeal of Mr. Richard P. Bland, 
of Missouri, from the decision of the Chair pending when the House 
adjourned on the previous day, on which motion the yeas and nays were 
ordered. Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, made the point of order 
that Mr. Bland was entitled to withdraw his appeal.
  The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order on the ground that under 
the established practice of the House the order for the yeas and nays, 
a constitutional right, was a ``decision'' of the House that it desired 
to vote upon the pending question.
  5355. A motion may not be withdrawn after the previous question has 
been ordered on it.--On April 30, 1890,\2\ the House was considering 
the bill (S. 389) granting pensions to soldiers and sailors who are 
incapacitated for the performance of labor, etc., under a special 
order, the terms whereof provided that ``the previous question be 
considered as ordered to the passage, at 4 o'clock, on the bill and all 
pending amendments.''
  Amendments having been submitted by Messrs. Joseph B. Cheadle, of 
Indiana, Charles H. Turner, of New York, and John G. Sawyer, of New 
York, after debate, the hour of 4 o'clock having arrived, at which time 
the previous question was to be considered as ordered, the Speaker 
stated the pending question to be on agreeing to the amendment 
submitted by Mr. Sawyer to the amendment submitted by Mr. Turner, of 
New York.
  Mr. William M. Springer, of Illinois, made the point of order that 
the said amendment submitted by Mr. Turner, of New York, had been 
withdrawn.
  The Speaker \2\ overruled the point of order, on the ground that the 
previous question having been ordered, an amendment could not be 
withdrawn without unanimous consent, which had not been granted.
  5356. Instance of the withdrawal of a motion after the previous 
question had been ordered on an appeal from a decision on a point of 
order as to the motion.
  A motion being withdrawn, all proceedings on an appeal arising from a 
point of order related to it, fell thereby.
  Reference to proceedings during the contest over the organization of 
the House in 1839.
  On December 14, 1839,\4\ before the House had organized and while Mr. 
John Quincy Adams, of Massachusetts, was acting as Chairman of the 
House, Mr. Daniel D. Barnard, of New York, submitted the following 
resolution:

  Resolved, That the execution of the order of this House, adopted 
yesterday, that the House do proceed to the election of Speaker, be 
suspended to give opportunity to any Member who may be so disposed, to 
move the House that the Members proceed in the first place to hear and 
adjudge, pursuant to a resolution of this House heretofore adopted, 
upon the elections, returns, and qualifications of persons
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, pp. 770-772; Record, 
p. 6353.
  \2\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \3\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 550; Record, pp. 
4026, 4061.
  \4\ First session Twenty-sixth Congress, Journal, p. 57 Globe, pp. 
51, 52.
Sec. 5357
who appear to be contesting seats on this floor from New Jersey, or to 
move that the names of John B. Aycrigg, John P. B. Maxwell, William 
Halstead, Charles C. Stratton, and Thomas Jones Yorke, the regular-
return Members from the State of New Jersey, be not called or their 
votes counted in the election of Speaker, or to move that Philemon 
Dickerson, Peter D. Vroom, Daniel B. Ryall, William R. Cooper, and 
Joseph Kille be called and their votes counted in the election of 
Speaker.

  Mr. Robert Craig, of Virginia, moved the question of consideration.
  Mr. William Beatty, of Pennsylvania, objected to the introduction of 
the resolution, and submitted the following point of order, in writing:

  That, under the fifty-second rule of the House, no motion or any 
other business shall be received, without special leave of the House, 
until the unfinished business in which the House was engaged at the 
last preceding adjournment shall have been disposed of.

  The Chairman referred to the House the decision upon the question of 
order submitted by Mr. Beatty; and after debate Mr. Hopkins L. Turney, 
of Tennessee, moved that the resolution moved by Air. Barnard and the 
question of order do lie on the table; which motion was decided by the 
Chair to be in order; when Mr. Barnard submitted the following question 
of order, in writing:

  A point of order having been made, that a resolution offered by Mr. 
Barnard was not in order at this time pending the discussion on that 
point of order, Mr. Turney rises and moves to lay the subject of the 
point of order on the table; and also, at the same time, to lay the 
resolution of Mr. Barnard on the table. On this motion of Mr. Turney, 
Mr. Barnard makes this point of order: That it is not now in order to 
move to lay the resolution of Mr. Barnard on the table.

  The Chairman decided against the point of order submitted by Mr. 
Barnard; from which decision Mr. Millard Fillmore, of New York, 
appealed to the House; and after debate,
  The previous question was moved by Mr. Turney, and demanded by a 
majority of Members; and the previous question was put, viz: Shall the 
main question be now put? And passed in the affirmative.
  The main question was then stated, i. e., that the decision of the 
Chair stand as the judgment of the House; when Mr. Barnard withdrew the 
resolution moved by him to suspend the execution of the order for the 
election of a Speaker; and all the incidental questions arising thereon 
fell, of course.
  5357. The vote whereby the previous question was ordered having been 
reconsidered, it was held in order to withdraw the motion for the 
previous question, the ``decision'' having been nullified.--On April 
20, 1894,\1\ Mr. Julius C. Burrows, of Michigan, called attention to 
the fact that Mr. Joseph Wheeler, of Alabama, had, without leave of the 
House, caused to be printed in the Congressional Record of Wednesday 
extended remarks on the proposed rule adopted by the House on Tuesday.
  Mr. Burrows suggested that the remarks should be omitted from the 
permanent Record.
  After debate on the question, Mr. Alexander M. Dockery, of Missouri, 
moved to refer the subject to the Committee on Printing.
  On motion of Mr. Dockery, the previous question was ordered on the 
motion to refer.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
  \1\ Second session Fifty-third Congress, Journal, p. 345; Record, p. 
3911.
                                                            Sec. 5358
  Pending further proceedings, on motion of Mr. Thomas C. McRae, of 
Arkansas, the vote by which the previous question had just been ordered 
was reconsidered.
  The question recurring on the demand for the previous question, Mr. 
Dockery proposed to withdraw his motion for the previous question.
  Mr. Burrows made the point of order that there having been a decision 
of the motion it was not in order, under the rule, to withdraw it.
  After debate, the Speaker \1\ overruled the point of order, holding 
that the action of the House on the motion having been reconsidered the 
decision was, in effect, nullified, and that the motion might be 
withdrawn.
  Mr. Dockery thereupon withdrew his motion for the previous question, 
and also withdrew his motion to refer the pending matter to the 
Committee on Printing.
  5358. The Member, having the right in the House to withdraw a motion 
before a decision thereon, has also the resulting power to modify the 
motion.--On September 16, 1890,\2\ the Speaker announced as the regular 
order of business the further consideration of the resolution submitted 
by Mr. Benjamin A. Enloe, of Tennessee, on September 15, relating to 
certain unparliamentary language of a Member published in the Record of 
September 14.
  Mr. Henry G. Turner, of Georgia, suggested a modification of the 
resolution submitted by Mr. Enloe, leaving out the words ``requiring a 
message to be sent to the Senate,'' which modification was accepted by 
Mr. Enloe.
  Mr. Charles H. Grosvenor, of Ohio, made the point of order that it 
was not competent for the mover of a resolution to modify the same 
during its pendency before the House.
  The Speaker \3\ overruled the point of order on the ground that it 
had become the established practice of the House to permit the mover or 
proposer of a motion or resolution to modify the same at any time 
before an amendment thereto had been adopted or the previous question 
ordered thereon.\4\
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  \1\ Charles F. Crisp, of Georgia, Speaker.
  \2\ First session Fifty-first Congress, Journal, p. 1041; Record, p. 
10105.
  \3\ Thomas B. Reed, of Maine, Speaker.
  \4\ In Committee of the Whole an amendment may not be withdrawn after 
it is once offered (see sec. 5221 of this volume), whence it results 
that the mover has no power to modify it after it is once offered.