LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST- 
KATRINA REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE

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LOOKING A GIFT HORSE IN THE MOUTH: A POST-KATRINA REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:13 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the committee) presiding.


Staff present: David Marin, staff director; Chas Phillips, policy counsel; Rob White, communications director; Andrea LeBlanc, deputy director of communications; Grace Washbourne and Wimberly Fair, professional staff members; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D’Orsie, deputy clerk; Phil Barnett, minority staff director/chief counsel; Michael McCarthy, minority counsel; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning. Thank you for your patience. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

After Hurricane Katrina, donations from other countries poured into the U.S. Government. Offers of money, water, food, and medical supplies and other commodities came from more than 130 nations and a dozen international organizations. In cash alone, the United States has received $126 million to date.

On behalf of the members of the committee and the people we represent, I want to thank those nations who rushed in to offer assistance and aid to those Americans affected by Hurricane Katrina. The list of countries who offered to help as reported by the State Department and the Department of Defense is enormous, and it reflects the goodwill of all people who come to the aid of those in need. The United States is eternally grateful for your generosity.

We are here today to find out if our government in effect looked this gift horse in the mouth. We will examine how prepared the Federal Government was to accept this unprecedented level of aid from foreign governments and whether the ad hoc procedures for accepting aid put in place after Katrina has been adequate. It appears that policies and procedures were lacking simply because no one in the Federal Government anticipated needing or receiving this assistance. It does no good to be offered money, food, water, or potentially life-saving medical supplies if we don’t have proce-
dures in place to get those donations into the hands of the people who need them.

The Government Accountability Office is here to talk about some of the problems they uncovered, among them about $66 million of $126 million donated has been allocated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with long-term recovery of Gulf Coast citizens. The remaining $60 million is being held by the Department of State in a non-interest bearing account. Why is this money not earning interest? Are there not people or organizations in New Orleans or southern Louisiana or the Mississippi Gulf Coast who could use the money?

Several thousand MREs, or meals ready to eat, were donated for the hurricane relief but were not used. Why? The Federal Government had difficulty accounting for in-kind assistance received. The ad hoc procedures put in place after Katrina didn't include policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities such as food and water and medical supplies and to ensure that commodities were vetted through the State Department exceptions process. This resulted in incomplete knowledge of in-kind assistance received from foreign countries.

It appears in-kind contributions were not always properly tracked at those final destinations. In one case, this failure cost the U.S. Government approximately $80,000 in storage fees. These are GAO's conclusions. FEMA may have a different view, and we have FEMA here today as well to give its side of the story.

I chaired the House Bipartisan Select Committee that investigated the Katrina disaster. I traveled to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast twice to see the damage and the recovery firsthand. The American people saw the destruction on their TV screens and the pages of their newspaper for weeks. I think they, like me, would want answers as to how this unprecedented amount of foreign assistance was used or not used.

The National Response Plan does contain procedures for accepting offers of international assistance and response to domestic incidents of national significance. The plan's international coordination support annex charges the State Department to coordinate and facilitate U.S. requests for aid as conveyed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or our Federal Agencies. The State Department also acts as an intermediary for offers of assistance, expediting delivery of such assistance whenever possible. In addition, international affairs offices within our government agencies are to act as primary partners with the State Department in such endeavors. Under this annex, the department may also engage the Red Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Today we have witnesses from across the government, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, FEMA, the Department of Education, and the GAO to explain what procedures were used to accept and distribute foreign disaster assistance received during the aftermath of Katrina. We need to get to the bottom of how this coordination should work and if the current polices in place for the acceptance and use the foreign disaster assistance are adequate. Under what authority did the Department of State determine that it should hold foreign cash donations that were meant for domestic disaster assistance for Hurricane Katrina? Why
did it take so long to decide where to distribute the money? When the decisions were made to give money for levy repair, why did the Army Corps of Engineers turn down the $60 million? Why were they allowed to? How did the Department of Education become involved in the distribution of funds? And what led to the involvement of the National Security Council regarding the international cash donations?

Since the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for developing the National Response Plan, how does DHS or FEMA ensure the agencies involved in international assistance are prepared to manage international assistance? How does FEMA provide oversight for international assistance that is received in the United States for domestic incident? Equally important, does Congress understand how priorities for distribution are reached and are we helping to make sure that the people who need the foreign assistance are getting it?

On February 23rd, the White House released its report, “The Federal Response for Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned.” The report recommended that the State and Homeland Security Departments lead an interagency effort to develop procedures for reviewing and accepting or rejecting any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident, including a mechanism to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance. These procedures are due to the Homeland Security Council June 1st.

I look forward today to hearing what changes need to be made so that this country can take advantage of the generosity of other countries in our time of tragedy.

I would now yield to our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]
Chairman Tom Davis
Opening Statement
Government Reform Committee Hearing, “Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance”
April 6, 2006

After Hurricane Katrina, donations from other countries poured into the U.S. government. Offers of money, water, food, medical supplies and other commodities came from more than 130 nations and a dozen international organizations. In cash alone, the United States has received $126 million to date.

On behalf of the Members of this Committee and the people we represent, I want to thank those nations who rushed in to offer assistance and aid to those Americans affected by Hurricane Katrina. The list of countries who offered help, as reported by the State Department and the Department of Defense, is enormous, and it reflects the goodwill of all peoples to come to the aid of those in need. The United States is eternally grateful for your generosity.

We are here today to find out if our government, in effect, looked this gift horse in the mouth. We will examine how prepared the federal government was to accept this unprecedented level of aid from foreign governments and whether the ad-hoc procedures for accepting aid put in place after Katrina have been adequate. It appears that policies and procedures were lacking, simply because no one in the federal government anticipated needing or receiving this assistance.

It does no good to be offered money, or water, or food, or potentially life-saving medical supplies if we don’t have procedures in place to get those donations into the hands of the people who need them.

The Government Accountability Office is here to talk about some of the problems they uncovered. Among them:

- About $66 million of the $126 million donated has been allocated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency to assist with the long-term recovery of Gulf coast citizens. The remaining $60 million is being held by the Department of State in a non-interest bearing account. Why is this money not earning interest? Are there not people or organizations in New Orleans, or southern Louisiana, or the Mississippi Gulf Coast who could use this money?

- Several thousand MREs, or meals-ready-to-eat, were donated for the hurricane relief, but were not used. Why?
The federal government had difficulty accounting for in-kind assistance received. The ad-hoc procedures put in place after Katrina did not include policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities – such as food, water, and medical supplies – and to ensure that commodities were vetted through the State Department acceptance process. This resulted in incomplete knowledge of in-kind assistance received from foreign countries.

It appears in-kind contributions were not always properly tracked to final destinations. In one case, this failure cost the U.S. government approximately $80,000 in storage fees.

These are GAO’s conclusions. I will note that the Federal Emergency Management Agency may have a different view, and we have FEMA here today as well to give its side of the story.

I chaired the House Bipartisan Select Committee that investigated the Katrina disaster. I traveled to New Orleans and the Gulf Coast twice to see the damage, and the recovery, first hand. The American people saw the destruction on their TV screens and in the pages of their newspapers for weeks. And I think they, like me, would want answers as to how this unprecedented amount of foreign assistance was used, or not used.

The National Response Plan does contain procedures for accepting offers of international assistance in response to a domestic Incident of National Significance. The plan’s International Coordination Support Annex charges the State Department to coordinate and facilitate U.S. requests for aid as conveyed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or “other federal agencies.” The State Department also acts as an intermediary for offers of assistance, expediting delivery of such assistance whenever possible. In addition, International Affairs Offices within other government agencies are to act as “primary partners” with the State Department in such endeavors. Under this annex, the Department may also engage the Red Cross and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Today, we have witnesses from the across the government – Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, FEMA, the Department of Education and the Government Accountability Office – to explain what procedures were used to accept and distribute foreign disaster assistance received during the aftermath of Katrina.

We need to get to the bottom of how this coordination should work, and if the current policies in place for the acceptance and use of foreign disaster assistance are adequate.

Under what authority did the Department of State determine it could hold foreign cash donations that were meant for domestic disaster assistance for Hurricane Katrina? Why did it take so long to decide where to distribute money? When the decision was made to give money for levee repair, why did the Army Corps of Engineers turn down
the $60 million? Why were they allowed to? How did the Department of Education become involved in the distribution of funds? And what led to the involvement of the National Security Council regarding the international cash donations?

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Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, this Nation is grateful for the outpouring of support from around the world the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Nations large and small generously offered money, supplies, and technical aid to help us recover from this enormous natural disaster.

Unfortunately, we will hear today of a new GAO report that finds serious waste and mismanagement of these international donations. More than 6 months after Katrina made landfall, nearly half of the funds donated by other nations have yet to be spent. The Army Corps of Engineers for reasons unknown decided not to accept $60 million of this money for levy reconstruction. As a result, the $60 million has been sitting in a State Department account that doesn’t earn interest.

GAO says FEMA could have earned more than $1 million in interest on this money, but the State Department wanted to keep control of it. Well, this is bureaucracy at its worst and the citizens of the Gulf Coast are suffering for it.

The Bush administration’s mishandling of international donations for Hurricane Katrina comes on the heals of its mismanagement of international donations to rebuild Iraq. Just this week, the Army Corps admitted that a project to build 142 health clinics in Iraq would run out of money with just 20 clinics completed due in part to runaway contractor overhead costs as high as 50 percent. Army Corps officials said they would seek foreign donations to complete the work, but the top world health organization official for Iraq found the lack of progress, “shocking” and said, “that is affecting people’s expectations and people’s trust, I must say.”

The same problems are recurring in the Gulf Coast except the funds being squandered are for Katrina relief and it is our citizens who are suffering. The State Department, the National Security Council, which have no experience administering domestic programs, have been controlling how international donations will be distributed. The Agency for International Development, which does have experience in rebuilding, seems to have been pushed to the sidelines just as it was in Iraq.

Meanwhile, donations remain in limbo for months, and other nations questioned whether their contributions were necessary or appreciated. We should all be grateful for the generosity of other nations. We should be equally grateful for the hard work of the many government officials and volunteers who have been working diligently to rebuild the Gulf Coast, but what we need to overcome is the bureaucracy and mismanagement that is frustrating their efforts and impeding recovery in the Gulf Coast.

I commend the chairman for holding this hearing and hope that this hearing will be a first step toward progress.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
Statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member Committee on Government Reform Hearing on “Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance”

April 6, 2006

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I commend the Chairman for holding this hearing and hope that this hearing will be a first step toward progress.
Chairman Tom Davis. Do any other Members wish to make statements?

The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I have to tell you I really appreciate you calling this vitally important hearing to examine the Federal Government’s system for accepting and distributing foreign donations intended for Hurricane Katrina relief, and as I listen to you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly to our ranking member, I can only say that a lot of what has happened with regard to Katrina either shows one of three things or a combination: a lack of empathy, incompetence, or a failure to synchronize conscience with conduct.

I guess what I have seen and what we have seen over and over again, Mr. Chairman, and I do applaud you for your Select Committee on the Gulf Coast problems and the way that was handled, but we have seen it over and over and over again, a failure on the part of the greatest government in the world to shoot straight. It is incredible to me. It is incredible to me that people could literally be begging for a piece of bread and a glass of water in the United States where 100 miles away there was probably a Safeway or a Giant that somebody could have put some food in a helicopter and got it to them, but yet and still, we with all of our phenomenal expertise and our ability to go clear across the world to deliver disaster relief, we can’t seem to get it right.

One need not study the history of the United States very long to identify the legacy of generosity our Nation has shown to the world. In light of that tradition, it may come as a surprise that before Hurricane Katrina, America had never accepted international assistance following a disaster; however, as images from the Gulf Coast evoked grief and compassion throughout the world, some 76 foreign countries and international organizations were empathetic enough to provide cash, in-kind contributions, and military assistance to support our relief efforts.

While the Federal Government embraced the helping hand of the world community, it seemed ill-equipped to accept and distribute this international assistance effectively and efficiently due to inadequate planning and inadequate interagency communication. Incredible. Consequently, nearly half of the $126 million in cash donations have yet, have yet, to be spent and donated relief supplies were distributed slowly if at all.

Specifically, the GAO reported that efforts to distribute international aid were plagued by the absence of a commodity tracking system and procedures to identify resource needs at FEMA, a divide between Federal agencies that included the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense and intergovernmental turf battles. For example, donations of meals ready to eat and medical supplies were poorly handled and failed to meet our health and safety standards. While thousands of Gulf Coast Americans were abandoned for days without food or water and called refugees, by the way, Federal officials were at times bewildered about what supplies were safe and therefore eligible for distribution.

I am also concerned that the international cash donations were deposited with the U.S. Treasury in a non-interest-generating ac-
count. It runs counter to common sense that such an account be utilized when an interest-bearing account could have thus far accrued $1 million in interest. With an additional $400 million in international cash donations expected, we must immediately address this problem. In doing so, we would generate millions of additional dollars that could be used to meet the critical needs of the Gulf Coast residents for housing, jobs, education, and reconstruction.

Mr. Chairman, 6 months after Hurricane Katrina, the need still exists for us to clarify what entity or entities have the authority and experience to best manage international aid. Moreover, we must make certain that contracts that are funded with international donations are awarded through a competitive process. This helps to ensure that we obtain the best goods and services at the best price. Make no mistake. Our international donors put faith in us that the assistance given to help Americans are efficiently and effectively utilized to provide meaningful relief to those in need. We must honor that trust by demonstrating that we are good stewards who are willing to take immediate action to strengthen our Nation’s systems for accepting, managing, and distributing international assistance.

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]
Opening Statement of
Representative Elijah E. Cummings, D-Maryland

Full Committee Hearing Entitled “Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: A Post
Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance”

Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
109th Congress

April 6, 2006

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this vitally important hearing to examine the federal government’s system for accepting and distributing foreign donations intended for Hurricane Katrina relief.

One need not study the history of the United States very long to identify the legacy of generosity our nation has shown to the world community. In light of that tradition, it may come as a surprise that before Hurricane Katrina, America had never accepted international assistance following a disaster. However, as images from the Gulf Coast evoked grief and compassion throughout the world, 76 foreign countries and international organizations were empathetic enough to provide cash, in-kind contributions, and military assistance to support our relief efforts.

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I am also concerned that international cash donations were deposited with the U.S. Treasury in a non-interest generating account. It runs counter to common sense that such an account be utilized when an interest bearing account could have thus far accrued over $1 million in interest.

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I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. Norton, do you want to say anything?
Ms. Norton. I do want to. This is one of those hearings which astonish you, you really learn something very astonishing. I appreciate that you have called the hearing and hope that it will not only keep something like this from happening again, but hasten what are some pretty obvious remedies.

I start out with an understanding that if we had no experience with a hurricane like Katrina, we certainly had no experience with receiving cash donations from other countries. We are the country who donates to other countries. So I can certainly understand that we would not have in place a capacity to know how to do that and then to do it quickly.

I find this GAO report, however, depressing, Mr. Chairman, because we are talking about a little itty bit of money, $126 million. It seems to me it is such a small amount of money that it leads me to another concern, and that is whether or not the government is sufficiently flexible in the face of something new to do what is required. I have regarded and I think there is no way to avoid believing that Katrina was a dress rehearsal for a terrorist attack; otherwise, why do we have these agencies all together in the Department of Homeland Security, and we have seen what happened when we had no notice that a hurricane was coming. Imagine what the chaos would have been with a surprise attack.

Here, we have 76 countries generously offering us aid. My first instincts given who some of these countries were would be to say perhaps we should not have accepted some of the aid, but should have said it is a wonderfully generous thing to do. That might have offended them. So I guess in the behavior of diplomacy, that is something you do, you accept the aid; but what kind of flexibility does it take to assign the money to a lead agency, use existing procedures even if you insist—and I don't know if this was a turf battle or not—that it go to an agency with no responsibility in the past for distributing funds on the domestic side? There are procedures, gazillions of procedures, one could borrow from, pick your agency, pick the one that best suits you, assign it to a lead agency, and there goes the money.

Apparantly, early in September 2005, FEMA identified an account that could earn interest. Hey, FEMA was incompetent, but you know the account wasn’t. Simply depositing the account, it seems to me, would have taken care of that. Of course, that would have meant that the administration would assign somebody to do this job, and that is what is most disturbing, that somebody wasn’t put in charge of this little itty bit of money, small to us, small to our government, but when you consider what the need was out there at the time that this money began to flow in, the notion that there would have been chaos on what to do and still undistributed money and we are talking about so small an amount can hardly give this committee confidence in our ability to handle larger items, larger matters, associated with natural disasters and with terrorist attacks.

Here, we had the money, plenty of notice it is coming, procedures on the domestic side for distributing money, a small amount of money relative to what our government is used to handling and
can't figure out what to do rapidly enough to matter to many. It is very disconcerting, particularly that there is money left now almost a year after the event needs to be fixed, but to me what is important is what it tells me about the larger effort and the lack of flexibility in the face of the unknown that our government has, the lack of an ability to move in keeping with the challenge that you are faced with, and that is the whole ball game on homeland security. If you can't do that for money you are glad to receive this late after the event, then I don't know how the committee can have confidence, and it has to do what you are doing, Mr. Chairman, and simply find out why.

I am going to try to stay as long as I can, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We may have to be interrupted by votes on the floor. We expect a series of two votes. So it won't be lengthy. Why don't we get started with our very first distinguished panel.

We have Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino, who has been no stranger, who is the Director of Defense Capabilities and Management of the GAO; Mr. Scott Rowell, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security; Mr. Gregory Gottlieb, who is Acting Director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID; Mr. Casey Long, the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at FEMA; Ms. Deborah McCarthy, the Director of the Hurricane Katrina Task Force Working Group, U.S. Department of State; and Mr. Hudson La Force, the Senior Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education.

Thank you all for being here with us. It is our policy we swear you in before you testify. So if you would just rise and raise your right hands.

Ms. D'Agostino, you have someone behind you that is going to help you?

Ms. D'AGOSTINO. Yes. McCoy Williams.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Thank you very much.

And DOD does. OK. Let me just state their names for the record, so it is on the record. We have Berand McConnell and Deborah Cagan. Is that right?

OK.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. D'Agostino, we will start with you. Thank you.
Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today before you to discuss GAO’s work on international assistance for Hurricane Katrina. My testimony is based on the report we issued today that reviewed how several departments and agencies dealt with the accountability for both international cash and in-kind donations. In-kind donations include food, medical, and other tangible items as well as technical assistance and support.

As you and the members have noted, Mr. Chairman, Hurricane Katrina was the first time the U.S. Government had been generously offered and welcomed such large amounts of international assistance for domestic disaster relief. The U.S. Government received $126 million in cash from 36 foreign donors by December 31, 2005 and literally tons of in-kind items from 43 foreign donors.

Several departments and agencies were involved in agreeing to receive, accept, and distribute the international assistance, including the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Defense, and Treasury, and FEMA. Also, the National Security Council was involved in decisions about the international cash donations.

In summary, the agency has created ad hoc procedures to manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and in-kind assistance. For cash donations, while we could account for all the funds that were received and disbursed, cash management policies were not in place to deal with their acceptance and use. Instead, the National Security Counsel established an interagency working group to decide how to use the foreign cash donations. State Department provided parameters to the working group regarding conditions it believed important for the use of the donated funds.

While the group was deciding how to spend them, the funds were kept in a State Department custodial account that did not pay interest. As a result, the funds' purchasing power was diminished and the opportunity to maximize the resources available for relief was lost.

The chart we provided today lists the key dates and events that took place regarding the cash donations. As you can see, by September 21st, $115 million was received and FEMA had identified an interest-bearing account to accept the donations. On September 23rd, FEMA presented a number of items for funding to the interagency group, including living expenses, building materials, fur-
niture, and transportation. Then on October 20th, the State Department transferred $66 million to FEMA for a grant to provide case management assistance for up to 100,000 households affected by the hurricane.

As of March 2006, the remaining $60 million was undistributed; however, on March 16th, the State Department and Department of Education signed a memorandum of agreement on the remaining $60 million to support various educational needs in the affecting areas, including holding $121 million in reserve for further potential projects. State also told us that at least $400 million in additional cash donations could possibly arrive, making it even more important that good planning and cash management policies be in place going forward.

Now I will turn to the in-kind donations, and I have three key points about the accountability of these items. First, while the in-kind assistance was reasonably accounted for as it arrived at Little Rock Air Force Base and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance did account for it, these goods, however, were not tracked to the FEMA distribution sites with confirmation of receipt from those sites.

Second, the lack of clear policies, inadequate information up front, and insufficient coordination with regulatory agencies resulted in the U.S. Government agreeing to receive food and medical items that could not be distributed in the United States.

Third, the ad hoc procedures allowed confusion as to which agency, FEMA or DOD, Defense, was to accept foreign military donations that were vetted through a State Department process that was created for that purpose. As a result, it is unclear today whether any agency properly accepted and took responsibility for the foreign military donations.

The administration’s recently issued Lessons Learned Report you mentioned highlighted the need for improvements as well in policies and procedures. We also recommended a number of areas where such improvements could be made in managing and overseeing international cash and in-kind donations. Homeland Security and Defense Departments generally agreed with our recommendations.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement, and I would be happy to respond to any questions.
[NOTE.—The GAO report entitled, “Hurricane Katrina, Comprehensive Policies and Procedures are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance, April 2006, GAO–06–460,” may be found in committee files.]

[The prepared statement of Ms. D’Agostino follows:]
Testimony
Before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT
Thursday, April 6, 2006

HURRICANE KATRINA
Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance

Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director Defense Capabilities and Management and McCoy Williams, Director Financial Management and Assurance
HURRICANE KATRINA

Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance

Why GAO Did This Study

In response to Hurricane Katrina, countries and organizations donated to the United States government cash and in-kind donations, including foreign military assistance. The National Response Plan establishes that the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator of all offers of international assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for accepting the assistance and coordinating its distribution. GAO’s testimony covers (1) the amount and use of internationally donated cash and (2) the extent to which federal agencies with responsibilities for international in-kind assistance offered to the United States had policies and procedures to ensure the appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of that assistance.

What GAO Recommends

In its related report, (GAO-06-440) GAO made six recommendations designed to improve the policies, procedures, planning, and oversight of international cash and in-kind donations to the U.S. government in response to disasters. In comments on the draft report, DOS and DHS generally agreed with GAO’s recommendations and cited actions being taken to further refine processes and procedures for managing international disaster donations to the United States.

What GAO Found

Because the U.S. government had not received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance before, ad hoc procedures were developed to accept, receive, and distribute the cash and in-kind assistance. Understandably, not all procedures would be in place at the outset to provide a higher level of accountability. The Administration recognized the need for improvement in its recent report on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.

FEMA was able to track the cash donations received to designated U.S. Treasury accounts or disbursed. In the absence of policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage $126 million in foreign cash donations to the U.S. government for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. As cash donations arrived, a National Security Council (NSC) led interagency working group was convened to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told GAO they had identified and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that use of those donated funds, once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than the wider range of possible uses available if the funds were held and then accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, $66 million of the donated funds were spent on a FEMA case management grant, and as of March 16, 2006, $69 million remained undistributed in the DOS-designated account at the Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. According to DOS, an additional $400 million in international cash donations could arrive. It is important that cash management policies and spending plan options are considered and in place to deal with the forthcoming donations so that the purchasing power of the donated cash is maintained for relief and reconstruction.

FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to ensure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by foreign countries and militaries. In-kind donations included food and clothing. FEMA and other agencies established ad hoc procedures. However, in the distribution of the assistance to FEMA sites, GAO found that no agency tracked and confirmed that the assistance arrived at their destinations. Also, lack of procedures, inadequate information up front about the donations, and insufficient coordination resulted in the U.S. government agreeing to receive food and medical items that were unsuitable for use in the United States and storage costs of about $80,000. The procedures also allowed confusion about which agency was to accept and provide oversight of foreign military donations. DOD’s lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD oversight.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the links above. For more information, contact David M. D'Aprea, (202) 513-6843, or McCoy Williams, (202) 513-9655.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of GAO's work concerning the accountability for international assistance for Hurricane Katrina, which is based on the report that we issued today. Hurricane Katrina brought death, devastation, and destruction to the Gulf Coast states causing billions of dollars in damage and displacing thousands of residents. In response to the disaster, many foreign countries and organizations offered cash and in-kind assistance, including foreign military donations, to the United States.

In addition to relevant statutes, Executive Orders, and directives, the National Response Plan (NRP) is the framework for managing domestic events. According to the NRP, the Department of State (DOS) is the coordinator for all offers of international assistance. For Hurricane Katrina, DOS established a task force to coordinate the offers of foreign assistance and to provide the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) information regarding the offers. FEMA used the Stafford Act to accept some of the assistance, and after acceptance, it was then responsible for coordinating the distribution of the assistance and ensuring it was distributed as intended. To accomplish these tasks, FEMA requested support from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an organization within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), to manage all logistics/operations support to coordinate the international in-kind assistance for FEMA. DOD was involved in the


2 In-kind donations are noncash items such as food, clothing, blankets, and tents that were donated by foreign countries to the U.S. government. Foreign military donations came directly from foreign militaries to the United States and included such items as the use of amphibious ships, divers, and pumps.

3 Also, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management, and the Secretary of State is charged with the responsibility to coordinate international activities related to the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from a domestic incident within the United States.

4 The U.S. government did not accept all offers of assistance. For example, the United States did not accept one offer of cash from a country due to ongoing U.S. sanctions against the country.

5 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5201 (b).
receipt of disaster relief donations from foreign militaries. In addition to the agencies mentioned above, the National Security Council (NSC) also had a role to play in the federal response to the hurricane. The NRP section on principal organizational elements states that issues that require policy adjudication or that fall outside the Secretary of Homeland Security’s areas of authority are elevated for resolution through the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council system.

The NRP also includes financial management guidance that states that federal agencies are to use proper federal financial principles, policies, regulations, and management controls to ensure proper accountability of funds. To safeguard assets, agencies can use the Comptroller General’s Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government. These standards provide federal agencies with the framework necessary to establish internal controls and thus safeguard and monitor assets and inventory to prevent waste, loss, or unauthorized use.

Our testimony today is focused on (1) the amount of cash that foreign countries donated, and the extent to which cash had been used to assist in the relief efforts; and (2) the extent to which those federal agencies with responsibilities regarding the international assistance had policies and procedures in place to ensure the appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations, including foreign military donations.

Summary

Given that the U.S. government had never before received such substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, ad hoc procedures were developed to manage the acceptance and distribution of the cash and in-kind assistance. It is understandable that not all procedures would be in place at the outset to guide the acceptance and distribution of the assistance and provide a higher level of accountability.

In the absence of guidance for international cash donations for a domestic disaster, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage cash donations.

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1 The Homeland Security Council ensures the coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments and agencies and promotes the effective development and implementation of all homeland security policies.

from 36 countries that totaled $126 million. DOS recorded the funds in a designated account at the U.S. Treasury, and we were able to account for the deposits and disbursements of the cash. As cash donations arrived, an NSC-led interagency working group was established to make policy decisions about the use of the funds. FEMA officials told us that they had identified an account that could be credited with interest to receive the international cash donations and presented to the working group a number of items that the donated funds could be spent on. The NSC-led interagency working group determined that the use of the donated funds, if accepted under the Stafford Act, would be more limited than if the funds were held until accepted under the gift authorities of other agencies. In October 2005, FEMA accepted $66 million of donated funds under the Stafford Act and spent the funds on a case management grant to provide case workers to assist 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina. As of March 16, 2006, $60 million had not been distributed and remained in an account at Treasury that did not pay interest. Treasury may pay interest on funds accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act. Since Treasury did not have the authority to pay interest on the funds in the DOS account, the purchasing power of those funds held in the DOS account have decreased due to inflation. Further since an additional $46 million or more in potential donations could materialize, it is important that cash management policies and plans be implemented to address the forthcoming funds to maintain the purchasing power of the donated funds.

At the time of the Hurricane Katrina disaster, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD lacked sufficient policies and procedures to adequately ensure appropriate accountability for the acceptance and distribution of in-kind donations—including foreign military donations. Lacking this guidance, these agencies established ad hoc policies and procedures to account for the acceptance and distribution of assistance; however, the ad hoc policies and procedures did not include internal controls for the appropriate federal agencies to maintain adequate oversight of the assistance that would assure the assistance was received at designated distribution points. For example, FEMA and USAID/OFDA were unable to provide us evidence that they had determined or confirmed that international in-kind assistance arrived at FEMA distribution points. Also, the lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the nature and content of foreign

7On March 16, 2006, DOS and the Department of Education (ED) signed a Memorandum of Agreement that states that $60 million will be transferred to ED for use in school reconstruction projects and other projects in the Hurricane Katrina-affected areas. We did not review the details of this agreement.
offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination before agreeing to receive items, resulted in food and medical items, such as Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and medical supplies that arrived and did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the United States. This resulted in storage costs of about $80,000. For receiving foreign military donations for disaster relief, DOS established a process to coordinate with FEMA and DOD, but the procedures allowed for confusion about which agency was to accept these items. FEMA and DOD each assumed the other agency had accepted these donations under their respective gift authorities, but it is not clear either agency did so. As a result, even for the foreign military donations that were vetted through the DOS process, it is unclear whether any agency properly accepted or maintained oversight of these donations and knew how they were eventually used. In addition, DOD’s lack of internal guidance regarding the DOS task force coordinating process resulted in some foreign military donations that arrived without DOS, FEMA, or DOD knowledge or oversight.

Officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD acknowledged the need for delineated policies and procedures to manage international assistance in the event that the United States receives international assistance in the future. As called for by The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, officials from DOS, FEMA, and DOD told us that by June 1, 2006, they will provide policies and procedures for managing international assistance to the Homeland Security Council. We made six recommendations that focus on specific areas for agencies with a role in international assistance to develop in the National Response Plan or other appropriate plan. Our recommendations complement the administration’s recommendations, but are more specific in some areas, such as the management of cash donations. For example, we recommended that alternative cash management options be considered, including the placement of cash donations in an account that would pay interest while decisions are made regarding the use of the donations. We also recommended that oversight of in-kind donations be maintained by tracking the donations from the time of receipt to disbursement, to provide reasonable assurance that assistance is delivered as intended. In addition, we recommended that plans be established for the acceptance of donated items that include coordination with regulatory agencies, such as


Page 4
USDA and FDA, in advance to prevent items that cannot be distributed from coming into the United States. We also recommended that DOD develop and issue internal guidance to commanders to ensure that all foreign military donations for disaster relief are coordinated through DOS to ensure appropriate acceptance, coordination, and oversight of the donations. In commenting on our draft report, DOD and DHS generally agreed with our recommendations.

Cash Donation Management Policies, Procedures, and Plans Were Not in Place

In the absence of international cash donation management policies, procedures, and plans, DOS developed an ad hoc process to manage the cash donations flowing to the U.S. government from other countries for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts. By September 21, about $115 million had been received and as of December 31, 2005, DOS reported that $125 million had been donated by 36 countries. Our review noted that DOS’s ad hoc procedures did ensure the proper recording of international cash donations and we were able to reconcile the funds received with those held in the designated DOS account at Treasury. Also, an NSC-led interagency working group was established to determine uses for the international cash donations for domestic disaster relief. In October 2005, $66 million of the $125 million donated had been accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act and used for a Hurricane Katrina relief grant. As of March 16, 2006, the other $59 million from international donations remained undistributed. Once accepted by FEMA under the Stafford Act, funds would be limited to use on activities in furtherance of the act. We were told that the NSC-led interagency working group did not transfer the funds to FEMA because it wanted to retain the flexibility to spend the donated funds on a wider range of assistance than is permitted under the Stafford Act. During this period and while deliberations were ongoing, the funds were kept in an account that did not pay interest, thereby diminishing the purchasing power of the donated funds and losing an opportunity to maximize the resources available for relief. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA could have held the funds in an account that can pay interest, but Treasury lacks the statutory authority to credit DOS-held funds with interest. A number of options could be considered to address this situation if there are dual goals of flexibility and maintaining purchasing power.

Key Events Involving the Use of International Cash Donations

Table 1 below shows the dates of key events in the receipt and distribution of the international cash donations according to documentation received and interviews with DOS and FEMA officials.
Table 1: International Cash Donations Received and Used—Key Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 2005</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina hit Gulf Coast region</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 2, 2005</td>
<td>DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3, 2005</td>
<td>DOS provided deposit instructions to diplomatic and consular posts for foreign cash donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6, 2005</td>
<td>FEMA identified account that can earn interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 2005</td>
<td>About $115 million in foreign donations received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23, 2005</td>
<td>FEMA presented items the funds could be spent on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 20, 2005</td>
<td>DOS transferred $66 million to FEMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 28, 2005</td>
<td>FEMA awarded case management services grant to United Methodist Committee on Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 2006</td>
<td>$60 million in remaining donations undistributed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2006</td>
<td>Memorandum of Agreement signed between DOS and Department of Education to spend remaining $60 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GAO analysis.

In early September 2005, FEMA officials identified an account at the U.S. Treasury for recording international cash donations and a number of potential uses for the donations that would help meet relief needs of the disaster. By September 21, 2005, about $115 million in foreign cash donations had been received. In a paper submitted to the NSC-led interagency working group, dated September 22, 2005, DOS recognized that every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and meaningful relief to Hurricane Katrina victims without compromising needed internal controls to ensure proper management and effective use of the cash donations and transparency. FEMA officials told us that on September 23, 2005, they had identified and proposed to the NSC-led interagency working group that the international cash donations could be spent on the following items for individuals and families affected by Hurricane Katrina: social services assistance, medical transportation, adapting homes for medical and handicap needs, job training and education, living expenses, building materials, furniture, and transportation. At NSC's request, on October 7, 2005 FEMA presented more detailed proposals for using the foreign donations. On October 20, 2005, with the NSC-led interagency working group consensus, DOS transferred to FEMA $66 million of the international donations to finance case management services to help up to 100,000 households affected by Hurricane Katrina define what their needs are and to obtain available assistance.
As of February 2006, the remaining $60 million had not been released, pending the NSC-led interagency working group determination about the acceptance and use of the remaining funds. DOS and FEMA officials told us that for the remaining $60 million in donated funds, the NSC-led interagency working group had considered a series of proposals received from a number of both public and private entities. At the time of our review, we were told that the NSC-led interagency working group decided that the vital needs of schools in the Gulf Coast area would be an appropriate place to apply the donations, and that they were working with the Department of Education to finalize arrangements to provide funding to meet those needs. FEMA officials told us that under the Stafford Act, they could use donated funds for projects such as rebuilding schools, but projects for new schools or buildings are not consistent with Stafford Act purposes unless replacing a damaged one. Also, according to DHS officials, the Act would have required that receiving entities match FEMA funds for these purposes. However, because of the devastation, the entities would have difficulty matching FEMA funds, which in essence limited FEMA from doing these types of projects. According to DHS, FEMA considered whether it would be useful for donated funds to contribute to the non-federal share for applicants having trouble meeting the non-federal share, but would need legislative authority to use it to match federal funds. We contacted NSC to further discuss these matters, however NSC did not respond to our requests for a meeting. On March 16, 2006, DOS and the Department of Education signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the use of $60 million of the international cash donations.

Inadequate Cash Management Policies and Planning Reduced Purchasing Power of Some International Cash Donations for Disaster Relief

Advance planning is very important given the outstanding pledges of $400 million or more that DOS officials indicated may still be received. While acknowledging that the U.S. government has never previously had occasion to accept such large amounts of international donations for disaster relief, going forward, advance planning is a useful tool to identify potential programs and projects prior to the occurrence of an event of such magnitude. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, while the NSC-led interagency working group reviewed various proposals on the use of the remaining $60 million, DOS held the funds in an account at the U.S. Treasury that did not earn interest. Treasury lacks the statutory authority to credit those DOS-held funds with interest. For the time the funds were not used, their purchasing power diminished due to inflation. If these funds had been placed in an account that could have been credited with interest to offset the erosion of purchasing power, the amount of funds available for relief and recovery efforts would have increased while...
decision makers determined how to use them. The U.S. government would be responsible for paying the interest if these funds were held in an account at the Treasury that can pay interest. Although the Stafford Act does not apply to the donated funds maintained in the DOS account at Treasury, the Stafford Act does provide that excess funds accepted under the Act may be placed in Treasury securities, and the related interest paid on such investments would be credited to the account. Had the foreign monetary donations been placed in Treasury securities, we estimate that by February 23, 2006, the remaining funds for relief efforts would have increased by nearly $1 million.\footnote{Interest was computed based on an estimated average annual yield of 5 percent for Treasury Government Account Series from October 21, 2005, to February 23, 2006.}

The Administration's report, *The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, released on February 23, 2006, recognized that there was no pre-established plan for handling international donations and that implementation of the procedures developed was a slow and often frustrating process. The report includes recommendations that DOS should establish before June 1, 2006, an interagency process to determine appropriate uses of international cash donations, and ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and accountable manner, among others. DOS officials recognized that the ad hoc process needed to be formalized and planned to develop such procedures by June 1, 2006. When developing policies and procedures, it is important that consideration also be given to strategies that can help maintain the purchasing power of the international donations. If the goal is to maintain both purchasing power and flexibility, then among the options to consider are seeking statutory authority for DOS to record funds in a Treasury account that can pay interest similar to donations accepted under the Stafford Act pending decisions on how the funds would be used, or to allow DOS to deposit the funds in an existing Treasury account of another agency that can pay interest pending decisions on how the funds would be used.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lack of Guidance Regarding the Accountability for International In-Kind Assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>In the absence of guidance, we found a lack of accountability in the management of the in-kind assistance. Specifically, FEMA did not have a process in place that confirmed that the in-kind assistance sent to distribution sites was received. The lack of guidance, inadequate information about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination also resulted in the arrival of food and medical assistance that could not be used in the United States. Also, the ad hoc procedures created to manage foreign military donations allowed for confusion about which agency—FEMA or DOD—should accept and be responsible for oversight of such donations.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Lack of Policies and Procedures to Confirm Receipt of Goods at Distribution Points</th>
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<tr>
<td>Because of the lack of guidance to track assistance, USAID/OFDA created a database to track the assistance as it arrived. We found that USAID/OFDA reasonably accounted for the assistance given the lack of information on the manifests and the amount of assistance that was arriving within a short time. However, on September 14, 2005, FEMA did request USAID/OFDA to track the assistance from receipt to final disposition. However, the system USAID/OFDA created did not include confirming that the assistance was received at the FEMA distribution sites. In part, USAID/OFDA did not set up these procedures on its own in this situation, because its mission is to deliver assistance in foreign countries and it had never distributed assistance within the United States. FEMA officials told us that they assumed USAID/OFDA had these controls in place. FEMA and USAID/OFDA officials could not provide us with evidence that confirmed that the assistance sent to distribution sites was received. Without these controls in place to ensure accountability for the assistance, FEMA does not know if all or part of these donations were received at FEMA distribution sites. Internal controls, such as a system to track that shipments are received at intended destinations, provide an agency with oversight, and for FEMA in this case, they help ensure that international donations are received at FEMA destination sites.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Inadequate Guidance, Information, and Coordination Resulted in the Arrival of Food and Medical Items That Could Not Be Used</th>
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<tr>
<td>We noted that the guidance the agencies created did not include policies and procedures to help ensure that food and medical supplies that the U.S. government agreed to receive and came into the United States met U.S. standards. The lack of guidance, inadequate information up-front about the nature and content of foreign offers of in-kind assistance, and insufficient advance coordination with regulatory agencies before agreeing to receive them, resulted in food and medical items, such as MREs and medical supplies, that came into the United States even though they did not meet USDA or FDA standards and thus could not be distributed in the</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
United States. We noted that FEMA's list of items that could be used for disaster relief that was provided to DOS was very general and did not provide any exceptions, for example, about contents of MRDs. DHS commented on our report that FEMA repeatedly requested from DOS additional information about the foreign items being offered and DOS did not respond. Both instances represent lost opportunities to have prevented the arrival of items that could not be distributed in the United States. The food items included MREs from five countries. Because of the magnitude of the disaster, some normal operating procedures governing the import of goods were waived. According to USDA and FDA officials, under normal procedures, entry documents containing specific information, which are filed with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, are transmitted to USDA and FDA for those agencies' use in determining if the commodities are appropriately admissible into the United States. Without consultation or prior notification to USDA or FDA, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection authorized suspension of some normal operating procedures for the import of regulated items like food and medical supplies. Consequently, USDA and FDA had no involvement in the decision making or process of agreeing to receive regulated product donations, including MREs and medical supplies, and no opportunity to ensure that they would all be acceptable for distribution before the donated goods arrived. Both USDA and FDA, based on regulations intended to protect public health, prevented distribution of some international donations, which resulted in the assistance being stored at a cost of about $80,000.

Policies and Procedures Were Lacking in the Oversight of Foreign Military Donations

In the absence of policies and procedures, DOS, FEMA, and DOD created ad hoc policies and procedures to manage the receipt and distribution of foreign military goods and services. However, this guidance left open which agency—FEMA or DOD—was to formally accept the foreign military assistance and therefore each agency apparently assumed the other had done so under their respective gift authorities. As a result, it is unclear whether FEMA or DOD accepted or maintained oversight of the foreign military donations that were vetted through the DOS Task Force. The offers of foreign military assistance included, for example, the use of amphibious ships and diver salvage teams. FEMA did not maintain oversight of the foreign military donations that it accepted through the DOS task force. A FEMA official told us that they were unable to tell us how the foreign military donations were used because FEMA could not match the use of the donations with mission assignments it gave Northern Command. Moreover, FEMA and Northern Command officials told us of instances in which foreign military donations arrived in the United States...
that were not vetted through the DOS task force. For example, we were

told of military MREs that were shipped to a military base and distributed
directly to hurricane victims. For the shipments that were not vetted
through the Task Force, DOS, FEMA, and DOD officials could not provide
us information on the type, amount, or use of the items. As a result, the
agencies cannot determine if these items of assistance were safeguarded
and used as intended.

In closing, since the U.S. government had never before received such
substantial amounts of international disaster assistance, we recognize that
DOS, FEMA, USAID/OFDA, and DOD created ad hoc procedures to
manage the receipt, acceptance, and distribution of the assistance as best
they could. Going forward, it will be important to have in place clear
policies, procedures, and plans on managing and using both cash and in-
kind donations in a manner that provides accountability and transparency.
If properly implemented, the six recommendations included in our report
issued today will help to ensure that the cognizant agencies fulfill their
responsibilities to effectively manage and maintain appropriate and
adequate internal control over foreign donations.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes GAO’s prepared statement. We would be
happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Committee
may have.

For further information on this testimony, please contact either David M.
D’Agostino at (202) 512-5401 or dagogstino@gao.gov or McCoy Williams at
(202) 512-0995 or williamson1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Kay Daly, Lorelei St. James, Jay Spaan, Pamela Valentine, and
Leonard Zapata.
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U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7140  
Washington, D.C. 20548
## International Cash Donations Received and Used – Key Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 29, 2005</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina hit Gulf Coast Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2, 2005</td>
<td>DOS Hurricane Katrina Task Force Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3, 2005</td>
<td>DOS provides deposit instructions to diplomatic and consular posts for foreign cash donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early September 2005</td>
<td>FEMA identified account that can earn interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 21, 2005</td>
<td>About $115 million in foreign donations received</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 23, 2005</td>
<td>FEMA presented items the funds could have been spent on</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 20, 2005</td>
<td>DOS transferred $66 million to FEMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 28, 2005</td>
<td>FEMA awarded case management services grant to United Methodist Committee on Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 28, 2006</td>
<td>$60 million in remaining donations undistributed</td>
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*Source: GAO analysis*
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rowell.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT ROWELL

Mr. Rowell. Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today on international disaster relief received by the United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. In order to save the maximum amount of time for questions, I would like to submit my formal prepared testimony for the record, but provide the committee a brief verbal summary.

Chairman Tom Davis. Great. Everyone's entire statement is in the record.

Mr. Rowell. I would also like to take this opportunity to introduce Mr. Berand McConnell, Director of Interagency Coordination from the U.S. Northern Command, and Ms. Deborah Cagan from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. I have asked these two individuals to join me at today's hearing to provide any additional details to your questions on the Department of Defense's involvement in the receipt of international disaster relief assistance.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history and proved to be the deadliest storm to strike since 1928. The international assistance received by the United States in the wake of this disaster was tremendous. 151 nations and international organizations offered assistance. Many of these same nations had accepted donations from the United States in previous disasters in their countries. This generosity displayed by our friends and neighbors continued until well after Hurricane Katrina had passed.

When it became clear that the United States was going to accept international assistance in response to Katrina, the U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance contacted the U.S. Northern Command in order to establish an appropriate location for the delivery of international donations. Working with U.S. Northern Command's logistics director, OFDA identified Little Rock Air Force Base Arkansas as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.

Little Rock Air Force Base was selected because of its proximity to the affected area and because the supplies that were arriving could then be loaded on trucks and moved out immediately. Although it was not a major hurricane relief staging area and was not responsible for warehousing relief supplies, Little Rock Air Force Base served as a vital transportation hub in the response.

The receipt of international donations was a mission led by OFDA; however, the men and women of Little Rock Air Force Base provided needed assistance to OFDA contract support on base. Overall for the Hurricane Katrina response, relationships between USAID, OFDA, and U.S. Northern Command worked well.

As with any significant event, the lessons learned from Katrina, the Katrina experience, are critical to future success. For the Department of Defense, the three recommendations identified in the GAO report require our attention.
We concur with the recommendations one through three. Specifically, recommendations one and two speak to the need for policies and procedures to ensure that foreign military offers of assistance for domestic disasters are coordinated with the Department of State and that internal DOD guidance to our military commanders on this issue is clear and for recommendation three, which speaks to the need for Federal Departments, DOD among them, to have appropriate State guidance on how offers of assistance are processed, match existing requirements, meet U.S. standards, and are delivered to the right locations.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of the Department's homeland defense and civil support missions with the particular focus today on international disaster relief assistance received by this country as a result of Katrina, and I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rowell follows:]
Statement by
Scott W. Rowell
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
(Strategy, Plans, and Resources)

Before the 109th Congress

Committee on
Government Reform

United States House of Representatives

April 6, 2006
Chairman Davis, Ranking Member Waxman, distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to address you today on international disaster relief assistance received by the United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. It is a pleasure to be joined by representatives of the Departments of State (DoS) and Education, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Introduction

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most challenging natural disasters in U.S. history – in terms of persons displaced, businesses disrupted, commerce affected, and in projected aggregate economic losses. In terms of its magnitude, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the most destructive natural disasters in U.S. history, and proved to be the deadliest storm to strike since 1928.

International assistance received by the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina was tremendous. 151 nations, international organizations, and political entities offered assistance. Many of these same nations had accepted donations from the United States in previous disasters in their own countries. This generosity displayed by our friends and neighbors continued until well after Hurricane Katrina had passed.

Responsibilities under the International Coordination Support Annex

Under the International Coordination Support Annex of the National Response Plan (NRP), DoS is the primary coordinating U.S. Government agency responsible for “international coordination in support of the Federal Government’s response to a domestic Incident of National Significance.” In accordance with the Annex, the role of the Department of State is “to fully support Federal, State,
local, and tribal authorities in effective incident management and preparedness planning."

With specific regard to international assistance, the Annex provides that DoS "acts as the intermediary for foreign offers of assistance to the U.S. Government" and works with other agencies to expedite delivery of such assistance. The Annex, however, does not provide the detailed means by which to handle assistance supplies once they arrive in the United States. The "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," report released on February 23, 2006 as a result of the White House Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review, noted this deficiency and has called for the roles and responsibilities under the International Coordination Support Annex to be clarified further.

Hurricane Katrina Response Operations

When it became clear that the United States was going to accept international assistance in response to Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), through the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), contacted U.S. Northern Command in order to establish an appropriate location for the delivery of international donations. Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, was identified as the central collection point for foreign relief donations.

Little Rock Air Force Base was selected because of its proximity to the Hurricane Katrina-affected areas, and because the supplies that were arriving could then be loaded on trucks and moved out immediately. Although it was not a major hurricane relief staging area, and was not responsible for the warehousing of relief supplies, Little Rock Air Force Base served as a vital transportation hub in the response. The receipt of international donations was a mission led by OFDA;
however, the men and women of Little Rock Air Force Base provided needed assistance to OFDA-contracted support on base.

Examples of International Assistance

Although listing all 151 of the international donations to the United States for response and recovery to Hurricane Katrina would be impractical, noting these few examples will demonstrate the extraordinary worldwide response to this catastrophic disaster:

Mexico – The Mexican Armed Forces was a proud and vital contributor to the Hurricane Katrina response. To assist in rescue operations, the Mexican Navy sent the MS Papaloapan, carrying two helicopters, eight all-terrain vehicles, seven amphibious vehicles, two tankers, radio communications equipment, medical personnel, and 250 tons of food. Additionally, Mexican Army personnel were deployed to San Antonio, Texas, where they set up field kitchens and provided meals for the victims of Hurricane Katrina as they departed the devastated areas in and around New Orleans.

Canada – The Canadian government organized “Operation UNISON,” which involved more than 1,000 personnel from the Canadian Forces and Canadian Coast Guard. This task force comprised three warships – HMCS Athabaskan, HMCS Toronto, and HMCS Ville de Quebec – along with the Canadian Coast Guard vessel CCGS Sir William Alexander and four helicopters. Moreover, Canada provided a team of 35 military divers to assist the U.S. Navy’s efforts in clearing navigational hazards, including unsecured and sunken vessels and debris, and to inspect flood-damaged levees.

Singapore – The Republic of Singapore Air Force assigned four CH-47 Chinook helicopters to Louisiana to assist in relief operations. These four aircraft,
based in Grand Prairie, Texas, arrived in Ft. Polk, Louisiana to aid rescue operations, mainly in resupplying and airlifting missions. Forty-one personnel, including pilots, aircrew, and technicians, were deployed as part of this mission, and worked with the Texas Army National Guard in the relief efforts.

Lessons Learned

As with all Department of Defense operations, we have made it a priority to capture lessons learned from our response to Hurricane Katrina. We have been doing so ever since the hurricane made landfall. DoD has also fully supported the White House Comprehensive Review of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina. The findings of the resulting report indicate that coordination of the receipt of international assistance for Hurricane Katrina, in the beginning of the operation, was difficult.

As a result of the deficiencies identified by the Comprehensive Review, the following are some of the recommendations for improving the receipt and distribution of international assistance during a disaster:

- The Department of State (DOS) should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying responsibilities of DOS, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DoD, and other supporting agencies in response to domestic incidents.

- DHS and DOS should revise the NRP to include DoD and USDA Food Safety Inspection Service as cooperating agencies to the International Coordination Support Annex.
The recommendations note that including DoD more directly in foreign assistance management would leverage existing relationships with partner military establishments and help to ensure that staging areas for the acceptance of foreign aid are pre-planned and quickly available.

We continue to work with our interagency partners to implement the recommendations of the Comprehensive Review. As we move towards the 2006 hurricane season, in coordination with Federal interagency partners, we are already making steady progress in implementing 11 critical actions.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this Committee for your leadership, interest in, and support of, the Department’s homeland defense and civil support missions, with a particular focus today on international disaster relief assistance received by the United States as a result of Hurricane Katrina. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, thank you.
Mr. Gottlieb, you will probably be the last one we get in before the break, and then we will probably take a 15, 20-minute break.

STATEMENT OF GREGORY GOTTLIEB

Mr. Gottlieb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for this opportunity to testify today. I will present a synopsis of USAID’s role during Hurricane Katrina and what we are doing to make improvements in case there is a next time.

Hurricane Katrina response was the first of its kind for the USAID, which is a signatory agency to the National Response Plan. Although USAID coordinates often with FEMA, until Katrina, USAID had never before been asked to provide significant support for domestic response. Our role in the Hurricane Katrina response was one of our most challenging and unusual experiences.

On August 29th, the day the hurricane came ashore on the Gulf Coast, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which has a long history of coordination with FEMA, offered any assistance it could provide. On August 31st, the USAID Administrator offered the entire agency’s support to FEMA.

Through formal mission assignments from FEMA, USAID began its work on Hurricane Katrina shortly thereafter. In probably its most important role, USAID provided support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities. FEMA, the Department of State, and USAID came to agreement on a division of labor.

The State Department task force would receive international offers of assistance from countries around the globe. FEMA would determine which offers to accept, and USAID would coordinate the overall process, including the logistics, of receiving the donated goods and integrating them into the FEMA distribution system.

USAID was perhaps uniquely qualified to fill this function. On the one hand from its extensive experience responding to disasters overseas, USAID understood the operational responsibilities of FEMA. On the other hand, from its experience as an operational foreign assistance agency, USAID understood the foreign policy concerns of the Department of State.

Since international assistance of this magnitude had never been previously received, ad hoc systems were rapidly developed by FEMA, State, and USAID. While these systems were not perfect, the cooperation among these three agencies was outstanding and in the end performed remarkably well. The mechanisms established during Katrina have become a rough model for a more formalized and codified management tool that is currently being created.

On behalf of the overall effort and at FEMA’s request, USAID activated a response management team in Washington and dispatched USAID personnel throughout the Gulf Coast. USAID disaster response systems lend themselves to easy integration with FEMA because both agencies operate on the principals of the Incident Command System.

During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, USAID provided a variety of staff, commodities, and services in support of the overall domestic response efforts. Some highlights include: The re-
sponse management team in Washington became a hub for coordination of international offers of assistance, working closely with State and FEMA. The work was in some ways more complex than some of the largest foreign responses we have ever orchestrated. In particular, the response management team hosted a variety of liaison officers from domestic U.S. Government Agencies, including State, Defense, Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and USDA. We also for first time hosted international counterparts, including NATO, several United Nation’s officers, the European Union, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The response management team worked to integrate international partners into Federal and regional agencies, coordinating field visits throughout the affected regions. USAID also created systems and procedures to support the review, acceptance, and delivery of international donations. Specifically, the RNT negotiated and communicated official dispatch procedures for supplies that had been received from international donors and also created a comprehensive data base to organize and track transportation of commodity offers and donations.

I have brought with me today copies of our final dispatch spread sheet from Little Rock which indicates the distribution points for all commodities received. We believe this will show the effectiveness of the dispatch system to donation points. Overall, USAID deployed a total of 24 field officers to the affected region in the first several weeks of the response. We facilitated a total of 52 flights of donated goods from international donors and consolidated all of these at Little Rock Air Force Base. From that reception point, USAID processed more than 2,500 metric tons of donated goods and transported 142 truckloads of foreign donated commodities to distribution centers.

Let me just say in conclusion through its unprecedented involvement in a domestic disaster response, USAID has learned many lessons. There is a unique and valuable interagency role for USAID during incidents of national significance. USAID staff members adapt quickly and our systems function well within the context of the domestic response, a proficiency that we have come to expect in a foreign environment. Experience gained by USAID overseas is valued and beneficial when applied in the United States and, as with most things, nothing works perfectly the first time.

Finally, USAID has learned that it can look constructively and critically at itself to continually improve its performance and is already working hard to ensure that it will.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gottlieb follows:]
Statement of
Gregory Gottlieb
Acting Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
U.S. Agency for International Development

Before the
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives

April 6, 2006

Introduction

The Hurricane Katrina response was the first of its kind for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is a signatory agency to the National Response Plan (NRP), and was also a signatory agency to the Federal Response Plan, the predecessor to the NRP. Until Katrina, although USAID coordinates often with the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA), USAID had never before been asked to provide significant support for a domestic response. Our role in the Hurricane Katrina response was one of the most challenging and unusual experiences in our staff members' collective memories.

Since the effort to manage significant amounts international assistance had never been done previously, ad hoc systems were developed by FEMA, USAID and the Department of State. While these systems were not perfect, the cooperation among these three agencies was outstanding and, in the end, performed well. The mechanisms established during Katrina have become a rough model for a more formalized and codified management tool that is currently being created.

In the sections to follow, we outline in more detail why USAID was uniquely able to perform its role, what it accomplished, and what is being done to improve its performance for the next major disaster.
Why USAID/OFDA?

As a signatory to the National Response Plan, USAID is committed to supporting the domestic response to an Incident of National Significance. On August 29, 2005, the day the hurricane came ashore along the Gulf Coast, the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which has a long history of coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), offered any assistance it could provide. On August 31, the USAID Administrator, Andrew S. Natsios, offered the entire agency's support to FEMA.

Through formal Mission Assignments from DHS/FEMA, USAID began its work on Hurricane Katrina shortly thereafter. In probably its most important role, USAID provided support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities. FEMA, the Department of State and USAID came to agreement on a division of labor -- the State Department Task Force would receive international offers of assistance from countries around the globe, while FEMA would determine which offers to accept, and USAID would coordinate the overall process, including the logistics of receiving the donated goods and integrating them into the FEMA distribution system. USAID was perhaps uniquely qualified to fill this function. On one hand, from its extensive experience responding to disasters overseas, USAID understood the operational responsibilities of FEMA. On the other hand, from its experience as an operational Foreign Assistance agency, USAID understood the foreign policy concerns of the Department of State. USAID was a natural partner between FEMA and the State Department.

On behalf of the overall effort, and at FEMA’s request, USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance activated a Response Management Team in Washington, and dispatched USAID personnel throughout the Gulf Coast. USAID's disaster response management systems lend themselves to easy integration with FEMA's domestic capabilities. USAID/OFDA has designed and trained its headquarters and field team to operate on the principles of the Incident Command System, which also forms the backbone of FEMA's response management systems.

What did USAID Accomplish?

During the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, USAID provided a variety of staff, commodities and services in support of the overall domestic response effort. This assistance was requested by FEMA in separate Mission Assignments (MAs),
which were received by USAID on September 2, 2005, including the following three:

- 1604DR-MS-AID-01 for technical expertise in IDP planning and logistics/operations to assist with international offers of assistance
- 1604DR-MS-AID-02 for volunteers to staff FEMA Call Center
- 1604DR-MS-AID-03 for USAID/OFDA support for handling internationally donated resources/commodities

Staff Support and Coordination in DC
On September 3, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as the Special Coordinator for the Department of State and USAID’s Hurricane Katrina response. USAID then activated a Response Management Team (RMT) based at the Quincy Street facility in Arlington, Virginia with a mandate to vet and facilitate formal offers of assistance from other governments. USAID also dispatched staff to FEMA headquarters in Washington and to the State Department Task Force to ensure effective communication and coordination.

The RMT became a hub for the coordination of international offers of assistance, working closely with the Department of State and FEMA. During the course of the response effort, the RMT hosted a variety of liaison officers from domestic U.S. Government (USG) agencies including the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The RMT also provided space and established ongoing coordination with a number of international counterparts including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). The USAID/RMT worked to integrate staff from these international partner organizations into federal and regional responding agencies, coordinating field visits throughout the affected region.

USAID also created systems and procedures to support the review, acceptance and delivery of international donations. Specifically, the USAID/RMT negotiated and communicated official dispatch procedures for supplies that had been received from international donors. The USAID/RMT also created a comprehensive database to organize and track transportation of commodity offers and donations.
Finally, USAID solicited and organized volunteers to staff a FEMA call center in Washington. Approximately 200 USAID employees responded to an initial e-mail request. Ultimately, thirty-four volunteers accepted 12-hour rotations at the center.

**Staff Support and Coordination in the Field**

USAID deployed a total of 24 Field Officers to the affected region in the first several weeks of the response. These staff members coordinated with FEMA Joint Field Offices, Emergency Management personnel from affected states and counties and parishes, and private voluntary organizations to identify users for the donated goods from international donors. After donated goods were delivered to consignees, the Field Officers made on-site visits to ensure that supplies reached the intended beneficiaries. USAID Field Officers also helped to host international visitors to the affected region, including diplomatic missions from Thailand, the UN and the EU. Some specialized technical experts conducted safety and security assessments in affected areas. In accomplishing these tasks, USAID Field Officers traveled throughout Louisiana and Mississippi and visited key coordination sites in Mobile, Alabama; Little Rock, Arkansas; Denton, Texas; and the Department of Defense, Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

USAID deployed two translators to Mobile, Alabama to facilitate services to Vietnamese speakers at the FEMA Disaster Recovery Center and to conduct outreach to the local Vietnamese community in Bayou La Batre.

**Supplies and Services**

In its role to provide support for handling internationally donated resources and commodities, USAID facilitated a total of 52 flights of donated goods from international donors, including foodstuffs, medical items, blankets, shelter materials, hygiene items and other supplies. USAID worked closely with DOD/NORTHCOM to receive and disburse supplies from a consolidated reception point at Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas. From that reception point, USAID processed more than 2,500 metric tons of donated goods and transported 143 truckloads of foreign-donated commodities to distribution centers in Louisiana (81), Mississippi (30), Texas (27), Arkansas (4) and Alabama (1).

At the request of FEMA, USAID accessed supplies from its cache at Dobbins Air Force Base (AFB), Georgia, providing relief workers with personal protective equipment, masks, gloves, wipes, water pumps, and field decontamination and shower units. These supplies were consigned to a number of recipient organizations, including:

- The Georgia National Guard to help meet the immediate needs of evacuees;
• The Federal Occupational Health offices to support the reestablishment of U.S. Post Office services, Veteran’s Hospitals, Immigration and Customs port-of-entry facilities, and U.S. Government (USG) buildings; and
• Local responders in New Orleans.

USAID Kawasaki “Mules” from the cache were also used to ferry evacuate baggage at airports.

What is being done to prepare for next time?

Following Hurricane Katrina, the White House, Homeland Security Council tasked the Department of State to lead an interagency review of the National Response Plan, International Coordination Support Annex and develop operational policies, plans, and procedures to ensure the efficient and effective use of foreign disaster assistance. An interagency Steering Committee was formed in January 2006 to oversee the effort, with representatives from DHS, FEMA, Department of State (DOS), USAID, Department of Defense’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM), and the American Red Cross. One of the first actions taken by the Steering Committee was the establishment of Working Groups to develop policies and procedures for managing international donations. The Working Groups comprise representatives from DOS, FEMA, USAID, NORTHCOM, and regulatory agencies that oversee the export of commodities to the United States (e.g., Customs and Border Protection, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Department of Agriculture). The Steering Committee assigned the following tasks:

In-Kind Donations

• Develop a list of resources that the U.S. might request from international partners in the aftermath of a national disaster. Specify the authority that may be needed to be waived to allow entry of each resource, and how the authority could be waived.

• Develop a list of resources that might be offered by foreign nations or international organizations during future domestic disasters. Identify which of these resources could enter the country with minimal difficulty, and which resources should not be accepted due to current restrictions or the difficulty of clearing the items for entry into the U.S.

• Review legal authorities and decide if legislative changes are required to broadly accept specific international donations.

• Develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for reviewing, accepting or rejecting offers of international assistance.
- Identify tools required for international donations, such as a database to track incoming resources.

**Cash Donations**
- Determine who needs to be involved in addressing cash donations.
- Develop and codify mechanism to accept cash donations to include guidelines, and use of funds.
- Develop additional options to use cash donations.
- Develop an awareness and education package for on how to manage cash donations in the future.

Subsequent to the establishment of the Steering Committee and Working Groups, the White House, Homeland Security Council (HSC) released “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned.” The report contains nine recommendations for improving the foreign assistance aspect of national preparedness and response, including three recommendations regarding foreign cash and in-kind donations.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also prepared a report on the management of international assistance during Hurricane Katrina. The draft report, which will soon be released, contains recommendations to ensure the appropriate use of and accountability for international assistance.

The Working Groups have addressed both the HSC and GAO recommendations and in the following sections outline how these recommendations will be addressed. The Working Groups will submit their deliverables to the Steering Committee in early April for initial review. Final products are close to completion in anticipation of the next hurricane season.

**HSC Recommendations**

_HSC recommendation #90 states that DOS and DHS should lead an interagency effort that will quickly develop procedures to review accept or reject any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident. This should include an appropriate mechanism, led by DHS and supported by DOS and Treasury, to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance received in support of victim needs._
Working Group 1 has developed a set of procedures to review, accept, or reject offers of international assistance, and has drafted a manual that provides detailed standard operating procedures and agency roles and responsibilities. The manual is currently being reviewed by Working Group 1 members and will be submitted to the Steering Committee in early April 2006.

HSC recommendation #91 states that DHS should lead an interagency effort to create and routinely update a prioritized list of anticipated disaster needs for foreign assistance and a list of items that cannot be accepted.

Working Group 1 is working on lists in response to this recommendation, which will include resources FEMA or another federal agency working under FEMA authority might request from overseas, as well as resources that cannot or should not be accepted due to current restrictions or the difficulty of clearing the items for entry into the US.

HSC recommendation #92 states DOS should establish an interagency process to: determine appropriate uses of international cash donations; to ensure timely use of these funds in a transparent and accountable manner; to meet internal Federal government accounting requirements; and to communicate to donors how their funds were used.

DOS has convened a subgroup of Working Group 1, including representatives from DHS/FEMA, Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the National Security Council (NSC), and is developing procedures to ensure that foreign cash donations are swiftly applied to unfunded response needs, as well as unfunded recovery needs where appropriate, in a transparent manner that can be easily communicated to donors. DHS/FEMA is developing a list of unfunded response needs that ordinarily arise soon after a domestic disaster to which foreign donations could be immediately applied. DOS is working with Treasury and other agencies to ensure that funds are properly accounted for upon receipt from foreign donors.

HSC recommendation #93 states that Public and Diplomatic Communications during domestic emergencies should both encourage cash donations -- preferably to recognized nonprofit voluntary organizations with relevant experience -- and emphasize that donations of equipment or personnel should address disaster needs.
DOS is developing standard language to be used in department communications issued in the aftermath of large domestic disasters. The language will be included in the International Assistance System Manual.

**GAO Recommendations**

*A GAO recommendation is to maintain oversight of foreign donated in-kind assets by tracking them from receipt to disbursement, to reasonably assure that assistance is delivered where it is intended.*

The Working Group 1 has provided recommendations for the design of a database that would be used to track all donated in-kind assets from receipt to disbursement. The Working Group has also developed standard operating procedures for the disbursement of donated in-kind assets, which includes documentation of delivery to a FEMA-authorized consignee.

*A GAO recommendation is to Establish plans for the acceptance of foreign donated items that include coordinating with regulatory agencies, such as USDA and FDA, in advance, in order to prevent the acceptance of items that are prohibited from distribution in the United States, regardless of waivers that might be established to expedite the importing of foreign assistance; these plans should also include DOS obtaining information on acceptable or non-acceptable items in order to communicate to the international community what is needed or what cannot be accepted.*

Regulatory agencies are well represented in the Working Groups and have played a key role in the development of policies and procedures for reviewing offers of assistance, as well as the identification of items that should not be accepted due to regulatory or logistical constraints. In the aftermath of a national domestic disaster, regulatory agency liaisons will provide technical advice to USAID, FEMA, and DOS on which items can and cannot be accepted.

**Conclusion**

While the agencies performed well to this unprecedented event, gaps were revealed during this response. The HSC recommendations outline many of these lessons which the working groups are now are working on with the intention of finalizing in anticipation of next hurricane season.
The following is an attachment to Mr. Gottlieb’s statement.
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<td>Furnishing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>20 Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5056 LA-BR-021</td>
<td>Emergency Kits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5056 LA-BR-021</td>
<td>Texts for clinics</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 5056 LA-BR-021</td>
<td>Liquid Soap, disinfectant (Skinnem 80)</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td>86 Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5056 LA-BR-021</td>
<td>Master of Paris</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 5056 LA-BR-021</td>
<td>Cotton, absorbent bags of 50g, 100g, 150g</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
<td>105 Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Adhesive sterile gauze</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>50 Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Assorted sterile gauze bandage and strip</td>
<td>291</td>
<td></td>
<td>291 Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Cotton, absorbent bags of 50g, 100g, 150g</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>210 Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Elastic Bandages, 6x5 years and 4x5</td>
<td>4510</td>
<td></td>
<td>4510 Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Cots</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td>63 Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bed sheets</td>
<td>2036</td>
<td></td>
<td>2036 Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Bed sheets</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td></td>
<td>1850 Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Cots</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td>63 Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5002 DC-006</td>
<td>Towel, assorted</td>
<td>550</td>
<td></td>
<td>550 Greece</td>
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<tr>
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<td>137</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Blankets</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>120 Norway</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Blankets</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5005 LA-BR-016</td>
<td>Ice boxes</td>
<td>96</td>
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<td>96 Finland</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5005 LA-BR-016</td>
<td>Large Tents, poles and net</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Tent poles</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 1 5005 LA-BR-016</td>
<td>Small Tents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100 Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct 1 5008 MS-GP-017</td>
<td>Large Tents, stakes and poles and net</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 Romania</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Blankets</td>
<td>630</td>
<td></td>
<td>630 Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct 1 5009 DC-006</td>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td>300 Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct 1 5009 DC-006</td>
<td>Blankets</td>
<td>930</td>
<td></td>
<td>930 Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Oct 1 5009 DC-006</td>
<td>Towels</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
<td>400 Greece</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Trucks sent: 143

Mississippi: 50
Louisiana: 81
Arkansas: 4
Texas: 27
Alabama: 1
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I am going to declare, I would say, about a 15-minute recess, maybe 20 minutes you can count on, and then we will finish up.
Thank you for your patience.
[Recess.]
Chairman Tom Davis. I want to thank you all for your patience. I think, Mr. Long, we can start with you. Is that where we left off?

STATEMENT OF CASEY LONG

Mr. Long. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name is Casey Long, and I am the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security. I want to thank you for inviting me here today to discuss international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and how that assistance was used.

It is important to note that the United States had never before accepted international assistance on such a large scale as it did during Hurricane Katrina. The outpouring of international aid was both heartwarming and beneficial, but also created some difficulties. In total, 151 nations and international organizations offered financial and material assistance. In response to this outpouring of generosity, FEMA with their Federal partners quickly developed a system to manage international assistance. Today I hope to explain to you that system and what we intend to do in the future to manage both material and cash donations.

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States, the U.S. Government began to receive offers of assistance from foreign governments and private organizations. On September 1st, the administration indicated that the U.S. Government was accepting all offers of international assistance in principle. Consistent with its role in the National Response Plan [NRP], the State Department set up a Hurricane Katrina task force and took on the duty of receiving those offers of international assistance.

As the lead agency in coordinating the Federal response to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies, FEMA has the authority to request assistance in responding to these disasters from other Federal agencies. Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, FEMA turned to the agency that has expertise working with the international community in responding to disasters, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance [OFDA].

On September 2nd, FEMA formally tasked OFDA to manage logistics and operations of international donations in response to Katrina. On Saturday, September 3rd, FEMA convened those departments and agencies that might play a role in managing national donations. These departments and agencies included other components of DHS such as Customs and Border Protection, the State Department, OFDA, the Department of Defense, Health and Human Services, and the American Red Cross, all of whom are signatories to the NRP. Collectively, this group met to discuss the roles and responsibility of each agency and to determine how the United States was going to manage international material donations. The outcome of this meeting was a system for accepting and using or declining commodities from international donors.
which worked as follows: The State Department would act as the focal point for receiving and responding to international offers of assistance. FEMA would identify the potential requirements and communicate acceptance of offers to State. OFDA would manage the operations and distribution for those international donations.

Despite the fact that the U.S. Government had never managed such a large quantity of donated international assistance before, we successfully accepted blankets, cots, tents, generators, school supplies, and other materials. Ultimately, on FEMA's behalf, OFDA distributed 143 truckloads of international donations to distribution centers in Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas.

Since additional decisions were required to determine how to send monetary donations, pledges of cash were handled under a different system. State received and held donated funds in a custodial account until a decision about how these funds would be used was made. When it became apparent that the Nation's cash would be coming in from foreign sources, FEMA also identified an account to hold a portion of these funds. An interagency group was convened to discuss how international donations, cash donations, would be accepted and distributed. FEMA identified types of activities for which the donated funds could be used to help meet the needs of communities and individuals impacted by the disaster, and we provided these options to the monetary donations working group.

Later, FEMA provided this working group with a more detailed proposal for individual case management which proposed that the funds be used to assist disaster victims by identifying immediate needs and helping them reach a level of self-sufficiency and begin the process of recovery. As a result, a portion of the cash donations were transferred to FEMA and awarded for a case management initiative.

Last November, FEMA initiated meetings to form an interagency work group made up of departments and agencies that participated in Hurricane Katrina's international donations effort. This effort corresponded with recommendations from the Homeland Security Council to develop a process for international assistance. The working group has begun formalizing an international assistance system. Participants include DHS components of FEMA, Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, the State Department, Defense, Agriculture, USAID, FDA, the American Red Cross, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, among others.

Much progress has been made to develop standardized procedures to review and accept or decline international offers of assistance and to respond to international inquiries. By June 1st, the interagency group expects to agree to a system on managing offers of international assistance.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having me here today. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them at the appropriate time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Long follows:]
Statement of
Casey Long, Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Homeland Security

Good morning, Chairman and members of the Subcommittee. My name is Casey Long and I am the Acting Director of the Office of International Affairs at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

I want to thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the outpouring of international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and how that assistance was used. Before I begin my testimony, I would like to describe FEMA’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) and the kinds of activities we normally undertake. The mission of FEMA’s Office of International Affairs is to support DHS’s international obligations and to execute FEMA’s international agreements. We also execute international technical-assistance projects, facilitate participation in international training and exercises and support civil emergency planning efforts at NATO.

Thus, as the program office in FEMA designated to oversee international activities, FEMA’s Office of International Affairs helped coordinate international assistance in the response to Hurricane Katrina. It is important to note that the United States had never before accepted international assistance on such a large scale as it did during Hurricane Katrina. After Hurricane Katrina hit, the outpouring of international aid was both heartwarming and beneficial, but it also created some difficult challenges.

One hundred fifty-one (151) nations and international organizations offered financial or material assistance. To coordinate and effectively use these offers, FEMA quickly developed a system with our Federal partners including the Department of State (DOS), which acted as the intermediary for offers of international assistance to the United States Government (USG) as required by the National Response Plan (NRP).

Today, I hope to explain to you the system that was developed and what we intend to do in the future, both for materials and cash-donation assistance. First, I would like to establish a timeline of what happened with international donations. Second, I would like to explain how we developed the system to handle international offers of assistance and the structure of that system. Finally, I would like to explain to you how FEMA and our Federal partners are working to formalize procedures to receive international assistance in the future.

Accepting Material Donations

After Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the United States, on Monday, August 29th, the USG received offers of assistance from governments and private organizations in Canada, France, and Honduras. On Tuesday, August 30th, Russia, Japan, NATO, and Venezuela also offered assistance. These offers ranged in nature from private citizens offering lodging, to offers of blankets, tents, and generators. On Wednesday, August 31st and Thursday, September 1st, the USG received similar offers to assist in relief efforts. Among the donors were countries such as
Australia, Belgium, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Mexico, the Netherlands and international organizations such as the Organization of American States and the United Nations.

On September 1st, the Administration indicated that the United States was accepting all offers of international assistance 'in principle.' Consistent with its role under the NRP, DOS’s Hurricane Katrina Task Force took on the duty of receiving offers of assistance from foreign governments and entities and communicating the acceptance/declination of these offers.

DHS and FEMA have the lead role in coordinating the Federal response to a major disaster. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended, gives FEMA the authority to request assistance from Federal partners to implement its disaster response. Accordingly, on September 2nd, FEMA turned to the agency that has diplomatic expertise working with the international community in a disaster context, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and formally tasked USAID/OFDA to manage the logistics and operations of incoming international donations.

FEMA formally tasked USAID/OFDA for multiple reasons. First, as a signatory to the NRP, USAID is committed to the principles underlying the NRP and committed to support DHS/FEMA in responding to incidents of national significance. Second, FEMA has an ongoing working relationship with USAID/OFDA and recognizes USAID/OFDA’s excellent logistics capability. Third, FEMA tasked USAID/OFDA because they know the international emergency-management community. USAID/OFDA has a good understanding of the kinds of emergency supplies that may be offered by our international emergency partners. USAID/OFDA also works closely with major international relief organizations such as the United Nations.

On Saturday, September 3rd, FEMA convened the departments/agencies that were to play a role in accepting and distributing international donations. DHS, DHS/FEMA, DOS, USAID/OFDA, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the American Red Cross (ARC) met to discuss roles and responsibilities of each agency and to determine how the United States was going to accept and receive international material donations. The outcome of this meeting was a system for accepting commodities from international donors, which worked as follows:

- State Department was the focal point for receiving and responding to offers of assistance from foreign governments.
- USAID/OFDA worked with FEMA to determine whether specific offers were acceptable and could be used.
- When FEMA identified a potential requirement for something that could be addressed by an international donation, FEMA communicated acceptance and specifics for that offer.
- DOS communicated USG acceptance of the resource to the donor country.
- USAID/OFDA, along with an active DOD personnel at Little Rock Air Force Base, managed logistical operations for incoming international donations. A USG team, led by USAID/OFDA representatives from CBP, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), was formed to receive international resources.
• When the resource was in-country, USAID/OFDA coordinated with FEMA in transporting it to the distribution point.

See Flowchart

Also on September 3rd, as FEMA worked with State and local officials to determine needs and how to fulfill these needs, FEMA provided DOS with a list of resources that FEMA might be able to use in disaster operations. Once USAID/OFDA stood up operations, they took over the function of matching needs to offers of assistance, obtaining resource specifications to help FEMA determine if they could use the donation, and communicating FEMA acceptances or declinations to DOS.

To facilitate the 24/7 FEMA operations, some USAID/OFDA staff members were physically co-located at FEMA headquarters. FEMA also asked USAID/OFDA to deploy to the Joint Field Office (JFO) in the affected region. This proved to be invaluable support for the logisticsians and response providers at headquarters and in the field.

For all donations that the USG received in the U.S., DHS took precautions to ensure that they could be distributed and would not place extra burdens on response operations. However, despite our best efforts to quickly put together with DOS and USAID/OFDA a mechanism to manage material offers, it was difficult to rapidly integrate such a large quantity of foreign assistance into the ongoing disaster response. Some of these challenges included incidental goods being shipped along with accepted items; lack of specificity in qualifying USG acceptance; and a lack of understanding of the specifics of the offers.

Nevertheless, despite that the USG had never managed such a large quantity of international assistance before, the USG did successfully accept blankets, cots, tents, generators, school supplies, and other materials. Ultimately, USAID/OFDA distributed 143 truckloads of international donations to distribution centers in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi, Texas and Arkansas.

Accepting Cash Donations

Since additional decisions were needed to determine how to spend monetary donations, pledges of cash were handled under a different system. DOS received and retained donated funds in a DOS custodial account pending determination of use of funds. When it became apparent that donations of cash would be coming from foreign sources, FEMA identified an account that could be used to hold donated funds. FEMA also identified programs and needs that would not be eligible for FEMA assistance, but that could benefit from monetary donations.

An interagency group convened to discuss how foreign cash donations would be accepted and distributed. FEMA was invited to attend the Interagency Work Group and FEMA identified types of activities for which the donated funds could be used to address the needs of communities and individuals affected by the disaster, and the Work Group discussed parameters to appropriately use the funds.
On October 7, FEMA provided the Work Group a more detailed proposal for case management of disaster victims displaced by the Hurricane. Specifically, FEMA proposed that funds be provided to case managers who would assist disaster victims by identifying immediate needs and helping victims reach a level of self-sufficiency. Following interagency working group consideration $66 million in cash donations was distributed to this case-management initiative.

The Future of International Coordination

Beginning in November, as part of our after-action review of disaster-response efforts, FEMA initiated meetings of the departments and agencies that had participated in the receipt of international donations following Hurricane Katrina. Knowing that the next hurricane season was less than a year away, FEMA wanted to build on lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina and formalize a system to identify requirements and accept international offers of assistance so that valuable time would not be spent developing the system in the midst of future disaster response.

These meetings led to formalizing an interagency workgroup of the departments and agencies that participated in Hurricane Katrina’s international donations effort. This working group has begun formalizing an international coordination system. Participants included components of DHS such as FEMA, CBP and ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement)/CIS (Citizenship and Immigration Services) and other departments and agencies such as USAID, DOS, DOD, FDA, USDA, ARC, and the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Much progress has been made to develop standardized procedures to review and accept or decline international offers of assistance and to respond to international inquiries. By June 1st, and once approved by the Homeland Security Council, DHS expects to have an interagency system in place for coordination of international assistance offered in response to a catastrophic event in the United States.

I hope that my testimony serves this committee well. Once again, I thank you for having me here today. If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them.
Handling International Offers of Assistance

DoS → Foreign Countries

Offers → Approvals

USAID-Response Management Team

Requirements

FEMA

If "yes"

OFDA initiates technical or logistical discussions with donor.

OFDA coordinates with FEMA and/or states as appropriate to facilitate delivery.
After "Yes": Management of Incoming Assistance

DoS submits international offers of assistance to OFDA task force, conveys "Yes" to donor; then hands off to OFDA for technical discussion.

FEMA initiates technical or logistical discussions with donor.

FEMA works with FEMA to identify further requirements, technical information, or logistical arrangements on specific offers.

FEMA continues to submit requirements generated from field.

USAID works with FEMA to identify further requirements, technical information, or logistical arrangements on specific offers.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Ms. McCarthy.

STATEMENT OF DEBORAH MCCARTHY

Ms. McCarthy. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
I would like to immediately go to the issue of how we managed the cash donations and how we came to decisions on how best to place them, and I would like to start off by first saying that we have placed the balance of the funds that we have received. $60.4 million were transferred on March 17th to the Department of Education. So the amounts of money that we have received, the $126 million, have been transferred to FEMA and to the Department of Education.

I wanted to note a couple of things with regards to the cash process and noting, for one, that on September 15th at a Homeland Security meeting, the Department of State agreed and was given the lead in developing options on how to distribute and utilize the funds. Subsequently, the Department of State and the National Security Council initiated as many have referred to here an interagency process. FEMA was requested and provided proposals for consideration for use of the funds. It was agreed in the interagency to use the funds immediately for immediate needs, and the case management system met that requirement.

Subsequently, we obviously entered into a memorandum of agreement with FEMA. Then the interagency looked for ways to place the money into tangible reconstruction projects where there were unmet needs. We considered a number of options and ultimately decided through the interagency that the funds should go to support schools, K through 12 and universities, in the affected area where there were unmet needs for reconstruction, bricks and mortar, libraries, scholarships for students, and financial ability to retain some staff and faculty. On March 16th, as I noted, we signed an agreement with the Department of Education, and we transferred the moneys on March 17th.

We have obviously learned a lesson on how to process the money, and in the wake of the recommendations of the Homeland Security Council, we are developing guidelines to set up an interagency process that would be more swift, more effective in moving international donations should we get them and accept them in another crisis. We are under a short time line to report to the Homeland Security Council by June 1st and we are well on way.

I want to note one other thing just before I sum up on a conclusion, and that is we need to recognize that moneys came in not only from governments, but this country received a huge amount of assistance, the sum total of which has never been calculated, from private individuals and organizations, and I want to mention a few: The donation of an entire life savings by a senior citizen in Europe who arrived at one of our embassies and asked that this gift be accepted in return for her having been liberated by U.S. soldiers from a concentration camp in World War II. She could not afford to give her savings but she did; the donation from one family in France of a check of approximately $602,000; millions of dollars in private donations from individuals and companies in Japan; funds raised by our own State Department foreign service nations;
and last but not least, the offers of many Canadians to open up their homes to take in displaced people as they had after September 11th when our planes were stranded.

To sum up a few things, our Nation received, as we have noted, an unprecedented amount of international assistance reflective that the people and governments around the world are prepared to support us and stand with us in our hour of need. We want to thank the international community and all those private citizens who gave so generously. We have ensured the best we could that the gifts made reached those affected by Hurricane Katrina.

We believe that in a major domestic crisis, it is likely that we will again receive generous offers, particularly from neighbors and close partners. Should we decide to accept them, we will have the mechanisms in place to quickly process the assistance given.

I would like to thank you for having the opportunity to discuss the international support we received during Katrina. It is an unknown aspect of this crisis, and I look forward to responding to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McCarthy follows:]
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee,

In response to the impact of Hurricane Katrina, this nation received an amazing outpouring of offers of assistance from around the globe, from countries rich and poor, from private companies both large and small, from associations, from students and from senior citizens. As the world viewed the devastation across the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, as it saw the suffering of those displaced, it responded with extraordinary generosity. Just as many nations and entities have received our bountiful assistance in their hour of need, they gave in ours.

In all, 151 nations, political entities and international organizations offered material and/or cash assistance to the United States Government. Beyond these gifts to the United States Government, there were hundreds if not thousands of gifts made directly to the states affected, to charitable organizations, or to those who suffered the Hurricane’s devastation. There is no precise measure of the total amount of public and private international assistance given, but perhaps there need not be.

For, beyond the dollar value that can be attributed to the international assistance given by foreign citizens and governments, is the significance of their gestures of generosity. Their gestures demonstrated that the United States and the American people have strong support around the world.

In September of last year, I directed the Katrina Task Force, which was established at the State Department to assess and process international
offers of assistance and to help foreign missions find and assist their missing citizens. Since the Task Force was disbanded on September 18, I have been the Director of the Katrina Working Group in the Department. Our work has focused on 1) processing further offers of assistance; 2) thanking donors; 3) ensuring that cash donations to the USG received from foreign governments and private entities were used to benefit the victims of the Hurricane; and 4) participating in an interagency process to establish detailed procedures to handle likely offers of foreign assistance in future domestic crises, in fulfillment of the recommendations made by the Homeland Security Council.

This morning, I will outline the responsibilities of the Department of State under the National Response Plan, provide an overview of the international donations accepted by the USG and describe how they were processed, indicate the lessons learned from Katrina, and what we are doing to address the procedural gaps that have been identified.

We believe that, in the event of a future major domestic disaster, countries, particularly our close neighbors and partners, are again likely to be generous and forthcoming in offering assistance. As in the case of Hurricane Katrina, if there is an executive branch decision to accept such offers, we will have in place a detailed and efficient procedure to swiftly process the assistance proffered by the international community.

**Responsibilities of the Department of State under the National Response Plan:**

The National Response Plan’s International Coordination Support Annex identifies the Department of State as the primary coordinating agency for the management of international assistance in response to an Incident of National Significance.

The Secretary of State is responsible for maintaining relations with foreign nations and coordinating the international aspects of a domestic
incident. In this capacity, the Department administers responses to both foreign offers of assistance and domestic requests for foreign aid. The Department, together with federal/state/local authorities, also has responsibilities regarding the protection of foreign missions and their official personnel, and plays a liaison role between foreign and domestic authorities in the provision of information and emergency assistance to foreign nationals.

In the wake of Katrina and the remarkable response from around the world, the Administration determined that we would, in principle, accept all offers of foreign assistance.

**Flow and types of International Offers of Assistance:**

The offers poured in immediately after Katrina’s landfall, rising from 7 offers on August 30 to 122 by September 9. Material offers included tarps, beds, use of ships, helicopters, generators, children’s clothing, first aid kits, food, high speed pumps, towels, water, diapers, life rafts, chlorine tablets, disinfectants, water purification equipment, education kits, and cleaning as well as medical supplies. Many countries offered specialized search and rescue, forensic and emergency medical personnel.

These offers described above were from governments. Private individuals also made numerous gifts, with the bulk going directly to NGOs or private groups in the affected areas. I must mention several of these: 1) the donation of an entire life’s savings by a senior citizen in Europe who arrived at one of our Embassies and asked that this gift be accepted in return for her having been liberated by US soldiers from a concentration camp after World War II; 2) the donation from one family in France of a check for 500,000 euros or 602,000 U.S. dollars; 3) the millions of dollars in private donations from individuals and companies in Japan; 4) the funds raised by many of our own Foreign Service Nationals in our Missions overseas; and 5) the offers of many Canadians
to open up their homes to take in displaced people as they had after 9/11 when planes were stranded.

**Management of the International Offers of Assistance:**

In accordance with the National Response Plan, the Department both coordinated offers of assistance from foreign entities and informed governments of specific requests for assistance based on needs conveyed to the Department by FEMA. On August 30, our Operations Center reached out to FEMA’s Office of International Affairs to offer the State Department’s help in tracking international offers of assistance as well as “welfare and whereabouts” inquiries regarding foreign citizens. On September 2, the Department made the decision to establish a Task Force to coordinate State Department activities and to link with key agencies, including the Department of Defense, as well as with the United Nations and other international organizations which offered assistance.

DHS and the Department of State agreed that the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) with its long experience in handling assistance programs, would be the proper entity to convey offers of assistance to FEMA, coordinate responses and, for those offers accepted by the U.S. government be the logistical point of contact for receipt of the material. The State Department’s Task Force established a mechanism for tracking international offers. An USAID/OFDA representative was included on the Task Force. State officers were also assigned to the USAID/OFDA Response Management Team (RMT). A daily interagency videoconference was established to coordinate relief shipments.

As FEMA determined its operational requirements and identified needed resources from the international assistance offers, DOS coordinated acceptance messages with our overseas embassies and directed that
logistical arrangements be coordinated with USAID/OFDA for receipt of the gifts.

To assist in the distribution of the assistance, the Department established a forward office (State Department South) with 70 persons to support the Joint Interagency Field office in Baton Rouge. Led by a Senior Officer, the office included representatives from State bureaus as well as USAID/OFDA.

USAID/OFDA and FEMA used Little Rock as staging areas for international commodities, and USAID/OFDA leased a warehouse to receive these resources and coordinate distribution of the material with FEMA.

A significant portion of the material international assistance received came from NATO countries and partners as well as Mexico. The acceptance and delivery of much of this assistance was coordinated with NORTHCOM and other DOD elements. To facilitate NORTHCOM’s receiving assistance rapidly, instead of requiring FEMA to validate a military need, some offers were coordinated directly by NORTHCOM, with the State Department’s Task Force advised of that coordination.

To help transport airlift of European assistance, NATO stood up the EADRCC (Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre), and provided a liaison located with the USAID/OFDA staff to assist in coordinating NATO airlift. Diplomatic clearances for flights carrying assistance from military channels were coordinated through the Department of State’s Task Force. Those for civilian flights were coordinated through TSA.

The Task Force prepared a series of messages to our Missions overseas providing guidance and updates on the handling of international offers of assistance, both material and cash. Posts were informed via cable on specific acceptance of offers of assistance with instructions provided to either establish contact with USAID/OFDA prior to any movement of
material or to request specific approval of any cash donations to the USG.

In an unanticipated outpouring of generosity, foreign governments and international organizations provided $126 million in cash donations to the U.S. Government.

The Department of State, in consultation with the Department of Treasury, determined that a specific pre-existing deposit account, “19 X 6755, General Deposits, Department of State”, was the most appropriate vehicle to place the donations in our role as temporary custodian of the funds given by foreign entities. Funds maintained in Treasury accounts do not ordinarily accumulate interest absent specific statutory authority.

To establish a point of reconciliation, the Department reviewed and documented the balance of the 19 X 6755 account at the baseline date of July 31, 2005. The account had a prior year balance but no current year activity. All subsequent collections related to Hurricane Katrina relief donations were recorded in the Department’s accounting system under this account symbol for reconciliation with the Treasury account balance. Additional monitoring was added in the Office of Accounting Operations to review overseas collection transaction recording between our overseas and Headquarters financial systems. All Hurricane Katrina relief receipts were also independently monitored and reported on an inception-to-date cumulative daily collections report provided to senior State Department officials, by the Office of the Managing Director, Global Financial Operations, Bureau of Resource Management.

On September 15 at a Homeland Security Council meeting, the Department of State agreed to take the lead in developing options on how to distribute and utilize the donated funds. Subsequently, the Department of State and National Security Council initiated an interagency -working level process to review potential uses for the international cash donations. At a meeting on September 23, 2005, FEMA was requested to provide proposals for use of the funds for
consideration at an October 7 meeting. It was subsequently agreed to provide FEMA $66 million of the foreign donations to use for case management services for hurricane victims. DHS and DOS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which specified that DHS/FEMA would assume full responsibility for these funds upon transfer, including providing for sufficient internal controls, transparent accountability, adherence to relevant Federal financial procedures and regulations, and would provide information to the Department to report to donors. The MOA was signed on October 19, 2005 and the funds were transferred from State to DHS on October 20.

The interagency group, led by the Department, then focused on directing the balance of the funds toward immediate, tangible reconstruction programs for which the generosity of donors could be easily recognized. After considering various options, it was ultimately decided through the interagency group that funds should be directed to support the needs of schools devastated by the Hurricane, including by providing funds for reconstruction, equipment, support for faculty, scholarships and financial support for students. On March 16, 2006, the Department of State signed an MOA with the Department of Education for projects to assist schools affected by the hurricane, and on March 17, 2006, $66 million was transferred to the Department of Education.

**Lessons Learned:**

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned includes a number of recommendations for the Department of State and other agencies in the NRP with regards to the management of foreign assistance and foreign nationals in cases of domestic crisis. As enumerated in recommendations 89 to 97, more detailed procedures are needed to process offers of international assistance, and to ensure that the needs of foreign missions are included in the international coordination support annex of the NRP.
The specific recommendations are listed below:

1. DOS should lead the revision of the International Coordination Support Annex to the NRP, clarifying responsibilities of State, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DOD, and other supporting agencies in response to domestic incidents. This revision should begin immediately.

2. Prior to June 1, 2006, State and DHS should lead an interagency effort that will quickly develop procedures to review, accept or reject any offers of international assistance for a domestic catastrophic incident. This should include an appropriate mechanism, led by DHS and supported by State and Treasury, to receive, disburse, and audit any cash assistance received in support of victim needs. These operating procedures should include:

   a. A coordination process among Federal agencies and non-governmental partners to solicit, accept, receive, integrate and distribute foreign assistance;

   b. An expedited review process for international aid that addresses both critical needs and legitimate foreign policy objectives;

   c. The inclusion of a USAID representative to the Joint Field Office (JFO);

   d. The inclusion of a representative from USAID/OFDA on the State Department Task Force and a DOS representative on USAID/OFDA’s RMT to improve interagency coordination; also the addition of a DHS representative to both task forces to provide more efficient information sharing about assistance needs on the ground.

What we are doing to address the gaps identified: The Department of State, along with the agencies testifying this morning and others not
present, is participating in several working groups. One is focusing on material donations and is developing a manual on the processing of offers of assistance. Another is developing procedures for handling cash donations to enable a rapid application of gifts received. A third is focusing on developing guidelines to keep foreign missions abreast of USG response in cases of major disasters. Still another is addressing the issues related to public communications with foreign media. These groups are on target to meet deadlines given by the HSC, which will review their work.

Conclusion:

Our nation received an unprecedented amount of international assistance in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, reflective of the fact that people and governments around the world are prepared to support us and stand with us in our hour of need.

We want to thank the international community and all those private citizens who gave so generously. We have ensured that the gifts made reached those affected by the Hurricane Katrina.

We believe that in a major domestic crisis, it is likely that we will again receive generous and additional offers of assistance from the international community, particularly from neighbors and close partners. Should the U.S. Government decide to accept in principle international offers to meet the crisis, we will have the mechanisms in place to quickly process the assistance given.

I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to discuss the international support we received during Katrina and look forward to responding to your questions.
Management of Foreign Assistance Received for Hurricane Katrina Relief

In response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, the United States has received a generous outpouring of financial assistance from foreign governments and other foreign entities. Under the International Coordination Support Annex of the National Response Plan, the Department of State, in collaboration with the Agency for International Development (USAID), “acts as the intermediary for foreign offers of assistance to the U.S. Government…” The Department and USAID “work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to respond appropriately to such requests” and “expedite delivery of assistance” that is accepted.

Given the international interest and generosity displayed by contributions from foreign governments for relief efforts, guidelines for the future management of the donated funds should be established. Many of the guidelines discussed below are drawn from donor experience in other countries (where the United States has been a donor). This assumes a designated U.S. Government account, likely assigned to FEMA or some other agency with appropriate gift acceptance and grant authorities for domestic relief and reconstruction, and the swift transfer of donated funds from the Department of State deposit account.

Accountability and transparency

- The Department of State has a fiduciary responsibility to account for all donations it receives to the point that such funds are transferred to another agency.

- Subsequent tracking, management and reporting of foreign assistance, including those mentioned below, are the responsibility of the receiving agency, in coordination with OMB, and other appropriate agencies.

- Ongoing management of the funds by the agency receiving them from State should allow for strong accountability and transparency as to their use, down to project level.

- To do this, the funds should be separately tracked by the receiving agency, for example in a sub-account to allow for the accounting of individual or partially aggregated donations, and not used as general budget support.
Smaller financial contributions (particularly those under $1 million) could be combined for a larger project -- to facilitate tracking and accounting for smaller donations -- but the combining of donors should be vetted with the State Department for diplomatic sensitivities.

If the recipient agency is not configured to provide this degree of tracking of foreign donations, it could potentially pass through the contributions and attendant requirements to one or a few implementing agencies (such as the Army Corps of Engineers).

Swift Delivery of Assistance

In order to expedite the delivery of assistance received, the agency and/or organization (with the account described above) that will direct the application of donations received for relief efforts must be identified.

The Department of State should move quickly to transfer relief funds and any donor intentions for their disposition to the agency identified above.

Given the anticipated interest in how the foreign assistance is used, every effort should be made to disburse the funds to provide swift and meaningful relief to Katrina’s victims without compromising needed internal controls to insure proper management and effective use of the donations.

Appropriateness of use:

Although foreign donors have not earmarked their contributions for specific projects, every effort should be made by the receiving agency to notify donors via the appropriate State Department regional bureau on the intended use for the contributions (above a certain threshold level -- e.g. $5 million).

Foreign donations should not be used for overhead.

Where possible, very large donations (e.g. over $10 million) should be used for a clearly identifiable purpose and even potentially marked with a plaque or other recognition of the donor. All countries expecting such recognition should get it. To the extent possible, all donors should be recognized in some appropriate way.
UNCLASSIFIED

Coordination:

- Use of the foreign funds should be well coordinated within the overall federal effort and with those at the state and local levels to avoid duplication of effort.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. La Force.

STATEMENT OF HUDSON LA FORCE III

Mr. La Force. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, on behalf of Secretary Margaret Spellings, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the actions Education is taking to distribute funds received from international donors following Hurricane Katrina. We regard these international donations as one important element of our total effort to provide assistance to schools and colleges directly impacted by the hurricanes last summer and to those schools who have enrolled students displaced by those storms.

Within days of when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Secretary Spellings sent high level officials to the affected States to gain first-hand information about the situation and the needs in those jurisdictions. We focused on listening to the issues faced by educators in the Gulf States and developing solutions that would work for schools, colleges, and students. We have provided significant technical and financial assistance to States, school districts, and colleges and have granted waivers when necessary to support State and local school leaders in managing their response to the disaster.

On December 30th, President Bush signed into law the Hurricane Education Recovery Act which gave education $1.6 billion for hurricane relief activities. Included was $750 million to help public and private schools in Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama restart their schools, $645 million to public and private schools across the Nation for the costs they have incurred in enrolling displaced students, and $190 million for colleges in Louisiana and Mississippi.

We made the first allocation of over $250 million less than 1 week after President Bush signed the law, made the first allocation of aid for displaced students 1 week after final applications were due from the States, and as of today have fully allocated nearly $1.5 million of the $1.6 billion appropriation. The only remaining funds are a portion of the aid for displaced students which by statute is intended to be made in four quarterly payments across the school year.

We are actively engaged with the States and our Inspector General in monitoring the use of these funds. In January, we began discussions with the Department of State regarding approximately $60 million in donations that State had received from foreign donors. We developed a proposed strategy for using this aid and on February 16th presented that strategy to an interagency task force comprised of officials from the Departments of State and Homeland Security, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding. The task force decided that education should receive and manage these foreign donations.

On March 16th, we entered into a memorandum of agreement with State under which Education has accepted these donations and will allocate the funds to educational institutions in Louisiana and Mississippi. The agreement provides a framework for education to maintain the funds in a separate trust account and to administer them in an accountable and transparent manner, includ-
ing proper Internet controls and performance measures. While we have not yet made final decisions on the distribution of this aid, we do know that it will go to schools and colleges in the hardest hit areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, and we expect to make those final decisions and disburse the money in May. I believe that we have established and maintained an effective working relationship with State on this matter, and if the Federal Government were to receive education assistance from foreign sources in the future, we would be ready to do so again.

Education has learned important lessons about crisis management and response from our Katrina experiences. We are using those lessons to inform ongoing agency activities in emergency response and crisis management, including our preparedness for the potential flu pandemic. We are working with the Homeland Security Council and other agencies to implement the recommendations of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned Report and are reviewing our internal capabilities for crisis planning and response and our capabilities to work with State and local education leaders in emergency situations.

This concludes my statement, and I am happy to respond to any questions you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. La Force follows:]
Statement of Hudson La Force III
Senior Counselor to the Secretary
U.S. Department of Education

On the Distribution of International Assistance
In the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

Before the House Committee on Government Reform
April 6, 2006

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, on behalf of Secretary Margaret Spellings, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the actions the Department is taking in distributing funds received from international donors to support recovery efforts by schools and colleges affected by Hurricane Katrina.

Background

We regard our administration of these international donations as just one important element in our effort to provide assistance to schools and colleges directly in the path of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, and to the educational institutions that have enrolled students displaced by those storms. As you may know, we responded to those storms quickly and, we believe, comprehensively. Within days of when Hurricane Katrina made landfall, Secretary Spellings sent high-level officials to the affected States to gain first-hand information about the situation and the needs in those jurisdictions. We focused on listening to the issues faced by educators in the Gulf States, and developing solutions that would work for schools, colleges and students. We subsequently provided significant technical and financial assistance to States, school districts, and colleges, and have granted waivers when necessary to support State and local school leaders in managing their response to the disaster.

For example, on September 30 we used Charter School Program funds that were available at the end of the fiscal year to make a special, competitive grant of $20.9 million to the State of Louisiana to help reopen charter schools damaged by the hurricanes, to help create new charter schools, and to expand the capacity of existing charter schools to enroll displaced students. As another example, the Department redirected $30 million in unspent Federal campus-based student aid funds to help hurricane-affected colleges meet the increased student demand for such aid. In addition, we established the Hurricane Help for Schools website, which links schools in the Gulf region that need books, clothing, and other supplies with individuals and organizations willing to donate those goods and services. To date, this website has facilitated hundreds of these linkages.

On December 30, President Bush signed into law the FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act, which gave the Department $1.6 billion for hurricane relief activities. From that
appropriation, $750 million is helping public and private schools in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas that were closed as a result of the two hurricanes to restart their operations, $645 million is for “Emergency Impact Aid” payments to public and private schools nationally for the costs they have incurred in enrolling displaced students, $5 million is for efforts to help students made homeless by the hurricanes, $190 million is for college recovery efforts in Louisiana and Mississippi, and the remaining $10 million is for reimbursing institutions of higher education that took in displaced students. The Department has acted quickly and decisively in administering and distributing these funds, working in partnership with education officials in the States. As of this date, we have allocated over 90 percent of this special appropriation; the only remaining funds are a portion of the Emergency Impact Aid, which, by statute, is to be distributed in four quarterly payments over the course of the school year.

In sum, ever since Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the Gulf, the Department has been highly engaged, at all levels, in helping school and college administrators to cope with the aftermath of the storms, and in providing them with many forms of assistance and support. We are proud of what we have accomplished so far, but recognize that the recovery effort is far from over. Our efforts continue.

Distribution of International Donations for Education

In early January, we began discussions with the Department of State regarding the dispensation of approximately $60 million that State had received from public and private sources in foreign nations. We developed a proposed strategy for using this aid and, on February 16, presented it to an interagency task force comprised of officials from the Departments of State and Homeland Security, the National Security Council, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Office of Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Recovery. The task force then made the decision that Education should receive and manage these foreign donations.

On March 16, we entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with State, under which our Department is accepting these donations and will allocate the funds to educational institutions in Louisiana and Mississippi. This memorandum provides a framework for Education to maintain the funds in a separate trust account and to administer them in an accountable and transparent manner. While we have not yet made final decisions on the distribution of this aid, we do know that it will go to schools and colleges in the hardest-hit areas of Louisiana and Mississippi, and we expect to make those final decisions and disburse the aid by mid-May.

Lessons for the Future

I believe that we have established and maintained an effective working relationship with State on this matter and that, if the Federal Government were to receive education assistance from foreign entities or individuals in the future, we would be ready to do something similar.
More generally, the Department has learned important lessons about crisis management and response from our post-Katrina experiences, and they will inform many of our efforts across the agency. For example, under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program, we make competitive Emergency Response and Crisis Management grants, to help school systems prepare to respond to natural and man-made emergencies. Although the original focus of these grants was on the threat of terrorism or such incidents as school shootings, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have shown that natural disasters are an equally important threat, and we have thus expanded the program’s focus. Our response to the hurricanes is also influencing how we help school authorities plan for the potential of a flu pandemic. Just a few weeks ago, we sent schools and colleges a checklist to help them prepare for that eventuality. In addition, the Department is working with the Homeland Security Council and other agencies to implement the recommendations of the Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned report. We are reviewing our internal capabilities for crisis planning and response, and evaluating our capacity to communicate with State and local education officials in emergency situations.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you.
The good news is I am the only one here. The bad news is there is no time limit. So I get to ask what I need to ask.

I will start with Mr. Long. Is it accurate that FEMA has not invested the $66 million in international funds yet?

Mr. Long. I don't know. I know that the money was transferred into a FEMA account, and then it is my understanding that as the UMCOR got up and running that we would then transfer upon receipt. As to how we would utilize those funds, FEMA would then transfer the money to UMCOR to utilize those, but I don't have a current status as to where the money resides.

Chairman Tom Davis. Is there anyone here from GAO that can answer that? What is your understanding of the money?

Mr. Williams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is our understanding also, that is the case.

Chairman Tom Davis. But these funds sat in non-interest-bearing accounts. Is that accurate?

Mr. Williams. We identified $60 million that had been in non-interest-bearing accounts.

Chairman Tom Davis. For how long?

Mr. Williams. From the September timeframe when the money first started to come into the organization, and I would feel it was through March 16th.

Chairman Tom Davis. Six months, 7 months.

Mr. Williams. About 7 months or so, and we estimate that if it had been invested, it would have earned nearly $1 million.

Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Long, do you know why that is? Is there some law that makes it go to a non-interest-bearing account or anything?

Mr. Long. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Can you repeat that question?

Chairman Tom Davis. Why would the money go to a non-interest-bearing account? Is there a prohibition in law about putting it in an interest-bearing account or was it thought that it would be there a short period and it just languished there?

Mr. Long. It is my understanding that the FEMA account is interest-bearing.

Chairman Tom Davis. Is that correct?

Ms. D'Agostino. Yes.

Chairman Tom Davis. So was any money lost as a result of going into the—did we lose any money in the investments, I guess is my question.

Ms. D'Agostino. By not placing it in the FEMA account, the FEMA interest-bearing account, yes.

Chairman Tom Davis. How long did that happen? Was it a 6-month period?

Ms. D'Agostino. We calculated about $1 million in interest would have been gained on the moneys had they been in the FEMA account.

Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. McCarthy, you sat on the money, not you personally, but State sat on the money for 6 months?

Ms. McCarthy. I think Mr. Chairman, I think we need to clarify something here, which is absent specific authority, funds held in the U.S. Treasury do not ordinarily accumulate interest. We dis-
cussed with Treasury and OMB that we had a specific State Department account and it would be the appropriate place to place the money as it flowed in over time. It didn’t come in in one fell swoop, and it was determined at the time that the donations in this account could not earn interest.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Why not?

Ms. MCCARTHY. I would have to ask my legal team here.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Go ahead. Ask them.

Ms. MCCARTHY. Absent statutory authority, our moneys could not earn the interest.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Ms. MCCARTHY. That is the key element, and another element to consider is——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I gather you would welcome statutory authority in a case like this so we don’t leave $1 million on the table.

Ms. MCCARTHY. We are discussing in the interagency group right now that is looking at how best to stand up a team immediately and an interagency, we are discussing precisely that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, hurricane season officially starts shortly, and moving things through this Congress even when they are easy takes a period of time. We will probably just initiate something on that right away and try to work with your team.

I think that is something we all ought to be a little embarrassed about, not that it is anybody’s fault. I understand the rationale, but when money is pouring in, maybe somebody should have said this ought to go in an account where it can earn some interest.

Ms. MCCARTHY. One of the things we may have to keep in mind is that the interest, I suppose, that these funds—again, I am not from Treasury, but if these funds earn interest in U.S. Government investment mechanisms, those who are paying the interest are the U.S. taxpayers.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, basically you are using it for debt reduction instead of for its intended purpose. That is all. I mean, I know everything is fungible, accounts and everything like that, but I think in a case like this, this is $1 million that really should have been earmarked for the coast and should have gone to the coast as opposed to debt reduction. I understand Government think and how this works, but at a time when you still have a lot of people along the coast that are looking for help and aid and everything else, that is my only point.

So I think from a statutory point of view, we would like to get this to a conclusion sooner or later, which is probably moving. I know what the government pays in interest. I don’t know if we could have gotten something better off in a different marketplace or not, but I think that explains it.

Now, FEMA has not invested the $66 million in international funds yet; is that right, Mr. Long, and what is it about the United Methodist Committee of Relief Contract? Can you tell us a little bit more about that?

Mr. LONG. The interagency group upon receiving international donations collectively as a group decided that case management would be an appropriate use of those funds. After that decision was made, FEMA pulled together a panel and reviewed proposals in the November timeframe and based on reviewing those proposals de-
cided that UMCOR was a cost-effective efficient way to utilize those funds.

Chairman Tom Davis. Well, Ms. McCarthy, FEMA has told the committee and GAO that they provided the State Department-led task force with uses for $326 million on September 23rd, identifying that the international cash donations could be spent on social service assistance, medical transportation, adopting homes for medical and handicap needs, job training, education, living expenses, building materials, and so forth. Why did the task force decide not to give the entire amount to FEMA for these purposes?

Ms. McCarthy. If I can respond, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Tom Davis. Sure. I was asking you.

Ms. McCarthy. The initial allocation was for the case management system, which would be for people to go out and determine the longer-term needs of those who had been affected by the hurricane. The other proposals as reviewed by the interagency needed further development and would flow from the case management system, and essentially what we decided to do in the interagency process is to look for something that was tangible immediate reconstruction and not wait for the development of what would be the results of the case management system, the citizens would need “X” or “Y” or housing, etc., because that process was going to take a longer time.

Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, I know these are foreign dollars flowing and somebody has to hold them, but I wonder if the State Department is competent. I mean they are not really part of the FEMA and recovery efforts as we look at this in the future. I don’t know if that is something we are looking at, but it is just not something you are used to, the State Department is used to, overseeing. Right?

Ms. McCarthy. Correct. It is not something we are used to overseeing, and that is why in the interagency process that we set up, we pulled in agencies who have a better feel for what is occurring on the ground, and in the future, that is what we would do. Obviously, the nature of the crisis is hard to determine. It could be manmade. It could be natural-made. And the moneys could go to one agency or another. That is essentially what we are discussing right now, to set up at least a mechanism to determine which agency would be the appropriate one to then process the money depending on the nature of the crisis.

Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, during the aftermath of Katrina, what process did DOD use to route foreign military assistance through the State-led task force charged with the responsibility for recording all offers of assistance? Was it an effective process?

Mr. Rowell. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you to restate the question, please.

Chairman Tom Davis. What process did DOD use to route the foreign military assistance that came in through the Department of State-led task force charged with the responsibility of recording all offers of assistance?

Mr. Rowell. Sir, let me ask Mr. Berand McConnell to address that, please.

Chairman Tom Davis. That would be fine.
Mr. McCONNELL. Good morning, sir.
Chairman Tom Davis. Good morning.
Mr. McCONNELL. The NORTHCOM role in particular followed essentially the same procedures that you have heard already described, which is to say when an offer of foreign assistance was received directly, we would refer those to the State-led task force for determination as to whether that task force would go to accepting the offer. Our part directly was to validate with General Honre and his task force whether those offers met a valid military need and then we made a recommendation on that point.
If all the pieces aligned, to include the Department of State task force agreement, we communicated directly with the military representatives to facilitate delivery.
Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. D'Agostino, GAO reports that the Federal Government didn't have the policies to help ensure FEMA had oversight of donated commodities and to ensure that the commodities were vetted through the Department of State acceptance process, but FEMA reports to the committee yesterday that everything went through the DOS acceptance process. Can you resolve that for us?
Ms. D'Agostino. Apparently not everything went through the DOS acceptance process, and, in fact, there is actually still confusion about particularly the foreign military donations, who actually accepted them and was responsible for them. Basically, as we understand it from DOD, well, actually NORTHCOM General Counsel, they believed that because they used the task force process at the State Department that FEMA accepted the foreign military donations, and FEMA has also told us that they did not accept anything that went through the foreign military donations.
Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, this is part of the debate going on with Congress about should FEMA be part of Homeland Security or should it be attached to the Office of the President. Obviously, if this were in the White House or attached right there, this stuff moves very, very quickly. It looks here like we have a bureaucratic jumble. Everybody is getting sign-offs and everything and money is sitting in accounts and it is not getting out there.
Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, if I may.
Chairman Tom Davis. Yes, please.
Mr. McCONNELL. Maybe I misunderstood the question. The interagency process either accepted or declined the military offers. Once the acceptance of those things, purely military goods, was complete, then they——
Chairman Tom Davis. What kind of things did you decline?
Mr. McCONNELL. I don't know that we declined anything, because the things that we accepted were divers, nurses. Ships from various countries came in to provide that sort of support. I don't know that once something was defined as a purely military offer, I do not believe we declined anything.
Chairman Tom Davis. My information shows that some of the items that were declined, we had some Japanese self-defense force units. Jordan offered two field hospitals. France offered an enabled frigate and hospital ship. Israel and Germany offered ground-based cellular communication systems, Switzerland two disaster relief Platoons.
Mr. ROWELL. Mr. Chairman, we will have to take that one for the record. We are not prepared to speak to that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There have been widespread news reports about items that were offered from countries that we weren’t prepared to take and turned back. Does GAO want to add anything to that?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. No, we don’t.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just named a few. We have a couple of pages of things that were declined at this point.

Mr. McCONNELL. Sir, I agree with you that there were things that were declined. As far as NORTHCOM was concerned, our process was part of the interagency process. Those things that we were able to validate against General Honres’ requirements, we recommended for the interagency process.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Mr. La Force, in your joint memorandum of agreement with the Department of State, which I think is in Attachment A, are you familiar with what I am talking about?

Mr. LA FORCE. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It indicates that the department will dedicate funds to Xavier and Dillard Universities, the Louisiana Department of Education, and the Laura Bush Foundation for American Libraries. In your written testimony, you say that you haven’t yet decided who to give the money to. Is this like a draft?

Mr. LA FORCE. The attachment to the memorandum is a summary of the proposals that we had received at the time the memorandum was signed. We have received additional proposals since that time and have made no decisions about the actual grant awards that we would be making.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. McCarthy, you reported to this committee that State-led interagency working group offered international funds to the Army Corps of Engineers for the rebuilding of levies and that the Corps turned down the offer. Is that basically the gist of it?

Ms. MCCARTHY. In the interagency effort to move the money swiftly for reconstruction, yes, we did approach the Corps, and once they had made a determination based on the moneys they received in the supplemental, they indicated to us that they did not need the international funds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. I am just trying to understand it. The Corps reports to the committee this morning that the Department of State was looking for options regarding how they could best allocate the foreign donations, but they never actually offered to give the money to the Corps. The Corps said they referred State’s inquiry to the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding who is responsible for overseeing all of the recovery operations because they felt they would have a better feel as to where the greatest needs were.

Ms. McCarthy, Sir, I am not privy to how internally they deliberated and who they went to, but ultimately the response to us on approximately November 22nd was that they did not and would not need these funds.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.
Ms. D’Agostino, does GAO believe that the current process that is currently in operation for acceptance and distribution of international assistance is transparent enough for proper oversight by Congress?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. Certain aspects of the process were very transparent and we were able to get very good records and access and information on. I would say that certain aspects regarding the role of the National Security Council were not as transparent.

Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Long, how does FEMA provide oversight for international assistance it has received in the United States for domestic incidents?

Mr. LONG. We would utilize standard case management oversight. Just to give you a brief overview of how FEMA manages these sorts of engagements, one would be to review the financial status, provide progress reports and close-out reports. In the case of UMCOR, we conduct site visits where we would go over a routine checklist of business and administrative systems, review the subgrantee selection and monitoring process. We monitor by telephone to maintain consistent communication, and there is consultation with the program officer at the time of payment requests and also at the time of progress reports, and then there is review of audit reports as well.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Let me ask this: I will start with Ms. D’Agostino, if you can shed some light on it. The National Security Council had a large role in determining how internationally donated funds would be used. What led to the involvement of the National Security Council regarding international cash donations? Any idea?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. The only thing I can tell you is that part of the National Response Plan acknowledges that there may be policy issues that need to be elevated to either the Homeland Security Council or the National Security Council. Since these were international cash donations and the State Department is a member of the NSC, I assume that is why they went the route of the NSC.

Chairman Tom Davis. Can anybody shed light on that? Is somebody afraid we would take some bad money from somebody? The NSC seems that it is really not equipped to decide how this stuff ought to be sent and accepted and stuff. Can anybody shed any light on that?

Ms. McCarthy. If I could clarify, the NSC offered to pull together agencies working with us so we would start a deliberative process. I don’t think one can infer from that they had veto making authority. It was an interagency deliberative process. They pulled the agencies together for meeting.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Until just a week or two ago, we still had some of these commodities sitting in a warehouse in Arkansas; is that right?

Ms. D’AGOSTINO. That is our understanding.

Chairman Tom Davis. While everybody is meeting and discussing and everything else.

Ms. McCarthy, as you interpret it, what kind of authority does the NRP give the Department of State for making decisions about handing foreign assistance to the United States? As you interpret it, what kind of authority does the NRP give the Department of
State to make decisions about spending foreign assistance given to the United States? What is the current thought?

Ms. McCarthy. Essentially, we act as an intermediary for foreign offers of assistance under the NRP and we work with other agencies to respond to requests and expedite the delivery of assistance. That in a nutshell is essentially our role under the NRP.

Chairman Tom Davis. All right. Mr. Long, GAO reports that FEMA and USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance were unable to provide the GAO with evidence that they had determined or confirmed that international in-kind assistance arrived at FEMA distribution sites. Can you shed any light on that?

Mr. Gottlieb. Mr. Chairman, I think I mentioned in my remarks that we actually recently received from our dispatch agent, DHL, a thorough listing of all that came into Little Rock, what those donations were, who the donors were, and the distribution points to which those are were dispatched. I believe we left 30 copies with the clerk.

Chairman Tom Davis. OK.

Mr. Gottlieb. So I think if you look——

Chairman Tom Davis. We just got them. OK. That is fine.

Mr. Long, let me ask you this: If matching funds that are required for State and local governments for public assistance was an issue and not using Stafford Act funds, could the Stafford Act be amended to permit international donations to be used for such matching funds? Do you have any thought on that?

Mr. Long. I was just informed that it would require statutory action.

Chairman Tom Davis. So that is something we could consider from our end?

Mr. Long. Yes. It is something we could consider.

Chairman Tom Davis. Is FEMA seeking statutory authority to change the Stafford Act to allow it to use international funds for other uses currently permitted under the act? That is what we are asking. That is something else we ought to look at.

Mr. Long. We are currently looking at all the changes that should be considered to be made to the Stafford Act based on what happened in Katrina.

Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask this for the panel, if somebody can answer it: Who is responsible for tracking who received in-kind donations to their final destinations, from the beginning to the end, receiving them and going to the end with this process? Who is ultimately responsible for that? We have all these different agencies up here. We have all these task forces. Ultimately, who makes those decisions, or it is just so diffuse at this point that you just kind of have to get GAO involved to try to follow the cash?

Mr. Gottlieb. Mr. Chairman, if I can respond in part and I think Mr. Long may respond afterwards, I think the way the system developed, which is fairly rapidly after we——

Chairman Tom Davis. Kind of ad hoc?

Mr. Gottlieb. Ad hoc, but because we didn’t have a system, that is the best we can call it, but it was pretty clear what our role was at OFDA, and that was once a decision had been made to accept an offer, after OFDA then liaised with wherever that donor was, whether it was consolidated goods from a NATO air base or it was
Britain or wherever it was, and then those planes were directed into Little Rock. At Little Rock Air Force Base, that is where we had our logisticians. We were working with DOD. They helped us with some of the offloads. We then engaged the services of DHL to help us then dispatch those goods to destination points that were given to us through consultation with FEMA.

So in the documents to which I referred earlier, it shows many, many destinations throughout Mississippi and Louisiana and Alabama where we actually dispatched those. Now, after that point, that was the end point for us. We sent it to a distribution center.

Chairman Tom Davis. You sign off at that point?

Mr. Gotlieb. That is where we sign off, yes.

Chairman Tom Davis. Then who gets it? I guess FEMA gets it.

Mr. Long. At that point, when the goods landed in Little Rock, FEMA would be in communication with OFDA as to where to distribute those based on need. If the goods were transferred to a Federal staging area, which would be FEMA warehouse or distribution center, we then, yes, would take physical receipt of those goods.

Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Rowell, let me ask did we have any issues with DOD coordinating with the Department of State, ensuring permission or visa for foreign military ships and planes and personnel during this emergency? Did it run pretty smoothly or did you run into some red tape in moving and getting people in and out?

Mr. Rowell. Our information is even though this was an ad hoc and quickly formed group, I have to say that the people at this table and the folks that supported them, it went well after we got our sea legs, if you will, and DOD has no problem.

Chairman Tom Davis. So we don’t need any statutory or any changes in a case like this to make sure that it functions should this happen again? We are asking this not to come back and chew everybody out for what happened this time around, but——

Mr. Rowell. In my discussions in the department, I know of no conversations regarding a change to statutory authority.

Chairman Tom Davis. This was the largest storm in recorded history in the United States, and I think as we take a look at that, and I have been down there three times and I know many of you have been down, even though it was predicted, it was predictable, we learned a lot and a lot of mistakes got made. The key is to make sure the next time around we are ready and we can be a smooth efficient machine.

We are going to wrestle up here with some major issues on organization. Frankly, we know FEMA is having trouble filling the slots at this point. There is some concern that being attached to the Department of Homeland Security, that it can’t operate as quickly and efficiently under the National Response Plan. It really never got a chance to operate in this particular case because Michael Brown who was on the ground kind of didn’t believe in the plan to begin with. He had handled emergencies before. He just tried to circumvent it and deal directly with the White House.

So, look, a lot of things happened that in retrospect today we would all do differently. You are just spokesmen for your different agencies. What we are trying to elicit here is the kind of statutory changes so we can give these departments the flexibility you need
to get the job done should something like this occur again. That is ultimately what we are after.

Any other comments before we close the hearing? I appreciate everybody’s patience today.

Mr. McConnell. Just one brief one, sir, and that is I am here as the NORTHCOM kind of representative, and just speaking from an operational basis, I think in many ways this is a very good news story. Yes, there was no system, there was no anticipation that there would be a need for this kind of a system, but once the people on the ground started to work together—and particularly kudos to the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance who has impressed the men and women of JTF Katrina very well—I think this in some ways as a good news story in allowing us to proceed along the lines that you just described.

Chairman Tom Davis. I am not sure I disagree with that. I think one of the problems is that we have institutional barriers, some statutory, some regulatory, that made it harder for people to get the jobs done, and that is really what we are trying to solicit here.

I was down on the ground and saw people working 24–7. I saw volunteers, fire departments, and emergency personnel from all over the country coming in and making this work. I saw people in the face of the storm who had made some early decisions decide they were going to put everything into saving lives, which meant some other things had to go by the wayside and did a remarkable job of actually limiting loss of the life once the levies broke and once some of the initial decisions that they probably wished had gone otherwise came about, and there were a lot of heroes in this story, and I don’t mean to detract from that at all.

We are really ultimately after institutionally what do we need to do to make sure that we can be a smooth-running machine. I know you have to deal with the rules and regulations that are passed by Congress and in some cases regulations that come through the agencies, and you are subject to that, and when you violate them, we will call you up and say why did you do that. Of course, emergency situations are different, and one of the things we found with FEMA and the folks on the ground—the Governor of Louisiana talked about this, even Michael Brown when the military came in—they were mission-oriented. They were not driven by regulations, and they were able to get things done a lot quicker than some other elements of the government that seemed to be just constrained by regulations. In emergencies, you have to look at the mission. You have to get the job done. It sometimes goes outside the box. We are seeing this all the time.

Anyway, I appreciate everybody sharing their thoughts with us today, coming before us. I am sure if we had it to do over again, we would all do it differently, but so would we up here. We are just trying to see what we need to do so that the next time, we give you the tools.

I appreciate your patience. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]
Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Davis, for holding this important oversight hearing to examine the acceptance and distribution of international aid donations for Hurricane Katrina relief. I appreciate that you have kept your promise to hold a series of hearings on the subject of Hurricane Katrina as you said you would in September of last year. I am grateful for your leadership in this regard.

After Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States on August 29, 2005, causing widespread flooding and significant property and infrastructure damage to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, over 76 countries and international organizations from around the world offered humanitarian aid in a variety of forms. Initially, the United States was reluctant to accept donations and aid from foreign countries other than Canada and the United Kingdom. After all, the United States had never before accepted international aid for disaster relief. As time passed and reports of damage grew grimmer, however, the United States began accepting many of the generous offers of aid.
Today’s hearing will look at several GAO findings of how the federal government botched up the receipt and distribution of this international aid. It should come as no surprise that the federal government ineffectively managed this international aid, as the overall federal response to the hurricane was both inadequate and appalling, from the suspension of the Davis Bacon fair wage provisions to the massive use of no bid contracts that mostly went to out-of-state contactors, not to mention countless other failures that cost money and lives.

However, rather than focusing on FEMA’s lack of organization or poor interagency communications, I’d like to highlight another major shortcoming: the United States’ rejection of offers of aid from select countries for narrow political reasons. For example, Cuba offered 1,586 doctors and 26 tons of medicine for U.S. victims, but this aid was not accepted. While the United States’ policy towards Cuba has been four decades of official hostility, was that sufficient reason to reject their unconditional offer of much needed healthcare?

Acceptance of humanitarian aid from a country at odds with our own country’s official policy would not have been without precedent. In the past, humanitarian considerations have often surpassed political concerns in dealing
with disaster relief. In fact, disaster relief has even served to bridge countries with poor relations. When devastating earthquakes hit both Turkey and Greece in 1999, not only did the two countries assist each other, but the bilateral relations between the two countries vastly improved after disaster assistance was exchanged. For example, Turkey and Greece co-sponsored a joint UN resolution on the establishment of a "Standby Disaster Response Unit." Later, the Political Directors of both Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministries established a joint mechanism to prepare for Turkey's membership to the European Union.

Venezuela offered our country another generous aid package, including two mobile hospital units, 120 rescue and first aid experts, 10 water purification plants, 18 power generation plants, 50 tons of food, and 20 tons of bottled water, however this offer was also rejected. Yet we have no official policy of hostility towards Venezuela. What was the justification for rejecting this aid?

I believe that in the aftermath of Katrina, the United States should have accepted any help that we were offered. Our country and especially the citizens of the Gulf coast region needed that aid. But Washington bureaucrats implacably turned their eyes from the needs of U.S. citizens, and remained
firmly opposed to the diplomatic humanitarian gestures from Cuba and Venezuela.

The rejection of aid from those countries was not only a missed opportunity to aid our suffering citizens, but also a missed opportunity for the U.S. to positively engage with countries with which we have strained or nonexistent diplomatic relations. Often, the silver lining of tragedies is that wounds are healed between those with differences, as those differences seem somehow less significant when faced with massive loss and destruction. Sadly, Hurricane Katrina brought no silver lining with its dark clouds. It was a colossal disaster in every sense.

I would like to hear today’s panelists try to justify our government’s rejection of aid from Cuba and Venezuela in a time of desperate need. I sincerely hope that this hearing will help to establish a healthier acceptance policy for any aid our country may be offered should there be any future disasters. Thank you.
Sent: Wed Apr 05 19:18:34 2006
Subject: Request for Information from Corps of Engineers

In late fall 2005, the State Department contacted the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) regarding the possible availability of foreign donations they had received to assist New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The State Department requested information from ACE on funding needs that could be met by a portion of $60 million dollars they had received from foreign governments. Our understanding was that there were stipulations on how this money could be spent - it had to be put towards efforts in the New Orleans area and a portion of the money had to be used to address education needs.

At the time, all of the Corps’ requirements were being adequately funded in the supplemental appropriation acts that were moving forward.

After discussion within the Corps, we suggested that the inquiry be forwarded to the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding at DHS. It is my understanding that they served in an advisory role and worked with the State Department to coordinate the transfer of available funds to the US Department of Education. Since Education already had a grant program in place and the money had to be used in New Orleans with an education component, they were deemed to be the logical distributor of the additional funds from foreign donors.

Thanks. Please let me know if you have additional questions. Jennifer

Jennifer A. Greer  
Chief, Future Directions Branch  
Civil Works Directorate  
202-761-4113  
202-761-4370 (fax)

Can u answer these questions for clarification:

Did ACE report to State working group that they were receiving adequate funds and did not need money? Why did ACE suggest the inquiry be directed to DHS Office indicated below?
ACE Response:

State was looking for options regarding how they could best allocate the foreign donations. They never actually offered to give the money to the Corps. Since the Department of Homeland Security GCR office is responsible for overseeing all Gulf Coast Recovery operations we felt they would have a better feel as to where the greatest needs were. That's why we referred them to the GRC office. We have been working closely with that office ever since it was formed. Jen
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

"Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth:
A Post-Katrina Review of International Disaster Assistance"

Index of Attached Documents:

I. Department of State Interagency Task Force Record of International Assistance
II. FEMA Mission Assignments to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
III. U.S. Northern Command Briefing on International Military Support
IV. United Methodist Committee on Relief Contract
V. Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Education on Use of International Monetary Donations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Nation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Accepted Offers of Assistance Description</th>
<th>Cash Collected/Items Received By USG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>9/21/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td>$99,800.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $300,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>9/21/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Relief Supplies sent to local hospitals</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>9/27/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>GOA sent a multi-disciplinary (White Helmet) team with expertise in social, psychological, and medical assistance related to disaster relief.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>10/7/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $200,000 pledged</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Emergency managers sent to assist with community recovery</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>GOA donated $10 million ($7,649,062) to Red Cross for Katrina disaster assistance.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>500 tarpas (10mx4m), 300 camp beds</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $500,000 cash pledged</td>
<td>$500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $50,000 cash pledged</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>9/7/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $5,090,000 pledged</td>
<td>$4,999,975.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $1 million pledged</td>
<td>$1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>FM Billie Miller – Barbados donated an unspecified amount to the Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9/2/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>(10 personnel) to work with Red Cross, coordination/liaison team (4 personnel), civil engineering team (10 personnel), diving team, balloon lamps.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>5 Civil Defense officers for week-long Subject Matter Expert Exchange visit with Mississippi National Guard</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>10/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $76,362 pledged</td>
<td>$61,406.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>11/2/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $1,000,000 pledged</td>
<td>$1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $20,000 pledged from King</td>
<td>$20,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>CPA 250 million (approx.) $380,000</td>
<td>$374,531.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2 Griffin helicopters to US CG District (Cape Cod and Virginia)</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td><strong>Military</strong>: 2 fleet diving unit teams (of 17 and 18 divers) - 5 support personnel/self-sustaining</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td><strong>Military</strong>: Canadian Ship w/ medical supplies</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/29/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Canadian National Emergency Stockpile System offered 31,400 blankets, 20,000 cots, 26,000 examination/rescue gloves, 5000 isolation gowns, etc.</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Aid Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/7/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Medical Supplies: Crutches (1483), Wheelchairs (110), Vinyl gloves (126,970),</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Surgical masks (13,900), Bandages, compress, etc. (17,000+)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Transport: Canadian Air Force transported 27 Canadian Red Cross workers and 5 FAC officials to Houston TX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/19/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Electrical crews, paramedics, police, firefighters, generators: By Mayor of Ottawa to Ambassador.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/19/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Electric Power: Manitoba Hydro offered 100 staff to help restore power.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government: Chile offered bottles of water, disposable diapers; 500 sheets/blankets, 200 body bags, 5 water pumps, &amp; small bandages, etc.</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $5,000,000 pledged</td>
<td>$5,000,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Government: China provided a $100,000 check to Charge Sidney in Beijing to pass to the Chinese Red Cross September 1.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government: Offered relief supplies: Tents: 5-7 person (590), Tents 12 person (410), small gasoline or diesel generators: 1-kilowatt (300), 3-Kilowatt (300). Generators 220V/110V capable; bed sheets (24,800); childrens' garments (10,000).</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government: GOC offered 4 English-speaking mental health experts</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>11/14/2005</td>
<td>Government: Cypriot Council of Ministers pledged $50,000 aid</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government: 24,000 blankets, 600 camp beds, 14 large tents, 25,500 Aquanitek kits</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government: 10,000 blankets, 2 rubber halls, 3500 First Aid kits</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $50,000 pledged</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>9/23/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $50K pledged</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>9/30/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $500.00 pledged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government: 6000 blankets, powdered milk, jam, 10,000 sets of underwear</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Cash pledged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>9/23/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $500,000 pledged Bush-Clinton fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>9/23/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $100,000 pledged Bush-Clinton Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Islands</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>Government: USD $30,000 pledged</td>
<td>$29,977.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9/3/2005</td>
<td>Government: Finland's 3 logisticians worked with IRC</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/16/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Sheets 9,000; Small tarps 200; First aid kits 200; 1,000 Pillow covers</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Unspecified cash through the Finnish Red Cross to the American Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>600 tents, 18.1 tons of relief supplies, kitchen sets, and 17 naval divers, MREs</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>EOD Diving Team: 16 Divers w/ equip;</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>USD 50,000 to Red Cross pledged</td>
<td>$50,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>15 high speed pumps for removal of water, with 94 personnel to operate them; On 9/8 German water pumps began flowing into the Joint Operating Area (JOA) to assist with water removal.</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>100,000 MREs - in response to NATO request; two shipments sent. 15 metric tons arrived September 6.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>10/26/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 200,000 pledged</td>
<td>$200,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government2500 facial towels, 2000 body towels</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 500,000 pledged</td>
<td>$500,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD15,000 pledged to Red Cross.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>10/6/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 36,000 pledged Habitat for Humanity</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>9/20/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 500,000 pledged Bush-Clinton fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government3000 personal hygiene kits, 3000 sheets, 3000 blankets, 150 extra large tarps</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 5,000,000 pledged to Red Cross.</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>10/4/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 200,000 to ARC pledged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>9/10/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentUSD 1 million pledged to the Iraqi Red Crescent - donated to ARC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentAmount actually received by Irish Red Cross = 700,000 Euros.</td>
<td>ARC confirms receipt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentIsraeli delegation: 80 tons of relief supplies including water, UHT milk, toddler food substance, diapers, mattresses, cookies, pairs of wooden crates, bathing soaps, tripod walking sticks, 2-wheel wheelchairs, adult wheelchairs, child wheelchairs elevators, adult diapers, folding beds, 1000 wool blankets, 200 polyestine (nylon) rolls, 2000 cardboard boxes, 100 first aid kits</td>
<td>Received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>GovernmentGOI sent four officials to Washington 9/7 both to serve as resource and to prepare and coordinate GOI relief efforts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government500 adult camp beds, 300 blankets, 600 sheets, 1 suction pump, 6 life rafts, 11,200 chlorine tablets, 1,000 lbs baby food formula, 6000 lbs Misc foodstuffs</td>
<td>Supplies &amp; emergency staff received</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Blankets (150K), generators (150 x 60Hz), electric cord reels (150).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 200,000 pledged to ARC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea (Republic of)</td>
<td>11/20/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Up to $50 million in cash and in kind ODA pledged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Water, tarps and plastic. Bedding, blankets, medical supplies, comfort kits, baby formula and diapers, coolers, large tents, vet supplies, cleaning supplies, 2000 emergency relief kit, emergency food (10,000 pieces), rain suits (5,035), contamination/biohazard suits (5,000), toiletry/Sanitary Items (60 boxes), feminine hygiene products (30 boxes), Cleaning supplies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Released 96,000 barrels of oil/day for 30 days from their Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) for a total of approx. 2.5 million barrels.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 495,000 to ARC pledged.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 25,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 100,000 pledged to the Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 100,000 pledged to NGOs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>EUR 10,000 ($12,300) pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Team of 5 people with two jeeps - water purification or pumping; 1000 camp beds, 2000 blankets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Blankets to the State of Louisiana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 1,000,000 pledged to the Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 25,000 pledged to Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 12,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 80,000 pledged to Amer, Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>9/7/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Protection Civil (Mexican disaster relief) sent 4 senior experts in medical disaster coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3,000 lunches and 4,720 dinners served to evacuees on 9/9 per NORTHCOM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/20/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>SEDENA (Mexican Defense) sent 49 vehicles carrying relief supplies such as water, medicine, vitamins, blankets, etc. donated by various GOM entities. They also donated two full field kitchen sets capable of feeding 7000 people, 3 meals a day for 20 days, and water purification units.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>MARINA - (Mexican Navy) deployed the amphibious ship PAPALOAPAN. Ship contained 8 &quot;Uralos&quot; (semi-amphibious vehicles); 7 amphibious vehicles; one water truck with 10,000 liters of potable water; one fuel truck with 15,000 liters of fuel; one naval engineering team (experienced in repairing dikes and canals); 200,000 liters of potable water; 2 MI-17 helicopters with rescue hoist cable.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20 tons of rice, 20 tons of milk, 2 tons of disposable diapers, 2 tons of comforters and 1 ton of drinking water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Truck convoy of UHT milk crossed the border at Eagle Pass (from Coahuila to Texas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 50,000 pledged to ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>9/29/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 500,000 pledged to ARC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 100,000 pledged $102,409.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>9/22/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 25,000 pledged $24,975.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>3 high capacity dewatering pumps; 1 scania support truck and trailer; 9 - 0.9x18 meter discharge pipes; 2-six meter containers. 3 pumps received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>M/S Van Amstel, a frigate with supplies and relief personnel (including two Lynx helicopters, 2000 MREs, a diver and engineer team) sent for search, rescue, medical care, five USCG personnel with law enforcement on board Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8/31/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>The Government also offered to help rebuild levees, provide a water management team. Levee inspection team arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 1.4 million pledged through the Red Cross ($2M New Zealand Dollars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 1,000,000 pledged $1,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Norwegian Red Cross made general offer of assistance to American Red Cross Awaiting ARC confirmation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9/20/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Pledged 10 million kroner (roughly $1.54 million USD) in relief supplies &amp; cash. Supplies (blankets) arrived</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>12/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>9/16/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $10,000 pledged to ARC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>16,000 bandages</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>General offer of assistance; 500,000 barrels of oil (2% of reserves) as part of the IAE response to the disruption of oil supplies caused by Hurricane Katrina.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000,000 pledged for use locally across the Gulf states affected by Katrina.</td>
<td>Tents arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20 military tents, 100 isothermal tents (designed for mountain rangers) and 64 packaging units (4 boxpallets and 60 pallets)</td>
<td>Arrived: 16 tons of bandages, and other supplies (tents, blankets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9/20/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>bottled water, two 20 kilowatt generators, 20-20 kilowatt generators, 3 water purifying stations, first-aid kits and bandages, 13 tons disinfectant; 10,000 MREs, 4000 blankets, 1001 30-person tents, 20 ten-person tents</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>9/27/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and Grenadines</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>GOSV pledged USD $20,000 to American Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>$10,000 cash donation via GOS to ARC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $18,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100 Million pledged for use locally across the Gulf states affected by Katrina.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>9/28/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td>$100,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Four CH-47 Singaporean Air Force helicopters attached to the Texas National Guard as part of long-term training arrangement. 3 additional personnel (experience in safety, hygiene, and psychological well-being of military personnel).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2,500 blankets, 500 camp beds, 1000 first aid kits and 600 liters of liquid soap.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>9/16/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>780 blankets, 250 camp beds, 250 mattresses, 2000 First Aid kit</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>9/23/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $2,000,000 pledged to Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>2 planeloads of tents (20), bedding, water purification equipment, MREs (6,200) and other items.</td>
<td>Arrived</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD 25,000 pledged to the Red Cross.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Offer of C-130 Hercules for transportation of humanitarian aid to New Orleans from September 4 - 9, 2005.</td>
<td>Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>9/11/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>8,100 kg rice (unknown type), 7075 kg rice (unknown type), 7,490 kgs blankets; 4,845 kg canned food</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Forensic team including 5 experts with specialization in mass casualty response and morgue/forensic mass casualty assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>12/16/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>President pledged USD $100,000</td>
<td>$103,492.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>9/27/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $2,000,000 pledged directly to four organizations: Habitat for Humanity, Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund, The Congressional Black Caucus and Former Sen. John Breaux.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9/15/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>20 tons of blankets, sheets, and other relief supplies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9/14/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $1,500,000 pledged to Turkey's Red Crescent for Red Cross</td>
<td>ARC confirms receipt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>9/22/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $200,000 to the Bush, Clinton, Katrina Fund pledged</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>9/19/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Air transportation using AN-124 aircraft Associated with Dutch pumps (funding all costs associated with the effort totalling approx. $200,000).</td>
<td>Assistance provided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>9/21/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100 million cash pledged</td>
<td>$99,999,975.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9/6/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USAID (USAID's equivalent) offered relief supplies pre-positioned in Miami for the Latin &amp; Caribbean region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>DOD (USAID's equivalent) offered relief supplies pre-positioned in Miami for the Latin &amp; Caribbean region.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Action/Assistance Provided</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/9/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>500,000 MREs airlifted to the US between 09/05/05 and 09/10/05 1,000 field kitchens to feed 40 people each Tents for 500 people 10,000 blankets in store, 2,900 transported 10,000 camp beds Approximately 10,000 tarps, Coordinating team deployed to US to the Office of Disaster Assistance 09/06/05 Bottled water and water purification assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/13/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $5,000,000 pledged to ARC and state governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/30/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>GOV offered assistance directly to Louisiana Governor Blanco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/12/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Arrangements made to send 1,000,000 barrels of gas to Louisiana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/8/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/2005</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>USD $100,000 pledged to the Red Cross</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Activated its Civil Protection Cooperative Mechanism which maintains contact database in civil emergency matters in 25 EU member states plus extra five European countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1/2005</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Provided specialized whereabouts tracking system in use on ARC website for displaced persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/20/2005</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>From 09/12-10/02/05 - 12 NATO flights delivered almost 189 tons of relief goods. 39 NATO and partner countries offered assistance to the U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/31/2005</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>OAS made $25,000 contribution from its Emergency Fund. OAS encouraged donations to the American Red Cross and created a specific fund to receive donations from member states.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/7/2005</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>10 Senior Public Health Officers, 5 Health Logisticians and 3 Emergency Health Kits suitable for 100,000 people for 3 months. 24 trauma kits, 44 health kits, 10 burn dressing modules, 14 diarrhea Profile kits D &amp; F.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/5/2005</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>5-10 staff exp emerg shelters and UNDAC trained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| UNICEF       | 9/14/2005  | Organization | Pre-packed emergency supplies:  
|              |            |          | EDUCATION - school in a box for 18,800 children, recreation kits for 50,000. WatSan - 60,000 water purification tablets, 6 collapsible water bladders each 5,000 litres capacity, 61,000 Jerry cans, 500,000 bars of soap, 9 million doses of ORS, 14,000 medical kits, 40,000 blankets, 3 rub balls for storage. Services Available: Psychosocial support and senior staff available to work in Operations Cell at the State Department. |
| U.S. Embassy - Beirut, Lebanon | 10/25/2005 | USG | U.S. Embassy Employees pledges | $19,300.00 |
| United Nations | 9/13/2005  | Organization | Staff of the United Nations Disaster Assistance and Coordination (UNDAC) teams - highly trained and experienced specialists in emergency coordination, specialists staff in logistics, medical, coordination, emergency education, water sanitation, shelter, environmental and traumatized children water supplies (purification tablets, shelter items (tents, plastic sheeting), Emergency health supplies and public health kits for up to 300,000 people, Vaccination materials, Emergency recreation for children, Emergency education kits. |
| Dalai Lama   | 9/13/2005  | Private | USD $100,000 pledged | |
| Taiwan       | 10/4/2005  | Private | USD $2,000,000 pledged | $2,000,000.00 |

ARC: American Red Cross  
IRC: International Red Cross
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)

See reverse side for Papernkht Section Instructions
D.O.E. NO. 2007-0278
Expires November 30, 2007

I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
State: MS
Program Code/Event #: 16041/MA-HURRICANE KATRINA
AGT: 100-92740

II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
Application Requested: Q See Attached

This Mission Assignment is for the Homeland Improvement腓敏 Assignment to perform support for handling of internationally disrupted resources/communications.

Quantity: 1

Date/Time Required: 08/03/2005
Internal Control #: AR00105

Delivery Location: Federal Reserve

Job/Requester Name: Vanessa Print

POC Name: CLARK, BURTON A

State Approving Officer (Required for OPA and TA): Date:

III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)

Action to: Q ESF # 6: Comp.

Date/Time: 09/03/2005 04:43

Priority: Q 1 Utes: Comp.

Q 2 Uts: Comp.

4 Medium

IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)

Mission Description: Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report to FEMA to include cost data when Mission Assignment data are more than 60 days complete, including billing. The Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report can be accessed and submitted online at www.fema.gov/dfwa/mission_assignments. The new AIC number can also be accessed at the above address.

FEMA-DFWA will provide assistance in the reception, coordination and distribution of internationally disrupted resources, equipment and commodities to support recovery and recovery efforts for hurricane Katrina.

Assigned Agency: EAD/SCV INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP

Projected Start Date: 09/08/2005

Projected End Date: 09/30/2005

Type of MA: Q Direct Federal Assistance

Q Technical Assistance

Q Federal Operations Support

State Cost Share Percent: 0.0%

State Cost Share Amount: $0.00

Rate Code: 200804100004500250100

Appropriation code: 7000000

Mission Assignment Coordinator (Personnel): DEBRA CLARK

** FEMA Project Officer/Branch Chief (Program Approver): BURTON CLARK

** Coordinated Funds Used (Funds Received): SUTERBAUGH, SHIRLEY L.

VI. APPROVAL

Date:

** State Approving Officer (Required for IFA and TA):

** Federal Approving Official (Required for all): CLAYTON SPANGENBERG

VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)

Mission Assignment #: 16041/MA-A00

Amount: $1,000,000.00

Date/Time: 09/13/2005

Initials: IPAS

** Signature required for all Federal Assistance and Technical Assistance Mission Assignments.

* Signature required only for Mission Assignments.

FEMA Form 40-108, 04/05

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DHS-FEMA-0037-0001873
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
MISSION ASSIGNMENT (FEMA Use Only)

I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
State: MS (Mississippi) Action: 10/10/2006-SM-504-HURRICANE KATRINA
Program Code/Event: 1940404-MS-HURRICANE KATRINA
Date/Time Event: 09/04/2006 04:08

II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

Assistance Requested:
Multi-lingual volunteers for FEMA phone bank.

POC: Sen Davis 202-649-2346

County 1 (State) 90240089
Date/Time Requested: 09/04/2006
Internal Control #: 1940404-MS-HURRICANE KATRINA

III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)
Action: C 03/02/2006 04:34
ESF # 2 03/02/2006 04:34
Client: CLARK BURTON
24-hour Ph # (202) 646-2450
Date: 09/03/2006

IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)
Max: Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Progress Report to FEMA to include cost data when
Mission Assignments take more than 90 days to complete, including billing. The Mission Assignment Progress Report can be accessed and
submitted online at www.fema.gov/1940404-ms-hurricane katrina. The new ALC number can also be accessed at this web address.

V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)
Type of Use: Q Direct Federal Assistance

VI. APPROVAL

R. SIGNATURE (FEMA Use Only)

DHS-FEMA-0037-0001874

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS
**FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY**

**MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)**

**1. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)**

- State: FL
- Incident: Hurricane Katrina
- Incident ID: 059-S-FL
- Action Request #: ORG-26963
- Date/Time: 09/09/2005 04:47

**2. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED**

- This Mission Assignment is to provide USAID-OFDA to perform response support for handling of internationally donated commodities.

- **Quantity:** 1 (line)
- **Due/Time Request:** 09/02/2005
- **Internal Control #:** NIKC006

- **Delivery Location:** [Location]
- **Immediate Request:** [Immediate Request]
- **Program Code #:** P000001
- **Program Name:** [Program Name]
- **Date/Time:** 09/09/2005

- **Date/Time:** 09/09/2005
- **Date/Time:** 09/09/2005
- **Date/Time:** 09/09/2005

**3. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operational Section)**

- **Action to:** [Action to]
- **ESP #:** [ESP #]
- **Other:** [Other]
- **Date/Time:** 09/09/2005 04:47
- **Action:** [Action]
- **Priority:** [Priority]
- **Q:** [Q]
- **D:** [D]
- **O:** [O]
- **Other:** [Other]

**4. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)**

- **Assigned Agency:** [Assigned Agency]
- **Assigned Agency:** [Assigned Agency]
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FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)

1. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
Date: 08/23/2006
Program Code/Event: 08045-040-HURRICANE KATRINA
Action Request #: 100-8279

2. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

3. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)

4. DESCRIPTION (Assisted Agency Action Officer)

5. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)

6. APPROVAL

7. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)

8. SIGNATURE

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS

DHS-FEMA-0077-0000905   FL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY</th>
<th>MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See reverse side for Payment Burden Disclosure notice</td>
<td>D.A.B. NO. 3967-0278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expires December 31, 2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)

- **State:** MD (Adverse Event) 20099-09/24 Hurricane Katrina Determination
- **Program Code:** R2004209.99 Hurricane Katrina
- **Action Request #:** 1102-20727
- **Program Code #:** 1104209.99 Hurricane Katrina
- **Date/Time:*** 20050606-04-00

### II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

- **Technical assistance in internally displaced persons (IDP) planning and logistics/operations to work international offers of assistance.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>1 (Each)</th>
<th>Date/Time Request</th>
<th>06/02/2005</th>
<th>Internal Control #: 46CCH600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delivery Location: Where Requ...</td>
<td></td>
<td>Priority: 06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td></td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Agency:</td>
<td>See Attached</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)</strong></td>
<td>See Attached</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Official)</strong></td>
<td>See Attached</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Statement: Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Identity Report to FEMA to include data when Mission Assignments are greater than 90 days. Following the Mission Assignment Identity Report can be accessed and submitted online at <a href="http://www.fema.gov">www.fema.gov</a>. The new ALC number can also be accessed at the web address.</td>
<td></td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAGD-OREDA will provide personnel with expertise in internally displaced persons planning and logistics/operations to work international offers of assistance to support response recovery efforts for Hurricane Katrina.</td>
<td></td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuant to 60 USC 1715p, 5170b and CFR 206.044</td>
<td></td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
<td>06/02/2005 4-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Assigned Agency: | IC, NDO (INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT) | Projected Start Date: 06/02/2005 | Projected End Date: 09/30/2006 |

| Type of MA: | Direct Federal Assistance
- State Cost Share 0%
- Federal Share 100%
- Technical Assistance
- Federal Operations Support
- State Cost Share 0%
- Federal Share 100%
| Total Cost Estimate: $14,490,000.00 |

| State Cost Share Percent: 0.00% | State Cost Share Amount: $0.00 |

| Fund Control: | 200404-090029H-0044-0000A003-0 |
| Mission Assignment Coordinator (Program): | DEBORAH CLARK |
| **FEMA Project Oversight Chief (Program):** | BURTON CLARK |
| **FEMA Project Oversight Chief (Program):** | BURTON CLARK |
| **Federal Operations Support (Program):** | CLAYTON BANSHISHER |

| VII. APPROVAL |
| **State Agency:*** | See Attached |
| **Date:** | 06/02/2005 |

| VIII. OBILIGATION (FEMA Use Only) |
| Mission Assignment #: 060205-0A4-0001 |
| Approved Date: 06/02/2005 |

| Amendment #: | 06/02/2005 |
| **Date/Time:** | 06/02/2005 |

| **Signature required for Direct Federal Assistance and Technical Assistance Mission Assignments.** |
| **Signature required for all Mission Assignments.** |
| FEMA Form 59-13E, OCT '92 |

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS | | | |
| FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY |
| MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA) |

**I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)**

State/Region: [Blank/Blurred]
Program Code/Event: 105049/MID-HURRICANE KATRINA
Action Request #: 1052-0072

**II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED**

- See Attached

**Concurrence Required:**
- Technical assistance to internally displaced persons (IDP) planning and logistics/operations to work international offices of assistance.

| Quantity: 1 (Each) | Date/Time Requested: 09/20/2005 | Internal Control #: NRD0156 |

**III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION**

Operations Section:

- See Attached

**IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)**

Mission Statement: Your agency is responsible for submitting a Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report to FEMA. This report is due on the 20th of each month. The Mission Assignment Monthly Progress Report can be accessed and submitted at [www.fema.gov](http://www.fema.gov).

**V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)**

Type: MA

| Action: | ESF # | Date/Time: 09/05/2005 | Priority: | 1: Highest |

- See Attached

| Assigned Agency: ACSY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOP | Projected Start Date: 09/05/2005 | Projected End Date: 09/26/2005 |

**VI. APPROVAL**

- See Attached

| Date: 09/19/2005 |

**VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)**

| Mission Assignment #: 105049/MID-HURRICANE KATRINA | Auth. The Action: $144,000.00 | Date/TIme Obligated: 09/10/2005 |

- See Attached

| Signature Required: | Direct Federal Assistance and Technical Assistance Mission Assignments. |

**FEMA Form 50-120, Oct 02**

**REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS**

DHS 0000538
### I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
- **State:** MS (Mississippi), Incident 20060082004-Hurricane Katrina Recovery
- **Program Code/Event:** 1804/GRF, HURRICANE KATRINA
- **Date/Time Req’d:** 06/29/2005

### II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED
- **Assistance Requested:** 
  - Search and Rescue
  - Restore Critical Functions
- **Contact Information:**
  - **POC:** Ben Curran 202-646-2845
  - **Date/Time Required:** 06/29/2005

### III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)
- **Assistance Action:**
  - **Action:** ESF #5
  - **Priority:**
    - 1: Life-saving
    - 2: Life-sustaining
    - 3: High
    - 4: Normal
  - **Total Cost Estimate:** $1,100,000.00

### IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)
- **Assigned Agency:** DOI/EPD
- **Project Title:** DOI/EPD
- **POC Name:** Ben Curran
- **Phone and Fax:** 202-646-2845

### V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)
- **State Initial:**
  - **State:** Mississippi
  - **Assistance Coordinator:** FEMA Region V
  - **State Office:** 206-00-HVH/09-24-2002-9
- **Mission Assignment Coordinator (PIO):** DEBBIE CLARK
- **FEMA Project Officer/Branch:**.
- **Contractual/Tech Assistance:**
  - **Contractor:** BUTCHER, ET AL.
  - **Contract:** 06/29/2005

### VI. APPROVAL
- **Approval:**
  - **Date:** 06/29/2005

### VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)
- **Mission Assignment #:** 06/29/2005
- **Aid/Task:**
  - **Federal Obligation:** $1,100,000.00
  - **Date/Time Obligation:** 06/29/2005

---

**REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS**
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
MISSION ASSIGNMENT (MA)

I. TRACKING INFORMATION (FEMA Use Only)
State MA (Manhattan) location:20050520-051-Hurricane Katrina Donation
Program Code/Event: ID/FOE-MA-HURRICANE KATRINA

II. ASSISTANCE REQUESTED

III. INITIAL FEDERAL COORDINATION (Operations Section)

IV. DESCRIPTION (Assigned Agency Action Officer)

V. COORDINATION (FEMA Use Only)

VI. APPROVAL

VII. OBLIGATION (FEMA Use Only)

Approved:

7/27/05

12/22/05

09/18/05

06/22/05

08/18/05

05/18/05

08/22/05

08/24/05

DHS 0000940

REPLACES ALL PREVIOUS EDITIONS
International Mil Support

- 44 countries offering money, personnel, or general aide relief (cots, blankets, food stuffs)
- 45 countries offering equipment /military assets

USNORTHCOM Staff and JTF-Katrina reviewed consolidated list coordinated by TF State

- Provided consolidated list of proposed NC/DOD needs
- Recommend acceptance of International Assistance offers to DOS

- Bottom line: Propose what we need immediately, what we may need, and what we do not need to JS/OSD and DOS
## Accepted - International Mil Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>PROJECTED TASK</th>
<th>ARRIVAL LOCATION</th>
<th>AMP N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2x - Fleet Dive Unit (Lant / Pac) Personnel – 35 x divers 5 x support Equipment – Self Sustaining</td>
<td>Harbour clearance ID and removal of Nav hazards Levee inspection</td>
<td>Chop to 2d Fleet Fwd deploy to Pascagoula</td>
<td>052100Z SEP Commenced Dive ops 06 Sept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5X Paxes - Eng Support Regt: (Combat Divers – UDT)</td>
<td>Harbour clearance ID and removal of Nav hazards Levee inspection</td>
<td>Northern GOM via CGG William Alexander</td>
<td>Departed 061700Z SEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2 x CH146 (Griffon)</td>
<td>USCG SAR backfill</td>
<td>USCG District 1, Cape Cod, Virginia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Naval TG: HMCS ATHABASKAN (DDH) w/ 1xCH124 HMCS TORONTO (FFH) w/ 1xCH124 HMCS VILLE DE QUEBEC (FFH) w/ 1xCH124 CCGV WILLIAM ALEXANDER</td>
<td>Assist in hurricane recovery ops</td>
<td>Northern Gulf Mexico</td>
<td>Departed 061700Z SEP ETA 101200Z SEP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Accepted - International Mil Support

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>PROJECTED TASK</th>
<th>ARRIVAL LOCATION</th>
<th>AMP'N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1 x Amphibious ship MS PAPALOAPAN - MI-17 Helos - 6X6 APCs</td>
<td>Relief mission</td>
<td>TF-20 Sea Echelon CDR coordinating Comm Plan distributed</td>
<td>Ship clear by State 9/5, departs 1200 9/5, arrives 9/7.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>SEDENA (Mexican Defence) 48 trucks carrying relief supplies</td>
<td>Relief mission</td>
<td>FEMA – Texas USA KELLY Evac center</td>
<td>Trucks enroute NG EXORD - 5th Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>HNLMS Van Amstel multi purpose Frigate</td>
<td>Helo platform w/ high volume pumping</td>
<td>On scene 08 Sep TF20 – Coordinating with Dutch, have comm's</td>
<td>Per JOC/JFMCC update, On Scene TACON TF-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>EOD Diving Team 16 Divers w/equip 01 Nurse</td>
<td>Relief mission</td>
<td>DOS approved, Coordinating Dip clearance w/French Embassy and MIl DATT</td>
<td>LOG: Pensacola/Pascagoula ETA: TBD MDSU TWO w/ 2d fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Salvage Tug</td>
<td>OPLAT surveys and clearance</td>
<td>DOS approved, Coordinating Dip clearance w/French Embassy and MIl DATT</td>
<td>TBD: Enroute from Martinique To be TACON to TF-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Accepted - International Mil Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>PROJECTED TASK</th>
<th>ARRIVAL LOCATION</th>
<th>AMP’N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Naval Dive and Salvage team</td>
<td>Dive / Salvage recovery ops</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Coord Indian Embassy - Awaiting input JFMCC / TF 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>High Capacity Water Pumps</td>
<td>US Army Corps of Engineers – Water removal / flood control</td>
<td>NOLA</td>
<td>DOS Cleared, Coordinating Transportation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### International Mil Support

#### Additional Items Offered, Still Under Consideration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>ASSETS</th>
<th>PROJECTED TASK</th>
<th>ARRIVAL LOCATION</th>
<th>AMP'N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>5 man military dive team</td>
<td>Dive / Salvage recovery ops</td>
<td>Halifax Canada Training</td>
<td>Awaiting JFMCC /TF-20 Cord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>HMS Cumberland RFA Wave Knight</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief assistance</td>
<td>JFMCC – Not required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japanese Self Defence Force units</td>
<td>SAR / medical teams</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2 field hospitals</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief Medical Support</td>
<td>TF Katrina – not required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Naval Frigate and Hospital Ship</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief assistance</td>
<td>JFMCC – Not required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel / Germany</td>
<td>Ground based Cellular Telecommunications System</td>
<td>Communications - Cell coverage</td>
<td>Not required – J6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2 Disaster Relief Platoons (100 soldiers)</td>
<td>Security / Mass Care</td>
<td>Not required -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>ASSETS</td>
<td>PROJECTED TASK</td>
<td>ARRIVAL LOCATION</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Cord with SOUTHCOM support cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2 - 6 mil heavy lift aircraft</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Coord French Embassy DATT / TF State as required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1-2 C-130s</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TF-Katrina / JFACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>IL-76 cargo plane</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Awaiting Input - JTF-K / JFACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1 C-130</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>Awaiting Input JTF-K / JFACC</td>
</tr>
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Program Name: National Case Management Consortium

CFDA Number: 97.084

GRANTEE: United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

AGREEMENT NUMBER: EMW-2006-GR-0056

AMENDMENT NUMBER:

ARTICLE I – AUTHORIZATION:

B. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as amended by P.L. 106-390, including Sec. 701(b)
C. Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations

ARTICLE II – PROGRAM NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION

The Grantee shall perform the work described in the proposal submitted September 27, 2005 entitled "National Case Management Consortium", the response to evaluation questions dated October 6, 2005 which is made part of these Grant Agreement Articles by reference.

ARTICLE III – PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE/BUDGET PERIOD

A. Project Period: The Project Period shall be a maximum of twenty-four (24) months, beginning October 28, 2005 through October 27, 2007 and will correspond to the applicable approved Budget Period, unless extensions have been authorized.

B. Budget Period: The Budget Period shall be from the effective date of this grant agreement through the following 24 months: October 28, 2005 through October 27, 2007.

C. Costs: The Grantee shall only incur costs or obligate funds within the Budget Period for approved activities or within the approved Period of Performance.
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A. Approved Budget: The approved budget for this award by category is:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$638,857.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL DIRECT</td>
<td>$65,419,075.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Charges</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUDGET</td>
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</table>

Estimated Consortium Contributions: $35,000,000.00

TOTAL PROJECT COSTS $101,000,000.00

B. There is no cost-share or match required for this funding. The Department of Homeland Security will pay up to 100% of the costs identified in the approved budget listed under Article IV.A, Approved Budget. While there is no required cost share associated with these funds, the Consortium estimates that its contributions will total $35,000,000.00 in cash and in-kind contributions including up to $5,000,000.00 for subgrants to non- Consortium agencies. The maximum funding amount for DHS/FEMA is $65,000,000.00. If costs exceed the maximum amount of DHS approved funding, the Grantee shall pay the costs in excess of the approved budget. If the Consortium estimated contribution is not significantly less than $35,000,000.00, there shall be no reduction in the DHS/FEMA award.

ARTICLE V – REQUEST FOR ADVANCE/REIMBURSEMENT

A. FEMA uses the Direct Deposit/Electronic Funds Transfer (DD/EFT) method of payment to Grantees. To enroll in the DD/EFT, the Recipient must complete a Standard Form 1199A, Direct Deposit Form.

1. The Grantee may be paid in advance, or reimbursed by completing the Standard Form (SF) 270, Request for Advance/Reimbursement. In accordance with Treasury regulations at 31 CFR Part 205, the Grantee shall maintain procedures to minimize the time elapsing between the transfer of funds and the disbursement of said funds. (See 44 CFR, Part 13.21(i) regarding payment of interest earned on advances.)
2. The Grantee may use the Internet at:

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/grants/sf270.pdf

http://www.fns.treas.gov/eff/1199a.pdf, to download the Standard Forms 270 and 1199A, respectively.

ARTICLE VI – FINANCIAL REPORTS

A. Quarterly Reports: The Grantee shall submit quarterly Financial Status Reports of the Federal and Consortium contributions on SF 269, Financial Status Report, to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office within 30 days after the end of each calendar quarter: January 30, April 30, July 30, October 30.

B. Final Report: The final Financial Status Report is due 90 days from the expiration date of the Period of Performance.

The addresses are as follows:

DHS/FEMA
Financial and Acquisition Management Division
Grants Management Branch
500 C Street, SW, Room 334
Washington, DC 20472
Attn: Arlene Ramsey

DHS/FEMA
500 C Street, SW, Room 614
Washington, DC 20472
Attn: Libby Turner

ARTICLE VII – PERFORMANCE REPORTS

Performance reports are due to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office quarterly. The reports shall describe the status of the grant activity, progress towards meeting objectives and any problems, delays, or adverse conditions which will materially impair the ability to meet the objective of the award. A final report will be submitted to the FEMA Office Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office listed in Article VII, 90 days after project completion.
ARTICLE VIII – GRANT MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

Officials for the NDSP grant agreement are as follows:

A. **Project Manager:** The Project Manager (PM), designated by the Grantee, is responsible for performance of the activities approved in the award:

   The Project Manager is: Rev. Kristin L. Sachen
   Assistant General Secretary
   UMCOR Program/Emergency Services International
   475 Riverside Drive, Room 330
   New York, NY 10115
   212-870-3909
   Fax: 212-870-3624
   ksachen@obem-umc.org

B. **DHS Project Officer:** The DHS Project Officer (PO) shall be an official who will be responsible for the technical monitoring of the stages of work and technical performance of the activities described in the program narrative statement.

   The DHS Project Officer is: Ms. Libby Turner
   Federal Coordinating Officer
   DHS/FEMA
   500 C Street, SW, Room 614
   Washington, DC 20472
   202-646-4395
   Fax: 202-646-2730
   Libby.Turner@dhs.gov

C. **DHS Assistance Officer:** The DHS Assistance Officer (AO) is the DHS official who has full authority to negotiate, administer and execute all business matters of the Grant award:

   The DHS Assistance Officer is: Mr. Richard W. Goodman
   DHS/FEMA
   Grants Management Branch
   500 C Street, SW, Room 334
   Washington, DC 20472
   202-646-4181
   Fax: 202-646-4156
   Richard.Goodman@dhs.gov
ARTICLE IX – GRANT AWARD AMENDMENTS

All budget and program plan revisions shall be in compliance with OMB Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations; and A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. In addition to these requirements, the Grantee shall submit and receive written prior approval before implementation for the following:

A. Budget Revisions:

1. Grantee must obtain prior approval from DHS/FEMA for transfers of funds between direct cost categories in the approved budget when such cumulative transfers among those direct cost categories exceed ten percent of the total budget.

2. Transfer of funds to entities, except those identified in the approved application, requires prior DHS/FEMA approval.

3. Need for additional funds. DHS is not obligated to provide additional funds prior to the submission and approval of consecutive continuation options based on satisfactory performance and availability of funds.

4. If a Grantee estimates that it will have unobligated funds remaining after the end of the performance period, the Grantee should report this to DHS/FEMA at the earliest possible time and ask for disposition instructions.

B. Extension Request:

1. Requests for additional time extensions to the Period of Performance will be considered, but will not be granted automatically and must be supported by adequate justification in order to be processed. The justification is a written explanation of the reason or reasons for the delay; an outline of remaining funds available to support the extended period of performance; and a description of performance measures necessary to complete the project.

2. Extensions to the Period of Performance shall be authorized only in writing by the DHS Assistance Officer.

3. There is no DHS obligation to provide additional funding as a result of time extensions approved.

4. Financial and Performance Status Reports must be current, and the extension justification must be submitted or extension requests will not be processed.
ARTICLE X - PREAWARD COSTS

Preaward costs may be approved for up to ninety (90) calendar days prior to the effective date of the Grant. The following conditions apply:

A. The costs have been incurred with the understanding that they were incurred at the Grantee’s risk and may not be reimbursed, if adequate funding has not been awarded to cover preaward costs and approved activities to be completed under the award.

B. The costs must be necessary for the effective and economical conduct of the project.

C. The costs are in compliance with the appropriate OMB Cost Principles.

D. The costs are supported with source documentation.

ARTICLE XI – OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The other terms and conditions of the agreement are as follows:

A. **Buy America.** The Grantee, Sub-grantees and contractors receiving funds from this grant shall comply with the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.) unless it is determined that it is inconsistent with the public interest, impracticable to comply with such a requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost of articles, materials, or supplies. The exception shall be noted in the specifications and documentation to justify the exception will be retained in the grant file for record.

B. **Copyright.** The Grantee is free to copyright original work developed in the course of or under this agreement. DHS reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to use, the work performed under this award for Government purposes. Publication resulting from work performed under this agreement shall include an acknowledgement of financial support from DHS and include a statement that the publication does not necessarily reflect the DHS views.

C. **Publication and Acknowledgement of DHS Sponsorship.**

1. One copy of each article planned for publication will be submitted to the DHS Project Officer simultaneously with its submission for publication. Following publication, a copy of each published paper shall be submitted to the DHS Project Officer.

2. The Grantee agrees that when releasing information relating to this Grant, the release shall include a statement that the project or effort undertaken was or is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security.
3. Disclaimer: The Grantee is responsible for assuring that every publication submission (including World Wide Web pages) based on or developed under this award, except scientific articles or papers appearing in scientific, technical or professional journals, contains the following disclaimer: "Any opinions, findings, and conclusion or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security."

4. For the purpose of this requirement, information includes news releases, articles, manuscripts, brochures, advertisements, still and motion pictures, speeches, trade association proceedings and symposia.

5. Publications: In compliance with the Section 623 of Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, and reenacted in Section 621 of the fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act requires that all grantees disclose the amount and percentage of Federal funding and funding from non-governmental sources when making public announcements about Federally-funded projects in the amount of $500,000 or more.

D. Patent Rights. Grantees are subject to applicable regulations governing patents and inventions, including government-wide regulations issued by the Department of Commerce, 37 CFR Part 401, "Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations and Small Business Firms under Government Grants, Contracts and Cooperative Agreements."

E. Environmental Standards. By accepting funds under this Grant, the grantee assures that it will:

1. Comply with applicable provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.) and Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.), as implemented by Executive Order 11738 (3 CFR, 1971-1975 comp., p. 799) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules at 40 CFR Part 15. In accordance with the EPA rules, the Grantee further agrees that it will:

   a. Not use any facility on the EPA’s List of Violating Facilities in performing any award that is nonexempt under 40 CFR 15.5 (awards of less than $100,000, and certain other awards, exempt from the EPA regulations), as long as the facility remains on the list.

   b. Notify the awarding agency if it intends to use a facility in performing this award that is on the List of Violating Facilities or the Grantee knows has been recommended to be placed on the List of Violating Facilities.
2. Identify to the awarding agency any impact this award may have on:

   a. The quality of the human environment, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, at 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and to prepare Environmental Impact (e.g., physical disturbance of a site such as breaking of ground) until the agency provides written notification of compliance with environmental impact analysis process.

   b. Coastal barriers and provide help the agency may need to comply with Coastal Barriers Resource Act (16 U.S.C. 3591, et seq.), concerning preservation of barrier resources.

   c. Any existing or proposed component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1271, et seq.).

F. Refunds. The Grantee shall transfer to DHS the appropriate share, based on the Federal support percentage, of any refund, rebate, credit or other amounts arising from performance of this agreement, along with accrued interest. The Grantee shall take necessary action to effect prompt collection of all monies due or which may become due and to cooperate with DHS in any claim or suit in connection with amounts due.

G. Overpayment and Earned Interest.

   Overpayment. Within ninety (90) days from the expiration date of the Performance Period, overpayment of funds shall be remitted to the Assistance Officer by check payable to DHS. An overpayment represents the difference between allowable actual expenditures and total DHS payment received by the Grantee.

H. Program Income. Program income is income earned as a result of Grantee or subgrantee grant-supported activity, or earned as a result of the grant agreement during the Period of Performance. Program income shall be added to the award of funds under this grant and shall be used to expand the approved program activities. The Grantee shall submit a written list of expanded activities to be accomplished as a result of the program income funds. This list shall be submitted to the DHS AO for review and the approval within 20 days of receipt of program income.

I. Security. The Grantee shall not be granted access to classified information under this Grant. If security restriction should happen to apply to certain aspects of the proposed activity, the Grantee will be informed. In the event that the scientific work under this Grant may either need classification or involve access to or storage of any classified data, the Government shall make a decision on the need to classify, or require such access or storage within 30 days after receipt of a written notice from the Grantee. If the decision is affirmative, the Government may invoke the Termination clause, as appropriate.
J. Controlled Unclassified Information. The parties understand that information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this Grant may be export controlled, sensitive, for official use only, or, otherwise protected by law, executive order or regulation. The Grantee is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Nothing in this Grant shall be construed to permit any disclosure in violation of those restrictions.

K. Travel. Allowability of Travel Expenses. Expenses for transportation, lodging, subsistence and related items incurred by project personnel and by outside consultants employed on the project (OPM) Section 514 who are in travel status on business related to an DHS-supported project are allowable as prescribed in the governing cost principles. The requirements for prior approval retained in the governing cost principles are waived.

L. Cargo Preference. The Grantee agrees that it will comply with the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241), as implemented by Department of Transportation regulations at 46 CFR 381.7, which require that at least 50 of equipment, materials or Grant, and which may be transported by ocean vessel, shall be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels, if available.

M. Fly America Act. Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers: Travel supported by U.S. Government funds under this Grant shall use U.S.-flag air carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. 41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 40118) and the interpretative guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in the March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B138942.

N. Site Visits. DHS, through authorized representatives, has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by DHS on the premises of the grantee or a contractor under an award, the grantee shall provide and shall require its contractors to provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Government representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.

O. Equipment Purchase. In accordance with 44 CFR 13.36(a), when procuring property and services under a grant, a State will follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The State will ensure that every purchase order or other contract includes any clauses required by Federal statutes and executive orders and their implementing regulations.

P. To the extent required by individual States, applicants should comply with State procedures consistent with E.O. 12372.
ARTICLE XII – AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

Grantees and Sub-grantees must follow the audit requirements under OMB Circular A-133. Non-Federal entities that expend $500,000 or more Federal funds in a year shall have a single or program-specific audit conducted for that year in accordance with the provisions of A-133.

ARTICLE XIII – GOVERNING PROVISIONS

The Grantee and any subgrantee shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations. A non-exclusive list of regulations commonly applicable to DHS grants are listed below:

A. Administrative Requirements
   1. OMB Circular A-102, State and Local Governments (10/07/94, amended 08/29/97)
   2. OMB Circular A-110, Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (11/19/93, amended 09/30/99), and
   3. 44 CFR Part 13

B. Cost Principles
   1. OMB Circular A-87, State and Local Governments (05/04/95, amended 08/29/97)
   2. OMB Circular A-21, Educational Institutions (08/04/00)
   3. OMB Circular A-122, Non Profit Organizations (05/19/98)

C. Audit Requirements

OMB Circular A-133, States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations (06/24/97, includes revisions published in the Federal Register 06/27/03)
Program Name: National Case Management Consortium

CFDA Number: 97.001

GRANTEE: United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR)

AGREEMENT NUMBER: EMW-2006-GR-0056

AMENDMENT NUMBER:

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Attn: Libby Turner

ARTICLE VII – PERFORMANCE REPORTS

Performance reports are due to the FEMA Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office quarterly. The reports shall describe the status of the grant activity, progress towards meeting objectives and any problems, delays, or adverse conditions which will materially impair the ability to meet the objective of the award. A final report will be submitted to the FEMA Office of Grants and Acquisition Management Division and to the Headquarters program office listed in Article VII, 90 days after project completion.
ARTICLE VIII – GRANT MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

Officials for the NDSP grant agreement are as follows:

A. **Project Manager:** The Project Manager (PM), designated by the Grantee, is responsible for performance of the activities approved in the award.

The Project Manager is: Rev. Kristin L. Sachen, Assistant General Secretary, UMCOR Program/Emergency Services International, 475 Riverside Drive, Room 330, New York, NY 10115. 212-870-3909, Fax: 212-870-3624, ksachen@ubgm-umc.org

B. **DHS Project Officer:** The DHS Project Officer (PO) shall be an official who will be responsible for the technical monitoring of the stages of work and technical performance of the activities described in the program narrative statement.

The DHS Project Officer is: Ms. Libby Turner, Federal Coordinating Officer, DHS/FEMA, 500 C Street, SW, Room 20472, Washington, DC 20572. 202-646-4395, Fax: Libby.Turner@dhs.gov

C. **DHS Assistance Officer:** The DHS Assistance Officer (AO) is the DHS official who has full authority to negotiate, administer and execute all business matters of the Grant award.

The DHS Assistance Officer is: Mr. Richard W. Goodman, DHS/FEMA, Grants Management Branch, 500 C Street, SW, Room 334, Washington, DC 20572. 202-646-4181, Fax: 202-646-4156, Richard.Goodman@dhs.gov
ARTICLE IX – GRANT AWARD AMENDMENTS

All budget and program plan revisions shall be in compliance with OMB Circular A-110, Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements With Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations; and A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations. In addition to these requirements, the Grantee shall submit and receive written prior approval before implementation for the following:

A. Budget Revisions:

1. Grantee must obtain prior approval from DHS/FEMA for transfers of funds between direct cost categories in the approved budget when such cumulative transfers among those direct cost categories exceed ten percent of the total budget.

2. Transfer of funds to entities, except those identified in the approved application, requires prior DHS/FEMA approval.

3. Need for additional funds. DHS is not obligated to provide additional funds prior to the submission and approval of consecutive continuation options based on satisfactory performance and availability of funds.

4. If a Grantee estimates that it will have unobligated funds remaining after the end of the performance period, the Grantee should report this to DHS/FEMA at the earliest possible time and ask for disposition instructions.

B. Extension Request:

1. Requests for additional time extensions to the Period of Performance will be considered, but will not be granted automatically and must be supported by adequate justification in order to be processed. The justification is a written explanation of the reason or reasons for the delay; an outline of remaining funds available to support the extended period of performance; and a description of performance measures necessary to complete the project.

2. Extensions to the Period of Performance shall be authorized only in writing by the DHS Assistance Officer.

3. There is no DHS obligation to provide additional funding as a result of time extensions approved.

4. Financial and Performance Status Reports must be current, and the extension justification must be submitted or extension requests will not be processed.
ARTICLE X - PREAMeward Costs

Preameward costs may be approved for up to ninety (90) calendar days prior to the effective date of the Grant. The following conditions apply:

A. The costs have been incurred with the understanding that they were incurred at the Grantee’s risk and may not be reimbursed, if adequate funding has not been awarded to cover preaward costs and approved activities to be completed under the award.

B. The costs must be necessary for the effective and economical conduct of the project.

C. The costs are in compliance with the appropriate OMB Cost Principles.

D. The costs are supported with source documentation.

ARTICLE XI – OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The other terms and conditions of the agreement are as follows:

A. Buy America. The Grantee, Sub-grantees and contractors receiving funds from this grant shall comply with the Buy American Act (41 U.S.C. 10a et seq.) unless it is determined that it is inconsistent with the public interest, impracticable to comply with such a requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost of articles, materials, or supplies. The exception shall be noted in the specifications and documentation to justify the exception will be retained in the grant file for record.

B. Copyright. The Grantee is free to copyright original work developed in the course of or under this agreement. DHS reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable right to reproduce, publish, or otherwise use, and to authorize others to use, the work performed under this award for Government purposes. Publication resulting from work performed under this agreement shall include an acknowledgement of financial support from DHS and include a statement that the publication does not necessarily reflect the DHS views.

C. Publication and Acknowledgement of DHS Sponsorship.

1. One copy of each article planned for publication will be submitted to the DHS Project Officer simultaneously with its submission for publication. Following publication, a copy of each published paper shall be submitted to the DHS Project Officer.

2. The Grantee agrees that when releasing information relating to this Grant, the release shall include a statement that the project or effort undertaken was or is sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security.
3. Disclaimer: The Grantee is responsible for assuring that every publication submission (including World Wide Web pages) based on or developed under this award, except scientific articles or papers appearing in scientific, technical or professional journals, contains the following disclaimer: "Any opinions, findings, and conclusion or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Homeland Security."

4. For the purpose of this requirement, information includes news releases, articles, manuscripts, brochures, advertisements, still and motion pictures, speeches, trade association proceedings and symposia.

5. Publications: In compliance with the Section 623 of Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, and reenacted in Section 621 of the fiscal year 1994 Appropriations Act requires that all grantees disclose the amount and percentage of Federal funding and funding from non-governmental sources when making public announcements about Federally-funded projects in the amount of $500,000 or more.

D. Patent Rights. Grantees are subject to applicable regulations governing patents and inventions, including government-wide regulations issued by the Department of Commerce, 37 CFR Part 401, "Rights to Inventions Made by Nonprofit Organizations and Small Business Firms under Government Grants, Contracts and Cooperative Agreements."

E. Environmental Standards. By accepting funds under this Grant, the grantee assures that it will:

1. Comply with applicable provisions of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.) and Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.), as implemented by Executive Order 11738 [3 CFR, 1971-1975 comp., p. 799] and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules at 40 CFR Part 15. In accordance with the EPA rules, the Grantees further agree that it will:

   a. Not use any facility on the EPA's List of Violating Facilities in performing any award that is nonexempt under 40 CFR 15.5 (awards of less than $100,000, and certain other awards, exempt from the EPA regulations), as long as the facility remains on the list.

   b. Notify the awarding agency if it intends to use a facility in performing this award that is on the List of Violating Facilities or the Grantee knows has been recommended to be placed on the List of Violating Facilities.
2. Identify to the awarding agency any impact this award may have on:

   a. The quality of the human environment, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA, at 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq.) and to prepare Environmental Impact (e.g., physical disturbance of a site such as breaking of ground) until the agency provides written notification of compliance with environmental impact analysis process.

   b. Coastal barriers and provide help the agency may need to comply with Coastal Barriers Resource Act (16 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.), concerning preservation of barrier resources.

   c. Any existing or proposed component of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers system, and provide help the agency may need to comply with the Wild and Scenic River Act of 1968 (16 U.S.C. 1271, et seq.).

F. **Refunds.** The Grantee shall transfer to DHS the appropriate share, based on the Federal support percentage, of any refund, rebate, credit or other amounts arising from performance of this agreement, along with accrued interest. The Grantee shall take necessary action to effect prompt collection of all monies due or which may become due and to cooperate with DHS in any claim or suit in connection with amounts due.

G. **Overpayment and Earned Interest.**

   **Overpayment.** Within ninety (90) days from the expiration date of the Performance Period, overpayment of funds shall be remitted to the Assistance Officer by check payable to DHS. An overpayment represents the difference between allowable actual expenditures and total DHS payment received by the Grantee.

H. **Program Income.** Program income is income earned as a result of Grantee or sub-grantee grant-supported activity, or earned as a result of the grant agreement during the Period of Performance. Program income shall be added to the award of funds under this grant and shall be used to expand the approved program activities. The Grantee shall submit a written list of expanded activities to be accomplished as a result of the program income funds. This list shall be submitted to the DHS AO for review and the approval within 20 days of receipt of program income.

I. **Security.** The Grantee shall not be granted access to classified information under this Grant. If security restriction should happen to apply to certain aspects of the proposed activity, the Grantee will be informed. In the event that the scientific work under this Grant may either need classification or involve access to or storage of any classified data, the Government shall make a decision on the need to classify, or require such access or storage within 30 days after receipt of a written notice from the Grantee. If the decision is affirmative, the Government may invoke the Termination clause, as appropriate.
J. **Controlled Unclassified Information.** The parties understand that information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this Grant may be export controlled, sensitive, for official use only, or, otherwise protected by law, executive order or regulation. The Grantee is responsible for compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. Nothing in this Grant shall be construed to permit any disclosure in violation of those restrictions.

K. **Travel.** Allowability of Travel Expenses. Expenses for transportation, lodging, subsistence and related items incurred by project personnel and by outside consultants employed on the project (GPM) Section 614 who are in travel status on business related to an DHS-supported project are allowable as prescribed in the governing cost principles. The requirements for prior approval detailed in the governing cost principles are waived.

L. **Cargo Preference.** The Grantee agrees that it will comply with the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 (46 U.S.C. 1241), as implemented by Department of Transportation regulations at 46 CFR 381.7, which require that at least 50 of equipment, materials or Grant, and which may be transported by ocean vessel, shall be transported on privately owned U.S.-flag commercial vessels, if available.

M. **Fly America Act.** Preference for U.S. Flag Air Carriers: Travel supported by U.S. Government funds under this Grant shall use U.S.-flag air carriers (air carriers holding certificates under 49 U.S.C. 41102) for international air transportation of people and property to the extent that such service is available, in accordance with the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974 (49 U.S.C. 40118) and the interpretative guidelines issued by the Comptroller General of the United States in March 31, 1981, amendment to Comptroller General Decision B138942.

N. **Site Visits.** DHS, through authorized representatives, has the right, at all reasonable times, to make site visits to review project accomplishments and management control systems and to provide such technical assistance as may be required. If any site visit is made by DHS on the premises of the grantee or a contractor under an award, the grantee shall provide and shall require its contractors to provide all reasonable facilities and assistance for the safety and convenience of the Government representatives in the performance of their duties. All site visits and evaluations shall be performed in such a manner that will not unduly delay the work.

O. **Equipment Purchase.** In accordance with 44 CFR 13.36(a), when procuring property and services under a grant, a State will follow the same policies and procedures it uses for procurements from its non-Federal funds. The State will ensure that every purchase order or other contract includes any clauses required by Federal statutes and executive orders and their implementing regulations.

P. To the extent required by individual States, applicants should comply with State procedures consistent with E.O. 12372.
ARTICLE XII – AUDIT REQUIREMENTS

Grantees and Sub-grantees must follow the audit requirements under OMB Circular A-133. Non-Federal entities that expend $500,000 or more Federal funds in a year shall have a single or program-specific audit conducted for that year in accordance with the provisions of A-133.

ARTICLE XIII – GOVERNING PROVISIONS

The Grantee and any subgrantee shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations. A non-exclusive list of regulations commonly applicable to DHS grants are listed below:

A. Administrative Requirements

1. OMB Circular A-102, State and Local Governments (10/07/94, amended 08/29/97)
2. OMB Circular A-110, Institutions of Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations (11/15/93, amended 09/30/99), and
3. 44 CFR Part 13

B. Cost Principles

1. OMB Circular A-87, State and Local Governments (05/04/95, amended 08/29/97)
2. OMB Circular A-21, Educational Institutions (08/08/00)
3. OMB Circular A-122, Non Profit Organizations (05/19/98)

C. Audit Requirements

OMB Circular A-133, States, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations (06/24/97, includes revisions published in the Federal Register 06/27/03)
State MA's

DHS-FEMA-0037-0001919
DHS-FEMA-0030-0001199 and 1200
DHS-FEMA-0077-0000951
DHS-0000896
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

I. Introduction

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, a number of foreign governments and international entities generously made donations of financial assistance to the U.S. Government (USG) to support Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts. As provided for in the National Response Plan, the Department of State ("DOS") has acted as the intermediary for these foreign offers of assistance. DOS is currently holding donated funds in a custodial "deposit account" within the Treasury. To date, the USG has received $126.4 million in foreign monetary donations. Of that amount, $66 million has been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security to finance case management services for Hurricane Katrina victims.

In early January 2006, DOS asked the Department of Education ("ED") to develop a proposal to use the remaining balance of donations on hand—approximately $60.4 million—to finance educational initiatives in Louisiana and Mississippi. ED agreed to accept the donations pursuant to its gift acceptance authority for the purpose of aiding the work of ED. ED developed a proposal for the use of these gift funds and will work with both public and private institutions to support the ongoing efforts to rebuild and restore educational institutions at all levels in the areas of Louisiana and Mississippi most directly affected by Hurricane Katrina. ED's proposal is described in Attachment A. ED expects to disburse the gift funds within two months of receipt. All recognize the need for transparency and accountability in the use of foreign donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts. This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) seeks to establish mechanisms so that foreign donations are properly managed and used in an accountable and transparent manner, resulting in identifiable educational benefits to Louisiana and Mississippi schools and institutions of higher education that were adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina.

II. Authorities

- DOS: 22 U.S.C. § 2656;
III. Responsibilities

A. Department of Education

1. ED shall assume full responsibility for accountability of the foreign donations made for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts that DOS will transfer pursuant to section III.B.1. In fulfilling this responsibility, ED will impose conditions to promote accountability for and transparency in the use of funds, including, but not limited to, requirements to ensure that recipients:

   a. obligate and expend the funds in accordance with prudent management practices, to include internal controls sufficient to protect against waste, fraud and mismanagement;
   b. maintain records of the use of the funds in accordance with standard accounting practices, so that a clear audit trail is maintained; and
   c. develop performance measures to evaluate the effective use of these funds.

2. Upon transfer by DOS and until disbursement to recipients, ED shall maintain the foreign donations in trust account 91X8258 established in the Treasury for contributions received under the authority of 20 U.S.C. § 3481. These funds shall be tracked separately from other appropriated or gift funds.

3. Funds transferred pursuant to this MOA shall be used for educational initiatives in the areas of Louisiana and Mississippi adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina, as described in Attachment A.

4. The Inspector General of ED may audit the administration of the funds provided under this MOA by ED and the recipients.

5. On a quarterly basis, ED will provide DOS with documentation and information on the use of funds transferred under this MOA, including information that may be shared with foreign donors.

B. Department of State

1. Upon the signing of this MOA, the Department of State shall transfer to ED $60,441,249.93 in foreign donations made for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts which are currently being held in Treasury account 19X6755.

2. DOS may, with the approval of ED, transfer additional foreign donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts which may be received after this MOA is executed.

3. DOS shall continue to serve as intermediary between
the USG and the foreign donors. DOS shall provide updates as necessary to foreign donors on the use of their donations for Hurricane Katrina relief and recovery efforts.

IV. Disposition of Remaining Funds

If any funds transferred pursuant to this MOA remain available upon termination of all projects described in Attachment A, the Parties to this MOA shall jointly determine the disposition of these remaining funds.

V. Modification

This MOA will be effective upon signature of the Parties and may be executed in counterparts. The MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties.

Signed March 16, 2006:

Henrietta Fore  
U.S. Department of State  
Under Secretary for Management

   

Michell Clark  
U.S. Department of Education  
Assistant Secretary  
Office of Management
ATTACHMENT A

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION PROPOSALS FOR FOREIGN DONATIONS
The funding levels in the proposals do not necessarily reflect ED's actual funding levels

- Xavier University: Xavier University of Louisiana is a historically black university located in New Orleans. Xavier submitted an $18.5 million funding request and proposes to use the funds for physical damage not covered by either insurance or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), financial aid for students, and faculty and staff retention;

- Dillard University: Dillard University is a historically black university located in New Orleans, Louisiana. Dillard submitted a $12 million funding request and proposes to use the funds for physical damage not covered by either insurance or FEMA, financial aid to students, and faculty and staff retention;

- Louisiana Department of Education: The Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) submitted a $20 million funding request for the Orleans Parish schools and proposes to use the funds for library books and resources, computer hardware and infrastructure, and long-range planning to re-establish educational services in Orleans Parish;

- Anticipated proposal from a non-profit organization on behalf of New Orleans schools for funds to restore libraries and science labs, provide student scholarships for needy students, and teacher salaries;

- The Laura Bush Foundation for America’s Libraries: The Laura Bush Foundation for America’s Libraries submitted a $5 million funding request and proposes to use the funds to purchase books, furniture, and equipment for school libraries adversely impacted by the hurricane;

- Reserve: ED proposes to reserve $21 million. Additional grant options will surface once the availability of the foreign donations is more widely known and understood. ED will hold these reserve funds for a short period after receipt to allow other potential grantees a reasonable opportunity to submit funding proposals. Any funds remaining in this reserve after additional project proposals have been considered would be distributed to the historically black colleges and universities, including those in Mississippi, which have submitted proposals.