[110th Congress House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 109-157]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]
[DOCID:hruletx-22]
[Page 173-195]
sec. xvii--order in debate
<<NOTE: Sec. 353. Decorum of Members as to sitting in their places.>>
When the Speaker is seated in his chair, every member is to sit in his
place. Scob., 6; Grey, 403.
In the House the decorum of Members is regulated by the various
provisions of rule XVII; and this provision of the parliamentary law is
practically obsolete.
[[Page 174]]
When <<NOTE: Sec. 354. Procedure of the Member in seeking
recognition.>> any Member means to speak, he is to stand up in his
place, uncovered, and to address himself, not to the House, or any
particular Member, but to the Speaker, who calls him by his name, that
the House may take notice who it is that speaks. Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487,
col. 1; 2 Hats., 77; 4 Grey, 66; 8 Grey, 108. But Members who are
indisposed may be indulged to speak sitting. 2 Hats., 75, 77; 1 Grey,
143.
In the House a Member seeking recognition is governed by clause 1 of
rule XVII, which differs materially from this provision of the
parliamentary law. The Speaker, moreover, calls the Member, not by name,
but as ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from ------,'' naming the State.
As long ago as 1832, at least, a Member was not required to rise from
his own particular seat since seats are no longer assigned (V, 4979,
footnote).
<<NOTE: Sec. 355. Conditions under which a Member's right to the floor
is subjected to the will of the House.>> When a Member stands up to
speak, no question is to be put, but he is to be heard unless the House
overrule him. 4 Grey, 390; 5 Grey, 6, 143.
In the House no question is put as to the right of a Member to the
floor, unless he be called to order and dealt with by the House under
clause 4 of rule XVII.
If <<NOTE: Sec. 356. The parliamentary law as to recognition by the
Speaker.>> two or more rise to speak nearly together, the Speaker
determines who was first up, and calls him by name, whereupon he
proceeds, unless he voluntarily sits down and gives way to the other.
But sometimes the House does not acquiesce in the Speaker's decision, in
which case the question is put, ``which Member was first up?'' 2 Hats.,
76; Scob., 7; D'Ewes, 434, col. 1, 2.
[[Page 175]]
In the Senate of the United States the President's decision is without
appeal.
In the House recognition by the Chair is governed by clause 2 of rule
XVII and the practice thereunder. There has been no appeal from a
decision by the Speaker on a question of recognition since 1881, on
which occasion Speaker Randall stated that the power of recognition is
``just as absolute in the Chair as the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the United States is absolute as to the interpretation of the law'' (II,
1425-1428), and in the later practice no appeal is permitted (VIII,
2429, 2646, 2762).
No <<NOTE: Sec. 357. Right of the Member to be heard a second
time.>> man may speak more than once on the same bill on the same day;
or even on another day, if the debate be adjourned. But if it be read
more than once in the same day, he may speak once at every reading. Co.,
12, 115; Hakew., 148; Scob., 58; 2 Hats., 75. Even a change of opinion
does not give a right to be heard a second time. Smyth's Comw. L., 2, c.
3; Arcan, Parl., 17.
But he may be permitted to speak again to clear a matter of fact, 3
Grey, 357, 416; or merely to explain himself, 2 Hats., 73, in some
material part of his speech, Ib., 75; or to the manner or words of the
question, keeping himself to that only, and not traveling into the
merits of it, Memorials in Hakew., 29; or to the orders of the House, if
they be transgressed, keeping within that line, and not falling into the
matter itself. Mem. Hakew., 30, 31.
The House has modified the parliamentary law as to a Member's right to
speak a second time by clause 3 of rule XVII and by permitting a Member
controlling time in debate to yield to another more than once (Apr. 5,
2000, p. 4497). In ordinary practice rule XVII is not rigidly enforced,
and Members find little difficulty in making such explanations as are
contemplated by the parliamentary law.
[[Page 176]]
But <<NOTE: Sec. 358. Participation of the Speaker in debate.>> if the
Speaker rise to speak, the Member standing up ought to sit down, that he
may be first heard. Town., col. 205; Hale Parl., 133; Mem. in Hakew.,
30, 31. Nevertheless, though the Speaker may of right speak to matters
of order, and be first heard, he is restrained from speaking on any
other subject, except where the House have occasion for facts within his
knowledge; then he may, with their leave, state the matter of fact. 3
Grey, 38.
This provision is usually observed in the practice of the House only
with regard to the conduct of the Speaker when he is in the chair. In
several instances the Speaker has been permitted by the House to make a
statement from the chair, as in a case wherein his past conduct had been
criticized (II, 1369), in a case wherein there had been unusual
occurrences in the joint session to count the electoral vote (II, 1372),
and in a matter relating to a contest for the seat of the Speaker as a
Member (II, 1360). In rare instances the Speaker has made brief
explanations from the chair without asking the assent of the House (II,
1373, 1374). Speakers have called others to the chair and participated
in debate, usually without asking consent of the House (II, 1360, 1367,
footnote, 1368, 1371; III, 1950), and in one case a Speaker on the floor
debated a point of order that the Speaker pro tempore was to decide (V,
6097). In rare instances Speakers have left the chair to make motions on
the floor (II, 1367, footnote). Speakers may participate in debate in
Committee of the Whole, although the privilege was rarely exercised in
early practice (II, 1367, footnote).
No <<NOTE: Sec. 359. Impertinent, superfluous, or tedious
speaking.>> one is to speak impertinently or beside the question,
superfluous, or tediously. Scob., 31, 33; 2 Hats., 166, 168; Hale Parl.,
133.
The House, by clause 1 of rule XVII, provides that the Member shall
address himself to the question under debate, but neither by rule nor
practice has the House suppressed superfluous or tedious speaking, its
hour rule (clause 2 of rule XVII) being a sufficient safeguard in this
respect.
[[Page 177]]
No <<NOTE: Sec. 360. Language reflecting on the House.>> person is to
use indecent language against the proceedings of the House; no prior
determination of which is to be reflected on by any Member, unless he
means to conclude with a motion to rescind it. 2 Hats., 169, 170;
Rushw., p. 3, v. 1, fol. 42. But while a proposition under consideration
is still in fieri, though it has even been reported by a committee,
reflections on it are no reflections on the House. 9 Grey, 508.
In the practice of the House it has been held out of order in debate
to cast reflections on either the House or its membership or its
decisions, whether present or past (V, 5132-5138). A Member who had used
offensive words against the character of the House, and who declined to
explain, was censured (II, 1247). Words impeaching the loyalty of a
portion of the membership have also been ruled out (V, 5139). Where a
Member reiterated on the floor certain published charges against the
House, action was taken, although other business had intervened, the
question being considered one of privilege (III, 2637). It has been held
inappropriate and not in order in debate to refer to the proceedings of
a committee except such as have been formally reported to the House (V,
5080-5083; VIII, 2269, 2485-2493; June 24, 1958, pp. 12120, 12122), but
this rule does not apply to the proceedings of a committee of a previous
Congress (Feb. 2, 1914, p. 2782), and the rationale for this limitation
on debate is in part obsolete under the modern practice of the House
insofar as the doctrine is applied to open committee meetings and
hearings.
No <<NOTE: Sec. 361. Personalities in debate forbidden.>> person, in
speaking, is to mention a Member then present by his name, but to
describe him by his seat in the House, or who spoke last, or on the
other side of the question, &c., Mem. in Hakew., 3; Smyth's Comw., L. 2,
c. 3; nor to digress from the matter to fall upon the person, Scob., 31;
Hale Parl., 133; 2 Hats., 166, by speaking reviling, nipping, or
unmannerly words against a particular Member. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3.
* * *
[[Page 178]]
In the practice of the House, a Member is not permitted to refer to
another Member by name (V, 5144; VIII, 2526, 2529, 2536), or to address
him in the second person (V, 5140-5143; VI, 600; VIII, 2529). The proper
reference to another Member is ``the gentleman (or gentlewoman) from --
----,'' naming the Member's State (June 14, 1978, p. 17615; July 21,
1982, p. 17314). A mere reference to a Member's voting record does not
form a basis for a point of order against those remarks (June 13, 2002,
p. 10226, p. 10232).
By rule of the House (clause 1 of rule XVII), as well as by
parliamentary law, personalities are forbidden (V, 4979, 5145, 5163,
5169), whether against the Member in the Member's capacity as
Representative or otherwise (V, 5152, 5153), even if the references may
be relevant to the pending question (Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778). The
House has censured a Member for gross personalities (II, 1251). The
Chair may intervene to prevent improper references where it is evident
that a particular Member is being described (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077).
The Chair does not rule on the veracity of a statement made by a
Member in debate (Apr. 9, 1997, p. 4926). Although accusing another
Member of deceit engages in personality, merely accusing another Member
of making a mistake does not (Oct. 26, 2000, p. 24921).
Clause 1 of rule XVII has been held to proscribe: (1) referring to an
identifiable group of sitting Members as having committed a crime (e.g.,
stealing an election or obstructing justice) (Feb. 27, 1985, p. 3898;
Speaker Wright, Mar. 21, 1989, p. 5016; May 19, 1998, p. 9738; July 15,
2004, p. ----); (2) referring in a personally critical manner to the
political tactics of the Speaker or other Members (June 25, 1981, p.
14056); (3) referring to a particular Member of the House in a
derogatory fashion (Nov. 3, 1989, p. 27077); (4) characterizing a Member
as ``the most impolite Member'' (June 27, 1996, p. 15915); (5)
questioning the integrity of a Member (July 25, 1996, p. 19170); (6)
denunciating the spirit in which a Member had spoken (V, 6981); (7)
using a Member's surname as though an adjective for a word of ridicule
(June 13, 2002, p. 10232); (8) questioning the decency of another Member
(Mar. 21, 2007, p. ----).
A distinction has been drawn between general language, which
characterizes a measure or the political motivations behind a measure,
and personalities (V, 5153, 5163, 5169). Although remarks in debate may
not include personal attacks against a Member or an identifiable group
of Members, they may address political motivations for legislative
positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p. 2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov.
17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13, 1996, p. 14043). For example, references to
``down-in-the-dirt gutter politics'' and ``you people are going to pay''
were held not to be personal references (Nov. 14, 1995, p. 32388).
Similarly, characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty
political terrorist tactic'' was held in order as a reference to the
pending measure rather than to the motive or character of the measure's
proponent (Nov. 9, 1995, p. 31413). The Chair also has held in order a
general reference that ``big donors'' receive ``access
[[Page 179]]
to leadership power and decisions'' because the reference did not
identify a specific Member as engaging in an improper quid pro quo (Apr.
9, 1997, p. 4926). A general statement that seemed to invoke racial
stereotypes, but not in a context so inflammatory as to constitute a
breach of decorum, was held not unparliamentary (Apr. 9, 2003, p. 9005
(sustained by tabling of appeal)).
A Member should refrain from references in debate to the official
conduct of a Member where such conduct is not the subject then pending
before the House by way of either a report of the Committee on Standards
of Official Conduct or another question of the privileges of the House
(see, e.g., July 24, 1990, p. 18917; Mar. 19, 1992, p. 6078; May 25,
1995, pp. 14434-37; Sept. 19, 1995, pp. 25454, 25455; Apr. 27, 2005, p.
----); and, although such references are ordinarily enforced by the
Chair in response to a point of order, the Chair may take the initiative
in order to maintain proper decorum (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; June 17,
2004, p. ----). This stricture also precludes a Member from reciting
news articles discussing a Member's conduct (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24318),
reciting the content of a previously tabled resolution raising a
question of the privileges of the House (Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33853; Sept.
19, 1996, p. 23855), or even referring to a Member's conduct by mere
insinuation (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22899). Notice of an intention to offer
a resolution as a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX
does not render a resolution ``pending'' and thereby permit references
to conduct of a Member proposed to be addressed therein (Sept. 19, 1996,
p. 23811).
The stricture against references to a Member's conduct not then
pending before the House applies to the conduct of all sitting Members
(Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899), including conduct that has previously been
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
(Sept. 24, 1996, pp. 24483, 24485; Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). This
stricture does not apply to the conduct of a former Member, provided the
reference is not made in an attempt to compare the conduct of a former
Member with the conduct of a sitting Member (Sept. 20, 1995, pp. 25825,
25826; Sept. 12, 1996, pp. 22900, 22901).
Debate on a pending privileged resolution recommending disciplinary
action against a Member may necessarily involve personalities. However,
clause 1 of rule XVII still prohibits the use of language that is
personally abusive (see, e.g., July 31, 1979, p. 21584; Jan. 21, 1997,
p. 393) and the Chair may take the initiative to prevent violations of
the rule (July 24, 2002, p. 14300). Furthermore, during the actual
pendency of such a resolution, a Member may discuss a prior case
reported to the House by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
for the purpose of comparing the severity of the sanction recommended in
that case with the severity of the sanction recommended in the pending
case, provided that the Member does not identify, or discuss the details
of the past conduct of, a sitting Member (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36271).
[[Page 180]]
In addition to the prohibition against addressing a Member's conduct
when it is not actually pending before the House, the Speaker has
advised that Members should refrain from references in debate (1) to the
motivations of a Member who filed a complaint before the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct (June 15, 1988, p. 14623; July 6, 1988, p.
16630; Mar. 22, 1989, p. 5130; May 2, 1989, p. 7735; Nov. 3, 1989, p.
27077); (2) to personal criticism of a member of the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct (Apr. 1, 1992, p. 7899; Mar. 3, 1995, p.
6715; Sept. 19, 1996, p. 23812; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317); and (3) to an
investigation undertaken by the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, including suggestion of a course of action (Mar. 3, 1995, p.
6715; Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24317; Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778) or advocacy of
an interim status report by the Committee (Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22900;
Sept. 28, 1996, p. 25778).
A Member may not read in debate extraneous material critical of
another Member that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
words (May 25, 1995, pp. 14436, 14437; Sept. 12, 1996, p. 22898). Thus,
words in a telegram read in debate that repudiated the ``lies and half-
truths'' of a House committee report were ruled out of order as
reflecting on the integrity of committee members (June 16, 1947, p.
7065), and unparliamentary references in debate to newspaper accounts
used in support of a Member's personal criticism of another Member were
similarly ruled out of order (Feb. 25, 1985, p. 3346).
For precedents applicable to references in debate to the President,
see Sec. 370, infra, or Members of the Senate, see Sec. 371, infra.
Complaint <<NOTE: Sec. 362. Criticism of the Speaker.>> of the conduct
of the Speaker should be presented directly for the action of the House
and not by way of debate on other matters (V, 5188). In a case wherein a
Member used words insulting to the Speaker the House on a subsequent
day, and after other business had intervened, censured the offender (II,
1248). In such a case the Speaker would ordinarily leave the chair while
action should be taken by the House (II, 1366; V, 5188; VI, 565). In the
104th Congress the Chair reaffirmed that it is not in order to speak
disrespectfully of the Speaker, and that under the precedents the
sanctions for such violations transcend the ordinary requirements for
timeliness of challenges (II, 1248; Jan. 4, 1995, p. 552; Jan. 19, 1995,
p. 1599). It is not in order to arraign the personal conduct of the
Speaker (Jan. 18, 1995, p. 1441; Jan. 19, 1995, p. 1601). For example,
it is not in order to charge dishonesty or disregard of the rules (July
11, 1985, p. 18550), to reflect on his patriotism by accusing him of
``kowtowing'' to persons who would desecrate the flag (June 20, 1990, p.
14877), to refer to him as a ``crybaby'' (Nov. 16, 1995, p. 33394), or
to refer to official conduct of the Speaker that has previously been
resolved by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct or the House
(Apr. 17, 1997, p. 5831). The Chair may take the initiative to admonish
Members for references in debate that disparage the Speaker (June 25,
1981, p. 14056; Mar. 22, 1996, p. 6077). Debate on a resolution
authorizing the Speaker to entertain mo
[[Page 181]]
tions to suspend the rules may not engage in personality by discussing
the official conduct of the Speaker, even if possibly relevant to the
question of empowerment of the Speaker (Sept. 24, 1996, p. 24485).
* * * <<NOTE: Sec. 363. Motives of Members not to be arraigned.>> The
consequences of a measure may be reprobated in strong terms; but to
arraign the motives of those who propose to advocate it is a
personality, and against order. Qui digreditur a materia ad personam,
Mr. Speaker ought to suppress. Ord. Com., 1604, Apr. 19.
The arraignment of the motives of Members is not permitted (V, 5147-
51; Dec. 13, 1973, p. 41270), and the Speakers have intervened to
prevent it, in the earlier practice preventing even mildest imputations
(V, 5161, 5162). However, remarks in debate may address political, but
not personal, motivations for legislative positions (Jan. 24, 1995, p.
2214; Mar. 8, 1995, pp. 7307, 7308; Nov. 17, 1995, p. 33832; June 13,
1996, p. 14043) or for committee membership (July 10, 1995, pp. 18257-
59). Accusing another Member of hypocrisy has been held not in order
(July 24, 1979, p. 20380; Mar. 29, 1995, p. 9675), and characterizing
the motivation of a Member in offering an amendment as deceptive and
hypocritical was ruled out of order (June 12, 1979, p. 11461). A
statement in debate that an amendment could only be demagogic or racist
because only demagoguery or racism impelled such an amendment was ruled
out of order as impugning the motives of the Member offering the
amendment (Dec. 3, 1973, pp. 41270, 41271). However, debate
characterizing a pending measure as a ``patently petty political
terrorist tactic'' was held in order as directed at the pending measure
rather than the motive or the character of its proponent (Nov. 9, 1995,
p. 31413). While in debate the assertion of one Member may be declared
untrue by another, yet in so doing an intentional misrepresentation must
not be implied (V, 5157-5160), and if stated or implied is censurable
(II, 1305) and presents a question of privilege (III, 2717; VI, 607). A
Member in debate having declared the words of another ``a base lie,''
censure was inflicted by the House on the offender (II, 1249).
No <<NOTE: Sec. 364. Disorder and interruptions during debate.>> one
is to disturb another in his speech by hissing, coughing, spitting, 6
Grey, 322; Scob., 8; D'Ewes, 332, col. 1, 640, col. 2, speaking or
whispering to another, Scob., 6; D'Ewes, 487, col. 1; nor stand up to
interrupt him, Town, col. 205; Mem.
[[Page 182]]
in Hakew., 31; nor to pass between the Speaker and the speaking Member,
nor to go across the House, Scob., 6, or to walk up and down it, or to
take books or papers from the table, or write there, 2 Hats., 171, p.
170.
The House has, by clause 5 of rule XVII, prescribed certain rules of
decorum differing somewhat from this provision of the parliamentary law,
but supplemental to it rather than antagonistic. In one respect,
however, the practice of the House differs from the apparent intent of
the parliamentary law. In the House a Member may interrupt by addressing
the Chair for permission of the Member speaking (V, 5006; VIII, 2465);
but it is entirely within the discretion of the Member occupying the
floor to determine when and by whom he shall be interrupted (V, 5007,
5008; VIII, 2463, 2465). There is no rule of the House requiring a
Member having the floor to yield to another Member to whom he has
referred during debate (Aug. 2, 1984, p. 22241). A Member may ask
another to yield from any microphone in the Chamber, including those in
the well, so long as not crossing between the Member having the floor
and the Chair (June 5, 1998, p. 11170). The Chair may take the
initiative in preserving order when a Member declining to yield in
debate continues to be interrupted by another Member, may order that the
interrupting Member's remarks not appear in the Record (July 26, 1984,
p. 21247), and may admonish Members not to converse with a Member
attempting to address the House (Feb. 21, 1984, p. 2758), as it is not
in order to engage in disruption while another is delivering remarks in
debate (June 27, 1996, p. 15915). On the opening day of the 103d
Congress, during the customary announcement of policies with respect to
particular aspects of the legislative process, the Chair elaborated on
the rules of order in debate with a general statement concerning decorum
in the House (Jan. 5, 1993, p. 105). Under this provision, the Chair may
require a line of Members waiting to sign a discharge petition to
proceed to the rostrum from the far right-hand aisle and require the
line not to stand between the Chair and Members engaging in debate (Oct.
24, 1997, p. 23293). Hissing and jeering is not proper decorum in the
House (May 21, 1998, p. 10282). For further discussion of interruptions
in debate, see Sec. 946, infra.
Nevertheless, <<NOTE: Sec. 365. Parliamentary method of silencing a
tedious Member.>> if a Member finds that it is not the inclination of
the House to hear him, and that by conversation or any other noise they
endeavor to drown his voice, it is his most prudent way to submit to the
pleasure of the House, and sit
[[Page 183]]
down; for it scarcely ever happens that they are guilty of this piece of
ill manners without sufficient reason, or inattention to a Member who
says anything worth their hearing. 2 Hats., 77, 78.
In the House, where the previous question and hour rule of debate have
been used for many years, the parliamentary method of suppressing a
tedious Member has never been imported into the practice (V, 5445).
If <<NOTE: Sec. 366. The parliamentary law as to naming a disorderly
Member.>> repeated calls do not produce order, the Speaker may call by
his name any Member obstinately persisting in irregularity; whereupon
the House may require the Member to withdraw. He is then to be heard in
exculpation, and to withdraw. Then the Speaker states the offense
committed; and the House considers the degree of punishment they will
inflict. 2 Hats., 167, 7, 8, 172.
This provision of parliamentary law should be in conjunction with
clause 4 of rule XVII, Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra, particularly as this
provision relates to the ultimate authority of the House to determine
whether a Member ignoring repeated calls to order should be permitted to
proceed in order.
For <<NOTE: Sec. 367. Proceedings in cases of assaults and
affrays.>> instances of assaults and affrays in the House of Commons,
and the proceedings thereon, see 1 Pet. Misc., 82; 3 Grey, 128; 4 Grey,
328; 5 Grey, 382; 6 Grey, 254; 10 Grey, 8. Whenever warm words or an
assault have passed between Members, the House, for the protection of
their Members, requires them to declare in their places not to prosecute
any quarrel, 3 Grey, 128, 293; 5 Grey, 280; or orders them to attend the
Speaker, who is to accommodate their differences, and report to the
House, 3 Grey, 419;
[[Page 184]]
and they are put under restraint if they refuse, or until they do. 9
Grey, 234, 312.
In several instances assaults and affrays have occurred on the floor
of the House. Sometimes the House has allowed these affairs to pass
without notice, the Members concerned making apologies either personally
or through other Members (II, 1658-1662). In other cases the House has
exacted apologies (II, 1646-1651, 1657), or required the offending
Members to pledge themselves before the House to keep the peace (II,
1643). In case of an aggravated assault by one Member on another on the
portico of the Capitol for words spoken in debate, the House censured
the assailant and three other Members who had been present, armed, to
prevent interference (II, 1655, 1656). Assaults or affrays in the
Committee of the Whole are dealt with by the House (II, 1648-1651).
Disorderly <<NOTE: Sec. 368. Parliamentary law as to taking down
disorderly words.>> words are not to be noticed till the Member has
finished his speech. 5 Grey, 356; 6 Grey, 60. Then the person objecting
to them, and desiring them to be taken down by the Clerk at the table,
must repeat them. The Speaker then may direct the Clerk to take them
down in his minutes; but if he thinks them not disorderly, he delays the
direction. If the call becomes pretty general, he orders the Clerk to
take them down, as stated by the objecting Member. They are then a part
of his minutes, and when read to the offending Member, he may deny they
were his words, and the House must then decide by a question whether
they are his words or not. Then the Member may justify them, or explain
the sense in which he used them, or apologize. If the House is
satisfied, no further proceeding is necessary. But if two Members still
insist to take the sense of the House, the Member must withdraw before
that question is stated, and then the sense of the House is to be taken.
2 Hats., 199;
[[Page 185]]
4 Grey, 170; 6 Grey, 59. When any Member has spoken, or other business
intervened, after offensive words spoken, they can not be taken notice
of for censure. And this is for the common security of all, and to
prevent mistakes which must happen if words are not taken down
immediately. Formerly they might be taken down at any time the same day.
2 Hats., 196; Mem. in Hakew., 71; 3 Grey, 48; 9 Grey, 514.
The House has, by clause 4 of rule XVII, provided a method of
procedure in cases of disorderly words. The House permits and requires
them to be noticed as soon as uttered, and has not insisted that the
offending Member withdraw while the House is deciding as to its course
of action.
Disorderly <<NOTE: Sec. 369. Disorderly words taken down and reported
from Committee of the Whole.>> words spoken in a committee must be
written down as in the House; but the committee can only report them to
the House for animadversion. 6 Grey, 46.
This provision of the parliamentary law has been applied to the
Committee of the Whole, rather than to select or standing committees,
which are separately empowered to enforce rules of decorum (clause 1(a)
of rule XI, which incorporates the provisions of rule XVII where
applicable). The House has censured a Member for disorderly words spoken
in Committee of the Whole and reported therefrom (II, 1259).
In <<NOTE: Sec. 370. References in debate to the
Executive.>> Parliament, to speak irreverently or seditiously against
the King is against order. Smyth's Comw., L. 2, c. 3; 2 Hats., 170.
This provision of the parliamentary law is manifestly inapplicable to
the House (V, 5086); and it has been held in order in debate to refer to
the President of the United States or his opinions, either with approval
or criticism, provided that such reference be relevant to the subject
under discussion and otherwise conformable to the Rules of the House (V,
5087-5091; VIII, 2500). Under this standard the following references are
in order: (1) a reference to the probable action of the President (V,
5092); (2) an adjuration to the President to keep his word (although an
improper form
[[Page 186]]
of address) (Dec. 19, 1995, p. 37601); and (3) an accusation that the
President ``frivolously vetoed'' a bill (Nov. 8, 1995, p. 31785).
Although wide latitude is permitted in debate on a proposition to
impeach the President (V, 5093), Members must abstain from language
personally offensive (V, 5094; Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829); and Members
must abstain from comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members
of the House or Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829). Furthermore, Members
may not refer to evidence of alleged impeachable offenses by the
President contained in a communication from an independent counsel
pending before a House committee (Sept. 14, 1998, p. 20171; Sept. 17,
1998, p. 20758), although they may refer to the communication, itself,
within the confines of proper decorum in debate (Oct. 6, 1998, p.
23841).
Personal abuse, innuendo, or ridicule of the President, is not
permitted (VIII, 2497; Aug. 12, 1986, p. 21078; Oct. 21, 1987, p. 8857;
Sept. 21, 1994, p. 25147; Sep. 7, 2006, p. ----). Under this standard it
is not in order to call the President, or a presumptive major-party
nominee for President, a ``liar'' or accuse him of ``lying'' (June 26,
1985, p. 17394; Sept. 24, 1992, pp. 27345, 27346; Nov. 15, 1995, p.
32587; June 6, 1996, pp. 13228, 13229; Mar. 18, 1998, p. 3937; Nov. 14,
2002, p. 22370; July 15, 2003, p. ----; Mar. 24, 2004, p. ----). Indeed,
any suggestion of mendacity is out of order. For example, the following
remarks have been held out of order: (1) suggesting that the President
misrepresented the truth, attempted to obstruct justice, and encouraged
others to perjure themselves (Feb. 25, 1998, p. 2621); (2) accusing him
of dishonesty (July 13, 2004, p. ----; June 29, 2005, p. ----), accusing
him of making a ``dishonest argument'' (Sept. 12, 2006, p. ----),
charging him with intent to be intellectually dishonest (May 9, 1990, p.
9828), or stating that many were convinced he had ``not been honest''
(Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620); (3) accusing him of ``raping'' the truth (Apr.
24, 1996, p. 8807), not telling the truth (Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----), or
distorting the truth (Sept. 9, 2003, p. ----); (4) stating that he was
not being ``straight with us'' (Nov. 19, 2003, p. ----); (5) accusing
him of being deceptive (Mar. 29, 2004, p. ----; Mar. 31, 2004, p. ----;
Feb. 1, 2006, p. ----), fabricating an issue (July 6, 2004, p. ----), or
intending to mislead the public (Oct. 6, 2004, p. ----; June 9, 2005, p.
----); (6) accusing him of intentional mischaracterization, although
mischaracterization without intent to deceive is not necessarily out of
order (July 19, 2005, p. ----).
Furthermore, the following remarks have been held out of order as
unparliamentary references to the President, or to a presumptive major-
party nominee for President: (1) attributing to him ``hypocrisy'' (Sept.
25, 1992, p. 27674; Apr. 26, 2006, p. ----); (2) accusing him of giving
``aid and comfort to the enemy'' (Jan. 25, 1995, p. 2352; May 6, 2004,
p. ----); (3) accusing him of ``demagoguery'' (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144;
Jan. 24, 1996, pp. 1220, 1221; May 30, 1996, pp. 12646, 12647); (4)
calling him a ``draft-dodger'' (Apr. 24, 1996, pp. 8807, 8808; Sept. 30,
1996, p. 26603) or alleging unexcused absences from military service
(May 5, 2004, p. ----), including allegations that the President was
``A.W.O.L.'' (Sept. 22, 2004, p. ----); (5)
[[Page 187]]
describing his action as ``cowardly'' (Oct. 25, 1989, p. 25817); (6)
referring to him as ``a little bugger'' (Nov. 18, 1995, p. 33974); (7)
alluding to alleged sexual misconduct on his part (May 10, 1994, p.
9697; Feb. 25, 1998, p. 1828; Mar. 5, 1998, p. 2620; May 18, 1998, p.
9418); (8) alluding to unethical behavior or corruption (e.g., June 20,
1996, p. 14829; July 9, 2002, p. 12286; Oct. 29, 2003, p. ----), such as
implying a cause-and-effect relationship between political contributions
and his actions as President (e.g., May 22, 2001, p. 9028; Sept. 29,
2004, p. ----), including an accusation that the President had ``lined
the pockets'' of his ``political cronies'' and filled ``campaign
coffers'' (Sept. 14, 2005, p. ----); (9) discussing ``charges'' leveled
at the President or under investigation (Mar. 19, 1998, p. 4094; June
11, 1998, p. 12025), including alluding to ``fund-raising abuses'' (Mar.
14, 2000, p. 2716) or speculating that the Vice President might someday
pardon the President for certain charges (Apr. 12, 2000, p. 5419); or
discussing alleged criminal conduct (Sept. 10, 1998, p. 19976) or
``illegal surveillance'' (June 20, 2006, p. ----); (10) discussing
personal conduct even as a point of reference or comparison (July 16,
1998, p. 15784; Sept. 9, 1998, p. 19735); (11) asserting that a major-
party nominee had done something ``disgusting'' and ``despicable' (Mar.
11, 2004, p. ----); (12) asserting that a major-party nominee is not ``a
large enough person'' to apologize (Mar. 11, 2004, p. ----) or that the
President does not care about black people (Sept. 8, 2005, p. ----);
(13) describing his action as ``arrogant'' (Jan. 11, 2007, p. ----; Mar.
22, 2007, p. ----); (14) equating his decisions with regard to armed
conflict as him having ``slaughtered'' thousands (Mar. 8, 2007, p. ----
). The Chair may admonish Members transgressing this stricture even
after other debate has intervened (Jan. 23, 1996, p. 1144).
A Member may not read in debate extraneous material personally abusive
of the President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
words (July 12, 1996, pp. 17109, 17110; July 26, 1996, p. 19458; Feb.
25, 1998, p. 1831; Mar. 3, 1993, p. 3958; Nov. 15, 1995, p. 32587; May
2, 1996, p. 10010; Mar. 17, 1998, p. 3799; July 15, 2003, p. ----; Sept.
16, 2003, p. ----). This prohibition includes the recitation of another
Member's criticism of the President made off the floor (even if recited
as a rebuttal to such criticism) (Dec. 17, 1998, p. 27775).
The Chair has advised that the protections afforded by Jefferson's
Manual and the precedents against unparliamentary references to the
President, himself, do not necessarily extend to members of his family
(July 12, 1990, p. 17206).
References in debate to former Presidents are not governed by these
standards (Nov. 15, 1945, p. 10735; June 27, 2002, pp. 11844, 11845).
In the 102d Congress, the Speaker enunciated a minimal standard of
propriety for all debate concerning nominated candidates for the
Presidency, based on the traditional proscription against personally
offensive references to the President even in his capacity as a
candidate (Speaker Foley, Sept. 24, 1992, p. 27344); and this policy has
been extended to a presumptive major-party nominee for President (e.g.,
Apr. 22, 2004, p.
[[Page 188]]
----). However, references to the past statements or views of such
nominee are not unparliamentary (May 6, 2004, p. ----).
For discussion of the stricture against addressing remarks in debate
to the President, as in the second person, see Sec. 945, infra.
On January 27, 1909 (VIII, 2497), the House adopted a report of a
committee appointed to investigate the question, which report in part
stated:
``The freedom of speech in debate in the House should never be denied
or abridged, but freedom of speech in debate does not mean license to
indulge in personal abuses or ridicule. The right of Members of the two
Houses of Congress to criticize the official acts of the President and
other executive officers is beyond question, but this right is subject
to proper rules requiring decorum in debate. Such right of criticism is
inherent upon legislative authority. The right to legislate involves the
right to consider conditions as they are and to contrast present
conditions with those of the past or those desired in the future. The
right to correct abuses by legislation carries the right to consider and
discuss abuses which exist or which are feared.
``It is, however, the duty of the House to require its Members in
speech or debate to preserve that proper restraint which will permit the
House to conduct its business in an orderly manner and without
unnecessarily and unduly exciting animosity among its Members or
antagonism from those other branches of the Government with which the
House is correlated.''
It <<NOTE: Sec. 371. References in debate to the other House and its
Members.>> is a breach of order in debate to notice what has been said
on the same subject in the other House, or the particular votes or
majorities on it there; because the opinion of each House should be left
to its own independency, not to be influenced by the proceedings of the
other; and the quoting them might beget reflections leading to a
misunderstanding between the two Houses. 8 Grey, 22.
Until former clause 1 of rule XIV (currently clause 1 of rule XVII)
was amended in the 100th and 101st Congresses (H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1987,
p. 6; H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 1989, p. 72), this principle of comity and
parliamentary law as described by Jefferson governed debate in the House
to the full extent of its provisions (see generally, V, 5095-5130; VIII,
2501-21; July 31, 1984, p. 21670; Deschler-Brown, ch. 29, Sec. 44). From
the 101st Congress through the 108th Congress, clause 1 of rule XVII
permitted some factual references that were a matter of public record,
references to the pendency or sponsorship in the Senate of certain
measures, factual descriptions con
[[Page 189]]
cerning a measure under debate in the House, and quotations from Senate
proceedings relevant to the making of legislative history on a pending
measure. In the 109th Congress clause 1 was amended to permit debate to
include references to the Senate or its Members but within the general
stricture that requires Members to avoid personality (sec. 2(g), H. Res.
5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). For a recitation of precedents under the
former rule, see Sec. 371 of the House Rules and Manual for the 108th
Congress (H. Doc. 107-284).
Since the adoption of the new rule, the following references to
Members of the Senate have been held unparliamentary: (1) accusing
Senate Republicans of hypocrisy (May 16, 2005, p. ----); (2) referring
to Senate Democrats as ``cowardly'' (May 18, 2005, p. ----); (3)
accusing a Senator of making slanderous statements (June 17, 2005, p. --
--; June 21, 2005, p. ----); (4) attributing to a Senator a list of
offenses under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(Oct. 18, 2005, p. ----); (5) accusing a Senator of giving ``aid and
comfort'' to the enemy (Dec. 13, 2005, p. ----).
It remains the duty of the Chair to call to order a Member who engages
in personality with respect to a Senator (see Sec. 374, infra), and the
Chair may admonish a Member for unparliamentary references even after
intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954; Nov. 15, 2001, p.
22596). Although the Chair is under a duty to caution Members against
unparliamentary references, the Chair will not advise Members on how to
construct their remarks to avoid improper references (Feb. 25, 2004, p.
----).
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair had consistently held
that the prohibition against improper references to Senators included
(1) a reference not explicitly naming the Senator (VIII, 2512; Feb. 23,
1994, p. 2658; June 30, 1995, p. 18153; Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2768, 2769),
such as a recitation of a quote by ``a Member of the other body'' (Feb.,
12, 2003, p. ----); (2) the reading of a paper making criticisms of a
Senator (V, 5127); and (3) a reference to another person's criticism of
a Senator (Aug. 4, 1983, p. 23145). Similarly, the Chair has
consistently held that if references to the Senate are appropriate, the
Member delivering them is not required to use the term ``the other
body,'' (Oct. 4, 1984, p. 30047) and, by the same token, references to
``the other body'' will not cure unparliamentary references directed to
the Senate (e.g., Oct. 2, 2002, p. 18913; Apr. 2, 2004, p. ----).
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that remarks in
debate during the pendency of an impeachment resolution may not include
comparisons to the personal conduct of sitting Members of the House or
Senate (Dec. 18, 1998, p. 27829) and remarks in debate may not criticize
words spoken in the Senate by one not a Member of that body in the
course of an impeachment trial (V, 5106). After examination by a
committee under the earlier form of the rule, a speech reflecting on the
character of the Senate was ordered to be stricken from the Record on
the ground that it tended to create ``unfriendly conditions between the
two bodies * * * obstructive of wise legislation and little short of a
public calamity'' (V,
[[Page 190]]
5129). Under the earlier form of the rule, where a Member had been
assailed in the Senate, he was permitted to explain his own conduct and
motives without bringing the whole controversy into discussion or
assailing the Senator (V, 5123-5126). Propositions relating to breaches
of these principles were entertained as a matter of privilege (V, 5129,
6980).
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held (1) that a Member
of the House may refer to a speech made in the Senate by one no longer a
Member of that body (V, 5112); and (2) that the precise standard in
clause 1 of rule XVII (formerly rule XIV) for references to ``individual
Members of the Senate'' did not apply to references to former Senators
(Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968).
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that references to
Members of the Senate in their capacities as candidates for President or
Vice President were not prohibited. Where a Senator was a candidate for
President or Vice President his official policies, actions, and opinions
as a candidate were permitted to be criticized in terms not personally
offensive (Speaker Wright, Sept. 29, 1988, p. 26683), but references
attacking the character or integrity of a Senator even in that context
were not in order (Oct. 30, 1979, p. 30150). The new form of the rule
obviates the distinction between a sitting Senator who is a candidate
for President and a sitting Senator who is not.
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held the following
references to the Senate out of order: (1) characterization of Senate
action as a ``further injustice'' (Oct. 6, 1999, p. 24186), (2)
accusation that the Senate was governed by ``arcane budget rules'' (Oct.
2, 2002, p. 18917), (3) inference that the Senate had failed to follow
the law (Oct. 3, 2002, p. 18994); (4) questioning of the Senate with
respect to its courage or resolve to take an action (Aug. 4, 1989, p.
19315); (5) accusation that the Senate minority held a bill ``hostage''
(Oct. 5, 1999, p. 23805); (6) speculation as to the intent or motives of
a Senator (Oct. 11, 1984, pp. 32221-23; Oct. 21, 1997, p. 22328; Nov. 6,
2001, p. 21725).
Under the earlier form of the rule, the Chair held that it was in
order in debate, while discussing a question involving conference
committee procedure, to state what actually occurred in a conference
committee session, without referring to or criticizing a named Member of
the Senate (July 29, 1935, p. 12011).
References in debate to the Vice President (as President of the
Senate) are governed by the standards of reference permitted toward the
President, as under the earlier form of the rule. As such, a Member may
criticize in debate the policies, or candidacy, of the Vice President
but may not engage in personality (Dec. 14, 1995, p. 36968; July 14,
1998, p. 15314; Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639). For example, it is not in
order to allude to ``wrongdoings [including] fund-raising telephone
calls by the Vice President'' (Mar. 14, 2000, p. 2716); to attribute to
him a list of offenses under investigation by a special prosecutor (Oct.
18, 2005, p. ----); to suggest that the House should investigate him in
connection with government con
[[Page 191]]
tracts awarded to his former employer (June 15, 2006, p. ----); to
speculate that he might someday ``pardon'' the President (Apr. 12, 2000,
p. 5419); to accuse him of lying (Sept. 20, 2000, p. 18639; Sept. 21,
2000, p. 18789; Feb. 16, 2006, p. ----; Mar. 6, 2007, p. ----); to
suggest ``he has a problem with the truth'' (Oct. 5, 2000, p. 21014); to
allege ``unethical behavior'' or ``corruption'' (see, e.g., Oct. 29,
2003, p. ----; Nov. 4, 2003, p. ----), including innuendo suggesting
policy choices were made on the basis of personal pecuniary gain (July
7, 2004, p. ----; Sept. 13, 2005, p. ----) or accusations of abuse of
power (July 14, 2004, p. ----). The rule also precludes the insertion in
the Record of a paper making improper references to the Vice President
(Sept. 19, 2000, p. 18580).
A Member may not read in debate extraneous material regarding the
Vice President that would be improper if spoken in the Member's own
words (Feb. 16, 2006, p. ----).
Neither <<NOTE: Sec. 373. Complaint by one House of conduct of a
Member of the other.>> House can exercise any authority over a Member or
officer of the other, but should complain to the House of which he is,
and leave the punishment to them.
In a notable instance, wherein a Member of the House had assaulted a
Senator in the Senate Chamber for words spoken in debate, the Senate
examined the breach of privilege and transmitted its report to the
House, which punished the Member (II, 1622). A Senator having assailed a
House Member in debate, the House messaged to the Senate a resolution
declaring the language a breach of privilege and requested the Senate to
take appropriate action (Sept. 27, 1951, p. 12270). The Senator
subsequently asked unanimous consent to correct his remarks in the
permanent Congressional Record, but objection was raised (Sept. 28,
1951, p. 12383). But where certain Members of the House, in a published
letter, sought to influence the vote of a Senator in an impeachment
trial, the House declined to consider the matter as a breach of
privilege (III, 2657). While on one occasion it was held that a
resolution offered in the House requesting the Senate to expunge from
the Record statements in criticism of a Member of the House did not
constitute a question of privilege, being in violation of the rule
prohibiting references to the Senate in debate (VIII, 2519), a properly
drafted resolution referring to language published in the record on a
designated page of Senate proceedings as constituting a breach of
privilege and requesting the Senate to take appropriate action
concerning the subject has been held to present a question of the
privileges of the House (VIII, 2516).
[[Page 192]]
* * * <<NOTE: Sec. 374. Duty of the Speaker to prevent expressions
offensive to the other House.>> Where the complaint is of words
disrespectfully spoken by a Member of another House, it is difficult to
obtain punishment, because of the rules supposed necessary to be
observed (as to the immediate noting down of words) for the security of
Members. Therefore it is the duty of the House, and more particularly of
the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to
go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other House,
and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between the two Houses,
which can hardly be terminated without difficulty and disorder. 3 Hats.,
51.
A rule of comity prohibiting most references in debate to the Senate
was first enunciated in Jefferson's Manual and was strictly enforced in
the House through the 108th Congress (albeit with certain exceptions
adopted in the 100th and 101st Congresses in the former clause 1(b) of
rule XVII) (Sec. 371, supra and Sec. 945, infra). In the 109th Congress
clause 1 was amended to permit references to the Senate or its Members,
even critical references, so long as avoiding personality. (sec. 2(g),
H. Res. 5, Jan. 4, 2005, p. ----). Nevertheless, it remains the duty of
the Chair to call to order a Member who violates the rule in debate or
through an insertion in the Record.
The Chair has distinguished between engaging in personality toward
another Member of the House, as to which the Chair normally awaits a
point of order from the floor, and improper references to Members of the
Senate, which violate comity between the Houses, as to which the Chair
normally takes initiative (Feb. 27, 1997, pp. 2778, 2779). The Chair may
admonish Members to avoid unparliamentary references to the Senate even
after intervening recognition (Oct. 12, 1999, p. 24954). Pending
consideration of a measure relating to the Senate, the Speaker announced
his intention to strictly enforce this provision of Jefferson's Manual
prohibiting improper references to the Senate, and to deny recognition
to Members violating the prohibition, subject to permission of the House
to proceed in order (Speaker O'Neill, June 16, 1982, p. 13843). Under
the earlier form of clause 1 of rule XVII, the Chair refused to respond
to hypothetical questions as to the propriety of possible
characterizations of Senate actions before their use in debate (Oct. 24,
1985, p. 28819). For a further discussion
[[Page 193]]
of the Speaker's duties regarding unparliamentary debate, see
Sec. Sec. 960-961, infra.
No <<NOTE: Sec. 375. Course of the Member when business concerning
himself is under debate.>> Member may be present when a bill or any
business concerning himself is debating; nor is any Member to speak to
the merits of it till he withdraws. 2 Hats., 219. The rule is that if a
charge against a Member arise out of a report of a committee, or
examination of witnesses in the House, as the Member knows from that to
what points he is to direct his exculpation, he may be heard to those
points before any question is moved or stated against him. He is then to
be heard, and withdraw before any question is moved. But if the question
itself is the charge, as for breach of order or matter arising in the
debate, then the charge must be stated (that is, the question must be
moved), himself heard, and then to withdraw. 2 Hats., 121, 122.
In 1832, during proceedings for the censure of a Member, the Speaker
informed the Member that he should retire (II, 1366); but this seems to
be an exceptional instance of the enforcement of the law of Parliament.
In other cases, after the proposition for censure or expulsion has been
proposed, Members have been heard in debate, either as a matter of right
(II, 1286), as a matter of course (II, 1246, 1253), by express provision
(II, 1273), and in writing (II, 1273), or by unanimous consent (II,
1275). A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was
asked by the Speaker if he desired to be heard (VI, 236). But a Member
was not permitted to depute another Member to speak in his behalf (II,
1273). In modern practice the Member has been permitted to speak in his
own behalf, both in censure (June 10, 1980, pp. 13802-11) and expulsion
proceedings (Oct. 2, 1980, pp. 28953-78). A Member-elect has been
permitted to participate in debate on a resolution relating to his right
to take the oath (Jan. 10, 1967, p. 23).
[[Page 194]]
Where <<NOTE: Sec. 376. Disqualifying personal interest of a
Member.>> the private interests of a Member are concerned in a bill or
question he is to withdraw. And where such an interest has appeared, his
voice has been disallowed, even after a division. In a case so contrary,
not only to the laws of decency, but to the fundamental principle of the
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause,
it is for the honor of the House that this rule of immemorial observance
should be strictly adhered to. 2 Hats., 119, 121; 6 Grey, 368.
In the House it has not been usual for the Member to withdraw when his
private interests are concerned in a pending measure, but the House has
provided by clause 1 of rule III that the Member shall not vote in such
a contingency. In one instance the Senate disallowed a vote given by a
Senator on a question relating to his own right to a seat; but the House
has never had occasion to proceed so far (V, 5959).
No <<NOTE: Sec. 377. Wearing of hats by Members.>> Member is to come
into the House with his head covered, nor to remove from one place to
another with his hat on, nor is to put on his hat in coming in or
removing, until he be set down in his place. Scob., 6.
In 1837 the parliamentary practice of wearing hats during the session
was abolished by adoption of current clause 5 of rule XVII. See
Sec. 962, infra.
<<NOTE: Sec. 378. Adjournment of questions of order.>> A question of
order may be adjourned to give time to look into precedents. 2 Hats.,
118.
As described in Sec. 628, infra, the Speaker has declined, on a
difficult question of order, to rule until he had taken time for
examination (III, 2725; VI, 432; VII, 2106; VIII, 2174, 2396, 3475), and
may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, especially where not
related to the pending proceedings (VIII, 2174; Apr. 7, 1992, p. 8274).
However, it is conceivable that a case might arise wherein this
privilege of the Chair would require approval of the majority of the
House to prevent arbitrary obstruction of
[[Page 195]]
the pending business by the Chair. The law of Parliament evidently
contemplates that the adjournment of a question of order shall be
controlled by the House. On occasion, the Chair has reversed as
erroneous a decision previously made (VI, 639; VII, 849; VIII, 2794,
3435).
<<NOTE: Sec. 379. House's control over question of the Speaker.>> In
Parliament, all decisions of the Speaker may be controlled by the House.
3 Grey, 319.
The Speaker's decision on a decision of order is subject to appeal by
any Member (clause 5 of rule I).