OVERSEAS SECURITY: HARDENING SOFT TARGETS

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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OVERSEAS SECURITY: HARDENING SOFT TARGETS

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING
THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Duncan, Dent, Kucinich, and Ruppersberger.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, “Overseas Security: Hardening Soft Targets” is called to order.

In 2002 terrorists assassinated an American diplomat in front of his home in Amman, Jordan. Lawrence Foley, an employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development, was a dedicated public servant working to bring economic growth and humanitarian aid to a troubled region. But to his terrorist attackers, he was political symbol and a “soft target.”

Recognizing a growing threat to U.S. personnel, the Department of State has done a great deal to harden embassies and missions. State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, under the leadership of General Charles Williams, has pursued an ambitious, risk-driven program to construct secure new facilities and retrofit or reconfigure older work spaces to reduce vulnerabilities.

But as embassy and consulate compounds are fortified, U.S. Government personnel and their families living and working outside those walls draw the aim of criminals and terrorists looking for the next tier of targets. So hardening official buildings is not enough. The security of soft targets hinges on the harder tasks of building personal awareness and sustaining institutional vigilance. Adding cement to the physical plant is an easy part. Precious lives depend on strengthening protections for America’s human capital abroad.

In a report for the subcommittee released today, the Government Accountability Office [GAO], concludes the State Department has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies
safety and security requirements or the resources needed to better protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats abroad. Despite recommendations by several panels since the late 1980's, programs to enhance security outside the embassy walls remain a porous patchwork. No hands-on antiterrorism training course is required for U.S. personnel and dependents going overseas. Host nation cooperation varies widely. Federal departments and agencies do not effectively or consistently monitor personal security programs.

These desultory efforts are too easily overwhelmed by the powerful human tendency to conclude, “It can’t happen to me,” or “If it’s going to happen, there’s nothing I can do about it.” Defeating the myths of invulnerability and inevitability requires teaching government employees and their families how to recognize threats, how to take reasonable precautions, and how to handle themselves appropriately in menacing situations. Those lessons need to be reinforced regularly as part of a strategic focus that links embassy security and personnel safety to harden today’s soft targets against the very real threats waiting outside.

The horrific terrorist attack on the school in Beslan, Russia last year reminded the world once again that terrorism is blind to moral boundaries. Terrorists recognize no zone of safety for the innocent. American officials and their families abroad must be equipped to maintain a perimeter of personal safety wherever they go.

Despite many studies, numerous recommendations, several efforts and some progress, our witnesses this afternoon will describe just how much must still be done to shield America’s soft target abroad. We look forward to their testimony.

At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
May 10, 2005

In 2002, terrorists assassinated an American diplomat in front of his home in Amman, Jordan. Lawrence Foley, an employee of the U.S. Agency for International Development, was a dedicated public servant working to bring economic growth and humanitarian aid to a troubled region. But to his terrorist attackers, he was political symbol and a “soft target.”

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But as embassy and consulate compounds are fortified, U.S. government personnel and their families living and working outside those walls draw the aim of criminals and terrorists looking for the next tier of targets. So hardening official buildings is not enough. The security of soft targets hinges on the harder tasks of building personal awareness and sustaining institutional vigilance. Adding cement to the physical plant is the easy part. Precious lives depend on strengthening protections for America’s human capital abroad.
In a report for the Subcommittee released today, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concludes the State Department has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements or the resources needed to better protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist threats abroad. Despite recommendations by several panels since the late 1980s, programs to enhance security outside the embassy walls remain a porous patchwork. No hands-on antiterrorism training course is required for U.S. personnel and dependents going overseas. Host nation cooperation varies widely. Federal departments and agencies do not effectively or consistently monitor personal security programs.

These desultory efforts are too easily overwhelmed by the powerful human tendency to conclude, “It can’t happen to me!” or “If it’s going to happen, there’s nothing I can do about it.” Defeating the myths of invulnerability and inevitability requires teaching government employees and their families how to recognize threats, how to take reasonable precautions, and how to handle themselves appropriately in menacing situations. Those lessons need to be reinforced regularly as part of a strategic focus that links embassy security and personnel safety to harden today’s soft targets against the very real threats waiting outside.

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Despite many studies, numerous recommendations, several efforts and some progress, our witnesses this afternoon will describe just how much must still be done to shield America’s soft targets abroad. We look forward to their testimony.
Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this very important hearing.

I am sitting down here only because I have some other meetings set up, so I am not going to be able to stay for the whole hearing. I will stay for as long as I can. Mr. Chairman, I admire the way you handle this subcommittee. I think you are one of the finest chairmen that I have ever worked with in my years in Congress, and you have turned this subcommittee into an extremely important subcommittee dealing with very important topics.

I will say this. We have seen in history, wars started over the killing of one citizen of one nation by a citizen from another nation, so we have to do everything possible to protect our citizens so passions do not become inflamed and so we do not get into wars we should not get into.

On the other hand, I recall Governor Gilmore, who chaired the President's Commission on Terrorism and what to do about it, in his cover letter to the President, he said we must resist the urge to seek total security, because it is not achievable and it will drain resources away from things that are attainable.

So the key question is what does both common sense and intelligence tell us about what is achievable? We cannot protect every American citizen from every conceivable threat that is out there. But what can we do that is realistic, that is cost effective? We need to not just do anything and everything that anybody can think of because it has the word “security” attached to it. I think that is why this hearing is important: what is achievable and what is reasonable at the same time. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I particularly thank you for your very thoughtful words.

Mr. Kucinich, welcome, the ranking member of the subcommittee.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Good afternoon to all of the witnesses.

The safety and security of our Nation's Ambassadors, foreign service officers, civil servants, and their families concern this subcommittee and concern me deeply. The number of incidents of international terrorism against so-called “soft targets” is rising, and Congress should assist the State Department in every way it can so our diplomats can continue their invaluable work of representing America’s values and ideals around the world.

While I believe the State Department is doing all it can to protect its employees abroad, it continues to play fast and loose with the Congress. Mistakes made in last year’s annual survey of international terrorism and the decision by the Department to simply not include the statistics in the report anymore are deeply troubling.

By all accounts, violence around the world is rising sharply. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, there were 651 incidents of terrorist acts last year that killed nearly 2,000 people. Violence directed against Americans and disapproval of our Nation's foreign policy actions are at an all-time high. Those people who are at our embassies are on the front lines. Whether on the battlefield or not, they are on the front lines. They know quite well just how vulnerable of a target they are.
The administration needs to have an open and honest dialog with Congress and the American people concerning the security of those who work overseas for the United States of America. We need to have all of the facts in front of us and we need to hold the State Department accountable for its actions. However, improving overseas security is not just about better counterterrorism strategies, increased surveillance, driver training courses or evacuation drills. The real issue is money and where our priorities lie. The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget request for the Department of Defense is $419.3 billion. Last week Congress approved the $82 billion supplemental for fiscal year 2005 for the Department of Defense for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the fiscal year 2006 budget request for the State Department was just $13.3 billion, or 31 times smaller than that for the Pentagon. No wonder there is no money left over for overseas security, our Nation’s coffers are totally depleted.

The State Department is asking for only $15 million a year to protect soft targets, including just $10 million to increase security at American and international schools abroad. Meanwhile, the Pentagon is asking for $7.8 billion for a missile defense program, a program which has repeatedly failed basic tests and where there is no end to spending in sight. I voted against the President’s request for supplemental funds and am a strong opponent of the missile defense program, but I am a strong proponent of the men and women who serve in the State Department. I have visited many of our embassies. I know the level of dedication of the people who work for our government. I know they are serving this country honorably, and the least we can do is make sure that we provide for their security.

In my opinion, more of these precious resources need to be spent on physical capital modernization, technology and increased resources for public diplomacy at our embassies, consulates, and posts abroad. Too many of our State Department offices overseas are in shabby condition, overcrowded, and lack modern communications technology such as Internet and e-mail. We cannot keep trying to solve 21st-century problems with 20th-century thinking.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I hope this subcommittee is going to do everything it can to protect our diplomatic corps.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to all of the witnesses here today.

The safety and security of all of our nation’s ambassadors, foreign service officers, civil servants, and their families concern me deeply. The number of incidents of international terrorism against these “soft targets” is rising, and Congress should assist the State Department in every way it can so that our diplomats can continue their invaluable work of representing America’s democratic ideals and values around the world.

Yet, while I believe that the State Department is honestly doing all it can to protect its employees abroad, it continues to play fast and loose with the Congress. The mistakes made in last year’s
annual survey of international terrorism, and the decision by the Department to simply not include the statistics in the report anymore are deeply troubling.

By all accounts, violence around the world is rising sharply. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, (hold up report) there were 651 incidents of terrorist acts last year that killed nearly 2,000 people. Violence directed against Americans and disapproval of our nation’s foreign policy actions are at an all-time high. Believe me, those on the front-lines - whether they are on the battlefield or at overseas posts - know quite well just how vulnerable of a target they are.

This Administration needs to have an open and honest dialogue with Congress and with the American people. We need to have all of the facts in front of us, and we need to hold the State Department accountable for its actions.

However, improving overseas security is not just about better counterterrorism strategies, increased surveillance, driver training
courses, or evacuation drills. The real issue here is money, and where our priorities lie.

The President’s Fiscal Year 2006 budget request for the Department of Defense is $419.3 billion. Last week, Congress also approved another $82 billion supplemental for FY 2005 for DoD’s operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On the other hand, the FY 2006 budget request for the Department of State was just $13.3 billion, or 31 times smaller than that for the Pentagon. No wonder there is no money leftover for overseas security - our nations coffers are totally depleted.

The State Department is asking for only $15 million a year to protect soft targets, including just $10 million to increase security at American and international schools abroad. Meanwhile the Pentagon is asking for $7.8 billion for the Missile Defense program - a program that has repeatedly failed basic tests, is conceived to deter an unrealistic threat, and where there is no end to spending in sight. I voted against the President’s request for
supplemental funds, and I am a strong opponent of the missile
defense program.

Rather, in my opinion, more of these precious resources need
to be spent on physical capital modernization, technology, and
increased resources for public diplomacy at our embassies,
consulates, and posts abroad. Too many of State Department
offices overseas are in shabby condition, overcrowded, and lack
modern communications technology such as the Internet and
e-mail. We can’t keep trying to solve 21st century problems with
20th century thinking.

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I
hope that this Committee will delve further into the real reasons
behind the growing security threats to our diplomatic corps. Let’s
re-prioritize our budget so that all of our valuable personnel abroad
are afforded the protections they need.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. SHAYS. The Chair would agree with much of what the ranking member said about the need to spend more. I know that would be welcome on the part of the State Department. And I agree with his comments about the patterns of global terrorism. The report needs to include the statistics and it needs to have those statistics analyzed and tell us what they mean. We have already written to the Secretary voicing that view.

At this time let me just take care, while I have Members here, to be official.

I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I recognize the first panel, Mr. Jess Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade Division, U.S. Government Accountability Office; Mr. Greg Starr, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Countermeasures, Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Foreign Missions, U.S. Department of State; Ambassador Prudence Bushnell, Dean, School of Leadership and Management, the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, U.S. Department of State; and Mr. Keith Miller, Director, Office of Overseas Schools, U.S. Department of State. We welcome all of our panelists and invite them to stand. As you know, we swear in all of our witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I note for the record that all of the witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

We will start with you, Mr. Ford.


STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the report we are releasing today on State’s efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist attacks outside the embassies. U.S. Government officials and their families living and working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1968, 32 embassy officials have been attacked, and 23 fatally, by terrorists outside the embassy.

As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to
focus on soft targets, such as homes, schools and places of worship. Recent terrorist attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia and places of worship in Turkey illustrate the growing threat.

Our report addresses four issues: whether State Department has a strategy for soft target protection; an assessment of State’s efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work; State’s efforts to improve security at schools overseas attended by children of U.S. officials; and issues related to protection of U.S. officials and their families at their residences. I will also discuss the recommendations in our report.

The State Department has a number of programs and activities to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, the State Department has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State Department officials have raised a number of legal, management, and resource challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy but they have agreed one is needed. The Department has indicated to us that they are now in the process of developing such a strategy.

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards against terrorist attacks while employees travel to and from work: counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations in terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside the embassies found officials lacked the necessary hands-on training in such areas as surveillance detection and defensive and evasive driving techniques that could have saved their lives. The investigations recommended that the State Department provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, we found that the State Department has not fully implemented all of these recommendations. For example, State’s hands-on counterterrorism training course is still not required, and Ambassadors, DCMs, and regional security officers are not fully trained to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures.

In addition, the accountability procedures monitoring activities and checklist developed in 2003 designed to promote personal security were not being followed at any of the five posts we visited. In response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in 2003 designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools from terrorist threats. This multi-phase program provides basic security hardware such as shatter-resistant window film, alarms, and radios, and additional protective measures designed based on the threat levels in the country. The first two phases are focused on Department-sponsored schools which have previously received grant funding from the State Department. State has also been provided money to support non-Department-sponsored schools with American students. However, during our visits to the five posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools qualified for security assistance and what resources
would be provided to the schools in which just a few American children are enrolled.

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences is largely designed to deter crime. To reduce the terrorist threat, some posts limit the number of U.S. officials living in a specific apartment building. At the post we visited, surveillance detection teams were used to protect schools in residential areas. Several regional security officers told us the use of surveillance detection teams could provide greater deterrence to potential terrorist attacks. However, State’s current guidance limits the use of surveillance detection teams for these purposes.

We made several recommendations to the State Department designed to improve the safety and security of U.S. officials and their families. We recommended that the State Department develop its soft target strategy to include a determination of the full scope of responsibilities and the legal and financial ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy; that they develop corresponding protection programs and activities and integrate the elements of the soft target strategy into embassy emergency action plans. We also recommended that the State Department bolster its training and compliance procedures to include making counterterrorism training mandatory at critical and high-threat posts.

We also recommended that the State Department fully implement the personal security accountability system in response to the 2003 Accountability Review Board’s report and develop accountability standards that help ensure compliance at all overseas posts.

This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Ford.

[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, “Overseas Security, State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies,” may be found in subcommittee files.]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ford follows:]
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

OVERSEAS SECURITY

State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director
International Affairs and Trade
OVERSEAS SECURITY
State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies

What GAO Found
State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy. They also indicated that they have recently initiated an effort to develop a soft target strategy. As part of this effort, State officials said they will need to address and resolve a number of legal and financial issues.

Three State initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found that the officials lacked the necessary hands-on training to help counter the attack. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. After each of those investigations, State reported to Congress that it planned to implement the recommendations, yet we found that State’s hands-on training course is not required, the accountability procedures have not been effectively implemented, and key embassy officials are not trained to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures.

State initiated a program in 2003 to improve security at schools, but its scope has not yet been fully determined. In fiscal years 2003 and 2004, Congress earmarked $20.0 million for State to address security vulnerabilities against soft targets, particularly at overseas schools. The multipurpose program provides basic security hardware to protect U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-compound employee association facilities from terrorist threats. However, during our visits to posts, regional security officers were unclear about which schools could qualify for security assistance under phase three of the program.

State’s program to protect U.S. officials and their families at their residences is primarily designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware and local guards, which State officials said provide effective deterrence against crime, though only limited deterrence against a terrorist attack. To minimize the risk and consequences of a potential terrorist attack, some posts we visited limited the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, some posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in residential areas.

May 12, 2004

What GAO Recommends
We are recommending that the Secretary of State develop a soft target strategy, develop counterterrorism training for officials, and fully implement the personal security accountability system for embassy officials. State generally agreed with our recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/pu/getDETAIL?GAO-04-468T

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Jim T. Ford at (202) 512-4166 or fordj@gao.gov.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss the report we are releasing today on State Department efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist attacks outside of embassies.1

U.S. government officials and their families living and working overseas are at risk from terrorist threats. Since 1988, 32 embassy officials have been attacked—33 fatally—by terrorists outside the embassy. As the State Department continues to improve security at U.S. embassies, concerns are growing that terrorist groups are likely to focus on "soft" targets—such as homes, schools, and places of worship. Recent terrorist attacks against housing complexes in Saudi Arabia, a school in Russia, and places of worship in Turkey illustrate this growing threat. State-initiated security assessments have further documented this growing concern and recommended that State develop better measures to protect U.S. officials and their families in soft target areas.2

Our report addresses four issues: (1) whether State has a strategy for soft target protection, (2) an assessment of State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and their families against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work, (3) State's efforts to improve security at schools overseas attended by the children of U.S. officials, and (4) issues related to protection of U.S. officials and their families at residences. I will also discuss our recommendations to State and State's response.

For our work on this subject, we reviewed State documents and interviewed State officials in Washington, D.C., and at five posts in four countries. We also attended security briefings available to State officials. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.


Summary

State has a number of programs and activities to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families abroad from terrorist threats outside the embassy. State officials raised a number of legal, management, and resources challenges related to developing and implementing such a strategy, but agreed a strategy was needed. The department is now in the process of developing a soft target strategy.

State has not fully implemented one of the most important safeguards against terrorist attacks while traveling to and from work—counterterrorism training. Three State-initiated investigations into terrorist attacks against U.S. officials outside of embassies found officials lacked the necessary training that could have saved their lives, including surveillance detection and avoidance and defensive and evasive driving techniques. The investigations recommended that State provide hands-on counterterrorism training and implement accountability measures to ensure compliance with personal security procedures. However, we found that State has not fully implemented these recommendations. For example, State’s hands-on counterterrorism training course is still not required, and ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers are not trained to implement State’s counterterrorism procedures.

In addition, the accountability procedures, monitoring, and checklists developed in 2001 designed to promote personal security were not being followed at any of the five posts we visited.

In response to congressional directives, State instituted a program in 2003 designed to improve the protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools and some off-campus employee associations from terrorist threats. The multiphase program provides basic security hardware, such as shatter-resistant window film, alarms, and radars, and additional protective measures based on threat levels and vulnerabilities. The first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have previously received grant funding from the State Department. The third and fourth phases, which are similar to the first and second phases, focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with American students.1 During

1Department-sponsored schools receive direct financial grants from State’s Office of Overseas Schools. There are over 180 department-sponsored schools worldwide.
our visits to five posts, Regional Security Officers were unclear about which schools qualified for security assistance under phase three of the program. Some Regional Security Officers raised questions about whether to fund schools in which just a few American children were enrolled.

State's program to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences is largely designed to deter crime. The Residential Security program includes basic security hardware, such as alarms, shatter-resistant window film, limited access control measures, and local guards. To reduce the terrorist threat, some posts limit the number of U.S. officials living in specific apartment buildings. Moreover, at most of the posts we visited, surveillance detection teams were used to help protect schools and residential areas. Several Regional Security Officers told us that use of surveillance detection teams could provide greater deterrence to potential terrorist attacks.

We are recommending that State, as it develops its soft targets strategy, determine the full scope of its responsibilities and the legal and financial ramifications of securing U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy; develop corresponding protection programs and activities; and integrate elements of the soft targets strategy into embassy emergency action plans. We are also recommending that State bolster its training and compliance procedures, including by making counterterrorism training mandatory and delivered on a prioritized basis, and by fully implementing the personal security accountability system that State agreed to implement in response to the 2003 Accountability Review Board for all embassy officials.

State said it was in general agreement with most of our recommendations and said that it would examine the others.

Background

Although State has not yet formally defined what constitutes a soft target, State Department travel warnings and security officers generally consider soft targets to be places where Americans and other westerners live, congregate, shop, or visit, such as hotels, clubs, restaurants, shopping centers, housing compounds, places of worship, schools, or public recreation events. Travel routes of U.S. government employees are also considered soft targets, based on their history of terrorist attacks.

The State Department is responsible for protecting more than 60,000 government employees, and their family members, who work in embassies and consulates abroad in 180 countries. Although the host nation is
responsible for providing protection to diplomatic personnel and missions under the 1961 Vienna Convention, State has a variety of programs and activities to further protect U.S. officials and family members both inside and outside of the embassy.

Following a terrorist attack that involves serious injury or loss of life or significant destruction of a U.S. government mission, State is required to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB). ARBs investigate the attack and issue a report with recommendations to improve security programs and practices. State is required to report to Congress on actions it has taken in response to ARB recommendations. As of March 2005, there have been 11 ARBs convened since the board's establishment in 1986.

Concerned that State was not providing adequate security for U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, the American Foreign Service Association testified on a number of occasions before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary on the need for State to expand its security measures. The subcommittee, in its 2002 and subsequent reports, urged State to formulate a strategy for addressing threats to locales abroad that are frequented by U.S. officials and their families. It focused its concern about soft targets on schools, residences, places of worship, and other popular gathering places.

In fiscal years 2001, 2004, and 2005, Congress earmarked a total of $15 million for soft target protection each year, particularly to address security vulnerabilities at overseas schools. Moreover, in 2003, the Senate Appropriations report directed State to develop a comprehensive strategy for addressing the threats posed to soft targets no later than June 1, 2005.

State Lacks a Strategy to Cover Soft Target Areas; Key Issues Need to Be Resolved

State has a number of programs and activities designed to protect U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy, including security briefings, protection at schools and residences, and surveillance detection. However, State has not developed a comprehensive strategy that clearly identifies safety and security requirements and resources needed to protect U.S. officials and their families.

For fiscal year 2005, Congress earmarked up to $15 million in the Overseas Buildings Operations appropriations to address security vulnerabilities of soft targets. State set aside $5 million to conduct a review of the security of all overseas schools attended by children of nonmilitary U.S. government employees. Of the fiscal year 2005 earmark, $10 million is for security at overseas schools attended by dependents of U.S. government employees.
State officials cited several complex issues involved with protecting soft targets. As the terrorist threat grows, State is being asked to provide ever greater levels of protection to more people in more dangerous locations, and they questioned how far State's protection of soft targets should extend. They said that providing U.S. government funds to protect U.S. officials and their families at private sector locations or places of worship was unprecedented and raised a number of legal and financial challenges—including sovereignty and separation of church and state—that have not been resolved by the department. State officials also indicated they have not yet fully defined the universe of soft targets—including taking an inventory of potentially vulnerable facilities and areas where U.S. officials and their families congregate—that would be necessary to complete a strategy.

Although State has not developed a comprehensive soft target strategy, some State officials told us that several existing programs could help protect soft targets. However, they agreed that these existing programs are not tied together in an overall strategy. State officials agreed that they should undertake a formal evaluation of how existing programs can be more effectively integrated as part of a soft target strategy, and whether new programs might be needed to fill any potential gaps.

A senior official with State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) told us that in January 2005, DS formed a working group to develop a comprehensive soft targets strategy to address the appropriate level of protection of U.S. officials and their families at schools, residences, and other areas outside the embassy. According to State, the strategy should be completed by June 1, 2006.

State Has Not Fully Implemented ARB Training and Accountability Recommendations to Improve Security for Embassy Personnel

To identify vulnerabilities in State's soft target protection, and determine if State has corrected these vulnerabilities, we reviewed the ARB reports conducted after U.S. officials were assassinated outside the embassy. Of the 11 ARBs conducted since 1996, the majority (5) have focused on soft target attacks, compared with attacks against embassies (2) or other U.S. facilities (4). We found that, 17 years after the first soft target ARB, State has still not addressed the vulnerabilities and recommendations identified in that and more recent reports: specifically, the need for hands-on counterterrorism training and accountability mechanisms to promote compliance with personal security procedures. Despite State's assurances to Congress that it would implement recommendations aimed at reducing these vulnerabilities, we found that State's hands-on training course is still not mandatory, and procedures to monitor compliance with security...
requirements have not been fully implemented. We also found that ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, and regional security officers were not trained in how to implement embassy procedures intended to protect U.S. officials outside the embassies.

Despite State’s Agreement That Counterterrorism Training Is Needed, It Is Still Not Required

Since 1998, State has reported to Congress that it agreed with ARB recommendations to provide counterterrorism training. For example, in 1995, State reported that it “re-established the Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Course (DSAC) for those going to critical-threat posts to teach surveillance detection and avoidance, and defensive and evasive driving techniques.” In 2001, State reported it agreed with the recommendations that employees from all agencies should receive security briefings and indicated that it would review the adequacy of its training and other personal security measures.

Although State implemented the board’s recommendation to require security briefings for all staff, hands-on counterterrorism training is still not mandatory, and few officials or family members have taken DSAC.

Senior DS officials said they recognize that security briefings are no longer adequate to protect against current terrorist threats. In June 2004, DS developed a proposal to make DSAC training mandatory. DS officials said that DSAC training should be required for all officials, but that issues such as costs and adequacy of training facilities were constraining factors. As of April 15, 2005, the proposal had not been approved.

Although State has agreed on the need to implement an accountability system to promote compliance with personal security procedures since 1998, there is still no such system in place. Beginning in 2003, State has tried to incorporate some limited accountability to promote compliance. However, based on our work at five posts, we found that post officials are following few, if any, of these new procedures.

In response to a 2000 ARB, State took a number of steps to improve compliance with State’s personal security procedures for officials outside the embassy. In June 2003, State revised its annual assessment criteria to take personal security into account when preparing performance appraisals, and in December 2000, State revised its Foreign Affairs Manual to mandate and improve implementation of personal security practices. In May 2004, State notified posts worldwide on use of a Personal Security Self-Assessment Checklist to improve security outside the embassy. However, none of the posts we visited were even aware of these and other key policy changes. For example, none of the officials we met with,...
including ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, regional security officers, or staff, were aware that the annual ratings process now includes an assessment of whether staff are following the personal security measures or that managers are now responsible for the reasonable oversight of subordinates' personal security activities. Furthermore, none of the supervisors were aware of the checklist, and we found no one was using the checklists to improve their personal security practices.

In explaining why posts were not aware of the new personal security regulations, DS officials noted that posts were often overwhelmed by work and may have simply missed the cables and changes in the Foreign Affairs Manual. They also noted that changes like this take time to be implemented globally.

Furthermore, State's original plan, to use the checklist as an accountability mechanism, was dropped before it was implemented. In its June 2003 report to Congress on implementation of the 2003 ARB recommendations, State stipulated that staff would be required to use the checklist periodically and that managers would review the checklists to ensure compliance. However, State never implemented this accountability mechanism out of concern it would consume too much staff time.

We also found that key officials receive no training on how to promote personal security outside the embassy. According to a number of State officials, improvements in this area must start with the ambassador and the deputy chief of mission. Yet no ambassadors, deputy chiefs of mission, or regional security officers receive any training in how to maximize soft target protection at embassies. DS officials agreed that this critical component should be added to their training curriculum.

State Develops Soft Targets Program for Schools, but Scope Is Not Yet Fully Defined

In response to several congressional committee reports, State began developing a "Soft Targets" program in 2003 to help protect overseas schools against terrorism. The program has four proposed phases. The first two phases are focused on department-sponsored schools that have previously received grant funding from the State Department, and the third and fourth phases focus on the nondepartment-sponsored schools with American students.

In phase one, department-sponsored schools were offered funding for basic security hardware such as shattered resistant window film, two-way radios for communication between the school and the embassy, and public address systems. As of November 19, 2004, 189 department-sponsored...
schools had received $10.5 million in funding for security equipment in phase one of the program. The second phase provided additional security enhancements, such as perimeter fencing, walls, lighting, gates, and guard booths. As of November 2004, State has obligated over $16 million for phase two security upgrades. For phases three and four, State plans to provide similar types of security upgrades to eligible nondepartment-sponsored schools.

The program also funds security enhancements for off-campus embassy employee association facilities, such as recreation centers. Security upgrades include funding for perimeter walls and shatter-resistant windows.

In fiscal year 2004, almost $1 million was obligated for these enhancements.

Full Scope of School Program Not Yet Determined

Regional Security Officers (RSO) said that identifying and funding for security enhancements at department-sponsored schools were straightforward because of the department’s pre-existing relationship with these schools. However, they said it has been difficult to identify eligible nondepartment-sponsored schools for phase three because of the vast number of schools that might qualify, the lack of any pre-existing relationship, and limited guidance on eligibility criteria. For example, some RSOs questioned how many American students should attend a school for it to be eligible for security upgrades. Some RSOs were considering funding schools with just a few American students. Moreover, one RSO was considering providing security upgrades to informal educational facilities, such as those attended by children of U.S. missionaries.

State is trying to determine the appropriate scope of the program, and sent cables to posts in the summer of 2004 asking RSOs to gather data on nondepartment-sponsored schools attended by American students, particularly U.S. government dependents. State officials acknowledged that the process of gathering data has been difficult since there are hundreds of such schools worldwide. According to an Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) official, as of December 2004, only about 81 out of the more than 250 posts have provided responses regarding such schools. OBO plans to use the data to develop criteria for which schools might be eligible for funding under phase three and, eventually, phase four of the program.

In anticipation of any future phases of the Soft Targets program, RSOs have been asked to identify other facilities and areas that Americans
frequently, beyond schools and off-campus employee association facilities, that may be vulnerable to a terrorist attack. State Department officials were concerned about the large number of sites RSOs could identify as potential soft target sites, and the department's ability to protect them.

**Issues Related to the Protection of U.S. Officials and Their Families at Residences against Terrorist Threats**

State has a responsibility for providing a secure housing environment for U.S. officials and their families overseas. However, we found that State's primary program in place to protect U.S. officials and their families at residences, the Residential Security program, is principally designed to deter crime, not terrorism. The program includes basic security hardware and guard service; and as the crime threat increases, the hardware and guard services can be correspondingly increased at the residences. State officials said that while the Residential Security program, augmented by the local guard program, provides effective deterrence against crime, it could provide limited or no deterrence to minimize the risk and consequences of a residential terrorist attack. State officials told us that the best residential scenario for posts is to have a variety of housing options, including apartments and single-family homes, to reduce the potential for a catastrophic attack.

To provide greater protection against terrorist attacks, most posts we visited used surveillance detection teams in the residential areas. The program is intended to enhance the embassies' ability to detect preoperational terrorist surveillance and stop the attack. According to State's guidance, surveillance detection units are primarily designed to protect embassies, and their use in residential areas is discouraged. However, we found RSOs at some of the posts we visited were routinely utilizing surveillance detection units to cover areas outside the embassies, such as residences, school bus stops and routes, and schools attended by U.S. embassy dependents. RSOs told us that the Surveillance Detection program is instrumental in providing deterrence against potential terrorist attacks, and argued that the current program guidelines are too restrictive. Senior State officials agreed that the use of the surveillance detection in soft target areas could be beneficial, but noted that the

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2. The guidelines allow posts to use surveillance detection in areas besides the embassy and key residences, but only if there are specific threats present at these locations.
program is labor intensive and expensive, and any expansion of the program could require significant funding.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

For questions regarding this testimony, please call Diana Glod at (202) 512-8445. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Edward George and Andrea Miller.
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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Starr.

STATEMENT OF GREG STARR

Mr. STARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is the statement limited to 5 minutes?

Mr. SHAYS. No, we let it roll over another 5 and you will be gav-eled down at 10.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be before you today with my distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Bushnell, Keith Miller, and Jess Ford from GAO.

I would first like to say we appreciate the GAO's report and the hard work that went into this effort. Prior to addressing the report’s findings, I believe it would be useful to provide the subcommittee some background information on our global security programs to put the soft targets program into perspective.

For many years, but especially since the East African bombings, diplomatic security, and many other elements, the Department of State has rolled out a robust array of security and counterterrorism programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and our personnel and our families overseas.

The modern incarnation of the diplomatic security service and vast majority of our programs originated with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Attack Act of 1986.

Our efforts were reenergized following the East Africa bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. The tragic attacks of September 2001 are often referred to as the event that catapulted terrorism into the forefront of U.S. policy. However, our real call to action was the 1998 bombings of our embassies. Funding and legislation following those acts provided many of the tools we use today to address global terrorism against U.S. officials, facilities, and our families abroad.

A linchpin of our overall strategy has been programs to harden our embassies and consulates, seen as the traditional symbols of U.S. overseas presence. We used funding in 1999, 2000, and 2001 to implement security upgrades and enhancement of our facilities to the extent possible, but we simply could not erase critical vulnerabilities such as lack of setback and weak-blast resistance. Since then, we have engaged in long-term capital construction program, which members discussed, which is generously funded by Congress to replace 180 of our most vulnerable facilities. American embassies and consulates are more than just symbolic targets, they are essential platforms from which we conduct diplomacy, consular affairs, commerce and trade, security, law enforcement, global health issues, and a myriad of other national security programs in foreign countries.

As the administration and Congress have so aptly recognized, protection of the homeland needs to start abroad, not just at our borders. Although historically the vast majority of catastrophic attacks and threats tend to be aimed at our official facilities, al Qaeda and other terror groups will attack soft targets when other more hardened assets prove too difficult.

Well before the global al Qaeda threat, we implemented programs to protect and educate our foreign and civil service officers,
their family members, and private American citizens on the terrorist threats overseas. These programs are not solely managed by my service, Diplomatic Security, but cut across many Department elements and continue to be refined today to address the global threat against our interests.

Many of these programs lie outside the scope of the GAO report before you, but they deserve mention in your consideration of the overall security posture. A critical element of our program to protect our employees, their families and official facilities, and a key element of our soft target strategy, is our security law enforcement and intelligence relationship with host government entities. Host country police, security, and intelligence forces are in many instances the first line of defense in protecting us against potential threats. Cultivating and developing liaison relationships with host government security services is a core function of regional security officers and other elements within the mission.

RSOs spend a great deal of time and energy working on improving the capabilities of the local police. In many locations, the police and security services are excellent; but overall, the capabilities are uneven. The diplomatic security Antiterrorist Assistance Program, or ATA, is an essential element in helping partner countries combat terrorism with the training, equipment and technology they need to carry the fight to the terrorists. ATA training for host government security officials not only helps to ensure the safety of our American diplomats, but all Americans traveling into these countries.

When we look to our own security resources, we start with the offices of the regional security officers. Today we have 500 RSOs at nearly 200 missions worldwide. Many of these positions were created following lessons learned from the East African bombings. Each RSO serves as the professional adviser to the chief of mission on all security matters, and together with the chief of mission, they are responsible under law and regulation for the security of the personnel under their charge.

One of the most important functions an RSO performs is developing post-specific briefings and security programs tailored to the threat environment. Every diplomatic mission has thoroughly researched and categorized threat ratings for transnational terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, counterintelligence and technical intelligence threats. The first four drive resources for security programs on everything from residential security and local guards to the surveillance detection programs, protection of key mission officials, extensive briefings for staff and families, private sector liaison, and physical security of all of facilities, armored vehicles, and staffing levels. RSOs serve on the Emergency Action Committee at every post and play a core role in the development of these emergency action plans. The emergency action plans play prominently in deciding how posts and the Department address all types of situations and threats. In today's world, the plan covers a wide spectrum, including terrorist threats and bombings, chemical, biological or radiological incidents, aviation and natural disasters, authorized or ordered departures, and post evacuations.
These plans are exercised at our missions and are routinely part of the post-specific security briefing program for employees and family members. Overseas schools have always been closely linked with the overall security of the missions, and we expect this relationship to grow even closer. Overseas schools attended by family members are now being formally added to our emergency action plans, and future post-specific emergency action plans will include physical security features, security plans and procedures and emergency drills at the schools themselves.

It is telling that in a recent study by the Foreign Service Institute, 87 percent of our officers and families serving overseas for 15 years or more will have served at a post that has experienced a crisis as we define them in our emergency action plans. We do not exercise because something might happen, we exercise because crises will happen.

Turning specifically to the GAO report, the recommendations, and the protection programs for personnel when they are not in an embassy or consulate. The Department has commenced several new programs and enhanced existing ones based on our experiences, results from accountability review boards, inspector general recommendations, and in response to the advice given to us from GAO.

We deeply appreciate the past and continued support of Congress in this ongoing effort. In this GAO report entitled “State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect Americans Outside the Embassy,” GAO is stating we could do more. GAO is correct, and has identified in its recommendations a few key areas that we can improve on.

However, I believe it is important to provide some clarification of the existing programs that we have in place to give you a sense of the importance we attach to the issue, the time we spend on it, the level of effort and funding it takes to protect our employees and families overseas in places other than hardened facilities.

In the past 7 years, we have accomplished the following: delivered over 1,500 armored vehicles to our posts overseas to provide the ability to transport our people in safety in heightened threat conditions; instituted a comprehensive chemical, biological, and radiological protection program, providing escape masks and equipment for our overseas personnel; provided local guards, roaming patrols and react teams at our residences according to the threat readings, costing in excess of $100 million a year.

Let me skip to one part that we must discuss, and that is the management of security issues and crisis management that stems from the top, the chief of mission. Every Ambassador and Consul General today understands his security responsibilities. Emergency action plans are implemented almost weekly in some corner of the world, and one of the most important tools and visible signs of the efforts made to protect our employees and families are the evacuations.

When the threat is too high, trip wires are crossed, or political violence or local instability too dangerous, we move nonessential families and employees out of harm’s way. On average, regrettably, we have one authorized or ordered departure from a post every 3 ½ weeks for the past 16 years. A sign of the times is the large num-
ber of posts we currently have in drawdown or unaccompanied sta-
tus.

Beyond that, sir, let me skip to the one recommendation I think we must agree with from GAO which is that we have to move from a system of briefing our personnel to training our personnel. It is a sign of the times that we believe we must increase the trade craft that we give our people, and give them better tools when they go overseas.

The terrorism threat against our people and facilities remains high. We must equip our people to respond to that.

I think I will cut it at that point.

Mr. SHAYS. Is there anything that you left out that is important to share?

Mr. STARR. I will be happy to address your questions after opening statements.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
Opening Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary [redacted] before
House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations
May 10, 2005

Good Afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee -- I am
honored to appear before you today with my distinguished colleagues,
Ambassador Prudence Bushnell and the Director of Overseas Schools Keith
Miller, to speak on the issue of protection of U.S. Officials under Chief of
Mission authority and their dependents from terrorist attacks outside of
embassies.

I would first like to say that we appreciate the GAO’s report and the
hard work that went into this effort. The report has required nearly a year to
research and publish, extensive meetings with Department of State officials,
and visits to half a dozen posts overseas. We have closely examined the
contents and recommendations of the report in draft and have provided
feedback to GAO. I will detail some of our observations during my oral
presentation.

Prior to addressing the report’s findings, I believe it would be useful
to provide the Committee some background information on our global
security programs. For many years, but especially since the East African embassy bombings, Diplomatic Security (DS) and many other elements of the Department of State have rolled out a robust array of security and counter-terrorism programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and our personnel and families serving abroad.

The modern incarnation of the Diplomatic Security Service and the vast majority of our global security programs originated with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. Our efforts were re-energized following the East Africa bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar-Es-Salam in 1998. The tragic attacks of September 2001 are often referred to as the event that catapulted terrorism into the forefront of U.S. policy, but our real call to action was the 1998 bombings of our embassies. Funding and legislation following these acts provided many of the tools we use today to address global terrorism against U.S. officials and facilities abroad.

A lynchpin in our overall strategy has been programs to harden of our embassies and consulates, seen as the traditional symbols of U.S. overseas presence. In 1999, 2000, and 2001 we used emergency funding from Congress to implement security upgrades and enhancements at our facilities to the extent possible, but we simply could not erase critical vulnerabilities
such as lack of setback and weak blast resistance. Since then we have engaged in a long-term capital construction security program, generously funded by the Congress, to replace 180 of our most vulnerable facilities worldwide. American Embassies and Consulates are more than just symbolic targets. They are the essential platforms from which we conduct diplomacy, consular affairs, commerce and trade, security, law enforcement, global health issues, and myriad other national security programs in foreign countries. As the Administration and Congress have so aptly recognized, protection of the homeland needs to start abroad, not just at our borders.

Although historically the vast majority of catastrophic attacks and threats tend to be aimed at our official facilities, Al Qa’ida and other terror groups will attack “soft” targets when other more hardened assets prove too difficult. Well before the global Al Qa’ida threat, we implemented programs overseas to protect and educate our foreign and civil service officers, their family members and private American citizens on the terrorist threat. These programs are not solely managed by DS but cut across many Department elements, and continue to be refined to address today’s global threat against U.S. interests. Many of these programs lie outside the scope of the GAO report before you, but they deserve mention in your consideration of our overall security posture.
A critical element of our program to protect our employees, their families and our official facilities, and a key element of our soft targets strategy, is our security, law enforcement and intelligence relationship with host government entities. Host country police, security, and intelligence forces are in many instances the first line of defense in protecting us against potential threats. Cultivating and developing liaison relationships with host government security services is a core function of our Regional Security Officers (RSO) and other elements within the mission. RSOs spend a great deal of time and energy working on improving the capabilities of the local police. In many locations the police and security services are excellent, but overall the capabilities are uneven.

The Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance program or ATA is an essential element in helping partner countries combat terrorism with the training, equipment and technology they need to carry the fight to the terrorist. ATA training for host government security officials not only helps to ensure the safety of our American diplomats, but all Americans traveling into these countries.

When we look to our own security resources, we start with offices of the Regional Security Officers. Today we have 500 RSOs at nearly 200 missions worldwide. Many of these positions were created following the
“lessons learned” from the East African embassy bombings. Each RSO serves as the professional advisor to the Chief of Mission on all security matters, and together with the Chief of Mission they are responsible under law and regulation for the security of personnel under their charge. One of the most important functions an RSO performs is developing post-specific briefings and security programs tailored to the threat environment. Every diplomatic mission has thoroughly researched and categorized threat ratings for transnational terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, and counterintelligence and technical intelligence threats. The first four drive resources for security programs on everything from residential security and local guards to surveillance detection, protection of key mission officials, extensive briefings for staff and families, private sector liaison, physical security of all facilities, armored vehicles, and staffing levels. RSOs serve on the Emergency Action Committee at every post and play a core role in the development of post Emergency Action Plans. The emergency plans play prominently in deciding how posts and the Department address all types of situations and threats. In today’s world, the plan covers a wide spectrum, including terrorist threats and bombings, chemical, biological, or radiological incidents, aviation and natural disasters, authorized or ordered departures, and post evacuations. These plans are
exercised at our missions and are routinely part of the post-specific security-briefing program for employees and family members. Overseas schools have always been linked closely with the overall security of missions, and we expect this relationship to grow even closer. Overseas schools attended by mission family members are now being formally added to our Emergency Action Plans, and future post specific emergency plans will include physical security features, vulnerability, security plans and procedures and emergency drills at the schools. It is telling that in a recent study by the Foreign Service Institute, 87% of our officers and families serving overseas for 15 years or more have served at a post that has experienced a crisis as we define them in our emergency action plans. We don’t exercise because something might happen – we exercise because crisis will happen.

Let me turn now specifically to the GAO report, the recommendations, and the protection programs for our personnel when they are not in an embassy or consulate. The Department has commenced several new programs and enhanced existing ones based on our experiences, results from accountability review boards, Inspector General recommendations, and in response to advice given to us from the GAO. We deeply appreciate the past and continued support of Congress in this ongoing effort. In this GAO report entitled “STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT FULLY
IMPLEMENTED KEY MEASURES TO PROTECT AMERICANS OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY,” GAO is stating that we could do more. GAO is correct, and has identified in its recommendations a few key areas that we can improve on. However, I believe it’s important to provide some clarification of the existing programs that we have in place, to give you a sense of the importance we attach to this issue, the time we spend on it, and the level of effort and funding it takes to protect our employees and families overseas in places other than the hardened facilities.

In the past seven years we have accomplished the following:

--Delivered over 1,500 armored vehicles to our posts overseas, to provide the ability to transport our people safely in heightened threat conditions;
--Instituted a comprehensive chemical/biological/radiological protection program, providing escape masks and equipment for our personnel overseas, and the training necessary to use the equipment;
--Provided local guards, roving patrols, and react teams at our residences according to threat ratings, costing in excess of $100,000,000 this year.
Provided residential security upgrades to over 13,000 residences overseas, including grills, security doors, alarms, and lighting. These residential security upgrades are based upon the threat environment at the post.

Funded grants to upgrade security at 181 of 189 schools where dependents of American children attend, providing shatter resistant window film, public address warning systems, radio communications to the embassy, and more robust physical security upgrades.

Commenced a worldwide surveillance detection program, which while normally focusing on our official facilities, are available to be reprogrammed to non-official facilities to address local the threat environment;

Enhanced the Crisis Management Exercise program with support from the Foreign Service Institute;

Conducted 28 Mobile Training visits to 68 posts since 2003. This training, provided to all members of the Embassy community, addresses a wide range of defensive measures that employee's can use to counter and respond to incidents of crime, terrorism and emergency medical response.

OBO has expended over $10,000,000 on long-term residential security improvements since 2003. We also funded and completed security
enhancements to 23 off-compound employee recreation associations since 2004.

As these programs attest, we understand that terrorists do not only target our hardened facilities. Our philosophy remains that we must have overlapping and complementary security layers in order to have a truly effective security program.

There is yet one more level that I must discuss, and that is the management of security issues and crisis management that stems from the top, the Chief of Mission. Every Ambassador and Consul General today understands his/her security responsibilities thoroughly. Emergency action plans are implemented almost weekly in some corner of the world, and one of the most important tools and visible signs of the efforts made to protect our employees and families are evacuations. When the threat is too high, tripwires crossed, or political violence or local instability too dangerous, we move non-essential employees and families out of harms way. Our average, regrettably, has been one authorized or ordered departure from a post every three and a half weeks during the past 16 years. A sign of the times is the large number of posts we currently have in draw-down or unaccompanied status, and this is likely to continue for some time.
Our personnel overseas have already remained at a heightened threat status since 1998. We have taken significant steps to harden our facilities and prepare our personnel for a wide variety of contingencies ranging from suicide car bombings and anthrax contamination to an attack on a soft target. In the near and mid-term, we see the global terror threat against U.S. interest abroad continuing. I have identified many of the steps we have taken to secure our official facilities, our personnel, and to protect them in soft target environments. Much has been accomplished to detect and deter the threat. However, as the GAO report points out, hands-on training is a vital component for an effective security program. The Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course, or DSAC, is an elective course offered to our officers who are assigned to critical threat level posts. In 2003 and 2004, 239 officers attended this course which will be offered seven times this summer. With the advent of Iraq operations, we modified the course to Iraq specific considerations and made it mandatory for anyone serving under the Chief of Mission in Iraq. Since December of 2003, 1193 personnel have attended 67 offerings of this course. We received almost immediate feedback which indicated the training was timely, necessary and on target. It has already saved lives, and the consensus among various Department elements is that the dangers of serving abroad in this age will increasingly require training,
as opposed to briefings, to prepare our employees and families properly. The ability to stand up such courses and train the high numbers of personnel going to vulnerable environments requires resources. We continue to expand FSI and DS training for Department personnel across a full range of security and crisis management areas. High threat training for DS personnel assigned to war zones and critical threat terrorist areas is now mandatory. Post specific security training and briefing programs are also a core element of a mission’s overall security program. In addition, a “soft target protection” module has been incorporated into RSO training and the Department is adding similar training to FSI’s Ambassadorial and Deputy Chief of Mission training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

The terrorism threat against our people and facilities remains high. Our government has rolled out a robust strategy to root our terror and the sources of terror wherever it has taken hold, but this likely will be a protracted battle. Our diplomats are in the front lines of this fight, and the Department, our overseas missions and the intelligence community must continuously evaluate threat information to include threats against soft targets. The foreign policy priorities of our Nation require us to work in some of the world’s most dangerous security environments. We are
constantly looking for ways to improve and make our personnel and their families safer. The Department’s long-range Capital Security Building Program, our physical and technical security upgrades and additional enhanced training programs are all means to accomplish this task.

I’ll be happy to address your questions once my colleagues complete their opening comments. Thank you for your time today.
Mr. SHAYS. I do want to say, I don’t think the GAO said you could do more, I think they were saying you must do more.

Mr. STARR. We must, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador Bushnell, were you in Kenya during the time of the attack?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. That’s correct. I was the U.S. Ambassador at the time.

Mr. SHAYS. So this is more than just theory.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR PRUDENCE BUSHNELL

Ambassador BUSHNELL. This is more than just theory. I thank you for inviting me to testify. This is the first time I have been asked to do so since al Qaeda bombed the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. I greatly appreciate your attention to the issue of overseas security, and I would like to give you a summary of my written testimony.

While the GAO report addresses so-called soft targets, and its recommendations, if implemented, would strengthen overseas security in general, an attack on family members or employees serving under chief-of-mission authority is a nightmare beyond belief, whether it occurs at a hard or a soft-target.

Nairobi was a case in point. The bomb that exploded in our parking lot on August 7 killed 213 people instantly and wounded 5,000 more. We suffered a 50 percent casualty rate in the embassy, and the remaining 50 percent had no 911, no police, no fire department, no rescue squad and no ambulance. Kenya, like over half the countries to which Department personnel are assigned, is a developing country. On a normal day, medical facilities are inadequate. On August 7, they were overwhelmed.

Survivors in our building, including a high school student and a college intern, regrouped on the front steps and voluntarily returned to what was a death trap to tend to the injured, dig colleagues out of the rubble and carry out the dead. For the first critical 24 hours, we were alone on our own. The heroism of the entire community was extraordinary, and I think you would have been as proud as I was.

Although American employees of the embassy were given the opportunity to curtail their assignments, an option unavailable to our Kenya colleagues, few chose to leave. Instead, some of the wounded returned, often with shards of glass still embedded in them. We lost two moms, and their surviving children remained in school. Trauma and sorrow permeated the community. Absent counseling and other services available at home, parents, students, teachers, and community members relied upon one another for support and healing.

The impact of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombing circled the globe. The U.S. foreign affairs community is a small one, and work is not just a job, it is a family commitment. So August 1998 for us was September 11th.

Since that day, the Foreign Service Institute and other elements of the Department of State have done much to prepare people to live in a far more dangerous world. All American entry-level employees receive basic security training incorporated in orientation programs for civil and foreign service employees and locally en-
gaged staff, including foreign service nationals. Employees from other agencies attend the mandatory introduction to working in an embassy course.

Security and crisis management training is also embedded in all of FSI’s, the Foreign Service Institute’s trade craft classes, including those provided to foreign service nationals. For senior-level employees, we have created a crisis leadership seminar which focuses specifically on the skills necessary during a crisis, and we are planning a similar one for mid-level employees.

The security overseas seminar which concentrates on life in overseas environment, is mandatory for all Federal employees and recommended for eligible family members. A similar age-appropriate program, Young SOS, is offered to young family members grades 2–12. At post, people receive briefings tailored to the host country, as well as hands-on training for briefing teams out of Washington. In addition, crisis management teams fan out across the world to help emergency action committees exercise their emergency plans biannually.

With our encouragement, foreign service nationals are participating. Where we can, we also include overseas schools and appropriate host government officials.

Are we satisfied that we are doing is enough? No. The GAO report makes the point that more rigorous DSAC training should become mandatory for everyone going to critical threat posts, and I agree. Colleagues have raised additional discussions, such as more defensive and evasive driving training because road accidents remain the No. 1 source of death overseas amongst Americans, better preparation for chemical or biological attacks, and greater coverage of emergency procedures.

As the GAO report points out, leadership is key. Counterterrorism, security and crisis-management issues take up more than any single topic at both the Ambassadorial and DCM seminars. Chief of missions are explicitly advised in the letter from the President, “I expect you to take direct and full responsibility for the security of your mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible, whether inside or outside the chancery.” Everyone takes this very seriously.

The Ambassadorial seminar emphasizes that responsibility and the leadership role of the chief of mission and spouse toward the entire community not just within the embassy. Attention to the institutions that support the community, such as schools or employee-sponsored recreation clubs, comes with that role.

For the 2005 series of Ambassadorial seminars, we have redesigned the aspect of the program devoted to security, counterterrorism and crisis management, and we will continue to refine the design.

Embassy leadership is now more aware and better prepared for crises than we were in the past. No one wants to go to the number of funerals and memorial services my colleagues and I attended; and if we do, we want to be able to truthfully say “I did my very best” when we look into the eyes of grieving survivors and family members.
The incremental changes offered by the GAO report will, I think, improve security, but I would like to suggest three more profound challenges.

One, finding the right balance between living vigilantly and normally. People do not stay on high alert for long periods of time. Scare tactics are ultimately self-defeating, and administrative mandates such as checklists risk becoming rote exercises. To use a metaphor, our challenge is to ensure people are looking both ways before they cross the street, becoming neither paralyzed nor indifferent to the oncoming traffic.

Two, maintaining a consistency of funding and attention to security issues. In his report to Congress in 1998, Admiral Crowe noted that, “The boards were especially disturbed by the collective failure of the U.S. Government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world. Responsibility for this failure can be attributed to several administrations and their agencies, including the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the U.S. Congress.”

The times have changed, thank heaven, since that report was written. I appreciate Congress’ support of the Department and the security of its people, and I fervently hope it will continue.

No. 3, changing the ethos and the image of the Department of State. Today, 64 percent of Department employees overseas and 87 percent of foreign service generalists with 15 years or more of service can count on experiencing evacuation, civil unrest, kidnapping, natural disasters, assassination, terrorist attacks, biochemical attacks, and other crises listed in the foreign affairs handbooks, and yet the old stereotype of Department employees as men in striped pants, which I saw recently in an article, continue. We have to change that perception.

My colleagues are fiercely patriotic, willing to put themselves and their families at risk in order to make a difference on behalf of the American people. They deserve to thrive. At the very least, they deserve our best efforts to keep them safe.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate what you are doing and hope we can continue to count on you and your fellow subcommittee members as our partners and our advocates. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bushnell follows:]
Testimony before the
House Government Reform Subcommittee
On National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
by
Condoleezza Rice
Dean, Leadership and Management School
Foreign Service Institute
May 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Kucinich, good afternoon. I am a career member of the Senior Foreign Service and currently the Dean of the Leadership and Management School of the Foreign Service Institute. Prior to this assignment, I served as the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Guatemala and, before that, to the Republic of Kenya. Thank you for inviting me to testify, the first time I have been asked to do so since the Al Qaeda bombing of the American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. I appreciate your attention to the issue of overseas security.

While the GAO Report addresses so-called “soft targets,” its recommendations would, if implemented, strengthen overseas security in general. An attack on family members or employees serving under Chief of Mission authority is a nightmare beyond belief, whether it occurs at a “hard” or “soft” target. When bad things happen in a foreign country far from home, the trauma is often magnified, and its impact goes far beyond effects on immediate victims and survivors.

Nairobi was a case in point. The bomb that exploded in our parking lot killed 213 people instantly and wounded 5,000 more. In the embassy, we suffered a 50% casualty rate. The remaining 50% had no 911 to call, no police or fire department to rely upon, no rescue squad or ambulances to contact. Kenya, like over half of the countries to which Department personnel are assigned, is a developing country. On a normal day, medical facilities are inadequate. On August 7, 1998, they were overwhelmed. Survivors in our building, including a high school student and a college intern, regrouped on the front steps and voluntarily returned to what was a death trap to tend to the injured, dig colleagues out of the rubble, and carry out the dead. For the first critical 24 hours, we were on our own. The heroism of the entire community was extraordinary. I think you would have been as proud as I was.
When help finally arrived, it came like fury -- hundreds of investigators, rescue workers and international press. Later, American and Foreign Service National colleagues also joined us to help put the pieces of our organization back together. Although American employees of the embassy were given the opportunity to curtail their assignments -- an option unavailable to our Kenyan colleagues -- few chose to leave. Instead, some of the wounded returned, often with shards of glass still imbedded in them. Two of the people who had died in the bombing were Moms. Their surviving spouses decided to stay, unwilling to subject their children to further stress by uprooting them from their friends and school. Trauma and sorrow permeated the community. Absent counseling and other services available at home, parents, students, teachers, colleagues and community members relied upon one another for support and healing. No one left Nairobi untouched.

The impact of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings circled the globe. Protecting and representing the United States overseas is not just a job for us, it is a family commitment. We are a small Service and we know one another, so when something happens, it affects all of us. For the foreign affairs community, August '98 was our 9/11.

I would like to outline what the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and other elements of the Department of State are doing to prepare people to live in a far more dangerous world. Ideally, we would create environments overseas in which employees and family members could thrive, notwithstanding the presence of constant threat. We are a long way from reaching that ideal, but we have been making progress.

TRAINING

All American entry-level employees receive basic security training. These programs are incorporated in the various orientation programs for Civil and Foreign Service employees, Locally Engaged Staff (including Foreign Service Nationals), and employees from other agencies attending the mandatory Introduction to Working in an Embassy course. We have also embedded security and crisis management training in all of FSI’s “tradecraft” classes, including those provided to Foreign Service Nationals. Health care providers, for example, receive training in such areas as triage and emergency medical treatment, while others will focus on aspects appropriate to their lines of work.
The Security Overseas Seminar (SOS), which concentrates on life in an overseas environment, is mandatory for all federal employees and recommended for eligible family members. Unfortunately, it is not provided to the growing numbers of people not listed on an employee’s official orders, such as elderly parents and partners. The two-day course addresses the full range of security issues, including general security awareness, sexual assault, counter intelligence, survival techniques, and managing in a crisis. A similar, age-appropriate program, YSOS, is offered to young family members, grades 2 through 12.

At post, people receive briefings tailored to the host country, as well as hands-on training from periodic roving teams out of Washington. The Overseas Building Operations, for example, send out people to teach fire prevention and protection, as well as methods of escape. The Medical Office offers “Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment” and “Community Emergency Response Training.” In addition, Crisis Management Teams from the Leadership and Management School fan out across the world to help Emergency Action Committees exercise their emergency plans. This is a bi-annual requirement for every embassy; in the case of one-year postings, exercises are conducted every year. Crisis scenarios tailored to actual possibilities are presented, and the outcomes are debriefed. With our encouragement, Foreign Service Nationals are participating in growing numbers. Where we can, we also include overseas schools and appropriate host government officials.

Are we satisfied that we are doing enough? No. The GAO Report makes the point that the more rigorous DSAC training should become mandatory for everyone going to critical-threat posts. I agree. My colleagues from other offices engaged in crisis preparation have raised additional suggestions, such as more defensive and evasive driving techniques because road accidents remain the number one cause of injury and death overseas. We all agree we need to better prepare people to survive chemical and/or biological attacks, and we would like to see greater coverage of emergency procedures like the Community and Emergency Response Training. I intend to be an advocate for this increased training within the Department and we will review how we can best address these needs.
LEADERSHIP

The GAO Report rightly points out that involvement from senior leadership is critical. The Leadership and Management School is responsible for both the Ambassadorial and Deputy Chief of Mission Seminars. Counter terrorism, security and crisis management issues take up more of that training than any other single topic. We begin the Ambassadorial Seminar, for example, with a lengthy discussion of President Bush's Letter of Instruction. It explicitly states their responsibilities: "I expect you to take direct and full responsibility for the security of your mission and all the personnel for whom you are responsible, whether inside or outside the chancery gate. Unless an interagency agreement provides otherwise, the Secretary of State and you as Chief of Mission must protect all United States Government personnel on official duty abroad, other than those under the protection of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international organization, and their accompanying dependents." Few employees receive such clear position descriptions, and our Ambassadors take them very seriously.

The Seminar also stresses ways to communicate with people "outside the chancery gates," encouraging frequent town meetings, close relationships with ex-patriot citizen and business organizations, and attention to the embassy's warden system. In so doing, we emphasize the importance of maintaining a strict policy of "no double standard" when it comes to sharing information with Americans under Chief of Mission authority and U.S. citizens in the host country for other reasons. We make it clear that the Ambassador and DCM have a critical leadership role within the community, not just within the embassy. Attention to the institutions that support the community, such as schools or employee-sponsored recreation clubs, comes with that role.

In preparation for the 2005 series of Seminars, we partnered with Diplomatic Security to redesign the day and a half we devote to security, counter terrorism and crisis management. We piloted the new design in the April Ambassadorial Seminar and plan more changes for the next one. The purpose of the redesign is to underscore the responsibilities they have and the role they play in providing for the safety and welfare of Americans at post. We will likely continue to refine the design to incorporate more "best practices," like sending out security notices under the signature of the Chief
of Mission or Deputy Chief of Mission, rather than the Regional Security Officer, to underscore their importance.

CHALLENGES

Embassy leadership is now more aware and better prepared for crises, including terrorist attacks, than we ever were in the past. No one wants to go to the number of funerals and memorial services my colleagues and I attended after the Nairobi bombing. All of us want to be able to say truthfully, “I did my very best,” when we look into the eyes of grieving survivors and family members. No one can make guarantees, but we can keep trying to make people safe. The GAO Report offers incremental changes. I would like to suggest more profound challenges.

1. Finding the right balance between living vigilantly and normally.

People do not stay on high alert for long periods of time. In my experience, they eventually either burn out or live in denial. Like many Chiefs of Mission, I have struggled to find a rhythm that provided a level of normalcy and yet retained a focus on the constant dangers around us. Employees routinely practice emergency procedures in the workplace, and many posts have mandatory radio programs and alerts for the schools and communities. As the GAO Report highlights, however, many community members are still unaware of what to do. Scare tactics are ultimately self-defeating, and administrative mandates such as checklists risk becoming rote exercises. The challenge is to ensure that people are “looking both ways before they cross the street,” to use a metaphor. Neither paralysis nor indifference is acceptable. I think we will learn how to do this, but it will take time.

2. Maintaining a consistency of funding and attention to security issues.

Maintaining the level of funding and effort we devote to security issues today is a shared responsibility of the Administration and the Congress, and one that still affects me very personally. In his Report of the Accountability Review Boards to Congress in 1998, Admiral Crowe noted in the Executive Summary that: “The Boards were especially disturbed by the collective failure of the U.S. Government over the past decade to provide adequate resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions to terrorist attacks in most countries around the world. Responsibility for this
failure can be attributed to several Administrations and their agencies including the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and Budget, as well as the U.S. Congress.” In fiscal year 1998, a budget for security construction and security upgrades for foreign buildings was woefully inadequate. By contrast, in fiscal year 2006, our request will provide over $1.1 billion for new embassy projects and other security upgrades to facilities worldwide. This total includes cost sharing with other agencies as part of our Capital Security Cost Sharing Program. Under this program, annual spending on capital security projects is expected to rise to $1.4 billion a year over the next several years. I appreciate the support the Congress has provided for this initiative and hope that you will continue to support this program critical to the safety of our men and women serving overseas. One of the reasons I appreciate the GAO Report and this hearing is the focus it continues to put on the safety of civilians on the front lines.

3. Changing the ethos and image of the Department of State.

Secretary Rice’s transformational diplomacy calls us to be proactive in a dangerous world. Today, 64% of Department employees overseas and 87% of Foreign Service generalists with 15 years or more of service can count on experiencing evacuations, civil unrest, kidnapping, natural disasters, assassinations, terrorist attacks and other “crises” listed in our Foreign Affairs Handbook. The old stereotype of Department employees as “men in striped pants,” which I saw recently in a newspaper article, is now more inaccurate than ever. The Administration and the Congress have recognized our important role in promoting American interests and have provided significant resource increases that have helped us to conduct diplomacy in today’s world. I hope the Congress will continue to support us by providing the Administration’s request for this fiscal year and remain vigilant in years to come.

Mr. Chairman, I have had the fortune during my career and at the Leadership and Management School to interact with thousands of State Department employees. I know them to be fiercely patriotic, willing to put themselves and their families at risk in order to make a difference on behalf of the American people. They deserve to thrive. At the very least, they deserve our best efforts to keep them safe. I can assure you of the sincerity of our efforts, and I thank you for your own contribution. My hope is that
we can continue to count on you and your fellow committee members to be partners and advocates.

Thank you.
Mr. S HAYS. Thank you, Ambassador. I am so grateful you were invited to participate. And I apologize that this is the first time you have had a chance to be able to express what is a powerful statement and one which we will look forward to understanding better.

Mr. Miller.

STATEMENT OF KEITH MILLER

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Department’s soft target programs for overseas schools. The mission of Overseas Schools is to ensure the best possible education for the dependents of U.S. Government employees abroad. Presently, we provide grant and technical assistance to 191 schools in 132 countries. And, interestingly, the enrollment in these schools is 103,000 children, of whom 28,000 are U.S. citizens.

Security in overseas schools has long been a concern of our office. When our regional educational officers travel overseas, they consult with regional security officers to encourage coordination with schools in reviewing security plans and otherwise assisting the schools with security issues. The Department has sent cables to all overseas posts in 1998, 2001, and again in 2003, directing the regional security officers to collaborate on security issues.

The Office of Overseas Schools published an emergency procedures manual, which was reviewed by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which provides a checklist of security items and procedures the schools can use to frame their local emergency plans, and that manual was sent to all posts with the encouragement to work with schools in updating their security plans.

In the Department’s Fiscal Year 2003 Appropriations Act, Congress provided funds to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations for security enhancement grants to overseas schools. And to carry out this mandate, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations asked our office and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to participate on the soft targets working group chaired by Overseas Buildings.

Our office advises the committee on school matters and has acted as the vehicle for sending security enhancement grants to overseas schools. During the past 2 years, we have sent grants in two phases totaling over $27 million to schools assisted by the Department of State, always in accordance with their needs as determined by the regional security officers.

Phases 3 and 4 of the soft targets program address security enhancement needs of overseas schools that do not have a preexisting grant relationship with the Department.

The GAO report on overseas security says the full scope of the school program has not yet been determined. This process is essentially complete for phases 1 and 2 and is underway for phase 3. The soft targets working group has requested and is analyzing information from posts to determine our priorities for phases 3 and 4.

The report further notes that schools are not tied to emergency plans. Our regional educational officers report very positive comments from the school administrators we visit about the cooperation they receive from post personnel on security matters, and I understand that some of the schools are presently integrated into the
post security plans, and efforts are underway to bring all of the others into the post-emergency plans.

What more needs to be done to better secure overseas schools? From our perspective the single best way to improve security in these schools is for the regional security officers to enhance their already close contact with school officials, to advise on security measures, and keep them fully informed about security matters.

In closing, I would like to say that the response from the overseas schools receiving assistance has been extremely positive. School boards and school heads have been universally appreciative of this generous and critically important support from the U.S. Government.

Thank you, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you so much, Mr. Miller.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Opening Statement of Keith Miller
Director of the Office of Overseas Schools
before
House Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International
May 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the Department’s Soft Targets Program for overseas schools. I
believe we have made progress in enhancing security at overseas schools
attended by dependents of U.S. Government employees, as well as other
U.S. citizen students. First, I will provide some background on the Office of
Overseas Schools and our mission to enhance educational opportunities for
U.S. students abroad, and then I will speak about the Soft Targets Program
at overseas schools.

The Office of Overseas Schools

The mission of the Office of Overseas Schools is to ensure the best possible
educational programs for U.S. Government dependents enrolled in
elementary and secondary schools overseas. Our office has a budget of $8.5
million and a professional staff of a director and six Regional Education
Officers. Our office provides grant and technical assistance to 191
elementary and secondary schools in 132 countries. These are independent,
non-profit schools that offer a core American curriculum to children of many
nationalities. Enrollment in these schools totals 103,000, of whom 28,000
are U.S. citizens. About 60% of the U.S employee dependent students, as
well as many other U.S. citizen students, attend these schools.

Security in overseas schools has long been a concern of the Office of
Overseas Schools:

- When the Regional Education Officers travel to posts and visit
  Department-assisted schools, they encourage school officials to
  update their security plans.

- The Regional Educational Officers consult with post Regional
  Security Officers, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s special agents
  in charge of embassy security, on these visits to encourage
  coordination with the assisted schools in reviewing security plans and
otherwise assisting the schools with security issues. Our experience shows that there is a solid relationship between Regional Security Officers and school officials.

- The Department sent cables to all overseas posts in 1998, 2001, and again in 2003 directing Regional Security Officers to collaborate with schools on security issues.

- In 1998, the Office of Overseas Schools published an Emergency Procedures Manual and sent it to all posts and Department-assisted schools. The manual provides a checklist of security items and procedures that schools can use to frame their local security or emergency plans.

- After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the manual was updated with the assistance of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and re-sent to all posts and Department-assisted schools. We again encouraged the posts to work with schools in updating their security plans.

- The Office of Overseas Schools has sponsored a security expert to address directors of Department-assisted schools at several regional association conferences of international schools around the world on matters of personal and school security.

**The Overseas Schools / Soft Targets Program**

In the Department’s FY 2003 Appropriations Act, Congress provided funds to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) for security enhancement grants to overseas schools in which U.S. citizens are enrolled—commonly known as the Soft Targets Program. The Office of Overseas Schools was asked to participate on a Soft Targets Working Group chaired by OBO, which also includes the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Over the past two years the Office of Overseas Schools has sent security enhancement grants, totaling over $27,000,000 in two phases to schools assisted by the Department of State. Phase I provided $10,500,000 to 184 Department-assisted overseas schools for basic security enhancements: shatter resistant window film, public address systems, and radios for communication with U.S. Embassies and consulates. Phase II offered
$17,000,000 for additional advanced security enhancements to 160 Department-assisted schools in accordance with their needs as determined by Regional Security Officers at posts, such as security walls, bollards, and gate systems.

Phases III and IV of the Soft Targets Program address security enhancement needs of overseas schools that are attended by U.S. government employee dependents, but do not have a pre-existing grant relationship with the Department. Phase III, currently under way, is providing the basic security upgrades. To date, $8.1 million has been awarded to schools in Phase III. Phase IV, to be undertaken in FY 06, will provide advanced security upgrades.

The GAO report, “Overseas Security,” says that the “full scope of the school program has not yet been determined.” It is my understanding that this complex process is well under way.

The report further notes that “schools are not tied to post emergency plans.” The Office of Overseas Schools encourages such involvement, and I understand that some schools are presently integrated into the post emergency plans and efforts are underway to bring the others into post emergency plans.

What more needs to be done to better secure overseas schools? The single best way to improve security in overseas schools is for Regional Security Officers to enhance their close contact with the school officials to advise on security measures and otherwise keep them fully informed about relevant security issues.
Mr. SHAYS. I am thinking of all of the statements in context not of Mr. Ford's work, but more in terms of Ambassador Bushnell's comments, because I am haunted by one thing you said. I am haunted by a number of things you said, actually, but one, the concept that 24 hours later you were still all alone. It makes me want to understand what you meant by that.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Sir, it was the ultimate irony that the airplanes carrying the rescuers broke down, both of them, so rescuers were 15 hours late, and so was the medical evacuation plan. It was just a series of snafus.

Mr. SHAYS. And there is no doubt in our minds this was an attack by al Qaeda; correct?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. The morning of the bombing we did not know. It was the very good work of the FBI that came in immediately that ultimately found evidence, traced the evidence into the Muslim community in Kenya, and found the al Qaeda connection.

Mr. SHAYS. And your reference to the fact that it was August 8?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. August 7.

Mr. SHAYS. August 7, 1998. And for you and for our country, you are saying it should have been our September 11, 2001?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. For the foreign affairs community, it was our September 11th. Because we are such a small service and we move all of the time, we know one another. Our children play together, we serve together. Nairobi was a medium-threat post. Dar es Salaam was off the map. If this could happen in two such safe posts in terms of terrorism, it could happen anywhere.

Mr. SHAYS. And al Qaeda, seeing no significant response for handiwork at our embassies, was a huge message that either the United States was incapable or unwilling to confront their actions which was, in my judgment, a very huge incentive to continue in a bigger scale, and to interpret that, even with September 11, we might respond in kind of an anemic way.

I guess my point to you is it should have been, and I say this to me as well, it should have been September 11th for all of us because the State Department is part of our family. They are our outreach to the rest of the world. It is a very poignant thing that you have told us.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Thank you for your words, Mr. Chairman. They are—I have been waiting a long time to hear them, as have the people behind me. I appreciate that.

Mr. SHAYS. We will see how we can remedy that even more.

This is what I would like to do. Mr. Starr, I would like you to tell me what you believe GAO was saying as succinctly as possible. And then, Mr. Ford, I want you to respond whether anything was left out or whether the intensity of a certain part was left out.

By the way, Mr. Starr, you are in charge not just of personnel security in terms of the training that GAO made reference to, but also the hardened targets? All security.

Mr. STARR. At the moment I am acting. Yes, I am in charge of it all.

Sir, I believe the most salient point in the GAO report was a combination of what Congressman Duncan said that we have to find out what that balance is and what we can best do with the resources we are given. I think what GAO has specifically pointed
out to us is we need to move and prepare our people better before they go overseas and while they are overseas.

We have engaged in briefing programs for many, many years for our people. And FSI and Ambassador Bushnell have been doing a wonderful job. But at critical posts, we need to give them hands-on training, how to avoid terrorist attacks, how to recognize terrorist attacks, how to get out of them when they happen. That is the single most salient point that the GAO report hammers home for us.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me the other points that were made that you think need to be mentioned.

Mr. STARR. GAO talks about accountability and how they would like to see some accountability systems built into our programs. We have in fact, as GAO noted, modified some of our evaluation forms for our employees so if they are not paying attention to security regulations, they can be written up on that. GAO's point is they believe that checklists should be—personal accountability checklists should be put into place.

But Ambassador Bushnell and I believe checklists become perfunctory and we have to work with that GAO recommendation and come up with something that promotes personal accountability, that brings our people to a realistic understanding of what they need to be aware of, and also we cannot put them on alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. We have to find that balance.

Mr. SHAYS. You are kind of qualifying her point. One is better training at home and overseas, better accountability. Is the third issue the whole concept of a checklist?

Mr. STARR. Personal accountability is what Jess and the GAO are talking about. We agree with personal accountability. We have to find ways to get people to better take their personal security seriously. One of the recommendations the GAO made, the checklist, we feel there are some downsides to that.

Mr. SHAYS. Having been in the business of politics 31 years at hearings, when I get people when I was in the State government or now in the Federal Government, your job is not to filter out what resources you have and then you make the best of it. That is your job when you are given it, but your job is not to shield me from the reality. If we are not giving you the resources, you are not being unfaithful to me or the administration, you are doing your job. You are under oath. You have that requirement.

If you prevent me from knowing what you need and therefore you do not claim it as a need, I will not be able to do my job and this subcommittee will not. You made reference to the fact with the resources you have available. I think GAO is saying what you need to do, and we need to figure out how to get you those resources.

Mr. STARR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, what do you think the report was saying? Any add-ons or qualifiers to what Mr. Starr said?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. One of the things that for me was missing from the report is looking——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me do this first. You are going to have a chance to say what should have been in the report because that is a great question, but what was in the report, do you think the issue——and
I think you have a sense why I am asking this question; I want to see what is getting through to the Department that GAO is saying, and then we will talk about disagreements and how you might have written the report to include some other things.

One is the better training at home and overseas. The other is the issue of accountability as raised by Mr. Starr. Do you think there are other issues that GAO was saying that State needs to pay attention to?

Ambassador Bushnell. The overall tone of the report was to say that State Department is not doing enough to protect safe targets. As I said in my statement, I think the report gives some excellent incremental suggestions. I think there are challenges that go beyond those incremental suggestions.

Mr. Shays. That is helpful to have you make that point as well.

Mr. Miller, I know you look at it more from one perspective, but would you add anything else? Then I am going to ask Mr. Ford to say whether he is in agreement.

What do you think the GAO is basically saying in addition to not doing enough to deal with the soft targets and not doing the kind of training at home and overseas for them when they are overseas? And finally, the whole issue of accountability. Is there anything else you would add to that?

Mr. Miller. Training or involvement of school officials in the emergency action plans and in the crisis management training would be helpful to give them the necessary information to improve their security.

Mr. Shays. You are seeing it from your position of being in charge of the schools?

Mr. Miller. Correct. Yes.

Mr. Shays. Mr. Ford, would you add anything or choose to emphasize it differently?

Mr. Ford. The key points in our report have been mentioned.

Mr. Shays. In this last line of questioning? Not whether they mentioned the statement. Do you concur with the answers you have just heard?

Mr. Ford. Yes. I concur that the State Department recognizes in areas of training and accountability, there are some steps it can take to improve the current situation based on what we said in our report.

Mr. Shays. I don’t like the word “can.”

Mr. Ford. Whether they are actually implementing the suggestions at this point, and I heard something today that I was not aware of regarding the inclusion of the schools in the emergency evacuation plans which at the time we did our work, we had not seen that in the actual plans themselves. Assuming they have done that, that is a step in the right direction because that is one of our recommendations.

Mr. Shays. Maybe it is part of your training to not be offensive. You say they can do it. Isn’t your report saying that they need to do it?

Mr. Ford. Absolutely. Specifically we talked about the need for hands-on training. We thought that ought to be made mandatory for every critical post overseas, and if they have the resources, they should reach down for the high-threat posts.
Mr. SHAYS. Say that again.

Mr. FORD. They have different categories of vulnerability that they have assigned to each post. With regard to terrorism, they have three categories based on threat: critical threat, high threat and medium threat.

We have a chart in our report that outlines the number of posts that are in those categories, and, given the resource requirements with making mandatory training, we felt one way to prioritize that would be to start with the critical-threat posts first.

Mr. SHAYS. I have to say, listening to this, if I was someone under high threat, I would like the training too, with all due respect.

Mr. FORD. The issue is resources. The Department indicated it needs to spend more money on training.

Mr. SHAYS. I feel like I am getting covered up with a web. It is good that you are telling me there is critical and medium and high threat, but is your report only saying they need to be trained for those that are critical, or are you saying all of them need to be?

Mr. FORD. I think all of them need to be. I think—we're talking about prioritizing what should happen first, and we felt that critical threat should be first.

Mr. SHAYS. And it's your testimony that critical is not being done right now?

Mr. FORD. I'm not—I saw the numbers in the statement from Mr. Starr. I don't know if that covers all of the critical threat posts. I don't believe it does, but I'd defer to him on that.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Is there any other point that you want to make before we go back to the other witnesses here?

Mr. FORD. Yes. I think there's some other areas that I think the Department should explore that, based on the——

Mr. SHAYS. That are in the report?

Mr. FORD. That are in the report that I—for example, the use of surveillance detection teams overseas. There was some uncertainty at the post we visited about how much of those teams could actually be used.

Mr. SHAYS. And describe to me without disclosing anything that we don't want to disclose, but when you make reference to surveillance teams, what do you mean? Do you mean people going overseas to review vulnerabilities? Do you mean looking out for bad characters? What do you mean?

Mr. FORD. Yes, basically the latter. These are teams that are trained to do those type of things.

Mr. SHAYS. And so one of the recommendations is that we should make better use of them and use them more often?

Mr. FORD. Yes. We met with—virtually every regional security officer that we met with at the five places we visited indicated that those teams can provide value added to protecting areas that are outside the embassy to the extent they have resources to do so.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So basically we have: Not doing enough to protect soft targets. And then ways to deal with that one is better training home and abroad, and accountability. And you are adding surveillance teams to that list that wasn't mentioned, that we should make better use of surveillance teams, correct?

Mr. FORD. That’s correct.
Mr. SHAYS. Anything else you want to add to that list?

Mr. FORD. I think the other area really gets more into the strategic outline of what soft target strategy ought to be. This gets into an issue of what set of requirements that the Department is now studying which will have resource implications. And basically we have a recommendation that the Department basically put out that strategy, lay out the requirements and the resources that are going to be required to implement it. And this will be tied directly to schools and perhaps other facilities outside the embassy.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. This is all very helpful, and I thank you.

Mr. Starr and also Ambassador and Mr. Miller, is there anything that you think the GAO should have spoken to in terms of vulnerabilities? It’s really Ambassador made that point. But is there anything, Mr. Starr, that you think the subcommittee needs to know? We're not looking to tell terrorists what are vulnerable, but areas where improvement needs to be made that might not have been made by the GAO.

Mr. STARR. Sir, if there’s one point I would like to make, it is that we thank the GAO for looking at the soft targets, and we do think there’s improvements to be made. But I think sometimes there’s the mistake that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are moving toward soft targets, they are moving away from our hard targets, and the fact is that we see as many, if not more, threats every day at our hard targets, and we see the type of attacks that they would like to undertake, which are catastrophic-type attacks, car bombs and things like that, which would not just injure one or two people or maybe five in a residence or in a car, but catastrophically, as we saw in Nairobi, you know, we had 222 people there killed and 5,000 injured. So we have to strike a balance between looking closely at protecting our people in soft targets, but not losing our focus on protecting our hard targets at the same time.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, what was left out that you would like this subcommittee to be aware of?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I would like as much help as possible from the Congress and any report that comes out on security of our employees overseas to underscore the danger of their mission so that we can begin to counteract this notion that somehow we are leading exotic and glamorous lives at taxpayers’ expense. Sixty-four percent have faced crisis, and these include our Foreign Service national employees overseas; 87 percent of people who have been in for 15 years or more. I would defy any organization to come up with that statistic. So any time there is a mention for need of force protection, which we do have, it would certainly help our cause in changing both ethos and image to underscore those statistics.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Miller, any comment you would like to make?

Mr. MILLER. I don’t think I can add to the GAO’s recommendations.

Mr. SHAYS. But schools represent a soft target, right?

Mr. MILLER. They certainly do.

Mr. SHAYS. Based on what happened in Russia, I think you, Mr. Starr, would agree that was catastrophic?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.
Mr. SHAYS. So we’re not suggesting that soft targets can’t be catastrophic either.

Mr. STARR. No, sir. We’re just suggesting that we have both to look after.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. And I think that’s important.

I’m just going to summarize. I am hearing a report by GAO that has basically acknowledged that we are doing pretty good at dealing with hard targets. That wasn’t the focus of your report, but the acknowledgment that we are doing well, but we could—and from the first panel, that we could be doing obviously better with more resources.

But we are hearing that, in your report, Mr. Ford, you basically said we are not doing enough to deal with soft targets; that we need to have better training for employees both at home and abroad for them when they go overseas. We’re hearing that we need to pay more attention to accountability, and we may need to flesh that word out a little better; that you believe that surveillance teams, Mr. Ford, need to be better utilized, excuse me, GAO does. And we’re hearing as well that there needs to be a strategic focus, which ties in, Mr. Starr and the Ambassador’s point, but ties in with your point: If you have a strategy, you are able to know how to allocate limited resources. And resources will always be limited. In my judgment, the resources are too limited in terms of protecting sites.

And I would just say for the benefit of Mr. Ruppersberger, who’s joined us, who serves on the Intelligence Committee—and I might add he was appointed to the Intelligence Committee as a freshman Member, which is quite, I think, an honor and opportunity for him—that Ambassador Bushnell was there when the Kenyan bombing took place, pointed out that the loss was 50 percent, pointed out that for 24 hours they basically were on their own because relief teams couldn’t get in for a variety of reasons, and pointed out to the subcommittee that basically September 11th for State Department happened on August 7, 1998; and that she said this is the first time she’s been able or invited to even testify about this experience in spite of the fact that she was the Ambassador, which is a failure on our part. And my only comment back to her is that September 11th began for all Americans on that day, if not sooner.

At this time, Mr. Ruppersberger, I would give you the floor.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Sure. First, I apologize. I had another hearing, and I have another hearing at 3:30.

Mr. SHAYS. Apologies are never required.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, I think so, because this is a very important issue. And for those of us who have traveled to different parts, we understand what’s going on as far as security, especially with our State Department, but other people, too, who work for other agencies, really non-military but military also, a lot of these areas that are difficult areas where families aren’t even allowed to be there because of how difficult they are.

I don’t know—and stop me if I’m repeating—but what has been our program or our plan with respect to our host nations and working with our State Department and having them to assign somebody? To just rely on them is one thing, because you don’t control them, but to assign manpower to work with us that we can help
Mr. Starr, why don't you do that.

Mr. STARR. Sir, we have a—in my earlier testimony, we do rely on the host country's security and police forces to a great extent overseas, but we find their response to us uneven. In many cases they are exceptionally good and exceptionally devoted, have highly trained people, and have an overlapping web of forces that include intelligence forces and security forces and police forces that help protect us. In other cases where we are less successful, where they are not as professional, the RSO spends a great deal of time working with the local police to try to get protection.

We have programs such as the Antiterrorism Assistance Program where we try to give those countries assistance where we identify there is a need that they can help themselves and help us and help other Americans. There are other programs out there like the INL programs that the State Department has to professionalize the police also.

Overall, I would say that in many places we have excellent response, but in many places it is less than excellent, and we work to try to improve it where we can.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do we have standards in all countries that involve host nations and training, or does that go country to country?

Mr. STARR. It's primarily country by country, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that on purpose, or is that just because we haven't put a standard together?

Mr. STARR. I think it's on purpose, sir. The Geneva Convention primarily assigns the responsibility for protection at diplomatic facilities to the host country. Where we identify that they are incapable or have weaknesses, we try to train them and try to get them to improve.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What percentages of countries are incapable of giving us the security that we need?

Mr. STARR. Sir, I would say that every country tries to give us security that they can. I would say that—I would be hazarding a guess, sir, but my guess would be that at least 30 percent of the countries out there, it is less than fully professional.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about from an intelligence perspective? I mean, basically it seems to me that your best offense is intelligence. Do you have that through the State Department? I mean, are you working with other agencies? Is that part of your security component, the intelligence end?

Mr. STARR. We work very closely with the Intelligence Community, sir, yes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In dealing with issues involving our own personal security or U.S. security?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, have you discussed the Overseas Security Policy Board?

Mr. STARR. No, sir, we did not.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Why don't you explain what that is, and who the members of the Board are, and does the Board meet, and what happens at the meetings?
Mr. STARR. The Overseas Security Policy Board is a Board of security directors of those agencies that are present in our overseas community. We have representation from the Defense Department, AID; and at this point the Intelligence Community is on it, CDC, FAA, FBI, Justice Department. I believe there are 22 members on the Overseas Policy Board at this point. We meet approximately once every 2 months. We develop policies for security overseas, technical, physical, counterintelligence policies. We publish them in what is called the 12-FAH, Foreign Affairs Handbook. Those standards are applied to all agencies serving overseas under a Chief of Mission.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Do you think that Board can do more? Do you think they are doing what they are convened to do?

Mr. STARR. I think it is an exceptionally good group, sir. I think that we do meet often enough, and we are cognizant enough of our protective responsibilities that we look constantly at evolving threats. And I think that's what our challenge is.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So sharing of information and strategies?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. How about the Soft Targets Working Group? Have you discussed that here today?

Mr. STARR. Very briefly, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What agencies are a member of the group, and how often does that meet?

Mr. STARR. At the moment, on one particular committee on residential security, we have a Soft Targets Working Group under the OSPB, and it is—as I understand it, it is State Department, USAID, and I believe it is DOD that is working with us on that as well.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Representatives from all the different countries?

Mr. STARR. No, sir. This would be looking at the agencies under the OSPB and looking at what standards we want to write or improve for residential security.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, you also, I think, in your testimony, you stated that overseas personnel have been on a heightened threat alert status since 1998; is that correct?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Is there a danger that long-term stress will be detrimental to job performance? Are you seeing that now?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bushnell commented specifically on that during her testimony, that it is very difficult to find that balance between having somebody on alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, and trying to find that balance and not burning our people out.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, again, I don't want to repeat because I didn't come in. The recommendations—I mean, we have these hearings, and one of the frustrations about being here is that you don't see implementation. Now, what, if anything—and let me go down the row. What, if anything, would you like to see to implement the resources or a system or move further where we need to go, because most of us who have traveled to the different parts of the world, and some of those very dangerous. There is a lot of anxi-
ety with those people that live there with their families. What, is it about resources? And let me start, Mr. Miller, and go right down.

Mr. MILLER. We have already gotten $27 million into the schools in a fairly short period of time, and the Department has asked for $15 million in each of the next 2 fiscal years. So, in our judgment, we're getting the resources. It's our job then to get the money out and put it to good use.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Are the resources being used effectively? Is the money being used to do the right thing? Would you like to see a better standard? Do you think we have a standard that is working?

Mr. MILLER. I think we have a good standard. This is always monitored and supervised and recommended by the regional security officers at post who are the experts on security. So we feel that there is a good monitoring process.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Ambassador?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I'm going to be a broken record here.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That's OK.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Anything that will portray the Department of State as what it is, which is an agency of civilian employees who are facing danger at—on a constant basis. That means public recognition for what we are facing. That means the training for what we are facing, the recruiting for what we are facing, the understanding among family members of what they face, the resources, and the force protection for what we face.

I would also add that I think we need to look very, very carefully at other agencies, because if there's anybody who gets it, it is the employees in the Department of State. People who are parachuted into posts from the middle of the United States, from one agency or another, are actually the most vulnerable of our people. And we need to focus, those agencies need to focus, on how they're selecting people, how they're training people to go overseas, and how they're holding people accountable for their own safety overseas.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know under Colin Powell's leadership there was a lot of emphasis put on capital improvements. Is that continuing on under Condoleeza Rice?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. That is continuing.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. All of the programs that former Secretary Powell began are continuing under Secretary Rice, I'm delighted to say.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK, good. Mr. Starr.

Mr. STARR. Sir, I'm going to be very specific. I agree with the GAO's assessment that we need to move from a system where we brief our people, both domestically and once they are overseas, to where we train our people. In 2003 and 2004, we trained 239 officers in the antiterrorism training before they went overseas for high and critical-threat-level posts.

That's not enough. We also augmented that course specifically to address Iraq-specific types of threats. Since 2003 we have put 1,193 people that went to Baghdad and the four regional posts through that specific training. I would like to see more training for our people, as the GAO report said, prior to going to high and critical-threat-level posts.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. So you feel that’s probably one of the highest priorities is the training?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. I feel that’s the biggest bang for the buck.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Should it just be in difficult areas, or just all members of the State Department that are going overseas as a curriculum that needs to be put forward to these employees?

Mr. STARR. As we move, sir, every 2 to 3 years, I think that every member of the State Department should get this training. I think that GAO has correctly identified that we need to start with our critical and high-threat posts.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Yes, I agree with that. I think—again, I want to repeat some things I said earlier.

Mr. SHAYS. You said what?

Mr. FORD. I agree, first of all, that training is a critical issue that needs to be addressed at the Department, as I mentioned earlier. But I also think it ought to include all the other non-Department employees that are going to be stationed overseas, and of which that’s about two-thirds of the number of people who are currently assigned.

I also think that there should be a clear set of requirements laid out for on the soft targets program that clearly spells out what we’re going to cover, how much it’s going to cost, and what the pros and cons of the various requirements might be.

I think that we need to continue to encourage accountability mechanisms, because unfortunately at the five posts that we visited in the course of doing this work, we found that compliance with some of the basic tenets of security awareness was not being followed.

I understand the issue regarding stress, but I also think that there was some due diligence on the part of people overseas that they tend to become complacent about, and they are potentially at risk, in my view. So I think that these accountability mechanisms are also important.

I guess the last thing I would like to mention is the issue of surveillance detection activities that can be used to help safeguard facilities outside the embassy walls, and I think the Department should look into that with regard to what type of resources could be applied to help safeguard those other assets besides the embassy itself.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How about the cost factors on what you just talked about, any idea?

Mr. FORD. I’m sorry?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The cost factors, the money.

Mr. FORD. Again, the Department has indicated to us that it would cost a lot of money to fully implement a lot of these requirements, but we haven’t seen what the requirements are yet. We understand the working group that was cited earlier is looking into that issue with regard to what those requirements would be and what the associated costs would be. So I don’t know exactly how much that is, but I think the Department should lay that out.

Mr. SHAYS. If the gentleman would yield.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Sure.
Mr. SHAYS. When they say it would cost a lot of money, they are not being specific in terms of how much it would, in fact, cost?

Mr. FORD. Again, I'm going to defer to Mr. Starr. I understand that at one time the Department was proposing, I believe, to expand the training courses that—on hands-on training earlier this year, and I forget the exact amount that they had identified. I believe it's in our report. But it was in the neighborhood of $5 to $6 million. That's the only cost number that I've seen related to this overall issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I go to the professional staff, Mr. Costa, I would just want to mention this and then see if there's any objection to what I'm saying: That it's fairly clear State has not defined soft target, that State lacks a soft target protection strategy. And this is the third one which may, in fact, not be true. State has not fully incorporated schools into emergency plans. So I guess, Mr. Starr, would you agree with all three of those, or would you dispute any of it?

Mr. STARR. I believe, sir, that in our emergency action plans, the last rewrite of it, which was going on while this GAO study was under way, we have, in fact, got the latest version that fully incorporates schools into our emergency action plans. So I think we have addressed that one.

Your other two questions, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. State has not defined soft targets.

Mr. STARR. We have—it's a difficult question for me, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say something. How long have you been doing this job?

Mr. STARR. Twenty-five years, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. But in this responsibility that you have now.

Mr. STARR. One year, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. You are not going to be able to do everything that you have to do in 1 year. This is not a judgment of you. It is trying to understand, and have the confidence that you understand, what remains to be done. We think of our job sometimes as a catalyst.

Mr. STARR. We are, in fact, writing a soft target strategy exactly as GAO suggests.

Mr. SHAYS. Good. How about the definition of soft target? Are we still kind of wrestling with that?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. Primarily from the standpoint that there's a soft target in terms of protection of our personnel that we serve, send overseas, and where they are soft targets. And then there's the much larger soft target universe of American companies, businesses, other types of soft targets that we do not control. And our program's trying to provide those soft targets with information, from programs such as the Overseas Security Advisory Council.

So we have sort of a dichotomy in the soft targets, the ones that we're specifically responsible for, that we fund programs for, that we give training to, and then the larger soft targets universe which I believe you will be hearing on your second panel, American businesses and Americans overseas.

Mr. SHAYS. Before I give Mr. Costa some time for questioning, I need to be clear. When we talk about critical, high, and medium
targets, I assume that was at the individual and not at the location. Is it more location than individual?

Mr. STARR. More country, more post-specific, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So a country is a critical or a high or medium?

Mr. STARR. Usually the actual city that we have the establishment in.

Mr. SHAYS. That qualifies my comments about—so, for instance—and is there anything below medium, or everybody is medium? Norway would be medium?

Mr. STARR. For global terrorism, sir, we really don't look at anybody as below medium.

Mr. SHAYS. I think that's fair, because at one time we didn't think Kenya would have been—we would not have called it high or critical probably at one time. So, OK. I'm going to be asking when it's my turn, and then we will get to the next panel, I will be asking you each, is there any question that we should have asked that we didn't? Any question that you will regret not having been asked, and we will find out later we should have asked the question? So I am asking you to think about what that might be. Sometimes the most important part of the hearing is the question we never thought to ask that you need to answer. And you have a solemn oath to do that. So don't leave anything unanswered here.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My first question is about the Overseas Policy Security Board and Overseas Security Advisory Council. According to the Foley ARB, they were going to look at the need for a potential special commission in the manner of the Inman report to look at soft targets broadly, look at training and so forth. As a response to the ARB, the Department said they would look at that recommendation and come back. What was the result, if you know, of that assessment of the recommendation?

Mr. STARR. As I understand it, the Overseas Security Advisory Council convened a few working groups to look specifically at the standards dealing with what we consider soft targets: Our residences, our residential policy, other policies in terms of protection of personnel away from the post. We did a review on it. We did, in fact, change the standards having to do with residential security. We reviewed them from what they had been in 1998, and I believe the consensus was that there wasn't a need for a special look at it after that. I believe that's what happened with that.

Mr. COSTA. So I guess the followup question then would be what is the status, then, of coming up with an all-encompassing strategy given the results of the Overseas Policy Security Board and Overseas Security Advisory Council? How is that coming together?

Mr. STARR. We are, in fact, in the process of drafting a strategy for the State Department in terms of protection of soft targets. Once we have that strategy fleshed out, we will put it all through the State Department clearance process, but also bring it to the Overseas Security Policy Board, which I think is the appropriate place with the experience to look at that strategy, give us comments on it, and determine whether or not what we're doing is appropriate.
Mr. COSTA. Can you make sure we get a copy of that strategy as we move forward?

Mr. STARR. Yes, sir. We are—the report language, I think, requires us to give it to you by June 15th, I believe.

[The information referred to follows:]
Dear Mr. Shaays:

Knowing of your interest in the GAO report, OVERSEAS SECURITY: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies (GAO-05-642) contains three recommendations for the Department of State. Chapter 7 of 31 USC 720 requires that the head of an agency submit to the Committee a written statement on action taken on the recommendations directed to that agency by the Comptroller General. This letter is intended to comply with this requirement.

Recommendations for Executive Action

I. Include in the current development of a comprehensive soft target strategy information to:

(1) Determine the extent of State’s responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

The extent of State’s responsibilities for providing security to U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy is mandated by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399; 22 USC 4801, et seq. (1986)), as amended. The Act directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement policies and programs, including funding levels and standards, to provide for the security of U.S. Government operations of a diplomatic nature. Such policies and programs shall include protection of all U.S. Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and those personnel under the command of the United States area military commander) and their accompanying dependents.

The Honorable
Christopher Shaays,
Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives.
(2) Address the legal and financial ramifications of funding security improvements to schools, places of worship, and the private sector.

The Department's primary authorities to provide physical security for persons overseas are set forth in section 103 of the Diplomatic Security Act (22 USC 4802(a)(2)) and in 22 USC 2709. In addition, the Department has other limited but relevant authorities, e.g., sections 29 and 31 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (22 USC 2701 and 2703), which authorize certain assistance to schools and employee service facilities, and section 4 (22 USC 2671), which authorizes evacuations of American citizens when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disasters. Specific authorities and funding are also provided in annual appropriations legislation.

Pursuant to existing authorities, the Department has initiated physical security upgrades for overseas schools attended by U.S. Government dependents and other American children. Under the guidance of the Department-wide Soft Target Working Group chaired by the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, grants of over $34 million have been issued to overseas schools for security enhancements. As of June 2005.

- Phase I - funded at $10.5 million, provided basic security upgrades – shatter resistant window film, public address warning systems, and radio communications – to 181 of 189 schools that receive educational grants from the Department. The eight others were invited to participate but declined. Phase I is now complete.

- Phase II - funded at $17.1 million, provided over 500 advanced security upgrades (perimeter walls, fences, window grilles, etc.) to 160 of the 189 Department-grant schools. The remaining schools were invited to participate but declined. Phase II is essentially complete, but will continue throughout FY 05 if additional requirements are identified.

- Phase III - provides basic security upgrades to schools that do not receive educational grants from the Department, but are attended by USG dependents and other American children; grants have been issued to 152 schools for $6.7 million; requests of $1.7 million are pending from another 30 schools.
- Phase IV - will provide advanced security upgrades to non-grant schools and begin once Phase III is completed. The Department has requested $15 million in the FY 06 budget for soft targets.

The Department has no legal or financial authority, however, to provide facilities security or personal protection to private U.S. citizens traveling or residing in foreign sovereign countries. Given the number of American citizens who travel and live abroad and the vast array of places where they might live and congregate, such a mandate would neither be feasible nor appropriate. Not only would the cost far exceed any imaginable resources, but also such an undertaking would implicate the civil liberties of the American citizens involved.

Determining which facility or private sector component received assistance and which did not could give rise to significant legal challenges, as would providing U.S. government security improvements to places of worship. The constitutionality and appropriateness of expanded U.S. government restrictions on American citizens’ travel, destinations, residences, and limits on other activities that form the underpinnings of government employee security programs, would not be acceptable to American citizens as they weigh the balance between their security and their freedom.

(3) Develop programs and activities with FAM standards and guidelines to provide protection for those areas for which State is deemed responsible.

Please see references to DOS authorities cited in answers 1 and 2 above.

(4) Integrate into the embassy emergency action plan elements of the soft targets program.

The Department has integrated elements of the soft target program into embassy emergency action plans. Overseas schools attended by mission family members are being formally added to our Emergency Action Plans, and future post specific emergency plans will include physical security features, vulnerability, security plans and procedures and emergency drills at the schools.
II. (5) Mandate counterterrorism training and prioritize which posts, officials, and family members should receive counterterrorism training first.

The Department of State mandated personal security training for employees transferring overseas under the Chief of Mission (COM) authority, effective June 1, 2004. Employees of other USG agencies under COM authority must complete Serving Abroad for Families and Employees (SAFE) or certify to the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) that they have completed an equivalent course. Effective January 1, 2005, the requirement to complete SAFE training was applied to personnel performing temporary duty overseas of more than 30 days. The Department’s Executive Secretary informed all agencies of this requirement via a memorandum dated March 25, 2004 and by cables sent to COMs (STATE 066580 dated March 25, 2004 and STATE 093760 dated April 27, 2004).

The SAFE program is a combination of the Foreign Service Institute’s (FSI) Security Overseas Seminar (SOS) two-day course and Working in an Embassy two-day course. From FY 1999 to March 31, 2005, more than 15,000 individuals from the Department and other agencies have completed the SOS course, which is mandatory for State Department employees (13 FAM 620) and has been in existence since 1986. The course covers the threats posed by terrorism, bombs, weapons of mass destruction, and crime, as well as fire safety and environmental hazards. Adult family members are strongly encouraged to attend. The Department also requires employees and strongly encourages their adult family members to renew the security awareness training every five years. A special one-day update version, the Advanced Security Overseas Seminar (ASOS), is provided to meet that need.

Additionally, after the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the resulting Accountability Review Board, the FSI Crisis Management Training Program experienced a significant expansion and a different focus. Exercises are designed for all posts about every two and a half years, not just critical and high threat posts. Critical threat posts are exercised every year. Post management is also encouraged to invite representatives from overseas schools, American businesses, and host governments to participate. From Fiscal Year 1999 to March 31, 2005, more than 25,000 persons participated in Crisis Management Exercises.
The Department is deeply committed to preparing U.S. officials and their families to travel, work and live safely overseas. Through increased security awareness and knowledge of good personal security measures, individuals can effectively "harden" themselves as a target. In FY 2004, over 4,800 U.S. officials and family members were briefed on topics such as personal protective measures, surveillance detection, and/or improvised explosive device awareness. This includes briefings provided to other government agencies, Marine Security Guards and various audiences at FSI (to include the Security Overseas Seminars).

In addition to briefings, two 5-day training programs are directed at reducing the vulnerability of soft targets in our more dangerous overseas environments. The first is DS' Antiterrorism Course (DSAC), which trains on-average 120 U.S. officials and family members each year who are assigned to critical and high threat terrorism posts. DSAC training focuses on surveillance detection, safe haven medical procedures, improvised explosive device awareness and defensive driving. The second of these training programs is the DSAC-Iraq specific course that has been offered nearly weekly since December of 2003 and is mandatory for all U.S. officials assigned to Embassy Baghdad under COM authority. As of June 2005, more than 1,300 individuals have been trained in surveillance detection, safe haven medical procedures, weapons of mass destruction, hostage survival and weapons familiarization.

As employees returned from Iraq, feedback indicated a need to provide an expedited overview of Iraq's area/cultural/language, so employees could put their experience in a context related to that part of the world. The rapid deployment required for Iraq did not provide employees time to attend the lengthier FSI familiarization and area studies and language programs. In October 2004, FSI partnered with DS to add a 3-day area/cultural/language overview to the DSAC-Iraq training making it an 8-day course. Since the integrated training began, 35 sessions have been offered and 613 individuals completed the course.

The Department is exploring the extensive resource implication of mandating counterterrorism training, such as DSAC. Such training will require the recruitment, hiring, and training of additional instructors and support staff; and is dependent upon the use of private training facilities.
that are severely limited in their availability and training capacity. Considerable funding is required to stand up such courses and train the high numbers of U.S. officials and family members going to vulnerable environments.

(6) Track attendance to determine compliance with this new training requirement.

Enrollment and attendance in all FSI training is tracked by the Department’s Student Training Management System (STMS). The Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC) began using the STMS to record training effective March 2005.

(7) Add a “soft target protection” training module to the Ambassadorial training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

The Ambassadorial Seminar includes DS’ soft target protection training.

(8) Add a “soft target protection” training module to the Deputy Chief of Mission training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

The Deputy COMs/Principal Officer Seminar, FSI Crisis Management module, includes soft target protection training.

(9) Add a “soft target protection” training module to the Regional Security Office (RSO) training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy.

A soft target module has been a part of the Basic RSO training since July 2004, and In-Service RSO training since the beginning of FY 2005. All Special Agents in both the Basic and In-Service RSO courses receive a training module on soft target protection. This fiscal year we will train approximately 175 agents in preparation for overseas assignment. In addition, all future Post Security Officer Courses will include a similar soft target module.
III. (10) Fully implement the personal security accountability system that State agreed to implement in response to the 2003 ARB for all embassy officials.

A cable (STATE 120220) was directed to the attention of Chiefs of Missions regarding responsibility for the security of personnel assigned to their posts. Although this information has been released in various forms over the last 18 months, the cable summarizes the changes in personal security policies in response to ARB recommendations and provides resource references. Wide distribution was requested to ensure the information reaches each employee and contractor serving abroad under COM authority.

The importance and responsibility the Department places in the leadership, accountability and management of security at our overseas missions begins at the very top and is emphasized to our COMs through numerous means, including their Letters of Instruction from the President. Every Ambassador and Consul General thoroughly understands his or her security responsibilities. Emergency Action Plans are implemented daily around the world to address all types of situations and threats. One of the most important tools and visible signs of the efforts made to protect our employees and their families are evacuations.

(11) Develop related accountability standards for the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) that can be used to monitor compliance.

Accountability standards for the protection of U.S. officials and their families serving in dangerous environments rely fundamentally on restriction and codify where individuals live, where they work, how and where they travel, and ultimately whether they remain in country at all (3 FAM-Personnel). The protection of our personnel, facilities and information similarly involves not only considerable expense but also significant restrictions on the location and construction of such facilities, as well as detailed technical specifications (12 FAM-Diplomatic Security and 15 FAM-Overseas Building Operations). Based on existing DOS authorities cited in actions 1 and 2 above, additional guidance and FAM modifications to include monitoring compliance with personnel and security regulations are currently being examined by a Department-wide working group.
A balance between living vigilantly and normally must be struck in developing accountability standards to monitor compliance with personal (private, individual and non-public) security beyond those in existence. People do not stay on high alert for long periods of time; they eventually either burn out or live in denial. Scare tactics are ultimately self-defeating, and administrative mandates such as checklists risk becoming rote exercises. Neither paralysis nor indifference is acceptable.

**GAO Report**

As noted in the report, the Department is developing a broad strategy that overlaps existing, expanded, and new interdisciplinary programs to create a security framework to protect U.S. officials and their families from terrorist attacks outside of embassies. We have many programs that are and have been in place and continue to be proactive countermeasures; one of these programs deals specifically with overseas schools. The Department has rolled out an array of security and counterterrorism programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and our personnel and families serving abroad. We must rely upon a multi-layered approach, including awareness training, host government involvement, information sharing, and physical and technical security programs. These programs cut across many Department elements and continue to be refined to address today’s global threats against U.S. interests, which are likely to change at any given moment, at any of more than 200 missions worldwide.

Inherent in the Department’s strategy is an understanding and acceptance of the principle of personal responsibility and self-reliance, both for individuals and institutions overseas. The Department will lead by example, serve as a coordinator and facilitator for threat and security information exchanges, and continue to develop specific security programs within our responsibility.

The Department’s programs and efforts in protecting U.S. officials and their families overseas, both within and outside of our diplomatic missions, are significant and continue to expand. With continued Congressional support we will maintain our existing programs, review of emerging threats, and the countermeasures to deter them. The level of funding and effort we devote to security is a shared responsibility of the Executive Branch and the Congress.
A Cooperative Effort

Throughout the course of the GAO review, the Department has been forthcoming in providing information and access to pertinent records, making its staff available to answer questions, and providing briefings. The GAO staff has been professional in its endeavors and has been receptive to our opinions and justifications. The cooperative effort between the legislative and executive branches throughout this review serves as a model for future work.

We hope that this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Matthew A. Reynolds
Acting Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
Senate Report 108-344

U.S. Department of State
Strategy on Soft Targets
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STRATEGY ON SOFT TARGETS

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to report to the Senate Appropriations Committee (S. Report 108-344 dated 09/15/04) on our strategy for addressing the soft target threat. This strategy is a combination of programs the Department has had in place for years to protect our personnel from terrorist attacks, including outreach programs to the private sector, and the development of several new initiatives.

For many years, but especially since the East African embassy bombings in 1998, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and many other elements of the Department of State have rolled out a robust array of security and counterterrorism programs to address the threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities, our personnel and families, and other Americans abroad. The term "soft target" in itself may be a fairly recent addition to the lexicon of the Department, but the meaning and programs designed to deter the soft target threat are not.

The modern incarnation of the Diplomatic Security Service and the vast majority of our global security programs originated with the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-399; 22 U.S.C. 4801, et seq. (1986)), as amended. Our efforts were re-energized following the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August 1998. The tragic attacks of September 2001 are often referred to as the event that catapulted terrorism into the forefront of U.S. policy. Funding and legislation following these events provided many of the tools we use today to address the global terrorism threat abroad.

In today's world the threat of terrorist acts against our people and facilities remains high. Since 9/11 the U.S. Government has implemented an aggressive action plan to root out terror and the sources of terror wherever they have taken hold. Often our diplomats are on the front lines of this fight, and the Department, our overseas missions, the U.S. intelligence community, and various host government intelligence and security services are continuously evaluating threat information, including threats to soft targets.

The linchpin in our overall strategy to address terrorism globally is our program to harden and replace our embassies and consulates, seen as the traditional symbols of U.S. overseas presence. Since 1999, Congress has provided funding to implement security upgrades and enhancements at our facilities to the extent possible, but we simply could not erase critical vulnerabilities such as lack of
setback and weak blast resistance. We are now engaged in a long-term capital
security construction program, generously funded by the Congress, to replace 180
of our most vulnerable facilities worldwide. American embassies and consulates
are more than just symbolic targets: they are the essential platforms from which we
conduct diplomacy, consular affairs, commerce and trade, security, law
enforcement, global health issues, and myriad other national security programs in
foreign countries. Our embassies and consulates are critical offshore installations
from which we coordinate the global war on terrorism with our allies. As the
Administration and Congress have so aptly recognized, protection of the homeland
needs to start abroad, not just at our borders.

Historically, most major attacks and threats have been aimed at our official
facilities, and without modern security safeguards these attacks would be
catastrophic. However, Al Qaeda and other terror groups will attack soft targets
when other, more hardened assets prove too difficult. Well before the global Al
Qaeda threat, we implemented programs overseas to protect and educate our
officers, their family members, and private American citizens on the terrorist
threat. These programs cut across many Department elements and continue to be
refined to address today’s global threat against U.S. interests.

Overall Strategy for Protection of Soft Targets

Inherent in the Department’s strategy is an understanding and acceptance of
the principle of personal responsibility and self-reliance, both for individuals and
institutions overseas. The Department will lead by example, serve as a coordinator
and facilitator for threat and security information exchanges, and develop and
institute specific security programs where our responsibility calls for it.

As we have stated in Congressional testimony, most recently in May 2005,
before the House Committee on Government Reform, the Department generally
sees the soft target program divided into two major areas, although some programs
overlap and benefit each other. The two areas are:

—Private Americans traveling and/or working overseas.

—U.S. Government employees and their families while outside of embassies,
consulates, and other hardened facilities.

(N.B. A third category—protection of U.S. Department of Defense personnel
under regional combatant command while not in hardened facilities—is not in our
purview. It remains the responsibility of the relevant U.S. regional area combatant commander.)

The protection of private Americans traveling and working overseas has long been a consular mission of the Department of State.

Apart from certain exceptional cases, the Department has neither the statutory authority nor the financial means to provide actual physical protection to American individuals, companies, or institutions overseas. Moreover, since most effective security procedures are ones of limitations (e.g., restricting locations where people can go, or when they can go, in a certain country; restricting when or in what manner they must travel; or insisting that they install recommended security devices or systems in homes, businesses, or institutions), it would not be appropriate for the Department of State to treat private American citizens like U.S. Government employees.

Protection of private American citizens begins with providing the best information we can about threats to safety and security to Americans using a variety of communication tools. The Department's Consular Information Program provides timely and effective information that is widely distributed in a variety of ways, including consular notices and travel warnings, to Americans both before departure and while abroad. Guidance includes information on local conditions, security situations, and known threats of crime, terrorism, or instability. In extreme cases, passport limitations may apply.

Diplomatic Security is the overall coordinator for another truly successful operation—the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), the premier public/private partnership on security today. OSAC, with over 100 individual country councils active today, provides a regular and timely exchange of information between the American private sector and the Department concerning developments in the overseas security environment, best practices to mitigate risks, and recommended methods and materials for coordinating security planning, and recommended methods for protecting the competitiveness of American businesses operating overseas.

For American citizens already in country, both the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security have skilled personnel serving abroad who are available to give advice or counsel. Depending on the country and the circumstances, various consular programs assist Americans with their
protection, including registration with the embassy, notification networks, and, if necessary, evacuation.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security also provides, in some cases, advice on facilities and program security for private American activities. Historically this has tended to be limited to larger and more visible symbolic targets, such as the Olympics.

Certain programs are designed to protect U.S. Government employees and their dependents overseas, such as the Soft Targets Program coordinated by Overseas Building Operations Bureau (OBO). As discussed below, the Department has given security grants to overseas schools attended by U.S. Government employee dependents, which also protects other American children in these schools.

Programs in Place That Protect Official Americans as Soft Targets

With respect to protection of U.S. Government employees and their families while outside of embassies, consulates, and other hardened facilities, the Department exercises greater authority and has a more direct responsibility. As Americans and their families serving abroad at embassies and consulates are highly symbolic representatives of our government, they likewise are higher priority targets for terrorists and other disaffected individuals and groups who perceive the United States as an enemy. We have a wide variety of programs in place to protect these essential personnel assets as well.

A critical element of our program to protect our employees, their families, and our official facilities, and a key element of our soft targets strategy, is our security, law enforcement, and intelligence relationship with host governments. Host country police, security, and intelligence forces are in many instances the first line of defense in protecting us against potential threats. Cultivating and developing liaison relationships with host government security services is a core function of our Regional Security Officers (RSOs) and other elements within the mission. RSOs spend a great deal of time and energy working to improve the capabilities of the local police. In many countries, the police and security services are excellent, but overall their capabilities can be uneven.

Looking at our own security resources, we start with our RSOs. Today we have 500 RSOs at nearly 200 missions worldwide. Many of these positions were created following the "lessons learned" from the East African embassy bombings.
Each RSO serves as the professional adviser to the Chief of Mission (COM) on all security matters and, together with the COM, is responsible under law and regulation for the security of personnel under COM authority.

One of the most important functions an RSO performs is developing post-specific briefings and security programs tailored to the threat environment. Every diplomatic mission has thoroughly researched and categorized threat ratings for transnational terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence, crime, and counterintelligence and technical intelligence threats. The first four drive resources for security programs on everything from residential security and local guards to surveillance detection, protection of key mission officials, extensive briefings for staff and families, private sector liaison, physical security of all diplomatic facilities, armored vehicles, and staffing levels.

The Emergency Action Committee (EAC) is an organization established at every post by the COM to direct and coordinate the post's response to contingencies. EACs play a critical role in the development of post Emergency Action Plans (EAPs). EAPs map out how posts and the Department address all types of situations and threats. In today's world, the EAP covers a wide spectrum, including terrorist threats and bombings, chemical, biological, or radiological incidents, aviation and natural disasters, authorized or ordered departures, and post evacuations. These plans are executed at our missions and are routinely part of the post-specific security-briefing program for employees and family members. Overseas schools have always been linked closely with the overall security of missions, and we expect this relationship to grow even closer.

Overseas schools attended by mission family members are now being formally added to our EAP, and future post-specific emergency plans will include physical security features, vulnerability, security plans and procedures, and emergency drills at the schools. It is telling that a recent study by the Foreign Service Institute showed that, of the Foreign Service Generalists who have been in the Service for 15 years or more, 87% have been directly affected by a crisis, as defined in the Department's Emergency Planning Handbook.

The Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, or ATA, is an essential element in helping partner countries combat terrorism with the training, equipment, and technology they need to carry the fight to the terrorists. ATA training for host government security officials helps to ensure the safety not only of our American diplomats but of all Americans traveling into these countries.
The Department's programs and efforts in protecting our employees and families overseas, outside of our diplomatic missions, are significant and continue to be refined. Since the East Africa embassy bombings, many existing programs have been enhanced and new ones created to address emerging threats. Results from Accountability Review Boards, Inspector General recommendations, and advice given to us from the Government Accountability Office have been incorporated. We deeply appreciate the past and continued support of Congress in this ongoing effort.

Highlights of the Department's Efforts Over the Past Seven Years

Since the East Africa bombings in August 1998, we have:

—Commenced a worldwide surveillance detection program, primarily focused on our official facilities but also available to be adjusted to non-official facilities depending on threat information and the local security environment.

—Delivered over 1,500 armored vehicles to our posts overseas, to provide the ability to transport our people safely in heightened threat conditions.

—Instituted a comprehensive chemical/biological/radiological protection program, providing escape masks and equipment for our personnel overseas and the training necessary to use the equipment.

—Provided local guards, roving patrols, and react teams at our residences according to threat ratings, costing in excess of $100 million in FY 2005.

—Provided residential security upgrades to over 13,000 residences overseas, including window grilles, security doors, alarms, safe havens, and lighting. Determinations of these upgrades are based upon the threat environment at a particular post. Although traditionally these countermeasures have been viewed as crime deterrents, they serve a dual purpose in hardening our homes overseas to terrorist threats.

—Under the guidance of the Department-wide Soft Target Working Group (STWG) chaired by OBO, funded grants of more than $34 million to overseas schools for security enhancements. As of June 2005:
  • Phase I, funded at $10.5 million, provided basic security upgrades—shatter-resistant window film, public address warning systems, and radio
communications—to 181 of 189 schools that receive educational grants from the Department.

• Phase II, funded at $17.1 million, provided over 500 advanced security upgrades (such as perimeter walls, fences, and window grilles) to 160 Department-grant schools.

• Phase III is providing basic security upgrades to schools that do not receive educational grants from the Department but are attended by USG dependents and other American children. Grants have been issued to 152 schools for $6.7 million; requests of $1.7 million are pending from another 30 schools.

• Phase IV will provide the same advanced security upgrades as Phase II for non-grant schools and will be introduced when Phase III funding is largely complete.

—Expended over $10 million on long-term residential security improvements since 2003 through OBO’s residential security facilities program.

—Enhanced the Department’s Foreign Service Institute’s (FSI) Crisis Management Exercise Program. In the past year alone, FSI has provided training in crisis management to 115 posts and nearly 10,200 staff. Included in our crisis management exercise program is a module on soft targets. Post management is also encouraged to invite representatives from overseas schools, American businesses, and host governments to participate.

—Made available online a series of training scenarios that Foreign Service posts can use to conduct their own crisis management exercises, supplementing the training provided by FSI.

—Mandated that all employees going abroad take the Foreign Service Institute’s two-day personal security training course, called the Security Overseas Seminar (SOS) since 1986. The Department also mandates that employees must take the one-day Advanced Security Overseas Seminar (ASOS) every five years as a refresher. From FY 1999 to March 31, 2005, more than 15,000 persons have completed FSI’s SOSs.

—Mandated, by the Department’s Executive Secretary, that all agencies and organizations who have personnel who fall under COM authority must either send individuals to FSI’s Security Abroad for Employees, a combination of SOS and Working in an Embassy courses, or certify that they had similar training for their employees who are being assigned abroad.
—Conducted 28 mobile training visits to 68 posts since 2003. This training, provided to all members of the embassy community, addresses a wide range of defensive measures that employees can use to counter and respond to incidents of crime and terrorism; it also covers emergency medical response.

As these programs demonstrate, the Department recognizes that the potential targets of terrorists go well beyond our hardened diplomatic facilities. Our strategy remains one of overlapping and complementary security layers.

Fundamental to the success of all of these efforts is the importance of leadership, accountability, and management of security at our overseas missions. Responsibility begins at the very top and is emphasized to our COMs through numerous means, including their Letters of Instruction from the President.

Hands-on training is a vital component for an effective security program. The Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Course (DSAC) is an elective course offered to our officers who are assigned to critical threat level posts. In 2003 and 2004, 239 officers attended this course, and it will be offered seven times this summer. With the advent of Iraq operations, the course was modified to Iraq-specific considerations, and the Department made it mandatory for anyone serving under the COM in Iraq. Since December 2003, 1,193 personnel have attended 67 offerings of this course. We received almost immediate feedback that the training was timely, necessary, and on target. It has already saved lives, and the consensus among various Department elements is that the dangers of serving abroad in this age will increasingly require training, as opposed to briefings, to prepare our employees and families properly. The ability to stand up such courses and train the high numbers of personnel going to vulnerable environments requires resources.

We continue to expand FSI and DS training for Department personnel across a full range of security and crisis management areas within our budget capability and training facility capacity, and we are fine tuning specific training programs for employees under COM authority. High threat training for DS personnel assigned to war zones and critical threat terrorist areas is mandatory. Post specific security training and briefing programs are also a core element of a mission’s overall security program. In addition, a “soft target protection” module has been incorporated into RSO training, and the Department is adding similar training to FSI’s Ambassadorial and Deputy COM training to promote the security of U.S. officials and their families outside the embassy. We have incorporated overseas schools attended by mission family members into our revised Emergency Action Planning process.
Partly as a result of these training programs, every Ambassador and Consul General today understands thoroughly his or her security responsibilities. These responsibilities are not hypothetical; EAPs are implemented daily around the world. One of the most important tools and visible signs of the efforts made to protect our employees and families is evacuation. When the threat is too high, tripwires are crossed, or political violence or local instability is too dangerous, we move non-essential employees and families out of harm’s way. In today's world we have averaged one authorized or ordered departure from a post every three and a half weeks over the past 16 years. Another sign of the challenging times we live and work in overseas is the large number of posts we currently have in drawdown or unaccompanied status, which we expect will continue for some time.

Our personnel overseas have remained at a heightened threat status since 1998. We have taken significant steps to harden our facilities and prepare our personnel for a wide variety of contingencies ranging from suicide car bombings and anthrax contamination to an attack on a soft target. In the near and mid-term, we see the global terror threat against U.S. interests abroad continuing. The steps we have taken to secure our official facilities and our personnel and to protect them in soft target environments are significant. We have accomplished much in our ongoing work to detect and deter threats.

**The Path Forward**

The Department recognizes that it must continue to focus on providing as safe and secure an environment as possible for our staffs, their families, and other Americans living and working abroad. The constant threat to official and non-official Americans overseas is a significant challenge to all involved. The universe of potential soft targets is immense. Providing a security solution for every conceivable threat is simply not possible, even if unlimited resources were made available. The foreign policy priorities of our nation require us to work in some the world’s most dangerous security environments. Nevertheless, we are constantly looking for ways to improve our security programs and make our personnel, their families, and all Americans overseas safer.

To this end, the Department is moving forward with initiatives to enhance our overall strategy in protecting staff and family members in soft target areas, such as:
—Expanding post-specific briefings programs tailored to potential soft target areas to be mandatory for all staff and family members.

—Enhancing liaison with host government security, intelligence, and police services on soft target awareness and potential countermeasures.

—Creating an interagency Soft Targets Coordinating Committee through the Overseas Security Policy Board to review soft target issues and vulnerabilities with regard to employees and family members of all USG agencies abroad. Through this interagency process, security standards would be revised as required to address potential threats across a host of security programs.

—Continuing our close working relationship with overseas schools on physical security projects and emergency plans, procedures, and security.

Other possible initiatives that the Department will evaluate include:

—DSAC training for all employees under COM authority assigned to critical threat posts, because security and counterterrorism training is a vital part of the overall strategy to prepare our personnel and families to live and work overseas.

—Assessing the effectiveness of regularizing the surveillance detection program as an instrumental deterrence against potential terrorist attacks at residences and other soft target areas.

—An analysis to develop a methodology and begin identifying highly visible, symbolically American non-government locations that might attract terrorist attack.

The Department has taken significant measures to protect U.S. personnel, their families, and other Americans abroad within the limits of its statutory authorities, and it will continue to expand and refine programs as required. In this war on terror, we have relied upon a multi-layered approach, including awareness training, host government involvement, information sharing, and physical and technical security programs, as well as partnerships with the private sector. With the continued support of Congress, we will maintain our existing programs and look forward to implementing new ones to protect our direct-hire employees, their families and dependents, and American citizens traveling and working abroad.
Mr. COSTA. OK. Thank you.

Ambassador, your comments in your report was finding a right balance between living vigilantly and living normally. And I guess my question for all the panelists would be, how do we do that? How do we find the right balance between living vigilantly and living normally? Mr. Ford. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. In some respects I have to go back to what I keep saying: We have to recognize the reality of what it is that Foreign Service people are facing. Therefore, you begin, A, with an understanding when you join the Department of State that you are getting yourself into a dangerous occupation. B, you begin your training. There’s the street, lots of traffic, look both ways. Right? You turn your head to the left, you turn your head to the right. So you begin to train people so that some responses become absolutely automatic.

I think it is also a leadership issue in which we begin to look at what does the leadership need to do or learn in terms of how people pulse? You cannot keep people in a hot environment all the time. Sometimes they need to leave. Maybe they need a place to recreate which is very, very safe.

This is a new world for us. It’s going to take time. I think there are answers out there, there are people who have done a lot of research, and we need to begin to look in that research, but we’re never going to do it until and unless we recognize the kind of business we are in.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you.

Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Yes. I would like to comment on that. I think that, again, based on the trips we took to five posts, there are some things that staff overseas, I think, need to be reminded of from time to time, and a lot of it has to do with basic self-awareness, awareness of what’s around you, your work habits in terms of when you go to work, the way you go to work. And I also believe that given the high level of turnover at overseas posts and the fact that many of the people that have served there are non-State Department people, that the supervisor level at the post needs to make that a priority to reinforce security awareness to their staffs, because, again, unfortunately, we talked to quite a few people overseas at these posts, and while they all acknowledge that they receive the training—the briefings and some training in headquarters, a lot of them told us, frankly, they weren’t following some of the basic precepts that they should be following.

So there needs to be reinforcement. I believe that reinforcement should be at the senior level at each of the embassies, and I think that it ought to encompass all of the employees there, not just the State Department. I think the State Department employees we interviewed tended to be a little more aware than some of the others.

Mr. SHAYS. I would like to just pursue that because it was mentioned more than once. Ambassador, in Kenya, was the average about what it is in other places, about 50 percent non-State Department, or were most in Kenya State Department?
Ambassador Bushnell. State Department representation was about one-third of the mission; two-thirds to overseas generally are other agencies.

Mr. Shays. So it was typical of the averages. I was understating it then.

So you have people from the FBI, from Commerce, from Environmental Protection potentially, from the Agency, frankly, and others, no secret. You have people from lots of different responsibilities. Now, Mr. Starr, are they given the same training that would be given? There's always sometimes a question of whether the Ambassador has the kind of control over these individuals that you need to. But are they given the same kind of training, or are they kind of on their own?

Mr. Starr. Two-part answer, sir. At the current time when we are doing the briefing program for the most part for most of our people that are going overseas, agencies have the ability to either self-certify that they give the same type of briefings that we give at the Foreign Service Institute, the security overseas seminar or the SAFE program, or their personnel attend the Foreign Service Institute training programs before they go overseas. So in certain agencies, if it’s an FBI agent who is already trained in counterterrorism, who already has a lot of that training, the FBI, Justice Department may self-certify that their people have the level of training. AID people or people from CDC or other agencies that don’t have that thing attend our Foreign Service Institute and the training programs.

Mr. Shays. When they’re overseas?

Mr. Starr. And when they’re overseas, they are briefed exactly the same as every single person who comes into post. Every person under the Chief of Mission gets an arrival briefing when they come in and the refresher briefings.

Mr. Shays. I think Mr. Costa still needs you to answer his question. But let me pursue this question that I’m asking now. Ambassador, is there anything you would add to the non-State Department employees?

Ambassador Bushnell. In theory, the Chief of Mission can agree or not agree to allow every person who works for the Federal Government to the post. We run the Ambassadorial seminar, and one of the things that I urge the people going through the Ambassadorial seminar to do is to deny country clearance, as we call it, to people who have not—other agencies who have not gone through mandatory training, and that’s the way we can control that.

Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.

Mr. Starr. Sir, may I add one thing? The DSAC training that we are doing, the specific security, antiterrorism training that we give to everyone before they go to Iraq, that is for every single agency going to that country under Chief of Mission.

Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Costa.

Mr. Costa. Thank you. Just, Mr. Starr and Mr. Miller, the question again was how do you teach people to find the right balance between living vigilantly and normally? And, Mr. Starr and Mr. Miller, if you could also address that perhaps from the point of view of children as well? But, Mr. Starr?
Mr. **Starr**. I believe that’s the difference between briefing and training. I believe that when you train somebody and you refresh them often enough, they don’t have to be vigilant 24 hours a day, but they are engrained with the right types of habits. It is that example that Ambassador Bushnell pointed out: When you get to a street, you look both ways. If you are trained to do it, you will do it. If you are trained to pick up countersurveillance training, I think you will have a better chance of doing it. And that, I think, is the real difference between a briefing program and actual hands-on training before you go overseas.

Mr. **Costa**. Thank you.

Mr. **Miller**.

Mr. **Miller**. When you are working with children, the best way is to model it. It’s the way you conduct yourself as parents and the way you conduct yourself as school officials.

There’s the danger of overdoing the comments about danger. I sometimes think of the pictures of missing children on milk cartons in the morning. I think we sometimes do more harm than good. And so my answer is training the adults to provide the proper modeling for children.

Mr. **Costa**. Thank you.

I would just like to point out, I actually had the opportunity to take the DSAC training several years ago. It was very impressive. And based on my experience as well, I see particularly the first few days of that training as being pretty critical to anybody going overseas. I can’t emphasize that enough.

And I’m done. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Shays**. So, let me end by asking: Is there anything that we should have asked that we didn’t? First off, no, let me do this. Is there anywhere where you disagree with anything another panelist has said that you just want to put on the record? I will conclude that you don’t disagree if I don’t get this answer. So you understand the importance of answering that question. Silence means you agree.

Is there anything, Mr. Ford, that you heard that you just feel needs to be stated that you disagree with?

Mr. **Ford**. No, sir.

Mr. **Shays**. Mr. Starr.

Mr. **Starr**. No, sir.

Mr. **Shays**. Ambassador.

Ambassador **Bushnell**. No.

Mr. **Shays**. Mr. Miller.

Mr. **Miller**. No.

Mr. **Shays**. Thank you.

Then finally this last question: Is there anything we need to put on the record that we haven’t? We will start with you, Mr. Miller. We didn’t talk much about schools. I will tell you one reason we didn’t. I didn’t choose to talk about vulnerabilities at schools. I’m not going to, some of it is intuitive, but frankly that’s a discussion I will make sure that my staff has with you. I don’t care to have publicly discussed all the ways that schools could be vulnerable. But is there anything on the record you want to put on? Anything you want to put on the record?
Mr. MILLER. Well, I'd put on the record that it's been a long time coming that there is this kind of interest in schools and the protection, and it's come very, very generously, in our opinion, and our office and these schools overseas are appreciative. We've had a 100 percent positive response. And we all know that there's a lot more to be done, and I think we've gotten off to a good start.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Mr. Chairman, I can't resist, so here goes. How do we recognize and take care of the psychological impact on employees and family members of living constantly with the stress of possibly being a soft or hard target? Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, do you think there is something we can do that we are not doing?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. I think there's a great deal of literature on how human beings react to extreme stress. I found out when I was trying to figure out what in the world was happening to my community in Kenya after the bombing. And that literature that exists in—with the military, that exists with the people who deal with disasters has not yet moved into the mainstream or the Department.

Mr. SHAYS. So we deal with how other professions deal with stress like this, the military and so on. And their point is they are in the line of fire, and we need to be doing that for the State Department and other people who work in the embassies. That's what I'm hearing you say?

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Both to use what the knowledge we have and the best practices that are out there; and also, if there is not knowledge or best practice, to try and find it from our group, because what happens to us ultimately happens to the American people.

Mr. SHAYS. So what I'm hearing you say just—and correct me if I'm wrong. I'm hearing you basically say there are people who have gone through this experience that aren't being spoken to, not being consulted with, not being asked, not being monitored in some cases. And I'm hearing you say that there's scars out there that haven't healed.

Ambassador BUSHNELL. Possibly damage. There are also things we could learn from other people. But to suck it up and move on, which is essentially what we do, is to not learn a whole lot nor to appreciate the possible toll that it's taking, or even to celebrate what people have gone through and withstood.

Mr. SHAYS. You have given me a lot to think about, thank you, and my staff.

Mr. Starr, anything we need to put on the record?

Mr. STARR. No, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And I think—was I going the wrong way? Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Given the previous comment made by Ambassador Bushnell, I'm not sure who sits on the working group for the State Department soft-target strategy, but I'm wondering whether someone with the background that she's articulated ought to be considered to be a part of that other than just the security experts. So my comment has to do with making sure that the people who are
going to make future decisions on what our strategy is going to be have taken into consideration some of those perspectives.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say in my own words what I’m hearing you basically say is on that council, if we are just having people who have a military police background and not include issues that the Ambassador’s raised, then it’s a committee that may need to be expanded or——

Mr. FORD. Well, I’m not sure of the makeup of the working group, but—I would defer to Mr. Starr. But I believe that if, in fact, they don’t have someone on that working group that has some awareness of that perspective, that perhaps they ought to consider including them so you will have a little broader discussion on it.

Mr. SHAYS. Great. Thank you.
I think this panel has been very helpful to the subcommittee, and we do appreciate each and every one of you being here. And, Ambassador, particularly thank you for your candidness and for giving this hearing a bit more reality. Thank you very much. Thank you all. Thank you all for your good work and your service to a magnificent country. Thank you.
Our next panel and final panel is Ambassador Wesley W. Egan, retired; Ambassador John W. Limbert; and Mr. Joseph Petro, executive vice president and managing director, Citigroup Security and Investigative Services, Citigroup.
So, Ambassador Egan, we have you right there. That’s good. You can stay standing because I’m going to swear you in. As you know, this being an investigative committee, we swear in all our witnesses and ask you to raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record all three witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
I will just point out that your entire statement will be submitted into the record. Also, you may have heard points that you—from the first panel that you wish to incorporate in your statements, so feel free.
We are just going to go as you sit. Ambassador Egan, we will go with you first. I don’t know why I said retired. I never think of Ambassadors as retired. OK.
Ambassador Egan. It does happen. You actually do have that title.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.
Ambassador Egan. Well, technically you don’t carry the title in a formal way for life unless you retired at the rank of career Ambassador.

Mr. SHAYS. I got you.
Ambassador Egan. But if you served as a Chief of Mission on one or more occasions, the title is often extended as a courtesy.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, thank you all for your work. And you are an excellent panel. We look forward to your testimony. Ambassador Egan, you go first.
STATEMENTS OF AMBASSADOR WESLEY W. EGAN, RET.,
CHAIRMAN, 2003 FOLEY ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD;
AMBASSADOR JOHN W. LIMBERT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION; AND JOSEPH PETRO, EX-
ECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND MANAGING DIRECTOR,
CITIGROUP SECURITY AND INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES,
CITIGROUP

STATEMENT OF WESLEY W. EGAN

Ambassador Egan. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommit-
tee, in 2003 I chaired an accountability review board to examine
the circumstances of the October 2002 murder of Laurence Foley,
the USAID executive officer at the American Embassy in Amman,
Jordan. I'd like to summarize the testimony I submitted earlier in
response to your invitation to testify this afternoon.

Our board made two recommendations. The first was that the
Secretary of State convene a special commission to make rec-
nommendations to improve the personal security of all personnel
serving abroad under the authority of the Chief of Mission regard-
less of department or agency affiliation. The second recommenda-
tion was that the embassy in Amman take several specific steps to
improve personal and residential security.

I believe the Department and the embassy accepted and have
begun to implement most of those post-specific recommendations. I
also understand that the Department has decided to implement
some of those recommendations at other overseas posts.

With respect to the first recommendation, however, the Depart-
ment of State informed the Congress in June 2003 that it agreed
with the spirit and the intent of the recommendation, but that it
did not agree that it was necessary to convene a special commis-
sion. Rather, the Department reported that the existing Overseas
Policy Security Board and the Overseas Security Advisory Council
would be asked to review the Department’s implementation of our
recommendations and to advise whether it would be worthwhile to
convene such a commission. I do not know what action those
groups have taken or recommended.

This recommendation, the first recommendation, reflected our
concern that there are no government-wide standards for briefing,
training, or selecting U.S. Government personnel and contract em-
ployees for long-term or temporary duty at posts with a high or
critical threat rating for terrorism. This is especially troubling
when you consider that there are over 50,000 people in 180 coun-
tries working at over 260 diplomatic and consular facilities, and
that over 50 percent of those facilities are now rated as subject to
a high or critical threat for terrorism.

At the time of the board’s visit to Amman in February 2003, the
embassy was a good example of a modern, busy, high-threat and
growing multiagency post. The Ambassador’s staff included 140 di-
rect hire American personnel representing 10 Federal agencies and
departments, over 350 personnel on temporary duty, more than 70
contract employees, over 200 family members, and approximately
200 Jordanian staff. In addition, the embassy compound was one
of the first constructed to Inman standards as recommended in the
1985 report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas
Security, the Inman Commission. In short, the embassy was a fortress.

We found, however, that despite a high level of security awareness, personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission for whose security and well-being the Ambassador bears ultimate responsibility had not received the same or in many cases even similar security preparation before arriving at post. Personnel who arrived in Amman directly from other overseas assignments often received no special security preparation at all. Most contract employees received little or no security-related training or preparation unless required by their contracts. And there was no mechanism to ensure that different agency contracts included such a requirement. For most of those who received security training, it was not specific to Jordan.

The embassy post report made no mention of security considerations or the growing terrorist threat. The Ambassador, his regional security officer, and the rest of his senior staff did not generally know what, if any, security preparation American staff and dependents had received before arriving at post. And yet, all Americans at post, regardless of their employment status and department or agency affiliation, were vulnerable to the same threat.

There had been a marked increase in threat reporting available to the embassy beginning with the millennium plot in 1999, which indicated a growing threat against American targets outside the heavily protected chancery compound. The reporting was sufficiently credible that the Community Counterterrorism Board called for a special community advisory, a special Intelligence Community advisory, on Jordan in early 2002. That advisory underscored that these threats deserved special attention. The frequency of guidance from post management to embassy personnel and the larger American community on how to respond increased as a result. There were approximately 25 such advisory communications to personnel and the American community between February and December 2002. The specificity, tone, and nature of the countermeasures recommended, however, did not change notably.

We were also troubled that, despite the increasing threat, many Washington officials and embassy personnel considered personal security a matter of personal choice. In my view, this reflects an attitude probably more common among civilian than military personnel that we cannot afford.

The killing of an American representative overseas is not a personal or a private matter. Personnel selected for assignment overseas, but especially for duty at high and critical-threat posts, should be just as accountable for their conduct when it comes to personal security preparedness as they are for other aspects of their professional and personal behavior.

Over the years we have made our facilities harder to attack, so it's not surprising that the vast majority of attacks against U.S. Government personnel have occurred outside our protected buildings and facilities. Tragically, when they are outside their hardened offices, which is where most of their most important work is, in fact, done, they are soft-targets. And, sadly there have been several ARBs convened since our work in 2003.
By temperament and training some personnel deal effectively with threatening environments, and some do not. Before 1985, existing groups in the foreign affairs community had been unable or unmotivated to make sweeping changes such as those recommended by the Inman Commission. So, too, we thought an Inman-like commission could challenge the foreign affairs community to look at recruitment, training and assignments, personal security countermeasures, and the accountability of personnel for the implementation of such measures in new ways to improve the ability of our people to survive in an increasingly hostile overseas environment. Inman helped us harden our facilities. We thought we needed something like the Inman Commission to help us harden our personnel.

No combination of security awareness, training standards, preparedness, or accountability can guarantee the protection of our people and our facilities. Human nature being what it is, security is inconvenient, especially for those unaccustomed to being targets. And there's no doubt that those who attack us will be quick to modify their tactics in response to our countermeasures. My colleagues and I thought, however, that we had identified problems that were widespread and that required a new approach. It may well be that 20 years after the work of Admiral Inman's commission, existing tools like the Overseas Policy Security Board and the Overseas Security Advisory Council can design an effective interagency approach for the protection of those who represent us abroad. I don't know, but there is no doubt in my mind that we need to do better.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Ambassador. And thank you for your good work.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Egan follows:]
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee.

In 2003 I chaired an Accountability Review Board (ARB) to examine the circumstances of the October 2002 murder of Laurence Foley, the USAID executive officer at the American Embassy in Amman, Jordan. The Board was charged by Secretary of State Powell to determine whether sufficient security systems for the protection of embassy personnel were in place and properly implemented at the time of Mr. Foley’s murder, whether his murder was security related, and whether any member of the embassy staff was culpable in his death.

We found:

That Mr. Foley’s death was security related;

That the security procedures in place at the time of his death met the Department of State’s standards for a high terrorist threat post;

That the growing threat to Americans in Jordan was regularly discussed with all agencies at post and was the basis for timely guidance to official personnel and the unofficial American community;

That many personnel, including Larry Foley, did not implement the security countermeasures recommended by post management; and

That no United States Government employee was culpable in Mr. Foley's death.

The ARB made two recommendations. The first was that the Secretary of State convene a special commission to make recommendations to improve the personal security of all US Government employees serving abroad, regardless of department or agency affiliation, under the authority of the chief of mission, especially when outside of hardened facilities.

The second recommendation was that the Embassy in Amman take several steps to improve personal security countermeasures, security briefings and guidance, and residential security.

I believe the Department and the Embassy accepted and have begun to implement most of those post-specific recommendations. I also understand that the Department has decided to implement some of those recommendations at other overseas posts.

With respect to the first recommendation, however, the Department of State informed the Congress in June 2003 that while it agreed with the spirit and intent of the recommendation, it did not agree that it was necessary to convene another special commission. Rather, the Department reported that the existing Overseas Policy Security Board and the Overseas Security Advisory Council would be asked to review the Department’s actions to implement the ARB recommendations and to advise whether it would be worthwhile to convene such a special commission. I do not know what action those groups have taken or recommended.

The report’s first recommendation reflected our concern that there were no agreed Government-wide standards for briefing, training, or selecting USG personnel and contract employees,
regardless of agency affiliation, for long-term or temporary assignment to posts with a high or critical threat rating for terrorism. This is especially troubling when you consider that there are over 50,000 people in 180 countries working at over 260 diplomatic, consular and other special purpose facilities, and that over 50% of those facilities are rated as subject to a high or critical threat of terrorism.

Amman was a good example of a busy, modern, high-threat, and growing multi-agency post. At the time of the Board’s visit in February 2003, the Ambassador’s staff included 140 direct hire American personnel representing ten federal agencies and departments, over 350 personnel on temporary duty, more than 70 contract employees, over 200 family members, and approximately 200 Jordanian staff. The Embassy compound was also one of the first constructed to “Inman” standards as recommended in the report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, the “Inman Commission,” in 1985. It was a fortress.

But we found that personnel under the authority of the chief of mission, and for whose security and well being the Ambassador bears ultimate responsibility, did not receive the same or in many cases even similar security preparation for service in Amman.

Personnel who arrived at post from other overseas assignments often received no special security preparation at all.

Most contract employees received little or no security-related training or preparation unless required by their contracts, and there was no mechanism to ensure that different agency contracts included such a requirement.

For most of those who received security training, it was not specific to Jordan.

The Embassy post report made no mention of security considerations or the growing terrorist threat.

The Ambassador, his regional security officer, and the rest of his senior staff did not generally know what, if any, security preparation American staff and dependents received before arrival at post.

And yet all Americans at post, regardless of their employment status and regardless of their department or agency affiliation, were vulnerable to the same threat.

There had been a marked increase in threat reporting collected by or available to the embassy, beginning with the “Millennium Plot” in late 1999, which indicated a growing vulnerability of American targets outside the heavily protected Chancery compound. The increase was sufficiently striking that the Community Counterterrorism Board (CCB) called for a special “Intelligence Community Advisory” on Jordan in early 2002 which underscored that these threats deserved special attention. The frequency of guidance from post management to embassy personnel and the larger American community on how to respond to those threats also increased. There were approximately 25 such communications between February and December of 2002. The specificity, tone, and nature of the countermeasures recommended, however, did not change
noticably.

We were troubled that many Washington and Embassy personnel, despite the increasing threat, considered personal security a matter of personal choice. The Embassy set the standards for residential security, but it was not unusual for personnel to not use alarm systems or to modify security patrol procedures to avoid inconvenience to the household. Post management repeatedly emphasized the need to take personnel security countermeasures and some personnel might therefore vary their timing and route to work and other regular destinations, but many did not. Supervisors exhorted their staff to implement good personal security countermeasures, but few of them took it upon themselves to monitor compliance.

In my view this is an attitude, probably one more common among civilian than military personnel, that we can not afford. The killing of an American representative overseas is not a personal or private matter. Personnel selected for assignment overseas, but especially at high and critical threat posts, must use every tool available to protect themselves and their ability to conduct the nation’s business. They should be just as accountable for their conduct when it comes to security preparedness as they are for other aspects of personal and professional behavior.

Over the years we have made our facilities overseas harder to attack. So it is not surprising that the vast majority of attacks against US Government personnel have occurred outside our protected buildings and compounds. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat against American personnel has grown and the number of Americans representing the United States abroad has also grown. Tragically, when they are outside their hardened offices, where much of their most important work is done, they are “soft targets.” And sadly, there have been several new ARBs convened since our work in 2003.

By temperament and training, some personnel deal effectively with threatening environments. Some do not. All the more reason, in our view, to recommend that the Department of State convene what in effect would be an Inman Commission for people. The 1985 Inman Commission concentrated on organizational issues, the standards for security professionals, counterterrorism efforts, intelligence and alert procedures, physical security standards, and buildings. We thought a similar initiative could do for personal security what Inman had done for organization and building security standards.

Inman hardened our facilities. We thought we needed something like Inman to harden our personnel.

Existing groups in the foreign affairs community had been unable or unmotivated to make sweeping changes such as those recommended by the Inman Commission. So too, we thought an Inman-like commission could challenge the foreign affairs community to look at recruitment, training and assignments, personal security countermeasures, and the accountability of personnel for the implementation of such measures in new ways to improve the ability of all of those at our embassies and consulates, military and civilian, to survive in an increasingly hostile environment.
No combination of security awareness, training, standards, preparedness or accountability can guarantee the protection of our people and our facilities. Human nature being what it is, security is inconvenient, especially for those unaccustomed to being targets. And there is no doubt that those who attack us will be quick to modify their tactics in response to our countermeasures.

My ARB colleagues and I thought, however, we had identified problems that were widespread and required a new approach. It may well be that 20 years after the work of Admiral Inman’s commission, existing tools like the Overseas Policy Security Board and the Overseas Security Advisory Council can design an effective interagency approach for the protection of those who represent us abroad. I don’t know.

But there is no doubt in my mind that we need to do better.

Thank you.
Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF JOHN W. LIMBERT

Ambassador LIMBERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the 13,000 members of the American Foreign Service Association [AFSA], I thank you for this opportunity to share our views with the subcommittee on the crucial matter of protecting soft targets overseas.

Let me first note that AFSA speaks as the independent voice of the Foreign Service. We do not speak for the State Department or for any foreign affairs agency. We do not clear our statements with anyone in the executive branch. Our first concern is always the safety——

Mr. SHAYS. I have to ask you, what is that like after so many years of having to clear it?

Ambassador LIMBERT. It’s very unusual.

Mr. SHAYS. You must go through some kind of mental anxiety or something.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Habits of a career are difficult to break, sir, but perhaps the bad news is that in a few months I have to go back into the regular system, so I’ll have to relearn.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry. I’m sure you will get it right back real quick.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But it’s fun while it lasts.

Mr. SHAYS. Enjoy it.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But our first concern is always the safety, the well-being, and security of those men and women who represent our country overseas.

For those of us in the Foreign Service, the term “soft target” is a euphemism. What we are talking about is the murder, kidnapping, and maiming of our colleagues, our spouses, and our children in school buildings and buses, in homes and cars, in recreation centers and places of worship, and in restaurants and shops as we live our daily lives with all those activities that we take for granted here in this blessed land. We take these threats seriously, and we take them personally. And so, Mr. Chairman, we very much welcome and appreciate your holding these hearings.

Four days ago we added three names of friends killed in the line of duty to the memorial plaques in the lobby of the State Department. These plaques now contain 218 names. Although I would like to say never again, I’m almost certain that we will be adding more names in the future.

AFSA’s concerns about embassy security took on new urgency after the 1998 bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. We note the sobering findings of the Accountability Review Board investigating those attacks that the, “emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment.”

Mr. Chairman, in plain English that means it’s gotten a lot more dangerous out there. Now places that were once considered safe are no longer so.

Mr. SHAYS. You know, I just have to interrupt you again. I’ve never heard someone in the State Department say “in plain English” before. So this is——
Ambassador LIMBERT. Well, as you pointed out, sir, I’d better not get used to it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I’m sorry.

Ambassador LIMBERT. The report said that terrorists could strike us anywhere. And they did. They hit us in Amman, in Islamabad, in Aden, and even in New York City and Washington.

AFSA applauds the work of administrations in the Congress for their diligence in improving the security of our missions since 1998, but the work of protecting our people is far from done. Mr. Chairman, as we made our workplaces harder to attack, we knew that terrorists would target families in places that did not have the same protection. And they did just that in Islamabad, Istanbul, Bali, Amman, and Riyadh.

AFSA thanks the Congress, particularly the appropriations committees of the House and Senate, for recognizing that protection goes beyond the bricks and wire of our chanceries. These committees required the Department of State to develop plans to protect soft targets and provided funding to begin the process.

Mr. Chairman, before continuing I need to say that I’m not a security specialist, but I do have 32 years experience in the Foreign Service, mostly in the Arab and the Islamic world, and have served in places such as Tehran, Algiers, and Baghdad. With that caveat, I would like to discuss some of our concerns on behalf of all our members posted abroad.

Our Foreign Service world is never without risk. Now, we cannot eliminate that risk, but we can at least recognize its existence. For example, we need to think about the risk at places such as the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, where terrorists murdered embassy worker Barbara Green and her 17-year-old daughter Kristin Wormsley in March 2002.

We frequently use hotels for meetings, for housing officials on temporary duty and congressional and staff delegations. These places and the many schools our children attend are all in the private sector. As such, there may be limits to what the U.S. Government can do, but we cannot ignore them, and we should make sure our security strategy includes them.

A word about schools. AFSA welcomes Congress’s attention to school security, but we also ask for consideration of school buses, school bus stops where children gather. We understand that, when the GAO team recently met with families overseas, these last two areas were of very high concern. The appalling 2004 attack on Russian children in Beslan showed us that terrorists no longer consider schools to be off limits.

AFSA supports State’s plan for protecting overseas schools, and urges its continued funding and review as conditions change, for we must always review, change, and improve our procedures because the terrorists will certainly change and improve theirs.

Leadership is key to safety. Chiefs of Mission overseas set the example by seeking protection for the people who work for them. These overseas leaders also need the support of leaders in the administration and in Congress, for if we are to hold accountable our Chiefs of Mission in accordance with their letters of instruction from the President, then it is not too much to ask that we also hold
accountable those in the Department and in OMB who must support their efforts.

Finally, instructions, security requirements, and methods of enforcement must all be clear and consistent whether they come from Washington or from the leadership at a post.

Sporadic attention to the security of our personnel from terrorist attacks sends the message that we do not take terrorism seriously and do not care about the safety of our people.

Absent those, we cannot make overseas duty 100 percent safe, nor can the Foreign Service represent the people overseas by staying in fortresses. Under these conditions, AFSA urges the Department to take whatever measures are necessary to provide safety and security to our people, all of them, overseas. We also urge Congress to support the Department in providing that safety and security so vital to our people and our operations. This funding and support should be consistent. Our world is not getting safer.

Mr. Chairman, if people lose interest after a few years and support dries up and if we relapse into old ways of doing business, more of our colleagues will die. I guarantee it.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express my appreciation to you for listening to the views of the men and women of the Foreign Service on this very important issue. We thank you for requesting the GAO study and for conducting this hearing. We also ask that you continue to review this area as oversight responsibility to see that the protection of soft targets continue.

Thank you. I am happy to answer questions.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Limbert follows:]
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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE’S
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BY JOHN W. LIMBERT, PRESIDENT
THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

May 10, 2005

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,

On behalf of the 13,000 members of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA),
I thank you for this opportunity to share our views with the Subcommittee on the crucial matter
of protecting “soft targets” overseas. We feel very strongly about this issue. AFSA’s first
concern is always the safety, well-being and security of our people – including their families --
overseas.

For those of us in the Foreign Service, as well as other civilian federal employees serving
with us, and all our families, as well, the term “soft targets” is a euphemism. What we are
talking about is threats against the schools our children attend and the school buses they ride in,
our homes and vehicles, the recreation centers and places of worship we attend, and the places
we shop and eat as we live our daily lives – all the activities we take for granted here in this
blessed land. We take these threats personally, and so, Mr. Chairman, we very much welcome
these hearings.

The American Foreign Service Association is both the professional organization and
recognized bargaining agent for the active-duty and retiree members of the Foreign Service in
the Departments of State, Commerce and Agriculture, the United States Agency for International
Development, and the International Broadcasting Bureau. We have over 13,000 members, who
represent about 75 percent of the total active-duty force and about 26 percent of all retirees. I and AFSA's four agency vice presidents are active-duty Foreign Service and the majority of our Governing Board are also active-duty members. When we leave our current positions, we go back into the regular Foreign Service to serve in posts around the world. Thus the issues you raise here and the recommendations you make will affect our lives directly.

AFSA, like the Executive Branch and the Congress, has always been extremely concerned about improving embassy security. Our concern grew after the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania – soft targets in their own way – in 1998. We note the sobering findings of the Accountability Review Boards investigating those bombings that the “emergence of sophisticated and global terrorist networks aimed at U.S. interests abroad have dramatically changed the threat environment.” That’s diplospeak for, “It’s gotten a lot more dangerous out there.”

Now posts and missions that we once considered safe are no longer such. The report said that terrorists could strike us anywhere. And they did; they hit us in Amman, Jordan, in Islamabad, Pakistan, in the port of Aden, Yemen, and even in New York City and Washington, D.C.

In those days after the East Africa bombings, AFSA worked with the Congress as it developed the “Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999,” (PL 106-113) and the provisions outlining efforts and funding to improve the security of our posts and missions abroad. When we thought the administration’s funding request was too low, based upon the recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards, we joined others in urging the administration to seek additional funds. Conversely, when the requests were at the ARB-recommended levels, we fully supported the administration’s request. As we consider our Aug.
7, 1998, starting point, AFSA applauds the work of the Clinton and Bush administrations, Secretaries of State Albright, Powell and Rice, and the many professionals working at the Department of State and elsewhere, and our friends in the Congress for their hard work and diligence in improving the security of our missions abroad. But the work of strengthening our missions is not done. At current levels of funding, including resources from the Capital Security Cost Sharing program, it will still take about 14 years to bring all of our posts and missions to current security standards.

Mr. Chairman, as we strengthened our workplaces, there was always the concern that terrorists would expand their sights to areas previously out of bounds. We feared they would target Americans (particularly those working for the U.S. government) and their families, in places that did not have the same protection. As we saw more evidence that our fears were well founded and that more than our offices were targets, AFSA has been expressing our concerns regarding the need to protect the so-called "soft targets." We wish to thank the Congress, particularly the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate, for recognizing that protection goes beyond bricks and wire of our posts and missions to include the Foreign Service community as well. These committees required the Department of State to develop plans to protect soft targets, and provided initial funding to begin the process. In testimony before the Congress in March 2004, the Department of State recognized the problem of soft target protection and outlined initial funding.

In this context, AFSA believes it is most fitting to evaluate how this effort is progressing by means of both the Government Accountability Office (GAO) study and this hearing. We thank you for this initiative and concern on behalf of the entire Foreign Service family.

Mr. Chairman, before proceeding, I need to say that I am not a security specialist; nor
were my predecessors. While we have security specialists in our membership, and on our
Governing Board, AFSA does not claim expertise in this area. But I do have 32 years'
experience in the Foreign Service, mostly in the Arab and Islamic world, and have served in
places such as Tehran, Algiers and Baghdad. So with this caveat and with your permission, I
would like to discuss some of our concerns and observations that we have as members of the
Foreign Service posted abroad.

The 2003 Conference Report, H. Rep. 108-10, accompanying H. J. Res. 2, the "Consoli-
dated Appropriations Resolution, 2003" required the Department of State "to formulate a
strategy for addressing such threats to locales that are either frequented by Americans or are
symbolic of the United States. The conferees are particularly concerned about the safety of
American schools abroad, as well as international schools attended by American children. ..."
Formulating a strategy to protect our people in all of the situations described in the Conference
Report is probably beyond the scope, authority and resources of the Department of State.

However, a comprehensive strategy with different levels of responses should, of course, consider
threats to sites such as employee residences and recreational facilities. But as the Conference
Report states, the department should also consider other places frequented by Americans. For
example, the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, where embassy employee
Barbara Green and her 17-year-old daughter Kristen Wormsley were killed by a terrorist attack
in March 2002, was one of the few English-speaking Christian churches in that city. In 2002, a
nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, was the target of a terrorist attack because it was a popular
destination for Western tourists. These sites and others, such as restaurants and hotels that may'
be frequently used for meetings by embassy and consulate staff, or for providing quarters for
officials on temporary duty or for congressional or staff delegations, and the many schools our
children attend, are all in the private sector. In such places there are limits to what the U.S. government can and should do. But because such facilities are also associated with the U.S. government and its personnel, one can amend the mission’s security strategy to include them.

The reporting requirements in the 2003 Consolidated Appropriations Conference Report, and in other Senate Appropriations Committee reports, go into detail about protection of the schools our children attend while we serve abroad. AFSA welcomes this emphasis but we would ask for consideration of school buses and the assembly points for our children as they wait for the bus. We understand that when the GAO team held discussions with families at our posts overseas, this area was of very high concern, and I believe that is true of our entire membership. School buses, of necessity, follow regular routes and pick up children at predictable places. Schools themselves can be targets where our children, in large numbers, meet to learn and play during recess. The 2004 terrorist attack on Russian school children by Chechen terrorists showed that schools were no longer “off limits”.

We understand that the State Department has started a phased plan for the protection of many of the schools it sponsors that our children and the children of other Americans and English-speaking families attend overseas. AFSA supports this plan and urges its continued funding and review as conditions change. We know that terrorists have adapted and will adapt to changes in security procedures. We must also change and improve our procedures if we are to protect our families.

We believe a comprehensive, multi-layered, multi-response protection of soft targets should have other components. Education is one of them. It is vital that training for Chiefs of Mission, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, management officers, and diplomatic security professionals include a strong anti-terrorist and soft target protection component. Our senior leaders overseas
-- backed by senior leaders in the department -- should be thinking about protection of their people beyond embassy walls. One issue is the use of flextime for embassy personnel. The experts tell us, "Vary your times and routes. Established patterns for going to the embassy and going home increase the danger of attack." Sounds simple? It isn't always. Requirements for a person to be at work at a certain time and to remain there until a certain time force the employee to establish patterns -- patterns that terrorists will use in their planning. Flextime could save lives.

In terms of training, one should also consider how much and what security training we should provide to all Foreign Service personnel. If our personnel had been better trained to detect surveillance, would such training have saved USAID Officer Larry Foley who was killed in his driveway in Amman, Jordan, three years ago? The concept of "duck and cover" should be well known regarding explosions, but the Accountability Review Board reports on the East Africa embassy bombings indicate that many died when they went to windows to see what the commotion was after an initial hand grenade exploded. It may be excessive to teach everyone how to do evasive driving or fire weapons, but security experts should consider how we train our personnel in this new threat environment.

Finally instructions, security requirements and methods of enforcement must all be clear and consistent whether they come from Washington or from a specific post. On-again, off-again attention to the security of our personnel from terrorist attacks sends the message that we do not take terrorism seriously and we do not care about the safety of our people.

Mr. Chairman, some would say about our families, "if you can't protect them, don't send them". I disagree with this statement. There has always been a risk in our profession. It comes with our oath of office. Certainly there are places, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, which are so
dangerous that we should not send families. It is also clear that there are times you need to evacuate families and personnel. The number of unaccompanied positions is increasing and today there are over 500 unaccompanied positions around the world. During my 32 year Foreign Service career, however, I have seen an important difference in the operation of posts where a family accompanies the member of the Service, and when they are posted by themselves. Accompanied posts run better and the morale is much higher. Further unaccompanied tours are much shorter (usually one year, as opposed to two to four years accompanied). That short tour means constant turnover of personnel and creates serious problems of management and staffing.

AFSA has always maintained that you cannot make overseas duty 100-percent safe. We do not expect that, and the Foreign Service cannot operate effectively in fortresses. The world is dangerous and it is getting more so. We understand that and we accept it. When we joined the Foreign Service, we knew that there would be hardship and danger for ourselves and our families. But we joined anyway, because we believed that this work was important to our nation and our fellow Americans. We remain proud of what we do to advance America's interests around the world. Nonetheless, AFSA urges the department to take whatever measures are necessary (including constant review in light of changing threats) to provide safety and security of our people — all of them — overseas. We also urge Congress to support the department in providing that safety and security so vital to our people and our operations.

Again, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I wish to express my appreciation for hearing the views of the Foreign Service on this very important issue. We thank you for requesting the GAO study and for conducting this hearing. We also encourage you to continue to review this area as an oversight responsibility to see that the protection of “soft targets” continues.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Petro, while you are executive vice president and managing director of Citigroup Security and Investigative Services, I will just note for the record from 1971 to 1993 you were special agent and senior executive for the U.S. Secret Service where you had numerous operation and management positions. Basically you supervised the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions in the Washington field office. We thank you for your service then and your insights now.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PETRO

Mr. PETRO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am here today representing private industry, to discuss the important issue of protecting both our citizens when they travel, work and live abroad, and our business facilities located around the world. I am also here representing Citigroup, where I served as executive vice president and managing director of our company’s Global Security Investigative Services.

Citigroup is the world’s largest financial services company, formed in 1998 with the merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp. Today Citigroup employs nearly 300,000 people. We operate in over 100 countries and serve more than 200 million customer accounts. We also have been operating in some countries for over 100 years.

The daily functioning of the world economy depends on the American financial services network of companies like Citigroup. It is critical to maintain a safe environment for our businesses, especially in this time of heightened threats and actual events of terrorism directed against Americans and American interests. The private sector is vital. The private sector is at risk, and the private sector must be involved in any solution.

American businesses cannot adequately protect themselves against a terrorist attack or effectively anticipate or prepare for new security risks without good intelligence. The ability to protect our companies is seriously hampered by this lack of reliable, timely and actionable information. The strict definition of what is a soft target can be debated but American customer-facing businesses are potential targets wherever they are located.

Unlike government facilities such as embassies and military bases, a bank branch is either open or closed. Customers must have easy access, and there must be identifiable signage. Citigroup businesses operate in nearly 12,000 facilities around the world. To adequately harden these buildings present serious challenges, and in many instances there are practical, physical or business limitations.

There are some reasonable precautions that the private sector can implement on its own to lower the risk of terrorism. Erecting barriers to prevent vehicle access, removing unnecessary company signage, screening visitors, moving noncustomer interfacing businesses to low-profile facilities, dispersing key business functions, increasing security guard presence, extending perimeters, and effective training all contribute to providing a safer environment for our people and businesses.

However, there are at least two realities that make it difficult to protect soft targets.
First, a sufficiently motivated attacker may eventually outsmart any static defense. This is an operational reality even for a highly defended site.

Second, even in today’s high risk environment, sustaining a high level of security indefinitely is just not possible. There is a tendency for anxiety levels to reduce as time passes between attacks. This tendency for complacency affects both the private and the public sectors.

Protection against terrorism must be a shared responsibility between American business and the government. We can no longer work in isolation. The private sector is limited in the types of defensive measures that can be implemented, and needs the government’s cooperation to effectively serve our security interests. We are prepared to take appropriate physical protective measures, but sharing risk assessment expertise and meaningful intelligence information would improve our security posture.

We are aware that the State Department has no authority and lacks the resources to protect private U.S. citizens traveling or residing abroad. Large multinational companies understand the unrealistic restrictions on business travel that would have to be imposed to completely protect every U.S. national traveling abroad. I believe the private sector fully understands these risks. In those instances when an employee must travel to a dangerous country, there is a question that must always be asked: How important is this trip? When a trip is determined to be business critical, there are ways to minimize the risk. Limiting the time in the country, using reliable and secure ground transportation, carefully planning the schedule and limiting its distribution, maintaining a low profile and employing security professionals when required are all simple, common sense precautions.

The private sector, its employees and customers directly benefit from the number of programs sponsored by the State Department to better help us understand the risks in foreign countries and to help us establish practical solutions to mitigate those risks. One such program is the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). Established in 1985 by Secretary George Shultz, OSAC has become one of the best examples of a private-public partnership that really has worked. Today, more than 3,300 U.S. companies with operations overseas belong to OSAC. Information is freely shared with the private sector in efficient and multiple ways. The OSAC security Web site receives nearly 2 million inquiries a month from the private sector. Trained intelligence analysts use briefings, reports, studies and other media to provide up-to-date information to our companies. There are more than 100 local OSAC country councils that provide services directly to our in country staff, regardless of their nationality. These services are provided to the private sector without charge, and any company with overseas operations may join OSAC.

We in the private sector recognize the inherent risk associated with doing business outside the United States. Risk management is an integral part of our business decisionmaking process. The risk of being a soft-target does not eliminate the need for U.S. companies to operate in foreign countries. By continuing to work in partnership with companies like the State Department, the CIA, the
FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, we believe that these risks can be better understood, better managed and significantly reduced.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I look forward to answering any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Petro follows:]
Good afternoon, Chairman Shays, Ranking Member Kucinich, and Members of the Committee. My name is Joseph Petro and I am here today representing private industry to discuss the important issue of protecting both our citizens when they travel, work and live abroad and our business facilities located around the world. I also am here representing Citigroup where I serve as Executive Vice President and Managing Director of our company’s Global Security and Investigative Services. Citigroup is the world’s largest financial services company, formed in 1998 with the merger of Travelers Group and Citicorp. Today, Citigroup employs nearly 300,000 people; we operate in over 100 countries and serve more than 200 million customer accounts. We have been operating in some countries for over 100 years and, given our international presence, nearly one-half of our employees are not United States citizens.

The daily functioning of the world economy depends on the American financial services network of companies like Citigroup. It is critical to maintain a safe environment for our businesses especially in this time of heightened threats and actual events of terrorism directed against Americans and American interests. The private sector is vital, the private sector is at risk, and the private sector must be involved in any solution.

American businesses cannot adequately protect themselves against a terrorist attack or effectively anticipate or prepare for new security risks without good intelligence. The ability to protect our companies is seriously hampered by this lack of reliable, timely, and actionable information. The strict definition of what is a “soft target” can be debated, but American customer-facing businesses are potential targets wherever they are located. Unlike government facilities such as embassies and military bases, a bank branch is either open or closed, customers must have easy access, and there
must be identifiable signage. Citigroup businesses operate in nearly 12,000 facilities around the world. To adequately “harden” these buildings presents serious challenges and in many instances there are physical, practical, or business limitations.

There are some reasonable precautions that the private sector can implement on its own to lower the risks to terrorism. Erecting barriers to prevent vehicle access, removing unnecessary company signage, screening visitors, moving non-customer-facing businesses to low profile facilities, dispersing key business functions, increasing security guard presence, extending perimeters, and effective training programs all contribute to providing a safer environment for our businesses.

However, there are at least two realities that make it difficult to protect “soft targets.” First, a sufficiently motivated attacker may eventually outsmart a static defense. This is an operational reality even for a highly defended site. Second, even in today’s high-risk environment, sustaining a high level of security indefinitely is just not possible. There is a tendency for anxiety levels to reduce as time passes between attacks. This tendency for complacency affects both the public and private sectors.

Protection against terrorism must be a shared responsibility between American business and the government. We can no longer work in isolation. The private sector is limited in the types of defensive measures that can be implemented and needs the government’s cooperation to effectively serve our security interests. We are prepared to take appropriate physical protective measures, but sharing risk assessment expertise and meaningful intelligence information would improve our security posture.

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distribution, maintaining a low profile, and employing security professionals when required are all simple common-sense precautions.

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We in the private sector recognize the inherent risks associated with doing business outside the United States. Risk management is an integral part of our business decision-making process. The risk of being a “soft target” does not eliminate the need for US companies to operate in foreign countries. By continuing to work in partnership with organizations like the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, and the Department of Homeland Security, we believe that these risks can be better understood, better managed, and significantly reduced.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. With thoughtful forums like this we can hopefully make even greater progress in our common goal of protecting US citizens, and our government and business interests around the world. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. SHAWS. Thank you, Mr. Petro. I just note for the record that the GAO staff and State Department have kept people here to listen to your testimony, and I appreciate that. And Mr. Starr in particular, thank you for staying.

I am going to start off by having the staff director of the subcommittee and the counsel to the subcommittee, Mr. Halloran, ask questions.

Mr. HALLORAN. May I ask each of you to respond to testimony you heard in the first panel, particularly the GAO findings and recommendations and the observations of other witnesses.

Ambassador EGAN. From my perspective, the most important aspect of the problem is that it be approached on an interagency basis, on a comprehensive basis, on a mandatory basis, and with strict terms of accountability, both for those in positions of authority and post management with staffs under their jurisdiction, and also on the part of individual U.S. Government employees, regardless of their payroll authority to the implementation of those countermeasures.

I feel quite strongly and I speak for the interagency members of my Accountability Review Board, I think, it is important I think to note that board, and it is typical of the way these boards are constituted, included only two Foreign Service officers, one of whom was the Executive Secretary, a specific individual nominated by the DCI, and other staff with military and law enforcement and USAID backgrounds. So these boards are not State Department boards. As a result the recommendations from those boards, and I think the first recommendation of our report in March 2002 is typical of that, tend to take a rather catholic, interagency, comprehensive view of such things.

I also cannot emphasize enough that the issue is not just training or training as opposed to briefing, but in my view it is also related to recruitment, selection and assignments. There are some people who should not be sent to serve in some of the most dangerous environments, and we should not go about the process casually of creating liabilities for ourselves.

I agree very much with the comment of my friend and colleague Ambassador Bushnell that any and all attention to these issues with respect to both hardened facilities and what are, as John said, called soft targets, any and all attention that helps provide the resources and in some cases the change of attitude required to protect our people overseas in a better way I think is probably welcomed by any of us with experience in the foreign affairs community.

Mr. HALLORAN. Ambassador Limbert.

Ambassador LIMBERT. AFSA certainly welcomes what GAO did, and we work closely with them. What is the most remarkable piece for me is something many of us have known for a long time, and which they discovered. Perhaps the key to all this is a cultural change in our service, in our mission, a cultural change which inculcates a necessity for safety and protection of the whole community.

The best work of our Chiefs of Mission, the best work of our wonderful colleagues from the Diplomatic Security Service, will go for
naught if people are not listening and if you do not inculcate that culture right from the beginning.

They spoke about training Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission. If by the time somebody becomes an ambassador he does not instinctively know that he is responsible for the safety of his entire community, something is wrong and it is too late. That is in fact what the GAO found when it went overseas, and that is probably for us the most significant part of the report.

Mr. Petro. What I found interesting about the early testimony, first I heard nothing that I did not agree with. I think most of it was very correct. What I did find interesting was that many of the issues that the government and in particular the State Department is dealing with, the private sector is dealing with in quite the same way. We certainly are very sympathetic, and it is a very interesting issue between briefing and training, in how we brief or train our people when they go and live in other countries, particularly high risk countries.

We are also dealing with the whole issue of balancing vigilance and normalcy. That is a huge business issue in terms of where we put our attention. I am often reminded in the company we do have a business to run. That is why we are there. We obviously have to provide a safe environment for our business and people but we are there to conduct business. That sometimes is not so easy in a difficult place.

Mr. Shays. Do they have to remind you often of that?

Mr. Petro. No. There is a bias in the private sector that people in the public sector do not understand that and we do. We do.

And the other difference in the private sector is we also have to balance risk with the cost to reduce them. There are a lot of costs that are evaluated as we balance those risks and whether or not we want to put people in certain places. That is the human cost and the reputational cost and all of the various costs that may be associated with a particular decision.

Risk assessment and making decisions on where the private sector wants to operate overseas has become a very complex issue.

Mr. Halloran. Thank you. Let me start the other direction because you mentioned the tension between vigilance and normalcy. Can’t vigilance be normalcy? Given the threats we face, the question is in the cycle we face between crisis, response, recommendations and forget it, what you call the tendency to complacency. How do you break that cycle and raise the normalcy bar?

Mr. Petro. I think it has been broken. Normalcy today is not what it was 3 or 5 years ago. It is a much higher vigilance in terms of protecting our facilities and our employees. That has changed at least for our lifetimes.

The issue of being vigilant, any company that was in New York City on September 11th is certainly well aware of how important it is to be vigilant, not just in terms of business continuity and being able to reconstruct a business, but in protecting our employees and having policies and procedures that create an environment where our employees feel safe, feel comfortable and are not afraid to come to work.

Mr. Halloran. Ambassador, how do you level out the cycle between crisis response and trying to forget it is all out there?
Ambassador LIMBERT. It is an excellent question because when it translates into a drying up of resources and attention and support, then in my view we are inviting another catastrophe. We build some more facilities, we put in technology, and a few years later we forget. Maybe there has not been an incident for a couple of years, we forget about it and get hit with something bigger and worse.

I worked in counterterrorism before September 11th, in the interval between 1998 and September 11th, and we also talked about draining the swamp in Afghanistan. To be very frank, we did not know how big the swamp was. To paraphrase what was said in "Jaws," we need a bigger boat to get that swamp drained. So yes, consistency of funding, so 1 and 2-year efforts, and not just funding but support.

These things are not easy. It is not all money. Management is there, too. For example, in my last posting in West Africa, we had motion sensors, security cameras, we had barriers that went up and down automatically. In 3 months those things did not work any more. The heat, the humidity, the dust ate them alive. The technology, the local infrastructure would not support it. So you wait 6 months for a technician to come out and fix these things, and it turned out the subcontractor, the supplier who put the thing in, had gone bankrupt and left no specifications.

This really is not money. A lot of money has been spent. This is management and leadership as well to make sure this thing is done right. That is why I said, to repeat, thank you for holding these hearings and thank you for the oversight.

Ambassador EGAN. I am not comfortable with the effort to make a distinction between vigilance and normalcy. In my 31 years in the service, I spent 26 of those overseas, and vigilance was a normal part of living and working in those overseas environments. Some of them in the old days were considered quite low threat. Today they are quite high threat. But it is not like getting on the Metro and coming to work in a metropolitan area. It is a different way of living and working, and it therefore imposes different requirements and levels of responsibility on the individuals engaged in that. So it is a distinction I would not be interested in pursuing very far.

John is absolutely correct, our most valuable resource in our representation overseas are the people who do it for us, not the buildings, not the bricks and mortar. I think one of the most difficult challenges is how you manage those official communities overseas in such a way that you can maintain that vigilance at a constantly effective level in such a way that people are still capable of doing the jobs they have been sent there to do. If they are not capable of achieving that equilibrium in their own person, then I think you have to ask whether or not they should be there.

Certainly the threats are in the aggregate much greater today than they were 10 or 15 years ago, and yet the size of our overseas nonmilitary presence is much greater today than it was 10 or 15 years ago.

Mr. HALLORAN. Finally, let me pursue the area of risk communication. We had some discussions back and forth to the State Department about elements of the GAO report and what would be in
this hearing in terms of communicating risks and information that
might not be classified but was considered sensitive enough that it
probably should not be discussed in a forum like this. But in the
environment in which we live, what would you see as the essential
elements of risk communication? What do people need to know
about the risk, despite the fact that we might be telling people
about those risks?

We know where schools are. Terrorists, bad people, know school
bus routes that do not vary that often. How do you make that bal-
ance?

Ambassador EGAN. I don’t think the process of establishing the
level of risk is particularly difficult. I don’t think the process of es-

tablishing standards to meet that risk is necessarily that com-
plicated either. We have done it to a very large extent in many of
our buildings, either in terms of new construction standards or in
terms of buildings that we went back and rebuilt.

The number of recommendations from a variety of accountability
review boards and other groups that have been implemented and
implemented successfully make a difference. I think the weakest
link in the chain is creating the environment in which people take
that guidance, training, advice, responsibility, seriously.

It is not essentially a money issue. It costs money to train people.
It costs money to brief people. It costs money to put surveillance
detection units on the street. It costs money to put static guards
on residences. It costs money to fortify our missions, but you do not
want those diplomatic facilities to be fortresses from which our re-
presentatives never emerge, and you also want people to know that
if they do not, to put it starkly, follow the rules with respect to
what the community thinks the way they should act in such an en-
vironment, that there will be a price to pay for not following those
rules and it should not be allowed to go to the lengths where that
price is a human life. It is very much a personnel, management,
accountability responsibility issue I think at this stage of the game.

Ambassador LIMBERT. I could not agree more. I would just point
out our starting point today is very different from what it was 20
or 30 years ago. The world is just a lot more dangerous. On April
26th, the State Department issued a public announcement for
American citizens warning them of dangers in the border towns in
northern Mexico where apparently there is drug warfare going on
between gangs and these shootouts, about 30 people have been
killed, 30 U.S. citizens kidnapped or killed in the past 8 months,
and the violence has spread as far as the bridges going across into
the United States.

Now our children go to school. We have five posts along the bor-
der. The children of the families stationed there go to school in the
United States. They cross those bridges every day. That is the kind
of world that we are in. This is not terror and this is not even ter-
rerism. We have not gotten into areas other than terrorism.

Crime is out there, civil instability is out there. All of these
things affect our people. This is what we are looking at. This is
why I go back and say we welcome the attention of the GAO and
the subcommittee to all of these issues which will protect our peo-
ple overseas.
Mr. Petro. Official travelers overseas are not the only ones subject to high risk. In the past year, two of our own employees were killed in bombings of bank branches, one in Argentina and one in Greece. The private sector is not immune to this either. We agonize over a lot of the same decisions as the State Department.

One of my big concerns is that we may not fully understand the risk in certain countries, cities and neighborhoods. Some are obvious, and some are not so obvious. We are very dependent on information we can get from official sources about risk because we are obviously dealing with issues like employee anxiety, the ability of our employees to feel comfortable when they come to work, whether that is in New York City or Amman, Jordan. There are issues in both those kinds of places. So we are dealing with that all over the world.

Many of our own business decisions have to be based on those kinds of risk assessments. But without good solid information, those risk assessments may not be correct.

Mr. Shays. Thank you, gentlemen.

First, Mr. Petro, getting into this issue of vigilance and normalcy, working with Secret Service, it has always amazed me that they can do their job for such a long period of time. My mind would start to wander and I would be thinking of something else. Is there a method to which you train people? There is nothing normal about why you are on duty. It would just help me understand. Are they doing their work for 2 hours and off for 2 hours, or are they on 8 hours straight looking at everyone and anticipating the worse?

Mr. Petro. Certainly in the Secret Service vigilance is the name of the game. The reason that the Secret Service I believe is able to maintain a high degree of vigilance all of the time is really training. The Secret Service puts a tremendous amount of effort and resources into training so that responses become instinctive and they do it sort of automatically. It is like what the Ambassador said earlier about looking left and right at a street. Under stress, people will act/react instinctively. If you are properly trained, hopefully that instinct will be good.

Mr. Shays. When the person is not on duty, do they still think that way?

Mr. Petro. When I was off duty, I was always looking around, yes. No, it is a very difficult thing to compartmentalize. When I was in the Secret Service, you worry about your responsibility all the time, whether you were there or not there.

I feel the same way working in the private sector as well. I think we have to worry about things that keep not just the company safe, but the employees safe, and it is a huge responsibility for a company like Citigroup.

Mr. Shays. During the war in the Gulf in 1991, we Congressmen and Congresswomen were instructed not to stop right behind a car at a redlight in case people got out so we would have some possibility of getting around the car or something. There were other things that you were told, and then you find yourself doing that instinctively. Is some of this almost a habit?

Mr. Petro. If you are trainable enough, it becomes a habit. If there is a lesson, and what I have heard from almost everyone, is training. Training and repetitive training. You cannot just train
someone once and send them off to a foreign post and expect them to maintain that level of instinctive behavior. It has to be repetitive.

Mr. Shays. So, for instance, knowing not to be right close to a car, other things that I am not aware of that you would tell someone, they would just do it and it would become normal? They do things that tend to be helpful if they were attacked?

Mr. Petro. It is things like that, like being attentive. You should be attentive and notice things. Someone mentioned countersurveillance. You ought to be aware of your surroundings all the time. You can train someone to do that, and it becomes instinctive. You automatically do that when you step out of a building. You pay attention to what is around you.

Mr. Shays. Ambassador Egan, from the first panel what was the point you agreed most strongly with and disagreed most strongly, whether Mr. Ford, Mr. Starr, Ambassador Bushnell or Mr. Miller, anything they said you strongly agreed or disagreed with?

Ambassador Egan. I most strongly agreed with the sentiment expressed in the report and the testimony of each member of the panel, this is an area of security that needs to be addressed in a way other than business as usual. Whether there are attitudinal changes, procedural changes, selection changes, there seemed to be a fairly broad consensus on that and I think that consensus is correct and I think it is important that it be sustained.

What I felt was addressed less effectively in the report and in part by the other witnesses, but that is also because they were representing particular capacities, is the broadness of the issue and the extent to which every American employee that represents this country overseas is vulnerable to the same risk. The terrorist does not care what your payroll authority is. Larry Foley was not selected, was not targeted because he was the executive officer of USAID, he was targeted because he passed across their screen. He was put under surveillance for no more than 2 or 3 days. His personal security habits were found to be weak, and he was easily killed.

Mr. Shays. By weak, you mean doing the same thing each day?

Ambassador Egan. His habits were predictable. His timing and route to work were predictable. He was a very effective USAID agency security officer. He worked closely with the RSO. He worked closely with the AID Director. He reminded USAC staff of effective countermeasures, but he felt he had reached a stage in his life that he didn’t want to have to live that way any more and he paid an extremely high price for it.

Accountability works both ways. You can talk until you are blue in the face about getting people, for example, to vary their times and routes to work. But if the embassy staff meeting is every morning at 8:15, it is not going to have much of an effect. I think not the weakness but the area not of sufficient focus is that we are not just talking about State Department officials, we are talking about every civilian and military representative under the Chief of Mission who represents this country overseas, and that is where I think we are probably weakest.

Mr. Shays. Were you surprised there was a killing in Jordan? When you heard this, did you say, my God, not a surprise?
Ambassador EGAN. Well——

Mr. SHAYS. Not even that it was successful, just the attempt?

Ambassador EGAN. I was surprised because I did not realize the extent to which the environment in Jordan and the region had changed with respect to Americans since I left Amman in July 1998. My feeling about that environment was unfortunately still reflected in a lot of language in the consular information sheet, the poster board, etc., that gave people the information that certainly by the standards of the Middle East and certainly by the standards of Beirut or Damascus, Amman is pretty safe duty and it is a great post for families.

The other side of that coin is beginning in December 1999, the intel reporting on American specific threats and especially threats to American targets outside of that embassy was like a drum roll. Now it is easy to say that when you look back over 3 years of intel and retrospect, but it was sufficiently alarming that the community in Washington gathered and put out a special Intelligence Community advisory documenting the nature and credibility of these threats and waving a flag that people needed to pay attention.

During that same period, two Israeli diplomats were wounded in an assassination attempt. The Deputy Director of the Jordanian Intelligence Service escaped an attempted assassination by a bomb in his car. An American embassy employee was roughed up in a street demonstration. The signals were pretty clear. If I had been following that intelligence for 3 years, I probably would not have been surprised.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Limbert.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Well, there was not much that we really disagreed with in the report or in the statements. The only thing which struck me as a little odd was the report referred to the need to train Chiefs of Mission to be more aware of protection. I don't think that is the key. As I mentioned earlier, by the time someone becomes Chief of Mission in our service, I am sure he or she are already very well aware of those responsibilities.

Mr. SHAYS. Sometimes the Chief of Missions might be a political employee.

Ambassador LIMBERT. That is true, but it is hard to speak to them in this setting.

Mr. SHAYS. That is totally out of order.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Congressman, we would very much wish it otherwise.

Mr. SHAYS. I can't wait until you get back to the State Department and they watch what you are saying here.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Exactly.

Mr. SHAYS. I am being a little facetious. It is important that you elaborate because what I am hearing you say, if you have been around a few times through the State Department, and you are now Chief of Mission, there is no excuse. In other words, it has been embedded in them by all their experiences.

So now is there a weak link here when it comes to the potential of political appointees, not that we should not make political appointees, but does that speak to the fact that they need a different kind of training?
Ambassador LIMBERT. Yes, sir. The best Chief of Mission I ever worked for was a political appointee.

Mr. SHAYS. That is important to put on the record.

Ambassador LIMBERT. But his strength was knowing the strength of his staff and the strength of his deputy and security officer, the strength of the people who worked for him who—and he knew instinctively this is what he had to do. But these things about safety and security, they appear so simple. Vary your times, vary your routes. Do not wash your car, so if someone was tampering with it you will see the fingerprints on the body of the car. It is very simple stuff apparently, but very difficult to inculcate into our culture. That is what we are really talking about is this cultural change where these things matter and we start them from the beginning and everyone is responsible for safety and security.

Mr. SHAYS. I happen to believe that people should get incredible training, and if you deter in terms of normalcy or vigilance, I go with vigilance. They are going to have to learn to have that be normal. I happen to believe in the work that I do and the observations I make. Maybe that needs to be qualified.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Sir, I agree with you and my colleagues that without vigilance at our overseas posts there can be no normalcy.

Mr. SHAYS. In some cases you need professionals who do security, maybe sometimes to drive the car so that the individual does not drive, and I realize the Ambassador does not drive but there may be the need to have regular employees be driven, and I think that happens. So that is one area that they do not have to be vigilant on top of all of the other ways that they have to think.

Mr. Petro, maybe you can speak to that. Doesn’t that sometimes speak, though, to having professionals do some part of the vigilance so you don’t have to do everything?

Mr. PETRO. I think as a practical matter that is the best way to do it, but it is not all that practical or attainable. That is the reality. But of course that would be the best.

Mr. SHAYS. So you do it for some and not for everyone.

What do you agree with most and disagree with most?

Mr. PETRO. Two things. The discussions earlier today on training is what I would agree with most. There is no question about that. The training should be a high priority across the board.

The thing I would comment on, and I would first like to say I appreciate the opportunity that the private sector is here. I think that is an important statement that the risks that our Foreign Service and other American officials face overseas is a real one and we all admire their dedication and what they do for our country. But also we have private sector people all over the world traveling and living in foreign countries.

I think the whole definition of soft-targets——

Mr. SHAYS. I need to get more focus. I am asking the question you agree with most.

Mr. PETRO. I agree most with the training issue. I would like to amplify on some of the things discussed earlier and perhaps not discussed specifically, and that is the whole issue of the role of the private sector in this issue of protecting U.S. citizens abroad. I
think it is an important issue. I think it says something that the private sector was actually invited to this hearing to speak.

Al Qaeda, from what I have read, has two stated objectives. One is to destroy the U.S. economy and the other is to kill Americans. One of the reasons that Mr. Foley was killed was because he was an American. We have a lot of Americans all over the world.

The other issue is the threat to Americans is not really just overseas. The threat today has no borders. Americans are at risk not just overseas but also here. I think as this process develops in terms of developing procedures and training for our Foreign Service representatives, I would like to see the private sector also involved in this so the benefit of that progress can also be given to the private sector.

Mr. SHAYS. That triggers a question. Having come from the public sector, is there anything you learned that you think was very helpful to you in the work that you do now?

Mr. PETRO. What I learned from the private sector?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. Having been in the private sector, is there any different perspective that would have been helpful to you when you were in the public sector? I don't know if there is. If so, I would like to make it a part of the record.

Mr. PETRO. That is a good question. The priorities in the private sector are different than in the government. The private sector is there to serve the shareholders and make money. That is the stated objective and that is their priority in terms of providing good shareholder value and return on investment.

That emphasis I think has been altered in the last several years, and certainly one of the things that I learned as I became more and more involved in the private sector, is there is a sensitivity to not just making money but also protecting the assets of the company, which includes its people. I think the private sector has recognized the importance of that and is willing to invest large sums of money to put in programs and procedures to protect their employees.

Mr. SHAYS. In some ways have resources been more available in the private sector than the public sector?

Mr. PETRO. I am not sure I would compare the two. You have a different set of calculations. There is a whole series of processes to go through in the government to get budgets approved and so forth. In a similar way there are processes in the private sector. From what I have experienced, it has been easier to get things approved in the private sector than it was in the public sector.

Mr. SHAYS. The general concept is 3 pass on a decision in the private sector and 11 in the public sector. It makes for a lack of accountability or even a sense that you had a play in the decision.

I am prepared to have counsel ask questions, and I would ask if there is any answer you want to put on the record before we adjourn?

Mr. HALLORAN. I just wanted to ask if any of you had a comment about Mr. Starr’s rather diplomatic response when he was asked about host nation support and his educated guess was 30 percent were unprofessional or not of professional standard in terms of support they could provide to the embassy in terms of their law enforcement cooperation and support. We have seen that as well.
Some nations otherwise sophisticated or Western just do not think there is a war on terrorism, and do not see the kind of external security that our embassy might require.

What are your experiences in terms of the variability of host nation support and the importance that has on soft target protections.

Ambassador Egan. I was Ambassador for the first time in a small country called Guinea-Bissau. It was called Portuguese Africa in the early 1980’s, 1983; 95 percent of my American staff were non-State Department. There was no local intelligence law enforcement or security capability on the part of the host government. That was 22 years ago. It was a very safe working environment.

Jordan has one of the most sophisticated intelligence services I have ever worked with. They are very, very good and we use them a lot. The relationship is an intimate one, as is the relationship with the local security and law enforcement officials, the equivalent of the FBI. They were flabbergasted at Larry Foley’s death. The two guys that did it, one Libyan and one Jordanian, supplied and instructed by al-Zarqawi, were not even on their screen and it took them 2 weeks to find them.

Cairo, which when I served there as the Deputy Chief of Mission during the Gulf war, was our largest embassy in the world with 2,500 staff. Again, an intimate relationship with Egyptian intelligence, law enforcement and security personnel and even during the first Gulf war, a reasonably comfortable environment in which Americans could serve despite the fact that one American was wounded in an attack on an embassy van driven by an embassy driver with an embassy security officer in the front seat bringing a group of employees in from a consolidated housing complex.

But those were different times. A security environment in that part of the world is different now. The risks are greater, and our exposure is greater.

I cannot comment on Mr. Starr’s 30 percent figure. Suffice it to say, in the case of Jordan the confidence of the services was superb, and they were surprised at Larry’s killing. In the case of Guinea-Bissau there were no services and we did not have a problem.

Ambassador Limbert. The biggest change I have seen over the last 30 years, or 20 years perhaps, is, and this is a good lesson that we have learned, is that we know now, we have a better sense now, when we should pull people out or when we should have fewer people there or when we should not have families in a position. Part of the equation are the capabilities and the willingness of our hosts to fulfill their responsibilities under international law. 26 years ago, I was involved in the capture of our embassy in Tehran. It was very clear in retrospect, looking back, that we were defenseless against the kind of thing that happened. And the book’s solution was we all should have been gone and maybe two or three people left there. But this is obviously one of the hardest things we do. You make the judgment and then put, fit your people that are there, how many people do you send, how many people do you send families in, and the country’s willingness to respond to those kinds of factors is a huge factor.

Ambassador Egan. Clearly I do not have the in-depth experience in foreign countries as my colleagues do, but I have worked on a
superficial basis in 80 or 85 countries, in my former career, so I have some sense of how governments react to security issues and how they support the Secret Service when we bring people into their country.

My assessment is that in most cases, and I guess the 30 percent is maybe a reasonable number, is not that these countries do not want to do it for us, they just cannot. They do not have the resources. It is not possible. It is not any reflection on their feelings toward the United States, it is just that they cannot do it.

Mr. SHAYS. What should we put on the record that we have not? Is there any question you are prepared to answer that we should have asked?

Mr. PETRO. I will just reiterate that first of all, thank you for the opportunity for the private sector to be here. If there was a question I would like to see asked or at least a statement put in the record, it is I think Americans are at risk everywhere, and Americans are Americans, whether official Americans or nonofficial Americans, and I would like to see whatever comes out of these hearings at least have some impact on the private sector.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Mr. Chairman, I am sure I will think of something at 2 a.m.

Mr. SHAYS. You can contact the subcommittee, maybe not at 2, but we can put it in the record.

Ambassador LIMBERT. Of course. With all seriousness, perhaps the question out there that remains, the question that remains is how do we ensure followup and implementation of all these good things that we are doing to protect soft-targets, that the good steps translate into protection and they translate into followup? That I did not hear or at least I did not hear it taken up.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough.

Ambassador EGAN. Mr. Chairman, very briefly, I cannot resist commenting on your point about political appointees.

Mr. SHAYS. I was reacting to Ambassador Limbert’s point.

Ambassador EGAN. I would say in many cases political appointees are more sensitive to some of these concerns because the environment is newer to them. They do not fall into the trap of those in the career service after 25 or 30 years, yes, yes, we have done that. Yes, yes, I know how that works. Often they ask more difficult questions and are more impatient with the bureaucratic response.

Mr. SHAYS. That last point I can agree with.

Ambassador EGAN. Second, please keep the attention focused on this issue, long term, yourself, other members of the subcommittee and the full committee and other Members of Congress because it is important to all of you and to all of us.

Finally, I think the key is there has to be a professional price paid for lack of attention to security. If you do not qualify in a language, a particular language, you will not get the assignment and you may not get the promotion. If you do not qualify in terms of the way you handle your own personal security, the personal security of your family and your sense of responsibility for your colleagues, then there ought to be a professional price paid for that as well.
Mr. SHAYS. That is a very nice way to end this hearing. This has been a very educational hearing, first and second panel both. I thank you for your service to your country.

And when you do a good job in the private sector, you are serving Americans as well and it is important that you provide products that we all enjoy and help us be more efficient. That is equally important. I thank you for your service to our country and for your participation on this panel.

With that, we adjourn the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]